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SMOKE AND FUMES The Legal and Evidentiary Basis for Holding Big Oil Accountable for the Climate Crisis

SMOKE AND FUMES THE LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR HOLDING BIG OIL ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS

“He who can but does not prevent, sins.”

–Antoine Loysel, 1607

“Victory Will Be Achieved When…Average citizens ‘understand’ (recognize) uncertainties in climate science; recognition of uncertainties becomes part of the ‘conventional wisdom’ [and]…Those promoting the Kyoto treaty on the basis of extant science appear to be out of touch with reality.”

–American Petroleum Institute, 1998

NOVEMBER 2017 ii CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

© 2017 Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)

About CIEL Founded in 1989, the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) uses the power of law to protect the environment, promote human rights, and ensure a just and sustainable society. CIEL is dedicated to advocacy in the global public interest through legal counsel, policy research, analysis, , training, and capacity .

Smoke and Fumes: The Legal and Evidentiary Basis for Holding Big Oil Accountable for the Climate Crisis by The Center for International Environmental Law is licensed under a Cre- ative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Acknowledgements This report was authored by Carroll Muffett and Steven Feit and edited by Amanda Kistler and Marie Mekosh, with additional contributions by Lisa Anne Hamilton. Many people have contributed to the Smoke and Fumes research over the last five years through insights, comments, and sharing of their own research, including Kristin Casper, Kert Davies, Brenda Ekwurzel, Peter Frumhoff, Lili Fuhr, Richard Heede, Kathryn Mulvey, Naomi Oreskes, Dan Zegart, and others. Nate Pauzenga designed the Smoke & Fumes , which makes navigating this information possible. This report, and the extensive body of research that underlies it, were made possible with generous support from the Wallace Global Fund, V Kann Rasmussen Foundation, WestWind Foundation, the KR Foundation, and Heinrich Boell Foundation. Errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of CIEL.

This briefing note is for general information purposes only. It is intended solely as a discussion piece. It is not and should not be relied upon as legal advice. While efforts were made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this report and the above information is from sources believed reliable, the information is presented “as is” and without warranties, express or implied. If there are material errors within this briefing note, please advise the author. Receipt of this briefing note is not intended to and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

DESIGN & LAYOUT: Marie Mekosh, CIEL ORIGINAL TEMPLATE: David Gerratt, NonprofitDesign.com COVER PHOTO: ©Dave Chenell SMOKE AND FUMES iii

Contents

1 Executive Summary

2 Introduction

3 Part 1 The Legal Basis for Accountability: Fundamental Elements of Responsibility under Tort, Civil Liability, and Human Rights Law Climate Litigation: Causation, Attribution, and the Scientific Case Against Major Producers The Fundamental Elements of Responsibility: Notice of Risk and the Opportunity to Avoid or Reduce Risk Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights Violations Arising from

7 Part 2 The Evidentiary Basis for Accountability: The Evidentiary Basis for Accountability Oil on Notice: Evidence of Early Awareness of Climate Risks Documentary Evidence Demonstrates Oil Industry was on Notice of Potential Climate Risks by 1957 The Engaged in Coordinated Research and Communications on Air Issues from the 1940s Onward The Industry Undertook Coordinated Research into Many Subjects Relevant to the Causes and Impacts of Climate Change The Petroleum Industry was Unequivocally Warned of Climate Change Due Primarily to the Combustion of Fossil Fuels By 1968 From 1977 to 1982 Exxon Scientists Repeatedly Confirm the Science of Climate Change As Early as the 1970s and No Later than the 1980s, Climate Change Projections Were Being Used in Business and Operational Planning In the 1990s, Even as it Acknowledged Climate Realities Internally, the Oil Industry Intensified its Public Campaigns Against Climate Science The Oil Industry Continued to Fund and Promote Climate Misinformation and to Oppose Climate Mitigation Actions Throughout the 2000s into the Current Decade A Systemic Problem The Petroleum Industry Was Researching that Could Have Been Used to Mitigate or Avoid Climate Change Summary of Industry Knowledge of and Action on Climate Change Key Findings Beyond Exxon and Beyond the US: The Expanding Investigations into Climate Denial

26 Appendix I Investor-Owned Carbon Majors, Ranked by Cumulative Emissions Contribution

28 Appendix II A Note on Sources

29 Appendix III A Note on Industries and Addressed in this Synthesis

31 Endnotes iv CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

© JuergenPM/Pixabay SMOKE AND FUMES 1

Executive Summary

limate change poses a Yet throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and fundamental threat to despite documents supporting ecosystems, nations, human the scientific consensus on climate rights, and human lives. It is change, the petroleum industry engaged Ccaused by the emission and accumulation in a massive campaign of gases in the atmosphere, against public understanding of climate primarily due to the combustion of fossil science.

fuels—oil, gas, and . This report was © Skitterphoto/Pixabay written to answer the questions: What As this report demonstrates, a robust and did the companies know? growing body of documentary evidence When did they know it? What did they indicates that the major oil and gas do about it? For what can we hold them companies whose products are legally and morally responsible? substantially responsible for global greenhouse emissions and the resulting Recent years have seen dramatic advances shows that fossil fuel companies have climate crisis had early and repeated in the science of climate attribution, been aware of the risks of climate change, notice of climate risks, and numerous allowing researchers, investigators, and and their products’ role in exacerbating opportunities to avoid or reduce those litigators alike to identify both climate those risks, for at least six decades. At risks. Abundant evidence of industry harms and potential defendants with ever least one major oil company was on support for climate denial suggests they greater precision. Researchers have notice of evolving climate science as early chose a different path. Evaluated under identified ninety major carbon producers, as 1957. By 1958, the industry as a whole the laws of tort, the law of non- including fifty-one investor-owned was studying carbon dioxide in the contractual responsibility in civil companies, that are responsible for nearly atmosphere through its industry jurisdictions, and international human two-thirds of historical carbon and the American Petroleum rights law, there are ample grounds to methane emissions. At the same time, Institute. From 1968 onward, the hold companies responsible for those new techniques are enabling ever more industry was repeatedly warned of the choices. precise calculations of the relationship climate risks of its products, including by between CO2 emissions, global its own scientists, and often in dire terms. While the present report focuses on US- temperature and sea level increases, and based oil and gas companies, the relevant climate impacts. For the first time, From the 1960s onward, the oil industry inquiry does not end there. Other scientists and plaintiffs can trace the was actively patenting technologies that industries, including the coal industry contributions of individual companies to might have been deployed to reduce have well-documented histories of climate specific climate impacts and climate- greenhouse gas emissions or accelerate the denial. And clear, if currently limited, related disasters. These techniques, and shift to clean energy. Industry leaders evidence demonstrates that climate denial the ability of affected communities to argued against public research into was a transnational phenomenon, draw on them, are evolving and rapidly cleaner technologies—or absorbed public involving corporate activities—and active improving. research dollars for themselves—even as deception campaigns—in multiple they argued internally that deploying new countries. Whether companies can be held legally technologies would reduce their own liable for these impacts depends on profits. By no later than the 1980s and One thing is already clear: For major whether they had the ability to foresee perhaps far earlier, major oil companies carbon producers around the world and climate harms and the ability and were incorporating climate risks into their the communities harmed by their decades opportunity to avoid or reduce those operational planning for major projects, of action and inaction on climate change, harms. and taking steps to protect their own the investigations into what Exxon knew assets from long-term climate impacts. are the beginning of this story, but they Through company documents, scientific are by no means the end. studies, and other evidence, this report 2 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Introduction

limate change poses a law that underpin the allocation of International Environmental Law fundamental threat to liability across an array of legal domains (CIEL), Climate Investigation Center’s ecosystems, nations, human and legal systems. Climate Files, InsideClimate News, Union rights, and human lives. It is of Concerned Scientists, Los Angeles Times Ccaused by the emission and accumulation We then review the factual background of and Columbia School of Journalism, of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the petroleum industry’s knowledge and DeSmog Blog, Corporate Europe primarily due to the combustion of fossil awareness of climate change. We present Observatory, and others. A more detailed fuels—oil, gas, and coal. This report was the best available evidence documenting description of these sources, their written to answer the questions: What the petroleum industry’s understanding of limitations, and their treatment in this did the fossil fuel companies know? climate change at critical moments synthesis is set forth as Annex II to this When did they know it? What did they throughout the twentieth and into the report. do about it? For what can they be held twenty-first centuries, along with research legally and morally responsible? the industry conducted into alternative To facilitate direct access to relevant explanations for observed climatic evidence, hyperlinks to cited documents The report begins by exploring the changes and potential carbon emissions have been provided wherever feasible. At fundamental principles of legal solutions. Finally, we offer examples of the time of publication (Nov. 2017) all responsibility in both tort and human actions taken by the industry to confuse hyperlinks were functional and accurate, rights law. The objective is not to assess or mislead the public. although some linked documents are the elements of a particular claim, but to subject to paywalls or other limitations. distill the core components of legal The evidence in this report comes from responsibility from tort and human rights several sources, including the Center for ©skeeze/Pixabay SMOKE AND FUMES 3

PART 1 The Legal Basis for Accountability Fundamental Elements of Responsibility under Tort, Civil Liability, and Human Rights Law

Climate Litigation: Causation, Attribution, and the Scientific Case Against Major Carbon Producers

cross countries, legal systems, and many fields of law, the essential links in the litigation chain are constant—an identifiableA plaintiff, identifiable defendants, a causal chain that connects the harms suffered by the fo to the actions or inactions of the other. Establishing the links in that causal chain—particularly in tracing specific climate impacts to individual defendants or groups of defendants—is a common challenge facing potential plaintiffs or © 12019/Pixabay others who would hold polluters accountable for their contributions to climate change.

Recent years have seen dramatic advances climate crisis are identifiable, measurable, This research identified what have in the science of attribution at every link and significant. become known as the “Carbon Majors,” a in this chain. As climate impacts group of ninety companies responsible accelerate worldwide, a growing body of In 2013, Richard Heede of the Climate for approximately two-thirds of industrial evidence is enabling scientists, Accountability Institute5 released a study carbon emissions since the beginning of governments, and litigators to identify wherein he traced historical carbon the industrial revolution in 1751,7 and and quantify the impacts of climate dioxide and methane emissions on records from as early as change on countries, cities, communities, embedded in all the traceable oil, gas, 1854.8 and even individuals. From farmers in the coal, and produced from 1751 Peruvian Andes,1 to communities in the through 2010.6 By focusing on fossil fuel Fifty of these companies are investor- Philippines2 and Massachusetts,3 to flood producers (and cement manufacturers) at owned (e.g. Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP); control engineers in California,4 ever the top of the product chain, Heede thirty-one are state-owned enterprises growing numbers of plaintiffs are able to could tabulate how much of historical (e.g. Saudi Aramco, Statoil); nine are trace the harms they are suffering or the emissions flowed from those companies industries run entirely by government, risks they face to the rising impacts of directly, or from the combustion of their such as in and Poland.9 climate change. fossil fuel products. The study was updated in 2014 to cover At the same time, analyses of historical Recent years have seen dramatic emissions through 2013.10 A production data for fossil fuels has advances in the science of supplemental analysis released by Climate identified a discrete group of potential Accountability Institute and Carbon defendants whose contributions to the attribution at every link in this Disclosure Project in June 2017 chain. 4 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

demonstrated that more than half of This new research is a leap forward in This research and methodology global CO2 emissions since 1988 can be attribution science. Heede’s original demonstrates that it is possible to linked to just 25 producers, including five research was groundbreaking in that it apportion percentages of specific leading investor-owned oil companies: tied significant fractions of global climate impacts to individual ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, Chevron, and emissions to individual companies or Total.11 If Saudi Arabia carries out its plan state actors. Now, UCS, CAI, and Oxford companies. to list state-owned Saudi Aramco on a have demonstrated that scientists (and public stock market, Aramco would join plaintiffs) can trace the contributions of under which proof of causation alone will the other investor-owned companies on individual companies to climate impacts trigger liability. Far more generally, this list. and climate-related disasters. While the however, as a matter of fairness, morality, specific mathematic conclusions may be and of law, judicial bodies seek evidence In September 2017, researchers from the challenged, the fact that this research and that a defendant not only caused a harm, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) methodology passed the muster of peer but that they were culpable for that harm and Oxford collaborated with review demonstrates that it is possible to in some way—that the defendant acted Heede to combine these fields of apportion percentages of specific climate (or failed to act) in a way that renders attribution science for the first time. The impacts to individual companies. them morally responsible for researchers disaggregated major carbon addressing—and remedying—the producers’ historical emissions by year But establishing that major carbon consequences of those actions. and constructed emissions profiles for producers are causally contributing to each company over time.12 By tracing climate impacts and climate harms is only As ethicist Henry Shue explains in an emissions through time, the team was the first step in accountability. The essay that accompanied the foregoing able to attribute fractions of the question remains: Can they be held paper: accumulation of carbon dioxide in the responsible? atmosphere, increases in atmospheric If A falls down the escalator because she is temperature, and elevation of the sea level The Fundamental Elements of hit from behind by B, but B was tripped to individual companies based on the Responsibility: Notice of Risk by C, B is partly causally responsible but timing of their commercial activities. Just and the Opportunity to Avoid not at all morally responsible for A’s fall. as significantly, the paper demonstrated or Reduce Risk The moral responsibility for A’s fall how hundreds of excess deaths from a belongs entirely to C. Causal responsibility single extreme weather event could be While establishing causal links between a must be blameworthy to become the basis attributed to climate change and defendant’s actions and a plaintiff’s harms for moral responsibility, and causation—or ultimately, in part, to the oil, gas, and is a necessary condition of liability in “contribution”—is blameworthy only if it coal produced by major carbon most circumstances, it is rarely sufficient. is a violation of a socially accepted producers.13 There are certain areas of law and certain principle.14 legal concepts—such as strict liability— © Aaron Sprecher/Greenpeace © Aaron SMOKE AND FUMES 5

Both tort law and international human rights law are rooted in this underlying concept of responsibility. The legal analysis presented in this section is not intended to prove the elements of particularized claims, but rather to distill the core components of responsibility in the areas of tort law, human rights law, and products liability. When determining whether someone can be held liable for a harm—and assuming the burden of showing causation has been met—tort law and human rights law both converge on two core elements of responsibility:

An actor is responsible for a harm when © PublicDomainPictures/Pixabay they have 1) the ability to foresee a harm, and 2) the ability and opportunity to avoid or minimize that harm.

As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the US Supreme Court observed, tort liability may be properly imposed when the harm in question was both reasonably 15 foreseeable and avoidable. Legal given loss, there can be more than one Corporate Responsibility for philosopher H.L.A. Hart reiterated these outcome responsible actor[.]”18 Both Human Rights Violations Aris- two criteria, namely, the capacity to Perry and Goldberg & Zipursky extend ing from Climate Change foresee the harm and the ability to avoid this theory to include the sale of the harm, as both necessary and sufficient products. When someone who produces In light of this analysis, the parallels conditions for responsibility for harmful between responsibility under tort and 16 or markets a particular product has the outcomes. ability to foresee certain potential harms civil law, and the essential elements of to flow from that product, this risk of responsibility for human rights violations Professor Stephen R. Perry of the harm gives rise to an obligation to become clear. Accordingly, we find the University of Pennsylvania School of Law same elements reflected in the of distills these elements into an “outcome- human rights bodies and mandate Both tort law and international responsibility” theory of tort liability. As holders. Perry explains, an actor agent “is human rights law are rooted in this outcome-responsible for a harmful underlying concept of In its treatise on “Corporate Complicity outcome if and only if he causally responsibility. & Legal Accountability,” the contributed to it, possessed the capacity International Commission of Jurists to foresee it, and had the ability and undertake further research. Perry observes explicitly addressed the fundamental opportunity to take steps, on the basis of that, “the company that negligently fails tenets of responsibility underlying the what could have been foreseen, to avoid laws of tort in common law jurisdictions, 17 to carry out appropriate further research it.” [is] outcome-responsible for the harms of “non-contractual obligations” in civil that result from releasing its product onto law countries, and the law of human 21 In a review of Hart and Perry, Goldberg the market[.]”19 Goldberg & Zipursky are rights. Recognizing the growing & Zipursky affirm and further elaborate even more explicit, concluding that “[a] importance of civil liability in assuring on the essential elements of responsibility. seller can cogently be deemed morally are held accountable for “A person is outcome-responsible for a responsible for its product having caused their role in human rights violations, and loss if the person’s volitional action was a an injury when the injury was an further recognizing that laws of civil necessary condition for the loss’s having avoidable consequence of selling the liability and human rights protect similar occurred, and if the loss was avoidable, in product.”20 fundamental interests, the Commission that the person could reasonably have undertook a comparative analysis of laws foreseen that his action might cause the of tort and civil liability across countries, loss, and the person was capable of acting and explored “the ways in which, across so as not to cause it. Critically, for any jurisdictions, civil liability may arise for 6 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

and therefore avoidable.) Finally, the extent of human rights obligations owed by corporations is limited to potential and actual human rights impacts resulting from a company’s business activities and relationships connected to those activities.29 (There is a causal relationship between the actor and the harm.)

This framework of elements—ability to foresee a harm, ability to avoid the harm, and a causal link between the actor and the harm—as the basis for responsibility can be applied to the behavior of individual fossil fuel companies, as well as the sector as a whole. As detailed in the pages that follow, there is now extensive

© taddtography/Pixabay evidence that the world’s largest investor- owned oil companies—also among the companies and/or their officials when report Guiding Principles on Business and largest of the major carbon producers they are complicit in gross human rights Human Rights.24 These “Ruggie identified by Heede and others—knew or abuses.”22 Principles,” as they have become known, should have known about the reality of have been endorsed by the UN Human climate change, and the fact that it was The Commission distilled the principles Rights Council as the foundation for caused primarily by the combustion of of civil liability—i.e. responsibility—into assessing corporate responsibilities to fossil fuels, more than a half century ago. four basic questions, which it found uphold human rights and avoid equally applicable to determining complicity in human rights violations.25 A 2015 essay by Peter Frumhoff, Richard whether companies were complicit in Heede, and Naomi Oreskes explicitly gross human rights abuses: These companies bear addresses the issue of industrial carbon responsibility for climate change producers’ responsibility for climate • Was harm inflicted to an interest of change.30 The authors conclude both that and have an opportunity—and the victim that is protected by law? these companies bear responsibility for • Did the company’s conduct obligation—to contribute to climate change and that they have the contribute to the infliction of the solutions. ability, and obligation, to contribute to harm? solutions.31 • Did the company know or would a The Ruggie Principles ground the prudent company in the same corporate responsibility to protect human Oxford’s Henry Shue drew the same circumstances have known that its rights in both substance and process.26 conclusion in considering the moral conduct posed a risk of harm to the Substantively, there are a suite of human responsibility of major carbon producers. victim? rights that corporations must not Shue concluded: • Considering this risk, did the violate.27 Procedurally, corporations must company take the precautionary implement human rights due diligence Unless carbon producers are somehow measures a prudent company would systems, including the adoption of exempt from the moral principles that have taken in order to prevent the human rights policies, production of society applies to ordinary mortals, their 23 risk from materializing? impact assessments, and tracking 50 years of flagrant disregard of their company performance.28 simple negative responsibility to do no These questions are, ultimately, asking harm, beginning by reducing any initially the same questions outlined in the three Under the principles, corporations are unavoidable harm as rapidly as possible factors above: foreseeability, causation, held to a standard of upholding human through either modification of or and ability to avoid. rights. (To violate those rights would substitution for their products, brings to constitute a harm.) They are obligated to bear the other basic principle that is the In 2011, UN Special Rapporteur on investigate and monitor the circumstances other side of the same coin: clean up your 32 Business & Human Rights John Ruggie of their operations, and therefore should own mess. addressed the human rights be on notice of violations of human responsibilities of corporations in his rights. (The harms should be foreseeable, SMOKE AND FUMES 7

PART 2 The Evidentiary Basis for Accountability Notice, Opportunity, and Failure to Act

Oil on Notice: Evidence of Early Industry Awareness of Climate Risks

he potential link between fossil fuel combustion and atmospheric temperature increase has been widely Tdiscussed in scientific literature and academic texts relevant to the oil industry for more than a century.

The earth receives a constant stream of radiant energy from the . This solar

radiation is critical to maintaining © dehenderson/Pixabay planetary temperatures at a level that will support life. It has been equally critical to life and to a stable human civilization that a significant portion of the radiation the earth receives from the sun is reflected back into space, thus ensuring that planetary temperatures do not increase temperatures has been routinely discussed This situation began to change, and uncontrollably. Beginning with the work in scientific literature, including specialist scientific attention to carbon dioxide of John Tyndall in 1859, it has been journals and textbooks for the geology began to intensify, when researcher Guy widely recognized that certain Callendar published a study entitled The “greenhouse gases,” such as carbon The potential link between fossil Artificial Production of Carbon Dioxide 36 dioxide, make the Earth’s atmosphere fuel combustion and atmospheric and its Influence on Temperature. In his study, Callendar observed that three more opaque to that reflected radiation, temperature increase has been trapping energy that would otherwise be quarters of the carbon dioxide released in released back into space.33 At the same widely discussed in scientific the prior 50 years had, in fact, remained time, scientists and industry experts alike literature and academic texts in the atmosphere. As a result, Callendar have long recognized the simple and relevant to the oil industry for estimated world temperatures had irrefutable fact that the combustion of more than a century. increased at 0.005ºC per year for the fossil fuels—including coal, oil, and previous fifty years.37 —releases tremendous and minerology communities, in the Callendar’s study was not immediately amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) into general and popular scientific press, and the atmosphere; and that, indeed, CO2 is 35 embraced, but it was widely cited and even in newspaper reports. For decades, 38 by far the largest waste stream from fossil however, the relationship between fossil debated over the following two decades. fuel combustion processes.34 Some, such as Giles Slocum of the US fuel combustion, atmospheric CO2, and global temperatures caused little concern Weather Bureau, determined that they The proportion of carbon dioxide in the because it was widely, but erroneously, could not detect a noticeable change in atmosphere has a strong positive atmospheric carbon dioxide assumed that the CO2 released in this way 39 correlation with planetary temperatures. would be safely absorbed by the world’s concentrations. Others postulated that For more than a century, this relationship oceans, thus reducing global climate the oceans would absorb so much of the between carbon dioxide and planetary impacts. carbon dioxide that “the amount of 8 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

surplus CO2 from artificial coal would be retained in the oceans much The Petroleum Industry En- combustion will become insignificantly longer before returning to the gaged in Coordinated Research small as soon as equilibrium with marine atmosphere, which would delay the and Communications on Air carbonate is established.”40 In 1955, impact of fossil fuel emissions by decades Pollution Issues from the 1940s however, Hans Suess provided the first or centuries.47 Onward clear proof that, as hypothesized in 1896 by Svante and theorized by Callendar, The Revelle and Suess study did not warn The petroleum industry has long been carbon dioxide traceable to the that climate change would definitely highly coordinated, acting through combustion of fossil fuels was devastate the planet, but it did centralized industry associations. The accumulating in the atmosphere,41 a emphatically state that atmospheric Western Oil and Gas Association phenomenon that would thereafter be carbon dioxide levels were likely to (WOGA)—now the Western States referred to as the “Suess effect.” increase significantly over the following Petroleum Association (WSPA)—was several decades. Moreover, the report founded in 1907 and represents The research of Callendar, Slocum, Suess, petroleum companies in the western and others was neither obscure nor “[W]ithin a few centuries we are .49 The American Petroleum hidden. Unsurprisingly, the earliest returning to the atmosphere and Institute was created in 1919 to represent industry studies to which we have access oceans the concentrated organic the American petroleum industry as a 50 that measure the buildup of carbon carbon stored in sedimentary rocks whole. From the time API was founded, dioxide in the atmosphere appear around oil companies recognized pollution issues over hundreds of millions of years.” this time. as an area of significant common concern, — HANS SUESS & ROGER REVELLE, 1957 and by the 1930s, they had focused Documentary Evidence Demon- particularly on the industry’s shared strates Oil Industry was on No- provides definitive evidence that, by concerns with air pollution and the tice of Potential Climate Risks 1957, at least one oil company—a related public hostility and risk of by 1957 subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey regulation it presented. (now ExxonMobil)—was aware that the In 1957, Suess and Roger Revelle, of the byproducts of fossil fuel combustion were In the 1940s, Los Angeles, California, Scripps Institute of Oceanography in La accumulating in the atmosphere and grappled with increasingly severe and Jolla, California, published a landmark would likely continue to do so. debilitating smog. In late 1946, paper that contradicted the longstanding executives from the major petroleum assumption that the oceans would absorb An internal account of industry-funded companies represented by WOGA a large majority of artificial carbon research projects in 1958 indicates that at established the “Committee on Smoke 42 dioxide added to the atmosphere. least one project funded by the American and Fumes of the Western Oil and Gas Revelle and Suess predicted large increases Petroleum Institute (API) was measuring Association” to fund research into the in atmospheric carbon dioxide, especially causes of air pollution in Southern the proportion of atmospheric carbon “of 51 if fossil fuel combustion continued to fossil origin,” i.e., the Suess effect.48 California. The committee was 43 increase exponentially. They noted that Funded under the auspices of the explicitly created not just to conduct “[w]ithin a few centuries we are returning American Petroleum Institute’s Smoke research, but also to communicate that to the atmosphere and oceans the and Fumes Committee, the research into research to the media, public, and concentrated organic carbon stored in atmospheric carbon was part of a broader decision makers with the express goal of sedimentary rocks over hundreds of research program targeting atmospheric discouraging pollution regulations the 44 52 millions of years.” Two months after the pollutants of concern to the oil industry industry deemed costly and unnecessary. Revelle and Suess paper was published, as a whole. This history provides clear scientists at Humble Oil (now documentary evidence that key oil and A report on the Committee’s work by ExxonMobil) submitted their own study gas industry actors were collaborating in Esso (now ExxonMobil) executive G.A. 45 for publication on the same question. and through API to investigate carbon Lloyd highlighted the central role that dioxide as an atmospheric pollutant by no understanding and shaping public Significantly, the Humble Oil study later than 1958. As discussed more fully opinion played in the work and the acknowledges not only rising levels of below, they were doing so within the objectives of the Smoke and Fumes Committee. Highlighting that an atmospheric CO2, but also the evident context of a longstanding campaign to contribution of fossil fuels to that increase combine industry-funded science with “Information Committee” populated and the continuing and projected rise in active public relations efforts to increase with public relations representatives was a 46 that fossil fuel combustion. In public skepticism of air pollution science key part of the enterprise, Lloyd outlined acknowledged disagreement with Revelle, and regulation. their key priorities. The highest of these however, the paper suggests that CO2 priorities was to collect, evaluate, and SMOKE AND FUMES 9

integrate information not only on key air Fumes Committee was, in part, to avoid presentation to the SRI board of directors pollutants of interest to the industry, but “the hasty passage of a law or laws for the was postponed, and his consultancy also on “the attitudes of the general control of a given air pollution terminated.65 public on these problems, and the situation,”62 the Committee did not activities of individuals or groups seeking to simply publish all the research it In 1954, when Vance Jenkins recounted achieve objectives in this field.”53 It sought sponsored. One stark example of this the history of industry-sponsored air to ensure, through API, that information pattern unfolded in the debate over the pollution research to the public, he relevant to air pollutants and their causes of urban smog. neglected to mention Johnston’s regulation flowed continuously to key oil confirmation of Haagen-Smit’s theory industry personnel, and, critically, to By the early 1950s, scientist Arie Haagen- and declared “[t]he work at Stanford assist industry leaders in “preparing Smit had identified automobiles and Research Institute has shown that there statements on controversial issues.”54 As as the primary causal agents for are a number of apparent errors both in explained by Lloyd, the Smoke and the pervasive smog pollution that choked this theory and in its interpretation to Fumes Committee actively pushed out its Southern California in a toxic haze for account for the various phenomena messages through articles in national decades. After California regulators associated with smog.”66 The experience magazines, outreach to reporters, leaflets accepted Haagen-Smit’s theory, the of Haagen-Smit was indicative of the and brochures, and issuing running Smoke and Fumes Committee launched Smoke and Fumes Committee’s work on progress reports on the industry’s an extensive campaign to discredit a number of fronts, and its frequent use pollution control efforts.55 Haagen-Smit and his research. When an of industry-funded researchers to atmospheric chemist named Harold question or contradict air pollution The early history of the Smoke and Johnston publicly criticized Haagen- research it considered unfavorable to Fumes Committee, and particularly its Smit’s theory, the Smoke and Fumes industry interests. engagement on the smog debate in Committee awarded Johnston a contract California, offers insight into the context with SRI to review Haagen-Smit’s work By 1958, the Smoke and Fumes in which early oil industry research into and disprove his theory.63 Unexpectedly, Committee was funding research into an climate change was undertaken. Johnston’s work confirmed Haagen-Smit’s array of pollutants at a number of research was correct, with Johnston additional institutes, including Armour In 1946, the year that the Smoke and himself proclaiming Haagen-Smit a Research Foundation, Franklin Institute, Fumes Committee was founded, the “genius.”64 When Johnston shared his and Truesdail Laboratories.67 Stanford Research Institute (SRI) was findings with superiors at SRI, his founded in connection with Stanford University.56 One written history of SRI indicates that Atholl McBean, director of Standard Oil of California (now Chevron) was the “most important of the founding fathers.”57 In 1947, the Smoke and Fumes Committee hired the newly- created SRI to conduct much of its air pollution research.58 Indeed, in its early years, 74% of SRI’s research “went to petroleum and natural gas people,”59 and oil and gas interests were heavily represented on its board. In 1952, the Smoke and Fumes Committee was reformed within API, with an executive of Union Oil Company of California (now Chevron) as its chairman.60

As noted above, the Smoke and Fumes Committee existed not just to fund and oversee research, but to actively © josepons28/Pixabay communicate with “interested in industry, research, and government; and to the public.”61 However, as the goal of the Smoke and 10 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

In 1965, the Smoke and Fumes The Industry Undertook Coor- Glenn notes that “the oil industry is Committee merged with other API dinated Research into Many several years ahead of the other American committees and working groups to form Subjects Relevant to the industries in applying meteorology and the Committee for Air and Water Causes and Impacts of Climate oceanography.”71 He further comments Conservation (CAWC) of the American Change that even the government’s own services Petroleum Institute.68 The CAWC in the space are too broad for industry consisted of “representatives from 20 API When the major petroleum companies needs and typically trail industry’s own member companies,” while “major oil began expanding their operations offshore science by years.72 industry associations also send liaison into the Gulf of Mexico in the 1940s, representatives to CAWC meetings.”69 they realized that hurricanes posed a In 1956, API initiated a research program significant challenge to the safe and that would last until 1962 to investigate reliable operation of offshore oil rigs. In the causes of, and conditions preceding, “The oil industry is several years 1947, Humble Oil (now ExxonMobil) hurricane formation.73 Mercer Parks, the ahead of the other American contracted with A.H. Glenn, a chairman of the program from Humble industries in applying meteorology meteorological consultant, to develop Oil, wrote a retrospective account of the and oceanography.” wave and weather forecasting project in 1963 where he outlined the techniques.70 In a paper from 1951, advances made in the ability to predict — A.H. GLENN, 1951 hurricane formation based on current weather conditions.74 Another paper by EXHIBIT 1 M.M. Patterson, of Shell Development Excerpt from 1954 Report for Smoke & Fumes Committee Company, describes a then-ongoing eighteen-month project to collect ocean data from newly installed Shell oil platforms “for the development and calibration of environmental forecasting theories.”75 This joint project included participation from several major petroleum companies, including Shell Development Company, Esso Production Research Company (now ExxonMobil), Mobil Company (now ExxonMobil), Pan American Petroleum (now BP), Gulf Oil Corporation, Texaco Inc., the CAGC Marine Region, and Chevron Oil Field Research Company.76

In addition to their research into hurricane formation, many of the major oil companies conducted research into paleoclimates and historical sea levels, to better predict where reserves of offshore oil may be found. Research into the historical temperature record was sponsored by API in 1950,77 and was being done at Humble Oil laboratories by 1957.78

This research was undertaken against a backdrop of modest but growing awareness of the relationship between climate change and extreme weather events. In 1956, the Madera Daily News ran an article, “Carbon Dioxide May Contribute to Hurricanes,” which SMOKE AND FUMES 11 © WikiImages/Pixabay

discussed Revelle’s ongoing work and consultant to Philipps Petroleum, and cutting-edge knowledge about changes in explained the theory that accumulating C.A. Stokes of Cities (now sea levels and hurricanes, two natural carbon dioxide in the atmosphere might CITGO) co-authored a -length phenomena implicated by climate be raising temperatures and contributing report on the use of petroleum-based change. to an intensification of hurricanes.79 The carbon dust in weather modification same year, an article in Time Magazine techniques at multiple geographic scales.82 The idea that accumulating carbon noted Revelle’s work and warned that dioxide in the atmosphere could lead to rising temperatures could “melt the Finally, the oil industry, for its own increased hurricane formation and rising icecaps of and Greenland, business motives, had a deep and sea levels was being discussed openly in which would flood the earth’s coastal profound understanding of the newspapers and magazines as early as lands.”80 As experts in the science relevant relationships between sea levels, 1956. While we cannot know for certain to their products, it can be presumed that atmospheric temperatures, and carbon in that the entire industry was aware of these the oil and gas industries knew or should the environment. In 1961, for example, theories, they had as much expertise in have known about these public API funded a study into the trends in sea the field as any other industry, academia, discussions and the relevant science level from 30,000 years before present to or the government. Moreover, scientists 7,000 years before present. The author hired by API explicitly connected If anyone would have understood discussed the relationship between the temperatures, glaciers, and sea levels in how fossil fuel combustion and size of glaciers, global temperatures, and research paid for by API. Given the global warming were going to sea level, noting specifically that a rapid advanced knowledge and expertise, it is change the climate, it was this rise in sea level coincided with a warming fair to ask whether the major oil and gas of the climate. “Sea level, on the other companies, and the petroleum industry as industry. hand, rises during warm periods and falls a whole, knew or should have known during cold periods[.]”83 If anyone would about the emerging science focused on underlying them. have understood how fossil fuel the relationship between fossil fuel In addition to studying the natural combustion and global warming were combustion, global temperatures, sea behavior of hurricanes, the oil industry going to change the climate, it was this levels, and extreme weather events. also sponsored research into weather industry. modification techniques. In the 1960s, The Petroleum Industry was for example, James Black of Esso—who It is clear that the purpose of the Unequivocally Warned of Cli- would later warn Exxon executives of the previously described research into mate Change Due Primarily to dangers of rising carbon dioxide levels in hurricanes, sea level, and paleoclimate the Combustion of Fossil Fuels the atmosphere—researched and patented was not to investigate climate change, but By 1968 techniques to trap heat and manipulate rather to determine where to explore for local weather conditions by covering large oil. However, these research priorities In 1968, a report from the Stanford areas in .81 M.L. Corrin, a armed the petroleum industry with Research Institute called Sources, 12 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Abundance, and Fate of Gaseous In assessing future research needs with its Smoke and Fumes database in 2016,

Atmospheric Pollutants was delivered to respect to CO2, Robinson and Robbins and it has not previously been reported W.A. Burhouse,84 Assistant Director of acknowledged that fossil fuel combustion by other sources. Accordingly, and in API’s Committee for Air and Water provided the best explanation for rising view of its early extensive treatment of Conservation, the successor to the Smoke carbon dioxide levels. More significantly, climate issues, it is discussed at length and Fumes Committee.85 Authored by they concluded that: here. SRI scientists Elmer Robinson and R.C.

Robbins, the report addressed six Past and present studies of CO2 are Unlike the original paper, the majority of pollutants, including carbon dioxide.86 It detailed and seem to explain adequately SRI’s 1969 supplemental report focused cautioned that rising levels of CO2 would the present state of CO2 in the on only two pollutants, one of which was likely result in rising global temperatures atmosphere. What is lacking is an atmospheric carbon dioxide. This

and that, if temperatures increased application of these atmospheric CO2 data supplement repeated and further significantly, the result could be melting to air pollution and work substantiated most of the core

ice caps, rising sea levels, warming oceans, toward systems in which CO2 emissions conclusions of the prior report, including and serious environmental damage on a would be brought under control.91 its recognition that: atmospheric global scale.87 The scientists concentrations of carbon dioxide were acknowledged that burning fossil fuels By no later than 1968, therefore, API and steadily increasing; 90% of this increase provided the best explanation for rising its industry members were being warned could be attributed to fossil fuel

CO2. They further recognized that by their own scientific consultants that combustion; and continued use of fossil existing science was “detailed” and the links between fossil fuel combustion fuels would inevitably and inexorably

seemed “to explain adequately the present and rising atmospheric CO2 were result in greater CO2 levels in the 88 state of CO2 in the atmosphere.” credible; that temperature rise was almost atmosphere. They reviewed the role of certain to result; and that the most plant growth and of oceans both as The 1968 report from SRI did not state pressing research need was into sources of and as natural sinks for carbon definitively that there was a scientific technologies to address and control the dioxide. They found it unlikely that consensus on questions of climate, but release of carbon dioxide into the either changes in marine biomass or other concluded “[s]ignificant temperature atmosphere from the burning of fossil natural changes in the biosphere could be

changes are almost certain to occur by the fuels. Although API quickly embraced responsible for rising CO2 levels, and year 2000 and these could bring about other aspects of the Robinson and further concluded that neither of these climatic changes.”89 Robinson and Robbins report, API asked SRI to review natural sinks could keep pace with the

Robbins cautioned that these increased their findings on CO2 more extensively in excess emissions created by burning fossil temperatures could result in melting ice a Supplemental Report submitted in fuels. As a result, Robinson and Robbins caps, rising sea levels, warming oceans, 1969.92 This document had not yet been estimated that the projected growth in and environmental damage on a global obtained when CIEL initially published fossil fuel use would push atmospheric 90 scale. CO2 to 370 ppm by the year 2000. This estimate proved remarkably accurate.93 EXHIBIT 2 Excerpt from 1969 Supplemental Report to API In their Supplemental Report to API, Robinson and Robbins acknowledged

that the increase in atmospheric CO2 was of potential concern because of how it would affect the radiation balance of the earth. They discussed at length, and with approval, modeling done by Manabe and Weatherald, and estimated that on the

basis of those models, an increase in CO2 to 370ppm would increase global temperatures by 0.5 C (0.9 F) by the year 2000. Again, Robinson and Robbins’ estimate proved remarkably accurate; between 1965 and 2000, long-term average global temperatures increased by approximately 0.5 C.94 They estimated that at 600 ppm, temperatures would rise by 2.36 C (4.2 F),95 while also SMOKE AND FUMES 13

recognizing that the combustion of all then recoverable fossil fuels would raise

atmospheric CO2 to 850 ppm, driving global temperatures still higher.

Robinson and Robbins acknowledged the widespread inference in the available science that “a given increase in atmospheric temperature could cause a gradual melting of the polar ice caps” and that this melting, if it occurred, “would obviously result in inundation of coastal 96

areas.” They also acknowledged a long- © girlart39/Pixabay term, detailed study that had indeed found apparent relationships between Antarctic ice caps and the global climate. Remarkably however, and in stark contrast to their treatment of other issues and the warnings of their earlier report, Finally, and notably, the Supplemental populated and funded by the petroleum Robinson and Robbins summarily Report included two paragraphs of industry, the NCP advises the federal disregarded these findings and their “Summary and Conclusions” with respect government on questions that concern implications, on the grounds that they 105 to CO2. The first of these paragraphs the industry. High-level executives were “based on what has occurred in the briefly and accurately summarized the from across the oil and gas industry were past, and with our present knowledge we report’s findings with respect to rising expressly listed as authors and editors of are not justified in predicting future CO2 levels, the role of fossil fuel the 1972 report and of its component effects of CO2 based on these 97 combustion, and the likelihood that chapters, including an extensive chapter correlations.” The Supplement omits 106 atmospheric CO2 would continue to on “Air Pollution.” several paragraphs from the earlier report grow as fossil fuel use continued. In stark summarizing the potential environmental contrast to the body of the report (and to By no later than 1968, the and human impacts of climate change. the 1968 original), however, the second petroleum industry as a whole was summary paragraph downplayed the on notice of climate change, its Despite this professed uncertainty, potential implications of that increase for Robinson and Robbins summarized by most probable causes, its potential global temperatures, sea levels, and the risks, and the pressing need to reiterating, “On the basis of our present environment—focusing exclusively on research technologies to reduce knowledge, significant temperature the uncertainties that made it impossible changes could be expected to occur by to draw any conclusions.101 We know that carbon dioxide emissions. the year 2000 as a result of increased CO2 industry scientists were aware, or should in the atmosphere. These could bring In its chapter on air pollutants, the 1972 98 have been aware, of Robinson and about long term climatic changes.” They Robbins’ reports for two reasons. First, an NPC report acknowledges Robinson & repeated their earlier warnings that “there internal API document titled Robbins’ report, describing it as a “careful seems to be no doubt that the potential Environmental Research, A Status Report, study” by “eminent scientists” and as an damage to our environment could be published in January 1972, outlines all of authoritative source on atmospheric severe …[and that] the prospect for the pollution.107 The report draws heavily 99 the research funded by CAWC up to that future must be of serious concern.” point in 1972.102 The status report from every aspect of Robinson and They marked again the irony that the acknowledges both the original 1968 SRI Robbins’ work, with the conspicuous abundant pollution by carbon dioxide report and the 1969 Supplemental exception of its section on carbon and particulate matter, “which we Report, including explicit references to dioxide. That NPC addressed carbon generally ignore because they have little the discussions of carbon dioxide dioxide as an atmospheric pollutant, but local effect, may be the cause of serious 103 did not reference either version of the SRI 100 contained therein. worldwide environmental changes.” report the industry itself had Perhaps for this reason, the Supplemental Second, the National Petroleum Council commissioned. Instead, it relied almost Report did not revisit or alter the (NPC) submitted a report to the entirely on a 1965 publication from the Research Needs identified in the original Department of Interior in 1972 entitled American Association for the report. Environmental Conservation: The Oil and Advancement of Science called Air 108 Gas Industries.104 An advisory body Conservation. The four-page section in 14 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW © tekila918/Pixabay

Air Conservation on carbon dioxide— the degree of certainty within the science regarding changes in energy strategies reproduced almost entirely in the NPC and the scale of possible impacts. In might become critical.”113 report—was dramatically shorter, less 1977, Exxon scientist James Black detailed, considerably more equivocal informed the company’s By 1980, the scientific consensus was than the industry’s own 1968 report, and committee that climate change driven by being openly acknowledged by Exxon failed to mention Revelle’s landmark fossil fuel use posed a significant global scientists. Exxon’s December 1980 paper from 1957, as well as several other threat.110 Later that same year, an inter- Technological Forecast warned that “most leading assessments.109 office memo from Henry Shaw, another widely accepted calculations carried on

Exxon scientist, noted that the “CO2 thus far on the potential impact of a The Robinson and Robbins reports, read problem … is the most important man- doubling of carbon dioxide on climate in conjunction with explicit references made weather problem that we have to indicate that an increase in the global thereto in an industry-authored 1972 contend with.”111 In May 1978, Black average temperature of 3 ± 1.5ºC is most report demonstrates that by no later than gave a presentation that included a likely … with greater warming occurring 114 1968, the petroleum industry as a whole prediction that a doubling of CO2 in the at the …polar regions.” The forecast was on notice of climate change, its most atmosphere would produce a temperature also noted that projections calculating probable causes, its potential risks, and increase of two to three degrees Celsius. smaller temperature increases “are not the pressing need to research technologies He noted that, despite any uncertainties held in high regard by the scientific to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. about the state of science at the time, community.”115 Documentary evidence “there is no guarantee that better demonstrates that similar findings were From 1977 to 1982 Exxon Scien- knowledge will lessen rather than being presented to and discussed within tists Repeatedly Confirm the augment the severity of the API as a whole.116 Science of Climate Change predictions.”112 He reiterated that the growth in carbon dioxide in the This understanding was also Investigations and document releases have atmosphere was due primarily to fossil communicated in a 1980 report from demonstrated that, by no later than the fuel combustion, and he concluded that Imperial Oil, Exxon’s Canadian late 1970s, scientists employed by Exxon “man has a time window of five to ten subsidiary, entitled Review of were reiterating to top management both years before the need for hard decisions Environmental Protection Activities for SMOKE AND FUMES 15

“[M]an has a time window of five to Celsius.120 In this memo, Cohen also Arctic and offshore projects in Canada, ten years before the need for hard acknowledged the work of a scientist who where warming will clearly affect sea ice, decisions regarding changes in believed increased water evaporation and icebergs, permafrost, and sea levels.”124 energy strategies might become cloud cover would suppress global temperature increases. Cohen concluded, Similarly, evidence uncovered by The critical.” however, that this analysis was consistent Guardian demonstrates that Shell was — JAMES BLACK, 1978 with predictions that atmospheric also directly put on notice of climate risks temperature increases would be non- and incorporating those risks into 1978-1979. The report acknowledges uniformly distributed across the globe, planning. A 1986 report seen by The “[t]here is no doubt that increases in with little warming at the equator and fossil fuel usage and decreases in forest greatest warming at the poles. He “Certainly any major development cover are aggravating the potential concludes that, “[in] summary, the results with a life span of say 30-40 years of our research are in accord with the problem of increased CO2 in the will need to assess the impacts of atmosphere.”117 Significantly, the memo scientific consensus on the effect of potential global warming…This is expressed the view that Exxon possessed increased atmospheric CO2 on particularly true of Arctic and 121 the technology to dramatically reduce climate.” offshore projects in Canada, where emissions, but that doing so would result warming will clearly affect sea ice, in an unacceptable increase in costs. Later that year, on November 12, 1982, Exxon circulated a 43-page climate icebergs, permafrost, and sea By 1981, Exxon had internally change primer to several members of levels.” Exxon management to “familiarize Exxon acknowledged the risks of climate change — KEN CROASDALE, 1986 122 and the role fossil fuel combustion played personnel with the subject.” By this in increasing carbon dioxide point, Exxon was fully aware and Guardian addressed the issue directly. The concentrations in the atmosphere. A internally acknowledging that climate report “notes the large uncertainties in position memo from Henry Shaw in May change was real, caused by burning fossil climate science at the time but 1981 includes as Exxon’s current position fuels, and would have significant impacts nonetheless states: ‘the changes may be on the environment and human health 125 on the CO2 greenhouse effect that a three the greatest in recorded history.’” degree increase in average temperatures and wellbeing. will result in a ten degree increase at the Later, in 1989, Shell Oil announced that poles, “[m]ajor shifts in rainfall/ As Early as the 1970s and No it was redesigning a $3 billion natural gas ,” and that “[p]olar ice may Later than the 1980s, Climate platform it had been designing for use in melt.”118 Change Projections Were Being the North Sea.126 The original had Used in Business and Opera- the platform sitting 30 meters above the By 1982, any lingering doubts were put tional Planning ocean’s surface, but the redesign would to rest by a memo from Roger Cohen, raise the platform by one to two meters to then Director of Exxon’s Theoretical and Internal documents uncovered by the Los account for rising sea levels as a result of Mathematical Sciences Laboratory. In this Angeles Times and the Columbia School global warming.127 memo, Cohen noted that “a clear of Journalism demonstrate that by the scientific consensus had emerged mid-1980s, Exxon was incorporating This evidence of early action to protect regarding the expected climatic effects of climate change projections into its Arctic industry assets from climate change 119 operations planning while discounting increased atmospheric CO2.” This should be considered a baseline for consensus determined that doubling the risks when communicating with the further investigation into both prior and 123 public. subsequent industry conduct. Anecdotal “[In] summary, the results of our evidence, including interviews with long- In 1986, a team of researchers led by Ken time industry , strongly suggests research are in accord with the Croasdale of Imperial oil, an Exxon scientific consensus on the effect of the oil and gas industry may have begun subsidiary, was “trying to determine how accounting for climate change in the increased atmospheric CO2 on global warming could affect Exxon’s design of its own infrastructure far earlier climate.” Arctic operations and its bottom line.” In than the 1980s. In a filmed interview 1991, Croasdale reported to an — ROGER COHEN, 1982 with one of the authors of the present conference that “[c]ertainly report, a long-time oil industry engineer any major development with a life span reported that he had been instructed to atmospheric CO2 would result in a global of say 30-40 years will need to assess the plan for melting permafrost in the design temperature increase of three degrees impacts of potential global warming,” and pads for the TransAlaska Celsius, plus or minus 1.5 degrees and that “[t]his is particularly true of Pipeline in the early 1970s.128 A second 16 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW © ambquinn/Pixabay

interviewed by a documentary “The scientific basis for the distributed to GCC members film crew reportedly suggested that at Greenhouse Effect and the potential acknowledged that, “The scientific basis least one oil company accounted for sea impact of human emissions of for the Greenhouse Effect and the level rise in its design of offshore oil rigs greenhouse gases such as CO on potential impact of human emissions of even earlier. 2 greenhouse gases such as CO on climate climate is well established and 2 is well established and cannot be Taken together, the available evidence cannot be denied.” denied.”135 demonstrates that by as early as the — GLOBAL CLIMATE COALITION, 1995 1970s, and no later than the 1980s, not Despite this internal acknowledgement, only was the entire petroleum industry on issue supports the conclusions that the the industry fought to undermine the notice of climate change, but internal facts today and the projection of future legitimacy of the Second Assessment of 130 documents from two of the largest oil effects is very unclear.” That same year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate companies had confirmed and reaffirmed Exxon scientist Brian Flannery reportedly Change, specifically its conclusion about the reality of the problem. Moreover, at urged the first Intergovernmental Panel the human contribution to warming. least two of the largest oil companies were on Climate Change (IPCC) to emphasize Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway outline actively incorporating expected changes the uncertainties surrounding climate how Ben Santer, one of the authors of the into their engineering projects. models in its first Scientific Assessment IPCC’s Second Assessment, became the 131 Report. target of a coordinated industry campaign In the 1990s, Even as it Ac- after leading the IPCC scientific team in Beginning in 1989, Exxon, Mobil, knowledged Climate Realities the cautiously worded groundbreaking Chevron, Shell, and BP, were Internally, the Oil Industry In- conclusion that “[t]he balance of evidence instrumental in the creation and tensified its Public Campaigns suggests that there is a discernible human operation of the Global Climate 136 Against Climate Science influence on global climate.” While Coalition (GCC).132 Throughout the Even as they acknowledged climate 1990s, the GCC lobbied aggressively “Victory Will Be Achieved When … realities internally, major oil companies against action on climate change, not Average citizens ‘understand’ continued and intensified their efforts to only within the United States but also at (recognize) uncertainties in climate the international level. In briefings increase uncertainty regarding climate sci- science; recognition of uncertainties provided to policymakers and reporters, ence and climate risks among the public becomes part of the ‘conventional and policymakers. the GCC routinely asserted that “[t]he role of greenhouse gases in climate change wisdom.’” is not well understood.”133 Internally, In 1990, a shareholder petitioned Exxon’s — AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, 1998 board of directors to develop a plan to however, the GCC members reduce carbon dioxide emissions from its acknowledged the reality of climate noted denialist Fred Singer attacked the operations facilities.129 The board change, including the role of fossil fuels scientific conclusions, lobbyists for API 134 responded that its “examination of the in climate impacts. A 17-page “primer and others accused Santer of altering the on global climate change science” report itself and suppressing dissent.137 SMOKE AND FUMES 17

The GCC, moreover, released a report ‘understand’ (recognize) uncertainties The op-ed ends by declaring that, “while accusing Santer and other IPCC scientists in climate science; recognition of some argue that the science debate is of revising the chapter, without uncertainties becomes part of the settled and governments should focus authorization—despite the fact that the ‘conventional wisdom,’” and “[t]hose only on near-term policies—that is empty report hadn’t yet been published.138 This promoting the Kyoto treaty on the basis rhetoric.”143 strategy of attacking scientists of extant science appear to be out of individually—echoing the experience of touch with reality.”141 Documents discovered via Freedom of Arie Haagen-Smit in the fight over Information Act requests demonstrate smog—presaged future attacks on The Oil Industry Continued to that from 2001 through 2012 Wei-Hock scientists, such as Michael E. Mann, the Fund and Promote Climate Mis- Soon, a scientist at the Smithsonian lead author of the third IPCC report.139 information and to Oppose Cli- Institution, received more than $1.2 mate Mitigation Actions million in research funding from fossil The stark dichotomy between the Throughout the 2000s into the fuel interests.144 Major funders of Soon’s oil industry’s internal understanding Current Decade work included ExxonMobil, API, the of climate change and its public Charles Koch Foundation, and Southern communications on climate science In 2000, ExxonMobil published an op-ed Company.145 That research was touted as and climate policy is manifest in an series entitled “Global Climate Change,” independent, and the Smithsonian was internal “Global Climate Science which summarized the company’s views disallowed from disclosing the identity of Communications Plan” prepared by the on the issue. In one of the four op-eds, the funders without their permission.146 American Petroleum Institute in 1998. called “Unsettled Science,” Exxon As explained by the Union of Concerned The plan, first brought to light by the describes the science as inherently Scientists, “Soon has written about many Union of Concerned Scientists in 2007, unsettled, questions whether changes in aspects of climate change but is best outlined the industry’s goals and strategies climate are due to human activities or known for his work on the role of solar for engaging in the climate debate in natural variation, and suggests that variability, research that has broadly the future.140 It defined a successful uncertainties regarding climate impacts overstated the role the sun plays in industry campaign on climate change in include positive uncertainties, for example climate change and has been largely the following language. “Victory Will about how much crop yields will increase discredited by his scientific peers… Be Achieved When… Average citizens and how much faster forests will grow.142 Outcry from the climate science

BOX 1 Coal and Climate Denial

While oil companies have been among the largest and most consistent funders of climate denial and misinformation efforts, they have not been alone. Like their colleagues in oil and gas, the coal industry has a long, extensively documented history in promoting climate misinformation and denial.150 In 1991, for ex- ample, the coal trade associations created the Information Council on the Environment, which orchestrated a national campaign publicly downplaying the risks of climate change.151 In 1998, the coal industry, through the Western Fuels Association, created “The Greening Earth Society” to promote the idea that

rising levels of atmospheric CO2 would benefit humanity and © Benita5/Pixabay the planet by accelerating plant growth. The Greening Earth Society (GCC) was only one among many climate front groups operated or funded by the Western Fuels Association.152 They were also a part of the Global Climate Coalition, discussed else- where in this section.153 Bankruptcy filings from three of the largest coal companies—Arch Coal, Alpha Natural Resources, Market Environmental Law Clinic.154 In 2009, as the United and Peabody Energy—demonstrate that even after GCC was States Congress was debating legislation designed to dramati- closed, these coal companies continued funding a network of cally reduce greenhouse emissions nationwide, an alliance rep- “denier groups,” including the Heartland Institute, the American resenting coal industry groups sent forged letters to members Legislative Exchange Council, the Competitive Enterprise Insti- of Congress that falsely suggested several civil society groups tute, the Energy & Environmental Legal Institute, and the Free opposed the legislation.155 18 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW © MaxxGirr/Pixabay

community over a 2003 paper published reducing emissions. In 2014, for example, advertisements (‘advertorials’) in The New by Soon in Climate Research even resulted ExxonMobil released a report entitled York Times.”161 Their findings were clear: in the resignation of several of the journal “Energy and Climate” which “provide[s] ExxonMobil misled the public, with a editors and an admission by the journal’s comments on the topics of global energy dramatic discrepancy between the publisher that the paper should not have and climate change.”156 In its discussion, certainties expressed in private and been accepted.”147 ExxonMobil describes itself as believing academic documents versus those shared “that changes to the earth’s climate, with investors, consumers, and the Leaked slides from a 2014 presentation including those that may result from general public.162 According to Supran from the Western States Petroleum anthropogenic causes, pose a risk.”157 Shell, and Oreskes, over 80% of internal and Association (WSPA), the successor to the in 2016, referred to fracking as a “future peer-reviewed documents acknowledge Western Oil and Gas Association, outline opportunity,” despite internal data from climate change as real and caused by the strategy the industry used to oppose 1998 indicating that exploiting such humans, whereas only 12% of climate change reduction efforts in the reserves would be incompatible with advertorials do—and over 80% express state of California, which has the second climate goals.158 Finally, as recently as doubt.163 highest greenhouse emissions of any US January 2017, Rex Tillerson, who served state.148 WSPA members include BP, as CEO of ExxonMobil until being A Systemic Problem Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and nominated as US Secretary of State by Occidental Petroleum. The slides reveal Donald Trump, downplayed the risks of It’s critical to understand that the series of that WSPA organized 16 “AstroTurf” climate change during his confirmation events presented above are not isolated organizations—organizations with hearing. “The increase in the greenhouse incidents, but rather demonstrate a innocuous and grassroots-sounding gas concentrations in the atmosphere are systemic, decades-long pattern of climate names—to deploy industry messaging having an effect, our ability to predict understanding, denial, and obstruction. against proposed regulation under the that effect is very limited.”159 Two recent developments in the guise of grassroots support.149 understanding of Exxon’s behavior shed In August 2017, Geoffrey Supran and light on what we know, and how much More recently, as the reality of climate Naomi Oreskes completed an analysis of more there is to discover. change has become all but impossible to 187 “climate change communications” deny, the largest companies have adjusted produced by ExxonMobil between 1977 New York State Attorney General Eric their strategies from outright denial to and 2014.160 The team analyzed “peer- Schneiderman is currently investigating questioning the human contribution to reviewed and non-peer-reviewed ExxonMobil to determine whether the climate change, the timing and severity of publications, internal company company misled investors about the impacts, and the economic feasibility of documents, and paid, editorial-style reality of climate change and its effects on SMOKE AND FUMES 19

the world and the company.164 This requirements, she stated that she was not into other major carbon producers may investigation has already revealed aware of the Wayne Tracker emails until reveal. significant evidence of potential corporate 2017.170 She confirmed, however, that malfeasance. For example, evidence from several Exxon executives, including at The Petroleum Industry Was the investigation indicates that, for years, least one who was directly involved in Researching Technologies that Exxon used a lower cost of carbon in producing subpoenaed documents, were Could Have Been Used to Miti- internal calculations than the one it aware of the account.171 Nonetheless, gate or Avoid Climate Change represented to investors and the public.165 Wayne Tracker emails were not initially provided to the Attorney General’s office Major oil companies have been on notice In June 2017, Schneiderman’s office filed as part of the investigation. for decades of the potential risks their the transcript of an interview with core products pose to the atmosphere, the Connie Feinstein, an information Even more striking is the fact that climate, and the planet. This raises a technology and consulting Michele Hirshman, outside counsel for corollary question: What, if any, manager at ExxonMobil, conducted as ExxonMobil, testified that she had opportunities were available to the oil part of this investigation.166 This knowledge of the secret email account in industry to avoid or reduce these risks? transcript revealed that, as CEO of early 2016.172 However, she chose not to ExxonMobil, Rex Tillerson used a secret disclose the existence of the account as The most important opportunity for email address, under the alias “Wayne she believed it would “be an interesting doing so would have been to immediately Tracker.”167 Not only was this email test of whether the Attorney General’s reduce, or at least limit, the production of account secret, it was registered to office is reading the documents[.]”173 oil, gas, and other fossil fuels until Romana Helble, an IT manager at the emissions could be controlled. In fact, the company—ensuring there was no visible The foregoing examples provide opposite occurred. More than half of all link between Tillerson and the account.168 compelling evidence that ExxonMobil global greenhouse gas emissions have And, whereas Tillerson’s official emails operated systematically, across years, and been emitted since 1988, well after oil were preserved to accord with record with the complicity of multiple top-level and gas producers were on clear notice of preservation requirements, the secret executives, to engage in schemes to, at climate risks. account was subject to Exxon’s file purge best, withhold critical information, and, program, potentially deleting up to seven at worst, defraud investors and the public Another opportunity for action would months of Wayne Tracker emails.169 at large. This evidence of deliberate have been to immediately and effectively efforts to conceal critical corporate warn the public regarding the potential Notwithstanding Feinstein’s own role in information raises further questions about climate risks associated with the ensuring electronic compliance with what further investigations of Exxon will production and use of fossil fuels. As the document production and audit uncover—and what future investigations foregoing evidence demonstrates, however, the industry repeatedly failed to warn consumers, investors, and the EXHIBIT 3 broader public about those risks; and, Excerpt from NY Attorney General’s Memo, 2017 indeed, engaged in ongoing and systematic efforts to convince the public that climate science was uncertain, climate risks were nonexistent or exaggerated, or that vital measures to reduce carbon emissions and promote cleaner energies were unwarranted or not feasible.

Finally, oil and gas companies could have moved quickly to design, develop, and deploy new technologies to dramatically curtail greenhouse gas emissions or to replace greenhouse gas emitting fossil fuels with cleaner energy alternatives. Here, again, the available evidence suggests that oil and gas companies had the resources and opportunity to act, yet repeatedly failed to do so. 20 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

BOX 2 A Note on Carbon Removal Technology

The removal and storage of carbon dioxide as an emissions reduction strategy remains unproven, uneconomic, and highly risky.180 Even assuming such technologies could be deployed at the massive scale envisioned and promoted by industry today, and that the immense impacts to land, water,

© Alex Gindin/Unsplash © Alex communities, and human rights attendant to that deployment could be addressed, the prospects for keeping massive

quantities of CO2 effectively buried for thousands of years are extremely uncertain.181 Moreover, the oil industry’s long promotion of carbon capture as a tool for extracting additional oil and gas from the ground through “enhanced oil recovery” makes the potential benefits for the climate illusory

at best. Nonetheless, had technologies for removing CO2 from waste streams been seriously deployed more than four decades ago—and their attendant costs properly factored into the costs of burning fossil fuels—both the scale of the climate crisis and the economic that effectively subsidize oil and gas combustion might have been reduced.

wells to increase the recovery of petro- Oil Company of Ohio.183 Indeed, oil Patent filings and related documents leum—a process long known as enhanced company patents accounted for a demonstrate that, from as early as the oil recovery, and, in recent years, it has significant portion of the overall fuel cell 1950s, the petroleum industry was been misleadingly touted as a form of research discussed in the review. Again, researching and patenting technology for “carbon capture and storage.” However, regardless of whether the interest in this

removing CO2 from waste streams, low what is clear is that regardless of the research was to produce low-emissions emission , fuel cells, and solar purpose of these patents, the industry was vehicles for their emission profile, because panels—all technologies which might aware of and actively researching tech- they appeared to be a profitable business have been deployed to reduce emissions niques to remove carbon dioxide from venture, or for any other reason, these and mitigate the impacts of climate gaseous streams. In fact, and as noted patents demonstrate that at least three oil change. earlier in this report, a 1980 document companies were not just aware of, but from Imperial Oil (Exxon’s Canadian developing, fuel-cell technologies with In 1954, the Standard Oil Development subsidiary) indicates that the company potential uses in electric or hybrid Company patented a process for the was eminently aware of both the ability vehicles. This research is unsurprising in “Production of Pure Carbon Dioxide” of carbon dioxide reduction technologies light of rising interest in clean and electric from the combustion of fossil fuels.174 A and the relationship that technology had technologies during the early patent for removing carbon dioxide, to climate change. “There is no doubt 1960s. And it was offered as a rationale in among other gases, was assigned to that increases in fossil fuel usage and 1967, when Robert Dunlop, president of Phillips Petroleum Company in 1966.175 decreases in forest cover are aggravating Sun Oil and chairman of API, testified

Another patent for the removal of acidic the potential problem of increased CO2 before Congress that federal research gases—including carbon dioxide—from in the atmosphere. Technology exists to subsidies for electric vehicles and other

gaseous streams in 1973 is assigned to remove CO2 from stack gases but removal alternatives to internal combustion 176 Shell Oil Company. of only 50% of the CO2 would double engines were completely unnecessary the cost of power generation.”179 because his industry was already doing Carbon dioxide has important com- that research.184 mercial uses, and it is not clear that these Oil companies were also investing heavily companies were patenting processes for in fuel cell technology. Between 1963 and In 1974, responding to the oil crisis of removing carbon dioxide and other gases 1970, at least five patents for fuel cells the preceding year, the US Congress for the purpose of reducing greenhouse were assigned to Esso Research and enacted the Research gas emissions. Esso, for example, holds Engineering Company.182 Over the same Development and Demonstration Act, patents from 1965177 and 1970178 for period, additional fuel cell patents were generating billions of dollars in federal processes of injecting carbon dioxide into assigned to Shell Oil and the Standard research subsidies for solar technologies. SMOKE AND FUMES 21

Over the ensuing years, major oil theory that accumulating carbon dioxide Institute’s Smoke and Fumes Committee, companies captured a significant could cause global warming and large- was funding collective research into the proportion of those subsidies—either scale climatic changes dates back to the accumulation of fossil carbon in the through developing their own patents185 nineteenth century. The fact that fossil atmosphere. By no later than 1958, or by buying up smaller solar energy fuel combustion releases tremendous therefore, the oil industry collectively was on companies.186 By the late 1980s, the amounts of carbon dioxide waste to the notice that the most important waste majority of solar energy production in the atmosphere has been undisputed for more product from oil and other fossil fuels might United States was owned or controlled by than a century. In 1938, at least one be accumulating in the earth’s atmosphere, the oil industry.187 Oil companies scientist claimed to have measured a and it was funding research into this continued to own large portions of the noticeable impact both on atmospheric question as part of an industry-wide air solar for the ensuing carbon dioxide and global temperatures. pollution program.

From no later than the 1940s, and Industry records, oral histories from “There is no doubt that increases in continuing thereafter, the oil industry was persons involved, and analyses of its fossil fuel usage and decreases in actively engaged in pioneering research in activities by independent researchers forest cover are aggravating the an array of areas relevant to climate strongly indicate that the core mission of

potential problem of increased CO2 change and climate impacts. This the Smoke and Fumes Committee was to in the atmosphere. Technology included, inter alia, research into long- combine industry-funded research and term changes in the earth’s temperature; public relations advocacy in order to exists to remove CO2 from stack gases but removal of only 50% of the relationship between global increase public skepticism about air temperatures and sea level rise; changes in pollution science, with the express the CO2 would double the cost of the concentration of CO2 in the purpose of influencing legislation and power generation.” atmosphere; the nature, causes, and regulation on pollution issues. Credible

— IMPERIAL OIL, 1980 history of hurricanes; and techniques, firsthand accounts suggest research was technologies, and consequences of undertaken to prove a pre-determined

188 intentional weather modification. result—in the case of Harold Johnstone, decade and into the 2000s. to discredit Arie Haagen-Smit’s theory of It is extremely difficult to assess how the In 1957, Roger Revelle and Hans Suess smog—and that unfavorable results were path of development, electrification, and published research demonstrating that the neither welcomed nor shared. carbonization might have changed had world’s oceans would not rapidly absorb the petroleum industry properly disclosed this CO2 and suggested carbon dioxide In 1968, a Stanford Research Institute the risks of climate change to consumers, levels in the atmosphere were likely to report commissioned by API, regulators, and the broader public. The increase significantly. Scientists working summarized the causes, nature, and degree to which we would have at Humble Oil (now ExxonMobil) were consequences of global warming and demanded low-carbon energy and aware of this research at the time of its climate change. The report warned the oil transportation had we been properly publication and published their own industry explicitly and in strong terms warned remains equally uncertain. It is research in early 1958, in which they that the science underlying climate not clear how much damage would have recognized the increase in atmospheric change was sound, that fossil fuel been avoided if the petroleum industry CO2, acknowledged the connection combustion provided the best explanation had deployed the technologies it knew between fossil fuel combustion and that for climate change, that the impacts of could reduce CO2 emissions, or had increase, acknowledged the link between climate change could be potentially developed or released the numerous atmospheric CO2 and potential significant on a global scale, and that the patents it held for clean energy temperature increases, and acknowledged industry’s highest research priority should technologies. What is certain, however, is Revelle’s criticisms of their own be identifying means and technologies for that we have strong and growing evidence conclusions on ocean absorption of CO2. reducing emissions. The core of its that major oil companies had both the By no later than 1957, therefore, at least analysis was further substantiated in a ability and the opportunity to take such one major oil company was clearly on notice supplemental report prepared by the same steps beginning many decades ago. that the most important waste product from authors at the request of API. The oil oil and other fossil fuels might be industry’s receipt of this report was Summary of Industry Knowl- accumulating in the earth’s atmosphere with acknowledged in other discussions of edge of and Action on Climate the potential to affect the climate on a API-funded research, and the 1968 report Change planetary scale. was explicitly and extensively cited in communications between industry The following basic conclusions can be By 1958, the oil industry as a whole, executives and the Department of the drawn from the foregoing synthesis. The through the American Petroleum Interior (DOI), although the sections on 22 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

carbon dioxide were not shared with science were overwhelming supported by Exchange Council (ALEC), which DOI. By no later than 1968, therefore, the the weight of credible science and that a promotes climate-denial to this day. oil industry was receiving warnings from its response was urgently needed. From the Finally, ExxonMobil and its executives own scientists that evidence of climate 1970s forward, therefore, scientists within still continue their pattern of change was credible and that, despite the oil industry not only acknowledged the downplaying both the severity of climate uncertainties about the scale and timing of scientific consensus that climate change was change and the role of human emissions impacts, the potential risks of climate occurring, but took potential climate in it. From the 1990s forward, therefore, change were real and serious. impacts into account in the companies’ own the oil industry acknowledged climate long-term plans. science internally and took measures to Between 1977 and 1982, scientists at incorporate climate risks into their own Exxon and other oil companies repeatedly In 1998, the American Petroleum project planning, while maintaining active acknowledged the scientific consensus Institute developed a public relations campaigns to promote skepticism of climate that climate change was happening, was strategy with the aim of sowing doubt change science and climate risks among caused primarily by the burning of fossil about the certainty of climate science in policymakers, journalists, and the public. fuels, and had the potential to be globally the minds of the public, legislators, and catastrophic. Exxon internally transmitted regulators. ExxonMobil, API, and others From the 1950s onward, oil companies its understanding of this in a 43-page funded research into debunked theories developed and patented numerous climate change primer. An Exxon to explain rising atmospheric technologies that might have been subsidiary was conducting scientific temperatures without disclosing the deployed to reduce greenhouse gas research in the Arctic no later than 1986, source of funding. Analysis demonstrates emissions, including fuel cells and which examined the effects climate that, while Exxon’s internal advanced batteries, low-emission vehicle change would have on intended understanding of climate change was technologies, and technologies for operations. It has been documented that advanced, its public communications removing carbon dioxide from industrial in 1989, Shell Oil deliberately changed between 1977 and 2014 expressed the design of their offshore oil drilling significant doubt and uncertainty. In From the 1990s forward, therefore, platform to account for sea level rise, and 2014, the Western States Petroleum the oil industry acknowledged that in 1991, the leader of the Imperial Association fought against state-level climate science internally and took Oil expedition acknowledged that regulation in California by internal planning would need to account misrepresenting public will through the measures to incorporate climate for climatic changes in the Arctic. In use of “Astroturf” front groups. Many oil risks into their own project 1995, fossil fuel interests were fully aware and gas companies continue to donate planning, while maintaining active that the fundamental realities of climate money to the American Legislative campaigns to promote skepticism of climate change science and climate risks among policymakers, journalists, and the public.

waste streams. In 1980, an ExxonMobil subsidiary acknowledged the potential value of the company’s patents in addressing climate risks, but noted that doing so would raise the costs of the company’s patents unacceptably. By the end of the 1980s, major oil companies owned or controlled the majority of production in the United States. From the 1980s forward, therefore, one or more oil companies had the technical capacity and the opportunity to reduce climate risks associated with greenhouse gas emissions, but chose not to do so for commercial reasons. © mrganso/Pixabay SMOKE AND FUMES 23

BOX 3 Prior Petroleum Industry Pollution Events Reveal a Pattern of Denial and Obfuscation © realworkhard/Pixabay

Oil industry executives and their allies have repeatedly of lead exposure, including on behalf of Ethyl Corporation, a dismissed allegations that the industry misled the public on joint venture co-owned by General Motors and Standard Oil of climate change and climate science as baseless conspiracy New Jersey (now ExxonMobil).195 theories. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, however, In 1968, prepared a report on the “Feasibility” and the available documentary evidence tells a different story, appropriate mechanisms for reviewing public health research suggesting a clear pattern of investigation, concealment, and related to and resolving the competing views of public obfuscation on the part of major companies and industry health and industry experts on these issues.196 He groups. Oil industry engagement in similar patterns of recommended to that the industry advocate for “a permanent conduct—discovery, investigation, concealment, obfuscation— commission…for the purpose of establishing a consensus on the often spanning decades, has been extensively documented results of various studies and what they mean.”197 Industry across an array of public health and environmental issues, records indicate that Sterling’s recommendation arose in large including lead,189 smog,190 vinyl chloride,191 and benzene,192 part due to the contributions of Robert Eckardt, a member of among others. the study advisory committee and Medical Director of Esso The documented history of industry engagement on these Research (now ExxonMobil).198 Eckardt was a member of the issues, including efforts to suppress or undermine relevant petroleum industry’s Air Pollution Research Advisory science, the targeting of scientists for personal and professional Committee (APRAC), upon which the recommended attack, and the use of advertising, editorials, and other tools to commission was based.199 Later, a 1975 industry encourage consumer skepticism about the need for action, is document would recount how the petroleum industry used the relevant to assessing the industry’s potential conduct on APRAC, an ostensibly neutral body with government climate change in light of the available evidence. participation, to “launder” research that made its products The complex and long-hidden history of the oil industry’s seem safe when they were not.200 engagement with the tobacco industry provides additional While the behavior of the petroleum industry in relation to insight into these recurring patterns of conduct. This history lead, smog, vinyl chloride, and benzene does not directly and relevant documentation, drawn from the 16 million industry implicate its liability for climate change, it does reveal a pattern. documents of The Tobacco Archive, are discussed extensively We know that Theodor Sterling, whose academic work elsewhere.193 The example of the industries’ intersection in the supported the cigarette industry through three decades, work of Theodor Sterling is instructive. worked with oil industry interests on questions of lead From the 1960s into the 1980s, Dr. Theodor Sterling was pollution, doing research that would be used to defend lead in among the scientists most heavily relied upon and heavily gasoline. We also know that when Sterling made valued by the tobacco industry.194 Sterling was not a medical recommendations after a feasibility study for the cigarette doctor but a mathematician and computer scientist, whose companies, he based those recommendations on a model work focused on issues of study design and epidemiological developed by petroleum companies—a model the cigarette proof. More specifically, Sterling argued that it was nearly companies would later acknowledge as effective in legitimizing impossible to prove through epidemiological data that a shoddy, industry-favoring research. particular pollutant was the cause of a specific disease. We also know, directly, that the Smoke and Fumes Sterling’s value to the industry lay not in his expertise in Committee of the American Petroleum Institute was designed identifying the causes of cancer, therefore, but in his arguments deliberately to affect regulation, and that we have one personal that these causes were nearly impossible to prove in most account of the methods by which the industry would use cases—that no matter the amount of data or modeling, there seemingly independent research institutes to produce favorable was always room for uncertainty and doubt. Sterling pioneered science. It should not be surprising that the cigarette industry these strategies in the early 1960s, while working on questions also contracted extensively with Stanford Research Institute.201 24 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Key Findings ExxonMobil), published research the industry over the ensuing acknowledging the link between decades. On the basis of the foregoing evidence, fossil fuels and atmospheric CO2 in several essential conclusions may be 1957. • The oil industry held early patents drawn with regard to the notice, on numerous technologies that might • awareness, opportunity to act, and Industry records document that have reduced climate change risk. industry research into air pollution documented conduct of leading investor- issues was highly coordinated and • Even while blocking public action to owned oil companies with regard to shared widely within the industry, address climate change, oil climate science and climate risks. and included research into fossil companies took steps to protect their carbon in the atmosphere by no later own assets from climate risks. This • Theories regarding the potential link than 1958. divergence between industry between fossil fuel combustion and communications to the public and atmospheric temperature increase • Industry records and other sources industry action to safeguard their were widely reported in scientific indicate that this coordinated own investments began as early as the literature and academic texts relevant industry research program was used 1970s and is well established by the to the oil industry from the early to mobilize public opposition to the 1980s. decades of the twentieth century. regulation of air pollutants by sowing doubt regarding air pollution science. • Notwithstanding their own best • The oil industry had incentives, information, leading oil companies opportunity, and relevant expertise to • The oil industry was expressly and industry associations actively investigate and understand climate warned of the potential severity of participated in or funded climate science. climate risks by its own consulting misinformation efforts for decades scientists in 1968 and repeatedly through media intended to reach • Documentary evidence demonstrates thereafter. wide audiences of consumers, the oil industry was on notice of investors, and the general public. potential climate risks by 1957-1958. • Numerous industry documents demonstrate these risks were • Humble Oil, at the time a wholly- communicated by industry scientists owned subsidiary of Esso (now to executives at the highest levels of © Foto-Rabe/Pixabay SMOKE AND FUMES 25

Beyond Exxon and Beyond the preceding pages at crucial junctures, have deep and persistent ties to US: The Expanding Investiga- including in lists for API organizations in Europe.206 For example, tions into Climate Denial research. CFACT Europe, based in Germany, is the European branch of the US Committee To date, the primary focus in Similar efforts have been documented for a Constructive Tomorrow (US investigations of climate science and within Europe itself—funded both by CFACT).207 While CFACT Europe’s climate denial, including within the oil European companies and their US finances are secret, US CFACT had and gas industries, has centered on the counterparts. Corporate Europe received over $500,000 from United States. This focus is Observatory (CEO) shed light on such ExxonMobil.208 The American Friends of understandable in light of the extensive industry denial efforts in Europe in a the Institute of Economic Affairs, the data that has already come to light, the report released in 2010. CEO American branch of IEA, received documented effectiveness of climate documented, for example, how BP $50,000 from ExxonMobil.209 denial efforts in sowing uncertainty, directly funded the Institute of Economic skepticism, and denial in the United Affairs (IEA), a think tank that promotes Similarly, individuals with ties to States, and the demonstrable impacts of radical free market approaches to issues.202 American denial groups often hold climate obstruction and inaction on US IEA has produced a number of positions or have significant relationships climate policy at home and abroad. documents featuring some of the favorite with European denial groups. In 2010, arguments of prominent climate change Holger Thuss, founder and then It is important to recognize the relevant deniers, including that “government Executive Director of CFACT Europe, inquiry doesn’t end with those was also listed on the US CFACT website companies. As earlier noted, the coal as a staff member.210 Gabriel Calzada, industry has a well-documented history To date, the role of European oil and founder of Instituto Juan de Mariana, of climate denial, and a handful of the gas companies in climate denial has authored a 2009 report declaring that largest coal producers are also listed received less scrutiny than their U.S. policies would destroy among the major carbon producers. counterparts. Nonetheless, a 2.2 jobs for every job they produced.211 modest but compelling body of That report was commissioned by the Nor should that inquiry stop at US evidence demonstrates industry- US-based Institute for Energy Research, borders. The oil and gas companies funded denial was an international which has received over $300,000 from involved in denial efforts operated phenomenon. ExxonMobil, as well as funding from worldwide, and knowledge was shared Koch-affiliated sources.212 widely across the industry and within individual companies. It is highly likely claims about the seriousness of global Much remains to be discovered about that major carbon producers in Europe warming are suspect” and that global these operations, the companies involved, and elsewhere had notice equivalent to warming will actually be beneficial to the and their intersection with broader 203 that of their US counterparts. planet. In the same report, CEO also industry efforts around the world. One profiled seven other prominent climate thing, however, is already clear: For major To date, the role of European oil and gas denial groups in Europe—the carbon producers around the world and companies in climate denial has received International Policy Network, CFACT the communities harmed by their decades less scrutiny than their US counterparts. Europe, the Global Warming Policy of action and inaction on climate change, Nonetheless, a modest but compelling Foundation, Instituto Juan de Mariana, the investigations into Exxon are the body of evidence demonstrates industry- CEPOS, Institut Economique Molinari, beginning of this story, but they are by no funded denial was a transboundary and Hayek Institute—noting that means the end. phenomenon. Evidence suggests that without mandatory financial European companies such as British transparency, it was unclear who was 204 Petroleum (United Kingdom) and Royal funding these organizations. Dutch Shell (Netherlands and United Kingdom) participated in multiple Additional information indicates aspects of US climate denial efforts dating European denial groups were also being back to the original Smoke and Fumes funded by American sources. For Committee, either directly through their example, ExxonMobil provided the US subsidiaries or through companies International Policy Network with nearly 205 they later acquired. Both BP and Shell, $400,000 from 2003 through 2006. for example, were active in the American Moreover, organizations known to be Petroleum Institute, and appear funded by ExxonMobil and the Charles numerous times throughout the Koch Foundation in the United States 26 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

APPENDIX I Investor-Owned Carbon Majors Ranked by cumulative emissions contribution*

1. Chevron 27. Encana 2. ExxonMobil 28. BG Group 3. BP 29. Cyprus 4. 30. Suncor 5. ConocoPhillips 31. Westmoreland 6. Peabody 32. Kiewit Mining 7. Total 33. Apache 8. Consol Energy 34. North American Coal Corporation 9. BHP Billiton 35. Lafarge 10. Anglo American 36. Canadian NR 11. Arch Coal 37. Holcim 12. ENI 38. Luminant 13. RWE 39. RAG 14. Rio Tinto 40. Talisman 15. Anadarko 41. Murray Coal 16. Occidental 42. UK Coal 17. Alpha 43. Husky 18. Lukoil 44. HeidelbergCement 19. Rosneft 45. Cemex 20. Sasol 46. Italcementi 21. Repsol 47. Murphy Oil 22. Marathon 48. OMV 23. Xstrata 49. Taiheiyo 24. Yukos 50. Massey 25. Hess 51. Nexen 26. Devon Energy

*Carbon Majors Update to 2013: Carbon Major Entities Cumulative Emissions to 2013 Ranked, Climate Accountability Institute (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.climateaccountability.org/pdf/SumRanking%20Dec14%208p.pdf. SMOKE AND FUMES 27

The following six charts are drawn from the 2017 study by Ekwurzel, et al., which details the relative contribution of the Carbon Majors to atmospheric CO2 accumulation, the rise in global mean surface temperatures, and the rise of global sea levels. Each chart identifies the twenty Carbon Majors with the greatest contribution in each category, with the charts on the left extending back as far as 1880, and the charts on the right only accounting for the thirty- year period between 1980 and 2010.**

**B. Ekwurzel, et al., The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level From Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144(4) CLIMATIC CHANGE 579 (2017), available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-017-1978-0. 28 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

APPENDIX II A Note on Sources

This synthesis draws or builds on have been provided wherever feasible. At by scores of primary documents. Research documentary evidence compiled from a the time of publication (Nov. 2017) all by the Union of Concerned Scientists has number of sources, including: early and hyperlinks were functional and accurate, unearthed more than 340 pages of pioneering research by Greenpeace’s although some linked documents are documents in seven dossiers addressing Exxon Secrets project; pathbreaking subject to paywalls or other limitations. various aspects of the climate. research by Dr. Naomi Oreskes of Accordingly, the present synthesis can Harvard University and Erik Conway of An earlier version of this synthesis was only highlight key findings to date. It is Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California shared with the Philippines Commission indicative of the available evidence, but Institute of Technology; multi-part on Human Rights in April 2016 in by no means exhaustive. investigations published in 2015 and conjunction with an amicus curiae brief 2016 by InsideClimate News, Los Angeles submitted to the Commission in its More fundamentally, it should be noted Times, and the Columbia School of examination of how oil companies’ that the great majority of relevant Journalism; documents unearthed by operations have affected human rights in documents, including more than two non-profit organizations, including the Philippines. The present synthesis million pages of documents produced by DeSmog Blog, the Climate Investigations draws on the more extensive material Exxon pursuant to an investigation in Center, Climate Files, and the Union of released during the ensuing months. New York State, have yet to be publicly Concerned Scientists; and CIEL’s own disclosed. Untold numbers of additional Smoke and Fumes project, a multi-year The volume of documentary evidence documents remain undiscovered and as investigation into the early history of arising from these various research yet undisclosed by the corporate actors climate science with particular attention initiatives is now staggering. CIEL’s involved, including by the Carbon to the oil and gas industries’ awareness of, database alone includes more than 200 Majors themselves. engagement in, and communications documents, spanning more than seven about that science. decades, not including and archival documents not available online. The To facilitate direct access to relevant InsideClimate News investigations include evidence, hyperlinks to cited documents at least twelve separate articles supported SMOKE AND FUMES 29

APPENDIX III A Note on Industries and Companies Addressed in this Synthesis

The documents referenced in this (2) For the first six decades of twentieth of petroleum products in the synthesis report offer insights into specific century, the global oil and gas industries United States, Europe, and worldwide. activities undertaken by leading oil were vertically integrated and heavily companies and petroleum industry concentrated among a very small number (3) The oil industry began operating groups, including all five of the largest of companies that exercised substantial internationally very early in its history. investor-owned oil companies as control over all phases of research, Consequently, almost all of the largest measured by aggregate emissions. exploration, production, transportation, US-based firms operated internationally. refining, and marketing of petroleum and Correspondingly, the largest investor- This report focuses almost exclusively on petroleum products on a global basis. owned oil companies from Europe, the oil and gas industries and particularly These companies—known colloquially as including notably BP and Royal Dutch on companies headquartered in or with the Seven Sisters, and comprised of five Shell, maintained significant commercial substantial operations in the United US-based companies, plus BP and Royal ties with and operations within the States. This emphasis arises from the Dutch Shell—routinely entered into United States. As a result, BP and Royal greater availability of public information and joint ventures in Dutch Shell, or their corporate regarding industry research activities and countries around the world. As a result, predecessors, do appear regularly in engagement on denial efforts in the the largest oil and gas companies evinced documents and research originating in United States; and the historically smaller a greater than usual degree of the US. Further, documents addressed in number of very large actors in the oil and coordination and collaboration than was the report periodically address the gas industry as compared to coal or common in many other industries. international role or operations of the cement industries. A detailed discussion Beginning in the 1960s, waves of US-based Carbon Majors, such as of these factors follows. by oil-rich countries ExxonMobil and Chevron. reduced industry concentration and (1) Climate misinformation campaigns control to a significant degree. Since the (4) Notwithstanding the smaller size of have been actively carried out for many 1970s, states and state-owned enterprises individual coal companies relative to the years in Australia, the United Kingdom, (SOEs) have accounted for a significant largest oil and gas companies, particularly and across Europe. Based on the best proportion of and production in the United States, coal companies information currently available, however, (thus the representation of SOEs among exercised significant political influence in climate denial campaigns within the the Carbon Major respondents). the United States throughout the United States have been among the Nonetheless, the largest oil companies twentieth century and into the twenty- largest, longest-lived, and best funded remained key service providers in the oil first. Documents disclosed during recent such efforts on a global basis. As a result, exploration and production space; and bankruptcy procedures indicate that at they have drawn significantly more media waves of again least three US-based coal companies and investigative attention than climate reduced the number of key investor- among the respondents—Peabody Coal, misinformation efforts, with the result owned companies in the industry from Arch Coal, and Alpha Natural that a much greater number of primary the 1980s onward. Throughout recent Resources—continued to fund climate materials, including eyewitness accounts, decades, the leading investor-owned oil misinformation efforts well into the are available for analysis. Additional companies have remained key players in present decade. Reputable news reports investigation into the knowledge and the exploration and opening of new oil on these disclosures are cited in the conduct of major fossil fuel producers and gas frontiers, the provision of synthesis. and related industry groups in other advanced production technologies and countries and regions is warranted. techniques to national oil companies and Given the comparative paucity of widely state-owned enterprises, and the available public documents addressing the 30 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

activities of major carbon producers based documentation does not exist, with one outside the US, the absence of specific exception: reference to activities of non-US companies should not be construed as In the view of CIEL, and in the absence evidence of absence. As investigations of compelling evidence to the contrary, it continue or commence in jurisdictions is reasonable to infer that, at all relevant around the world, it is likely that times, every leading carbon producer, as additional evidence will come to light and an assumed expert in the products it that some of this evidence may offer produced and/or brought to market, was insights into the specific knowledge of aware or should have been aware of the other leading carbon producers with state of climate science and the existence respect to climate change, and with of potentially significant climate risks respect to their actions in light of that associated with its products to a degree knowledge. At the same time, and until generally commensurate with other such new information becomes available, companies in its industry and/or national no activities in this report should be context. imputed to companies for which

SMOKE AND FUMES 31

CHAPTER 6 Endnotes

1 See Gero Reuter, Peruvian Farmer Sues German 14 Henry Shue, Responsible for What? Carbon 32 Shue, supra note 14, at 594.

Energy Firm RWE, Deutsche Welle (Nov. 24, Producer CO2 Contributions and the Energy 33 SPENCER WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/peruvian- Transition, 144(4) CLIMATIC CHANGE 591, 594 WARMING 3 (2008). farmer-sues-german-energy-firm- (2017), available at https://link.springer.com/ 34 See, e.g., THOMAS C. CHAMBERLIN & ROLLIN rwe/a-36506880. content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10584-017-2042-9. S. SALISBURY, GEOLOGY, vol 3. 444-45 (1907) 2 See John Vidal, World’s Largest Carbon pdf. (discussing the work of Arrhenius, Angstrom Producers Face Landmark Human Rights Case, 15 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE and others); JW Gregory, Climatic Variations: (July 27, 2016, 11:11 AM), COMMON LAW (1963). Their Extent and Causes, International https://www.theguardian.com/ 16 Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for outcomes, Geological Congress 1906, reprinted in Annual environment/2016/jul/27/worlds-largest- Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND Report of the Smithsonian Institution 33944, at carbon-producers-face-landmark-human- tHE LAW OF TORTS 72, 83 (Gerald J. Postema, 347-48 (1908) (discussing with approval the rights-case. ed., 2001). work of Arrhenius and Chamberlin on the role

3 See Jon Chesto, Conservation Law Foundation 17 See id. at 91. of atmospheric CO2 in climate change); FRANK Sues Exxon Mobil, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 29, 18 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, WIGGLESWORTH CLARK, THE DATA OF 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ Tort Law and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL GEOCHEMISTRY (4th ed.) 48-49. (1920) (“At 3 business/2016/09/29/conservation-law- FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS (John parts in 10,000 the carbon dioxide in the foundation-follows-through-its-threat-sue- Oberdiek, ed., 2014). atmosphere amounts to about exxon-mobil/x6VW5yPu0Sbdi89TVaSrmJ/ 19 Perry, supra note 16, at 105. 2,200,000,000,000 tons, equivalent to story.html. 20 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 22. 600,000,000,000 tons of carbon. …The 4 See Gary McWilliams, California Cities Sue Big 21 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, annual consumption of coal, estimated by A. Oil Firms Over Climate Change, REUTERS CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL Krogh at 700,000,000 tons in 1902, adds (Sept. 20, 2017, 9:34 PM), https://www. ACCOUNTABILITY, VOLUME 3: CIVIL REMEDIES yearly to the atmosphere about one-thousandth reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-accord- (2008), available at http://www.icj.org/wp- of its present content in carbon dioxide. In a temperature/this-year-to-be-among-three- content/uploads/2009/07/Corporate- thousand years, then, if the rate were constant hottest-on-record-extraordinary-weather-u-n- complicity-legal-accountability-vol3- and no disturbing factors interfered, the

idUSKBN1D619E. publication-2009-eng.pdf. amount of CO2, in the atmosphere would be 5 Note that Carroll Muffett, President of CIEL 22 Id. doubled. If we take into account the and a co-author of this paper, is also a member 23 See id. at 7. combustion of fuels other than coal and the of the Board of Trustees of CAI. 24 See U.N. Special Rep. on Business & Human large additions to the atmosphere from the 6 Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and sources previously mentioned, the result Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel Human Rights: Implementing the becomes still more startling. Were there no and Cement Producers, 1854 – 2010, 122(1-2) “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. counterbalancing of this increase in CLIMATIC CHANGE 229 (2014), available at Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), available atmospheric carbon, animal life would soon https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/ at https://business-humanrights.org/sites/ become impossible upon our planet.”); Robert s10584-013-0986-y. Note that Heede deducts default/files/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie- E. Swain, Atmospheric Pollution by Industrial for net non-energy use of petroleum, gas, and guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf Wastes, 15(3) IND. ENG. CHEM. 296, 296 coal for lubricants, , oil, [hereinafter Ruggie Principles]. (1923), available at http://pubs.acs.org/doi/ , , , etc. 25 Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human abs/10.1021/ie50159a035?journalCode=iechad 7 See id. Rights and Transnational Corporations and (“The greatest single waste product in industry 8 See id. Other Business Enterprises, 17th Sess., May is a gas, carbon dioxide, which is usually 9 See id. 30-June 17, 2011, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, discharged as it is produced directly into the 10 See Carbon Majors Update, CLIMATE 2011), available at https://business- air….If all the coal consumed annually in this ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTE, http://www. humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/ country were completely burned, there would climateaccountability.org/carbon_majors_ documents/un-human-rights-council- be produced approximately nine hundred update.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). resolution-re-human-rights-transnational- thousand billion cubic meters, or one billion 11 See CDP, THE CARBON MAJORS DATABASE corps-eng-6-jul-2011.pdf. eight hundred million metric tons of this gas. (2017), available at https:// 26 See Ruggie Principles, supra note 24. The combustion of petroleum would add two b8f65cb373b1b7b15feb- 27 See id. at 14-17. hundred million metric tons, and of natural gas c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3. 28 See id. at 16-17. ninety million metric tons, while the burning rackcdn.com/cms/reports/ 29 See id. at 17. or decay of wood, and of plant products and documents/000/002/327/original/Carbon- 30 See Peter C. Frumhoff, Richard Heede, Naomi tissues, would add an indeterminable but Majors-Report-2017.pdf?1501833772. Oreskes, The Climate Responsibilities of enormous total to these figures. … But it is a 12 See B. Ekwurzel et al., The Rise in Global Industrial Carbon Producers, 132(2) CLIMATIC remarkable fact that, rapidly disbursed as it is

Atmospheric CO2, Surface Temperature, and Sea CHANGE 157 (July 23, 2015), available at into the great ocean about us, this gas is present Level From Emissions Traced to Major Carbon https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/ in the strikingly small and uniform amount of Producers, 144(4) CLIMATIC CHANGE 579 s10584-015-1472-5. three parts by volume of carbon dioxide to ten (2017), available at https://link.springer.com/ 31 See id. thousand parts of air, or three hundred parts article/10.1007/s10584-017-1978-0. per million parts of air.”) 13 See id. 35 See, e.g., Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of 32 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

the Ground, 41 Phil. Mag. and J. of Sci. 237 42 See Roger Revelle & Hans E. Suess, Carbon 66 See Jenkins, supra note 51, at 147. (1896), available at http://patarnott.com/ Dioxide Exchange Between Atmosphere and 67 See Jones, supra note 48, 269-70. atms749/pdf/Arrhenius.pdf; Charles JJ Fox, Ocean and the Question of an Increase of 68 See ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH: A STATUS

On The Coefficients of Absorpotion of Nitrogen Atmospheric CO2 during the Past Decades, 9 REPORT, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE 6 and Oxygen IX Distilled Water and Seawater, TELLUS 18 (1957), available at http://www. (1972), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/ and of Atmospheric Carbonic Acid in Sea-Water tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.3402/tellusa. fulltext/ED066339.pdf. 5 TRANSACTIONS OF THE FARADAY SOC’Y 68, 68 v9i1.9075?needAccess=true. 69 Id. (1909), available at http://pubs.rsc.org/en/ 43 See id. 70 See A. H. Glenn, Forecasting for the Offshore Oil content/articlelanding/1909/tf/ 44 Id. at 19. Boom, 2 WEATHERWISE 6 (1949), available at tf9090500068#!divAbstract (“The object of the 45 See H. R. Brannon et al., Radiocarbon Evidence http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/ present series of measurements was primarily on the Dilution of Atmospheric and Oceanic 00431672.1949.9925186?journalCode=vw the determination of the absorption coefficients Carbon by Carbon from Fossil Fuels, 38 ws20. of nitrogen, oxygen, and atmospheric carbonic TRANSACTIONS AM. GEOPHYSICAL UNION 643 71 See A. H. Glenn, Economic Consideration of acid in sea-water. These coefficients have of late (1957), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley. Certain Weather and Oceanographic Problems years acquired some special significance, com/doi/10.1029/TR038i005p00643/full. Arising in the Petroleum Industry 7 (1951), notably in connection with that group of 46 See id. at 643. available at https://www.onepetro.org/ physical problems of which Arrhenius’s work 47 See id. at 649. conference-paper/SPE-152-G. on the diatherinancy of the atmospheric gases, 48 See Charles A. Jones, A Review of the Air 72 See id. particularly carbonic acid, and its effect upon Pollution Research Program of the Smoke and 73 See Herbert Riehl & Mercer H. Parks, terrestrial temperatures, is typical, and again in Fumes Committee of the American Petroleum Hurricane Formation in the Gulf of Mexico connection with those matters of biological Institute, 8 J. OF THE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL (1963), available at https://www.onepetro.org/ interest which are concerned with the dynamic ASS’N 268, 270 (1958), available at http:// conference-paper/API-63-101. processes of pelagic life.” (emphasis added)). www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00966 74 See id. See also Clark, supra note 34, at 49-50 665.1958.10467854 (“a recently placed project 75 See M. M. 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SCIENTIFIC REPORT TO THE GEOLOGICAL this question has been discussed by S. 50 About API, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, SOCIETY OF AMERICA, THE AMERICAN Arrhenius, who argues that if the quantity of http://www.api.org/about#tab_history. PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, AND THE OFFICE OF the gas in the atmosphere were increased about 51 See Vance N. Jenkins, The Petroleum Industry NAVAL RESEARCH (1950), available at https:// threefold, the mean temperature of the Arctic Sponsors Air Pollution Research, 3 Air Repair www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/4423471. regions would rise 8° or 9°.”). 144, 146 (1954), available at http://www. 78 See H. R. Brannon et al., Humble Oil Company 36 See Guy S. Callendar, The Artificial Production tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00966665.1 Radiocarbon Dates II, 125 SCI. 919 (1957), of Carbon Dioxide and its Influence on 954.10467615. available at http://science.sciencemag.org/ Temperature, 64 Q. J. 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84 See ELMER ROBINSON & R. C. ROBBINS, of Carbon Dioxide” 3 (Oct. 31, 1977) (on file 128 See Die geheimen Machenschaften der SOURCES, ABUNDANCE, AND FATE OF GASEOUS with InsideClimate News), available at https:// Ölindustrie (The Secret Machinations of the ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTANTS: FINAL REPORT insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/ Oil Industry), Westdeutscher Rundfunk (1968), available at https://www.osti.gov/ documents/Government%20Meeting%20 (2017). scitech/biblio/6852325. Memo%20%281977%29.pdf. 129 See Jerving et al, supra note 123. 85 See H. H. Meredith, Platitudes or Performance?, 112 See Memorandum from James F. Black, supra 130 Id. 16 J. OF THE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N note 110, at 1. 131 Jeremy Leggett, (1999) 547, 549 (1966), available at http://www. 113 See id. at 2. (attributing the following statement to Exxon tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00022470.1 114 See Memorandum from Henry Shaw to T. K. scientist Brian Flannery during the final 966.10468517?needAccess=true. Kett on “Exxon Research & Engineering drafting session for the IPCC’s Scientific

86 See ROBINSON & ROBBINS, supra note 84. Company Technological Forecast: CO2 Assessment Report: “The range of model 87 See id. at 108. Greenhouse Effect” 2 (Dec. 18, 1980) (on file results isn’t any better justified than it was ten 88 Id. at 112. with InsideClimate News), available at https:// years ago. The range is quite scientifically 89 See id. at 109. insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/ uncertain. This should be stated as such in the 90 Id. documents/Technological%20Forecast%20 executive summary.”) 91 Id. (emphasis added). on%20CO2%20Greenhouse%20Effect%20 132 See KATHY MULVEY & SETH SHULMAN, UNION 92 See ELMER ROBINSON & R. C. ROBBINS, 1980.pdf. OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE CLIMATE SOURCES, ABUNDANCE, AND FATE OF GASEOUS 115 Id. DECEPTION DOSSIERS: INTERNAL FOSSIL FUEL ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTANTS: SUPPLEMENT 116 See Letter to API Climate Task Force on “The INDUSTRY MEMOS REVEAL DECADES OF

(1969), available at https://www.osti.gov/ CO2 problem; Addressing Research Agenda CORPORATE DISINFORMATION 34 (2015), scitech/biblio/6852325. Development” (Mar. 18, 1980) (on file with available at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/

93 Global Mean CO2 Mixing Ratios (ppm): Climate Files), available at http://www. default/files/attach/2015/07/The-Climate- Observations, NASA, https://data.giss.nasa. climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1980-api-climate- Deception-Dossiers.pdf. gov/modelforce/ghgases/Fig1A.ext.txt (last task-force-co2-problem/. 133 Andrew Revkin, Industry Ignored its Scientists on visited Oct. 27, 2017) (reporting that 117 See Brendan DeMelle & Kevin Grandia, “There Climate, N.Y. TIMES (April 23, 2009) http://

atmospheric CO2 reached 370 ppm exactly in is no doubt”: Exxon Knew CO2 Pollution Was A www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/science/ the year 2000). Global Threat By Late 1970s, DESMOG BLOG earth/24deny.html. 94 See Michael Carlowicz, Global Temperatures, (Apr. 26, 2016, 9:19 AM), http://www. 134 See id. NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY, https:// desmogblog.com/2016/04/26/there-no-doubt- 135 Id. earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/ exxon-knew-co2-pollution-was-global-threat- 136 See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, WorldOfChange/decadaltemp.php (last visited late-1970s. MERCHANTS OF DOUBT 205-09 (2010). Nov. 6, 2017). 118 Memorandum from Henry Shaw, Exxon, to 137 See id. at 207. 95 Relative to 1965 levels. Dr. E. E. David, Jr., Exxon (May 15, 1981) (on 138 See id. For a longer, contemporary discussion of 96 See ROBINSON & ROBBINS, supra note 92, at file with InsideClimate News), available at these events, see WILLIAM K. STEVENS, THE 23. https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/ CHANGE IN THE WEATHER: PEOPLE, WEATHER, 97 Id. files/documents/Exxon%20Position%20 AND THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE 129-31 (1999). 98 Id. at 24. on%20CO2%20%281981%29.pdf. 139 See Suzanne Goldenberg, The Inside Story on 99 Id. at 25. 119 Memorandum from Roger W. Cohen, Climate Scientists Under Siege, THE GUARDIAN 100 Id. Theoretical and Mathematical Sciences (Feb. 17, 2012, 7:28 PM), https://www. 101 Id. at 24. Laboratory, Exxon, to A. M. Natkin, Office of theguardian.com/environment/2012/feb/17/ 102 See Environmental Research: A Status Report Science and Technology, Exxon (Sept. 2, 1982) michael-mann-climate-war. (Jan. 1972) (staff paper prepared for the (on file with InsideClimate News), available at 140 Global Climate Science Communications American Petroleum Institute), available at https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/ Action Plan (1998), available at https:// http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED066339.pdf. files/documents/%2522Consensus%2522%20 insideclimatenews.org/documents/global- 103 See id. at 103. on%20CO2%20Impacts%20%281982%29. climate-science-communications-plan-1998. 104 See ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION: THE OIL pdf. First published in UNION OF CONCERNED AND GAS INDUSTRIES / VOLUME 2, NATIONAL 120 See id. SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, MIRRORS & HOT AIR 37 PETROLEUM COUNCIL 7 (1972), available at 121 Id. (2007), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/ http://www.npc.org/reports/1972- 122 See Memorandum from M. B. Glaser, Manager, sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/ Environmental_Conservation-Oil_and_Gas_ Environmental Affairs Programs, Exxon (Nov. global_warming/exxon_report.pdf. Industries-Vol_II.pdf. 12, 1982) (on file with InsideClimate News), 141 Id. 105 See NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, http:// available at https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/ 142 EXXONMOBIL, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: www.npc.org/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2017). default/files/documents/1982%20Exxon%20 THE OP-ED SERIES (2000), available at https:// 106 See ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, supra Primer%20on%20CO2%20Greenhouse%20 www.documentcloud.org/ note 104. Effect.pdf. documents/2805611-2000-Oped-Series- 107 See id. at 7. 123 See Sara Jerving, Katie Jennings, Masako Global-Climate-Change-Exxon. 108 Id. at 11. Melissa Hirsch, & Susanne Rust, How Exxon html#document/p5. 109 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE Went From Leader to Skeptic on Climate Change 143 Id. ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, AIR Research, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http:// 144 See Kert Davies, Willie Soon Scandal: Corporate CONSERVATION 78-82 (1965). graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/. Funding Year By Year, Climate Investigations 110 See Memorandum from James F. Black, 124 Id. Center (Feb. 27, 2015), http:// Scientific Advisor, Exxon Products Research 125 Damian Carrington & Jelmer Mommers, ‘Shell climateinvestigations.org/willie-soon-scandal- Division, to F. G. Turpin, Vice President, Knew’: Oil Giant’s 1991 Film Warned of Climate corporate-funding-year-by-year/. See also Exxon research and Engineering Co. (Jun. 6, Change Danger, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, Mulvey & Shulman, supra note 132, at 14. 1978) (on file with InsideClimate News) 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ 145 See id. [hereinafter Black Memorandum], available at environment/2017/feb/28/shell-knew-oil- 146 See id. https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/ giants-1991-film-warned-climate-change- 147 Id. files/documents/James%20Black%201977%20 danger. 148 Id. at 39. Presentation.pdf. 126 See Amy Lieberman & Suzanne Rust, Big Oil 149 Id. 111 See Memorandum from Henry Shaw to John Braced for Global Warming While it Fought 150 For a more extensive discussion of climate W. Harrison, regarding “Environmental Effects Regulations, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), denial by the U.S. coal industry, see ORESKES http://graphics.latimes.com/oil-operations/. & CONWAY, supra note 136, at 169-215. 127 See id. 34 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

151 See MULVEY & SHULMAN, supra note 132, at New York State Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, attempts have led to cracks in rock formations, 19. 2017), available at https://www.nytimes. indicating likely future leakage, or actual 152 See Greening Earth Society, DESMOG BLOG, com/2017/06/02/business/energy- leakage events). https://www.desmogblog.com/greening-earth- environment/exxon-mobil-climate-change- 182 Direct Production of Electrical Energy from society (last visited Nov. 3, 2017); for a useful lawsuit.html. 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Exxon’s Motion to Quash and in Support of U.S. Patent No. 4,366,335 (filed Apr. 30, 156 ExxonMobil, Energy and Climate (2014), the Office of the Attorney General’s Cross- 1981); Thin Film Solar Cell Substrate, U.S. available at http://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/ Motion to Compel at 12, n. 12, New York v. Patent No. 4,510,344 (filed Dec. 19, 1983). media/global/files/energy-and-environment/ PriceWaterhouseCoopers (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 186 See Tracy Emblem, How Big Oil had Controlled report---energy-and-climate.pdf. 2, 2017) (451962/2016). the Solar Industry, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE 157 Id. (emphasis added). 172 See Examination of Michelle Hirshman, supra (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www. 158 See Carrington & Mommers, supra note 125. note 169, at 37. sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-how-big-oil- 159 See Dana Nuccitelli, New Studies Show Rex 173 Id. at 135-36. had-controlled-the-solar-industry-2011apr17- Tillerson is Wrong About Climate Risks, THE 174 Production of Pure Carbon Dioxide, U.S. story.html. 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TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), available campaigns/climate-change/Solutions/Reject- 2, 2000) https://www.thenation.com/article/ at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/ false-solutions/Reject-carbon-capture--storage/ secret-history-lead/; see also discussion infra. opinion/exxon-climate-change-.html?_r=0. (noting that carbon capture and storage 190 See, e.g., CHIP JACOBS, WILLIAM J. KELLY, 164 See Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon technology is expensive, has led to unnatural SMOGTOWN: THE LUNG-BURNING HISTORY OF Mobil Investigated for Possible Climate Change earthquakes, and has other technical POLLUTION IN LOS ANGELES (2008); Devra Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES implementation problems which have led to Davis, When Smoke Ran Like Water: Tales of (Nov. 5, 2015), available at https://www. Norway, the United States, the European Environmental Deception and the Battle nytimes.com/2015/11/06/science/exxon- Union, and the United Kingdom, among Against Pollution (2003) (passim); JAMES E. mobil-under-investigation-in-new-york-over- others, to cancel high-profile carbon capture KRIER, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY climate-statements.html. and storage projects). ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 165 See Diane Cardwell & John Schwartz, Exxon 181 See id. (noting examples in Salah, Algeria, the WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940- Emissions Costs Accounting ‘May Be a Sham,’ Norwegian North Sea, and Mississippi, United 1975 (1977); and discussion supra notes 49-69 States, where carbon capture and storage and accompanying text. 191 Jennifer Beth Sass, Barry Castleman, and David SMOKE AND FUMES 35

Wallinga, Vinyl Chloride: A Case Study of Data California, San Francisco), available at https:// Suppression and Misrepresentation, 113 ENVtl. www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/ HEALTH PERsp. 809 (Mar. 24, 2005) available tobacco/docs/#id=pkyx0119. at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 197 See Theodor Sterling, The Feasibility of a PMC1257639/; Ugo Fedeli and Giuseppe Definitive Evaluation of the Data Concerning Mastrangelo, Vinyl Chloride Industry in the Smoking and General Morbidity and Courtroom and Corporate Influence on Scientific Disability: Status Report (report commissioned Literature, 54 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 470 (2011) by tobacco industry) (on file with University of available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ California, San Francisco), available at https:// doi/10.1002/ajim.20941; www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/ Archives, http://www. tobacco/docs/#id=xxhl0040. chemicalindustryarchives.org (last visited Nov. 198 See Sterling, supra note 196. 15, 2017). See also 11-part review of Vinyl 199 See id. Chloride Conspiracy Documents, JON L. 200 See Laundered Research (Feb. 11, 1975) (on GELMAN: ATTORNEY AT LAW https://gelmans. file with University of California, San com/ReadingRoom/tabid/65/ctl/ Francisco), available at https://www. CategoryView/mid/372/categoryId/6/Vinyl- industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/ Chloride-Cancer.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, docs/#id=rybl0004. 2017). 201 See, e.g., Memorandum from David E. 192 See, e.g., Kristen Lombardi, “Inside the Townsend, RJR, to M. E. Stowe, (Nov. 30, Industry’s $36m ‘Research Strategy’ 1978) (on file with University of California, on Ubiquitous Poison Benzene,” The Guardian San Francisco), available at https://www. (Dec. 4, 2014) available at https://www. industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/ theguardian.com/environment/2014/dec docs/#id=pkyf0082; memorandum from R. L. /04/-sp-documents-petrochemical-industry- Johnson to W. L. DeWitt (Mar. 13, 1975) (on poison-benzene; Exposed: Decades of Denial on file with University of California, San Poisons, Center for Public Integrity, Francisco), available at https://www. https://www.publicintegrity. industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/ org/2014/11/23/16319/exposed-decades- docs/#id=tspm0139; proposal for research denial-poisons (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). prepared by Edward M. Liston et al., Stanford 193 See Smoke & Fumes (Smoke), Center for Research Institute (Dec. 9, 1975) (on file with International Environmental Law (2016), University of California, San Francisco), available at https://www.smokeandfumes.org/ available at https://www. smoke; Benjamin Hulac, Tobacco and Oil industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/ Industries Used Same Researchers to Sway Public, docs/#id=mzbm0088. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (July 20, 2016) available 202 See CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY, at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ CONCEALING THEIR SOURCES – WHO FUNDS tobacco-and-oil-industries-used-same- EUROPE’S CLIMATE CHANGE DENIERS? 2 researchers-to-sway-public1/. (2010), available at https://corporateeurope. 194 See, e.g., Letter of William W. Shinn to Thomas org/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/files/ Arensfeld et al., (March 1, 1972) (on file with article/funding_climate_deniers.pdf. University of California, San Francisco), 203 See id. at 3. available at https://www. 204 See id. at 9. industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/ 205 See id. at 5. docs/ #id=yxvh0128. See generally discussion 206 See generally, id. and documents at Theodor Sterling, Smoke and 207 See id. at 5. Fumes, https://www.smokeandfumes.org/ 208 See id. at 4. smoke/moments/20 (last visited Nov. 15, 209 See id. 2017). 210 See id. at 5. 195 See Robert T. P. DeTreville et al., Occupational 211 See id. at 7. Exposure to Organic Lead Compounds, 5 J. OF 212 See id. at 4. OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. MED. 229 (1962), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ abs/10.1080/00039896.1962.10663326?journ alCode=vzeh20. See also Theodor Sterling et al., Mathematical Analysis of Lead Burdens, 8 ARCHIVES OF ENVtL. HEALTH 44 (1964), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ abs/10.1080/00039896.1964.10663630?journ alCode=vzeh20. 196 See Theodor Sterling, Report and Recommendations of the Advisory Panel to the Feasibility Study (report commissioned by tobacco industry) (on file with University of © Greenpeace/Tom Jefferson

SMOKE AND FUMES The Legal and Evidentiary Basis for Holding Big Oil Accountable for the Climate Crisis

Smoke and Fumes: The Legal and Evidentiary Basis for Holding Big Oil Accountable for the Climate Crisis presents a comprehensive synthesis of the available evidence on what the oil industry knew about climate science, when they knew it, and what they did with the information. It combines that synthesis with an update on the latest developments in accountability research and science, which have dramatically improved our ability to identify the impacts of climate change on individuals and communities, the corporate actors that contributed to those impacts, and the nature of their contributions. The report presents this evidence in the context of the core elements of legal responsibility in tort and human rights law. It concludes that oil industry actors had early knowledge of climate risks and important opportunities to act on those risks, but repeatedly failed to do so. Those failures give raise to potential legal responsibilities under an array of legal theories.

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