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Report of a Fact-Finding Mission to Khartoum, Sudan

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Report of a Fact-Finding Mission to Khartoum, Sudan Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018 Published: November 2018 This project is part funded by the EU Asylum, Migration Contentand Integrations Fund. Making management of migration flows more efficient across the European Union. Contents Background .......................................................................................................... 5 Purpose of the mission ....................................................................................... 5 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 5 Research standards ......................................................................................... 5 Identification of sources ................................................................................... 5 Arranging and conducting interviews ............................................................... 6 Notes of interviews/meetings ........................................................................... 6 FFM team observations ................................................................................... 6 Terminology ..................................................................................................... 6 Structure of this report ..................................................................................... 7 List of abbreviations ............................................................................................ 8 Executive summary .................................................................................................. 9 Demography and ethnicity ............................................................................... 9 Darfur ............................................................................................................... 9 Treatment of non-Arab Darfuris in Khartoum ................................................. 10 Freedom of movement ................................................................................... 11 Government monitoring ................................................................................. 12 Returns .......................................................................................................... 12 Synthesis of notes ................................................................................................. 13 1. Demography and migration ........................................................................ 13 1.1 Size of the population ............................................................................. 13 1.2 Non-Arab Darfuri groups in Darfur .......................................................... 13 1.3 Non-Arab Darfuri population in Khartoum............................................... 14 1.4 Darfuri community groups in Khartoum .................................................. 18 1.5 Darfuri employment profiles and representation across society ............. 20 1.6 Drivers of migration and routes out of Sudan ......................................... 23 1.7 Ethnicity and identification of non-Arab Darfuris ..................................... 26 Notion of identity and perceptions of the Darfur conflict ................................. 26 Identifying non-Arab Dafuris .......................................................................... 27 2. Darfur ............................................................................................................ 31 Page 2 of 181 2.1 Background to the conflict ...................................................................... 31 2.2 Security and political situation ................................................................ 32 2.3 Human rights and humanitarian situation ............................................... 37 3. Non-Arab Darfuris in Khartoum .................................................................. 38 3.1 Human rights - generally ........................................................................ 38 3.2 Discrimination ......................................................................................... 38 3.3 Arrest and detention - general ................................................................ 44 Treatment in detention ................................................................................... 46 Treatment of family members ........................................................................ 46 ‘Ghost houses’ ............................................................................................... 47 Arrest warrants and the death penalty ........................................................... 47 Demonstrations and arrests: January 2018 ................................................... 48 3.4 Profiles and specific groups .................................................................... 49 Students ........................................................................................................ 51 3.5 Socio-economic rights - general ............................................................. 57 Employment ................................................................................................... 60 Healthcare ..................................................................................................... 61 3.6 Access to ID numbers and cards ............................................................ 62 3.7 National service ...................................................................................... 66 4. Freedom of movement ................................................................................ 69 4.1 Exit process ............................................................................................ 69 Penalties for leaving without an exit visa ....................................................... 72 4.2 Entry process ......................................................................................... 73 4.3 Obtaining passports, ID numbers and cards .......................................... 74 Forged and fraudulently obtained documents ................................................ 75 4.4 Checkpoints and travel within Sudan ..................................................... 75 Movement in Sudan generally ....................................................................... 75 Travel between Darfur and Khartoum ............................................................ 76 Travel in Darfur .............................................................................................. 77 5. Government monitoring .............................................................................. 78 5.1 Monitoring and tracking .......................................................................... 78 5.2 Overseas - monitoring the diaspora ....................................................... 80 6. Returns ......................................................................................................... 80 6.1 Statistics ................................................................................................. 80 6.2 Returnees ethnic profile / place of origin ................................................ 83 6.3 Treatment of returnees ........................................................................... 83 6.4 Monitoring of returnees (and of human rights generally) ........................ 92 Page 3 of 181 Annex A: Terms of reference (ToRs) .................................................................... 96 Annex B: Questions based on the ToRs .............................................................. 97 Annex C: List of sources ..................................................................................... 100 Annex D: FFM background explained to sources ............................................. 101 Annex E: Notes of meetings with sources ......................................................... 102 Amjed Farid El Tayeb ....................................................................................... 102 A Sudanese political scientist and former DFID policy adviser ................... 105 A university professor from Darfur ................................................................ 111 Salih Mahmoud M Osman, Darfur Bar Association ....................................... 117 A UK official, Department for International Development (DFID)................. 122 Dr Enrico Ille ..................................................................................................... 124 Dr Ahmed Eltoum Salim, European & African Centre (EAC) ........................ 130 A UK FCO official ............................................................................................. 134 Second Secretary Political, British Embassy ................................................ 135 An official of Western Embassy A .................................................................. 139 International Organization for Migration (IOM) official ................................. 143 A civil society activist ...................................................................................... 148 An official of Western Embassy B .................................................................. 151 A Norwegian official ......................................................................................... 155 Siddig Yousef ................................................................................................... 157 A human rights defender ................................................................................
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