Borough Market
Report into the fatal shootings by police of Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane, Youssef Zaghba and the serious injury of Mr A, Borough Market, London 3 June 2017
Please note, this investigation was completed and submitted to the decision maker before 8 January 2018, while we were still the IPCC. Therefore, the report will contain the investigator’s opinion, which may differ from the final outcome. The report refers to the IPCC and the Commission throughout, and does not reflect the new structure of the IOPC.
Independent investigation report
Investigation information
Investigation name: Borough Market
IPCC reference: 2017/086568 and 2017/086599
Investigation type: Death or Serious Injury (DSI)
IPCC office: Croydon
Lead investigator: Susan Gilbert (OTL)
Operations Manager: Graham Beesley
Commissioner: Sarah Green
Status of report: Final
Date finalised: 13 December 2017
Stills from CCTV referred to in this report have been removed to protect the identities of those who appear in them.
Contents
Investigation information ...... 2 Introduction ...... 4 The investigation ...... 6 Policies, procedures and legislation considered ...... 7 Background information ...... 10 Chronology of events ...... 11 Summary and analysis of the evidence ...... 22 Conclusions ...... 67 Appendix 1: The role of the IPCC...... 77
Introduction
The purpose of this report
1. I was appointed by the IPCC to carry out an independent investigation into the deaths of Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba, who were fatally shot by police officers on Stoney Street on Saturday 3 June 2017. In addition, the investigation has also examined the serious injury caused to Mr A during the same incident. The incident was brought to the attention of the IPCC on the night it occurred and was subsequently formally referred to the IPCC in writing.
2. This is my report for the Commission. It summarises and evaluates the evidence, refers to relevant documents and makes factual findings where necessary. In my conclusions I will: a) Set out the established facts, the sequence of events and their consequences. b) Give my opinion about the nature and extent of the police contact prior to the deaths of Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba, and establish what evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to their deaths. c) Give my opinion about the nature and extent of the police contact prior to the serious injury of Mr A, and establish what evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to the serious injury. d) Draw attention to any lessons which may need to be learned by any organisation related to the investigation about which the Commissioner may wish to make a recommendation.
Other investigations
3. The Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command is investigating the terrorist attack at London Bridge and Borough Market on Saturday 3 June 2017 under Operation Datival.
4. At 10.07pm, on 3 June 2017, a white van driving south on London Bridge, SE1, mounted the pavement, injuring and killing pedestrians. The van subsequently crashed into railings outside Southwark Cathedral and three male occupants left the vehicle armed with knives. They began randomly stabbing members of the public and a police officer as they made their way south from London Bridge to an area known as Borough Market. Here they continued to stab members of the public both on the street and in restaurants
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until armed police arrived. When armed police arrived, all three suspects were wearing items strapped to their chests which appeared to be Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and they were in the process of stabbing a member of the public. The attack was declared as an act of terrorism and resulted in the deaths of eight members of the public, with a further 48 people injured.
5. The three suspects were identified as Khuram BUTT, date of birth 20/04/1980, Rashid REDOUANE, date of birth 31/07/1986 and Youssef ZAGHBA, date of birth 26/01/1995.
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The investigation
Terms of reference
The terms of reference for the investigation were approved by Sarah Green on 9 June 2017.
The terms of reference specific to this investigation were:
1. To investigate;
a) The actions and decisions, including the use of lethal force, of the City of London officers who fired shots at the incident on 3 June 2017
b) The actions and decisions, including the use of lethal force, of the Metropolitan Police officers who fired shots at the incident on 3 June 2017
2. To assist in fulfilling the state’s investigative obligation arising under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by ensuring as far as possible that the investigation is independent, effective, open and prompt, and that the full facts are brought to light and any lessons are learned.
3. Further to paragraph 21A of Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002, to assess during the investigation whether any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner justifying the bringing of disciplinary proceedings (i.e. whether there are any indications of ‘conduct matters’) and if so, follow the paragraph 21A procedure and make appropriate amendments to the terms of reference of the investigation.
4. To consider and report on whether there may be organisational learning, including;
a) whether any change in policy or practice would help prevent a recurrence of the event, incident or conduct investigated;
b) whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be shared
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Policies, procedures and legislation considered
6. A number of national and local policies were examined in relation to this incident, in order to ascertain whether the policies were complied with, and whether the existing policies were sufficient in these circumstances.
7. These include the College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice (APP) into Armed Policing, ‘Operation Plato’ and training material delivered to firearms officers in relation to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) from the City of London and Metropolitan Police Services.
8. The APP states, “The primary intention of the police, when discharging a firearm, is to prevent an immediate threat to life by shooting to stop the subject from carrying out their intended or threatened course of action. In most circumstances this is achieved by aiming to strike the central body mass (i.e., the torso).”
9. In relation to individual responsibility, the APP states, “Each authorised firearms officer is individually responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions; nothing can absolve them from such responsibility and accountability. This includes decisions to refrain from using force as well as any decisive action taken, including the use of force, the use of a firearm and the use of a less lethal weapon”.
10. “Authorised Firearms Officers are answerable, ultimately, to the law in the courts. They must be in a position to justify their decisions and actions based on their honestly held belief as to the circumstances that existed at the time, and their professional and legal responsibilities.”
11. In establishing whether the force used was reasonable, consideration must be given to section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967, section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, sections 3, 4 and 7 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, and the police standards of professional behaviour.
Operation Plato
12. ‘Operation Plato’ is the agreed national identifier for the response to a marauding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA). This terminology has been adopted by key agencies including the police, ambulance service, fire and rescue, military, National Health Service, local and central government departments.
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13. A marauding terrorist firearms attack does not have a single recognised definition; there are many factors either in isolation, or as a combination of events, that indicate an MTFA is taking place.
14. The declaration of an ‘Operation Plato’ incident triggers a multi-agency response designed to rapidly inform, mobilise and operationally deploy the most appropriate resource. The nature and speed of a marauding terrorist attack requires the deployment of armed officers to intervene immediately, in order to prevent or minimise the loss of life. Armed officers are deployed with the intention of identifying, locating and confronting (rather than containing) the threat.
City of London Police Service
15. During their annual training programme, City of London Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) received training on responding to an MTFA incident and incidents where ‘Operation Plato’ has been declared.
16. City of London firearms officers are not given specific training on IED vests, but are invited to discuss circumstances where shots at the central body mass would be impractical, present a risk to life or be unlikely to achieve immediate incapacitation and other points of aim may be required.
Metropolitan Police Service
17. The training in response to Person Bourne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIEDs) began in the Metropolitan Police Service in 2002. Since 2002, the advice provided to armed officers in relation to PBIEDs has been consistent. It has been determined by a process of examining the threat and risk, that these types of attacks are unlikely to be resolved using contain-and-negotiate tactics unless a sterile cordoned area could be maintained.
18. The first tactical consideration is one of preventing detonation of the device. The only way to prevent a subject being able to activate a detonation switch for a PBIED would be to achieve immediate and total incapacitation.
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19. Armed officers are usually trained to discharge firearms at the largest part of the subject they can see, which in most cases would be the central body mass or torso. There will be circumstances when aiming directly for the head will be necessary, as aiming to strike another part of the body would present increased risk to life and/or be unlikely to achieve immediate incapacitation. A ‘critical shot’ is a shot or shots intended to immediately incapacitate the subject. A critical shot should only be fired when absolutely necessary in defence of a person when there is an imminent and extreme risk to life from unlawful violence. A critical shot is a shot to the head, if possible, or otherwise to the central nervous system or major organs.
20. Only bullets striking the central nervous system (which is largely located in the brain and spinal cord) and the major organs, which are contained in the upper body, are likely to result in rapid incapacitation. The head is itself a relatively small target but any central headshot is likely to result in immediate incapacitation. Such a central bullet strike will cause the brain stem to be neutralised, and the subject will be incapable of any movement or experience even reflexive motor action.
21. The second consideration is the make-up of the PBIED, and the possibility that police bullets may cause it to detonate. A PBIED may, and commonly does, contain homemade explosive (HME). Advice provided to officers is that most commonly used forms of HME, such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP), would, in all likelihood, detonate following a direct bullet strike. Officers are advised to consider placement of shots away from any obvious signs of a device, such as a rucksack or body belts.
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Background information
22. On Wednesday 22 March 2017, there was a terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge and the Houses of Parliament. The attack resulted in the deaths of four members of the public on the bridge, and of Police Constable Keith Palmer in the grounds of the Houses of Parliament. A further 50 people were injured and the suspect, Khalid Masood, was fatally shot by police.
23. On Monday 22 May 2017, there was a terrorist attack at Manchester Arena at a concert. The attack resulted in the deaths of 22 members of the public and 64 were wounded. The suspect, Salman Abedi, was wearing a suicide vest that detonated.
24. Following the Manchester Arena terrorist attack, the threat level in the UK from international terrorism was categorised as ‘critical’. This is defined as ‘an attack is expected imminently’ and this remained in place between Tuesday 23 May and Saturday 27 May 2017, when it downgraded to ‘severe’. This is categorised, as ‘an attack is highly likely’. This threat level was in place on Saturday 3 June 2017.
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Chronology of events
25. The following chronology has been constructed using relevant video evidence, police radio traffic and accounts from members of the public and police officers. The video evidence consists of one council CCTV camera from Stoney Street, video footage from two Metropolitan Police armed response vehicles (ARVs) that drove onto Stoney Street, and CCTV taken from the Wheatsheaf Public House. There is no video evidence from the City of London ARV.
26. The council CCTV obtained from Stoney Street did not have audio but did visually capture the entirety of the firearms officers’ engagement with the three suspects on Stoney Street on 3 June 2017. Therefore this has been relied upon as fact and has negated the requirement to obtain multiple witness accounts from members of the public regarding the actions of the firearms officers and the three suspects. The timings used for the chronology are from the council CCTV system.
London Bridge, Saturday 3 June 2017
27. On Saturday 3 June 2017, police were informed of an incident involving a van being driven over London Bridge from the north side of the river, hitting and injuring pedestrians.
28. The van crashed into railings on the south side of London Bridge outside Southwark Cathedral and three suspects, later identified as Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba got out on foot. All three men were in possession of ceramic knives attached to their wrists with lanyards. They were also wearing what appeared to witnesses to be Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), although it is now known that the IEDs were fake.
29. All three suspects continued to make their way along Borough High Street past Southwark Cathedral. Members of the public whom they encountered were stabbed numerous times, including an unarmed British Transport Police officer who tried to stop them using his police issue asp. The actions of the suspects resulted in significant public panic, which caused people to run in various directions and businesses in the vicinity to lock their doors and close their shutters.
30. The three suspects continued to stab members of public as they made their way through Borough Market and onto Stoney Street. In addition to those injured by the van, people were stabbed in the street and inside restaurants, causing eight deaths and multiple casualties. The IPCC investigation examined events, which began when the three suspects were seen outside the Wheatsheaf Public House on Stoney Street for a second time, and were heading back towards Southwark
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Street. This is when firearms officers arrive on Stoney Street and engage with the three suspects.
Arrival of firearms officers at London Bridge, Saturday 3 June 2017
31. After the three suspects had crashed the van and left the immediate vicinity to continue their attack, a Metropolitan Police armed response vehicle (ARV) arrived where the van had crashed. The two officers in this ARV are referred to as BY5, the driver, and DA87, the passenger, and had travelled to the scene from Old Kent Road. They had responded to a call on the radio, which informed them that a van had driven into people on London Bridge. As BY5 drove to the scene his initial thought was that it was a terrorist attack, due to the recent attacks in the media. BY5 recalled knowing he needed to get to the scene as quickly as possible in order “to identify the threat, locate it and confront it”.
32. BY5 and DA87 were the first armed officers to arrive at the van and exited the vehicle with their G36 firearms raised. They recalled they approached the van and searched it for any suspects. BY5 searched the rear of the van where he saw “items” but no people. DA87 recalled smelling strong petrol and stated this heightened his threat assessment, as the items in the van could have been “some type of improvised explosive device”. BY5 immediately thought any attackers had run off or were continuing their attack in some other way.
33. Members of public directed BY5 and DA87 down some steps next to where the van had crashed. Here the officers recalled seeing a man slumped against a wall surrounded by members of public who confirmed he had been stabbed. BY5 recalled he believed the suspects were continuing their attack on foot but he did not know how many of them there were, what they looked like or what they were armed with.
34. BY5 and DA87 entered Borough Market to continue their search for the suspects and recalled seeing multiple injured people on the floor, one of whom BY5 believed to be deceased. BY5 and DA87 recalled that they made the decision to leave injured people to be treated by unarmed officers and other members of public so they could continue their search for the suspects and prevent further causalities. BY5 and DA87 split up in order to cover more area within the market stalls, this was the last time they saw one another until after the incident.
35. Whilst BY5 and DA87 searched Borough Market for the suspects, other armed officers arrived on Stoney Street.
Stoney Street, Saturday 3 June 2017
36. Earlier on during the attack, the three suspects had approached the Wheatsheaf Public House as they walked up Stoney Street. At 10.15pm Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba walked back down Stoney Street towards
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Southwark Street, this time with the Wheatsheaf Public House on their right. By this time, members of the public had grouped together on the street and, whilst keeping a safe distance, were utilising chairs, crates and bottles in an attempt to prevent the suspects from continuing their attacks on members of the public.
37. Khuram Butt approached the Wheatsheaf Public House and began to kick the door and hit the glass windows, leaving blood marks on the panes, whilst Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba stood behind him. The three suspects were unable to gain entry to the pub as the public had locked and barricaded the doors with beer kegs.
38. At 10.16pm, Mr B crossed Stoney Street outside the Wheatsheaf Public House, which was on his left. He appeared unaware that the three suspects were standing nearby. Rachid Redouane ran across the road towards him and made a number of swiping and stabbing motions. Khuram Butt and Youssef Zaghba follow Rachid Redouane and begin to attack Mr B.
39. A City of London armed response vehicle, hereon referred to as ARV1, was responding to a radio transmission that a van had hit five pedestrians on London Bridge before it had crashed near to Southwark Cathedral. BX45 was the driver, BX46 was the front passenger and BX44 was the rear offside passenger. They were all aware the incident had been declared ‘Operation Plato’.
40. As they drove along Southwark Street, members of the public pointed them in the general direction of London Bridge / Borough Market and with the window open, officers recalled someone said people were being attacked and they pointed the officers in the direction of Stoney Street.
41. Within four seconds of the suspects starting their attack on Mr B, ARV1 entered Stoney Street from Southwark Street.
42. As ARV1 entered Stoney Street, members of public were throwing objects towards the three suspects as they attacked Mr B. As ARV1 approached the Wheatsheaf Public House, BX46 got out of the police vehicle whilst it was still moving and ran towards the commotion, pointing his G36 firearm. At the same time, the three suspects stopped their attack on Mr B and ran slightly away from the ARV1 before turning around.
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Figure 1 - Council CCTV showing ARV1 arriving on Stoney Street and BX46 exiting from the front passenger seat. The three suspects can be seen attacking Mr B, who is on the floor.
The actions of Khuram Butt
43. BX46 recalled as he got out of the police car, he saw an Asian suspect in a dark blue Arsenal shirt holding a large knife in his right hand and looking towards the police car, this suspect is now known to be Khuram Butt. BX46 ran from the passenger door of ARV1 to the front of the vehicle, with his weapon pointed towards the three suspects.
44. BX46 recalled he shouted verbal commands to Khuram Butt, who then turned and ran towards him; BX46 noticed he was wearing an IED vest. Khuram Butt ran in front of ARV1 as BX44 and BX45 exited the vehicle, which continued to roll forwards as the handbrake had not been applied.
45. BX46 backed away from Khuram Butt towards the Wheatsheaf Public House as he ran towards him. At this point BX46 recalled he fired a shot at Khuram Butt. CCTV showed BX44 and BX45 also had their weapons pointed towards Khuram Butt, across the bonnet of ARV1, and appeared to ‘track’ him as he ran towards BX46.
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Figure 2 – Council CCTV showing Khuram Butt running across the path of ARV1 towards BX46, as BX44 and BX45 point their weapons across ARV1 towards Khuram Butt and in the direction of the Wheatsheaf Public House
46. At this time, the CCTV footage from the Wheatsheaf Public House shows ARV1 rolling past the pub as two bullets pass through the windows of the Wheatsheaf Public House, causing members of the public inside to duck down. One member of the public, Mr A, fell forwards to the floor just after the second bullet went through the window near to where he was standing.
47. BX46 recalled he was unable to see whether his shot to Khuram Butt had hit him and Khuram Butt continued to run towards him so he continued to move backwards and fired further shots. CCTV showed Khuram Butt swung his left leg up to head height but stopped abruptly and fell to the floor one or two metres from BX46. Khuram Butt fell directly outside the Wheatsheaf Public House between partitions which cordon off their dedicated outside area.
48. The amount of time from when Khuram Butt started to run at BX46 to when he fell to the floor was approximately three seconds. After he fell to the floor, BX46 remained with his weapon trained on Khuram Butt and recalled being aware that BX44 and BX45 had also discharged their weapons and two other suspects were on the floor.
The actions of Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba
49. As Khuram Butt fell to the floor, a suspect in a striped top, now known to be Rachid Redouane, ran in front of the moving ARV1 and followed the same path as Khuram Butt towards BX46. Rachid Redouane then turned to his left as he
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reached the middle of Stoney Street and ran back towards BX44 and BX45, who were stood on the offside of ARV1.
50. As Rachid Redouane changed direction, BX44 and BX45 stepped back to avoid ARV1 hitting them. At the same time, a suspect wearing a black hooded top, now known to be Youssef Zaghba, joined Rachid Redouane and they both ran towards BX44 and BX45. Within seconds, Rachid Redouane, Youssef Zaghba, BX44 and BX45 were all within a few metres of each other and at some point during this time ARV1 ran over BX45’s foot.
Figure 3 - Council CCTV showing Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba running towards BX44 and BX45
51. BX44 and BX45 recalled that the three suspects were armed with knives and wearing IED vests as they ran towards them.
52. BX44 recalled he fired shots at Rachid Redouane as he ran at BX45 and then fired shots towards Youssef Zaghba to protect himself. CCTV showed BX44 fell backwards onto the floor and BX44 recalled he continued to fire at Youssef Zaghba from the floor until he also fell, landing on top of BX44. CCTV showed BX44 stood up and moved away from Youssef Zaghba.
53. BX45 recalled he shot towards the centre mass of one of the suspects but saw no immediate reaction, so continued to fire until he was satisfied the threat was over. Both Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba fell to the floor, where they remained.
54. BX45 recalled the suspect BX44 had shot was still moving whilst on the floor and had an IED strapped to his body, he therefore shot him but cannot recall how many times.
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55. CCTV showed BX44 and BX45 provided firearms cover on Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba as they remained on the floor within a short distance of one another. BX46 maintained firearms cover on Khuram Butt who was on the opposite side of Stoney Street on the pavement.
56. ARV1 continued to roll forwards before it came to a stop further down Stoney Street, approximately ten–15 metres from where the officers got out of the vehicle.
57. CCTV showed Mr B stood up as ARV1 rolled passed him and he ran into Borough Market, where he received first aid.
58. The amount of time from when BX46 exited ARV1 to when all three suspects were laying on the floor was approximately eight seconds.
59. Whilst he continued to point his weapon at Youssef Zaghba, BX44 used his foot to move Youssef Zaghba’s left arm away from the suicide vest. As BX44 did this, two Metropolitan Police armed response vehicles also arrived in Stoney Street (hereon referred to as ARV2 and ARV3) and a fourth armed response vehicle (hereon referred to as ARV4) parked on Southwark Street, near to the junction of Stoney Street.
60. ARV2 and ARV3 arrived approximately 23 seconds after ARV1.
Arrival of armed officers from the Metropolitan Police Service
61. The first Metropolitan Police armed response vehicle to arrive on Stoney Street, ARV2, contained three firearms officers, referred to as E122, AY14 and BY28. The officers recalled they responded to reports that a van had run over several people on London Bridge before crashing. They recalled being informed the suspects were now attacking members of the public with knives and that ‘Operation Plato’ was declared.
62. ARV2 came to a stop in the middle of Stoney Street, close to where Youssef Zaghba was laying. ARV2 had on-board Cleartone footage, which recorded the incident in Stoney Street. AY14 emerged from the front passenger seat of ARV2 and ran directly towards Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane. He provided firearms cover on them both and he recalled they were wearing IED vests.
63. BY28 emerged from the rear passenger seat of ARV2 one second later and ran towards Youssef Zaghba and also provided firearms cover on him. BY28 recalled shouting verbal commands to Youssef Zaghba and saw the IEDs strapped to him and Rachid Redouane.
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64. Whilst AY14 and BY28 covered Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba on the floor, BX44 and BX45 moved to provide firearms cover on Khuram Butt with BX46, who remained on the ground in front of the Wheatsheaf Public House.
65. E122 emerged from the driver’s seat of ARV2 three seconds after BY28. E122 removed his pistol and provided firearms cover on Youssef Zaghba, and noticed he was wearing an IED vest. E122 recalled officers shouted to one another about the discovery of the IED devices.
66. The officers from ARV4 are referred to as D4, the driver, E59 and AY37, the passengers.
67. At the same time as E122 began providing firearms cover, D4, E59 and AY37 ran onto Stoney Street and provided firearms cover on Youssef Zaghba, near to E122. All officers recalled they saw Youssef Zaghba was wearing an IED.
68. CCTV showed that, whilst officers provided firearms cover, Youssef Zaghba moved slightly, but no further shots were fired towards him.
69. After approximately 16 seconds at the scene, AY14, BY28, D4 and E122 retreated to the nearside of ARV2 and E59 retreated to the offside of ARV2. The officers maintained firearms cover on Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane as they arranged themselves around ARV2.
70. AY37 recalled hearing screams from within Borough Market so he left Stoney Street and began an emergency search of Borough Market, during which he told members of the public to either run, hide or secure themselves in businesses.
71. AY14, BY28, E122 and E59 recalled noticing Khuram Butt laying on the floor outside the Wheatsheaf Public House, as they retreated to ARV2. AY14 and E122 provided firearms cover on Khuram Butt and they recalled he was also wearing an IED. BY28 covered Rachid Redouane across the bonnet of ARV1 and E59 covered Youssef Zaghba from the offside of ARV1. D4 walked between the four officers behind ARV2.
72. BX44, BX45 and BX46 maintained firearms cover on Khuram Butt on the opposite side of the road.
Arrival of BY5 at Stoney Street
73. Having searched through Borough Market from London Bridge looking for suspects, BY5 approached Stoney Street from an alleyway opposite the Wheatsheaf Public House. BY5 recalled seeing ARV2 in front of him with armed officers pointing weapons at the suspects on the floor. BY28 saw BY5 approach Stoney Street from within the market and shouted to him to “get back” as he was
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near to where Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane were laying and wearing the IEDs. BY28 told BY5 to “go long” further up Stoney Street.
74. BY5 heard officers shouting “IED” so he withdrew back into Borough Market to find a better location to access Stoney Street. He turned left inside the market and headed towards ARV1.
Two unarmed officers, PC X and PC Y, and a member of public, Mr C, approach Khuram Butt and Rachid Redouane
75. Approximately 19 seconds after the firearms officers retreated to ARV2, CCTV showed PC X and Mr C, a member of public, approached BX45 and BX46 on the pavement outside the Wheatsheaf Public House. PC X handcuffed Khuram Butt. Mr C stood near to Khuram Butt and filmed the incident.
76. Seconds later, PC Y also approached Khuram Butt and stood next to PC X. BX44, who was covering Khuram Butt from the middle of the street, recalled he shouted to the unarmed officers to get away so he could have effective firearms cover on Khuram Butt. Following this, BX44 withdrew up Stoney Street towards where ARV1 had stopped.
77. BY5, who recalled going back through Borough Market as instructed by BY28, met with BX44 at ARV1. BY5 recalled BX44 was pointing his G36 firearm towards Khuram Butt, who BY5 saw was wearing an IED.
78. BX45 and BX46 withdrew back along Stoney Street towards Southwark Street. AY14, E122, BY28 and E59 remained around ARV2 providing cover on the three suspects.
79. At 10.17pm, CCTV showed, PC Y crossed Stoney Street from where Khuram Butt was laying on the floor and jogged directly towards where Rachid Redouane was laying on the floor. PC Y leant over Rachid Redouane with his handcuffs out before he stopped and retreated towards Khuram Butt. PC Y recalled he wanted to handcuff Rachid Redouane to stop him from detonating the IED vest, but retreated when told to by a firearms officer.
80. PC X, PC Y and Mr C remained in front of the Wheatsheaf Public House, to the left of Khuram Butt, until AY14 gestured with his arms towards them and they backed away and ran up Stoney Street, away from the suspects.
Members of the public from within the Wheatsheaf Public House
81. Whilst officers provided firearms cover on the three suspects, Mr D repeatedly opened the Wheatsheaf Public House door, onto Stoney Street. He was shouting to the firearms officers for help as Mr A was seriously injured inside the pub.
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82. Officers recalled they saw Mr D gesturing for assistance, but they believed there was still an ongoing threat to the public from the presence of the IEDs, particularly the IED on Khuram Butt, who was laying outside the Wheatsheaf Public House. Officers recalled telling Mr D to go back inside the pub where he would be safer, should the IED have detonated.
Movements of Khuram Butt and Rachid Redouane
83. Having withdrawn back down Stoney Street towards ARV2, BX45 and BX46 entered the market area to follow the same route as BY5 and join BX44 next to ARV1.
84. D4 recalled more armed officers arrived at the scene and he instructed them to fully kit-up, so they could relieve the containment officers who were wearing less protection. D4 also instructed local unarmed officers to stay clear and set up a cordon due to the IEDs.
85. Whilst officers continued to provide firearms cover from ARV2, CCTV showed Khuram Butt made small movements on the floor, but no further shots were fired towards him.
86. At 10.22pm, whilst BY28 maintained firearms cover on Rachid Redouane from across the bonnet of ARV2, Rachid Redouane began to move his feet. He continued moving for the next nine seconds, lifting his left leg and moving it back and forth across his right leg.
87. A few moments later Rachid Redouane, who was laying on his right side, facing away from ARV2, made a larger movement and his hand appeared underneath his torso. At this point BY28 and E59 both shot at Rachid Redouane until he stopped moving. This was the last time Rachid Redouane moved and the last time he was fired upon.
88. Approximately 24 seconds after Rachid Redouane was shot, Khuram Butt made further but more significant movements than before. Khuram Butt’s legs moved significantly and he appeared to be raising his head and torso off the pavement into a seated position. BX44, BY5, AY14 and E122 all shot Khuram Butt simultaneously and in quick succession after seeing this movement.
89. At 10.26pm, other firearms officers arrived in Stoney Street which allowed AY14, BY28, E122 and E59 to withdraw back down Stoney Street. BX44, BX45, BX46 and BY5 remained by ARV1.
90. BY5 recalled hearing Mr D shout that someone “was dying” inside the Wheatsheaf Public House. BY5 was aware there was no other way out of the pub than through the two doors that opened onto Stoney Street. BY5 recalled he believed that the IED vest on Khuram Butt could have been remotely detonated
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or had a time-delay, putting the public inside the Wheatsheaf Public House at immediate risk. He therefore instructed BX45 and BX46 to retrieve a ballistic shield from ARV1 so they could evacuate the public from the Wheatsheaf Public House. BY5 was aware the ballistic shield did not offer blast protection but believed it at least provided some form of protection to the public.
Evacuating the Wheatsheaf Public House
91. At 10.30pm, BY5, BX45 and BX46 approached the Wheatsheaf Public House as a group in order to evacuate the pub. BX45 held a ballistic shield and BX46 provided firearms cover on Khuram Butt whilst they walked from ARV1 to outside the Wheatsheaf Public House doorway. BX44 recalled he stayed near to ARV1, providing firearms cover on Khuram Butt as the three officers moved towards the pub.
92. BY5 recalled a member of the public unlocked the door to the Wheatsheaf Public House. BY5 established there were no outstanding suspects within the premises but was told that a member of public had been shot in the head. BY5 requested the public get together and evacuate onto Stoney Street as quickly as possible, which they did.
93. As the public evacuated, BX45 stood between where Khuram Butt was laying and the public were evacuating, holding a ballistic shield. BX46 stood next to BX45, pointing his firearm at Khuram Butt. As the public started to evacuate, BY5 located Mr A, who was laying seriously injured on the floor.
94. Whilst covering Khuram Butt, BX44, BX45 and BX46 all recalled seeing Khuram Butt move on the floor. BX44 and BX46 fired further shots at Khuram Butt which caused the public to stop evacuating and duck down. Eight seconds later the public continued to evacuate. These were the final shots fired during the incident, approximately 14 minutes after the first firearms officers arrived on Stoney Street.
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Summary and analysis of the evidence
95. During this investigation, a volume of evidence was gathered. After thorough analysis of all the evidence, I have selected the evidence I think is relevant and answers the terms of reference for my investigation. As such, not all the evidence gathered in the investigation is referred to in this report.
96. However, the methodology of the investigation, including key decisions that were made, strategies that were set, and details of people referred to in this report are included in the attached appendices1.
97. In order to reach my findings it was necessary for me to analyse and evaluate the evidence. In deciding whether something is more likely than not to have occurred, I have had regard to all of the available evidence and the weight to be attached to it.
98. All the officers who discharged their weapons have provided statements in relation to their actions whilst in Stoney Street as they remembered them. They did not have access to the CCTV evidence prior to making their accounts. Due to the fact each person will remember an incident differently, especially in fast- moving, stressful and dynamic situations, it is accepted that their accounts, and those of the public, will differ in places to the CCTV evidence. Where there are relevant discrepancies, these have been highlighted in the below analysis.
99. It is now known that the items strapped to Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba were not real IEDs. However, the findings of this report will look at the officers’ decisions and actions based on the information they knew, or honestly believed, at the time they fired the shots, not with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, the report will examine the reasonableness of these beliefs.
1 These appendices were removed in the published version as they contain sensitive information.
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Threat assessment of officers
100. When a member of public calls the police and the operator decides the call requires officers to attend, the call is logged and officers are assigned to attend the location. The log of the call is referred to as a computer aided despatch (CAD).
101. On Saturday 3 June 2017, police logged over 300 calls from members of public regarding the London Bridge and Borough Market attacks. Multiple CADs were created for the calls and officers were assigned to attend the area.
102. This report is examining the actions and decisions of armed officers who fired their weapons on Stoney Street when confronted by the three suspects. These officers had not heard the calls from the public, but the operator had relayed the information from the CADs to them over the radio.
103. In order to establish what officers knew before they arrived at the scene, officers’ statements have been examined, together with radio communications between the radio operator and the officers. The officers’ threat assessments whilst on route to the scene were based upon information received from the radio communications.
104. The officers’ threat assessments were added to upon arrival at the scene, based on the situation as it presented itself. Officers’ statements were examined together with CCTV evidence and witness accounts to understand the threat the officers were presented with at the scene.
105. Police officers across London work from different radio channels, depending on where they are based and their specialist skills. Additionally, the City of London Police Service is a separate police service to the Metropolitan Police Service so have their own radio channels. The firearms officers who attended this incident and fired shots were from the City of London and Metropolitan Police Services. Due to being specialist firearms officers and working for two different forces, more than one radio channel was examined in this investigation.
Suspects move from London Bridge to Stoney Street
106. Having crashed the van on London Bridge into some railings outside Southwark Cathedral, the three suspects travelled on foot through Borough Market until they reached Stoney Street. During their time on foot, they stabbed multiple members of the public, which is subject to an investigation by the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Unit, SO15. They also encountered unarmed officers, who have provided statements.
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107. Many witnesses have provided statements regarding the demeanour and actions of the three suspects prior to firearms officers engaging with them on Stoney Street. To avoid repetition, not all statements are referred to in this report, particularly where multiple witnesses saw the same thing or CCTV evidence is available and sufficient.
People running on Stoney Street
108. Prior to firearms officers arriving at the scene, CCTV showed many members of public ran up Stoney Street past the Wheatsheaf Public House on their left. Some looked over their shoulders as they ran as though they were looking at something behind them. CCTV from within the Wheatsheaf Public House showed people inside were aware of something happening outside as they crowded around the windows and looked out towards Stoney Street.
Figure 4 – Council CCTV image showing members of the public running on Stoney Street before the suspects appear in view and walk up Stoney Street and approach the Wheatsheaf Public House for the first time.
109. Ms E was inside the Wheatsheaf Public House and she recalled hearing a commotion outside, which sounded like men and women shouting.
110. As the commotion grew outside, Ms E saw people running past the pub and saw a woman knocked over by a man as he ran passed her. Ms E wanted to have a closer look to see if this woman was all right but was unable to get closer to the window as people crowded around the windows. She recalled seeing a man outside the pub throwing items and believed there was a fight going on outside as someone inside the pub said, “They’ve got knives”.
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111. As a larger group of people ran past the pub, Ms E saw people shut the pub doors and put items up against them as a barricade.
112. Ms F recalled she was inside the Wheatsheaf Public House sat a table by the window, which looked out towards Stoney Street. At approximately 10.05pm, Ms F recalled noticing a “commotion taking place outside of the pub”. She saw people running past the window towards Borough High Street and a man pick up a bar stool. Her first thought was “oh no, there is going to be a bar fight”. Ms F recalled the doors to the pub were locked and then she saw two suspects walking calmly towards the pub, one was carrying a knife “8 inches long” which she described as “shiny and clean”. Ms F then witnessed a member of staff being stabbed outside the pub.
113. Mr C recalled he was walking towards Borough Market when he saw a man running towards him shouting, “There’s a terrorist attack going on”. Mr C stated he carried on walking towards Borough Market and saw more people running before he noticed the three suspects who he described were “walking around trying to chase people passing by”.
Stabbings on Stoney Street
114. At 10.10pm, CCTV showed that as the three suspects walked up Stoney Street, they approached a group of people stood on the street outside the Wheatsheaf Public House. Two of these people, Mr G and Ms H, were stabbed by the three suspects, but managed to escape.
Figure 5 – Council CCTV showing the three suspects as they walk up Stoney Street, past The Wheatsheaf Public House (on the left) before they stab members of the public on the street
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Black and Blue Restaurant
115. At 10.11pm, the three suspects continued up Stoney Street, away from the Wheatsheaf Public House and out of CCTV view. The suspects then entered the Black and Blue Restaurant where they continued their attack on the public, which forms part of the Metropolitan Police Service’s Counter Terrorism investigation.
116. At 10.14pm, the three suspects walked back down Stoney Street, towards Southwark Street, with the Wheatsheaf Public House on their right. As the three suspects walked back down Stoney Street, CCTV showed members of the public running away from them.
Figure 6 – Council CCTV image showing members of the public running on Stoney Street away from the Black and Blue Restaurant (out of view to the top of the camera).
Continuity of the three suspects
117. By this time police had received multiple calls from the public and unarmed officers had arrived in Bedale Street, which runs parallel to Stoney Street, on the other side of the market stalls within Borough Market.
118. Local response team officers (unarmed) recalled they attended a radio call to attend the London Bridge area to reports of a road traffic collision. Due to the number of officers who attended the area, not all officers are referred to in this report. PC Z (uniformed), PC Y (uniformed) and PC X (plain-clothed) engaged with the suspects during their attack on the public and before armed officers arrived.
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119. As PC Z arrived at Bedale Street, he recalled seeing multiple casualties on the street and noticed people running towards him from Borough Market and Stoney Street. He recalled people were screaming and shouting and he recalled hearing things like “they are there” as people pointed back towards the market area. PC X stopped his vehicle on Bedale Street and recalled the public shouting at him “they went down there, get down there” and pointing him towards an alleyway leading into the market area. PC Y recalled seeing a person lying face down on the ground as he arrived on Bedale Street and members of public shouting, “they’ve gone that way” and pointing towards a walkway that leads into the market stalls.
120. PC Z, PC Y and PC X entered the market and, as they approached Stoney Street, they came across the three suspects.
121. PC Z recalled he ran towards the market and, as he came to the junction with Stoney Street, he saw one of the suspects and stopped immediately. He recalled the suspect was carrying a knife and stated, “He was covered in blood from the tip of the knife almost up to his elbow”. PC Z stated he was about to shout verbal commands at this suspect but then noticed there were two other suspects who also had knives in their hands.
122. PC Z recalled seeing the suspects “wearing some kind of vest with 3 cylinder shapes items on it”, which he believed were suicide vests. PC Z believed he would have been stabbed if he tried to get close enough to the three suspects to use his baton or CS spray. PC Z recalled the three suspects staring at him for “a good few seconds” before they started to “chant” at him and say things like “Allahu Akbar”. He recalled one subject raised his knife towards him as all three moved closer.
123. PC Y recalled seeing three suspects and noticed one of them had an IED strapped across his abdomen and a knife in each hand. He recalled, “I didn’t think it was real at the time as it didn’t seem real to me”, he further stated, “it didn’t register with me that someone would be wearing a bomb”. PC Y recalled seeing “a large machete” in one of the suspect’s hand, “about 2-3 feet in length” and raised above his head. He recalled a smaller weapon in the suspect’s other hand, also raised above his head.
124. PC X recalled he immediately noticed one of the suspects had “a knife in each hand”, which he described as being covered in blood. He recalled they were about 8–10 inches long. When PC X saw the other two suspects, he believed the incident was an ongoing terrorist attack.
125. PC Z recalled he began to walk backwards away from the suspects. He was concerned that the suspects would follow them. PC X recalled calling for urgent firearms assistance from armed officers and backing away from the suspects.
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126. PC Z and PC Y recalled one of the suspects threw a brown glass bottle at PC Z’s face, striking him on the forehead causing a cut. PC Z recalled thinking at the time that the bottle may have contained acid, based on his belief he was at a terrorist attack.
127. The three officers continued to back away from the suspects, who they stated then turned and went back towards Stoney Street. The three officers followed the suspects back towards Stoney Street in order to update the control room on their position.
Threat assessment from radio communications en route to the scene – City of London Police
128. In their statements, BX44, BX45 and BX46 recalled that, at approximately 10.05pm they heard over their radio that a van had hit five pedestrians on London Bridge. At this time, the officers were on Great Eastern Street, approximately two miles away.
129. BX44 recalled his initial thoughts were to the recent terrorist attack at Westminster and the current threat level only recently being reduced from ‘critical’ to ‘severe’ following the Manchester attack. BX45 recalled his initial thoughts were of the similarities to the recent terrorist attack in Westminster. BX46 recalled believing that this incident could be a similar attack to the terrorist attack at Westminster Bridge.
130. As BX44, BX45 and BX46 made their way to the scene; the three officers recalled receiving an update on the radio that the suspect van had crashed into Southwark Cathedral.
131. In this statement, BX44 recalled that this update made him believe it must be a terrorism-related incident rather than a traffic collision as the van had crashed south of the bridge, some distance from where it was reported that pedestrians had been hit on the bridge. BX44’s threat assessment of what he heard on the radio caused him to remove their primary weapons from the safe of their vehicle which he accessed by pulling the rear seats forward. This meant that each officer was in possession of a Heckler and Koch G36 carbine and a Glock 9mm pistol. BX44 recalled he wanted to ensure they were as prepared as possible at the scene.
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132. The three officers recalled the incident was declared ‘Operation Plato’ over the radio shortly before they arrived at the scene. BX44 understood this to mean he was attending a suspected marauding terrorist attack and would be likely to encounter attackers armed with knives, firearms and/or suicide vests. BX45 understood this to mean they were attending a terrorist attack with an unknown number of casualties and attackers. BX46 understood this to mean they were attending a terrorist operation, where terrorists have access to unrestricted victims, and officers could expect the presence of guns, knives and explosives.
The suspects approach the Wheatsheaf Public House for a second time
133. After the confrontation with PC X and his colleagues in the market, the three suspects went back to Stoney Street. In his statement, Mr D recalled he was leaving the Wheatsheaf Public House with his partner Ms J. He saw a commotion on Stoney Street as he stepped outside and saw people running and heard someone scream “knives”. Mr D described seeing three “shadowy figures” walking down Stoney Street who he thought were all carrying “red coloured sticks,” pointing “straight upwards”, making no effort to conceal them.
134. As Ms J left the Wheatsheaf Public House, slightly behind Mr D, she recalled her attention was drawn to a “couple of guys walking calmly” as everyone else on the street was running. She recalled one of the men had a knife in his hand, which she described as “10-11 inches long, it was thin and was covered in blood”. Ms J pulled Mr D back into the pub and the doors were locked immediately behind them.
135. At 10.15pm, CCTV shows the three suspects walked back down Stoney Street from the direction of the Black and Blue Restaurant and approach the Wheatsheaf Public House. CCTV within the Wheatsheaf Public House showed most people inside attempting to hide out of view, where they remained until evacuated by the police.
136. As the three suspects approached the Wheatsheaf Public House, Ms E recalled, “They were wearing canisters as a sort of utility belt around their waists”. CCTV showed Khuram Butt approached the door of the Wheatsheaf Public House.
137. Mr D remained by the door, he recalled one of the suspects came to the door, and started kicking it with “such force the bottom of the door was buckling”. Ms J also saw one suspect come to the door of the pub and try to get in by “kicking the door for about 30 seconds”. This was Khuram Butt.
138. Mr D described Khuram Butts eyes were “as big as golf balls”. Ms E recalled, “His eyes were really wide and he had a crazed, manic look in his eyes.”
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139. Mr D recalled Khuram Butt was holding a “hunting knife” described as “about 12” long” which he then used to start “pounding on and attacking the glass in the door with”. Ms J recalled this caused the windowpane to “fill with blood” from his hands.
140. Ms F remained by the window and recalled Khuram Butt “stopped and opened his arms up wide to sort of shoulder height in a ‘come on then’ type pose”. Ms F also noticed Khuram Butt was wearing “camping type bottles with screw on tops strapped up with gaffer tape around his stomach area” so she told people inside “they have got explosives” and ran to the back of the pub to hide.
141. Mr D saw “four or five canisters strapped to his torso” and saw that each canister had a “black coloured lever on the top” so he believed the suspects were terrorists and carrying bombs. Mr C recalled one of the suspects had “a belt around him at belly level” and saw that it had “little canisters” on it that appeared to him to be yellow or green in colour. He thought it looked like “some sort of bomb” but stated he “didn’t think they looked real”.
Figure 7 – Council CCTV showing the three suspects stood outside the Wheatsheaf Public House door with Khuram Butt kicking one of the doors.
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Attack on Mr B
142. Approximately 18 seconds after the three suspects had walked back down Stoney Street and stood outside the Wheatsheaf Public House, their attention was drawn to Mr B, who was walking up Stoney Street. Mr B recalled one of the men was wearing a dark coloured hoodie and “was screaming something” that he did not understand. He recalled this suspect was holding something as he ran towards him and lunged at him, hitting him on the head. Mr B now realises this suspect was holding a knife about 20cm in length and stabbing him.
143. Mr B recalled he tried to deflect some of the blows from the subject as he repeatedly struck him. He had the impression he was attacked by more than one person and felt “it could have been three men that were assaulting me”.
144. Mr D recalled the three suspects ran over to Mr B and “without hesitation they attacked him”. Mr D stated that it appeared as if the suspects were “trying to stab the man as many times as they could and they were clearly trying to kill him”.
Threat assessment of City of London Police officers on entering Stoney Street
145. As the City of London drove towards Stoney Street from Southwark Street, BX45 recalled a member of public flagged them down and told them his friend had been stabbed and pointed towards Stoney Street. BX46 recalled his window was open and he heard someone say about people being stabbed. BX46 recalled that as they drove along Southwark Street members of the public pointed them in the general direction of London Bridge/Borough Market.
146. The City of London Police firearms officers arrived in Stoney Street approximately four seconds after the three suspects started their attack on Mr B. CCTV showed Stoney Street was generally empty, apart from a few people who were stood on the street throwing chairs and crates in an attempt to defend Mr B from the three suspects.
147. On entering Stoney Street, BX44 recalled seeing what appeared to be a large fight in front of them, with bottles and chairs being thrown. BX44 recalled he had just removed the last G36 from the vehicle safe to hand to BX45 as he got out of ARV1.
148. BX45 recalled that, as he drove onto Stoney Street he saw several people running in different directions. BX45’s attention was drawn to a male swinging a chair around trying to hit another male.
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149. BX46 recalled seeing a big commotion in the street with large objects being thrown.
150. PC Z, PC X and PC Y were stood nearby and witnessed the three suspects begin to attack Mr B. PC Z recalled armed police arrived on Stoney Street so he shouted out to the officers “it’s them”, in relation to the three suspects.
151. Mr K was on Stoney Street as armed police arrived and recalled he threw a crate at one of the suspects during their attack on Mr B just as the police car arrived. Another witness, Mr L, was also on Stoney Street and recalled throwing a chair towards the three suspects as they attacked Mr B, in order to stop them. As the City of London Police arrived, Mr L recalled, he shouted out to an armed officer “he’s over there” pointing towards the suspects.
Actions of Khuram Butt during the initial engagement
152. ARV1 arrived on Stoney Street approximately four seconds after the attack on Mr B began. CCTV showed that the three suspects stopped their attack on Mr B and disappeared briefly into Borough Market. Mr B was injured but able to stand and run into the market, where he received first aid.
153. ARV1 stopped in the middle of the road and BX46 got out first from the front passenger door and ran around the front of ARV1 towards where the suspects had run into the market, before stopping in front of ARV1. In his statement, BX46 recalled he saw an Asian male in a dark blue Arsenal shirt holding a large knife in his right hand and looking towards ARV1, this is now known to be Khuram Butt. BX46 recalled shouting “armed police” and saw Khuram Butt turn and start moving towards him.
Figure 8 – Council CCTV showing ARV1 arriving on Stoney Street and BX46 exiting from the front passenger seat. The three suspects can be seen attacking Mr B, who is on the floor.
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154. BX46 recalled he saw Khuram Butt was wearing a suicide vest so fearing for his own life and the lives of others, he pointed his G36 carbine towards Khuram Butt and moved the fire selector lever to ‘fire’.
155. BX46 recalled that he gave verbal commands to Khuram Butt to “stand still” and “stay there” but CCTV shows Khuram Butt ran from the market area towards BX46, who immediately started to back away.
156. PC Z recalled hearing someone shout verbal commands such as “get down” and “drop the knife”. PC Y and PC X recalled hearing the firearms officers shout “armed police”.
157. Mr C recalled hearing a police officer shouting, “Go down” but stated “they didn’t look like they cared what the officer was saying”. He recalled one of the suspects pointed his arm towards an officer as the officer was moving backwards and to the sides.
158. In his statement, BX46 stated he believed Khuram Butt was going to kill him as he ran towards him because he had a knife in his hand and was wearing what BX46 believed was an IED vest. BX46 stated he knew the incident had been declared as a terrorist attack, which heightened his threat assessment. BX46 recalled he shot at Khuram Butt as he continued to run at him. He stated he was unable to see whether his shot hit Khuram Butt, as there was no reaction from his body and no blood visible. As BX46 backed away from Khuram Butt, CCTV showed, Khuram Butt kept running towards him.
159. PC X recalled shouting at BX46 “shoot him, shoot him” in regards to Khuram Butt. He recalled Khuram Butt running towards BX46 with his hands in front of him with the “knives on show” as he heard BX46 shout “armed police”. PC X recalled Khuram Butt was “2-3 yards from the officer” before BX46 started to shoot him.
160. PC Z recalled he shouted, “shoot them” to the firearms officers and saw the suspects get so close to the officers they could “almost lean onto the officer’s guns”.
161. BX46 recalled he fired further shots at Khuram Butt until he fell to the floor on his front and BX46 considered he was no longer a threat. Once Khuram Butt had fallen to the floor, BX46 backed away towards the pavement outside the Wheatsheaf Public House. CCTV showed Khuram Butt fell between the temporary partitions on the street outside the Wheatsheaf Public House.
162. Although CCTV does not show when BX46 fired his weapon, it does show that Khuram Butt ran from the market, across the path of ARV1 and almost reached BX46 before he fell to the floor.
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163. CCTV evidence showed that, as Khuram Butt ran towards BX46, both BX44 and BX45 got out of the offside of ARV1, ran towards the front of the vehicle and ‘tracked’ Khuram Butt with their firearms pointed towards him as he ran at their colleague, BX46. This caused their firearms to face towards the Wheatsheaf Public House (sweeping right to left). Mr B recalled that, within seconds of being stabbed, he heard “loud bangs like fire crackers” as if “many shots from guns were taking place all together”.
Figure 9 – Council CCTV showing Khuram Butt running across the path of ARV1 towards BX46, as BX44 and BX45 point their weapons across ARV1 towards Khuram Butt and in the direction of the Wheatsheaf Public House.
164. BX44 and BX45 do not recall firing their weapons as they ‘tracked’ Khuram Butt. However, CCTV from inside the Wheatsheaf Public House showed this was when two bullets enter through the windows, one of which hit Mr A, who was standing by the window inside the Wheatsheaf Public House, causing him to fall to the floor.
165. Evidence provided by the ballistic expert states two bullets were fired into the windows of the Wheatsheaf Public House from Stoney Street, approximately 1.5 metres above the height of the pavement. There was no evidence to suggest these bullets had ricocheted from a hard surface before striking the windows. In the ballistic expert’s opinion, these bullets were fired in quick succession by a gun or guns positioned in Stoney Street to the left of the Wheatsheaf Public House as looking towards it from the outside, and pointing in the direction of the premises.
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166. These bullets could only have come from BX44 or BX45 because BX46 was facing in a different direction and there were no other armed officers in attendance at this time.
167. It was approximately three seconds from when Khuram Butt ran at BX46 to when he fell to the floor.
168. Some members of the public remained on Stoney Street during the initial police engagement. CCTV showed Mr B got to his feet as officers shot the three suspects to the floor and ran into the market area where he heard “another series of rapid shots being fired” and received first aid.
169. Many members of the public within the Wheatsheaf Public House heard the gunshots on Stoney Street.
Injury to Mr A
170. The CCTV from within the Wheatsheaf Public House showed Mr A was hit by a bullet and fell forwards to the floor as ARV1 rolled along Stoney Street outside the window. No other firearms officers were on the scene at this time.
171. Mr A recalled he saw Mr B being attacked on Stoney Street and was thinking of how to stop the suspects getting into the Wheatsheaf Public House when he saw “two or three firearms officers” and “brilliant white flashes maybe two or three rounds fired in a split second”. The next thing he recalled was being “catapulted backwards through the air” having been shot. Mr A states the officers “fired towards the man so therefore towards the pub”.
172. In his interview, Mr A stated, “the police turned up and dealt with the situation admirably”.
173. Mr D, who was stood near to Mr A recalled hearing a “volley of bullets being fired” and he dropped to the ground, as he did not want to get shot. He stated he felt a “stinging sensation to the side of my face” and sharply turned his head to the left. He recalled looking to his left and saw there was a man lying on the floor with blood around him. This was Mr A.
174. Following subsequent treatment at hospital, Mr A stated he sustained a non- penetrating gunshot wound to the head as the bullet glanced from his skull front to back. This did not result in any brain tissue damage. Mr A’s speech, reading and comprehending was affected, but this is not thought to be permanent.
The number of shots fired towards Khuram Butt during the initial engagement
175. It is unknown how many shots the officers fired in total towards Khuram Butt during this initial engagement.
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176. From the ammunition count-back, it is known that BX46 fired six shots in total during the incident. CCTV does not show how many times BX46 fired his weapon during this engagement and BX46 recalled, “I cannot be certain how many shots I fired but I continued to fire until the male fell to the floor”. However, BX46 stated he only fired one further shot during the incident and therefore the evidence suggests he fired five rounds during this initial engagement with Khuram Butt.
177. The CCTV is not of a quality to make out BX44 or BX45 firing their weapons towards Khuram Butt and neither officer recalled firing at him as he ran towards BX46. Both BX44 and BX45 subsequently fire multiple shots during the incident and therefore the count-back of ammunition at the police station does not assist.
178. The post-mortem and ballistic evidence indicates that Khuram Butt received multiple gunshot injuries in Stoney Street and therefore this evidence does not assist in determining how many shots BX44 and BX45 fired during this initial engagement, neither does it assist in determining how many times Khuram Butt was hit during this initial engagement. This was not the last time Khuram Butt was fired upon.
Actions of Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba during the initial engagement
179. CCTV showed as Khuram Butt fell to the floor outside the Wheatsheaf Public House, Rachid Redouane, who was just out of view of the CCTV, ran in front of ARV1, which was still moving, following the same path as Khuram Butt. He appeared to be following Khuram Butt and running towards BX46. As Rachid Redouane reached the middle of the road, he turned to his left and ran towards BX44 and BX45, on the opposite side of ARV1. At the same time, Youssef Zaghba appeared from the market area and ran towards BX44 and BX45, closely following Rachid Redouane.
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Figure 10 – Council CCTV showing Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba running towards BX44 and BX45.
180. Within seconds, Rachid Redouane, Youssef Zaghba, BX45 and BX44 were all within metres of each other and at some point ARV1 ran over the left foot of BX45.
181. BX44 recalled that three Asian suspects armed with knives ran towards him and his colleagues. BX44 described one suspect running towards him was wearing a black hoodie with “military webbing”, and brandishing a 12-inch kitchen knife. This was Youssef Zaghba. He described the suspect running towards BX45 as wearing a striped top with “military webbing”, brandishing a 12-inch knife. This was Rachid Redouane.
182. BX44 recalled that he fired a number of shots at Rachid Redouane, believing he was about to stab BX45 with the knife he was holding. BX44 then recalled he fired a number of shots towards Youssef Zaghba, who was two metres away from him, and he fell backwards onto the floor in the process.
183. BX44 continued to fire at Youssef Zaghba from the floor until he fell, landing on top of BX44. CCTV showed BX44 managed to free himself, stand up and move away from Youssef Zaghba, who remained lying on the floor.
184. It was approximately three seconds from when Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba ran from the market area towards BX44 and BX45 to when they fell to the floor.
185. BX45 recalled Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba had knives and one of them was wearing an IED strapped to their body. Therefore, BX45 shot towards the centre mass of one of the suspects but was unable to specify whether it
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was Youssef Zaghba or Rachid Redouane. BX45 recalled there was no immediate reaction to the shots he fired and stated, “I can’t be sure how many shots I fired, but I fired until I believed the threat was neutralised”.
186. BX45 recalled he noticed the male BX44 had shot was also wearing an IED and was still moving whilst on the floor. He recalled “this male posed an imminent threat to my life” so fired a number of shots towards him. The evidence would suggest this was Youssef Zaghba.
187. BX46 did not fire any shots towards Rachid Redouane or Youssef Zaghba, but was aware his colleagues were firing their weapons. PC Z recalled seeing the officers fire multiple shots as the suspects ran towards them. Mr C described the suspects moving “as a group” and being about one to two metres from the police officers.
The number of shots fired towards Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba during the initial engagement
188. It is unknown how many shots BX44 and BX45 each fired towards Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba during this initial engagement. The CCTV does not assist the investigation in this regard.
189. BX44 recalled he fired a number of shots towards Rachid Redouane followed by a number of shots towards Youssef Zaghba. BX44 fired further shots during the incident and therefore the count-back of ammunition does not assist. BX44 fired 17 shots in total during the incident.
190. BX45 stated he fired a number of shots towards Rachid Redouane followed by a number of shots towards Youssef Zaghba whilst he continued to move on the floor. BX45 stated he did not fire further shots during the incident and the count- back of ammunition showed he fired eight shots in total. However, the evidence suggests BX45 fired shots towards Khuram Butt as he ran towards BX46, so the count-back does not indicate how many shots he fired towards any of the suspects. BX45 fired eight shots in total during the incident.
191. The post-mortem evidence indicates that Rachid Redouane received multiple gunshot injuries in Stoney Street and therefore this evidence does not assist in determining how many shots BX44 and BX45 fired during this initial engagement, neither does it assist in determining how many times Rachid Redouane was hit during this initial engagement.
192. This was not the last time Rashid Redouane was fired upon.
193. Youssef Zaghba was not shot again after the initial engagement, he was therefore only shot by BX44 and BX45. The post-mortem and ballistic expert evidence indicates that Youssef Zaghba received two distinct gunshot injuries in Stoney Street. This evidence does not assist in determining how many shots
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BX44 and BX45 fired during this initial engagement, as some bullets may have missed, but it does show of the number of bullets, which hit Youssef Zaghba.
194. The ballistic evidence shows that Youssef Zaghba sustained one gunshot entry wound to the front of his chest and one to the back of his lower right chest.
195. One exit wound was apparent to his upper back, which corresponded to the entry wound to the front of the chest. This was caused by a fully expanded 5.56 x 45mm calibre soft-point bullet, which was recovered during the post-mortem from the material used to wrap his body at the scene.
196. A second fully-expanded 5.56 x 45mm calibre soft-point bullet was recovered during the post-mortem under the skin of the outer right chest wall. This bullet had entered at the back of his lower right chest.
197. There were visible close range discharge effects present on Youssef Zaghba’s right hand. This ballistic evidence indicates that Youssef Zaghba’s right hand was within 60 centimetres of the muzzle of a firearm at the time it was discharged. This is supported by CCTV evidence, witness and officers accounts that Youssef Zaghba ran towards the firearms officers and did not fall to the floor until he reached them.
Threat assessment from radio communications en route to the scene – Metropolitan Police Service
198. At the same time as the City of London Police officers engaged with the suspects, additional firearms officers from the Metropolitan Police Service were making their way to the scene.
199. The second ARV to arrive on Stoney Street, ARV2, contained E122, AY14 and BY28. ARV2 travelled from Lambeth Police Station, Norfolk Row.
200. The driver of ARV2, E122, recalled that, just after 10pm, he heard on his radio about a quickly developing incident. He recalled hearing that a van had driven along London Bridge, running over several members of public. E122 recalled being informed that numerous members of the public had called police and some had reported the attackers from the van had run off. He also recalled being informed there were numerous casualties.
201. Whilst en route to the area, E122 recalled being updated that the attackers were armed with knives and that the incident had been declared ‘Operation Plato’, which he understood to mean he was attending a terrorist incident where the role of firearms officers is to identify, locate and confront the threat.
202. As they approached the area, E122 recalled being informed that the suspects were possibly in the area of Southwark Cathedral but, as he drove towards
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London Bridge, he recalled seeing injured members of the public at the junction with Stoney Street so he turned left onto Stoney Street.
203. AY14 recalled responding to a call to London Bridge at about 10pm. Whilst en route to the area, AY14 recalled, he was in charge of monitoring the radios for further updates and recalled hearing reports of multiple casualties. He also recalled the incident was declared ‘Operation Plato’ and was handed his Sig MCX carbine.
204. As they neared the Borough Market area AY14 recalled seeing the public and police officers running along the street, away from the direction of the market.
205. BY28 recalled that, just after 10pm, they responded to a call over the radio that a vehicle had just knocked numerous people over on London Bridge. He recalled hearing that numerous people were injured and there was possibly someone in the water.
206. Whilst on route to the area, BY28 recalled being informed it was a possible terrorist attack so he retrieved their Sig MCX carbines from the safe in the vehicle. In his statement, BY28 considered the similar methodology to the Westminster terrorist attack and knew they needed to get to the scene as quickly as possible to assess what was happening and possibly confront a threat and help injured parties.
207. Before arriving at the scene, BY28 recalled, the incident had been declared ‘Operation Plato’ and he heard reminders on the radio that said something similar to “remember your training, identify, locate and confront the threat, confront the threat”. BY28 recalled they received further updates that people were being attacked at Southwark Cathedral.
208. As ARV2 drove along Southwark Street, BY28 saw people running out of Stoney Street in a panic, some of whom were injured and had blood on them. BY28 heard someone shout “they are killing people”. As ARV2 entered Stoney Street, BY28 recalled hearing a numerous shots being fired.
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Figure 11 – Cleartone footage from ARV2 prior to their arrival on Stoney Street showing members of the public fleeing the scene (NB there is a time difference between this vehicle footage and the Council CCTV system).
209. The third ARV to enter Stoney Street is referred to as ARV3. None of the officers in ARV3 fired shots during this incident.
210. The fourth ARV to arrive at the scene is referred to as ARV4. This vehicle contained the driver, D4, and two passengers AY37 and E59. Only E59 fired shots during this incident.
211. E59 recalled he heard over his radio that a vehicle had run over members of the public on the footway on London Bridge. Whilst en route to the area, E59 recalled hearing updates on the radio that there were numerous casualties and the incident had been declared ‘Operation Plato’. E59 recalled this made him certain he was attending a terrorist attack and his “tactics and decision making would have to be commensurate with that increased risk”. As ARV4 drove along Borough High Street towards the junction of Southwark Street, E59 recalled, he heard a number of gunshots to his left coming from Stoney Street. E59 recalled he had never heard so much gunfire in his life and stated it sounded like a training scenario.
212. ARV4 stopped on the footway of Southwark Street and E59 recalled immediately running towards Stoney Street. E59 stated that there was no time for him to put on his gloves, PPE (personal protection equipment) or attach his weapon (MCX Sig carbine) to his sling. E59 stated this had never happened at an incident before and recalled it demonstrated to him how fast moving and dangerous the situation was.
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213. AY37 recalled that, at approximately 10.10pm, he heard on his personal radio that a van had crashed on London Bridge and there were a number of casualties. Whilst en route AY37 recalled the incident was declared ‘Operation Plato’ and as they reached the area AY37 recalled being informed that there were “X-Rays” within Borough Market itself, which he understood to mean potential terrorists. As ARV4 drove along Borough High Street, AY37 recalled seeing members of public “running in every direction” but most were running from Stoney Street. AY37 recalled hearing a lot of gunfire coming from the direction of Stoney Street as ARV4 stopped. AY37 saw other ARVs enter Stoney Street as he got out of ARV4 and ran into Stoney Street.
214. D4 recalled that, after 10pm, he heard on the radio that a vehicle had run over members of the public on London Bridge. D4 stated he had an instant feeling that it was serious. Whilst en route to the area, D4 recalled hearing there were a number of males attacking members of the public near Southwark Cathedral with knives and the incident had been declared ‘Operation Plato’.
215. D4 understood this to mean he was attending a “marauding terrorist attack”. As they approached the area, D4 told his unit to wind down their windows in case they came across the suspects quickly and needed to engage with them from within the car. As D4 drove along Southwark Street towards the junction with Stoney Street he heard multiple shots, which he recalled sounded like either more than one firearm or an automatic weapon, so was instantly considering that the suspects might have automatic weapons. D4 saw members of the public running “all over the road and pavements” and described the scene as “chaos”. D4 stopped ARV4 and approached Stoney Street on foot and recalled hearing members of public shouting words similar to “they are around there, they’ve got knives, hurry”.
Metropolitan Police Service arrive at the scene
216. ARV2 arrived approximately 23 seconds after the City of London Police officers arrived on Stoney Street, by which time all three suspects were on the floor. As ARV2 stopped near to where Youssef Zaghba was lying, Cleartone footage from ARV2 showed, Youssef Zaghba raised his hand to his chest area and BX44 used his foot to scrape his hands away from the IED.
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Figure 12 – Cleartone footage from ARV2 showing BX44 with his foot on Youssef Zaghbas chest. Image edited by IOPC to cover BX44’s face. (NB there is a time difference between this vehicle footage and the Council CCTV system).
217. As ARV2 came to a stop, AY14 emerged from the front passenger seat and ran directly towards Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane, providing firearms cover on them. AY14 recalled in his statement that Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane were alive and had large silver bundles strapped to their chests. Additionally, he recalled, Rachid Redouane had a belt around his body, which was exposed by his top riding up. AY14 stated he believed these silver bundles were person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) and was aware they could be detonated at any moment. AY14 shouted to his colleagues that the suspects had explosives.
218. CCTV showed that BY28 emerged from the rear passenger seat of ARV2 one second after AY14 and ran towards Youssef Zaghba and provided firearms cover on him. BY28 recalled being aware there were three suspects on the floor, and it was evident to him they had been shot by police as firearms officers were pointing their weapons towards them. BY28 recalled shouting verbal commands to Youssef Zaghba and could see him breathing as he noticed he had “6-8 white and silver packets strapped to his chest”, which BY28 believed were IEDs.
219. In his statement, BY28 stated he feared for his life and the lives of his colleagues and public in the area because he believed the devices could have been detonated at any moment. BY28 shouted to his colleagues to warn them of the presence of IEDs and noticed the same “packets” were strapped to the chest of Rachid Redouane, who was still breathing. BY28 recalled he heard his
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colleagues shouting verbal commands to Rashid Redouane to keep him still and keep his hands where they could be seen.
220. Whilst AY14 and BY28 covered Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba on the floor, CCTV showed BX44 and BX45 moved across Stoney Street to join BX46 and provide firearms cover on Khuram Butt, who was on the ground in front of the Wheatsheaf Public House.
221. Three seconds after BY28 got out of ARV2, CCTV showed E122 emerged from the driver’s seat and made his way behind ARV2 to the front passenger side. E122 recalled he saw Youssef Zaghba on the floor and saw he was wearing what he believed to be a “person borne improvised explosive device” strapped to the front of his body. E122 recalled also seeing the male behind Youssef Zaghba, now known to be Rashid Redouane, lying on the floor.
222. E122 saw Rashid Redouane had a belt secured to him, but recalled it was back to front. E122 believed they were dealing with suicide bombers at this point so immediately removed his Glock 17 pistol and provided firearms cover on Youssef Zaghba. E122 recalled hearing his colleagues shouting to one another about the discovery of the IED devices. E122 saw a third subject, now known to be Khuram Butt, on the floor outside the Wheatsheaf, also wearing a person borne improvised explosive device.
223. As E122 provided cover, CCTV shows, E59 ran onto Stoney Street and immediately provided firearms cover on Youssef Zaghba, to the right of E122. E59 stated as he ran onto Stoney Street he noticed a male lying face-up on the ground with his arms outstretched to the side with palms facing upwards, now known to be Youssef Zaghba. E59 recalled his hands were covered in blood and there was a large knife covered in blood on the floor close to his head.
224. As E59 approached, he saw what he thought were at least four 500ml sized drinks bottles on Youssef Zaghba’s midriff, arranged on a belt and covered in duct tape. E59 immediately thought this was an IED and that he had a suicide vest on. E59 pointed his weapon at Youssef Zaghba’s head, as he had been taught that shooting at an IED could trigger it, and he believed the most effective way to incapacitate a suicide bomber is to shoot them in the head.
225. CCTV showed D4 entered Stoney Street and approached E59 from behind, who was providing firearms cover on Youssef Zaghba. D4 recalled he saw Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane on the floor and the CCTV showed they were still moving. In his statement, D4 considered first aid but was notified by colleagues that the suspects were wearing “suspect devices”. D4 immediately saw the devices, which he believed were IEDs and believed their presence put everyone in imminent danger as they could be detonated.
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226. D4 recalled the recent Manchester bombings in which many people were killed because of an IED. D4 stated he realised none of the firearms officers present were wearing helmets or carrying ballistic shields to provide protection. D4 also became aware of Khuram Butt lying outside the Wheatsheaf Public House and was informed he was also wearing an IED.
227. CCTV showed AY37 ran onto Stoney Street and stopped as he reached ARV2, where other firearms officers were already providing cover on the suspects on the floor. He recalled seeing Youssef Zaghba lying on the floor and that he was wearing what he believed to be body-worn improvised devices around his body. He described the IED as “at least 3 vertical blocks”, which he believed were about the shape and size of a block-paving brick. He described seeing tape and wires on the vests, which connected the blocks. AY37 believed the vest was viable and believed it posed a threat to everyone. He realised he needed to find hard cover because Youssef Zaghba was still moving and did not know what the method of initiation was for the device.
228. AY37 recalled in his statement that this whole thought process took “a fraction of a second”. At this moment AY37 recalled hearing screams coming from within Borough Market so, recognising that other armed officers on scene had better coverage of Youssef Zaghba, he entered the market, concerned there may be further suspects outstanding. Additionally, AY37 stated, he believed any person within the market would be at risk if the IED detonated.
229. CCTV showed that, whilst AY14, BY28, E122 and E59 provided firearms cover on Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane, Youssef Zaghba moved slightly, but no further shots were fired towards him.
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Figure 13 – Council CCTV showing the City of London and Metropolitan Police officers providing firearms cover on the three suspects after they have been shot to the floor.
230. Sixteen seconds after ARV2 arrived on Stoney Street, CCTV showed AY14, BY28, D4 and E122 retreated to the nearside of ARV2 and E59 retreated to the offside of ARV2. The officers maintained firearms cover on Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane as they arranged themselves around ARV2.
231. As they retreated to ARV2, AY14, BY28 and E122 recalled noticing Khuram Butt lying on the floor outside the Wheatsheaf Public House. From their position on the nearside of ARV2, E122, AY14 and BY28 recalled seeing Khuram Butt was wearing an IED and, BY28 recalled, he was still breathing and had six to eight silver and white packages strapped to his chest.
232. The CCTV showed AY14, BY28, E122 and E59 maintained firearms cover on the three suspects whilst D4 walked between the four officers behind ARV2, appearing to communicate with them. The officers recalled being unable to withdraw any further as members of the public were trying to leave the Wheatsheaf Public House and they needed to protect them from the IEDs.
233. At this time BX44, BX45 and BX46 maintained firearms cover on Khuram Butt on the opposite side of the road.
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Figure 14 – Council CCTV showing the positioning of firearms officers as they moved to hard cover behind ARV2. Image edited by IOPC to cover BX45’s face.
PC X, PC Y and Mr C approach Khuram Butt
234. As officers retreated around ARV2, sixteen seconds after ARV2 arrived on scene, CCTV showed PC X, in plain clothes, and Mr C, a member of public, approached BX45 and BX46 on the pavement outside the Wheatsheaf Public House.
235. PC X recalled BX46 shouted “CUFFS” to PC X so he decided to handcuff Khuram Butt. PC X recalled Khuram Butt “had his hands clenched and up to his chest and they were covered in blood, he was groaning and clearly still alive at that stage”.
236. CCTV showed Mr C stood near Khuram Butt, on the pavement, outside the Wheatsheaf Public House. Mr C stated he decided to get closer to the area to take photographs. He recalled police shouting at the suspects on the floor, but stated he only had a clear visual of the one closest to the Wheatsheaf pub, now known to be Khuram Butt. Mr C stated he saw an officer take a knife from Khuram Butt and described it as a “big knife, quite big, 30-40cms an aluminium knife”. He saw officers “checking the other guys” but states he thought only Khuram Butt was alive.
237. PC X recalled as he placed a handcuff onto Khuram Butt he noticed he was wearing “a brown belt around his waist with what appeared to be grey plastic bottle taped to the belt with black gaffa tape”. In his statement, PC X stated he feared this was an explosive belt.
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238. CCTV showed PC Y also approached Khuram Butt and stood next to PC X, over Khuram Butt. At this time, BX44 stated he stood on Stoney Street providing firearms cover on Khuram Butt and recalled shouting to the unarmed officers to get away so he could have effective firearms cover. BX44 then withdrew further up Stoney Street near to where ARV1 has stopped where he was joined by BY5 and remained for the rest of the incident.
239. Other than BX44 and BY5, CCTV showed the position of the other firearms officers. BX45 and BX46 withdrew back along Stoney Street towards Southwark Street. AY14 and E122 remained on the nearside of ARV2 with their weapons pointed towards Khuram Butt. BY28 was stood with AY14 and E122 but pointing his weapon across the bonnet of ARV2 towards Rachid Redouane. E59 remained on the offside of ARV2, pointing his weapon towards where Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane were lying.
240. At 10.17pm, 19 seconds after PC Y arrived at the scene, CCTV showed him run across Stoney Street from where Khuram Butt was lying towards where Rachid Redouane was lying. PC Y appeared to lean over Rachid Redouane before he stopped and retreated back towards Khuram Butt and PC X. PC Y recalled in his statement that he wanted to handcuff Rachid Redouane to “prevent him from setting off the device”, but retreated when told to by a firearms officer.
Figure 15 – Council CCTV showing PC Y (labelled as ‘unarmed officer’) as he ran across Stoney Street towards Rachid Redouane.
241. All firearms officers who witnessed PC X and PC Y at the scene recalled they told them to get away from the area due to their belief the IEDs were genuine and could have been detonated. CCTV showed PC X, PC Y and Mr C
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remained in front of the Wheatsheaf Public House, to the left of Khuram Butt, until AY14 gestured with his arms towards them and they backed away up Stoney Street, away from the suspects. They were at the scene for approximately 33 seconds.
242. Mr C recalled he saw Khuram Butt move his legs whilst he was lying on his back with his knees up and heard officers shout at Khuram Butt not to move. Mr C recalled being asked by police officers to move away as he was one to one- and-a-half metres from Khuram Butt. Mr C recalled he moved around the corner, away from the suspects.
243. Having withdrawn back down Stoney Street towards ARV2, BX45 and BX46 crossed Stoney Street and went into the market area. BX45 and BX46 turned left and recalled making their way through the market with the intention of getting to where BX44 was standing next to ARV1.
Movements of Khuram Butt
244. Whilst officers continued to provide firearms cover from ARV2, CCTV and Cleartone footage showed Khuram Butt continued to move on the floor. AY14, stood on the nearside of ARV2, moved back and forth between ARV2 and the pavement, keeping his weapon trained on Khuram Butt, while E122 pointed his weapon at Khuram Butt from the front nearside of ARV2.
245. AY14 recalled in his statement that he was trying to find a better view of Khuram Butt’s whole body to establish what his exact movements were.
246. Khuram Butt continued to make slight movements on the floor, approximately every ten to 30 seconds but was not fired upon.
Secondary engagement with Rachid Redouane
247. Shortly after Khuram Butt moved, Rachid Redouane also moved. CCTV showed Rachid Redouane was lying on his right side with his back towards ARV2. At 10.22pm, he lifted his left leg and moved it back and forth across his right leg. BY28 recalled Rachid Redouane had a strap around his lower back, and he could see a lead or cable and aimed his firearm at Rachid Redouane’s centre body mass.
248. E59 was providing firearms cover on Youssef Zaghba, but recalled his attention was drawn to Rachid Redouane because of his continued movements. As Rachid Redouane continued to move, CCTV showed, E59 stepped away from the rear offside of ARV2 pointing his firearm towards him.
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Figure 16 – Council CCTV showing Rachid Redouane as he moved on the floor and the positioning of the firearms officers around ARV2.
249. A few seconds after making this movement with his legs, both officers recalled Rachid Redouane’s hand appeared from underneath his torso. BY28 stated he believed this was a “deliberate movement”. E59 and BY28 recalled they believed Rachid Redouane was reaching to detonate the IED on his body and so both officers stated they shot Rachid Redouane until he stopped moving. Cleartone footage and CCTV evidence supports the officers’ accounts that Rachid Redouane moved as they described.
250. Although CCTV does not have audio, it does show E59 appear to ‘brace’ himself and smoke appears from BY28’s weapon. The officers cannot be seen leaning against the vehicle on the Cleartone footage from ARV2, however the footage ‘shakes’ indicating the vehicle rocks slightly shortly after Rachid Redouane makes these movements. Additionally, after making the movements with his leg, Rachid Redouane’s body makes large movements. Both of these evidential facts would support that this is when he is shot.
251. These were the final shots towards Rachid Redouane. These occurred approximately seven minutes after the first ARV from the City of London Police arrived at the scene.
The number of shots fired towards Rachid Redouane in the second engagement
252. This was the last time Rachid Redouane was fired upon. The count-back of ammunition shows BY28 fired two bullets and E59 fired four bullets during the incident. BY28 and E59 recalled only firing upon Rachid Redouane whilst he was lying on the floor and the CCTV evidence supports this.
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253. In his statement, E59 recalled he fired four bullets towards Rachid Redouane which is supported by the ammunition count-back. In his statement, BY28 recalled he fired three bullets towards Rachid Redouane; however, the count- back shows he only fired two bullets. Therefore, Rachid Redouane was fired upon six times during the second engagement, as no other officers fired.
254. The post-mortem and ballistic expert evidence indicates that Rachid Redouane received four distinct gunshot injuries in Stoney Street. This evidence does not assist in determining how many of the bullets fired by E59 and BY28 hit Rachid Redouane during the second engagement.
255. The ballistic evidence shows that Rachid Redouane sustained four distinct gunshot wounds; two wounds to the front of the chest, one to the front groin and one to the back of the upper right chest. Additionally a fifth bullet had struck his upper left chest and a sixth bullet had passed through his right forearm.
256. Two fully expanded 5.56 x 45mm calibre soft-point bullets were recovered during the post-mortem. One was recovered from the right buttock, which corresponded to the entry wound in the right groin. The second bullet was recovered from the left shoulder, which had most likely entered the upper right back. A damaged and deformed bullet fragment was also recovered from the right forearm.
257. A further bullet was recovered from the mortuary after the post-mortem. This was a fully expanded 5.56 x 45mm calibre soft-point bullet which, in the ballistic expert’s opinion, most likely originated from one of the entry wounds to the front of the chest. The bullet from the second entry wound to the front of the chest appeared to have exited, causing several wounds to the back of the right chest.
258. In the ballistic expert’s opinion, Rachid Redouane had been struck by at least six bullets, although the report notes that there were a number of other injuries and abrasions present that may have been caused by further bullets or bullet fragments striking him.
Secondary engagement with Khuram Butt
259. After the initial engagement with Khuram Butt, several officers maintained long- cover on him. After falling to the floor, Khuram Butt continued to make small movements on the floor. Approximately 24 seconds after Rachid Redouane moved his legs and was shot; Khuram Butt can be seen on the CCTV to make movements that are more significant.
260. BY5 recalled he saw “a number of tubes on his back” in relation to the IED and saw him “moving his arms and appeared to be pushing himself up”. BY5 recalled he shouted words to the effect of “armed police” “stop moving” and “stay still” but Khuram Butt continued to move. BY5 recalled being mindful that
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the Wheatsheaf Public House was “made up of glass predominantly” and would not afford the public inside any protection if the IED detonated. BY5 believed Khuram Butt was attempting to detonate the IED on his body and there was a real risk to his own and others’ lives if it detonated.
261. BX44 also recalled he saw Khuram Butt moving and he was aware how close Khuram Butt was to members of the public in the Wheatsheaf Public House. He believed that, if the device were to be detonated, it would kill many people. BX44 recalled Khuram Butt’s arms positioned “as though his hands would have been near his throat” but stated his hands then moved downwards towards the suicide vest. At this point BX44 believed he was about to detonate the vest.
262. E122 recalled shouting verbal commands to Khuram Butt to show his hands, but stated he saw him “beginning to sit up”. He believed everyone was in imminent danger and believed Khuram Butt was moving in order to detonate the IED, which he believed would cause casualties and fatalities.
263. AY14 recalled shouting verbal commands to Khuram Butt to “stay down” and “show me your hands” but states Khuram Butt appeared to be pushing himself up from the floor, raising his head and torso. All the officers stated they believed he was moving in order to try to detonate the IED.
264. The officers’ accounts are supported by the CCTV evidence that showed Khuram Butt made further and more significant movements whilst he was on the floor. His legs moved significantly and he appeared to be raising his head and torso off the pavement into an almost seated position. CCTV also supports that members of the public were in the immediate vicinity of Khuram Butt by the door of the Wheatsheaf Public House, a matter of only a few metres away.
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Figure 17 – Council CCTV showing the moment Khuram Butt moved on the floor.
Figure 18 – Council CCTV showing the moment Khuram Butt moved on the floor.
265. BY5, stood next to BX44 near to where ARV1 came to stop, recalled he fired one shot from his G36 carbine to the central body mass between Khuram Butt’s shoulder blades, above the device. BY5 stated Khuram Butt continued to move, so he kept shooting until he believed the threat was over and was aware BX44, stood next to him, was also firing his weapon. BX44 recalled he was aware that other shots were also being fired from the other end of Stoney Street.
266. E122, stood by ARV2 at the other end of Stoney Street, recalled he fired one shot from his Glock 17 but believed the threat still existed so fired two further
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shots until he believed the immediate threat to life from Khuram Butt had diminished. E122 recalled he still believed there was a real risk from the device detonating.
267. AY14, stood next to E122, stated he took a deliberately aimed shot to Khuram Butt’s upper torso with his G36 carbine. AY14 stated this had no effect and Khuram Butt was still moving so he fired another shot to his upper torso. AY14 recalled Khuram Butt was in “an almost press up position” so AY14 altered his aim and fired at his head. He recalled that Khuram Butt immediately slumped to the floor, and so he believed he had neutralised the threat.
268. As Khuram Butt made the above movement, CCTV showed, AY14 and E122 appeared to ‘brace’ themselves and smoke and flashes are seen at the end of their firearms. At the same time, Khuram Butt’s body makes sudden movements. These evidential facts would support that this is when he was shot by AY14 and E122. On the basis that BX44 recalled hearing shots at the same time as he and BY5 fired at Khuram Butt, the evidence suggests they all fired at the same time.
The number of shots fired towards Khuram Butt during the second engagement
269. It is unknown how many shots BX44 fired towards Khuram Butt during this second engagement. BX44 recalled he fired a number of shots towards Khuram Butt, but cannot recall how many. BX44 fired his weapon at all three suspects during this incident so the count-back of ammunition does not assist. CCTV does not assist with how many times BX44 fired his weapons during this engagement with Khuram Butt as he was standing by ARV1, behind a pillar and out of camera view.
270. From the count-back of ammunition and the officers’ accounts, BY5, E122 and AY14 each fired three shots during the incident. The evidence supports the fact that these officers only fired their weapons during the second engagement with Khuram Butt. Therefore, the evidence suggests, a minimum of nine shots were fired at Khuram Butt during this second engagement.
271. The post-mortem evidence indicates that Khuram Butt received multiple gunshot injuries in Stoney Street and therefore this evidence does not assist in determining how many shots were either fired towards, or hit, Khuram Butt during this second engagement. This was not the last time Khuram Butt was fired upon.
Evacuation of the Wheatsheaf Public House and the final engagement with Khuram Butt
272. After the second engagement with Khuram Butt, AY14, BY28, E122 and E59 withdrew from ARV2 back along Stoney Street, as other firearms officers
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arrived to cover Youssef Zaghba and Rachid Redouane from a safer distance. This was at approximately 10.26pm. BY5 and BX44 remained near to ARV1 covering Khuram Butt and were joined by BX45 and BX46.
273. At approximately the same time, BY5 recalled, he heard a member of public shout from the Wheatsheaf Public House doorway that someone “was dying” inside. The member of public who was shouting is now known to be Mr D. Mr D recalled he was concerned with Mr A’s serious injury and he opened the Wheatsheaf Public House door to shout for help, but was told to go back in by officers.
274. From his own knowledge, BY5 knew there was no other way out of the Wheatsheaf Public House, other than through the two doors that open onto Stoney Street. BY5 recalled he instructed BX45 and BX46 to get a ballistic shield out of ARV1 so they could evacuate people from the Wheatsheaf Public House. BY5 recalled he believed the device was still live and had the potential to kill members of the public.
275. At 10.30pm, BY5, BX45 and BX46 crossed Stoney Street and approached the Wheatsheaf Public House as a group in order to evacuate the pub. BX45 held a ballistic shield and BX46 provided firearms cover on Khuram Butt whilst they walked from ARV1 to outside the Wheatsheaf Public House door. BX44 recalled he stayed near to ARV1, providing firearms cover on Khuram Butt as the three officers moved towards the pub.
276. When BY5, BX45 and BX46 arrived outside the Wheatsheaf Public House doorway, CCTV showed the public inside removed the beer keg they had placed in the front of the door and unlocked it, allowing BY5 to enter. BY5 recalled telling people inside the pub to get together as they needed to evacuate to get away from the IED. The public were directed out of the door and to the left, up Stoney Street and away from the three suspects.
277. CCTV showed BX45 and BX46 had their backs towards the public as they evacuated in single file and were facing Khuram Butt. BX45 was stood holding a ballistic shield between where Khuram Butt was lying and the door where the public were evacuating. BX46 stood to BX45s left, pointing his firearm towards where Khuram Butt was laying. The wall of the Wheatsheaf Public House blocked any view of Khuram Butt on the CCTV from the Wheatsheaf Public House.
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Figure 19 – Wheatsheaf Public House CCTV showing BX45, BX46 and BY5 at the front door of the Wheatsheaf Public House as the public were evacuated. Image edited by IOPC to cover officers faces. [NB there is a time difference between this CCTV system and the council CCTV system]
278. As the public started to evacuate, BY5 entered the pub to assist Mr A.
279. The public evacuated onto Stoney Street and were directed left, away from the suspects, towards Park Street. Their view of Khuram Butt on exiting the Wheatsheaf Public House was blocked by BX46 and BX45.
280. BX45 and BX46 recalled watching Khuram Butt as the public evacuated behind them. BX44 recalled also providing firearms cover on Khuram Butt from across Stoney Street as the public evacuated. Whilst covering Khuram Butt, BX44, BX45 and BX46 all recalled seeing Khuram Butt move on the floor. These were the only officers who had sight of Khuram Butt at this time.
281. BX46 described Khuram Butt moved his head and raised it from the floor. BX46 recalled he could only see one of Khuram Butt’s hands because his body obstructed his other hand. BX46 stated he believed Khuram Butt was going to detonate the vest, which would kill the public and police officers present, so BX46 took an aimed shot with his G36 carbine towards Khuram Butt’s head. BX46 stated he aimed this shot at Khuram Butt’s head because this was the furthest body mass from the IED that would provide incapacitation.
282. BX44 recalled that, as the officers were moving up to clear the Wheatsheaf Public House, he believed Khuram Butt may have been “playing dead” in order to detonate and kill as many people as possible. He then noticed Khuram Butt was still moving and therefore took aimed shots at Khuram Butt’s upper body, above the vest towards where he believed his head was positioned.
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283. After BY5, BX46 and BX44 arrived outside the Wheatsheaf Public House and began the evacuation, CCTV from within the pub showed BX46 took a small but quick single step back as he pointed his firearm towards Khuram Butt. The public immediately stopped evacuating and ducked down.
284. Eight seconds after the public ducked down and immediately stopped moving, they continued to evacuate.
285. This is the last time Khuram Butt was seen to move and these are the final shots fired during the incident. This is approximately 14 minutes after the first firearms unit, ARV1, arrived on Stoney Street.
286. During the evacuation of the Wheatsheaf Public House, Mr A was assisted to his feet by BY5 and members of the public and was able to leave the pub to receive medical attention.
The number of shots fired towards Khuram Butt in the final engagement
287. This was the last time Khuram Butt was fired upon. It is unknown how many shots BX44 fired towards Khuram Butt during this final engagement. BX44 could not recall how many shots he fired during this final engagement and CCTV does not assist as he was out of view. The count-back of ammunition shows BX44 fired 17 shots in total during the incident, however, he engaged all three suspects at different times so this does not assist in determining how many shots BX44 fired during this engagement.
288. BX46 recalled he fired one shot towards Khuram Butt during this final engagement. CCTV from within the Wheatsheaf Public House supports this account as BX46 takes one small single step backwards. BX45 also recalled BX46 fired a single shot at Khuram Butt whilst they were evacuating the Wheatsheaf Public House.
289. The post-mortem and ballistic expert evidence indicates that Khuram Butt received multiple gunshot injuries in Stoney Street and therefore this evidence does not assist in determining how many shots were either fired towards, or hit, Khuram Butt during this final engagement.
290. The ballistic expert notes that, due to the number of injuries and their complexity, it was not possible to identify the number of bullets that had struck Khuram Butt or isolate specific internal wound tracks to indicate the trajectory of the bullets.
291. One of the injuries to Khuram Butt included a gunshot wound to the lower jaw, which passed across the jaw from his left to right. The evidence would suggest it was more likely than not that this wound was caused by BX46 during the final engagement with Khuram Butt.
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292. Other injuries noted during the post-mortem included;
a) a fragment injury to the left scalp, which had not penetrated the skull b) two guttering gunshot wounds to the front chest, possibly associated with the passage of a single bullet c) complex injuries to both shoulders, including extensive tissue damage most likely caused by cavitation effects d) a gunshot entry wound to the outer aspect of the right hip e) a gunshot entry would to the back of the chest f) numerous abrasions and puncture wounds, many of which had most likely been caused by the passage or impact of bullets or bullet fragments
293. During the post-mortem, three fully expanded 5.56 x 45mm calibre soft-point bullets were recovered from Khuram Butt’s body.
294. In the ballistic expert’s opinion, Khuram Butt had been struck by six or, likely, more bullets.
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Reasonable force
295. In establishing whether the force used was reasonable, consideration is given to section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967, the College of Policing, Authorised Professional Practice (APP) into Armed Policing and the relevant civil test.
296. Section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967 states, “A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.”
297. The degree of force used by a person will not be regarded as having been reasonable if it was disproportionate in the circumstances.
298. In these circumstances, the APP into Armed Policing echoes legislation. The APP identifies the primary intention when the police discharge a firearm. It is to “prevent an immediate threat to life by shooting to stop the subject from carrying out their intended or threatened course of action.”
299. The APP continues, “Each authorised firearms officer is individually responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions, nothing can absolve them from such responsibility and accountability. This includes decisions to refrain from using force as well as any decisive action taken, including the use of force, the use of a firearm and the use of a less lethal weapon.”
300. The APP states that, in most situations, it is the individual firearms officer who must assess the immediacy and proximity of the threat and make an operational decision on whether it is necessary to discharge a firearm or take other decisive action.
301. A firearms officer’s appreciation of the critical nature of the situation may be informed by a combination of the following factors, including their observation and assessment of the situation; their perception of any imminent threat and their understanding of the wider police operation.
Reasonableness of the officers’ belief that the IEDs were real and that non-lethal force was inadequate
302. It is now known that the IED vest worn by the suspects were fake. However, this does not preclude the officers’ honestly held beliefs that the vests were real at the time lethal force was used.
303. Witnesses who formed the same belief as the officers support the reasonableness of the officers’ beliefs that the IED vests were real. The presence of the IED vests prevented many unarmed officers and members of the public from confronting the suspects directly.
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Figure 20 – Photograph of the vests worn by Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba. [Source: Metropolitan Police Service website]
304. The incident was declared ‘Op Plato’ prior to firearms officers arriving at the scene. This was relayed to the firearms officers over the radio and they understood this to mean they were attending a marauding terrorist attack where suspects could be armed with knives, firearms, IEDs or a combination thereof. Their understanding of the threat they thought they would be facing is supported by the fact they armed themselves with their primary weapon.
305. Some members of public armed themselves with crates and chairs to prevent having direct contact with the suspects, whilst still being able to defend those being attacked. The evidence suggests this was for a mixture of reasons, where some witnesses recalled seeing the IED vests and others recalled only seeing the knives. Most members of public believed the suspects posed such a threat that they ran and hid from them.
306. Unarmed officers who had contact with the suspects prior to the arrival of firearms officers also formed the belief that the IED vests were real. Due to their belief, these officers requested the assistance of armed officers and did not approach the suspects themselves, deeming their own officer safety equipment; asps, CS spray and handcuffs, inadequate to stop the threat the IED vests posed.
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307. There were some members of the public, including Mr C, who saw the IED vests and, although they believed they looked like IED vests, they did not believe them to be real. The personal view formed by these witnesses does not undermine the honestly held belief of the firearm officers that the IED vests posed a real threat, when taking into account all the information available to them.
308. Prior to firearms officers arriving, PC W, a British Transport Police officer, had attempted to use non-lethal force to stop the three suspects during their attack on the public. The suspects attacked PC W, which resulted in him receiving serious knife injuries. Although the firearms officers were not aware PC W had been stabbed prior to their arrival in Stoney Street, the attack on PC W supports the firearms officers’ subsequent use of lethal force, as non-lethal force had not been adequate to stop the threat posed by the three suspects. The attack on PC W also demonstrated the willingness of the three suspects to attack police officers to evade capture and ensured they could continue their attack on the public.
Initial engagement with Khuram Butt
309. The evidence suggests that the force used by officers against Khuram Butt was reasonable in the circumstances. The officers’ accounts are supported by CCTV evidence, which shows Khuram Butt ran at BX46 armed with a knife, and wearing what officers honestly believed was an IED around his body.
310. The officers arrived in a marked police vehicle with blue lights flashing and they recalled shouting warnings to Khuram Butt, identifying themselves as armed police officers, and witnesses who remained on Stoney Street during the initial engagement support this. The evidence suggests there were clear identifiers to all three suspects that police officers had arrived and were attempting to give them instructions.
311. Witnesses further support the officers’ accounts that they did not fire immediately when they exited the vehicle, and shots were only fired when Khuram Butt continued to run at BX46 and posed an imminent threat to the life of BX46 due to the knife he brandished and the IED vest.
312. BX44 and BX45 do not recall firing their weapons at Khuram Butt as he ran towards BX46; however, the evidence would suggest that one or both of them were firing towards him, due to the bullets entering the Wheatsheaf Public House windows. If either BX44 or BX45 fired their weapon at this time, it was to defend their colleague BX46 from the imminent threat posed by Khuram Butt.
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313. CCTV shows the officers had less than three seconds to make a decision on the threat posed by Khuram Butt, and upon seeing the knife, the IED vest and Khuram Butt running towards BX46, the use of lethal force was reasonable.
Initial engagement with Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba
314. The evidence suggests that the force used by officers against Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba was reasonable in the circumstances. The officers’ accounts are supported by CCTV evidence which shows Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba ran towards BX44 and BX45 armed with knives and wearing what officers honestly believed were IEDs around their bodies.
315. The officers recalled shouting warnings to Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba, identifying themselves as armed police officers, and this is supported by witnesses who remained on Stoney Street during the initial engagement.
316. Witnesses support the officers’ accounts that they did not fire immediately when they exited the vehicle, and shots were only fired when Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba continued to run at BX44 and BX45, and posed an imminent threat to the officers’ lives due to the knives they brandished and IED vests. The CCTV supports that Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba ran towards BX44 and BX45 and reached the officers within seconds of them getting out of ARV1. The suspects reached the officers before they fell to the floor, causing BX44 to also fall over and Youssef Zaghba landed on top of him.
317. CCTV showed the officers had less than three seconds to make a decision on the threat posed by Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba as they appeared behind Khuram Butt. Upon seeing the knives, the IED vests and Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba running towards BX44 and BX45, their use of lethal force during the initial engagement was reasonable.
Secondary engagement with Rachid Redouane
318. The evidence suggests that the force used by officers against Rachid Redouane during the second engagement with him was reasonable in the circumstances. The officers’ accounts are supported by CCTV evidence which showed Rachid Redouane continued to move on the floor whilst wearing what officers honestly believed was an IED around his body.
319. After he was shot to the floor, Rachid Redouane continued to move whilst officers provided firearms cover on him. The officers believed the IED vest he was wearing could be detonated by Rachid Redouane or detonated remotely, posing everyone in the vicinity in imminent danger, including the public. The officers did not immediately fire their weapons when Rachid Redouane moved, but continued to assess the risk he posed.
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320. After making some small movements, Rachid Redouane made a larger movement, described by officers to appear deliberate. Upon seeing Rachid Redouane’s hand appear underneath his torso, BY28 and E59 both fired further shots towards him because they believed he was reaching to detonate the IED, putting the lives of officers and the public in imminent danger.
321. The evidence suggests BY28 and E59 both fired towards Rachid Redouane at the same time, from opposite sides of ARV2. Both officers believed that Rachid Redouane posed an imminent threat to the lives of everyone in the vicinity as his hand moved towards the IED vest. The officers formed this belief based on what they saw in front of them at the time.
Secondary engagement with Khuram Butt
322. The evidence suggests that the force used by officers against Khuram Butt during the second engagement with him was reasonable in the circumstances. The officers’ accounts are supported by CCTV evidence, which showed Khuram Butt continued to move on the floor whilst wearing what officers honestly believed was an IED around his body.
323. After he was shot to the floor, Khuram Butt continued to move whilst officers provided firearms cover on him. The officers believed the IED vest he was wearing could be detonated by Khuram Butt or detonated remotely, posing everyone in the vicinity in imminent danger, including the public. The officers did not immediately fire their weapons when Khuram Butt moved, but continued to assess the risk he posed.
324. After making some small movements, CCTV showed Khuram Butt began to sit up. Upon seeing Khuram Butt raising his head a torso off of the floor, AY14, E122, BX44 and BY5 fired shots towards him because they believed he was about to detonate the IED, putting the lives of officers and the public in imminent danger.
325. The evidence suggests the four officers fired towards Khuram Butt at the same time. AY14 and E122 were standing next to ARV2. BX44 and BY5 were standing near to ARV1, further up Stoney Street. All four officers believed that Khuram Butt posed an imminent threat to the lives of everyone in the vicinity as he continued to move, especially since he was lying directly outside the Wheatsheaf Public House, metres from the public who were standing by the windows. The officers formed this belief based on what they saw in front of them at the time.
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Final engagement with Khuram Butt
326. The evidence suggests that the force used by officers against Khuram Butt during the final engagement with him was reasonable in the circumstances.
327. Officers providing firearms cover on Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba retreated back along Stoney Street to gain some distance between themselves and the IEDs. BY5, BX44, BX45 and BX46 remained close to ARV1. These officers were aware a member of public was seriously injured inside the Wheatsheaf Public House and required emergency first aid. Through local knowledge, BY5 was aware that the only access points to the Wheatsheaf Public House were on Stoney Street.
328. The investigation has established that the access points to the Wheatsheaf Public House were from the two front doors, which had been temporarily locked and barricaded by the public and a further metal-gated access point via the beer garden, which was locked and secured. All of the access points were onto Stoney Street and within several metres of where Khuram Butt was laying.
329. There were no members of the public or staff in the beer garden when the officers approached to evacuate the Wheatsheaf Public House, but there were members of the public and staff by the front door who were able to unlock them to allow officers access. Therefore, this was the only access point immediately available to the officers.
330. Upon being given access to the Wheatsheaf Public House, BY5 was informed a member of public had been shot in the head. In order to remove the public from any immediate threat posed by Khuram Butt, BY5 took the decision to evacuate the Wheatsheaf Public House and instructed people to exit onto Stoney Street and turn left, away from where Khuram Butt was laying.
331. During this evacuation, the public were within metres of Khuram Butt, who was lying on the floor directly outside the Wheatsheaf Public House wearing what the officers believed to be an IED vest.
332. As the public were evacuating, BX44, BX45 and BX46 all recalled seeing Khuram Butt move on the floor. CCTV showed BY5 was inside the Wheatsheaf Public House at the time, and did not have sight of Khuram Butt. The evidence suggests that BX44 and BX46 both fired towards Khuram Butt at the same time, believing he posed an imminent risk to life due to the IED vest he was wearing. BX45 was holding a ballistic shield to protect the public during the evacuation.
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Ballistic evidence
Number of bullets fired
333. Evidence from the post-incident procedure confirmed three City of London Police and five Metropolitan Police firearms officers discharged 46 bullets in total.
334. All 46 casings were recovered from the scene. The Independent Police Complaints Commission was present at the scene of the police shooting, the post-mortems of the three suspects and the post-incident procedure, where officers completed their statements and the count-back procedure for the ammunition.
335. The evidence suggests that the two bullets which entered the Wheatsheaf Public House through the front windows were both fired from a gun or guns positioned on Stoney Street.
336. The second bullet to pass through the window of the Wheatsheaf Public House, which hit Mr A, was a fully expanded 5.56 x 45mm calibre jacketed soft-point bullet.
337. All three suspects sustained a number of gunshot wounds. The evidence suggests that Youssef Zaghba had been struck by at least two bullets. Rachid Redouane and Khuram Butt had each been struck by at least six bullets, likely more, particularly in the case of Khuram Butt.
Police firearms
338. No officer involved in this incident has reported any faults with their firearms to the IPCC.
339. A ballistics expert tested the eight police firearms discharged during this incident, to ascertain whether any of them were faulty. This testing was carried out by a ballistic expert from the Metropolitan Police Service Forensic Firearms Unit and overseen by an independent forensic ballistic expert employed by the IPCC.
340. The eight police-issued firearms, their associated accessories, magazines and ammunition were all good condition and functioned as expected. In the ballistic expert’s opinion, none of the eight police-issued firearms had a dangerously light trigger pull and in the course of normal handling each of the eight firearms would only fire if the trigger was pulled.
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Police ammunition
341. The spent casings recovered from the scene were a mixture of 5.56mm and 9mm ammunition. The bullets retrieved from the three post-mortems were fully- expanded 5.56 x 45mm calibre rifle bullets and the wounds seen to the three suspects were consistent with the discharge of such high-velocity expanding rifle bullets.
342. The ammunition was of the correct make and type as the ammunition issued to officers of the City of London and the Metropolitan Police Services.
Collateral damage
343. It is noted that there was a significant amount of further gunshot damage identified in the area of the police shooting, including a bullet entry hole in a window of the Monmouth Coffee Co., on the corner of Stoney Street and Park Street. There were also numerous entry holes in the shutters of stalls within Borough Market, facing Stoney Street.
344. Although this damage was not examined further, it is considered that this gunshot damage was caused by police firearms during this incident.
345. During the secondary and final engagements, the suspects were shot at whilst on the floor. It is therefore anticipated that the collateral damage to the surrounding area was likely caused during the initial engagement with the three suspects as they were stood up, running towards officers.
346. CCTV showed members of the public were stood on the street during the initial engagement, between the firearms officers and the Monmouth Coffee Co. and shutters of Borough Market.
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Conclusions
347. Below, I have set out my conclusions for the appropriate authorities and Commission to consider.
348. After reviewing my report and considering my recommendations, the Commission will decide whether any organisational learning has been identified that should be shared with the organisations in question. They may also recommend or direct, unsatisfactory performance procedures.
349. Although the events of London Bridge and Borough Market are now well known, it is important to note that the officers who fired shots only knew the information that had been relayed to them over their radios, or presented itself to them at the scene. The officers’ decisions and actions are examined based on the information they knew, or honestly believed, at the time they fired the shots, not with the benefit of hindsight.
350. This was the first time in the United Kingdom officers have engaged multiple marauding terrorists wearing IED vests within a public place. For both members of the public and the emergency services, this was a highly stressful, fast-paced and erratic situation, which demanded the highest level of service from the police to prevent further loss of life.
351. To conclude the investigation, I, as lead investigator, have considered the evidence with a view to addressing the following issues: a) What was the nature and extent of police contact with Mr A prior to his serious injury? b) What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Mr A’s serious injury? c) What was the nature and extent of police contact with Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba prior to their deaths? d) What evidence is available as to whether the police may have caused or contributed to the deaths of Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba? e) Why, having regard to the evidence, there is no indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of criminal proceedings?
What was the nature and extent of police contact with Mr A prior to his serious injury?
352. Based on the evidence provided above there was no contact between police officers and Mr A, a bystander, before he sustained his serious injury.
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What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Mr A’s serious injury?
353. The CCTV shows Mr A was leaning forwards looking through the Wheatsheaf Public House window onto Stoney Street during the initial engagement between the City of London firearms officers and Khuram Butt.
354. As already documented in the analysis, City of London Police officers BX44 and BX45 were the only officers on Stoney Street with their weapons pointed towards the Wheatsheaf Public House when the Mr A was shot.
355. The evidence available does not allow a determination of whether BX44 or BX45 caused the injury to Mr A; however, it is clear from the evidence that his injury was caused by an officer from the City of London Police Service.
What was the nature and extent of police contact with Khuram Butt prior to his death?
356. Khuram Butt had contact with multiple unarmed officers prior to his engagement with firearms officers on Stoney Street. This was due to the fact that he and others were involved in the deaths of multiple members of the public, and unarmed officers were trying to prevent further casualties.
357. Based on the evidence provided, Khuram Butt had contact with the following firearms officers, BX44, BX45, BX46, BY5, E122 and AY14, prior to his death.
What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Khuram Butt’s death?
358. There is no doubt that the death of Khuram Butt was caused by police firearms officers. The cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.
359. Due to the number of shots fired during the entire incident, I am unable to say with certainty how many shots were fired towards Khuram Butt in total. The following is a summary of the firearms officers’ engagement with Khuram Butt.
360. During the initial engagement Khuram Butt was shot at by BX46 five times as he ran towards him, it is not clear how many of these bullets hit him. Additionally, he was shot at by either BX44, BX45 or both officers as he ran towards BX46, however, it is not known how many times they fired or whether their bullets hit Khuram Butt.
361. During the second engagement with Khuram Butt, BX44, BY5, E122 and AY14 all shot at Khuram Butt when he was on the floor and continued to
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move. BX44 and BY5 were located near to where ARV1 came to a stop, further down Stoney Street and E122 and AY14 were located on the nearside of ARV2, closer to the junction with Southwark Street. Therefore, the officers were not all stood together when they independently formed an honestly held belief that Khuram Butt posed an imminent threat to life and made the decision to fire at him.
362. It is unknown how many bullets BX44 fired towards Khuram Butt during this engagement. BY5 shot at Khuram Butt three times, E122 shot at him three times and AY14 shot at him three times. The officers were a relatively short distance away from where Khuram Butt was lying, they were taking aimed shots and so, on the balance of probabilities, it is my opinion that these bullets were more likely than not to have hit Khuram Butt. Therefore, during this second engagement, the evidence would suggest Khuram Butt was shot at least nine times.
363. During the final engagement, BX44 and BX46 shot Khuram Butt again whilst the Wheatsheaf Public House was evacuated.
364. BX44 was located near to where ARV1 came to a stop further down Stoney Street and BX46 was stood next to Khuram Butt on the pavement outside the Wheatsheaf Public House. Therefore, the officers were not stood together when they independently formed an honestly held belief that Khuram Butt posed an imminent threat to life and made the decision to fire at him.
365. It is unknown how many bullets BX44 fired towards Khuram Butt during this engagement. BX46 fired one bullet at Khuram Butt’s head from a short distance away, after which BX46 stated Khuram Butt did not move anymore.
366. BX46 was a very short distance away from where Khuram Butt was lying, he took one aimed shot at his head, after which Khuram Butt did not move. Taking the post-mortem evidence and BX46’s statements into account, this bullet hit Khuram Butt in the head and was fatal.
367. At the same time BX44, who was a relatively short distance away from where Khuram Butt was lying, was taking aimed shots to the area where he believed Khuram Butt’s head to be as he could not actually see it. On the balance of probabilities it is my opinion that these bullets were more likely than not to have hit Khuram Butt, although taking the post-mortem evidence into account, they did not hit him in the head.
What was the nature and extent of police contact with Rachid Redouane prior to his death?
368. Rachid Redouane had had contact with multiple unarmed officers prior to his engagement with firearms officers on Stoney Street. This was due to the fact
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that him and others were involved in the deaths of multiple members of the public, and unarmed officers were trying to prevent further casualties.
369. Based on the evidence above Rachid Redouane had contact with the following officers: BX44, BX45, BY28 and E59.
What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Rachid Redouane’s death?
370. There is no doubt that the death of Rachid Redouane was caused by firearms officers. The cause of death was gunshot wounds.
371. Due to the number of shots fired during the entire incident, I am unable to say with certainty how many shots were fired towards Rachid Redouane. The following is a summary of the firearms officers’ engagement with Rachid Redouane.
372. During the initial engagement, Rachid Redouane was shot at by BX44 and BX45 as he ran towards them. However, it is not known how many times the officers fired at him or how many of their bullets hit Rachid Redouane.
373. During the second engagement, BY28 and E59 both shot at Rachid Redouane when he was on the floor and continued to move. BY28 shot him twice. E59 shot him four times. The post-mortem shows that Rachid Redouane did receive gunshot wounds to his front and back, one of which hit his heart, after which he could only have lived for a few seconds.
374. As Rachid Redouane continued to move after the initial engagement, but did not move after the second engagement, the evidence suggests that Rachid Redouane died following the second engagement by BY28 and E59.
What was the nature and extent of police contact with Youssef Zaghba prior to his death?
375. Youssef Zaghba had had contact with multiple unarmed officers prior to his engagement with firearms officers on Stoney Street. This was due to the fact that he and others were involved in the deaths of multiple members of the public, and unarmed officers were trying to prevent further casualties.
376. Based on the evidence above Youssef Zaghba had contact with the following officers: BX44 and BX45.
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What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Youssef Zaghba’s death?
377. There is no doubt that the death of Youssef Zaghba was caused by firearms officers from the City of London Police Service. The cause of death was gunshot wounds.
378. Youssef Zaghba ran at BX44 and BX45, and was shot at by BX44 before falling on top of him. The post-mortem evidence would suggest that at least one of the bullets fired by BX44 hit Youssef Zaghba. BX45 stated he shot either Rachid Redouane or Youssef Zaghba at this point. From the CCTV analysis, which showed the direction his firearm was pointing, it is my opinion that on the balance of probabilities, he shot Rachid Redouane as he ran towards him.
379. From the CCTV analysis, which showed the direction BX45s firearm was pointing, and BX45s statement, it is my opinion that, on the balance of probabilities, BX45 shot at Youssef Zaghba immediately after he fell to the floor on top of BX44.
380. Youssef Zaghba was not shot again after this initial engagement. It is not known who fired the fatal shot, which caused the death of Youssef Zaghba. The post-mortem showed that Youssef Zaghba did receive gunshot wounds to his front and back, both of which hit his heart.
Why, having regard to the evidence, there is no indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of criminal proceedings?
381. The force used by the firearms officers has been analysed against their accounts, CCTV evidence, statements from members of the public, radio communications and relevant policy and legislation.
Initial engagement with Khuram Butt and injury to Mr A
382. Based on the analysis of the evidence above, Khuram Butt posed a real and imminent threat to BX46’s life when BX46 used lethal force against him during the initial engagement. In summary, this was because Khuram Butt did not comply with BX46’s commands and continued to run at him armed with a knife and wearing what BX46 believed was an IED. At the point at which Khuram Butt fell to the floor he was within metres of BX46.
383. Based on the analysis of the evidence above, Khuram Butt posed a real and imminent threat to BX46’s life when BX44 and/or BX45 used lethal force against him during the initial engagement. In summary, this was because Khuram Butt did not comply with BX46’s commands and continued to run at
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BX46 armed with a knife and wearing what BX44 and BX45 believed was an IED. Therefore the evidence supports that their use of force was in order to protect the life of their colleague, BX46.
384. Therefore it is my opinion that the force used on Khuram Butt by BX44, BX45 and BX46 during the initial engagement does not amount to a breach of the professional standards that would lead to disciplinary proceedings and neither is it an indication of a criminal offence.
385. Based on the analysis of the evidence above, the injury to Mr A was a result of a bullet, which missed Khuram Butt, its intended target. This bullet could only have been fired by BX44 or BX45. As stated above, the use of lethal force by BX44 and BX45 was intended to be against Khuram Butt, and was necessary to prevent serious harm or death to BX46.
386. Therefore, it was an unintentional use of force on Mr A and it is my opinion that for this reason it does not amount to a breach of the professional standards that would lead to disciplinary proceedings and neither is it an indication of a criminal offence.
Initial engagement with Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba
387. Based on the analysis of the evidence above, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba both posed real and imminent threats to BX44 and BX45 when the officers used lethal force against them during the initial engagement. In summary, this was because Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba ran at the officers armed with knives and wearing what BX44 and BX45 believed were IEDs. At the point at which BX44 and BX45 used lethal force, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba were within metres of them. Youssef Zaghba got so close to BX44 that he fell on top the officer as he was shot. Therefore, the evidence supports that their use of force was in order to protect their own lives and the lives of one another.
388. Therefore it is my opinion that the force used on Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba by BX44 and BX45 during the initial engagement does not amount to a breach of the professional standards that would lead to disciplinary proceedings and neither is it an indication of a criminal offence.
Secondary engagement with Rachid Redouane
389. Based on the analysis of the evidence above, Rachid Redouane posed a real and imminent threat to officers and members of the public when BY28 and E59 used lethal force against him during the second engagement. In summary, this was because Rachid Redouane was wearing what BY28 and E59 believed was an IED and continued to move despite being told by the officers not to. This led them to believe that he may have detonated the
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device, causing multiple serious injuries or fatalities to officers and members of the public in the near vicinity. Therefore, the force used by BY28 and E59 was to protect the lives of themselves, their colleagues and members of the public.
390. Therefore it is my opinion that the force used on Rachid Redouane by BY28 and E59 during the secondary engagement does not amount to a breach of the professional standards that would lead to disciplinary proceedings and neither is it an indication of a criminal offence.
Secondary engagement with Khuram Butt
391. Based on the analysis of the evidence above, Khuram Butt posed a real and imminent threat to officers and members of the public when BX44, BY5, E122 and AY14 used lethal force against him during the second engagement. In summary, this was because Khuram Butt was wearing what these officers believed was an IED and continued to move despite being told by the officers not to. This led them to believe that he intended to detonate the device, causing multiple serious injuries or fatalities to officers and members of the public in the near vicinity. Therefore, the force used by BX44, BY5, E122 and AY14 was to protect the lives of themselves, their colleagues and members of the public.
392. Therefore it is my opinion that the force used on Khuram Butt by BX44, BY5, E122 and AY14 during the second engagement does not amount to a breach of the professional standards that would lead to disciplinary proceedings and neither is it an indication of a criminal offence.
Final engagement with Khuram Butt
393. Based on the analysis of the evidence above, Khuram Butt posed a real and imminent threat to officers and members of the public when BX44 and BX46 used lethal force against him during the final engagement. In summary, this was because Khuram Butt was wearing what these officers believed was an IED and continued to move whilst the public were evacuated from the Wheatsheaf Public House within metres of where he was lying. This led them to believe that he intended to detonate the device, causing multiple serious injuries or fatalities to officers and members of the public. Therefore, the force used by BX44 and BX46 was to protect the lives of themselves, their colleagues and members of the public.
394. Although the decision to evacuate the Wheatsheaf Public House carried a risk that the IED vest on Khuram Butt would be detonated, BY5 believed the evacuation of the Wheatsheaf Public House was necessary in order to
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remove the public from the vicinity of the IED vest on Khuram Butt and to provide emergency first aid to Mr A.
395. Therefore it is my opinion that the force used on Khuram Butt by BX44 and BX46 during the final engagement does not amount to a breach of the professional standards that would lead to disciplinary proceedings and neither is it an indication of a criminal offence.
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Borough Market
Report into the fatal shootings by police of Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane, Youssef Zaghba and the serious injury of Mr A, Borough Market, London 3 June 2017
Independent investigation report Appendices
Appendix 1: The role of the IPCC
The IPCC carries out its own independent investigations into complaints and incidents involving the police, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Home Office immigration and enforcement staff when the seriousness or the public interest require it.
We are operationally independent of the police and the government. IPCC commissioners by law may never have worked for the police.
All cases are overseen by a Commission delegate, providing strategic direction and scrutinising the investigation. The investigation
At the outset of an investigation, a lead investigator will be appointed who will be responsible for the day to day running of the investigation on behalf of the Commission. This may involve taking witness statements, analysing CCTV footage, reviewing documents, obtaining forensic and other expert evidence, as well as liaison with the coroner and other agencies.
The lead investigator is supported by a team that includes other investigators, lawyers, press officers and other specialist staff.
Throughout the investigation, meaningful updates are provided to families and other stakeholders both inside and outside the IPCC at regular intervals. Each investigation also passes through a series of reviews and checks to ensure quality.
The IPCC has three main types of investigation. This case was what we refer to as a Death or Serious Injury (DSI) investigation. In these cases, the lead investigator has concluded that there is no indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. Our investigations in these cases will aim to establish facts and set out the sequence of events and their consequences. The investigation should help to determine the nature of the police contact and cover what evidence there is available in relation to whether the police may have caused of contributed to the death or injury. The possible outcomes of these investigations reflect the fact that it is not an inquiry into any criminal, conduct or complaint allegation against any person serving with the police. Investigation reports
Once the investigator has gathered the evidence they must prepare a report. The report must summarise the evidence and refer to or attach any relevant documents.
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The report must then be submitted to the Commission delegate who will review how and to what extent, if any, the person who died or was seriously injured had contact with the police, and the degree to which this caused or contributed to the death or injury. At this point they will also consider whether there was an indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. If the Commission delegate decides that there is such an indication, the case will then be investigated as a conduct matter.
Once the Commission delegate has received the finalised report, they will then decide whether to make individual or wider learning recommendations for the police. They also consider whether the actions of anyone serving with the police were unsatisfactory. If so, they will be dealt with through the police force’s unsatisfactory performance procedure (UPP). UPP is handled by the person’s line manager and is intended to improve the performance of both the individual and police force.
The report must also be given to the appropriate authority (normally the police force). They must then inform the Commission what action they propose to take in relation to any unsatisfactory performance. If the Commission delegate considers that the appropriate authority’s response is not appropriate, the Commission has powers to recommend or ultimately direct UPP.
Inquests
Following investigations into deaths, the IPCC’s investigation report and supporting documents are usually provided to the coroner. The coroner may then hold an inquest, either alone or with a jury. This hearing is unlike a trial or tribunal and is a fact finding forum. A coroner might ask a selection of witnesses to give evidence at the inquest. At the end of the inquest the coroner and/or jury will decide how they think the death occurred on the basis of the evidence they have heard and seen. Publishing the report
After any possible proceedings relating to the investigation have concluded, and the IPCC is satisfied that they will not be prejudiced by publication, the IPCC may publish its investigation report.
Redactions might be made to the report at this stage to ensure that individuals’ personal data is sufficiently protected and occasionally for other reasons.
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