Train Protection - Technical Review of the ERTMS Programme Team Report
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
HSE Health & Safety Executive Train Protection - Technical review of the ERTMS Programme Team report Prepared by the NEL Consortium for the Health and Safety Executive 2003 RESEARCH REPORT 067 HSE Health & Safety Executive Train Protection - Technical review of the ERTMS Programme Team report The NEL Consortium consists of - EQE International Ltd TUV NEL Ltd TUV Bau und Betrieb EQE House East Kilbride Westendstrasse 199 Warrington Road Glasgow D-80686 Birchwood G75 0QU Munich Warrington WA3 6WJ Prepared by: Richard Adams (EQE), Michael Cavanagh (EQE), Roger Lillicrapp (EQE), Karl Gotz (TUV), Udo Steininger (TUV) and Heiko Saalbach (TUV) Approved by: Linda Rowan (NEL) The final report of the ERTMS Programme Team (EPT), published on 25 April 2002, outlines a way ahead for train control and signalling on the UK main line network. The costs and benefits of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) were modelled over a 40 year period and, based on these predictions, recommendations have been made for the implementation of ERTMS while ensuring compliance with the Interoperability Directives. When considering the safety benefits of ERTMS, predicted shifts between different modes of transport strongly influence the report’s conclusions. The EPT was commissioned to produce the report, which outlines the industry’s plan, by the ERTMS Programme Board (EPB), a body jointly set up and co-chaired by Railway Safety and the Strategic Rail Authority. The HSE has initiated a Review of the EPT report using independent consultants and experts. The NEL Consortium, which comprises NEL, TÜV and EQE International, has been awarded a contract to review the EPT intermediate and final reports. Other reviews are being undertaken by People Science & Policy and by NERA. This report and the work it describes were funded by the HSE. Its contents, including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect HSE policy. HSE BOOKS © Crown copyright 2003 First published 2003 ISBN 0 7176 2607 5 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Applications for reproduction should be made in writing to: Licensing Division, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, St Clements House, 2-16 Colegate, Norwich NR3 1BQ or by e-mail to [email protected] ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The final report of the ERTMS Programme Team (EPT), published on 25 April 2002, outlines a way ahead for train control and signalling on the UK main line network. The costs and benefits of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) were modelled over a 40 year period and, based on these predictions, recommendations have been made for the implementation of ERTMS while ensuring compliance with the Interoperability Directives. When considering the safety benefits of ERTMS, predicted shifts between different modes of transport strongly influence the report’s conclusions. The EPT was commissioned to produce the report, which outlines the industry’s plan, by the ERTMS Programme Board (EPB), a body jointly set up and co-chaired by Railway Safety and the Strategic Rail Authority. The HSE has initiated a Review of the EPT report using independent consultants and experts. The NEL Consortium, which comprises NEL, TÜV and EQE International, has been awarded a contract to review the EPT intermediate and final reports. Other reviews are being undertaken by People Science & Policy and by NERA. HSE defined a set of 13 technical questions which form the basis of the NEL Consortium’s review of the EPT report. The primary purpose of this review was to comment on the justification for the conclusions reached by the EPT and to assess the quality of the evidence cited in support of these conclusions. HSE requested liaison between the NEL Consortium and NERA in answering questions 4, 5 and 7. The EPT report recommends implementation of ERTMS Level 2 in an upgrade programme extending over 30 years. The report claims that capacity, performance and safety should all be enhanced by adopting the recommended strategy. Other options reviewed (principally the Uff/Cullen recommendation) were expected to have financial drawbacks and to reduce rail capacity, resulting in a potential shift of rail passengers to road transport (where mortality rates are far higher), with a consequent rise in risk to travellers. However, the evidence cited in support of this anticipated modal shift was inadequate. Furthermore, ERTMS Level 2 is currently at an early stage of development and because of this, the risks associated with its implementation are not fully understood. The high degree of project risk in recommending ERTMS Level 2 at this stage has not been given sufficient weight in the EPT report. These shortcomings mean that the totality of safety risks to passengers has not been adequately addressed in the report. Although the evidence cited in support of the report’s conclusions was considered to be inadequate, the technical solution recommended (ERTMS Level 2) has significant advantages. The following paragraphs summarise the NEL Consortium’s comments in response to the 13 questions which were raised by HSE on the EPT report. The impact on network capacity of implementing different levels of ERTMS (designated A, B, C and D in the report) has been analysed and is supported by traceable data. However, it is considered that further investigation is necessary to validate the report’s conclusions taking into account the initial state of the network, the combination of systems used in the different options and the implementation strategies employed to migrate from the initial state to each of the final states. The safety benefit for passengers in terms of SPAD-related incidents is the same for every option because the ATP function can provide the same protection for trains irrespective of the ERTMS level installed. However, the reduction in risk to passengers achievable with TPWS/TPWS+ is considered to be greater than that assumed by EPT, so if TPWS/TPWS+ is already installed, then the relative benefit of early ERTMS implementation is substantially iii reduced. In addition to these technical issues, the modal shift anticipated includes many potentially uncertain long-term assumptions and complex interactions which make the report’s conclusions on this aspect open to question. The safety of rail workers improves when ERTMS level 2 is fully installed, but this has not been analysed quantitatively in the EPT final report. However during the process of installing ERTMS it is anticipated that there may be an increase in risk to track workers, although the EPT report has not properly identified and recorded these risks nor have they been fully considered when assessing the safety benefits. The EPT report does acknowledge some uncertainty about the data used in the final report. The EPT report has not addressed the Railway Safety initiatives in reducing risks to trackside workers. Although modal shift between rail and road transport will occur, the assumption in the EPT reports of 100% modal shift is considered unrealistic and is not supported by credible evidence. The expected modal shift, when appropriate factors are considered, would be expected to be substantially less than that assumed in the EPT reports for both the case of capacity reduction and of capacity increase. Significant weaknesses were identified in the EPT’s consideration of societal risk as a result of modal shift. There are concerns over the mixing of actual fatalities and equivalent fatalities and the transfer of risk from one transport mode to another. In analysing the development times of their preferred strategy, ERTMS Option 4, the EPT identified qualitatively a series of critical factors. Although the major EU projects have been researched, a more detailed evaluation of the policy and influence of European railway operators would have given improved timescale estimates for system development and implementation in the UK. A number of potential business risks have been overlooked in the EPT report. In particular the assessment of ‘risked’ Capital Cost is suspect as there appears to be a lack of correlation between the Capital Cost assessment and the risked Capital Cost assessment. The EPT report identifies the system development issues and puts them on the critical path. However, there are concerns over the evidence supporting the areas of potential acceleration in the development programme. The EPT report states that all trains and 46% of all signals including those at pinch points (high risk junctions) will be fitted with TPWS which could avoid 81% of accidents preventable by ATP. Due to this claimed mitigation of risk and the expected higher costs for the early fitment of ERTMS/ETCS there does not appear to be sufficient justification on the grounds of ATP safety benefits alone. The EPT states that GSM-R is not a proven technology in the UK with the result that acceptance in the UK will be difficult. The EPT has assumed that GPRS could be added to the GSM-R system for a relatively small cost although it is acknowledged that some problems have to be solved before GPRS could be used. Although the EPT has set out a possible 5 stage migration strategy from TPWS to ERTMS Level 3, it has correctly not considered migration from Level 1 to Level 2 of ERTMS. It has been generally assumed that there is no incremental upgrade path from ERTMS Level 1 to ERTMS Level 2. The EPT reports do not consider new hazards and safety risks which may be introduced as a result of the implementation of ERTMS Level 2. In particular, the transfer of safety critical iv functions from trackside on to trains has not been fully considered.