DOCSLIB.ORG

Greenhouse Economics and the Costs of Global Warming

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Greenhouse Economics and the Costs of Global Warming GREENHOUSE ECONOMICS AND THE COSTS OF GLOBAL WARMING Samuel Fankhauser A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of London Department of Economics University College London January 1994 ProQuest Number: 10045522 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest 10045522 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Für meine Eltem ABSTRACT My thesis deals with the economics of global warming. It focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on an aspect which has perhaps gained less attention in the literature so far, the economic costs of "greenhouse damage". The thesis is structured into five parts. Part I reviews the existing literature on greenhouse economics, including a first overview of work dealing with the economic costs of global warming. Part II then assesses the costs of global warming associated with a doubling of atmospheric CO 2 concentration, the benchmark typically used by scientists to assess the physical impacts of climate change. Part III provides estimates of the marginal damage per tonne of emission for several greenhouse gases, figures which are of importance for the assessment of individual abatement projects. The calculations are based on a stochastic greenhouse damage model in which all key parameters are random. It therefore also allows insights into the likelihood of different damage cost scenarios. Part IV picks out one particular aspect of greenhouse damage - sea level rise - and studies it in more detail. Sea level rise is a good example of the fact that a part of greenhouse costs are not damage costs as such, but arise from the implementation of damage mitigation strategies, such as the erection of sea walls. In addition to providing a more detailed assessment of the economic costs of sea level rise. Part IV also analyses the relative role of protection and mitigation expenditures within the total costs of sea level rise. Part V (written jointly with Snorre Kvemdokk of Statistics Norway) finally offers an illustration of how the costs and benefits of abatement ought to be put together to determine the socially optimal result. It introduces a stylised model of greenhouse gas negotiations, in which countries negotiate to reach a socially optimal greenhouse treaty. TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures 6 List of Tables 7 Acknowledgements 9 Preface 10 PART I: ECONOMICS AND GLOBAL WARMING 12 1. The Emergence of the Greenhouse Problem 13 2. Energy Models and the Costs of Greenhouse Gas Abatement 16 2.1 The Different Modelling Approaches 16 2.2 Model Comparisons 19 2.3 Assessment and Extensions 22 3. The Economic Costs of Global Warming Damage 25 3.1 Agricultural Damage 26 3.2 Sea Level Rise 28 3.3 Enumerative Approaches 29 3.4 Extensions and Critique 32 4. The Optimal Policy Response to Global Warming 36 4.1 The Cost Benefit Approach 36 4.2 Discounting 40 4.3 Hedging and Uncertainty 45 4.4 The Carbon Budget Approach 49 5. Policy Instruments and Carbon Taxes 50 5.1 Choosing the Instrument 51 5.2 Distributional Issues 53 5.3 Revenue Recycling and Double Dividend 55 6. International Cooperation 57 6.1 Sharing the Abatement Burden 57 6.2 Unilateral Action 61 7. Conclusions 64 PART H: THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF CO^ CONCENTRATION DOUBLING 67 1. Introduction 67 2. Individual Damage Categories 69 2.1 Sea Level Rise Protection Costs 69 2.2 Dryland Loss 72 2.3 Coastal Wetland Loss 74 2.4 Species and Ecosystems Loss 77 2.5 Agriculture 79 2.6 Forestry 81 2.7 Fisheries 84 2.8 Energy 84 2.9 Water 87 2.10 Other Sectors 90 2.11 Human Amenity 91 2.12 Morbidity and Mortality 93 2.13 Air Pollution 97 2.14 Migration 100 2.15 Natural Disasters 102 3. Total Damage 106 4. Concluding Remarks 109 Appendix: Basic Economic Indicators Used 111 PART m : THE SOCIAL COSTS OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 112 1. Introduction 112 2. Existing Damage Estimates 115 3. A Stochastic Greenhouse Damage Model 118 3.1 General Description 118 3.2 Future Emissions 120 3.3 Atmospheric Concentration 122 3.4 Radiative Forcing 123 3.5 Temperature Rise 124 3.6 Annual Damage 125 3.7 Discounting 128 4. The Social Costs of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 131 4.1 The Social Costs of CO 2 131 4.2 Other Greenhouse Gases 135 4.3 Sensitivity Analysis I: Discounting 137 4.4 Sensitivity Analysis II: Greenhouse Angst 139 5. Policy Implications and Conclusions 141 Appendix: Overview on Parameters and Parameter Values 143 PART IV: PROTECTION VS. RETREAT: THE COSTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE 147 1. Introduction 147 2. Greenhouse Gas Abatement vs. Damage Mitigation: The General Context 149 3. A Model of Optimal Sea Level Rise Mitigation 153 3.1 General Description 153 3.2 Protection Costs 155 3.3 Dryland Loss 156 3.4 Wetland Loss 159 3.5 The Sea Level Rise Protection Problem 160 4. Solving the Model 162 4.1 The Optimal Height of Protection Measures 162 4.2 The Optimal Length of Coastal Protection 163 4.3 Costs as a Function of Sea Level Rise 166 5. Simulation Results for OECD Countries 168 5.1 Estimation of Parameters 168 5.2 The Optimal Level of Protection 170 5.3 The Costs of Sea Level Rise 174 6. Summary and Conclusions 178 Appendix 1: Model Parameters 181 Appendix 2; Optimal Degree of Coastal Protection 186 Appendix 3: The Costs of Protection 190 PART V; THE GLOBAL WARMING GAME: SIMULATIONS OF A CO 2 REDUCTION AGREEMENT" 193 1. Introduction 193 2. The Model 195 2.1 General Description 195 2.2 The Climate Module 200 2.3 The Income Function 202 2.4 The Damage Function 205 2.5 Discounting 207 3. Simulation Results 208 3.1 The Non-Cooperative Equilibrium 208 3.2 The Social Optimum 210 3.3 The Gains from Cooperation 212 3.4 Sensitivity of the Results 214 4. Concluding Remarks 216 Bibliography 217 * Jointly with Snorre Kvemdokk (Statistics Norway) LIST OF FIGURES PART I Figure 1: Damage Distribution, Extreme Events and Best Guess Estimates 34 PART n Figure 1 Overview on Global Warming Impacts 69 Figure 2 Global Warming, Energy Demand and Welfare 92 Figure 3 Occurrence of Tropical Cyclones 103 PART m Figure 1 Present Methodology vs. Optimal Control 114 Figure 2 The Probability Distribution of CO 2 Damage 133 Figure 3 CO2 Damage Distribution and the Threat of Catastrophe 140 PART IV Figure 1: SLR and the Loss of Unprotected Land 157 Figure 2: Land Value Distribution and the Value of Protected and Unprotected Land 158 Figure 3: Optimal Coastal Protection in the OECD 172 Figure 4: Optimal Protection in OECD Countries against a 1 Metre SLR 173 Figure 5: The Costs of Sea Level Rise in the OECD 175 Figure 6: The Costs of Sea Level Rise in Individual OECD Countries 176 Figure 7: The Costs of a 1 Metre SLR - The Impact of Discounting 177 LIST OF TABLES PART I Table 1 : GDP Loss due to Emissions Stabilisation at 1990 Levels 20 Table 2: Carbon Tax Necessary for Emissions Stabilisation at 1990 Levels 20 Table 3: Economic Damages from 2x002 31 Table 4: Costs of a US Carbon Tax under Different Recycling Scenarios 56 Table 5: Efficiency Gains from Emissions Trading 58 PART n Table 1 : Costs of Preventing Capital Loss 71 Table 2: Costs of Dryland Loss 73 Table 3: Coastal Wetland Loss 75 Table 4: Benefits from Coastal Wetlands 76 Table 5: Value of Lost Ecosystems 79 Table 6: Costs to Agriculture 80 Table 7: Damage to the Forestry Sector 83 Table 8: Reduction in Fish Harvests 85 Table 9: Costs of Increased Energy Demand 86 Table 10: Damage to the Water Sector 89 Table 11: Damage from Increased Mortality 96 Table 12: Damage through Increased Air Pollution 99 Table 13: Migration Costs 101 Table 14: Costs from Increased Tropical Storms 105 Table 15: Total Damage due to 2xC02 107 Table 16: US Damage Compared to Cline and Nordhaus 108 Appendix: Basic Economic Indicators Used 111 PART m Table 1 : Existing Estimates of CO 2 Emissions Costs 117 Table 2: The Social Costs of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 132 7 Table 3: The Social Costs of CO 2 Emissions - The Impact of Discounting 138 Appendix: Overview on Parameters and Parameter Values 143 PART IV Appendix 1 : Model Parameters 181 Appendix 2: Optimal Degree of Coastal Protection 186 Appendix 3: The Costs of Protection 190 PART V Table 1 Climate Parameters 203 Table 2 The Parameters of the Income Function 205 Table 3 Damage from a Hypothetical 2.5 “C Temperature Rise 207 Table 4 Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium 209 Table 5 The Rio Stabilisation Target 209 Table 6 The Social Optimum 209 Table 7 Welfare Gains from Cooperation 213 Table 8 Results for Income Parameter b Based on GREEN 214 Table 9 Sensitivity to Climate Parameters 215 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During the course of my studies I have profited from the help of many people and institutions. For one year my work was financed by a stipend of the Schweizerischer Nationalfonds für Forschung und Wissenschaft, and their support is gratefully acknowledged.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Strategic Aspects of Implementing the International Agreement on Climate Change - A
    CONVENTIONS, TREATIES AND OTHER RESPONSES TO GLOBAL ISSUES – Vol. II - Strategic Aspects of Implementing the International Agreement on Climate Change - A. Endres, M. Finus, and B. Rundshagen STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE A. Endres, M. Finus, and B. Rundshagen Department of Economics, University of Hagen, Germany Keywords: climate change, international agreement, environmental treaties Contents 1. Introduction 2. Game Theoretical Fundamentals of International Environmental Treaties 2.1 The Need for Cooperation: Global Rationality 2.1.1 The Free-Rider Incentive 2.1.2 Introduction 2.1.3 The Basic Framework 2.1.4 Individual Rationality 2.1.5 Credible Sanctions 2.1.6 Means of Sanctions 2.1.7 Transfers 2.1.8 Issue Linkage 2.1.9 Emissions 3. Socioeconomic Assessment of the Impact of Climate Change 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The BAU-Scenario and CO2-Equivalents 3.3 Abatement Costs: Top-down versus Bottom-up Approach 3.4 Environmental Damages 3.5 Abatement Costs and Environmental Damages: CBA 3.5.1 The DICE-Model 3.5.2 Other Results 3.6 The Carbon Budget Approach Acknowledgements Glossary Bibliography Biographical Sketches UNESCO – EOLSS Summary The article providesSAMPLE criteria for the economic assessmentCHAPTERS of international environmental agreements (IEA) in general and with special regard to the Framework Convention on Climate Change including the Kyoto Protocol. In the first part, the essential elements of any IEA, necessary to induce countries to sign and to comply with its terms are specified. Due to the voluntary character of any international commitment and the lack of a central enforcement authority, a prerequisite for the participation of a country is its expectation of a welfare improvement.
    [Show full text]
  • “On the Shorter-Term Economic Motivation for Carbon Emissions Reductions”
    “On the shorter-term economic motivation for carbon emissions reductions” AUTHORS Roy Hegner Heiko Paeth ARTICLE INFO Roy Hegner and Heiko Paeth (2013). On the shorter-term economic motivation for carbon emissions reductions. Environmental Economics, 4(3) RELEASED ON Wednesday, 09 October 2013 JOURNAL "Environmental Economics" FOUNDER LLC “Consulting Publishing Company “Business Perspectives” NUMBER OF REFERENCES NUMBER OF FIGURES NUMBER OF TABLES 0 0 0 © The author(s) 2021. This publication is an open access article. businessperspectives.org Environmental Economics, Volume 4, Issue 3, 2013 Roy Hegner (Germany), Heiko Paeth (Germany) On the shorter-term economic motivation for carbon emissions reductions Abstract It is often suggested that there is not least an economic interest in climate change mitigation because the negative im- plications from and the adaptation to longer-term climate change will easily exceed the costs of preventive measures in terms of carbon emissions reduction. This paper revises whether this hypothesis also holds over shorter time horizons, in particular the current decade, and for individual states. For most considered states it is found that the minimum of the national cost functions is associated with a slight reduction of carbon emissions. However, this reduction amounts to less than 1% of the total emissions expected until 2020 under a business-as-usual scenario. Unilateral advances in emissions reductions at the national scale hardly affect the optimal strategies and costs of other states. Some states are still profiting from a moderate extent of shorter-term climate changes and will not be motivated towards carbon emissions reductions, while other states already experience climate-related economic damage.
    [Show full text]
  • THE GLOBAL WARMING GAME – SIMULATIONS of a CO2 REDUCTION AGREEMENT by Samuel Fankhauser and Snorre Kverndokk CSERGE Working P
    THE GLOBAL WARMING GAME – SIMULATIONS OF A CO 2 REDUCTION AGREEMENT by Samuel Fankhauser and Snorre Kverndokk CSERGE Working Paper GEC 92-10 THE GLOBAL WARMING GAME – SIMULATIONS OF A CO 2 REDUCTION AGREEMENT by Samuel Fankhauser* and Snorre Kverndokk** *Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE), London **Centre for Research in Economics and Business Administration, SNF, Oslo Acknowledgements The Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE) is a designated research centre of the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). We are indebted to R. Golombek, M. Hoel, A.J. James and D.W. Pearce for valuable comments and discussion, and to A.S. Manne and J. Oliveira-Martins (OECD) for providing us with data. Fankhauser also acknowledges the support of the Schweizerischer Nationalfonds für Forschung und Wissenschaft. The authors are solely responsible for remaining errors and any conclusions drawn. A more detailed version of the paper is available on request. ISSN 0967-8875 Abstract The paper analyses incentives for, and the benefits of a possible international cooperation to reduce CO 2 emissions. The negotiations are modelled as a (static) reciprocal-externality- game in CO 2 emissions between five world regions. CO 2 emissions affect the players in two ways: first, each country’s income depends (via energy inputs) on the amount of CO 2 emitted; on the other hand, emissions may cause future damage due to climate change. Without cooperation, each player maximises its net benefits in setting marginal income equal to its marginal damage costs (Nash equilibrium). Under full cooperation marginal income equals the sum of the marginal damages (social optimum).
    [Show full text]
  • Climate Change and Game Theory
    Climate Change and Game Theory: a Mathematical Survey Peter John Wood Crawford School The Australian National University CCEP working paper 2.10, October 2010 Abstract This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, and games where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, is also examined. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behaviour of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve cooperation is to design a game, known as a mechanism, whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome. This paper examines some mechanisms that are based on conditional commitments, and their policy implications. These mechanisms could make cooperation on climate change mitigation more likely. Centre for Climate Economics & Policy Crawford School of Economics and Government The Australian National University ccep.anu.edu.au The Centre for Climate Economics & Policy (ccep.anu.edu.au) is an organized research unit at the Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University. The working paper series is intended to facilitate academic and policy discussion, and the views expressed in working papers are those of the authors. Contact for the Centre: Dr Frank Jotzo, [email protected]. Citation for this report: Wood, P.J. (2010), Climate Change and Game Theory: a Mathematical Survey, CCEP working paper 2.10, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy, Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, Canberra.
    [Show full text]
  • Self-Enforcing Strategies to Deter Free-Riding in the Climate Change Mitigation Game and Other Repeated Public Good Games
    Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games Jobst Heitzig1, Kai Lessmann, and Yong Zou Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam, Germany Edited by Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, and approved July 25, 2011 (received for review April 27, 2011) As the Copenhagen Accord indicates, most of the international community agrees that global mean temperature should not be Alice allowed to rise more than two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels to avoid unacceptable damages from climate change. The Berta scientific evidence distilled in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and recent reports by the US National Academies shows that this can only be achieved Celia by vast reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Still, international cooperation on greenhouse gas emissions reductions suffers from First harvest: Second harvest: Next spring: Berta falls short Liabilities are Liabilities are incentives to free-ride and to renegotiate agreements in case of redistributed restored noncompliance, and the same is true for other so-called “public Fig. 1. Illustration of linear compensation in a simple public good game. good games.” Using game theory, we show how one might over- Alice, Berta, and Celia farm their back yard for carrots. Each has her individual come these problems with a simple dynamic strategy of linear com- farming liability (thick separators), but harvests are divided equally. In the SCIENCES pensation when the parameters of the problem fulfill some general first year, Berta falls short by some amount (white area).
    [Show full text]
  • Global Warming: Sunny Side Up
    Trinity College Trinity College Digital Repository Trinity Publications (Newspapers, Yearbooks, The First-Year Papers (2010 - present) Catalogs, etc.) 2009 Global Warming: Sunny Side Up Blake Adams Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/fypapers Part of the Environmental Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Adams, Blake, "Global Warming: Sunny Side Up". The First-Year Papers (2010 - present) (2009). Trinity College Digital Repository, Hartford, CT. https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/fypapers/2 Global Warming: Sunny Side Up Blake Adams The most certain aspect about the Earth’s climate is that it perpetually changes. From massive global trends such as the different Milankovitch cycles to more tangible temperature movements over the past few hundred years, we see the Earth as either in a period of “warming” or “cooling”—never truly in homeostasis. So why all the debate about anthropogenic Global Warming? The answer, in my opinion, is the same reason why “Global Warming” is capitalized at all: the concept has largely shifted from a scientific reality to a product advertised and sold through hysterical media reports and “environmental” movements. It’s easy to quickly assume that humans are creating an environment through CO 2 output that teeters on apocalyptic doom, but when one looks at the actual data involved in these doomsday theories, one can see that human being CO 2 output is so incredibly minor compared to other geologic and cosmic mechanisms that affect and dictate climate on Earth (Spencer, 2008). The Earth’s climate has changed an incredible amount since the beginning of time, and even man himself was driven to expand and evolve due to these shifts in climate and terrain, with receding water levels initially spurring man out of Africa as glaciers grew and the climate cooled.
    [Show full text]
  • 13 International Cooperation: Agreements & Instruments
    International Cooperation: 13 Agreements & Instruments Coordinating Lead Authors: Robert Stavins (USA), Zou Ji (China) Lead Authors: Thomas Brewer (USA), Mariana Conte Grand (Argentina), Michel den Elzen (Netherlands), Michael Finus (Germany / UK), Joyeeta Gupta (Netherlands), Niklas Höhne (Germany), Myung-Kyoon Lee (Republic of Korea), Axel Michaelowa (Germany / Switzerland), Matthew Paterson (Canada), Kilaparti Ramakrishna (Republic of Korea / USA), Gang Wen (China), Jonathan Wiener (USA), Harald Winkler (South Africa) Contributing Authors: Daniel Bodansky (USA), Gabriel Chan (USA), Anita Engels (Germany), Adam Jaffe (USA / New Zealand), Michael Jakob (Germany), T. Jayaraman (India), Jorge Leiva (Chile), Kai Lessmann (Germany), Richard Newell (USA), Sheila Olmstead (USA), William Pizer (USA), Robert Stowe (USA), Marlene Vinluan (Philippines) Review Editors: Antonina Ivanova Boncheva (Mexico / Bulgaria), Jennifer Morgan (USA) Chapter Science Assistant: Gabriel Chan (USA) This chapter should be cited as: Stavins R., J. Zou, T. Brewer, M. Conte Grand, M. den Elzen, M. Finus, J. Gupta, N. Höhne, M.-K. Lee, A. Michaelowa, M. Pat- erson, K. Ramakrishna, G. Wen, J. Wiener, and H. Winkler, 2014: International Cooperation: Agreements and Instruments. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier,
    [Show full text]
  • Self-Enforcing Strategies to Deter Free-Riding in the Climate Change Mitigation Game and Other Repeated Public Good Games
    Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games Jobst Heitzig1, Kai Lessmann, and Yong Zou Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam, Germany Edited by Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, and approved July 25, 2011 (received for review April 27, 2011) As the Copenhagen Accord indicates, most of the international community agrees that global mean temperature should not be Alice allowed to rise more than two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels to avoid unacceptable damages from climate change. The Berta scientific evidence distilled in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and recent reports by the US National Academies shows that this can only be achieved Celia by vast reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Still, international cooperation on greenhouse gas emissions reductions suffers from First harvest: Second harvest: Next spring: Berta falls short Liabilities are Liabilities are incentives to free-ride and to renegotiate agreements in case of redistributed restored noncompliance, and the same is true for other so-called “public Fig. 1. Illustration of linear compensation in a simple public good game. good games.” Using game theory, we show how one might over- Alice, Berta, and Celia farm their back yard for carrots. Each has her individual come these problems with a simple dynamic strategy of linear com- farming liability (thick separators), but harvests are divided equally. In the SCIENCES pensation when the parameters of the problem fulfill some general first year, Berta falls short by some amount (white area).
    [Show full text]
  • Self-Enforcing Strategies to Deter Free-Riding in the Climate Change
    Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games Jobst Heitzig ∗, Kai Lessmann ∗ , and Yong Zou ∗ ∗Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam, Germany Final authors’ draft as accepted for publication in PNAS on July 25, 2011. Published version: DOI:10.1073/pnas.1106265108 As the Copenhagen Accord indicates, most of the international community agrees that global mean temperature should not be al- lowed to rise more than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial Alice levels to avoid unacceptable damages from climate change. The scientific evidence distilled in the IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report and recent reports by the U.S. National Academies shows that this Berta can only be achieved by vast reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Still, international cooperation on GHG emissions reductions suf- fers from incentives to free-ride and to renegotiate agreements in Celia case of non-compliance, and the same is true for other so-called ‘public good games.’ Using game theory, we show how one might First harvest: Second harvest: Next spring: overcome these problems with a simple dynamic strategy of Lin- Berta falls short Liabilities are Liabilities are ear Compensation (LinC) when the parameters of the problem redistributed restored fulfill some general conditions and players can be considered to be sufficiently rational. Fig. 1. Illustration of Linear Compensation in a simple public good game. Alice, The proposed strategy redistributes liabilities according to past Berta, and Celia farm their back-yard for carrots. Each has her individual farming compliance levels in a proportionate and timely way.
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis Using Cooperative Game Theory
    JAN KERSTING Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations Fraktale Dooel-Boo Fraktale Dooel-Boo Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations AN ANALYSIS USING COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY CHRISTOPHER J JAN KERSTING Jan Kersting Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations An analysis using cooperative game theory Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations An analysis using cooperative game theory by Jan Kersting Dissertation, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie KIT-Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 22. Juni 2017 Referenten: Prof. Dr. K.-M. Ehrhart, Prof. Dr. M. Uhrig-Homburg Impressum Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) KIT Scientific Publishing Straße am Forum 2 D-76131 Karlsruhe KIT Scientific Publishing is a registered trademark of Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. Reprint using the book cover is not allowed. www.ksp.kit.edu This document – excluding the cover, pictures and graphs – is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en The cover page is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-ND 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/deed.en Print on Demand 2017 – Gedruckt auf FSC-zertifiziertem Papier ISBN 978-3-7315-0700-0 DOI 10.5445/KSP/1000072088 Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations An analysis using cooperative game theory Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) von der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften des Karlsruher Instituts für Technologie (KIT) genehmigte Dissertation von Jan Kersting, M.Sc.
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae
    Curriculum Vitae Professor Michael FINUS Office Department of Economics Karl-Franzens University of Graz Universitätstrasse 15 8010 Graz AUSTRIA Tel: +43(0)316380-3450 E-Mail: [email protected] Michael Finus, page 2 Nationality: German Languages: English (fluent) and German (native tongue) Education Habilitation, Economics, University of Hagen, Germany, 2005 (venia legendi in Economics) Ph.D., Economics, University of Hagen, Germany, 2000 (summa cum laude, i.e. first honours) Advanced Studies Certificate in International Policy Research, Institute of World Economics, Kiel, Germany, 1993 Master, Agricultural Economics, (Diplom-Ing.-Agrarwissenschaften) University of Giessen, Germany, 1992 (first honours: 1.3) Appointments 2018-present Professor in Climate and Environmenal Economics, University of Graz, Austria; Deputy Head of Department and Chair of the Faculty Curriculum Commission PhD since Oct. 2019; Honorary Professor, University of Bath, UK 2012-2018 Chair in Environmental Economics, University of Bath, UK 2014-2017 Head of Department 2013-2014 Director of Research 2009-2011 Associate Professor in Economics of Climate Change, University of Exeter, UK 2007-2009 Senior Lecturer, University of Stirling, Scotland; Director of two new Master Programmes in “Environmental Finance” and in “Energy Management” 2005-2007: Associate Professor in Economics (“Privatdozent”), University of Hagen, Germany 2006: Visiting Fellow (6 months), National University of Singapore (on leave from University of Hagen) 2000-2005: Assistant Professor in
    [Show full text]
  • The Copenhagen Challenge: China, India, Brazil and South Africa at the Barricades コペンハーゲンへの挑戦−−中国・ブラジ ル・インド・南アフリカ共和国バリケードを張る
    Volume 8 | Issue 8 | Number 4 | Article ID 3309 | Feb 22, 2010 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus The Copenhagen Challenge: China, India, Brazil and South Africa at the Barricades コペンハーゲンへの挑戦−−中国・ブラジ ル・インド・南アフリカ共和国バリケードを張る Peter Lee, Eric Johnston The Copenhagen Challenge: China, climate effort. India, Brazil and South Africa at the In their joint communiqué, the four nations Barricades (Chinese translation promised to submit their emissions reductions available) goals—“voluntary mitigation actions” in the jargon—to the UN’s Framework Convention on Peter Lee with a post-mortem on Climate Change by January 31. The other Copenhagen’s COP15 by Eric Johnston substantive point covered was urging the On January 25, 2010, the West was handed the developed world to pony up the $10 billion it bill for continuing the Copenhagen climate had promised at Copenhagen in December change process: $10 billion for the developing 2009: world, due immediately. The invoice was delivered by Brazil, South The Ministers called for the early Africa, India, and China—the so-called “BASIC” flow of the pledged $10 bn in 2010 nations--after their meeting in New Delhi on with focus on the least developed January 25. countries, small island developing states and countries of Africa. (link) As the Indian media pointed out, this was a move by the BASIC countries to “claim the moral high ground”. In fact, the battle for the moral high ground—and political advantage—has been driving the international climate change negotiations since November of 2009. That was when the United States conceded that the U.S.
    [Show full text]