DOCSLIB.ORG

Challenges and Presidential Falls in South America Author(S): Kathryn Hochstetler Reviewed Work(S): Source: Comparative Politics, Vol

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Challenges and Presidential Falls in South America Author(S): Kathryn Hochstetler Reviewed Work(S): Source: Comparative Politics, Vol Rethinking Presidentialism: Challenges and Presidential Falls in South America Author(s): Kathryn Hochstetler Reviewed work(s): Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jul., 2006), pp. 401-418 Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20434009 . Accessed: 16/07/2012 17:27 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Comparative Politics. http://www.jstor.org RethinkingPresidentialism Challenges and Presidential Falls in SouthAmerica Kathryn Hochstetler Since the South American countries returned to civilian government in the 1970s and 1980s, twenty-threepercent of theirelected presidentshave been forced to leaveoffice before the end of their terms. This striking rate of early presidential exits has received little systematic attention, although it should be central in debates about the quality of democracy and possible instability in presidential systems. Why and how do South Americans demand theirpresidents leave office early? Since 1978 themost serious challenges have come from civilian actors, in the legislature, on the streets, or both together.The challenged presidentswere more likely to be personally implicated in scandal, to pursue neoliberal policies, and to lack a congressional majority than their unchallenged counterparts. The presence or absence of street protests then played a cen tral role in determining which presidents actually fell. Presidentialism and Presidential Fails The contrast between presidential and parliamentary regimes is one of the fundamental dichotomiesof comparativedemocratic politics, with perennialdebates aboutwhich is more stable or more democratic.' This article looks only at presidential regimes, since its central dilemma of early ends to executive terms is only possible in presidentialism. It departs from Sartori's classic definition that a regime is presidential "if and only if the head of state i) results from popular election, ii) during his or her pre-established tenure cannot be discharged by a parliamentary vote, and iii) heads or otherwise directs the governments that he or she appoints."2 Linz points out two features that are common to all presidential systems: a directly elected president enjoys individual democratic legiti macy and is elected for a rigidly fixed term.3 These definitions form the consensual foundation formost ensuing investigations of presidentialism and its effects. In contradictionto theseexpectations, the regularemergence of challengersdemand ing that presidents leave office early suggests that direct elections in South America do not consistently give presidents legitimacy that lasts as long as it should. This study con siders only presidents who were selected by a popular vote of their populations and thus at one time possessed evidence of their individual electoral legitimacy to be the head of 401 Comparative Politics July 2006 state and government. Of the forty such presidents whose terms were over by the end of 2003, sixteenof them (fortypercent) faced challenges to their remainingin office for theirfull terms,and nine (twenty-threepercent) of their"fixed" termsended early (see Table 1). Presidents in Ecuador and Bolivia have also fallen since 2003, and President Chavez inVenezuela has narrowly survived challenges to his government. Given these developments, it is obvious that South American presidents can not assume they will hold a given and fixed term of office. The term "presidential fall" is used here to identify all the times elected presidents leftoffice before theirterms were completed,whether they resignedor were impeached or otherwise forced out of office. "Challenges" involve concrete action to convince the president to resign or to force him out early. The various challenges and falls are consid ered together on the theoretical ground that they are all equally deviations from the expected fixed termof presidentialism. All these cases resulted in new civilian presidents in short order. Presidential falls as discussed here are changes within the regime, not regime breakdowns. Uniformly, vice presidentsand legislativeleaders took constitutionalterms as presidentsafter presiden tial falls. Two challenges did include military protagonists Ecuador in 2000 and Venezuela in 2002 but they also quickly resulted in civilian regimes. The civilian natureof presidentialfalls is especiallynotable sincenoncivilian actors also ineffective ly threatened presidents during this time. Linz's expectation that themilitary would step in as a moderating power to handle conflicts between the executive and legislature is ratherdramatically disproved.4 Consequently, the focus is on challenges to presidents from civilian actors, in the leg islature or in civil society. Many studies of presidential falls in South America have focused on elite negotiations that bring down presidents in one country, treating street protests as background pressure on elites.5 Others, however, give central place to the role of mass protest in a specific presidential fall.6While these articles provide valuable information about the unfolding of crisis moments, the study of presidential falls needs to be advanced in two ways in order to understand the general phenomenon in South America and perhaps beyond. First, all of these studies suffer from the methodological error of selecting on the dependent variable from the standpoint of understanding the causes of presidential falls. They select cases because the presidents fell and lack corresponding cases where presi dents remain in office whole terms despite efforts to throw them out. This article uses a tool from studies of social movements, protest event analysis, to correct this method ological problem. Protest event analysis uses media sources to document the occurrence of unconventional forms of collective action as a first step in assessing the causes or consequences of that action.7 This technique is used to document all of the sixteen times since 1978 that South American mass publics or congressional elites have moved to demand early ends to presidential terms (see Table 2). Most of the failed efforts are largely forgotten since they did not succeed, but they are as crucial in understanding 402 KathrynHochstetler Table 1 Fates of Popularly Elected South American Presidents, 1978-2003 Country President Term Minority Scandal Neoliberal Outcome Argentina Alfonsin 1983-1989 Yes No No Resigned Menem I 1989-1995 Yes No Yes Completed MenemII 1995-1999 Yes Yes Yes Completed De laRia 1999-2001 Yes No Yes Resigned Bolivia PazEstenssoro 1985-1989 Yes No Yes Completed PazZamora 1989-1993 Yes Yes Yes Completed Sanchezde Lozada 1993-1997 Yes Yes Yes Completed Sanchezde Lozada 2002-2003 Yes No Yes Resigned Brazil Collorde Mello 1990-1992 Yes Yes Yes Impeached;resigned; convicted CardosoI 1995-1998 Yes No Yes Challenged;completed CardosoII 1999-2002 Yes No Yes Challenged;completed Chile Aylwin 1990-1994 Yes No Yes Completed Frei 1994-2000 Yes No Yes Completed Colombia Turbay 1979-1982 No No No Completed Betancur 1982-1986 Yes No Yes Completed Barco 1986-1990 Yes No No Completed Gaviria 1990-1994 No No Yes Completed Samper 1994-1998 No Yes No Challenged;completed Pastrana 1998-2002 Yes Yes Yes Completed Ecuador FebresCordero 1984-1988 Yes No Yes Challenged;completed Borja 1988-1992 Yes No Yes Challenged;completed DurdnBallen 1992-1996 Yes Yes Yes Completed Bucaram 1996-1997 Yes Yes Yes Voted"incapable" Mahuad 1998-2000 Yes Yes Yes Civil/militarycoup; voted "desertion" Paraguay Rodriguez 1989-1993 No No Yes Completed Wasmosy 1993-1998 Yes Yes Yes Challenged;completed Cubas 1998-1999 No Yes Yes Resignedfacing impeachment Peru Belainde 1980-1985 No No Yes Completed Garcia 1985-1990 No Yes No Completed FujimoriI 1990-1995 Yes No Yes Impeached;completed FujimoriII 1995-2000 No No Yes Completed FujimoriIII 2000-2000 Yes Yes Yes Resigned,voted "incapable" Uruguay SanguinettiI 1985-1990 Yes No No Completed Lacalle 1990-1995 Yes No Yes Completed SanguinettiII 1995-2000 Yes No Yes Completed Venezuela HerreraCampins 1979-1984 Yes No No Completed Lusinchi 1984-1989 No No No Completed Perez 1989-1993 Yes Yes Yes Impeached;voted "desertion" Caldera 1994-1999 Yes No Yes Completed Chavez 1999-2000 Yes No No Completed Note:This listdoes not includepresidents whose termsended early for reasons of illnessor death, nor presidents whose termshad not ended by 2003. The textand notes in thesection "Why Presidents are Challenged" explains how thecases were coded. presidential falls as the successful ones. There are three inductively identified reasons for challenges: the president's neoliberal economic policies, his personal involvement in scandal, and his minority status. In all forty presidencies, each of these is a risk factor for presidents who want to complete their terms, as challenged and fallen presidents dis proportionately shared these characteristics compared to the full set of presidents.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies Democracies Are Often Classified According to the Form of Government That They Have
    Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies Democracies are often classified according to the form of government that they have: • Parliamentary • Presidential • Semi-Presidential Legislative responsibility refers to a situation in which a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove a government from office without cause. A vote of confidence is initiated by the government { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. A vote of no confidence is initiated by the legislature { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. A constructive vote of no confidence must indicate who will replace the government if the incumbent loses a vote of no confidence. A vote of no confidence is initiated by the legislature { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. A constructive vote of no confidence must indicate who will replace the government if the incumbent loses a vote of no confidence. A vote of confidence is initiated by the government { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. The defining feature of presidential democracies is that they do not have legislative responsibility. • US Government Shutdown, click here In contrast, parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies both have legislative responsibility. • PM Question Time (UK), click here In addition to legislative responsibility, semi-presidential democracies also have a head of state who is popularly elected for a fixed term. A head of state is popularly elected if she is elected through a process where voters either (i) cast a ballot directly for a candidate or (ii) they cast ballots to elect an electoral college, whose sole purpose is to elect the head of state.
    [Show full text]
  • Presidential Or Parliamentary Does It Make a Difference? Juan J. Linz
    VrA Democracy: Presidential or Parliamentary Does it Make a Difference? Juan J. Linz Pelatiah Pert Professor of Political and Social Sciences Yale University July 1985 Paper prepared for the project, "The Role of Political Parties in the Return to Democracy in the Southern Cone," sponsored by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the World Peace Foundation Copyright © 1985 by Juan J. Linz / INTRODUCTION In recent decades renewed efforts have been made to study and understand the variety of political democracies, but most of those analyses have focused on the patterns of political conflict and more specifically on party systems and coalition formation, in contrast to the attention of many classical writers on the institutional arrangements. With the exception of the large literature on the impact of electorul systems on the shaping of party systems generated by the early writings of Ferdinand Hermens and the classic work by Maurice Duverger, as well as the writings of Douglas Rae and Giovanni Sartori, there has been little attention paid by political scientists to the role of political institutions except in the study of particular countries. Debates about monarchy and republic, parliamentary and presidential regimes, the unitary state and federalism have receded into oblivion and not entered the current debates about the functioning of democra-ic and political institutions and practices, including their effect on the party systems. At a time when a number of countries initiate the process of writing or rewriting constitu­ tions, some of those issues should regain salience and become part of what Sartori has called "political engineering" in an effort to set the basis of democratic consolidation and stability.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights, Separation of Powers and Devolution in the Kenyan Constitution, 2010: Comparison and Lessons for Eac Member States
    HUMAN RIGHTS, SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DEVOLUTION IN THE KENYAN CONSTITUTION, 2010: COMPARISON AND LESSONS FOR EAC MEMBER STATES ∗∗∗ By Prof. Christian Roschmann, Mr. Peter Wendoh & Mr. Steve Ogolla Abstract This paper is essentially a study of the new governance system in Kenya and an explanation why constitutional democracy holds the key to the promotion of human rights; entrenchment of the rule of law and the realisation of good governance. The paper suggests that the concept of constitutional democracy is not the same thing as constitutional government; accordingly, to achieve constitutional democracy, a government must be both constitutional and democratic. Further, this paper focuses on the structures, powers and organizing principles of the devolved governance and explores the challenges that lie ahead to ensure that constitutional democracy endures and is strengthened. The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 seeks to establish a society permeated by the spirit of liberty and democracy, the spirit of the laws and the habit of order. This paper proceeds from the assumption that although the constitutional models across the East Africa Community vary considerably, they share common themes that led to the demise of constitutional democracy, human rights violations and weaker institutions of government. The design and architecture of Kenya’s new constitution may, therefore, herald the beginning of the return of the East Africa Community to constitutional democracy. A. Introduction A historical inquiry of the foundations of Kenya’s political system, traceable to the colonial rule, underscores the very political basis of Kenya’s Constitution. Lord Delamere, a pioneer European farmer in Kenya believed the extension of European civilisation was desirable 1.
    [Show full text]
  • PRESIDENTIAL FORM of GOVERNMENT the Presidential Form of Govt Is Based on the Principle of Separation of Power Between the Executive and Legislature
    PRESIDENTIAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT The presidential form of govt is based on the principle of separation of power between the executive and legislature. Under this system the executive is independent from the control of legislature. Definition: in the opinion of Gettell,” presidential government is that form in which the chief executive is independent of the legislature as to his tenure and to a large extent, as to his policies and acts. In this system, the head of the state is real executive.” According to D.V. Verney.” The term presidential has been chosen because in this system the office of the head of the government and head of state is combined in president.” The above definitions summarize two features of the presidential executive i.e its independence and non-responsibility to the legislature as well as its definite tenure and united structure. At present countries like USA, Brazil, Sri Lanka etc are having presidential form of government. Department of Political Science Jawaharlal Nehru College, Pasighat FEATURES OF PRESIDENTIAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT: 1. Real head of the state: in this system the head of the state is the real executive head. 2. Seperation of powers: the presidential form of government is based on the principle of separation of power among the three organs of the government. The executive is not responsible to legislature. The executive cannot dissolve the legislature. And the judiciary is independent from executive and legislature. 3. Principle of checks and balances: All the three organs of the government is separated from each other but all are checking each other and restraining each other from any type of transgression of their power and functions.
    [Show full text]
  • AP® Comparative Government and Politics Nigeria Briefing Paper
    AP® Comparative Government and Politics Nigeria Briefing Paper Paul J. Kaiser University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, Pennsylvania connect to college success™ www.collegeboard.com The College Board: Connecting Students to College Success The College Board is a not-for-profit membership association whose mission is to connect students to college success and opportunity. Founded in 1900, the association is composed of more than 4,700 schools, colleges, universities, and other educational organizations. Each year, the College Board serves over three and a half million students and their parents, 23,000 high schools, and 3,500 colleges through major programs and services in college admissions, guidance, assessment, financial aid, enrollment, and teaching and learning. Among its best-known programs are the SAT®, the PSAT/NMSQT®, and the Advanced Placement Program® (AP®). The College Board is committed to the principles of excellence and equity, and that commitment is embodied in all of its programs, services, activities, and concerns. Permission to Reprint Statement The College Board intends this publication for noncommercial use by teachers for course and exam preparation; permission for any other use must be sought from the College Board. Teachers may reproduce this publication, in whole or in part, in limited print quantities for noncommercial, face-to-face teaching purposes and distribute up to 50 print copies from a teacher to a class of middle or high school students, with each student receiving no more than one copy. This permission does not apply to any third-party copyrights contained within this publication. When educators reproduce this publication for noncommercial, face-to-face teaching purposes, the following source line must be included: Nigeria Briefing Paper.
    [Show full text]
  • Legislature-Executive Relations in the Presidential System: a Study of Lagos and Ogun States, Nigeria, 1999-2011
    Legislature-Executive Relations in the Presidential System: A Study of Lagos and Ogun States, Nigeria, 1999-2011 By ONI, Samuel Olorunmaiye CUGP070188 A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Political Science and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, College of Development Studies, Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of Ph.D Degree in Political Science May, 2013 i CERTIFICATION This is to certify that this study titled “Legislature-Executive Relations in the Presidential System: A Study of Lagos and Ogun States, Nigeria, 1999-2011” was carried out by Oni Samuel O. under our supervision and that the thesis has not been submitted for the award of any degree in this or any other university. Professor Remi Anifowose Department of Political Science Signature and Date University of Lagos (Supervisor) Professor Kayode Soremekun Department of Political Science Signature and Date & International Relations College of Development Studies Co-Supervisor ii DECLARATION It is hereby declared that this thesis titled “Legislature-Executive Relations in the Presidential System: A Study of Lagos and Ogun States, Nigeria, 1999-2011” was undertaken me, Oni Samuel O. The thesis is based on my original study in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, College of Development Studies, Covenant University, Ota. The views of other researchers have been acknowledged. It is further restated that this work has not been submitted for the award of degree in this or any other institution. Oni Samuel O. Researcher Signature and Date The above declaration is attested to by: Professor Remi Anifowose Supervisor Signature and Date Professor Kayode Soremekun Co-Supervisor Signature and Date Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Executive–Legislative Relations and the Transition to Democracy from Electoral Authoritarian Rule
    MWP 2016/01 Max Weber Programme The Peril of Parliamentarism? Executive–legislative Relations and the Transition to Democracy from Electoral Authoritarian Rule AuthorMasaaki Author Higashijima and Author and Yuko Author Kasuya European University Institute Max Weber Programme The Peril of Parliamentarism? Executive–legislative Relations and the Transition to Democracy from Electoral Authoritarian Rule Masaaki Higashijima and Yuko Kasuya EUI Working Paper MWP 2016/01 This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. ISSN 1830-7728 © Masaaki Higashijima and Yuko Kasuya, 2016 Printed in Italy European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy www.eui.eu cadmus.eui.eu Abstract Why do some electoral authoritarian regimes survive for decades while others become democracies? This article explores the impact of constitutional structures on democratic transitions from electoral authoritarianism. We argue that under electoral authoritarian regimes, parliamentary systems permit dictators to survive longer than they do in presidential systems. This is because parliamentary systems incentivize autocrats and ruling elites to engage in power sharing and thus institutionalize party organizations, and indirectly allow electoral manipulation to achieve an overwhelming victory at the ballot box, through practices such as gerrymandering and malapportionment. We test our hypothesis using a combination of cross-national statistical analysis and comparative case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines.
    [Show full text]
  • Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical Perspective
    University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2010 Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical Perspective Tom Ginsburg Jose Antonio Cheibub Zachary Elkins Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Tom Ginsburg, Jose Antonio Cheibub & Zachary Elkins, "Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical Perspective," 89 Texas Law Review 1707 (2010). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical Perspective Jos6 Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins" & Tom Ginsburg*** Since the time of Aristotle, comparative scholars have developed various alternative typologies to classify constitutional systems., One paradigmatic scheme focuses on executive-legislative relations. Some systems,2 we are told, are "presidential," in which a directly elected president serves a fixed term as both head of state and head of government. Others are "parliamentary," in which a legislative majority determines who will lead the government and for how long. A third model combines features of the two and is called "semi-presidential." 3 Each of these models of "government type" has an archetype: The United States is seen as the quintessential presidential system,4 the United Kingdom as the parliamentary model,5 and France as the semi-presidential model.6 The models are also seen as systemic, in that each implies a certain institutional configuration. So, presidential systems are thought to include a host of features (e.g., an executive veto) that are not typically found in * Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
    [Show full text]
  • State Structure and Electoral Systems in Post-Conflict Situations
    STATE STRUCTURE AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS Authors Jarrett Blanc Aanund Hylland Kåre Vollan ii PREFACE In contemporary peace processes, almost without exception, the arrangements that bring about transition from conflict to stability include requirements related to elections. These requirements range in level of detail from general calendars to specific, almost legislative requirement for the nature and conduct of the elections. In either case, the electoral requirements are only very rarely subjected to a thorough process of expert review and public consultation. Unintended consequences often result, such as unrealistic timetables (and consequent postponements) in Afghanistan or guarantees for minority representation in Kosovo which, if implemented literally, could have deepened rather than moderated ethnic divisions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton accord introduced strong protection of the three major parties to the conflict, but at the same time created a government at state level which has had difficulty passing laws and making decisions in a reasonably efficient way. In addition, the protection of other groups has been weak. Post-conflict elections often bring conflicting groups back to the positions that created the conflict in the first place. If well designed and managed, elections can create legitimate political structures which promote conciliation and lead to controversial issues being solved through negotiations. If poorly designed and managed, they can simply restart passionate disputes and undermine the peace process. Careful consideration of the closely related issues of state structure and electoral systems is therefore essential at an early stage of any peace process. Identifying the requirements of state structure and electoral system design – such as protection of minority groups with separate identity at a national or sub-national level – can help to achieve robust political solutions.
    [Show full text]
  • Advantages & Disadvantages of Presidential System Of
    ADVANTAGES & DISADVANTAGES OF PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT Advantages of the Presidential System of Government;; i) Quick and decisiveness in Decision-making The presidential system of government makes for decisive actions because the president knows that ‘the buck stops on his desk’, a phrase popularised by the late Harry Truman, when he decided to use nuclear weapons against two Japanese cities in order to bring about a decisive end to World War II. In America and Nigeria, the constitution did not even make it mandatory for the president to call a meeting of the executive council before he can take action on any issue. The president is at liberty to either consult his ministers or any of them, or refuse to seek their opinion in taking decisions. The ministers or any other functionaries are mere advisers to the president and it is not binding on the president to go along with the council of ministers, unlike the case under the parliamentary where the prime minister is always at pains to secure the support of the cabinet, and unanimity of opinions among its members. This promptness in decision-making therefore makes the response of government to issues, especially in situations where any delay in taking action may be dangerous. ii) Presidential discretion in Appointments One major advantage of the presidential system of government is that the President has a free hand in appointing his ministers and other government appointees. Ministers could be chosen from outside the president’s party, a situation that confers high degree of latitude on the president to select the best materials from any part of the country.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ideological Coalition Model Is the Strategy for Strengthening Presidential Systems in Indonesia
    The Ideological Coalition Model is The Strategy for Strengthening Presidential Systems in Indonesia 1st Restu Rahmawati1, 2nd Firman, Firman2 {[email protected], [email protected]} University of 17 Agustus 1945 Jakarta, Jalan Sunter Permai Raya, North Jakarta1,2 Abstract. This paper examines the impact of implementing an ideological coalition model for strengthening presidential systems in Indonesia. The reason for raising this issue is because the current application of the parliamentary system coalition in the presidential system in Indonesia is causing problems in the legislative body so that the debate in parliament about a government policy is no longer concerned with the interests of the people but rat her that it highlights the opposing attitude of the government. Parliamentary system coalition, if implemented in a presidential system, will only prioritize political interests, so an ideological coalition model is needed. The methodology used is a literature study on the ideology coalition model and the writer will look for aspects of the impact of the ideology coalition model for strengthening presidential systems in Indonesia in this modern democr atic era. The result shows that ideological coalition is needed in the life of the nation and state because ideology is the basis of political party platforms to build a shared vision and mission in organizing the state so that this ideological coalition can strengthen political institutions in the presidential system. Applications of this study can be used for the government, legislative members, teachers, and students. In this research, the model of ideological coalition model for strengthening presidential systems in Indonesia is presented in a comprehensive and complete manner.
    [Show full text]
  • Reforming South Korea's “Imperial Presidency”
    Policy Brief No. 205, October 10, 2017 Reforming South Korea’s “Imperial Presidency” Seonhwa Kim South Korea’s constitution vests too much power in the office of the president, which raises the risk of the post being misused. This was brought dramatically into focus earlier this year when millions of South Korean citizens took to the streets to protest against the revelations of misconduct concerning former President Park Geun-hye. Reform of the constitution is now a pressing issue to bring much needed accountability and trans- parency to South Korea’s often called imperial presidency. he National Assembly of the Republic of Korea is constitution for South Korea in 1948. While its draftees Tpreparing to amend the constitution, including en- tried to adopt a parliamentary system, South Korea’s first hancing human rights provisions and granting greater president, Syngman Rhee, argued that a strong leader, local autonomy. The biggest issue, however, is changing and thus a centralization and concentration of power, was the current governmental system in order to establish needed in building a new nation, as well as to confront greater checks and balances on the presidency. While the threat posed by North Korea. Following the April 19 such amendment has long been proposed, the impeach- Revolution which led to Rhee’s resignation in 1960, the ment and subsequent conviction of former President Park new government formed a parliamentary system according Geun-hye in March 2017 on charges of abusing her po- to the constitution but this was thwarted within a year by sition – which saw millions come out on to the streets in Park Chung Hee’s military coup.
    [Show full text]