Disorder in Wandsworth

DISORDER IN WANDSWORTH

Report of the Independent Review

Neil Kinghan

Page 1 of 80 Disorder in Wandsworth

Report of the independent review

Contents:

Introduction……………………………………………………….. Page 3 Section 1 - What happened on 7, 8 and 9 August?…………...Page 5 Section 2 - What local factors contributed to the disorder?..... Page 18 Section 3 - The responses of the Police and the Fire and Rescue service to the disorder……………...... Page 22 Section 4 - The response of Wandsworth Council to the disorder…...... Page 28 Section 5 - What was the impact on local businesses and local residents…….………………………… ……... Page 34 Section 6 - Recommendations to Wandsworth Council and others for action and further examination………. Page 36 Annexes……………………………………………………...... 1. Terms of Reference…………………………………… Page 41 2. List of Interviewees…………………………………….Page 42 3. Notes of Public Meetings…………………………….. Page 44 4. Social and Economic Statistics for Wandsworth…... Page 70 Executive Summary………………………………………...... Page 76

I would particularly like to thank the following for their support during this review:

Metropolitan Police: Chief Superintendent David Musker Superintendent Gerry Campbell Superintendent Dawn Morris

Wandsworth Council: Paul Martin, Chief Executive Stewart Low, Community Safety Sean Dunkling and Virginia Wall, Young People & Learning Ian Stewart and Mark Howell, Housing Department for their time and support.

Patrick Watson, Support & Democratic Services Frankie Belloli Simon Vernon Thayyiba Shaah for organising and recording the public meetings.

And most of all: I am very grateful for the brilliant support I have had from John Boyle, from the Council’s Policy Unit and Antonia De Lima from the Chief Executive’s office who organised and recorded my meetings, and gave me first class advice in the course of the review.

Page 2 of 80 Introduction

1. Wandsworth is known to be a peaceful place. It is the safest Inner London Borough judged by the rate of crime per head of the population, and has been since 2003/04. It has areas of deprivation and vivid contrasts of wealth and poverty and a small number of housing estates with gangs and drug-related crime. But these problems are not on the scale of many other urban areas. Clapham Junction attracts visitors from other parts of London, for its shops, its bars and restaurants, not as a meeting place for those intent on violence.

2. Yet, on 8 August 2011, Clapham Junction was the scene of some of the worst of the disorder that broke out across London and in other cities that night. Across Wandsworth as a whole, 109 shops and businesses were attacked on 7 and 8 August. Many windows were broken; large numbers of televisions, other electronic goods, mobile phones, pairs of shoes, trainers and other sports goods were stolen. 25 businesses were seriously damaged and one shop was gutted by fire.

3. Fortunately, no-one was seriously hurt, but shop owners, restaurant and bar staff, local residents and passersby were very scared. Television and CCTV pictures show clearly how frightening the scenes of disorder were. 153 people have so far been arrested and 71 have been charged for alleged participation in the disorder; the police estimate that 300 more may have been involved in the disorder.

4. How did the disorder start? What happened on 7 and 8 August, and in the aftermath on 9 August? Why did it happen in Clapham Junction? Were there local factors which help explain the events of 8 August? How well did the police and other emergency services cope? What was the response of Wandsworth Council? What has been the impact on local businesses and local residents?

5. These are the questions which Wandsworth Council asked me to examine and which this report of my review will seek to answer. The terms of reference for the review are at annex 1. The Council has paid for the review but I am independent of them. I will offer recommendations to the Council and to the police which will, I hope, enable them to learn the lessons of the events of 7, 8 and 9 August and to take action that will reduce the risk of such events happening again.

6. My review has been a rapid exercise, launched on 2 September and concluding with this report on 29 September. The Council’s view, with which I agree, was that it was important to carry out a swift review from which lessons could be quickly drawn and action taken. I have not sought to conduct a fundamental analysis of the social and economic issues that may have contributed to the disorder in London and other cities, nor in-depth research on the young people involved. I hope that the Victims and Communities Panel which Darra Singh is leading and the research by the National Centre for Social Research will address those issues. I was asked to focus specifically on Wandsworth and the events there, because Wandsworth Council saw it as

Page 3 of 80 its responsibility to examine the events in its area, to learn from them and to assess what action it would take.

7. I have had the fullest co-operation from the members and officers of Wandsworth Council, in carrying out this review. They have dealt with my questions and those which others have raised in my presence in an open and transparent way. So have the senior officers in the local Police, whose co- operation has been essential to the conduct of the review and who have taken part in the public meetings I have held.

8. I have made it a priority in conducting this review to give all those affected by the disorder the opportunity to express their views. To this end, I have held interviews with 61 people on a personal basis, including local residents, shopowners and managers and other business people, the local MPs and GLA member, Wandsworth councillors, council officers, the police and the fire and rescue service. The names of all those I have talked to in these personal meetings is at Annex 2.

9. I have met the Battersea Residents Panel, two groups of young people, in Tooting and Battersea, and a group of Council youth workers. I held three public meetings, in Battersea, Tooting and Wandsworth, attended by 180 people in total, each of which gave rise to lively and informative discussions. Notes of those public meetings are at Annex 3. I attended a special Council meeting which Wandsworth Council held to discuss the disorder and its aftermath. I have also received 35 responses to my invitation for written comments. I am very grateful to all those who contributed for their willingness to help and for their generosity with their time.

10. All these contributions have informed this report and made it possible to produce it so quickly. But, this is an independent report, for which I take responsibility, as I do for the assessments in the report and the recommendations I have made.

Page 4 of 80 Section 1

What happened on 7, 8 and 9 August?

1.1. I set out below a timeline for the events of 8 August in Clapham Junction and other parts of Wandsworth. Many of those I spoke to in the course of my review have memories of the events of that day which differ from one another and at some points from the timeline below, on some points substantially. That is inevitable on an occasion such as this when the events themselves are so confusing and difficult to deal with. The timeline here is drawn primarily from the CCTV footage which Wandsworth Council recorded and from the police record of events. It offers the best timetable of events that I have been able to put together.

1.2. The timeline begins with the death of Mark Duggan in Tottenham on 4 August and the disturbances that followed his death in the Tottenham area on 6 August. Those events did not cause the disturbances that broke out in other parts of London, including the Tooting area of Wandsworth on 7 August. Nor were they directly related to the disorder in Clapham Junction, Balham and Putney on 8 August. But they were part of the chain of events that led to disturbances in Wandsworth, as I shall discuss in the next section of this report.

1.3. It was on Tooting High Street on the evening of 7 August that trouble first occurred in Wandsworth. Eight shops were attacked and a group of 30 to 40 young people forced entry to an amusement arcade. Given the disturbances across London, local residents and businesspeople were understandably worried and the attacks were serious for those affected. They were not repeated on 8 August but they caused much anxiety in Tooting on that day. It is likely that they would have received more attention if they had not been followed by the events of 8 August elsewhere.

1.4. In Balham, a total of eight shops, mainly on Balham High Street, were attacked on the evening of 8 August. Mobile phones and accessories, DVDs, cigarettes and other goods were stolen. An attempt was made to storm a wine bar and the manager attacked. Businesses in Hildreth Street had heard that they might be attacked too, and two shops there had their windows broken, but the owners came together to fend off further trouble. There are also accounts of groups of hooded young men in the area. As in Tooting, the previous night, the incidents were serious for those affected, though limited. They too would have attracted more attention but for the disorder in Clapham Junction.

1.5. In Putney, two mobile phone shops were attacked on the evening of 8 August. A sandwich shop had been attacked earlier in the day.

Page 5 of 80 Timeline of Events 4th Mark Duggan dies in Tottenham August 6th Demonstration in Tottenham is followed by riot August 7th Disorder and looting in: August Waltham Forest: Chingford Mount, Walthamstow Enfield: High Street, Ponders End Kensington & Chelsea: Notting Hill Wandsworth: Tooting Lambeth: Streatham Hackney: Kingsland shopping centre, E8 Westminster: Oxford Circus

8th Disorder and looting in: August Hackney: Central Station/Mare Street from 4pm Croydon: from 7pm Greenwich: Deptford violence reported 7.40pm Newham: East Ham looting reported 8pm Redbridge: Ilford reported 8.55pm Camden: High St./Chalk Farm Rd riots reported Ealing: Broadway reported riots Southwark: Camberwell, Old Kent Rd, East Dulwich Wandsworth: Clapham Junction, Balham

8th August Clapham Junction area

17.00 Multi- agency GOLD meeting notes rumours of attacks planned on Putney, Tooting, Southside shopping centre and Clapham Junction amongst others. Information is described as scrappy and unreliable.

Winstanley Estate and roads nearby

19.24 First report of small groups gathering.

19.40- Larger groups form – reports vary between 60-100 at different times. They 20.00 are armed with sticks, bricks etc. and attack vehicles and Police.

19.42 First violence - 50-60 youths throwing bottles at cars. 19.47 Level 2 (L2) officers on estate (levels defined below). All buses re- routed away. Dog vans requested. Smoke grenades being thrown. At 19.53 British Transport Police (BTP) assistance is requested. 19.54 Housing Department vehicle attacked at Plough Rd/Wynter Street. At 19.56 report of 100 youths at Plough Rd SW11. Police under attack there and withdraw and return to patrol.

By 20.02 youths reported to have left the area heading to Battersea Park Road. 20.10 Police stand down from the estate

Clapham Junction

Page 6 of 80 putting on masks. At 20.15, BTP report 50 Youths on Peabody Estate - all hooded and at least one armed with machete. 20.24 Youths reported at JD Sports 20.39- Attacks begin on shops in St. Johns Rd. A small number of police there 21.08 have some initial success but come under attack. Borough Commander becomes aware of a large group approaching from Lavender Hill and decides to withdraw Police from from St. John’s Rd at 21.08 to a safer distance

20.39 Attack on TMobile shop in St. John’s Rd. 20.45 Attack starts on Debenham’s. At the same time, report of a group armed with bricks / stones heading towards Lavender Hill. 20.47 O2 store broken into 20.50-21.00 Police report they are being attacked. 20.56 Blacks leisure attacked 21.05 On CCTV, 8 police with shields outside Debenhams, the rest of St. John’s Rd appears clear of people 21.08 Police pull back along St. John’s Rd towards Northcote Rd. Approx 200 people coming down Lavender Hill round the corner from the officers who cannot see this developing situation 21.14- No Police in St. John’s Rd. There is a large number of spectators as well as 22.37 ordinary members of the public in the area whilst the looting continues

21.17 Curry’s attacked. Also Footlocker 21.22 Report of attack on Jamie Oliver shop. 21.24 Call from Pizza Express in Lavender Hill reporting attack. 21.25 ASDA attacked 21.30 In Lavender Hill near the party shop, barriers have been placed across the road by rioters. 21.44 3 phone shop in St. John’s Rd attacked. 21.56 JD Sports attacked 21.57 Further L2 officers arrive at Lavender Hill Station. Senior Level 2 officer takes charge

22.37- With reinforcements, the Police move back into St. John’s Rd and the midnight immediate vicinity and re-establish control 22.37 Three L2 vans with 75 trained officers arrive o/s Clapham Junction and up St John’s Rd. 22.40 L2 serials stop o/s Currys, disperse people and make arrests. 20-25 officers involved here. A couple of people throw things at them. By 22.48 most of crowd in St. John’s Rd has cleared. Traffic is still coming down Lavender Hill from Plough Rd 23.14 Lavender Hill described as “quietening”

23.58 Fire at the Party Shop starts. Call made to LFB by Police. Explosions. Police attempted to put out the fire with fire extinguishers. The fire was too fierce so officers commenced evacuation of the people in the flats above

Midnight Activity in Lavender Hill onwards 00.10 9 Aug Fire engine arrives. No heavy police escort but one police van arrives just after

00.13 Further up Lavender Hill, 7 armoured vehicles arrive form east along with 3 other police vehicles. A large number of people are still on the streets

01.00-03.00 Varying reports across Putney, Southside, Balham & Tooting of disorder, fires or looting. Units deployed to each area and no further disorder reported or observed.

03.20 Fire at Party Shop is out

Page 7 of 80 1.6. Level 1 trained officers are full time public order trained officers and members of the Territorial Support Group. Level 2 officers receive training every six months and deal with public order issues on a part-time basis, alongside normal police work. Level 3 officers have basic public order training.

1.7. Most of this time-line relates to events in Clapham Junction on 8 August. In the remainder of this section, I shall look at: 1. the hours preceding the outbreak of violence in Clapham Junction and the level of expectation that it would happen; 2. the key events of the events of the evening and, in particular, the role of the Police; 3. what is known about those who participated in the disorder; 4. the events of 9 August and, in particular, the role of the Council.

1. The hours preceding the outbreak of violence

1.8. The first recorded outbreak of violence in Clapham Junction on the evening of 8 August was an incident involving 50 – 60 young people throwing bottles at cars on Falcon Road, at 7.42pm. There are many different accounts of the hours preceding that incident, of the sense of disquiet in the area and of the level of expectation that there would be trouble emerging from twitter and other social networks during the afternoon and early evening. Others say that the area was quiet during the same period.

1.9. Rumours were circulating among the shops and businesses in the Clapham Junction ‘town centre’ area, that is St. John’s Hill, St. John’s Road and Lavender Hill, during the day that there would be attacks on the area similar to those in other parts of London on the previous evening. A map of this area is on the next page. One shop manager was told by a member of the public at 11.30am that her daughter had been told by friends that there would be trouble in Clapham Junction that evening. There are many other stories of rumours circulating among young people that there would be trouble, often coupled with invitations to join in. By 4pm, the rumours were strong enough to persuade some shops and other businesses to decide to close early, which they did over the next two hours.

1.10. Many of these rumours were primarily based on exchanges on twitter and other social networks. Other rumours spread that police officers were said to have warned businesses about trouble that evening. I understand that it is normal police policy not to advise businesses to close in such circumstances. But it may be that individual police officers expressed their concerns about possible trouble to some shopowners, and managers. Some shopkeepers are critical of the Police because they were not warned that there would be trouble.

Page 8 of 80

1.11. A ‘multi-agency Gold meeting’, involving Police and non-police experts in public order issues, including representatives of Wandsworth Council, was held at 5pm, convened by the Police and chaired by Superintendent Gerry Campbell, the Acting Borough Commander for Wandsworth. The meeting considered the developing situation in Wandsworth.

1.12. There were four possible areas of disorder – Tooting, where there had been trouble the previous evening, Balham, Wandsworth Town Centre, in particular the Southside Shopping Centre, and Clapham Junction. The Police view was that there was no reliable information about the prospect of trouble in any of the four areas. The Borough Commander described the information available to him as scrappy. The meeting concluded with the view that the Police would, therefore, remain on alert for possible trouble in any of the four areas.

1.13. The Gold meeting finished at 6.15pm. The Council’s representatives have described the conduct of the meeting as professional and calm, neither alarmist nor complacent.

1.14. With hindsight, it may be seen that the rumours of potential trouble in Clapham Junction turned out to be all too accurate. Some of those I spoke to are convinced that the evidence was much stronger than the Gold meeting recognised, in particular that the messages exchanged on Twitter were focussing increasingly strongly on Clapham Junction. It is possible that some

Page 9 of 80 of these messages were not fully reported to the Police. Some are, therefore, critical both of what they see as the failure of the Police to access and make use of the information available on Twitter and other social networking sites, and of the failure to recognise that Clapham Junction was in fact the target of those who would initiate the disorder.

1.15. By 6pm, St John’s Road was relatively quiet, following the early closure of the shops, mainly chain stores, there. On Lavender Hill, many shops, including a number of independent businesses and restaurants, were still open. There are different accounts of the atmosphere in the area. Some who walked through the area say that they saw no signs of trouble between 6pm and 7.30pm; others that there was a growing sense of unease by 7pm, around the junction between Lavender Hill and St. John’s Road and on Falcon Road. There were small groups of young people in the area, but no large groups at this stage.

2. The key events of the evening

1.16. The first recorded event of the evening which was the fore-runner of events to come was the attack by 50 – 60 young people on cars in Falcon Road at 7.42pm. This was followed by further incidents in and around the Winstanley Estate, over the next twenty minutes. A Wandsworth Council Housing Department vehicle was attacked on Plough Road at 7.54pm. By 8pm there were as many as 100 young people gathering in a number of groups in the area. At 8.10pm, the Police withdrew from the Winstanley Estate.

1.17. From this point onwards, the focus shifted first to St. John’s Road and then to Lavender Hill, as groups around the Falcon pub began putting on masks. The first attacks on shops in St. John’s Road appear to have been on the T Mobile shop at 8.39pm and on Debenhams at 8.45pm. One police sergeant and seven constables with level 2 public order training were now on St John’s Road trying to deal with growing numbers of potential looters. By 9pm there were 100 to 150 on St. John’s Road and 200 coming down Lavender Hill, unseen by the small group of Police on St. John’s Road.

1.18. It was at this point that the Borough Commander decided that the Police should be withdrawn from St John’s Road. Only eight officers with Level 2 public order training and equipment were available to him. They were dealing bravely and professionally with the situation, but they were confronted with more than three hundred potential looters. He was concerned that the small group of Police officers would be overwhelmed and that he would have to send in more officers without public order training to rescue them. This in turn could have led to a much more violent confrontation, involving Police, looters and other members of the public. His first priority was to protect human life.

1.19. The Police were withdrawn at 9.08pm. The attacks on many shops in St John’s Road and Lavender Hill began at this point and continued, in the

Page 10 of 80 absence of the Police, until 10.30pm. The numbers involved swelled to an estimated 450.

1.20. From 8pm onwards, the senior Police officers dealing with Clapham Junction began making calls to the Metropolitan Police Control Centre to ask for extra support, in particular for officers trained at Level 1 or Level 2 in public order control. 75 Level 1 and 2 trained officers from the Territorial Support Group and other police areas arrived at Lavender Hill police station at 9.57pm, under the command of a Level 2 trained Superintendent.

1.21. At 10.38pm, the Police began to move back into the area of looting with the 75 new officers. They were able to clear St. John’s Road and Lavender Hill, progressively so that both areas were largely clear by 11.15pm.

1.22. At 11.58pm, there was an explosion, followed by a fire at the Party Shop on Lavender Hill. At 12.10am, a fire engine arrived to begin tackling the fire, with support from the Police. At 12.15am, seven armoured vehicles, supported by Police with shields began moving down Lavender Hill. The people remaining in the area, largely spectators, moved out of the way.

Page 11 of 80

Page 12 of 80 1.23. The timeline shows that the Police were absent from the immediate town centre area from 9.08pm until 10.38pm. That is a shorter period than the three hours or more that has frequently been quoted to me, though it is worth noting that, once they had returned at 10.38pm it took half an hour to progressively clear the area. Whether the period in question was three hours or two hours, shop owners, restaurant staff and others in the area felt that they were abandoned by the Police while their shops and businesses were under attack.

1.24. Some 90 shops and businesses in Clapham Junction were attacked during this period. Cash was stolen from cash point machines and tills, televisions, hi fi and other pieces of electronic equipment, mobile phones and accessories, trainers and other sportswear, shoes, clothing and accessories and alcohol and cigarettes were stolen from shops and restaurants. The shops and businesses attacked were on St. John’s Road, St. John’s Hill, Lavender Hill and Falcon Road. Many residents on neighbouring roads saw looters deposit stolen goods in gardens, behind hedges and elsewhere, and return for more. The churchyard of St. Mark’s Church was also used for this purpose. Cars and vans arrived to carry away stolen goods; others were taken away by hand.

1.25. The disorder did not extend far beyond this relatively limited area. It did not extend into Northcote Road, where a number of people who had been eating and drinking in the bars and restaurants, and some local residents, formed something of a barrier. It seems likely that those involved in the looting were less interested in the Northcote Road shops.

1.26. The general impression of all those I heard from was that most of those involved in the disorder and looting were young, male and black, which is broadly consistent with the analysis of those arrested which I set out below, though the proportion of young people under the age of 18 is lower than media coverage has suggested. There appeared to be little sense of anger, or of the threat of serious violence among the looters, though those trapped in restaurants and shops on Lavender Hill certainly felt threatened. The general sense was that the looters were intent on taking what they could, that there were elements of criminal organisation and of opportunism and that some who went along to see what was going on were drawn into the looting. I will discuss issues of motivation further in section 2 of this report.

1.27. No-one was seriously injured in Clapham Junction. But many people were very frightened, including many people making their way home during a Monday evening. In the Wimpy Bar on Lavender Hill, the manager was punched by a group who smashed the door of the restaurant to get in at about 9pm. He took refuge in the flat above the restaurant. At Oceans hairdressers, the owner and his wife first took refuge at the back of their salon, then escaped through the backdoor, as the front of the salon was attacked, looted and smashed up, soon after 9pm.

1.28. At the Pizza Express restaurant on Lavender Hill the duty manager, seven other members of staff and six customers locked themselves into two

Page 13 of 80 rooms while the restaurant was attacked, glass and tables smashed and alcohol stolen. Most of them stayed locked in these two rooms from soon after 8pm until close to midnight, firstly expecting help as a result of their 999 calls, subsequently told that the Police would not be able to send help. The Police kept a close watch on the restaurant via CCTV cameras, to ensure that they were not personally attacked.

1.29. Those who experienced these attacks, and others including the owner of the Party Shop which was gutted by fire, believe that the Police failed to give priority to protecting their lives. It is important to note, however, that many others whom I spoke to, including some residents of nearby streets, thought that the Police response was well-judged, and prevented a potentially much more serious situation from developing, if they had chosen to confront the looters.

1.30. I shall discuss the response of the Police, the fire and rescue service and the Council in sections 3 and 4 of this report. The Council’s direct involvement on the Monday evening was very limited. The Council and the Police both take the view that the responsibility for dealing with the disorder was with the Police and the other emergency services, not with the Council. The Council did, however, maintain its CCTV cameras throughout the night and they have been a major source of intelligence and evidence for the police in pursuing those involved. The Council had a much bigger part to play on the following day, see below.

1.31. Though the Council’s part was limited on the evening of 8 August, the role played by Lorinda Freint, the Town Centre Manager for Clapham Junction, has been universally praised, and described as “heroic” by one interviewee. She spent the whole evening helping people who were frightened by the disorder. She and the manager of the Wessex House nightclub provided a safe place for people to go to and helped them to escape the area without trouble.

1.32. The Local Authority Liaison Officer, Kevin Power, was called to the fire at the Party Shop at 12.30am and subsequently arranged for a Council surveyor to come to the building, to advise the fire service on moving through the building. Mr Power remained on site until 4am, when he began the arrangements for the clean-up that would follow later in the day.

3. What is known about those who took part in the disorder

1.33. The disorder in Clapham Junction, in common with similar events across London and other cities was remarkably well-recorded. In identifying those involved, the Police have been able to use the extensive CCTV cameras maintained by Wandsworth Council and the CCTV operated by many of the shops and businesses attacked. They have broadcast television footage, and photographs taken by many passers-by on their mobile phones. The residents of nearby streets took photographs of the looters and recorded the registration numbers of the cars and vans used to take away stolen goods.

Page 14 of 80 Superintendent Campbell has given generous praise to the help and support the Police have had in tracking down those involved.

1.34. As this report is finalised, there have been 153 arrests; 71 people have been charged, as a result of the disorder in Wandsworth. - 50% of those arrested are Wandsworth residents. Of those not from Wandsworth, most are from Lambeth or Croydon. Of the 50% from Wandsworth, 22% are from Battersea, 17% from Tooting, and 11% from Wandsworth/Putney. - 24% are under 18; a further 41% 18 – 24; the total age range is 14 – 53, the average age 24 - 88% are known to the Police because they have been arrested previously and had their DNA taken -82% are male - according to the classification used by the Metropolitan Police, 66% are Afro-Caribbean, 29% west European, 5% of Asian appearance and 1% of Chinese or South-east Asian appearance

1.35. The Police estimate that the total involved may have been 450. The analysis of those arrested in Wandsworth is largely consistent with figures produced by the Ministry of Justice for those arrested throughout the country following the disturbances on 6, 7 and 8 August.

1.36. It is not possible to know whether those who have not been arrested, possibly 300 in the case of Wandsworth, share the same characteristics as those who have been. It is possible that some of them were younger, but such conjecture is inevitably speculative.

4. Key events on 9 August

1.37. By 4am on 9 August, the fire at the Party Shop was being damped down, the looters had dispersed and the area was declared a crime scene. This designation was still in place at 6am when council staff arrived and at 8am when local residents and others began arriving to help clear up, some of them encouraged to do so on Twitter, others spontaneously. This group of volunteers grew in force during the morning and early afternoon, to 400 or more, according to observers at the time, and became swiftly known as the ‘broom army’.

1.38. In the event, the broom army had to wait until mid-afternoon until they were allowed access to the area, once the scene of crime forensic work was done. They waited very patiently.

1.39. There was an element of controversy in mid-morning when members of the Council’s cleaning team, also waiting for the Police to finish, are said to have told the volunteers that they would not be allowed into the looted area, “for health and safety reasons”. This message was set aside when more senior staff from the Council and its contractors arrived and explained that the delay was because of police work.

Page 15 of 80

Page 16 of 80 1.40. The Mayor of London and the Home Secretary arrived at 2.30pm, with the Leader of the Council, to observe the scene. Soon afterwards, the broom army were allowed access and did a good job, along with council staff and contractors in clearing up. Those who were present say that the spirits of the broom army remained remarkably cheerful during the day. The Leader of the Council has drawn a contrast between the negative behaviour on the evening of 8 August and the community spirit shown by this large number of volunteers on 9 August.

1.41. There were many rumours in the course of the day that another evening’s disorder was in preparation, either in Clapham Junction again, or in another part of Wandsworth. People were very worried about what might happen. Many shops and businesses closed in the afternoon; so did the Southside shopping centre. The decisions to close were made by the shops and businesses because of their anxieties about the rumours, not as a result of official Police advice.

1.42. Within the Council, a crisis management team meeting was held at 8.30am, and again at 1pm. A public message deploring the disorder was issued on behalf of the Council Leader at 9.30am; internal messages were sent to senior staff at 9.30am and to all staff at 3pm. The media team put out messages welcoming the broom army in the course of the day.

1.43. The same rumours circulating in the town centres about possible further trouble were circulating round the Town Hall. One senior member of staff described the atmosphere as more fear-filled than he had ever experienced before. A rumour went round that hundreds, possibly thousands, of young men were gathering in King George’s Park, near Wandsworth Town Centre. A check was made and revealed that just a handful of people were in the park. At 3pm, the Town Hall was closed to public visitors, but remained open for staff. At 6pm, all staff were encouraged to go home.

1.44. There was no repeat of the events of 8 August on the 9th or on succeeding days, though the Police remained on high alert for many days. Most shops and businesses in Clapham Junction and the other areas moved quickly, to restore broken windows and doors and to repair damage to the interiors. Some were open again on the Wednesday, most by the end of the week, with the exception of a small number too badly damaged to recover quickly. For the most part, the message that the town centres were open for business as usual was given strong expression. Councillors, council staff and the Police visited many of those affected. I shall look further at the impact on local businesses and residents in section 5 of my report.

Page 17 of 80 Section 2

What local factors contributed to the disorder?

2.1. Most of those I have heard from in personal interviews and who have spoken at public meetings and group meetings during the course of this review have offered their views on the causes of the disorder. I have been very grateful to them for the clarity of their expression and I shall seek to do justice to them in this section of my report.

2.2. Some have taken as their starting point the events in other parts of London on 6 and 7 August which preceded the major outbreak of disorder in Wandsworth, in Clapham Junction on 8 August. Others have focused more strongly on the factors which they consider to be particularly relevant to the Clapham Junction area. I was asked particularly to look at the local factors but it is essential to do so in the context set by events elsewhere in London, and the read-across into the Wandsworth experience.

2.3. It is important to be clear that this report does not seek to offer a forensic assessment of the events of 7 and 8 August. This has not been a judicial inquiry, set up to reach conclusions on the basis of evidence closely analysed and judged. Nor have I been able to carry out any in-depth research on the background and motivation of those involved. Other studies, including one by the National Centre for Social Research, on the motivation of young people involved in the riots across England, and the National Panel on Victims and Communities led by Darra Singh, will take a longer and more in-depth look at these issues.

2.4. I have, however, heard from a wide range of people in Wandsworth, local residents and business people, young people and youth workers, MPs, Councillors and council officers and the Police and the Fire Brigade. It is they who were most closely affected by the disorder and who continue to live and do business in the area. My aim has been to give everyone who wished to express their views the opportunity to do so and it is right that their views should be recorded here.

London–wide context

2.5. I shall look first at the events that preceded the outbreak of disorder in Wandsworth and the context they set for what happened there. On one issue, there is no reason to hesitate. That is that the disorder in Wandsworth was part of a chain of events which began with the shooting by armed police of Mark Duggan in Tottenham on Thursday 4 August. His death was followed by a demonstration which turned into a riot in the same area on Saturday 6 August. That in turn was followed by disorder in several areas of London, on Sunday 7 August. There was also trouble on a limited scale in Tooting. On 8 August, Clapham Junction was one of several areas hit by serious disorder, including Hackney and Croydon where a number of serious fires were started.

Page 18 of 80 2.6. This is not to suggest that there was a causal link, that Mark Duggan’s death was the reason why people became involved in the disorder elsewhere in London. The general view of most of those who have commented on the disorder, and of those I heard from in Wandsworth, is that the events in Tottenham triggered disorder elsewhere; they did not cause them.

2.7. Why then did disorder break out on such a wide scale across London and in other cities? There have, of course, been riots before in England, some of them with much more serious consequences than the events in August. But the widespread nature of the disorder on 7 and 8 August was unprecedented in recent times. It took the whole country by surprise, central government, local authorities and the Police included.

2.8. For most observers, and most of those I heard from in Wandsworth, the primary reason why people took part in the disorder was criminal opportunism. This may have had three elements: - organised looting, by people associated with gangs and criminal networks - disorganised looting, by people who joined in with the intention of doing so, and - people who were caught up in the moment, who went first to watch what was going on, then joined in. The phrase “copy-cat” is one that is often used; people in other parts of London and other cities followed the example set first in Tottenham on 6 August, then in other areas of north London on the 7th.

2.9. The question of motivation is one which the courts and other national studies will examine. It is not for this review to comment on individual cases. The general belief that criminal opportunism was the main reason for the disorder does not explain why it happened in some places rather than others, nor why it happened as it did in Clapham Junction. I will return to those issues below. But there is no evidence so far that there was a significant political element in the disorder, as there has been in other riots in England in the past.

2.10. Some commentators have suggested that the disorder spread across London and outside because it was clear in Tottenham that the Police were unable to bring it under control, others that the development of social messaging made it possible for outbreaks of disorder to be “organised” in the way that large parties, or raves, used to be in the 1990s. Some contributors to this review have raised the possibility of some measure of central coordination of the disorder, either one “mastermind”, or several, planning its spread.

2.11. I record these comments because they were raised with me a number of times in the course of this review. They will be examined, along with all other aspects of the disorder in a major review which Assistant Commissioner Lynn Owens is carrying out for the Metropolitan Police, on which an interim report is expected in mid-November and a final report in December.

2.12. The Police review may answer the question of why and how the disorder spread as it did across London, and to other cities on 8 August. It may also

Page 19 of 80 answer the question of why it happened in some parts of London and not others and why in some cities outside London and not others. Local factors no doubt played a part in all the areas concerned. In the rest of this section of the report, I shall look at the local factors that may have applied in Clapham Junction.

Local Factors in Clapham Junction

2.13. It will be apparent from what follows that there was a wide range of views among those who contributed to the review. Some are essentially factual points about the area; some offer suggestions about the motivation of those who took part; others are about underlying issues which may help to explain what happened. Almost all of those I heard from started from the premise that the primary motivation for those involved was criminal opportunism. The factors listed below were not said to justify or excuse the behaviour of those involved, rather to explain why it happened in Clapham Junction and what persuaded some people to take part, and not others.

2.14. The factors suggested were: 1. accessibility – Clapham Junction is well known and an easy place to get to, by bus and by train; 2. the attractive array of shops in the area, in particular on St. John’s Road, stocked with goods that are attractive to those involved in the disorder, including televisions, mobile phones, shoes and clothes, trainers and other sportswear; 3. the juxtaposition of the shopping area to a number of housing estates on which there is significant deprivation and in which gangs and other less organised groups are known to operate; 4. a significant element of organisation within the groups involved, as evidenced by the extensive use of mobile phones and the arrival of cars and vans to carry off stolen goods; 5. the widespread use of social networks, in particular blackberry messaging, to encourage people to come and see what was happening, and then to join in; 6. an expectation that those who joined in would not be stopped, or caught, following the reports of what happened in Tottenham and elsewhere, and encouraged by the lack of police presence in Clapham Junction itself; 7. rolling television news coverage of disorder breaking out in other parts of London in the afternoon and early evening, leading to the relatively late start to the disorder in Clapham Junction; 8. racial tension, in particular between the Afro-caribbean population and the Police, in which the absence of mutual respect and the continuing use of stop and search are said to be significant factors; 9. family breakdown, particularly on the housing estates in the area, and the lack of parental discipline; 10. the sense of alienation between the many different ethnic, cultural and religious communities in the area, some of which are said to have little or no connection with civic authorities such as the Council and the Police;

Page 20 of 80 11. the vivid contrast between wealth and poverty in the Clapham Junction area, expressed sometimes by reference to the level of relative poverty north of the railway line that goes through Clapham Junction station and the relative wealth south of the railway; 12. a lack of availability of youth services, sports facilities and other things to do, for young people in the area, particularly in summer; 13. the lack of job opportunities for young people in the area, leaving school and university, 14. resentment about the removal of the Educational Maintenance Allowance in February this year, and the increase in tuition fees for university students; 15. a sense of entitlement which is said to encourage people to believe that they are entitled to take goods which are otherwise available to others, and not to them; 16. the emphasis on materialism in the media, in particular on new and shiny goods, such as televisions, mobile phones and trainers.

2.15. There is clearly a mix of issues here. Some of these factors relate to the physical characteristics of the area, and to what was happening at the time across London and others to more long-standing issues some of which are particularly relevant to Clapham Junction, others national or even international in compass. In reflecting on those that are relevant to young people, it is worth noting that the proportion of young people under the age of 18 arrested has been just 24%, though a further 41% have been 18 to 24. There is no justification for suggesting that this was a disorder generated largely by teenagers.

2.16. After a review lasting less than a month, I am not in a position to make an evidence-based judgement of this list of explanatory factors. But it seems to me reasonable to offer the following comments: - the physical characteristics of the area help to explain why disorder broke out in Clapham Junction - events elsewhere in London and the rapid spread of news about them help to explain why it happened on 8 August - a mix of the longer term factors in the list helps to explain why those who took part did so, and why others did not. They do not justify criminal behaviour but they are relevant to an understanding of what happened and to the motivation of those who took part.

2.17. Many of these factors are not within the power of Wandsworth Council or the Metropolitan Police to address, but there are some which they will wish to reflect on and to which I shall return later in this report, after looking next at the responses of the Police and the Council to the disorder. At Annex 4, I have set out some key facts relevant to the list of underlying factors quoted above, including the level of crime in Wandsworth, relative deprivation rates and spending on youth services.

Page 21 of 80 Section 3

The responses of the Police and the Fire and Rescue service to the disorder

3.1. The response of the Police to the disorder in Clapham Junction on 8 August has been the biggest single source of controversy in the course of this review. Some of those I heard from, including many residents of roads near the scene of the disorder, consider that the judgement shown by the Police as the disorder developed from 8pm onwards was just right and avoided turning a bad event into a complete disaster. Others, especially those whose businesses were damaged that evening, but other observers too, think that the Wandsworth Police and their higher command should have taken different decisions in the course of the day, and that the withdrawal of the Police from St. John’s Road and Lavender Hill at 9.08pm left them abandoned and unprotected until order was restored several hours later.

3.2. I shall look at the balance of argument on the key points of controversy, in the light of the comments I have heard from all those concerned and from the Police themselves. It is worth stating one possibly obvious point first, that almost no one, supporter or critic, holds the police primarily responsible for the outbreak of disorder. The blame for that lies with those who took part, be it as organisers, deliberate participants or watchers who were drawn into criminal behaviour.

3.3. I will also address the role of the Fire and Rescue service in the events of 8 August. Fortunately there was no need for the ambulance service to become involved.

3.4. The response of the Police in Wandsworth on 8 August must be seen in the context of events across London on 6, 7 and 8 August. The extent of the disorder was unprecedented, involving as it did 22 of 32 London Boroughs, some with relatively minor disorder, some including neighbouring Croydon, with disturbances even worse than those in Wandsworth. There were not enough public order trained officers available to deal with disorder on this scale. This is one of the issues which Assistant Commissioner Owens’ review is looking at, which I will return to in Section 6 of this report. Inevitably, many of the police officers who faced the disorder on 8 August, in Wandsworth and other parts of London had had little sleep for 48 hours or more.

3.5. The main issues raised about the response of the Police in Clapham Junction are: 1. Should they have anticipated that Clapham Junction would be a major trouble spot much earlier in the day? 2. How many police were available in Wandsworth when the trouble began at 7.40pm? How many were trained to deal with public order problems? Were there enough? 3. Should the Police have withdrawn from the centre of the disorder at 9.08pm?

Page 22 of 80 4. Why did it take until 10.38pm for public order trained reinforcements to return to the streets, and until 12.13am for armoured vehicles to arrive in the area?

Q1. Should the Police have anticipated that Clapham Junction would be a major trouble spot much earlier in the day?

3.6. There are two main issues here, the first concerned with social networks, the second with other forms of intelligence which might have provided more warning.

3.7. There are many stories about the exchanges on social networks in the course of the day, about young people receiving messages, via Blackberry messenger, telling them that Clapham Junction would be a trouble spot. There was also a lot of traffic on Twitter, anticipating trouble in Clapham Junction. Some of those who are regular users of Twitter say that the focus of those exchanges was strongly on Clapham Junction by the end of the afternoon. The level of rumour was sufficient to persuade a number of shops in St. John’s Road to close early.

3.8. The Police view given at the Gold meeting at 5pm that day was that the information then available was too scrappy, and not reliable enough to identify Clapham Junction as the focus of trouble. The Police were still concerned about Balham, Tooting and the Southside Centre in Wandsworth as alternative trouble spots. They had some knowledge of the Blackberry messaging and of Twitter but they were sceptical about its value as a source of reliable information.

3.9. With hindsight, those who anticipated trouble in Clapham Junction were right. But it is worth noting that in other parts of London including Barnet and Lambeth, people were equally convinced that they would see serious trouble in their areas, and they did not. On the following day, 9 August, there were very strong rumours that there would be more trouble in Clapham Junction, or at the Southside Centre. Those rumours turned out to be wrong.

3.10. The other question raised here is whether the Police should have had better intelligence via their Safer Neighbourhood Teams, and from those who had been convinced by the social networks that there would be trouble in Clapham Junction. There may be issues of timing here, if many of those who took part in the disorder decided to do so when they saw what was happening elsewhere. But it may also be the case that some people who were persuaded that there would be trouble could have done more to urge the Police to share their view; and equally that the Police could have been more receptive to those messages.

3.11. It is likely that there will continue to be a range of views on this question. Having heard the arguments, my own view is that, in the light of the information then available to them, it was difficult for the Police at the time of the Gold meeting to be certain that there would be trouble in Clapham

Page 23 of 80 Junction that evening. They will, however, wish to review their intelligence arrangements in relation to the monitoring of social networks and in ensuring that they can receive messages at times of crisis (Section 6 below).

Q2. How many police were available in Wandsworth at 7.40pm when the trouble began? How many were public order trained at levels 1 and 2? Were there enough?

3.12. There were sixty officers on duty on the evening of 8 August, trained to level 3 or above. One sergeant and seven constables had level 2 public order training. 52 Wandsworth-based officers had been deployed earlier in the day to deal with possible trouble in Tottenham. 32 of the officers deployed out of Wandsworth had level 2 public order training.

3.13. In view of what happened on the evening of 8 August, the number of trained officers available in the early evening was manifestly inadequate. The decision to move 52 officers out of Wandsworth to Tottenham was taken earlier in the day at more senior levels in the Metropolitan Police. Whether there would have been enough to deal with the disorder had the transfer not been made is not a question that I can seek to answer. But the effect of the transfer was to leave just eight public order trained officers to deal with potential disorder in Wansdworth. That was a very small number given that there were rumours circulating of potential trouble in the Borough throughout the day.

3.14. Wandsworth has rightly been known as a relatively safe place. Some of those I heard from during the review expressed concern that this reputation may have had the effect of encouraging the decision-makers in the Metropolitan Police to treat the risk to the area less seriously than they did with other, traditionally less safe areas. Clearly, these decision-makers had to make decisions about priorities on the basis of the information available to them. The intelligence available about Clapham Junction was limited, but the decision to leave Wandsworth with a small number of trained officers was itself a risky one, which did not turn out well. The question of resource allocation across London will be a major issue for AC Owens’ review.

Q3. Should the Police have withdrawn from the centre of the disorder at 9.08pm?

3.15. The issue facing the acting Borough Commander at 9pm was a stark one. His small number of public order trained officers, one sergeant and seven constables, were facing a growing number of people intent on looting. There were 100 to 150 in St. John’s Road and a further 200 moving down Lavender Hill towards the junction with St. John’s Road, whom the small band of public order trained officers could not see. There had already been several attacks on these officers, involving bricks and bottles; some of the crowd had knives.

Page 24 of 80 3.16. The officers in question were responding bravely to their situation. They had moved potential looters away from the shops already attacked. But they were seriously outnumbered. The risk was that they would be overwhelmed by the crowd. The Borough Commander would have had to send his relatively inexperienced Level 3 trained officers in to rescue the first group. The prospect then was of a much more seriously violent encounter in which the Police and members of the public, including people nearby, might have been seriously hurt. The Borough Commander decided to withdraw his small group of public order trained officers. His first priority was to preserve human life.

3.17. Withdrawal from the centre of the disorder inevitably meant that shops and business premises were attacked and looted. Most shop windows on St. John’s Road were smashed; most shops were looted. On Lavender Hill, more shops and businesses were attacked, and a number of staff and customers were put into very frightening situations. It is not surprising that some shop owners and business people felt abandoned and that their interests were given a lower priority than that of residents in the area. This experience came in top of an existing concern that property theft, especially shoplifting, scored low on the list of police priorities.

3.18. Most of the residents of nearby roads that I heard from, though not all, took the view that the Borough Commander was right to withdraw. So did a number of other observers. There was serious damage to local shops and businesses in the course of the disorder, but no-one was seriously hurt. Much worse might have followed a battle between looters and the Police.

3.19. There has been speculation that the approach taken by the Police in Clapham Junction and elsewhere might have been influenced by experiences such as Broadwater Farm and the more recent furore over the G20 demonstrations, the court cases that have followed them and the controversy over kettling demonstrators on other occasions. Some critics have gone on to say that the Police were unduly cautious as a result of those events, unwilling to take firm action where they should. Others, more sympathetic, have taken the line that the Police were “damned if they took firm action, damned if they didn’t”.

3.20. Here again, it seems to me inevitable that different views will continue to be held about the withdrawal from the scene. My view is that the Borough Commander had no serious alternative but to withdraw when he did. The risk of leaving such a small group of public order trained officers to face a crowd of 300 and more potential looters, some of them likely to attack with bricks and bottles, was too great both to the officers themselves and to the public more generally if a confrontation developed. The problem was that he had too few officers available and only a handful of officers trained to the necessary level.

Page 25 of 80 Q4. Why did it take until 10.38pm for public order trained reinforcements to return to the streets, and until 12.13am for armoured vehicles to arrive in the area?

3.21. This question will, I hope, be the one to which AC Owens’ review will give most serious attention. The senior officers in Wandsworth began calling for reinforcements at 8pm. At that point, whatever doubts there may have been earlier, it was clear that there would be serious trouble in Clapham Junction. I understand that several calls were made before reinforcements arrived, at Lavender Hill Police Station at 9.57pm. The new arrivals then had to be briefed on the area and plan their action, before beginning successfully to move the looters on, at 10.38pm.

3.22. I do not know what the competing demands for trained officers were at the time. It may be that the available resources of public order trained officers were too limited for them to be moved to Wandsworth more quickly, or that other areas were still considered to be of higher risk when the requests for reinforcement were first made. But a two hour gap between an urgent request for reinforcement and its arrival seems a very long one. It is fortunate that no- one was seriously hurt in the intervening period.

3.23. Seven armoured vehicles arrived at the top of Lavender Hill at 12.13pm. By that time, most of the looters had left the area, and the 75 level 2 trained officers had regained control of the streets. The armoured vehicles made their way down Lavender Hill accompanied by Police with riot shields. They stopped before they reached the junction with St. John’s Road.

3.24. These vehicles were clearly intimidating to the people still on the street at the time and may well have deterred those who caused trouble earlier in the evening. By the time they arrived, it is not clear that their presence was any longer needed.

3.25. It seems to me essential that AC Owens’ review should consider the issues raised by the time it took to reinforce the Police in Clapham Junction. It may be that there simply were not enough public order trained officers available, or that a different approach to resource allocation would have allowed a quicker response. It seems clear that, had more public order trained officers been available in Wandsworth and elsewhere in London, the Police response to the outbreak of disorder on 8 August would have been much more effective.

3.26. In the circumstances they faced, and with the resources available to them, it seems to me that the Wandsworth Police did the best they could. The issue for the future is for the Metropolitan Police as a whole and for the Government in allocating its funding. Should substantially higher priority be given to training police officers to deal with outbreaks of public disorder? Or is the risk of repetition too low to justify substantial change? I shall return to this in Section 6 of my report.

Page 26 of 80 The response of the Fire and Rescue Service

3.27. I have heard a number of stories about the role of the Fire and Rescue Service in the disorder, in the course of my review, including: that Battersea Fire Station was closed on the evening of 8 August; that it took more than an hour for the fire service to respond to the fire in the Party Shop on Lavender Hill; and that fire officers were attacked while dealing with the fire.

3.28. None of these stories is true. Battersea Fire Station was open throughout 8 and 9 August. Its station manager was called to Forest Hill on 8 August, to support the South London central operation. But a watch manager and crew, with fire engine, were on duty when the fire started at the Party Shop. They were on the scene within fifteen minutes and were supported by the Police. They did not come under attack while dealing with the fire. A second fire engine from Wandsworth joined the Battersea crew soon after they arrived.

3.29. The fire at the Party Shop was a serious one, given the presence of helium tanks in the shop. It took until 3.20am to bring it under control. Under more normal circumstances, more fire engines would have been brought in to deal with the fire. But given what was happening elsewhere in London, including four serious fires in Croydon, the Fire and Rescue service seem to have responded well to this incident.

Page 27 of 80 Section 4

The response of Wandsworth Council to the disorder

4.1. The response of the Council to the disorder has had a good press from most observers and most of those I spoke to during the review. In particular, the Council is seen to have moved quickly and effectively to organise the clean-up operation, and to have offered both moral and practical support to the shops and businesses affected. There have been criticisms, which I shall discuss below but they have come largely from within the Council rather than from outside. The issue of an eviction notice to a tenant whose son was arrested following the disorder has been controversial.

4.2. In this section, I shall look at: 1. the response of the Council on 8 August 2. the handling of the clean-up operation on 9 August 3. the response within the Council on 9 August and the effectiveness of the emergency plan 4. the engagement with shops and businesses 5. the issue of an eviction notice on Friday, 12 August.

Q1. The response of the Council on 8 August

4.3. Both the Council and the Police take the view that the responsibility for dealing with the disorder in Clapham Junction, and elsewhere, on 8 August was with the Police, and the other emergency services as necessary. So it was the Police who convened the Gold multi-agency meeting on the evening of 8 August, which the Council’s representatives attended. The responsibility for decisions made at the meeting were the Acting Borough Commander’s.

4.4. This seems to me to be clearly right. Any division of responsibility in the event of disorder of this kind would be a distraction. The Council was, however, involved in the events of the evening of 8 August, in a number of ways. A housing vehicle owned by the Council was attacked in Plough Road at 7.54pm and the decision was made to withdraw the housing staff who would normally be on duty in the evening. At the same time, the cleaning staff who would normally be cleaning the shopping streets in the evening were also withdrawn from Clapham Junction. Both were sensible decisions, to avoid risk to staff.

4.5. The Town Centre Manager for Clapham Junction, Lorinda Freint, went back to the area at 7pm, after a phone call to tell her that trouble was looming, and stayed there most of the night. She did her best to help those affected by the disorder and worked with the manager of the Wessex House Nightclub to provide a refuge for those upset and frightened by the violence. She has rightly been praised by a number of people I spoke to in the review.

4.6. Ms Freint was not contacted during the evening by members of the Council staff. The Council’s emergency plan provides for senior managers

Page 28 of 80 within the Council when an emergency arises, but this does not include town centre managers.

4.7. The Local Authority Liaison Officer, Kevin Power, was contacted at 9pm by the Council’s emergency centre and, thereafter, made and received a number of phone calls to and from senior Council officers. Shortly after midnight, he was called about the fire at the Party Shop, went to the site of the fire and then arranged for a building surveyor to come to advise the fire brigade about the safety of the building for them to work through it. By 4am, when the fire was out, he arranged for the cleaning services to be in place at 6am to begin the clear-up. This was overtaken by the declaration of the area as a crime scene but it seems that Mr. Power carried out his tasks effectively, in line with the emergency plan.

Q2. The handling of the clean-up operation on 9 August

4.8. Council staff and contractors were in place early on the morning of 9 August, to begin the clear-up. They were unable to begin until mid-afternoon, because of the designation of the crime scene. They then did a good job, alongside the broom army of volunteers. The Council also organised the boarding-up of a number of shops and businesses where necessary. Council staff worked through Tuesday night and into Wednesday to secure fourteen shops and businesses. They have rightly been praised for their efficiency in doing so, by a number of the shop owners and managers.

4.9. The arrival and subsequent growth in the number of the volunteers who formed the broom army, to a total of 400 or more in the course of the day, clearly took the council staff and contractors by surprise. There have been stories that council staff told some volunteers that they could not help, for “health and safety” reasons. In fact, no one was allowed into the areas that most needed cleaning-up, until the Police had finished their forensic work in mid-afternoon. By mid-morning, more senior staff had arrived, to clarify the position.

4.10. There has been some criticism that the Council responded slowly to the broom army and did not show as much leadership as it should have done, to ensure that everyone knew what was happening, and when they would be able to begin helping. That seems to me to be a counsel of perfection. The Council was as shocked as everyone else by the disorder the previous evening; it was bound to take time to put follow-up arrangements in place; and there was a lot of anxiety about what might happen later that day.

4.11. The appearance of the broom army was itself a surprise, albeit a very welcome one. It did not take long for council officers to take a positive approach to the volunteers and for the Council’s press office to send out very positive messages about them. Once the Police allowed access, the Council’s staff and volunteers combined to do a good clean-up job quickly. It seems to me to be right to regard this part of the Council’s response a success, and for

Page 29 of 80 the Council to consider how best to build on the enthusiasm of the broom army, as I shall discuss in the next section.

Q3. The response within the Council and the effectiveness of the emergency plan

4.12. I have set out in section 1 of this report the main points of the Council’s internal response on 9 August. There were meetings of the Crisis Management Team and messages to staff and to the public; the Town Hall was closed to the public at 3pm and staff were sent home at 6pm. There was a lot of anxiety among staff, many rumours flying around and a sense of fear that there would be more trouble that evening.

4.13. Should these events have been handled differently within the Town Hall? Would more regular communication to staff, and the public have helped? Some council officers have expressed their frustration at the lack of communication between the Police and the Council and between Departments within the Council. Some think the decision to close the Town Hall at 3pm was unnecessary and made people more worried.

4.14. In fact, there was very little information to communicate. The question to which everyone wanted an answer was whether the disorder would break out again on the evening of 9 August , and where? But, no-one knew the answer to that question. And the most perfect communication systems would not have provided an answer.

4.15. That said, it does seem that it was harder than it should have been for the Council’s press office to find out what was happening across the Council and for one Department to know what another was doing. It may be that better communication would have limited the spread of the rumour that the closure of the Town Hall to the public meant that the building was at risk of attack. It is sensible for the Council to look at its communication systems in the aftermath of the disorder and to consider the establishment of a communication hub, to which all those with information would pass it on and from which everyone could take consistent messages.

4.16. The Council’s emergency plan seems to have worked well in ensuring that senior managers were alerted to the disorder, that meetings were organised and that the Leisure and Amenity Services Department arranged for cleaning and boarding-up operations were put in place. What the plan did not do was ensure that front line staff, in particular Town Centre Managers, were contacted and given advice as soon as the disorder began. This was particularly an issue in Clapham Junction but relevant in the other town centres as well. I understand that a youth worker has also commented that the plan offered no guidance about dealing with young people in the aftermath of the disorder.

4.17. No emergency plan can provide for every possibility. Wandsworth Council’s plan is for the Council and its services, not for the Borough as a

Page 30 of 80 whole. As one council officer put it, local businesses would not have wanted to spend time on bureaucratic planning against the unlikely event of a riot in the area. The Council will, however, wish to reflect on how best to ensure that its front-line staff are given immediate support and advice in future emergencies. I shall return to this in my recommendations below.

Q4. Engagement with shops and businesses

4.18. The Council responded very well to help businesses deal with the effects of the disorder. All affected businesses were visited within the following few days and a package of emergency support put in place for those who needed it, involving the following elements: (a) helping businesses to apply for business rate relief, reschedule business rate payments and applying for business rate payment holidays; (b) suspending all recovery action and issuing of business rates bills until 31st August 2011 for businesses in the affected area; (c) offering a ‘payment holiday’ to affected businesses (no payment in August and September and instalments will be re-calculated from October); (d) reporting to the Valuation Office Agency premises destroyed by the fire so they can be removed from the Rating List; (e) exempting premises from rates that are clearly empty and awarded a 3- month rate-free period; (f) helping with filling in claims for funds under the Riot Damages Act 1886. (the Government subsequently agreed to extend the time allowed for claims to be submitted from 14 days to 42 days); (g) helping with filling in claims for funds under the Capital Communities Foundation Hardship Fund (grants up to £3,000); (h) helping with filling in claims for funds under the Mayor’s High Street Fund; (i) assisting with their insurance claims; (j) helping with filling in applications for funds under the Council’s Town Centre Improvement Scheme (see paragraph 16 below); (k) putting businesses in touch with Victim Support to assist them and their staff traumatised by the disturbances; and (l) circulating town centre newsletters, together with a flyer outlining what is available and giving one key point of contact.

4.19. In addition, financial support was offered, including the following amendments to the Town Centre Improvement Scheme (TCIS) for the period to 31st December 2011:-

(a) extending the geographical areas covered by the TCIS (which offers grants and loans of up to £15,000) to all premises adversely affected by the disturbances for major capital improvements to their premises for works already agreed as eligible; and (b) introducing grants and loans of up to 100% and a maximum of £2,000, to help with immediate repairs, shop-front replacements and/or dressing boarded up shops to minimise the impact of the damage caused to the street scene, to include short term loans for recoverable losses and

Page 31 of 80 grants/loans for uninsurable losses, but excluding assistance for insurable losses.

4.20. The Council has amended the existing Business Rates Hardship Scheme so that for all businesses in occupation and trading on 8th August 2011 and liable for business rates, and where there is evidence the business was affected by the riots between 8th and 11th August 2011 (e.g. Police report / repair bill for boarding or replacement glass or Town Centre Manager’s report or evidence of other consequential hardship), relief at a minimum level will be awarded to sole traders at 5% and PLC/Limited Companies at 2.5%; the maximum relief should be at 50% for sole traders and 25% for PLCs. Relief will apply for the period from 8th August 2011 to 31st March 2012.

4.21. For the future, a multi-agency Gold Recovery Coordination Group has been formed, to develop a recovery plan that will include business recovery as one of its key elements. It will be important that the business community itself is closely involved with the development of this plan. I will return to this in the next two sections of the report.

Q5. The issue of an eviction notice to a tenant whose son was arrested following the disorder

4.22. On Friday, 12 August, a notice of eviction, technically a Notice of Seeking Possession, the first formal step in the legal process that could ultimately lead to eviction, was issued to a tenant whose son had been arrested, and charged following the disorder. The press release which announced this generated a large amount of national publicity and controversy, both nationally and locally. That controversy gave rise to strong views expressed in the course of this review.

4.23. The Council’s position is that the notice of eviction was served as a result of a breach of conditions of the tenancy (ground 1 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985), due to the alleged behaviour of the tenant’s son. The conditions of the tenancy agreement require tenants, household members and their visitors, not to “do anything which causes or is likely to cause a nuisance to anyone living in the borough of Wandsworth and/ or the local area” or “do anything which interferes with the peace, comfort or convenience of other people living in the borough of Wandsworth and/ or the local area” nor “cause damage to property belonging to other people or council property in the borough of Wandsworth and/or the local area”.

4.24. The Council was notified by the Police of the arrest of the son of one of their tenants (among other early arrests) and decided to issue the eviction notice, in the light of the alleged breach of the tenancy agreement. Twenty- two tenants had been evicted in the last three years for antisocial behaviour and a larger number of notices seeking possession had been served on tenants in cases where a member of the household had been convicted or

Page 32 of 80 accused of crimes, both at their homes and elsewhere in the Borough, though they did not lead to eviction.

4.25. The Council has made clear that a decision on whether the tenant should in fact be evicted will be for the County Court to make. No further action will be taken until the case against the son of the tenant in question has been determined by the Crown Court. If he is acquitted, the eviction notice will be withdrawn.

4.26. The Press Notice issued by the Council gave no information that could have led to the identification of the tenant by the media. The Council’s aim was to show to its residents and businesses that the scenes of disorder would not be tolerated and to show leadership at a time of crisis.

4.27. The decision to issue the eviction notice and to put out a press notice about it have both been criticized by the Opposition on Wandsworth Council and by others in the course of the review and in the national media. The eviction notice is criticized on the grounds that is was disproportionate, given that the young man concerned had not been convicted at the time and that eviction would punish his mother and sister both of whom are innocent of any crime. The critics suggest that the Council was unlikely to take similar action in relation to the families of all those arrested following the disorder. The decision to issue the eviction notice was, therefore, wrong. The announcement by press notice is criticized on the grounds that it was done to secure publicity for the Council’s “tough stance”.

4.28. It seems to me to be clear that there are precedents for the issue of eviction notices in cases where a member of a tenant’s family is convicted or accused of a crime. Whether the Council takes a consistent approach in similar cases following the disorder will be for Councillors and officers to decide in considering the cases concerned. The next step in this case will be the Crown Court hearing of the charges against the young man concerned. If he is convicted, it will then be for the County Court to decide whether the tenant should be evicted in this case.

4.29. The Council has said that the press notice announcing the notice of eviction was issued in order to be transparent and to show leadership in a crisis. It was, in that sense, a political decision and should be judged on a political basis.

Page 33 of 80 Section 5

What was the impact on local businesses and local residents?

5.1. The impact of the disorder on the shops and businesses damaged on 7 and 8 August was immediate and dramatic. A total of 109 were affected in Wandsworth, 9 in Tooting on 7 August, 90 in Clapham Junction, 8 in Balham and 2 in Putney. 25 shops and businesses were extensively damaged, one, the Party Shop on Lavender Hill was destroyed by fire. The Council has estimated the overall cost of the damage to be between £5m and £10m.

5.2. On 9 August, the affected areas of St. John’s Road and Lavender Hill were closed for trading purposes, first because of the police work to gather evidence from a crime scene, second because of the clean-up that was then necessary. 14 shops were boarded up on 9 and 10 August. Many shops across Wandsworth, and elsewhere in London, closed early on 9 August because of the rumours that there would be more trouble that evening.

5.3. The loss of trading income has not been calculated but clearly will have been significant for the shops and businesses concerned. Most were insured and I have set out the support which the Council has provided for independent businesses in Section 4 of this report.

5.4. For almost all the businesses affected, the priority has been to return to business as usual as soon as possible. Many of those which suffered relatively minor damage were open again on 10 August, most of those with more serious damage re-opened by the end of the week. The Party Shop has reopened on a temporary basis within Debenhams and will shortly move into the building next door.

5.5. It is still early to assess whether there will be any long-term impact on shops and restaurants in Clapham Junction. Some of those I heard from report that trade has largely returned to normal; others that it is significantly lower than they would expect at this time of year. They welcome the support that independent businesses have received from the Council in dealing with the consequences of the disorder. Some were optimistic that one effect of the disorder might be to draw businesses in the area more closely together, to encourage shop owners and staff to talk more to each other than they had done before. The Council will wish to support the recovery of businesses in the area and I shall return to this in my recommendations below.

5.6. There is still unhappiness about the sense of abandonment by the Police for many of those whose shops and businesses were most directly affected. It will be important for the Police to continue to maintain as high a level of visibility as possible and to continue their engagement with shops and businesses.

5.7. The direct impact of the disorder on residents was limited, though many were frightened and very disturbed both by the scenes of looting in St. John’s Road and Lavender Hill, and by the sight of stolen goods deposited in their

Page 34 of 80 streets and then driven away in cars and vans in the course of the evening of 8 August. A number of local residents have written to me, to express their continuing anxiety about what happened and the risk that it might happen again. Others have commented on how quickly the impact passed and the area appeared to return to normal.

5.8. The most striking impact of the response by local residents was in the numbers that turned out to help clean up on 9 August, the broom army of 400 or more volunteers. For most of those who joined in, the main motivation was a powerful commitment to put right what had been done to their area, and to their community. Similarly, most of those who left messages on the board outside Debenhams over the following days wanted to emphasise their support for the local community, and their outrage at the disorder. A Battersea Buzz event was organised on 20 August at which thirty local people came to talk about what had happened and what they could do to support the community in future. There has been limited follow-up since but the Council may wish to look at what can be done to build on this aspect of the response – see Section 6 below.

5.9. For those who were most affected by the disorder, Victim Support has offered its help. The agency wrote to all local businesses and residents, to inform them about the support available, including emotional and practical support and to offer information and advocacy where needed. No businesses have asked for help but four residents have been given support, including emotional support, information about financial assistance following damage to property and help with an application to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority.

5.10. The Police have said how grateful they are to local residents for the help they have provided with identifying people who took part in the disorder, with photographs and records of car registration numbers. I too have been very grateful to all those who have attended the public meetings held during the review or who have come to talk to me or written to me, with their memories of what happened, their views on the reasons and their suggestions on what should be done to reduce the risk of it happening again. They have wanted to help because they care about their community and the place they live or work in.

Page 35 of 80 Section 6

Recommendations to Wandsworth Council and others for action and further examination

6.1. I set out in this section my recommendations for action which I hope will reduce the risk that disorder like that in Clapham Junction will happen again. They are primarily for the Police and for Wandsworth Council, but I will also address some issues which are also for the Government to consider.

6.2. Many people in the course of the review have said that the events of 6, 7 and 8 August in Wandsworth and across London will not be repeated for many years, if ever. I hope that they are right but it seems to me clear that there are important lessons to be learned from what happened and that there are steps which the Council and the Police can take that will reduce the risk of a recurrence in the future.

Recommendations for the Police.

6.3. Intelligence and information. The information available to the Acting Borough Commander in the early evening of Monday 8 August was “scrappy and unreliable” and did not provide a basis on which the subsequent disorder could be anticipated with confidence. Yet, people who were monitoring Twitter and other social networks that day were increasingly certain that there would be trouble in Clapham Junction. There were some attempts to contact the Police to warn them.

6.4. I recognise that it is very difficult to decide how much reliance to place on social networks; there seem to have been equally strong rumours about areas where trouble did not follow. It was also exceptionally difficult to keep track of all the calls coming into the Police that day; 20,000 across London compared with a normal figure of 5,000. But senior police officers have said that they need to give much more attention to social networks and how to monitor them.

6.5. Recommendation 1. I recommend that the Police should review their information and intelligence systems, in the light of the disorder on 6, 7 and 8 August, in particular the use they make of social networks sites and the way they handle large numbers of calls from the public about public order emergencies.

6.6. Relations with the business community. It will take time to restore good relations between the Police and the business community in Clapham Junction, and other areas. For some of those most seriously affected, it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to do so. Others have accepted that, in the circumstances they faced on 8 August, the Police had no alternative but to withdraw when they did and that a confrontation with the large numbers involved in the disorder might well have made things worse.

Page 36 of 80 6.7. Many businesses are unhappy that the Police do not, on a day-to-day basis, give a high priority to dealing with thefts of property, in particular shoplifting. It is inevitable that the Police will have to prioritise the demands on their time. But senior officers in Wandsworth have gone out to talk to many business people since the disorder and a higher level of visibility on the part of senior officers, as well as ‘bobbies on the beat’, will contribute to higher level of confidence and give business people the chance to discuss their concerns.

6.8. Recommendation 2. I recommend that senior officers should continue to spend as much time as they can with shop owners and managers and other business people in Clapham Junction and discuss with them their plans for policing in the future.

6.9. Dealing with disorder. It is clear that there were not enough public order trained police available to deal with the disorder in Clapham Junction on 8 August. One sergeant and seven constables could not cope with 300 people at 9pm, let alone the subsequent total of 450 – most of them intent on looting, some ready to throw stones and bottles. It then took a long time for trained reinforcements to arrive and take to the streets, after the Borough Commander’s first request at 8pm. It was 10.38pm before the new group of 75 police began to regain control of the area.

6.10. The number of police officers with public order training and the ability of the Police to respond quickly to requests for assistance from trouble spots will be major issues for the review which Assistant Commissioner Owens is carrying out following the disorder across London. It is essential that these issues are addressed in good time before the London Olympics in 2012. It may be that there is little chance of a repeat of the events of August this year but London must be fully prepared in case of trouble during the Olympics.

6.11. Recommendation 3. I recommend that the Metropolitan Police review give urgent priority to a re-assessment of the numbers of police with public order training and equipment at levels 1 and 2, and to the ability of the police control system to respond immediately to requests for assistance, if and when disorder breaks out.

6.12. Reducing the influence of gangs. The extent of gang organisation and influence in the disorder of 8 August will not be fully assessed until the court cases against those charged have been completed, and the work of other reviews and research can be considered. There are some who believe that the extent of gang activity in Wandsworth is overstated and the degree of organisation in the disorder itself much exaggerated. On the other hand, the Police’s present view is that there was a significant element of organisation in the looting that evening. Many of those I heard from in the course of the review are worried about the continuing existence of the gangs in Battersea and Tooting and their influence on the lives of many young people.

6.13. The Police have been dealing with gangs in Battersea and Tooting for many years and I understand that they have had considerable success in the last three years in securing the conviction of a substantial number of leading

Page 37 of 80 figures in the gangs. But it seems clear that the gang culture is still powerful, not just during events such as the disorder on 8 August. It will take concerted action by the Police and the Council and others, including central government to reduce the influence of the gangs. The disorder of 8 August is a reminder to all of us how important that action is.

6.14. Recommendation 4. I recommend that the Police and Wandsworth Council, with the support of central Government, should develop a long- term programme of action both to bring to justice those responsible for criminal behaviour and to reduce the influence of the gangs on the areas where they operate.

Recommendations for the Council.

6.15. Reducing the influence of gangs. My first recommendation for the Council is the same as no. 4 for the Police. Wandsworth Council cannot, by itself, tackle the gang culture which exists in its area, nor the social and economic conditions which help to sustain it. But it does seem likely that the gangs were a factor in the events of 8 August and that their influence is a pernicious one for young people and others in the Borough affected by it.

6.16. The Council should look at the actions it might take to reduce the influence of the gangs, for example in the design of its housing estates, the provision of more public areas such as the square on the Doddington Estate, its support for residents’ associations and the provision of sports and other facilities for young people. None of this will be successful immediately but these and other steps, together with action by the Police may be effective over time.

6.17. Recommendation 4 (again). I recommend that the Police and Wandsworth Council, with the support of central government, should develop a long-term programme of action both to bring to justice those responsible for criminal behaviour and to reduce the influence of the gangs on the areas where they operate.

6.18. The Family Recovery Project. The Council has committed itself to participation in the Family Recovery Project which will coordinate the support of a number of public sector agencies for families with severe problems. The estimated cost is £30,000 a year, per family, and Wandsworth will target 30 families in the first year of the project.

6.19. This programme was tested with some success in Westminster and is now being piloted in a number of areas, including Wandsworth. The hope is that it will save up to £200,000 a year for each family supported if the demands which the families concerned currently make on the health service, the benefit system, the Police and the Prison Service can be reduced. It is clearly essential that it should be sustainable beyond the year of targeted support. If it is, it will address a number of the social problems that may have been factors for those who participated in the disorder.

Page 38 of 80

6.20. Recommendation 5. I recommend that the Council gives its full support to the Family Recovery Project, and maintains that support beyond the initial year if it is successful. It is essential that the Government Departments concerned also give their practical support to the programme.

6.21. Community Engagement. There are two areas of community engagement to which I recommend that the Council should give priority in the aftermath of the disorder. The first concerns ethnic and religious communities, in Tooting and Battersea, which have little connection with either the Council or the Police at the moment. Some of these communities were not represented among those involved in the disorder on 8 August; others were. But a lack of interaction between minority communities and the Council may give rise to other problems in the future. This is not a one-sided issue, the leaders of the communities also have a responsibility to engage more fully with the Council if the invitation is offered.

6.22. The second opportunity for community engagement follows the community response to the disorder, in the broom army and the Battersea Buzz event. There is a risk that the level of interest generated there will drift away if the Council does not try to maintain and develop it, with further community meetings, social events and a programme of action that people who are interested in can join. Such attempts to promote community engagement may be difficult to sustain in big cities like London but a serious attempt to do so now would recognise the positive value of the response by the broom army, and its potential.

6.23. Recommendation 6. I recommend that the Council should commit itself to programmes of community engagement with the ethnic and religious communities in the Borough and to build on the enthusiasm and community spirit shown by the broom army on 9 August.

6.24. Business recovery. The Council has a recovery coordination group in place, to develop a coordinated strategy for the recovery of the community. One aspect of that is business recovery and it seems to me essential that a plan should be developed and implemented very quickly, with the active participation of shops and other businesses in Clapham Junction. Its aims should be to build on the new willingness of businesses in the area to come together and to address the risk that some of them may take a long time to recover from the disorder. A relaunch in time for Christmas would be an ambitious but worthwhile target.

6.25. Recommendation 7. I recommend that the Council and its partners, in close consultation with the shops and businesses in Clapham Junction, should develop and implement a relaunch plan for the area, to celebrate its recovery from the disorder and its potential for the future, in time for Christmas.

Page 39 of 80 6.26. Communications within the Council. In Section 4 of my report, I described the difficulties in communication within the Council and between the Council and the Police, in particular on 9 August. The best communications system cannot make up for lack of information, which was the main problem on 9 August for people worried about further violence. But it does seem that the processes in place did not make communication across the Council as effective as it could have been.

6.27. Recommendation 8. I recommend that the Council establish a communications hub, to be activated in the event of future emergencies, to provide a focus for information to be channelled in from all Council departments and from the Police and other agencies outside, and to provide a source of consistent information to those who need it. It should be developed as part of a review of the emergency plan.

6.28. Review of emergency planning. The Council’s emergency planning systems seem to have worked reasonably well on 8 and 9 August and to have supported a well-regarded response by the Council overall. They did not, however, ensure that some of the Council’s front-line staff, in particular the town centre managers and some youth workers, were given support and advice at crucial moments. Nor did the plan anticipate the appearance of a large number of volunteers in the broom army on 9 August, though the managers concerned seem to have adapted quickly to cope with this unforeseen development.

6.29. No emergency plan can provide for every contingency or cater for every member of staff in an organisation the size of Wandsworth Council. It does seem to me, however, that there should be an expectation that those whose role it is to coordinate the Council’s response should ensure that the key front- line staff, in this case the Town Centre Managers, are offered advice and support from the beginning.

6.30. Recommendation 9. I recommend that the Council should review its emergency plan in the light of the disorder and its aftermath, to ensure that flexibility should be built into the response systems and that front-line staff, whoever they may be, are given support and advice as soon as possible.

Neil Kinghan 29 September 2011

Page 40 of 80 Annex 1

Independent Review

Terms of Reference

- to review the disturbances of 8 August (and other days) in Clapham Junction and elsewhere in Wandsworth;

- to consider local factors which contributed to those disturbances;

- to review the response of the Police and other emergency services and of Wandsworth Council;

- to examine the impact on local residents and local businesses;

- to make recommendations to Wandsworth Council and others for immediate action and for further examination.

Page 41 of 80 Annex 2 Independent Review

Interviewees

MPs, emergency services and the public

Jane Ellison MP for Battersea Sadiq Khan MP for Tooting Justine Greening MP for Putney Richard Tracey GLA Member for Merton and Wandsworth Kit Malthouse Deputy to the Mayor of London Catherine Crawford Chief Executive, Metropolitan Police Authority David Musker Former Borough Commander, Chief Superintendent Gerry Campbell Acting Borough Commander, Superintendent Dawn Morris Superintendent Julian Spooner Fire Station Manager, Battersea Fire Station Mac Downes Secretary, Doddington & Rollo Community Assoc. David Smith Chair, Connor Court Residents’ Association Marlene Price Chair of York Road Resident's Association Valerie Moore JP and Northcote resident Steve Howlett Chief Executive, Peabody HA James Mummery Local resident Jackie Coward Local resident Philip Beddows Resident and ex-councillor Michael Local resident Sarah Banham Chair, Clapham Junction Town Centre Partnership Rev. Paul Perkin Vicar, St. Mark’s Church Michael Ham Manager, Wimpys Duncan Mundel Owner, The Party Shop Jenny Howes Duty Manager, Debenhams Enzo Giarratano Owner, Ocean Hairdressers Scott Thwaites Manager, Clapham Junction Station Shopping Centre Pamela Price Manager, Wessex House Night Club Adrian Thompson Store Manager, JD Sports Peter Momodou Ndow Assistant Manager, Pizza Express Sue Rimmer Principal, South Thames College Battersea Area Housing 12 representatives from residents’ associations Panel meeting Youth Group, Tooting 16 young people, 3 youth workers Hub Youth Group, 10 young people, 2 youth workers, 2 NatCen Providence House, researchers Battersea Youth Workers Meeting 11 youth workers Focus group facilitated 4 local residents, including one councillor by National Centre for Social Research

Page 42 of 80 Council Members and Officers

Councillor R. Govindia Leader of the Council Councillor J. Cook Shaftesbury ward councillor, Deputy Leader of the Council Councillor P. Dawson Northcote ward councillor Councillor J. Cousins Cabinet Member Councillor Mrs. Usher Balham ward councillor Councillor Mrs. K. Cabinet Member Tracey Councillor R. Osborne Leader of the Opposition Councillor T. Belton Latchmere ward councillor Councillor M. Thomas Furzedown ward councillor Councillor Ms. Boswell Tooting ward councillor Paul Martin Chief Executive & Director of Administration, Wandsworth Council Roy Evans Director of Housing Ian Stewart Head of Housing Management Marc Howell Area Housing Manager Martin Byrne Area Housing Manager Kevin Power Asst. Director – Operational Services (DTS) Edmund Checkley Emergency Planning Manager Stewart Low Head of Community Safety Sean Dunkling Asst. Director – Young People & Learning Virginia Wall Head of Youth Work Michele Harris Family Recovery Project Manager/Head of Youth Support Robert Musgrave Senior Youth Worker Mike Brook Economic Development Officer Lorinda Freint Clapham Junction Town Centre Manager Debbie Western Deputy Head of Emergency Planning Audrey Helps Tooting Town Centre Manager Nicola Grant Wandsworth Town Centre Manager Kim Sullivan Balham Town Centre Manager Peter Robinson Asst. Director of Leisure & Amenity Services Liz Rees Head of Policy Eyvind Ryans Communication Officer

Page 43 of 80 Annex 3

Notes of Public Meetings in Battersea, Tooting and Wandsworth

Notes of meeting held as part of the above review at Battersea Arts Centre, Lavender Hill, SW11 on Monday, 12th September 2011 at 6.30 p.m.

PRESENT

Neil Kinghan, independent commissioner appointed by Wandsworth Borough Council Chairing the meeting. Paul Martin, Chief Executive and Director of Administration, Wandsworth Borough Council. Acting Borough Commander Gerry Campbell, Metropolitan Police Superintendent Dawn Morris, Metropolitan Police.

Wandsworth Council Members

Councillor Tony Belton – (Latchmere Ward) Councillor Peter Dawson – (Northcote Ward) Councillor Vanessa Graham – (Fairfield Ward) Councillor Simon Hogg – (Latchmere Ward) Councillor Elizabeth Howlett – (West Hill Ward) Councillor Sarah McDermott - (Nightingale Ward) Councillor Charles McNaught-Davis – (Earlsfield Ward) Councillor Jo-Anne Nadler – (Queenstown Ward) Councillor Guy Senior – (Shaftesbury Ward) Councillor Wendy Speck – (Latchmere Ward) Councillor Stuart Thom – (Fairfield Ward) Councillor Mark Thomas – (Furzedown)

Jane Ellison MP was also present. Approximately 55 members of the public attended the meeting.

INTRODUCTION

Before asking the members of the public present to give their views or to ask questions, Mr. Kinghan introduced himself, Paul Martin and Acting Borough Commander Campbell; who also briefly introduced themselves.

Page 44 of 80 Mr. Kinghan said he had already held discussions with the Council, Police, local residents and local business owners all of whose views would be considered in coming to the recommendations that the report would make. It is intended that the report will be concluded and published by the end of October 2011.

Paul Martin commented that the events of early August were without precedent and that he hoped they would never be repeated. He said the Council had commissioned the review in order to learn from the events and hopefully draw the correct lessons. He said the Council is seeking three things from the review; firstly it hoped that Mr. Kinghan would produce an accurate and factual record of the events that took place and the effect of them on the local community and businesses. Secondly the Council wanted to record the views of local people as well as those of the police, businesses and faith groups. Thirdly it will look at the roles and responsibilities of the Council in the local and wider community. This includes its role in maintaining an emergency plan for the Borough. Mr. Martin noted that the present plan takes no account of the effect of social media; something which was clearly central to the recent disturbances. It will also look at its role as a provider of services, such as assisting with the cleaning up operation, providing access to funding where necessary and helping to re-establish businesses affected by the disturbances. Finally the Council will also look to its community leadership responsibilities.

Acting Commander Campbell then took the opportunity also to thank all those at the meeting, and emphasised that their views would count. He said that the Metropolitan Police were also undertaking a strategic review of the events in order to look at the management of the disturbances, the use of social media by those involved in the lawlessness and the use of intelligence by the police and to embed for the future any lessons learnt. He recognised, given that 109 businesses across the Borough had been hit, that many people had been affected by the events either directly or indirectly. Acting commander Campbell said the disturbances had affected 22 of the 32 London boroughs. He said that decision making in such circumstances is extremely challenging and he thanked the public and businesses for the level of support they had shown to the police, adding that police bravery had been widely matched by that of the public. He said that at the peak, there were some 350 people involved in the disturbances in Wandsworth. Across London there were some 1200 crime scenes being investigated and 20,000 hours of CCTV footage being reviewed in the pursuit of evidence. Within the Borough, Acting Commander Campbell said there were currently 128 crimes being investigated. He said there had been 147 arrests made so far, with the age profile of those arrested being between 14 and 53 – the average age of a suspect being 24, of those arrested 88% were already known to the police.

Mr. Kinghan then invited the views of those present at the meeting.

Page 45 of 80 ISSUES RAISED

The first speaker commented that while he appreciated that everyone had been shocked at the events that had taken place; he was extremely concerned at what he considered was a disproportionate response by the Council in seeking to evict the family of a youth involved in the disturbances. He considered that the youth had been caught up in the events, as many had been, and that whilst he should answer for his actions the response of the Council in evicting the whole family was draconian.

Councillor Belton endorsed this view, adding that the youth in question had been unknown to the police prior to his arrest and he considered that, however stupidly the youth had acted; the Council’s response is wrong in the extreme and if followed across London would result in some 500 additional homeless families. He said that whilst the youth should obviously have to face the courts, evicting the whole family was a pointless and expensive exercise.

Another resident said she had initially, in the heat of the events, considered such an eviction to be the right action to take, but had subsequently come to the conclusion that it was not.

Another member of the audience asked about the level of provision of facilities for young people and suggested that if they were higher fewer young people might have become involved in the disturbances.

One person commented that the Council appeared to have a poor attitude toward children and young people, citing as an example its intention albeit subsequently withdrawn, to charge for use of one of the playgrounds in Battersea Park.

A Battersea resident who had moved to the area from South Africa said that the disturbances had given her the opportunity to engage more with the local community; becoming involved in helping children with their homework and in helping young people with finding employment. She said she would like to see some of the elements of the South African education system brought into use in Britain, such as teaching life skills, encouraging enterprise and mentoring of young people by local businesses. Such teaching, she said, shows children the relevance of what they are being taught in their formal education. In conclusion she said that young people need role models they can respect and who demonstrate some morality, but that the actions of MPs and bankers in recent times had singularly failed them in this respect.

One resident asked whether it was true that a number of police from Battersea and Wandsworth had been drafted to other areas of London prior to the disturbances breaking out in Clapham Junction.

Page 46 of 80 RESPONSE

Responding to these initial points, Mr. Martin said that some of the comments showed why this review was important, and that good things can come out of bad events, out of a crisis comes the opportunity to do better. Turning to individual comments, he said he did not believe there was a lack of facilities for young people in the Borough, adding that as Acting Commander Campbell had already pointed out, young children only formed a small cohort of the people involved in the disturbances. Mr. Martin commented that it was important to focus on and invest in whole families as part of the recovery process. He then addressed the issue of eviction of families where a member of the family had been involved in law breaking. He explained that the Council’s tenancy agreements all contain a clause warning tenants of the likelihood of eviction where a family member is involved in criminality. Mr. Martin said that in the case being raised the Council was simply invoking the clause in line with its long established policy of holding tenants to the agreement. He said he realised the action was controversial, but that ultimately the decision to evict lay with the courts.

Mr. Kinghan then invited further comments from the audience.

A resident of Lavender Sweep question the lack of response by the police, he said that Acting Commander Campbell had claimed that there was a lack of specific intelligence prior to the disturbances breaking out, but said he had been told by a police officer on the ground on the night that there was specific intelligence that trouble was in the offing. He asked whether it was considered acceptable that residents should be left unprotected.

A faith group representative asked whether they could become involved with the Gold group saying that healing was an important part of any response to the disturbances.

Reference was made to the Wandsworth Youth Offending Team who are making use of restorative justice; bringing together young people involved in the rioting with those that were affected. The speaker commented that many of the young people involved had considered it ‘a bit of a laugh’ for half an hour or so.

A resident of the Falcon Estate commented that reference kept being made to young people and their involvement and whether this might have been reduced if there were more facilities available for them, but no reference was being made to the involvement of older people who were encouraging and influencing the younger elements.

One attendee asked whether the police are intending to review the use stop and search.

Page 47 of 80 Councillor Belton asked whether it was true that the Fire Station in Este Road had been closed on the night of 8th/9th August, and Councillor Dawson asked when the Fire Service had been advised that disturbances were likely.

RESPONSES

Acting Commander Campbell replied that at the time the disturbances broke out in Wandsworth, 52 officers had been deployed to other areas of London; 4 being in the London Control Centre. He said that as events unfolded it became clear that the 350 suspects would overwhelm the police resources available in the Borough at that time.

He said the overall deployment of police officers across London is part of the review being undertaken by the police.

Referring to the reference made to the Gold Group, Acting Commander Campbell explained that the Group comprises senior police officers; together with other stakeholders and that they hold an advisory role. He said the involvement of faiths representatives in the Group was something to consider for the future.

He also said the involvement of older people in the events was being considered with all other elements. In addition the likelihood that older people who were not involved would now feel more concerned at going out was also being addressed by the police.

Referring then to Stop and Search, Acting Commander Campbell said this was one of a variety of powers available to the police, some of which require an officer to have reasonable suspicion of a person’s intentions. Section 60 of the Criminal Justice Act however, does not require such grounds, but its use has to be authorised by an officer of commander rank or above.

He said he had first authorised its use at 3.20a.m. on Monday, 8th August and had retained this authority until 8.45a.m. on Friday, 12th August, making him one of the first Commanders in London to relinquish the power. He added that he was well aware that the power is widely disliked and that officers who had been drafted in from other authorities had been briefed on how it was being applied in the Borough. Acting Commander Campbell said he was not in a position to respond as to whether the Fire Station was closed or not.

Mr. Kinghan then invited further comments from the audience.

A member of the Battersea and Wandsworth Trades Council asked how the Council thought the collective punishment of a whole family was going to help prevent riots in the future. He went on to ask the police representative if it was true that there had been 200/300 young people outside Lavender Hill Police Station, and that if this was the case why there was such anger against the police. He referred to the riots of 1981 and the subsequent report by Lord Scarman that had referred to a breakdown between young people and the

Page 48 of 80 police. He said context had to be found for the recent violence and looting because sustainable solutions have to be found. He urged Mr. Kinghan in drawing up his report; not to jump to the pat conclusions that those involved simply wanted a new plasma tv or ipad, but to realise that there is considerable racial feeling against the police.

Councillor Thom; referring to the fact that during and after the initial looting; stolen items were being placed in gardens and other locations and arrangements then being made to have them collected by others; asked how many of the serious criminals who were clearly organising these drops were being caught by the police.

Councillor Dawson asked how many officers trained in dealing with public disorder were available and how they were deployed, because on the night in question there was a sense of abandonment felt by many of the community.

One person commented that she had a sense of horror and dismay at what had occurred, but was personally very relieved at the manner in which the police had addressed the situation. She said it was particularly noticeable that they had avoided inflaming an already dangerous situation. She further commented that the police had in general made great strides in their dealings with the public over the last 30 years. Continuing, she said there was a deep sense of unfairness in society that had built up over recent years, citing as the clearest recent examples the MPs expenses scandal and the crisis brought about by the greed and incompetence of bankers. In both cases she said the impression was that little or no real consequences were suffered by either group, whist the rest of society was paying for the mistakes. As others had stated earlier, she considered it completely wrong that whole families should be punished, saying rather that they should be helped, but that Council resources for such assistance were being cut. She also considered that describing any group of people as feral was outrageous and more suited to the language of Hitler and the Third Reich.

A shop owner in the area considered that much that had been said was quite insulting to many residents. He felt that the police should have some sort of rapid response unit so that potential trouble could be nipped in the bud.

Jane Ellison MP (Battersea) commented that she had already made a submission to the review, but wished to state that the fire station in Este Road had been open and operational, indeed the fire service more widely across London were frustrated that they could not get more quickly to some areas.

RESPONSES

Acting Commander Campbell said he could not confirm the claim that there were 200/300 people gathered outside Lavender Hill Police Station and that if there were it would be of great concern. He considered that the question as to whether the police were being specifically targeted was a much wider matter and outside the scope of this review.

Page 49 of 80

Referring then to the causes for the disturbances, Acting Commander Campbell emphasised that whilst it was right and proper that sustainable solutions are identified as to the causes, it was equally important not to lose site of the fact that across the Borough 109 premises had been attacked or looted.

He commented that of those arrested during and following the disturbances, 88% had been arrested before, and of those subsequently prosecuted 91% were already known to the police and criminal justice system.

Acting Commander Campbell said that the core objectives of the Police Service to protect life and property had not altered since they were established in1829.

He then referred to the questions regarding officers trained in dealing with public order. Commander Campbell explained that on the night in question there had been 1 sergeant and 7 constables available in the Borough who had the relevant training and that in the early stages they faced a daunting task given the numbers they were facing. Following requests for assistance there were eventually 100 public order trained officers deployed in the Borough, together with armoured Land Rovers.

Commenting on teams of specially trained officers who could ‘nip trouble in the bud’ Acting Commander Campbell said that possibility was being considered as part of the separate review being undertaken by the police, as was the use of social networking sites by the offenders to rapidly mobilise groups of people. Mr. Kinghan then sought further comments form the audience.

A Battersea resident said that following the disturbances, there had been a suggestion from the Prime Minister that social networking sites should be shut down during such events. He considered this response to be wrong, because social media was also used by people to let families know that they were safe, and it was also used extensively in organising the subsequent clean up. He said he was looking for a thoughtful and considered response, not the usual knee jerk action. Technology, he said, is neutral.

Another commented that whilst technology was now being used more, word of mouth contact remained important and could still be very rapid. She said that Britain has a long tradition of rioting and while agreeing that a rapid and firm response is necessary, commented that if the response is too firm the situation is only inflamed.

Councillor McDermott criticised the police response to disturbances in Balham, saying that many residents had felt left out in the cold as officers had been moved to Battersea. She said there was much that could be done to ensure that young people caught with the events do not become involved with the justice system again. She concluded by asking what had happened to personal morality nowadays.

Page 50 of 80

Another speaker said that the disturbances should not be referred to as riots; he said rioting is normally associated with a political purpose, whereas in this case it was simply a matter of looting and theft.

Another speaker commented that many positive things have come from riots in the past as they usually had a particular purpose, but she agreed with the previous speaker that in this case it was straightforward lawbreaking with no purpose beyond thieving and it was therefore incorrect to refer to rioting.

One resident thought it all came down to opportunism and people jumping on a bandwagon and that it had to be dealt by the criminal justice system.

One speaker noted that most of the audience were white and middle class, and asked where the people involved in the disturbances were. He said this was a clear example of the lack of engagement between different elements of society.

Another commented that the various speakers had mostly taken one of two positions, either looking at it as simple criminality or there being some underlying cause. He said it was not a black and white issue, but that there were elements of both and that it is important that both are addressed.

The earlier speaker from the Battersea and Wandsworth Trades Council said he was surprised that the police representative was unable to clarify the situation at Lavender Hill Police Station. Continuing, he agreed that there had obviously been criminality, but did not consider it to be a race matter, but more a reaction to impoverishment and a lack of youth provision. He agreed with earlier speakers who had spoken of a lack of morality at all levels of society.

The final speaker said he had come to Clapham Junction at the most intense point of the disorder and had found it very moving seeing a small group of police officers facing such a huge crowd. He said they had shown extraordinary bravery and that it was awful to think of what might have happened to them given what we know has happened in the past. He said that during the disorder he had felt a chilling sense of a complete breakdown of the rule of law, something he said he had never thought would happen in Britain In conclusion he said that the absolute basis of our democracy is the rule of law and that if we lose it, as is beginning to happen, we have nothing.

RESPONSES

Acting Commander Campbell responded that many good things had come out of these bad events, such as the way the community had come forward to help with the clean up. He said that an immense level of support had been shown toward the police following the disturbances and that for this he was truly grateful.

Page 51 of 80 He said that the public had also been of great help in supplying information and intelligence; such has where stolen property was being left for later collection by others, vehicle registrations and images of offenders or vehicles .Acting Commander Campbell said some of this had led directly to the conviction of those concerned. Regarding Lavender Hill Police Station, he said that it had not been damaged and there had been no forced entry, but that he would nonetheless look into this claim. In conclusion, he confirmed that the causes and the recovery from the events are key points of the Gold review and thanked everyone for coming.

Mr. Kinghan then thanked all those who had attended for the manner in which they had expressed their views and had also listened to other speakers politely.

The meeting ended at 8.39p.m.

Page 52 of 80 Notes of meeting held as part of the above review at the Samaj Hall, 26b Tooting High Street, SW17 0RG on Tuesday, 13th September 2011 at 6.30 p.m.

PRESENT

Neil Kinghan, independent commissioner appointed by Wandsworth Borough Council, chairing the meeting. Paul Martin, Chief Executive and Director of Administration, Wandsworth Borough Council. Acting Borough Commander Gerry Campbell, Metropolitan Police Superintendent Dawn Morris, Metropolitan Police.

Wandsworth Council Members

Councillor Claire Clay – (Wandsworth Common Ward) Councillor James Daley – (Tooting Ward) Councillor Andy Gibbons – (Graveney Ward) Councillor Angela Graham – (Earlsfield Ward) Councillor John Locker – (Bedford Ward) Councillor Matthew Maxwell Scott - (Earlsfield Ward) Councillor Rex Osborn – (Graveney Ward) Councillor Mark Thomas – (Furzedown Ward)

Approximately 10 members of the public attended the meeting.

INTRODUCTION

Before asking the members of the public present to give their views or to ask questions, Mr. Kinghan introduced himself, Paul Martin and Acting Borough Commander Campbell, who also briefly introduced themselves.

Mr. Kinghan explained that the purpose of the review into the disturbances that took place on the 8th and 9th August 2011 was to produce a record of what happened, to consider what local factors there may have been to explain the disorder, to review the response of the police and the Council and to look at the impact of the disorder on local businesses and residents. He said the report he was producing would take account of views expressed at the three public meetings being held; of which this was the second, as well as from two drop-in sessions being held at Battersea Library. Mr. Kinghan said he had already held discussions with the Council, Police, local residents and local business owners all of whose views would be considered in coming to the recommendations that the report would make. It was intended that the report would be concluded and published by the end of October 2011.

Paul Martin commented that the events of early August were both significant and without precedent and that it was therefore right that the Council should

Page 53 of 80 reflect on their implications in a considered and objective way. He said the Council was seeking three things from the review; firstly it hoped that Mr. Kinghan would produce an accurate and factual record of the events that took place and the effect of them on the local community and businesses. Secondly, the Council wanted to record the views of local people as well as those of the police, businesses and others. Thirdly, it would look at how the Council and other relevant agencies had responded to the events and whether there were lessons for the future. In relation to the Council, this would include its role in maintaining an emergency plan for the Borough (eg. should it reflect the increasing role of social media); its role as a provider of services, such as assisting with the cleaning up operation, providing access to funding where necessary and helping to re-establish businesses affected by the disturbances; and also the Council’s community leadership responsibilities.

He said that at the peak, there were some 350 people involved in the disturbances in Wandsworth. Across London there were some 1200 crime scenes being investigated and 20,000 hours of CCTV footage being reviewed in the pursuit of evidence. Within the Borough, Acting Commander Campbell said there were currently 128 crimes being investigated. He said there had been 147 arrests made so far, with the age profile of those arrested being between 14 and 53 – the average age of a suspect being 24, of those arrested 88% were already known to the police.

Mr. Kinghan then invited the views of those present at the meeting.

ISSUES RAISED

A member of the public questioned the Police claims that they had no intelligence that Clapham Junction would be a target of looting and disorder, when they had be discussing this possibility with traders in Tooting on the afternoon of 8th August and Police officers had been bussed from there presumably to tackle situations in other areas of the Borough. This had left Tooting with only 4 PCSOs and one special constable for that evening/night, at a time when large groups of youths were to be seen travelling around the

Page 54 of 80 area in cars. He referred to claims made a few years ago by a senior Police officer that there was no gang problem in Tooting, yet there had been a number of murders since and recently, the stabbing of a woman in Derington Road. He alleged that the Police preferred to deal with businesses in the area rather than residents and he felt they had a communications problem with the community. He referred to the use of Police officers from other forces, such as Kent, and the impression that these officers were actually more community-focused than local officers. He also queried whether the PCC inquiry into the Mark Duggan shooting could credibly be regarded as independent.

Another member of the public felt it was important for the social context of the disorder to be considered. He referred to his work with up to 30 local community leaders who were largely disconnected from civic society in the Borough even though they were the leaders of, say, faith communities with large numbers of local residents. He argued that the official and established civic structures were not engaging with these real communities. The resident also underlined the social and economic disadvantages suffered in parts of these communities which had the effect of reinforcing their alienation from established structures and democratic processes; often they had been deterred from engagement by suffering racism and other forms of discrimination. He considered that the review would not be effective and useful unless it recognised these cultural factors.

A local businessman, explained his involvement in the Tooting Town Centre Panel, the local crime prevention panel and the Tooting Network. He felt the disorder had been characterised by its violence and the degree of organisation in the looting of shops. He said that local traders had become aware of threats and risks through local intelligence, and when the word had spread, a number of shops had closed. It appeared that some 8 or 10 shops had been looted in Tooting. Local businesses were working to resolve issues in the area affecting them all, such as shopper parking, but the disorder of early was something outside their previous experience.

Another local businessman, had been the victim of the disorder when his corner shop was attacked. Initially, although covered by a good CCTV system, two looters had tried to force entry, and had then been joined by others until eventually 11 people were trying to break in, causing damage to grilles, windows and walls. There was no question that the attack was organised and targeted. He had been pleased with the Police’s active response since the event; this had included analysis of CCTV images to identify the culprits and ongoing contact/support from a Police officer. However, this contrasted with his experience two years before when, after a car had been driven into his shop window, he had failed to get any meaningful response from the Police and had been told it was simply an insurance matter. He also referred to his attempts to report suspicious surveillance of jewellery shops by possible burglars, when he had had to resort to ringing 999 to contact the Police. So he did consider than communications by the Police could be improved.

Page 55 of 80 A local resident felt that the review should seek to understand the socio- economic background to the disorder without exonerating the crimes. He out the estimated cost of the disorder nationally, £140m, in the context of the estimated financial loss to the country of the banking crisis of some £350 billion. He felt that the cuts in such areas as child benefit, tax credits, EMA and the Connexions service, al had an effect on the causes of the disorder. In response, another member of the public stated that there should be “zero tolerance” for looters and that the Police should adopt policies of challenging them when there was a risk to property.

RESPONSES

Responding to these initial points, Acting Borough Commander Campbell stated that there had only been a couple of social media references to Tooting and Balham in the Police intelligence reports of 8th August, and in fact, there had been no clear, actionable reports of the risk of looting, rioting or disorder anywhere in the Borough on that day. The Borough had five town centres and comprised 13 square miles, so it would be very difficult to deal with the competing claims to respond to reports of disorder as they happened. The Police had used plain clothes officers in spotting roles. He also reported that positive action was being taken in respect of the perpetrator of the Derington Road stabbing, and he would ensure that the outcome was communicated locally at the appropriate time.

Acting Commander Campbell accepted that there was an issue about effective communications with the community. In respect of gangs, he had a specific responsibility for the Police response locally and he was absolutely committed to tackling the problem. He reported that, in fact, there had been a number of arrests of gang members and this had had an effect on street activity. He wished to commend business people present and other members of the Tooting business community on their valuable contribution to the response to the disorder. In terms of the reported experience of communicating with the Police, he considered it completely unacceptable for the local businessman to have received such a poor response when he reported that a car had driven into his shop window. The insurance issue was irrelevant to the Police responsibility to respond in such situations.

Acting Borough Commander Campbell understood the argument for “zero tolerance” towards looters, but emphasised that the response should seek to achieve positive action, not necessarily always arrests.

Mr. Martin acknowledged that the points raised concerning the socio- economic context of the review would add depth to it and related to the Council’s responsibility to foster a sense of place, belonging and community. However, the Council was primarily a practical organisation and would naturally focus on practical interventions, such as the Family Recovery Programme targeting support to particularly deprived and dysfunctional families. The Council was also effective in its support for children at risk, though it could probably do more for whole families. He accepted that efforts should be made to improve its partnership work in this area, given its

Page 56 of 80 importance to community cohesion. Mr Martin felt that while it was important to consider the social conditions behind the disorder as context, this was not the same as accepting them as causal; the disorder had happened on particular days in August, but the social conditions were more persistent.

FURTHER COMMENTS

Mr. Kinghan then invited further comments from the audience.

Councillor Angela Graham suggested that contact with the Police could be improved through Tooting Town Centre Panel and Business Watch. She also referred to the role of faith communities and underlined the fact that the Leader of the Council listened carefully to their representatives.

Councillor John Locker reported that the traders on Ritherdon Road had not been aware of risks to their shops on 9th August; it was important that the parades of shops outside town centres were not forgotten in such situations. He particularly wished to thank and commend Police officers for their response to the disorder. He had spoken to an officer from the Hampshire force who had been involved and had been struck by the speed and organisation of the rioters and their use of new technology to coordinate activities. He felt that the Police should seek to use similar strategies to communicate quickly with communities and businesses to organise resistance in such situations and to facilitate the public to act as their “eyes and ears”.

Councillor Andy Gibbons reported on his experience of the situation in Tooting on 8th August. It had been tense with rumours circulating about possible attacks. In Blackshaw Road, he had heard that the Tandem Centre in Colliers Wood had been raided. There was virtually no Police presence at the time and this raised the likelihood of communities considering their own responses with the risks of violence and vigilantism. He considered that it had got close to the point where the public had lost faith that the Police would respond. He also pointed to the differing forms of unrest; a rumour of 200 people attacking the Savacentre had caused its closure, yet in Tooting there had been clear targeting and looting of particular shops.

A member of the public responded to the point about the role of faith communities by saying that the faith community representatives who engaged with the Council through formal settings were often not particularly representative of the wider communities who followed their faith and he also questioned whether they were therefore properly able to hold the Council to account. He suggested that this meeting was an example of this disengagement, as he estimated that there were 30 or 40 more active faith leaders, perhaps speaking for thousands in their communities, living within 500 metres of the meeting venue, yet none were in attendance. He considered this to be a judgement on how agencies like the Council approached consultation and that they should think seriously about how to change this. He acknowledged schemes such as the Family Recovery Programme, but argued that as a proportion of the estimated £3.5 billion total public sector spend in the Borough, the relative investment in such

Page 57 of 80 programmes demonstrated politicians’ priorities. He suggested that this derived from a “top-down”, managerial model of public administration which should change radically if is was to engage with deprived communities.

Another member of the public referred to a visit to Tooting in 2007 from Chris Grayling MP when he had spoken about the value of family structures. The resident considered that the benefits system should encourage families to stay together, and he also felt that the Police should be given more supported to take strong action in response to disorder.

A local resident said he was disappointed about the turnout at this meeting and advised that at least a month’s notice should be provided, using noticeboards in the town centre. He pointed to the possible effect of Ramadan on the impact of the disorder in Tooting, since it had led to more people being on the streets after sunset, perhaps deterring rioters and looters. He considered that some positive lessons could be learned from the experience, particularly in the area of communications between the Police and the public.

Another resident also mentioned the desire of the community to communicate quickly and effectively with the Police and there had been disappointment this had not been easier. He suggested that the Tooting Town Centre Partnership should be used and that a “local centre point” be established for such communications and to encourage the public to assist the Police with information.

RESPONSES

In response to the points made about community engagement, Mr Martin suggested that local residents and community leaders be encouraged to attend the remaining public meeting at the Town Hall Civic Suite on 19th September 2011 and/or to communicate directly with Mr Kinghan on the review. He underlined that the Council wished to take as much positive learning out of the sad events of early August, and use this to strengthen local communities.

Acting Commander Campbell accepted that the Police had focused on town centres rather than smaller shopping parades during the disorder. He again acknowledged the need to address Police communications with the public, and he suggested that social media and business partnerships could be used more effectively in future. On social media, he recognised its potential in supporting communities, and indeed it was increasingly used by the Police for intelligence purposes; yet the fact was that it had also been used by rioters and looters to organise the attacks. Acting Commander Campbell considered that the Police did an immense amount of work on community engagement, but also acknowledged question marks over its effectiveness, particularly in reaching more remote and isolated communities. He was keen on galvanising people to break down any barriers to communications and he was prepared to step away from the more mainstream mechanisms to achieve

Page 58 of 80 more genuine involvement. He reported that, as part of these efforts, the Police used some budgets to support youth and community groups to engage.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Kinghan then thanked all those who had attended for their helpful contributions. He intended to complete his report by the end of September, and the Council was due to publish it in October.

The meeting ended at 8.33pm.

Page 59 of 80 NOTES OF MEETING HELD AS PART OF THE ABOVE REVIEW AT CIVIC CENTRE, WANDSWORTH HIGH STREET, SW18 ON MONDAY, 19TH SEPTEMBER 2011 AT 7.00 P.M.

PRESENT

Neil Kinghan, independent commissioner appointed by Wandsworth Borough Council Chairing the meeting. Paul Martin, Chief Executive and Director of Administration, Wandsworth Borough Council. Chief Superintendant David Musker, Metropolitan Police Superintendant Gerry Campbell, Metropolitan Police Superintendent Dawn Morris, Metropolitan Police

Wandsworth Council Members

Councillor Tony Belton – (Latchmere Ward) Councillor Jenny Browne (Northcote Ward) Councillor Peter Carpenter – (Roehampton and Putney Heath Ward) Councillor Jonathan Cook – (Shaftesbury Ward) Councillor Peter Dawson – (Northcote Ward) Councillor Antonia Dunn – (Bedford Ward) Councillor Paul Ellis – (Balham Ward) Councillor Ravi Govindia – (East Putney Ward) Councillor Angela Graham – (Earlsfield Ward) Councillor Guy Humpries – (Southfields Ward) Councillor Alex Jacob – (Bedford Ward) Councillor Martin D. Johnson – (Northcote Ward) Councillor Matthew Maxwell-Scott – (Earlsfield Ward) Councillor Piers McCausland – (Fairfield Ward) Councillor Charles McNaught-Davis – (Earlsfield Ward) Councillor Rex Osborn – (Graveney Ward) Councillor Michael Ryder – (Thamesfield Ward) Councillor Guy Senior – (Shaftesbury Ward) Councillor Liz Stokes – (West Putnet Ward) Councillor Tessa Strickland – (St. Mary’s Park Ward) Councillor Stuart Thom – (Fairfield Ward) Councillor Kathy Tracey – (Wandsworth Common Ward) Councillor Terence Walsh – (Southfields Ward)

GLA Member, Richard Tracey was also present.

Approximately 89 members of the public attended the meeting.

Page 60 of 80 INTRODUCTION

Before asking the members of the public present to give their views or to ask questions, Mr. Kinghan introduced himself, Paul Martin and Superintendant Campbell; who also briefly introduced themselves.

Mr. Kinghan said he had already held discussions with the Council, Police, local residents and local business owners all of whose views would be considered in coming to the recommendations that the report would make. It is intended that the report will be concluded and published by the end of October 2011.

It will also look at its role as a provider of services, such as assisting with the cleaning up operation, providing access to funding where necessary and helping to re-establish businesses affected by the disturbances. Mr. Martin added that Wandsworth had experienced a trauma, and needed to be assisted through the healing process. Finally the Council will also look to its community leadership responsibilities.

Superintendant Campbell then took the opportunity also to thank all those at the meeting, and emphasised that their views would count. He said that the Metropolitan Police were also undertaking a strategic review of the events in order to look at the management of the disturbances, the use of social media by those involved in the lawlessness and the use of intelligence by the police and to embed for the future any lessons learnt. He recognised, given that 109 businesses across the Borough had been hit, that many people had been affected by the events either directly or indirectly.

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Superintendant Campbell gave a timeline of events as detailed below:

4th August 2011: Late Mark Duggan shot by armed Police officers in Tottenham. This incident is subject to an investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).

6th August 2011: At approximately 17:40pm planned demonstration of approx 300 people outside Tottenham police station wanting "justice" for Mr Duggan and his family. The rioting erupted following the peaceful protest. Police came under attack from bottles, fireworks and other missiles.

7th August 2011: Disorder in Enfield, Walthamstow, Hackney and later in Brixton, the latter area requiring a sustained Police response.

8th August: Rioting and looting continued for the third night in London affecting Croydon, Clapham, Hackney, Camden, Lewisham, Peckham, Newham, East Ham, Enfield, Woolwich, Ealing and Colliers Wood. First offences committed at 2.18 a.m. in Wandsworth. Gold Group meetings between senior police officers; together with other stakeholders (who hold an advisory role) were held.

Superintendant Campbell said the disturbances had affected 22 of the 32 London boroughs. He said that decision making in such circumstances is extremely challenging and he thanked the public and businesses for the level of support they had shown to the police, adding that police bravery had been widely matched by that of the public. Superintendant Campbell confirmed that the intelligence had been imprecise and that there had been no clear informed intelligence that Clapham Junction would be attacked. 350 suspects were involved in the incident at Clapham Junction, although as information unfolds the numbers involved could be 450 at any one time. Police officers in Clapham Junction were overwhelmed by the numbers involved in the disorder. Across London on 8th August 20,000 emergency calls were made compared to 500 the previous Monday.

He said that at the peak of the disorder there were some 350 people involved in the disturbances in Wandsworth. Across London there were some 1200 crime scenes being investigated and 20,000 hours of CCTV footage being reviewed in the pursuit of evidence.

Within the Borough, Superintendant Campbell said there were currently 128 crimes being investigated. He said there had been 147 arrests made so far, with the age profile of those arrested being between 14 and 53 – the average age of a suspect being 24, of those arrested 88% were already known to the police.

Page 62 of 80 Mr. Kinghan then invited the views of those present at the meeting.

ISSUES RAISED

The first speaker agreed with the statement that Wandsworth had suffered a trauma and was disappointed that only 8 or 9 people had attended the meeting held on 13th September in Tooting. The speaker continued to state that he had visited a number of communities, all of whom felt frustrated and isolated from the Civic structure in Wandsworth. The speaker stressed that the Council needs to appreciate that whole sections of our community feel marginalised and isolated. Therefore, there was a need to look at the community engagement architecture and ways to engage our communities.

Another resident said the most deprived areas in Roehampton had not been subject to the disorder and rioting. He believed the engagement of youths at a local level by the Youth Service, particularly during the riots, had worked. Another resident from Roehampton reported that the Youth Service had confirmed how horrified young people were to see the action of those looting.

Another speaker emphasised that it was important to remember that of those arrested 77% were above 18 years old, and therefore, this was not a problem restricted to young people.

A further resident reiterated that young people were totally disconnected with the political structure. He stated that despite his organisation having shared information on how ex-offenders could be re-integrated into the community, for example through programmes, such advice was not embraced, and an opportunity for other organisations to learn from and to share their experiences was lost. The speaker further added that it was difficult to fight those who had no fear. He believed that a long term view was needed to demonstrate that we are ready to engage with our communities. He added that we needed to understand the problem to be able to assist the process of healing.

Another member of the audience questioned why when it was apparent to her that a group of youths outside a department store in Clapham Junction were very excited and ready to attack the store, the Police in a van opposite the store failed to walk over and engage with these youths.

Another resident stated that people had participated in the riots because they knew they would get away with it as Police presence was low.

Another resident stated that the attacks in Tooting, Balham and Clapham Junction had occurred at the same time and, therefore, were well coordinated. He asked if the Police were investigating who organised the riots. The speaker believed that this was an incitement to riot and not just co- incidence.

Page 63 of 80 RESPONSE

Responding to these initial points, Mr. Martin stated that although the lack of community engagement may be a contributory factor, he felt it could not be the cause of the riots. Mr. Martin agreed that the Council needed to work on community engagement. Mr. Martin also commented on the positive feedback received about the work of the Youth Service and the preventative measures it deployed in Roehampton during the riots.

Mr. Martin said there was no quick fix solution and that the problems may be repeated if we did not understand the root cause. Mr. Martin added that he did not want the myth developing that this disorder was primarily associated with young people, when in fact it was an adult disorder.

Mr. Martin said that we should look at ways of developing role models and providing evidence of positive leadership. Mr. Martin added that this Council’s aim was to nurture a sense of aspiration in the community and for all to have a stake in their community.

Superintendant Campbell confirmed that the Metropolitan Police Review would include community engagement. He stated that the depth and breadth of engagement needs to penetrate deeper in the borough and that those marginalised in the community need to be given a voice to shape the services we deliver.

Superintendant Campbell confirmed that 77% of those prosecuted and charged were 18 years and over. However, as there were a further 300 images of people who had committed crimes predominantly in the Clapham Junction area, the ages may change. Of those arrested 52% gave a Wandsworth address and of those charged and prosecuted 47% gave a Wandsworth address.

The role of the police is not to criminalise young people, but instead to work with statutory partners and the community to help young people to realise their full potential.

In response to the Police not intervening sooner, Superintendant Campbell confirmed that the Police had been over-whelmed by the numbers involved in the disturbances at Clapham Junction.

Superintendant Campbell praised the Police officers on the ground, who had to sustain the barrage of missiles, and the fire brigade and community individuals who assisted.

Superintendant Campbell confirmed that it was clear from the CCTV footage that there was some sort of co-ordination, although it was not apparent at present that it occurred across the 22 London Boroughs affected. As part of the Metropolitan Police Review, the need to look at social network sites and whether the volume of traffic should be monitored would be considered.

Page 64 of 80

Mr. Kinghan then invited further comments from the audience.

ISSUES RAISED

A member of the audience said that she did not understand the connection between the protest and riots and that there was no clear pattern from what had happened in Tottenham and the other places targeted. The speaker added that the fact that Mark Duggan hardly featured in the riots, must mean that there has to be some other reason for the riots.

Another resident asked if any information had been obtained from those prosecuted as to why they got involved in the riots.

Another speaker asked whether it was Council Policy to evict tenants involved in the riots. Cllr Peter Dawson stated that the victim support aspect should be considered as part of the Council’s independent review as businesses and residents were totally frightened by the events. Cllr Dawson added that our emergency planning and the support offered to victims needs to be reviewed to determine how fit for purpose it is.

Another resident stated that young people took part in the riots because of the lack of prevention (i.e. that one week prior to the riots it had been announced that 1000 police officer posts would be cut, therefore, there would be less police on the streets) and lack of alternatives (i.e. cuts to Youth Service). The speaker reminded the panel of the example at Roehampton and what could be achieved and provided by the Youth Service. The speaker said in essence many thought that as there was less chance of getting caught and nothing to do, why not join in the fun. The speaker said it was wrong to isolate one section of the community, i.e. young people and questioned what the Council was going to do to help the Police in preventing such occurrences in the future and how it was going to help 24 year olds.

The Panel was asked whether the role messaging and the social media had in the riots would be investigated as part of this review. In addition, that many of those arrested had previous convictions and a number of young people were receiving messages to join in the looting. It was also questioned whether there was evidence of a pattern emerging.

Councillor Belton agreed with Cllr Peter Dawson’s comments in relation to victim support. In respect of the Council Policy to evict families convicted of being involved in the disturbances, Councillor Belton was in favour of restorative justice and in the cohesion of the community. Although the Courts would determine whether to make an eviction order, potentially families in Wandsworth with children could be evicted. Councillor Belton added that the eviction of families that are convicted was within the Council’s control. Cllr Belton also referred the Panel to the consultation that was underway on ‘A New Mandatory Power of Possession for Anti-Social Behaviour’.

Page 65 of 80 Another speaker stated that people felt that the disturbances were harming their community.

RESPONSES

Mr. Kinghan confirmed that the review would include victim support, but that it was not within his remit to assess evidence of how social messaging had influenced the disturbances.

In relation to the comment made about the lack of connection between the protest and riots, and how the riots had progressed, Mr. Martin said that natural progression and connection was a fair observation to make. Mr Martin added that Mark Duggan’s death had appeared to unleash a set of reactions that were latent, but not directly related to it. In addition, Mr. Martin stated that we need to be thoughtful about the source of events that can lead to rioting.

Mr. Martin confirmed that it was Council Policy, as set out in the tenancy agreement, to evict when a family member is involved in disorder. The clause in the agreement relating to this is primarily there to protect other members of the community against ASB. However, Mr. Martin added that the decision to make an eviction order was that of the court.

Mr. Martin, in acknowledging the cuts to services, stated that it was important for all young people to have a stake in their community and opportunities that they could aspire to; and that there should be something within our society for everyone.

In view of the uncertainty that arose as a consequence of the disturbances, Mr. Martin said it was very important to communicate with both residents and staff, and to communicate more frequently in times of uncertainty.

Chief Superintendant Musker stated that he was constrained from discussing Mark Duggan’s case as it was subject to an investigation by the (IPCC). Chief Superintendant Musker stated that the disorder in Tottenham was within the Police’s tactical parameters. However, the Police were not prepared for and could not have foreseen the events that occurred on Monday 8 August and were not resourced for the events that took place on Monday.

Chief Superintendant Musker said that it was clear that communication had taken place through social networks, and that the same volume of social networking had taken place on Tuesday as it had on Monday. He added that the Police needed to understand how this would determine the tactics and resources deployed.

Superintendant Campbell said that the Gold Group had considered victim support activity around employees of businesses affected, and that tertiary victims of crime needed to be identified so that they could access support.

Superintendant Campbell added that at present it was too early to determine any connection between the individuals involved, and that at an appropriate

Page 66 of 80 time a debrief would take place to understand why these individuals had taken part in the disturbances.

Mr. Kinghan then invited further comments from the audience.

ISSUES RAISED

A resident echoed the sentiments of a previous speaker, in that those who were involved in the disturbances did so because of the lack of respect they had for the Police and their community; and because of the lack of consequences for their actions. The resident further added that a number of young people had not been involved in the riots, instead they helped to protect the community they lived in and their families. It was stated that a sense of community was lacking and that engaging people in voluntary work gives people a sense of belonging to a community that they helped to develop.

Another resident asked whether the cuts imposed by the Government were going to continue and how this Council was going to help the Police and fund the Youth Services.

Another speaker asked the Chief Executive if from a financial point of view, whether the Council could afford such disturbances to recur.

A member of the audience did not accept that a lack of consequences was the reason for rioting, as theft of articles ranged from flat screen TVs to basic food items. The speaker was also concerned that there had been no further publicity as to how the Police officer who shot Mark Duggan was being dealt with, yet for stealing a packet of crisps during the riots swift and severe punishment had been sanctioned.

Another resident stated that society should contribute more towards higher education fees instead of placing this burden on young people. He also stated that although at 16 young people can make their own decisions, even at 18 their parents are being held responsible for their actions. The speaker added that youths were alienated from the Police and their community, and that we needed to redeem our youth.

Another speaker asked what the Council intended to do to prevent such disturbances from occurring in the future and to assist community organisation funding.

The final speaker stated that better community engagement would build stronger communities that were more trusting and which would support our services.

Page 67 of 80 RESPONSES

Mr. Martin said that the Police would ensure that there were effective consequences for acts of criminality. However, the lack of respect was a deeper and a longer term issue.

Mr. Martin confirmed that this Council, as did other Councils, would have to make savings and that the loss of grants was a fact. Mr. Martin added that in light of the cuts, the Council’s responsibility was to ensure that the funding received is used as effectively as possible so that it stretches further.

Mr. Martin concluded by stating that the reason for these meetings and the independent review was to listen to the views of our residents and to reflect and make the right judgements to build stronger communities.

Chief Superintendant Musker said that the findings of the investigation in relation to the Police officer who shot Mark Duggan would be submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service. Chief Superintendant Musker added that British policing is unique in that the British Police are an unarmed service that police by consent. In the event that such a disturbance was to recur, Chief Superintendant Musker confirmed that the police would still use proportionate tactics to threats faced, with the underlying principle being of protecting lives.

Superintendant Campbell re-iterated that the role of the British Police force was firstly to preserve life; secondly to prevent crime; and thirdly when a crime is committed to identify the perpetrator. Superintendant Campbell added that there were a number of suspects that had to be identified and that the Police were determined to identify, locate and arrest those clearly involved in looting and rioting.

Superintendant Campbell confirmed that the Police were wedded to the idea of community engagement and that there was a renewed commitment from the local Police to engage all members of the community so that everyone had a voice in shaping the services provided.

Superintendant Campbell thanked the local community for their help and stated that 600 separate items of information and intelligence had been gathered as a consequence of the information provided by the local community. Superintendant Campbell also thanked those involved in the ‘clean-up’ operation of Clapham Junction following the disturbances for their patience whilst the Police gathered forensic evidence from crime scenes in the area, as a consequence of which a further 40 suspects had been identified.

Superintendant Campbell also thanked the public for their attendance and said that their views would be taken into account to shape future Police response.

Page 68 of 80 Mr. Kinghan then thanked all those who had attended for the manner in which they had expressed their views and had also listened to other speakers politely.

The meeting ended at 9.10 p.m.

Page 69 of 80 Annexe 4

Independent Review

Social and Economic Statistics for Wandsworth

This note summarised the latest statistics on crime, deprivation and the youth service in Wandsworth.

Crime: comparative data

The number of notifiable offences in Wandsworth has fallen consistently over the past decade. In 2010/11, the number of offences was 31% lower than it had been in 2001/02.

The chart below shows the total crime figures for the past 8 financial years. Figures are expressed as total volume and as rate per 1000 population. Wandsworth has had the lowest rate in inner London since 2003/04. The rate is also below the average for the whole of London and below that of a ‘family’ of comparable boroughs 1.

Total Notifiable Offences 60 55 50

nts 40 35 30 25 20

Rate1,000 per reside 15

5 0

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 03 / 04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 Inner London Greater London Wandsworth Family

1 The family of similar boroughs includes Croydon, Ealing, Hammersmith and Fulham, Hounslow, Kensington and Chelsea, Lewisham, Merton, Waltham Forest and Wandsworth.

Page 70 of 80 Deprivation in Battersea Estates

Comparisons with the national position The Borough as a whole does not feature highly on the index of multiple deprivation; 20 of Wandsworth’s 174 super output areas (SOA) fall within the 20% most deprived areas in England and Wales.

Just 3 Wandsworth SOAs fall within the 10% most deprived areas in the country and 10 fall within the 15% most deprived. Within Wandsworth, there is a concentration of deprivation in the Battersea area: it has 2 of the 3 SOAs in the 10% most deprived and 5 of the 10 SOAs within the 15% most deprived areas.

The SOA that covers much of the Winstanley Estate is the most deprived within Wandsworth and falls within the 8th percentile of most deprived areas in the country.

Results for the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI) are more pronounced. The index measures the proportion of children under the age of 16 that live in low income households, essentially those with 1 or more adults on a benefit.

On this index, 35 Wandsworth SOAs fall within the 10% most deprived in the country, including 12 that cover parts of Battersea estates. The SOA that covers much of the Winstanley estate falls within the 1% most deprived areas in the country.

The Winstanley Estate The estate is seen as one of the five most difficult to manage in Wandsworth. Whilst its buildings meet ‘decent homes’ standards, it shares many of the features common to inner city estates, being densely populated and having a high level of reliance on benefits. It is affected by crime and anti-social behaviour and has had problems with drug dealing and use, often associated with gang activity. Despite this, it is not seen as a ‘problem’ estate on the scale seen in other parts of inner London. A key indicator is that applications by tenants to move off the estate are not out of line with estates elsewhere in Wandsworth. In fact, as is shown in the tables below, the profile of the estate (at 31st March 2011) is, in most respects, very similar to that of other estates across the Borough. Where it differs, this is more a reflection of the difference between Battersea estates and those in the western part of the Borough than an indication of Winstanley being unique.

There is a lower proportion of leaseholders than on estates across Wandsworth. This is typical of the larger Battersea estates and reflects the high levels of sales particularly in the western part of the Borough. Even so, it is clear that Winstanley is not a single tenure estate.

Page 71 of 80 Tenure Type Borough Wide Winstanley Estate Number % of Number % of Council / Council / ex-Council ex-Council properties properties Total number of Council / ex-Council properties 41040 805 Number of Council properties sold 23715 57.8% 235 29.2%

The following information relates to Council tenants and is the most accurate available as at 31st March 2011.2

Household type Borough Wide Winstanley Estate Number % of total Number % of total households households One adult, one person household 6455 38.3% 205 36.3% More than one adult, no children household 4885 29.0% 151 26.8% One adult, one or more children household 2778 16.5% 104 18.4% More than one adult, one or more children household 2755 16.3% 104 18.4% Total number of households 16873 100.0% 564 100.0%

Age of First/Sole Tenant Borough Wide Winstanley Estate Number % of total Number % of total Under 25 638 3.8% 32 5.7% 25 to 34 2182 12.9% 96 17.0% 35 to 44 3327 19.7% 129 22.9% 45 to 54 3577 21.2% 140 24.8% 55 to 64 2462 14.6% 76 13.5% 65 to 74 2139 12.7% 46 8.2% 75 and over 2548 15.1% 45 8.0% Total number of households 16873 100.0% 564 100.0%

2 The Council’s tenancy conditions require tenants to notify the council in writing, within 28 days, of any long-term change in the people who are living in the property. However, this may not always happen. There is no obligation on tenants to provide information about their ethnic group).

Page 72 of 80 Number of children and Borough Wide Winstanley Estate adults living in these Number % of total Number % of total households people people Children (0-17) in 24.2% 27.0% households 9526 354 Adults (aged 18 plus) in 75.8% 73.0% households 29772 958 Total number of people in 39298 100.0% 1312 100.0% households

Ethnic Group of First/Sole Borough Wide Winstanley Estate Tenant Number % of total Number % of total households households White 8118 48.1% 195 34.6% Mixed / multiple ethnic groups 310 1.8% 10 1.8% Asian / Asian British 1033 6.1% 35 6.2% Black / African / Caribbean / Black British 4594 27.2% 238 42.2% Other 580 3.4% 26 4.6% Not known 2238 13.3% 60 10.6% Total number of households 16873 100.0% 564 100.0%

Youth Service provision

Expenditures levels Statutory returns and National Youth Agency (NYA) ‘audits’ have shown consistently that Wandsworth, along with other inner London boroughs, has amongst the highest levels of investment in youth services. This is despite the changing definitions of what is included in ‘youth service’ expenditure which makes comparisons over time difficult while comparison across Councils is complicated by varying local accounting practices.

In 2007/08, the latest available NYA figures showed Wandsworth as ranking 13th of 118 authorities in terms of gross expenditure on youth work services and 4th in terms of net expenditure.

More recently, analysis by DfES 3 for 2010/11 shows this comparatively high level of expenditure continuing. Wandsworth has the 7th highest expenditure per capita in London on ‘Services for Young People’. This includes universal and targeted services, youth work, positive activities, teenage pregnancy services, etc.

3 DfES available at http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/adminandfinance/financialmanagement/schoolsrevenuefunding/s ection251/a00197971/benchmarking-2011-12

Page 73 of 80 High levels of per capita expenditure are not always an indicator of cost- effectiveness and a detailed review of the youth service was carried out in 2007, involving extensive consultation with users and potential users of youth centres. A ‘hybrid’ model of provision was adopted, involving development of a small number of ‘bigger, brighter’ centres that would be open at least 5 days a week and offer a core curriculum plus a range of specialisms. Each of the centres would be linked to satellite centres that would open and close with demand. Some smaller centres with low take-up have been closed to allow reinvestment in the bigger centres.

Activity levels and outcomes Despite the closure of centres, attendances at Council-run centres increased by over 34% between 2007/08 and 2009/10. Voluntary sector centres showed a fall in attendances of around 5% over that period, partly reflecting closures whilst development work was underway. Changes in the method of counting attendances means that subsequent figures are not comparable. However, on the new counting system, total attendances at Wandsworth staffed youth clubs and projects rose from 57,886 in 2009-10 to 73,346 in 2010-11 and, in 2010-11, 28% of the 13-19 resident population was in contact with a club or project (against a National Indicator of 25%). This excludes the numerous other community, faith-based and uniformed groups who will be reaching other young people. It also excludes after school activities run by schools as part of the extended schools programme.

National Indicators for youth services have been dropped since 2010 but still provide an indication of local activity.

% participants % participants with a gaining a nationally “recorded outcome”, i.e. recognised award a change in behaviour or skill resulting from a youth work programme 2006/07 19% 62% 2007/08 26% 66% 2008/09 24% 66% 2009/10 29% 78% 2010/11 27% 54% National 30% 60% target

‘Participants’ = young people who have attended a youth club or project at least five times in the year.

Although the levels of recorded and accredited outcomes appear below target, this represents significant under recording as staff adjusted to a new database and inputting systems.

It is worth noting that Wandsworth has a relatively low level of 16-18 year olds who are ‘not in education, employment or training’ (NEETs). The rate has

Page 74 of 80 hovered around 4.5% for the past three years, putting Wandsworth among the 20 authorities nationwide with the lowest level of NEETs.

Future provision of youth services In February 2011, the Council decided to close six youth clubs, two of which are in Battersea.4 The staffing and non-staffing budget from one club was transferred to another to form part of a ‘bigger, brighter’ centre in Roehampton. At the same time, work is proceeding to develop two of the ‘bigger, brighter’ centres at Devas Youth Club and Caius House in Battersea with Devas receiving half a million pound of capital investment from the Council for a ground floor refurbishment this financial year. The other ‘bigger, brighter’ centres‘ – Training Resource Centre, Tooting Hub and Roehampton Base with Roehampton Youth Club – are all receiving significant funding for refurbishment or development this financial year.

4 Paper No. 11-209 to Education & Children’s Services OSC 23rd February 2011 and to Executive 28th February 2011

Page 75 of 80 Executive Summary

1. This summary encompasses the timeline of events leading up to and including the disorder in Clapham Junction on 8 August 2011, and the key findings of my report.

2. My report reflects the information that has come to me from the Metropolitan Police and Wandsworth Council and the views expressed in the 61 personal interviews, three public meetings and a number of other meetings I have held and in the 35 written responses I have received. This has not been a judicial inquiry nor an in-depth research project. The report is, however, informed by the experiences and the views of those who were directly affected by the disorder.

Timeline of Events 4th Mark Duggan dies in Tottenham August 6th Demonstration in Tottenham is followed by riot August 7th Disorder and looting in: August Waltham Forest: Chingford Mount, Walthamstow Enfield: High Street, Ponders End Kensington & Chelsea: Notting Hill Wandsworth: Tooting Lambeth: Streatham Hackney: Kingsland shopping centre, E8 Westminster: Oxford Circus

8th August Clapham Junction area

17.00 Multi- agency GOLD meeting notes rumours of attacks planned on Putney, Tooting, Southside Shopping Centre and Clapham Junction amongst others. Information is described as scrappy and unreliable.

Winstanley Estate and roads nearby

19.24 First report of small groups gathering.

19.40- Larger groups form – reports vary between 60-100 at different times. They 20.00 are armed with sticks, bricks etc. and attack vehicles and Police.

19.42 First violence - 50-60 youths throwing bottles at cars. 19.47 Level 2 officers on estate. All buses re-routed away. Dog vans requested. Smoke grenades being thrown. At 19.53 BTP assistance is

Page 76 of 80 requested. 19.54 Housing Department vehicle attacked at Plough Rd/Wynter Street. At 19.56 report of 100 youths at Plough Rd SW11. Police under attack there and withdraw and return to patrol.

By 20.02 youths reported to have left the area heading to Battersea Park Road. 20.10 Police stand down from the estate

Clapham Junction

20.00 Acting Borough Commander makes first request for additional Level 2 trained officers from Met. Police control centre S60 stop and search procedure, initially authorised at 03.20hours, reviewed and adjusted 20.00- Larger groups form at Clapham Junction (Falcon Rd, St. John’s Rd, 20.39 Lavender Hill junction). At 20.04, BTP report c35 youths outside the Falcon pub and in Falcon Rd, putting on masks. At 20.15, BTP report 50 Youths on Peabody Estate - all hooded and at least one armed with machete. 20.24 Youths reported at JD Sports 20.39- Attacks begin on shops in St. Johns Rd. A small number of police there 21.08 have some initial success but come under attack. Borough Commander becomes aware of a large group approaching from Lavender Hill and decides to withdraw Police from from St. John’s Rd at 21.08 to a safer distance

Page 77 of 80

Midnight Activity in Lavender Hill onwards 00.10 9 Aug Fire engine arrives. No heavy police escort but one police van arrives just after

00.13 Further up Lavender Hill, 7 armoured vehicles arrive form east along with 3 other police vehicles. A large number of people are still on the streets

01.00-03.00 Varying reports across Putney, Southside, Balham & Tooting of disorder, fires or looting. Units deployed to each area and no further disorder reported or observed.

03.20 Fire at Party Shop is out

3. The key findings of the report are:

1. The disorder in Clapham Junction, and other parts of Wandsworth, was part of a chain of events that began with the death of Mark Duggan in Tottenham on 4 August and the demonstration that turned into a riot in the same area on 6 August. 2. The primary motivation of those involved in the disorder was criminal opportunism, some of it organised, some disorganised and some involving people who were caught up in the moment. 3. A combination of the physical characteristics of the area and of the events of the day, including extensive social messaging, help to explain why it happened in Clapham Junction on 8 August. 4. A mix of more long-term underlying social and economic factors, some particular to the area, others of more general application, help to explain why some people became involved, and others did not. They do not excuse or justify what happened. 5. The total number of people involved in the disorder in Clapham Junction may have been 450. Early indications are that the proportion under 24 was 65% but only 24% were under 18. This was not a riot by the teenagers of Wandsworth. 6. The information available to the Police from social network sites and elsewhere about potential trouble in Clapham Junction at 5pm on 8 August was scrappy and unreliable. 7. The disorder began on the Winstanley estate at 7.40pm. By 9pm, there were 100-150 looters and potential looters on St. John’s Road, a further 200 on Lavender Hill. The Borough Commander had eight officers with Level 2 public order training and a total of sixty officers altogether. 8. The resources available to the Borough Commander were inadequate. That was the result of decisions taken earlier in the day by the Metropolitan Police Control Centre. 9. In the circumstances, the Borough Commander had no choice but to withdraw from St. John’s Road. The owners of the shops and businesses in the area feel that they were left abandoned and

Page 78 of 80 unprotected. There was, however, a serious risk that police confrontation with the looters risked much worse violence for them and the public. 10. A total of 109 shops and businesses were damaged in the course of the disorder in Wandsworth, 90 of them in Clapham Junction. 25 were seriously damaged, one gutted by fire. No-one was seriously hurt. 11. The Borough Commander first requested public order trained reinforcements at 8pm. By that point, there was serious disorder in many parts of London. It took until 9.57pm for 75 trained reinforcements to arrive and until 10.38pm for them to begin clearing the streets, which they were able to do by 11.15pm. 12. A fire broke out at the Party Shop at 11.59pm. The Fire and Rescue service were on the scene within fifteen minutes. They received Police protection but they did not come under attack. 13. On 9 August, the main issues were the clear up of the looted area and the making secure of the damaged shops and businesses, and the anxiety that pervaded the community and the Council, that there would be further disorder that evening. 14. The Council organised the clear up and making secure of damaged shops and premises, with the help of a large number of volunteers, the ‘broom army’. The Council’s response is generally considered to have been well-organised and effective. 15. Many shops and restaurants closed early on 9 August. The Town Hall was closed to the public at 3pm and staff sent home at 6pm. There was no further disorder. 16. Many of the damaged shops and businesses reopened on 10 August, most by the weekend. The Council has offered assistance and support to the independent businesses affected both by damage during the disorder and by loss of trade thereafter. 17. The issue of an eviction notice to the family of a young man arrested following the disorder has been controversial. The Council’s position is that it was consistent with previous practice in relation to tenants or family members accused or convicted of crimes and anti-social behaviour. The announcement of the eviction notice was a political judgement, designed to show leadership in a crisis. 18. There have been welcome signs of a positive community response to the disorder, starting with the broom army and a Battersea Buzz event on 20 August, and of strengthened community spirit among the shops and businesses in the area.

4. My recommendations to the Police and the Council arising from this review are as follows:

Recommendation 1. I recommend that the Police should review their information and intelligence systems, in the light of the disorder on 6, 7 and 8 August, in particular, the use they make of social network sites and the way they handle large numbers of calls from the public about public order emergencies.

Page 79 of 80 Recommendation 2. I recommend that senior officers should continue to spend as much time as they can with shop owners and mangers and other business people in Clapham Junction and discuss with them their plans for policing in the future.

Recommendation 3. I recommend that the Metropolitan Police review give urgent priority to a re-assessment of the numbers of police with public order training at levels 1 and 2, and to the ability of the police control system to respond immediately to requests for assistance, if and when disorder breaks out.

Recommendation 4. I recommend that the Police and Wandsworth Council, with the support of central Government, should develop a long-term programme of action both to bring to justice those responsible for criminal behaviour and to reduce the influence of the gangs on the areas where they operate.

Recommendation 5. I recommend that the Council gives its full support to the Family Recovery Project, and maintains that support beyond the initial year if it is successful. It is essential that the Government Departments concerned also give their practical support to the programme.

Recommendation 6. I recommend that the Council should commit itself to programmes of community engagement with the ethnic and religious communities in the Borough and to build on the enthusiasm and community spirit shown by the broom army on 9 August.

Recommendation 7. I recommend that the Council and its partners, in close consultation with the shops and businesses in Clapham Junction, should develop and implement a relaunch plan for the area, to celebrate its recovery from the disorder and its potential for the future, in time for Christmas.

Recommendation 8. I recommend that the Council establish a communications hub, to be activated in the event of future emergencies, to provide a focus for information to be channelled in from all Council departments and from the police and other agencies outside, and to provide a source of consistent information to those who need it. It should be developed as part of a review of the emergency plan.

Recommendation 9. I recommend that the Council should review its emergency plan in the light of the disorder and its aftermath, to ensure that flexibility should be built into the response systems and that front-line staff, whoever they may be, are given support and advice as soon as possible.

Neil Kinghan 29 September 2011

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