The Issue of Conscientious Objection in Apartheid South Africa: Growth of the Anti-Conscription Movement

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Alternative title Notes and Documents - United Nations Centre Against ApartheidNo. 9/89 Author/Creator United Nations Centre against Apartheid; Committee on South African War Resistance Publisher United Nations, New York Date 1989-11-00 Resource type Reports Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) South Africa Coverage (temporal) 1957 - 1989 Source Northwestern University Libraries Description "The present paper deals with the growth of the South African anti-conscription and anti-war movement. It looks at the steady extension of military obliqations, religious opposition to conscription, the formation of ECC and, since its restriction, the emergence of a movement aqainst war and conscription in South Africa. Finally, it examines the current conditions in which mass defiance of apartheid legislation has encouraged the re-emergence of organized anti-conscription work." The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. Format extent 23 page(s) (length/size)

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United Nations Contre ag8StAlOI i9id Notes and Documents 9/89 - November 1989 JAN 3 11990 THE ISSUE OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: GROWTH OF THE ANTI-CONSCRIPTION MOVEMENT by the Committee on South African War Resistance [Note: The Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR) was formed by exiled South African war resisters in London in 1979. In 1980 it set up an office in Amsterdam. In resolution 33/165 of 20 December 1978 and in subsequent resolutions, the General Assembly of the United Nations, inter alia, recognized the right of all persons to refuse service in military or police forces which were used to enforce apartheid, called upon Member States to grant asylum or safe transit to another State to such persons and urged Member States to consider favourably the granting to such persons of all the rights and benefits accorded to refugees under existing legal instruments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.] All material in these Notes and Documents may be freely reprinted. 89-32874 Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated. United Nations, New York 10017

-2- INTRODUCTION Since their establishment, the South African armed forces have had one consistent function - to maintain economic and political inequality. Ideological justifications for apartheid have become increasinaly sophisticated, but the South African Defence Force (SADF) has remained its ultimate quarantor. As a consequence, it reflects strains within the oppressor group and its few African, coloured and Indian allies and between this group as a whole and the nationally oppressed majority of South Africans. These strains became increasingly apparent in the period becinnin early in 1975, when SADF entered Angola and was eventually forced to retreat back into illecally occupied Namibia, and in June 1976, when the uprisino started by black schoolchildren exposed the army's role in maintaininq apartheid. Exile was the earliest articulation of war resistance, followed by moral and religious objections to conscription. The deepeninq economic and political crises of apartheid have activated social and economic sectors that normally support the rime, such as business, into support for anti-conscription initiatives. To date, the greatest success of the South African anti-conscription and anti-war movement has been its ability to draw new areas of support without losing old ones. The current phase of struqale occurs on the eve of an election characterized by unprecedented divisions within the white communitv, while regional political developments have placed the r~gime in a strong position to make concessions that could weaken recently formed alliances within the anti-war movement. Simultaneously, there has been an upsurge in popular resistance by a broad range of forces from the oppressed majority and white anti-apartheid groups. The End Conscription Campaiqn (ECC) is among them. The present paper deals with the growth of the South African anti-conscription and anti-war movement. It looks at the steady extension of military obligations, religious opposition to conscription, the formation of BCC and, since its restriction, the emerqence of a movement against war and conscription in South Africa. Finally, it examines the current conditions in which mass defiance of apartheid lecislation has encouraged the re-emergence of orqanized anti-conscription work. CONSCRIPTION LBGISLATICN Only white males have military obliqations. Currently, the full-time, combat- ready SADF force is at about 178,000 soldiers, 111,000 of whom are fulfilling compulsory obligations to defend apartheid. Since 1957, when conscription was introduced, there has been a significant increase in the numbers wearinq the SADF uniform. 1/

-3- The ruling Nationalist Party has explicitly linked conscription to repression of internal resistance and the maintenance of inequality. In December 1959, Defence Minister Erasmus threatened to ban the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and stated that he planned to reorganize SADF along the lines of the French army in Algeria "to maintain the internal security of the State". 2/ He cited the use of troops in the townships, in Transkei and in Pondoland in the early 1960s and in the 1976 uprisings. 3/ The basis for conscription into SADF is the 1957 Defence Amendment Act which established a ballot system and twice-vearly intakes for military training lasting three months. In 1961, after widespread internal resistance which led to the declaration of a state of emergencv and the mobilization of the army, conscription was increased to six months. At that time, J. J. Fouche, then Minister for Defence, called upon white mothers to aive up their sons "in defence of the land", i.e., in defence of apartheid. 4/ Bv 1964, the annual intake to SADF amounted to 16,500 men. 5/ Three years later, in 1967, South Africa's rulers perceived apartheid to be under even greater threat. Liberation struqles in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe led them to introduce a period of nine months compulsory national service for all white men. In 1972, national service was extended to 12 months and 19 days of service in "camps", periods of operational duty in the Citizen Force, spread over five years. 6/ During the 1975 Anqolan invasion, which required a massive mobilization, SADF extended the service in camps to three months. In 1977, SADF increased the period of initial national service from one to two years, intendina to replace three-month camps with one 30-day camp stay per year for eight years. But three-month camp service was retained to meet the reoime's aqqressive regional military and political strategv: SADF incursions into Anqola and other neiqhbourinq States had increased and more troops were required to retain control of Namibia. 7/ In 1980, the South African Parliament passed leqislation to stop young men givina up their South African citizenship to avoid military service. Anvone who gave up their South African citizenship would lose the right to permanent residence. 8/ In 1982, there was another increase in citizen force camps. The period of obligation after national service was extended from 5 to 12 years, comprising alternate annual commitments of one and three months. In addition, older white men who had not been called up in the 1950s and 1960s were conscripted into the Conandoes. This involved one months's basic training, followed bv 12 days per year until the aqe of 55 years and additional duty in emergency situations. According to Defence Minister General Magnus Malan, this scheme placed an extra 800,000 men at the disposal of SADF. 9/ The bulk of this mobilization occurred in rural border areas as part of the r&Time's "area war" strateqy. 10/ The next significant development was the 1984 amendment to the Citizenship Act. This measure automatically imposed South African citizenship on all resident foreign nationals between the ages of 15 years and 6 months and 25 years, making them eligible for conscription into SADF. Moreover, several thousand older resident foreign citizens who had delayed taking out South African citizenship until they were too old to be conscripted, were also made

-4- eligible for Commando duties. This added approximately 46,000 persons to the combat potential of SADF. It has to be pointed out that, in practice, this measure was onlv applied to white immigrants. 11/ RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO CONSCRIPTIN The Defence Act made extremely limited provision for refusal to perform military service. Section 67(3) of the 1961 Defence Act enabled the registerinq officer to "allot any person who to his knowledge bona fide belongs and adheres to a recognized religious denomination by the tenets whereof its members may not participate in war" to a unit where thev could serve in a non- combatant capacity. Therefore, the State initially made only extremely limited recognition of conscientious objectors. They could only be members of universal pacifist denominations, such as Jehovah's Witnesses. There was no provision for any other type of objection. 12/ The early 1970s saw the re-emergence of internal extra-parliamentarv opposition at a time when the national liberation struggles in southern Africa, particularly in Mozambique and Angola, were oainina ground. Coupled with the extensions of conscription and military duties mentioned earlier, these factors increased debate about resistance to SADF. At the 1974 annual conference of the South African Council of Churches (SAgC), delegates passed a motion calling on church members to consider becoming conscientious objectors and to investigate the possibility of extending pastoral care from SADF to armed members of national liberation movements. Siqnificantly, the context of this motion was the concept of "just war": South Africa was an unjust and violent society, SADF was beinq used to defend and maintain inequality and it had provoked violence from freedom fighters which was not comparable with State violence. 13/ There was an outraqed response from the Government, the white "opposition" parties and the media. Even officials of member churches of SACC condemned the resolution. One of the exceptions was the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), which noted that the South African Government was committina the South African people to a war in defence of inequality and that apartheid was responsible for black resistance. It condemned the regime's efforts to develop war psychosis and militarism among whites. 14/ The State acted quickly. That same year it amended the 1957 Defence Act with a clause that imposed a R 5,000 fine and/or a six vear gaol sentence on anyone who encouraged or incited others to refuse or fail to perform any military service required under the Act. But, as Dr. Beyers Naud4 pointed out, legislation would not remove the causes for a crisis of conscience among young white conscripts concerned with apartheid. Increasingly, they were beinq drafted to defend a r4gime in crisis. 15/ In June 1975, Mozambique became independent. In August of that year South Africa invaded Anqola, intendinq to install pro-Western and pro-South African

- 5- of the Frente Nacional para a Libertac~o de Anola (FNEA) and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Anoola (UNITA) in Luanda before 11 November, Anqolan Independence day. In late March 1975, after seven months of fightinq, SADF was repulsed by a combined Cuban and Angolan army and forced to retreat to Namibia. 16/ In June 1976, three months later, the r4gime was confronted with widespread urban uprisings. Initiated bv schoolchildren, this resistance lasted six months, united diverse sectors of the black population and helped create the political conditions for the current phase of non-racial anti-apartheid opposition of which the movement against conscription has become a part. The army and the police were mobilized to crush opposition. This brought home to increasing numbers of vounq conscripts the armv's role in defending apartheid. Before the formation of a formal anti-conscription organization, the majority of politically motivated resisters went into exile. They fled to countries in southern Africa, Western Europe and to Commonwealth countries. The majority of those claiming asvlum had gone to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland or to the Netherlands. There thev organized themselves into self-help groups and linked up with the anti-apartheid orqanizations and ANC. In 1979, war resisters in the United Kinqdom and the Netherlands formed the Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR). Since its formation, COSAWR has pursued four main objectives: (a) Support and advising refugee war resisters seeking asylum; (b) Campaiqn for imprisoned war resisters in South Africa; (c) Research into the SADF's role in maintaining apartheid; (d) Work with the South African and Namibian national liberation movements and anti-apartheid qroups to isolate the apartheid regime. IMPRISONED OBJTORS Between 1977 and 1983, there were a succession of reliqiously and politically motivated conscientious objectors. In December 1977, Anton Eberhardt, who had already done his initial military service, was sentenced to 12 months in detention barracks, with ten months suspended for five years. He had refused to attend a three-week military canp or to serve in a non-combatant capacity "Wearing a uniform means you are part of the army", he said. 17/ In 1979, Peter Moll, a Baptist, confronted SADF as a selective conscientious objector. Moll had completed his initial period of service. He put forward three objections: (a) South African society was fundamentally unjust; (b) he would be forced to fight fellow South Africans who had legitimate grievances; and (c) he refused to fight for apartheid. In 1980, Moll was sentenced to 18 months in the military detention barracks. While there, he refused to wear military overalls or to perform military drill. He was placed in solitary confinement for a succession of two-week periods.

-6- In February 1980, Richard Steele, a universal pacifist, joined Moll in the detention barracks. He had been sentenced to one vear for refusina to perform military service. He too refused to wear military overalls or obey commands and was subjected to the same punishment. Moll and Steele had been active in church-based campaians to establish forms of alternative service. Their stands became the focus of a campaign among church people and academics for alternate service. Both were eventually given the right to wear blue conscientious objector overalls normally allocated to members of "peace churches". 18/ On 18 February 1981, Charles Yeats was arrested for refusing to obey call-up orders for a two-vear military service. In May 1981, he was court martialled and sentenced to 12 months in the detention barracks. For Yeats, service in SADF at that time was incompatible with the teachinqs of his church, but he expressed willingness to serve in the SADF Medical Corps if it was engaged in a just war. He also refused to wear a prison uniform or obey prison orders. After 12 months in gaol, he was "discharged with dishonour" and sentenced to another year in a civilian gaol for refusing to obey a lawful command. In November 1981, Graham Philpott, a theology student conscripted into the Chaplains Corps, refused to undergo compulsory training in firearms at the start of his militarv service in June that year at the Valhalla Air Force Gymnasium. He was charged under section 126al(b) of the Defence Act. 19/ On 24 February 1982, a military court sentenced Mike Viveros, a Baptist, to 18 months in gaol for refusing to render military service. Unlike his predecessors, Viveros was not placed in the detention barracks, but in a civilian gaol. "By heeding the call-up of SADF", he argued, "I would be required to defend the present system, a result of apartheid ideology, which is contrary to the teachings of Jesus Christ". The sentence he received did not nullify his eligibility for conscription on release, and further refusal could have led to additional punishment. 20/ After protests from church leaders, his sentence was reduced to one year. 21/ On 20 July 1982, Neil Mitchell, a Catholic pacifist, was sentenced to one year in the detention barracks for refusing to perform service in SADF. Mitchell refused to "go along with the dehumanization of the enemy into people to be hated, thereby denying their human dignity", but he was prepared to do an alternative non-militarv service. Like Viveros, he faced the possibility of further call ups after his gaol sentence. 22/ On 5 October 1982, Billy Paddock, an Anglican, was sentenced to one year in a civilian gaol, after which he would be "discharged with ignominy". Paddock was not a universal pacifist - he believed that SADF was fighting an unjust war. He supported the overall goals of the liberation movement and he respected the choice of those who felt that thev have no alternative but to take up arms against apartheid. On the same day, Neil Mitchell, who sought recognition as a conscientious objector, was charged with refusing to wear military overalls and sentenced to successive periods in solitary confinement. 23/

-7- In March 1983, Peter Hathorn became the first purely politically motivated war resister to be qaoled for refusin to serve in the apartheid armed forces. He received a two-year sentence, later reduced to one year on appeal, which he served in a civilian qaol. Hathorn put forward three reasons for refusinq: (a) the conflict in South Africa was immoral; (b) guerrillas of ANC and the South West Africa People's Orqanization (SWAPO) were not terrorists because the liberation movements had a lonq history of non-violent resistance; and (c) SADF could not be called a defence force because it occupied Namibia and attacked neiqhbourinq States. Hathorn, too, was prepared to perform non-military service that did not aid SADF. 24/ Forced to acknowledqe that hih profile conscientious objectors were the symptom of a more deep-rooted problem, in early 1982 SADF had set up the South African Army Non-Effective Troops Section. Its function was to keep track of conscripts with deferments and to prosecute war resisters. It was also desined to cope with students who held anti-apartheid views - particularly at the universities of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town, where there had been considerable discussion of war resistance. 25/ 1983 DEFENCE AMENDME24T ACT Hathorn was the last war resister to be sentenced under the old lecislation. As noted above, this leqislation only accepted as conscientious objectors adherents of particular churches. In March 1983, the Defence Act was amended to make provisions for individual conscientious objectors provided they fulfilled certain criteria. The r~cime introduced these provisions and established a Board for Religious Objection (BR)) as a result of pressure from the mainstream churches. A succession of articulate and principled objectors, many of them reliqious, had qone to qaol. This had generated demands from within the churches for alternative service, stimulated debate on liberal campuses and prompted the formation of conscientious objector support qroups. This represented the first sign of a war-resistance movement amonq younq whites. The provisions of the amendment, however, were extremely limited. BRO could only recognize reliqiously motivated universal pacifists who had no moral or political objections to servinq in SADF. It could recommend qaol or "alternative service", both of which were calculated on the basis of one to one and a half times the amount owed to the army in initial service or camps. A conscript who had performed no service would therefore face a six-year qaol or "alternative service" term. Gaol sentences were completed in civilian prisons while "alternative service" had to be performed in a qovernment department or office. This fell far short of the demands by the churches and it was clearly intended to separate reliqious from political/moral objectors and to punish or dissuade them with harsh sentences. There were public protest meetinqs. Orqanizations such as NUSAS, the Black Sash, and the South Africa Institute of Race Relations, as well as prominent anti- apartheid clerqymen, all condemned and criticized it. At an official level, all mainstream churches except the pro-apartheid Dutch

-8- Reformed Church refused to have any part in its implementation. EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT The amendment greatly reduced the flow of war resisters who were prepared to suffer imprisonment. In this respect, the amendment succeeded: at least one objector who had publicized his intention before the amendment went into exile rather than face six years in qaol. But the r~uime had not reckoned on other developments, including: (a) The cumulative political impact of the actions of previous conscientious objectors; (b) Moral opposition to conscription among young whites; (c) Resentment at increasing militarv commitments in Angola, Namibia and South Africa itself; (d) The existence of conscientious objector support groups (COSGs), a national support structure for imprisoned objectors; (e) A political climate favouring mass anti-apartheid orcianization; (f) Resurgence of a non-racial programme of opposition which placed anti- conscription work within the overall context of the struggle against apartheid. These factors created the conditions for the formation of a broadly based anti- apartheid orqanization that could unite diverse motivations for resisting conscription and that worked openly, using a political style with which young whites could identify. FORMATICN OF BOC In March 1983, the Annual Congress of the Black Sash, a white liberal women's anti-apartheid organization, passed a motion calling for an end to compulsory conscription into SADF. In July of that year, BCC was launched at the Annual Conference of COSGs held at Durban. Local COSGs were instructed to establish local B:Cs, drawing together church, women's, student, civil rights and political organizations. In November 1983, ECCs were set up at Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Other centres followed later. While the 1974 amendment to the Defence Act prevented anyone from persuading others to refuse or ignore instructions to perform military service, they could call for an end to the system of compulsory conscription and for changes in the area of alternate service in the 1983 Defence Amendment Act. BXC was launched at the end of 1983. Throughout its existence, it has sought to maintain the broadest possible support for these objectivps, while at the same time pointing to the SADF role in maintaining apartheid. In the first half of 1984, the Johannesburg and Cape Town branches of BCC organized a "No war in Namibia" campaiqn. Public meetings, press conferences and concerts attracted a wide ranging audience to the messaae that withdrawal

-9- of South African troops from Namibia was a first step towards the end of conscription. However, EOC was only put on a national footing in October 1984, when it launched its "Call for a just peace in South Africa". By a "just peace", EXCC meant a future South Africa without the injustices of apartheid and the internal conflict of a situation analogous to civil war, an end to the South African occupation of Namibia, an end to SADF implementation of apartheid and an end to the imprisonment or exile for objectors. In addition, they arqued that conscription of black South Africans would exacerbate conflict and that defence expenditure could be better used to reduce poverty. 26/ In the second part of 1984, 19-year-old William Archer was sentenced to 75 months in gaol, after the Board for Religious Objection had rejected his application for alternative service. Archer had started his national service and at that time was in the Reconnaisance Commando, an elite unit specializing in sabotage and operations behind enemy lines. BRO rejected his application as "insincere". 27/ In 1985, the International Year of the Youth, EOC worked with SACC and the United Democratic Front (UDF). During late June, it organized a peace festival at the University of Witwatersrand. The festival's theme was "Stop the call-up". At the end of the festival, participants unanimously adopted a resolution for an end to conscription. It stated: "The building of peace in southern Africa is threatened by the presence of and actions of SADF in Namibia and elsewhere in southern Africa and in South Africa's townships... . We call for an end to conscription which forces young men to fight in these situations." 28/ Though the 1983 amendment seriously curtailed individual resistance to conscription, it could not destroy it. On 13 August 1985, Alan Dodson was court martialled for refusing to obey an order to qo into the townships with SADF. Anxious to avoid an incident at a time when the presence of troops in the townships was widely condemned, SADF merely fined him. 29/ In October 1983, ECC initiated a dual campaign. One aspect called for "troops out of the townships". The other aspect was the "Fast for a just peace", which consisted of a three-week fast by individuals and qroups at Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburq and Port Elizabeth. The fast ended in large public meetings which called for the removal of troops from the townships. Those who had fasted for the full three weeks were given standing ovations. Exiled war resisters in London and Amsterdam fasted in solidarity. 30/ A JUST PEACE During 1986, the primary campaign of ECC was also based on the notion of a just peace. Having called for the removal of troops from the townships and for the riqht of conscripts to choose whether they should be used to defend apartheid, EXC now set out to demonstrate what they regarded as genuine national service. The "Working for a just peace" campaign brouaht aroups of young whites into the townships to work on projects approved by township

- 10 - organizations, simultaneously stressing shortcomings of the r&qime's alternative service campaign. 31/ In May 1986, Phillip Wilkinson, a conscientious objector, was arrested at a Johannesburg ECC rally and dragged out of the hall by plainclothes military policemen. Wilkinson had already completed his initial "national service" and one camp service. In June 1984, BEO had turned down his application for a religious objector status. Further refusal would made him liable for a 30-month gaol sentence. 32/ Speaking at the meeting at which Wilkinson had been arrested, the Rev. Molefe Tsele of the National Education Crisis Committee (NaCC) told the audience that it was "a crime against our people and our children to serve in the army. Life will never be the same. The time will come when we will check the lists of what young white men did after matriculating and we won't lightly call someone a comrade when they have fought against us". 33/ Wilkinson was held, released on bail and charged seven times. On 14 June 1986, he was detained without trial for 111 days under the state of emergency regulations. On his release, he was severely restricted. 34/ In May 1987, he was fined R 600 for failing to report for military service - a light sentence for someone accused by the magistrate of disrupting "SADF and the entire administration of the country". 35/ Wilkinson's defence included evidence from an ex-conscript who testified that troops on patrol provoked reaction from township residents in the townships, a former SWAPO member abducted by SADF from the Kassinga refugee camp in 1978, and Archbishop Hurley, past president of the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference. But the reluctance to create an anti-apartheid martyr, whose case had already generated considerable publicity, must also have been a factor. 36/ A significant development during this period was the formation of EQC branches in Stellenbosch and Pretoria, both predominantly Afrikaans speakina areas. The Pretoria branch was launched in May 1986. The Stellenbosch branch experienced continued harassment, and was eventually banned from the Stellenbosch University campus. 37/ RESTRICrIN OF EOC In June 1986, the year-old state of emergency was renewed. Tighter regional and national restrictions were affecting work of EOC. Special emergency legislation introduced harsh penalties for any organization which brought "into disrepute the system of compulsory militarv service". In October 1986, as part of its "Right to speak" campaign, ECC distributed 10,000 postcards addressed to State President P. W. Botha calling for the removal of restrictions on BOC. Prevented from publicly articulating opposition, it used the widespread display of yellow ribbons as a protest against political detentions, the deployment of troops in the townships and black schools and for the right to protest against oppression in South Africa. 38/

- 11 - During this period, CC placed greater emphasis on small-scale actions. They included the building of sand castles and peace signs on beaches and the exhibition entitled "Prisoners of war", displayed at Johannesburg. 39/ The movement was also being investigated under the Fund Raising Act. This led to international protests. 40/ Despite these limitations, it was evident that SADF faced disquiet about troop deployment in the townships. As early as 1985, when 35,000 troops were sent into the townships, several Witwatersrand units consistently deployed in the townships reported a 25 per cent absentee rate. Within the army itself, there were signs of internal resistance and strain. The attempted suicide rate had risen from 261 in 1985 to 362 in 1986. Of the latter figure, 335 were conscripts. Many of the deaths were caused by conflicts within SADF such as Enolish-Afrikaans hostility, the treatment of homosexuals and convicted drug offenders, harsh and meaningless discipline, punishment exercises and confinement to the military detention barracks. 41/ In January 1987, prior to the February call-up, SADF published full-page letters in national English and Afrikaans newspapers written by General Geldenhuvs, chief of SADF. 42/ Its first major campaign of 1987, "War is not compulsory - Let's choose a just peace", began on 23 April with a one-day fast and ended on 31 May. It included an anti-war film festival, a rally and meetings in support of Phillip Wilkinson (see above). 43/ THE TWEI-THREE Between June 1987 and July 1988 BCC slowly rebuilt itself. Under the state of emergency it could not organize mass-participation high-profile campaigns; it had no legal public voice and the defensive nature of its campaigns meant that in effect it had been campaigning for the right to campaign. Within this unpromising context, in August 1987, 23 Cape Town objectors publicly and collectively refused further participation in SADF at the time of the second annual call-up. Their stand was a direct challenge to the State. Previously, objectors, many with deeply held religious convictions, had stood as courageous and articulate, but isolated individuals. They had received wide support as objectors confronted SADF collectively. They took the initiative. They did not wait for SADF to seek them out. The stand of the 23 appeared to mark a dramatic change. In fact, it was the product of extensive discussions among war resisters, many of whom had already declared at public meetings that they would refuse initial or further military obligations in defence of apartheid. The group comprised students and working people, ex-conscripts and those facing initial conscription, both English- and Afrikaans-speakers. It confirmed that objection was not confined to the liberal English-speaking community and that the movement against conscription was the expression of

- 12 - qrowing resistance among young whites, which was a symptom of the wider struggle against apartheid. In their joint statement, the 23 attributed their refusal to apartheid the source of conflict in South Africa: "...It poisons relations between our people and our neighbourinq countries. It creates poverty and inequality. Its bitter fruits are hatred and violence... We believe that SADF is not a shield behind which peaceful change can occur, but an instrument for defending the privileqes of a minority. SADF continually contravenes international law. It illegally occupies Namibia. It violates the sovereignty of neiQhbourinq States and commits acts of aggression aqainst the citizens of these countries... We believe that there is a future where all South Africans can live in peace and harmony with each other. We pledge ourselves to build and be part of that future. To serve in SADF would contradict such a pledge." 44/ On 3 March 1988, Dr. Ivan Toms, an ex-conscript and founding member of BOC, was sentenced to 21 months for refusing further service in SADF. Toms was the second person to be charged under the 1983 amendment, but the first of the 23 to stand trial. He had already completed two years of conscription as a medical doctor in Namibia and had worked in a church-funded clinic in the Crossroads squatter community outside Cape Town until 1986, when SADF took it over as part of its drive to destroy squatter resistance. During the publicity campaign preceding his trial, he received widespread national and international support from religious, homosexual, medical, anti-apartheid and war resistance groups. In the recent past, the State had charged objectors such as Dodson and Wilkinson with failing to report for duty, a "crime" which carries a liqhter penalty. However, the regime tried to make an example of Toms, hoping to frighten off further objectors. Toms received a qaol sentence amountinq to one-and-a-half times the period "owed" to SADF. In December 1988, Toms was released from prison pending the outcome of an appeal against the lenqth of his sentence. At the end of August 1989, he was still out on bail. THE CASTLE THREE At the time of Toms' trial, three serving Cape Town conscripts were charged with passing on secret information to an "unauthorized source" - EC. A fourth conscript was also involved, but he was a spy who had consistently informed his superiors of the plans and actions of the other three. While the three did not share identical motives for their actions, they were all aware of a secret department within the Cape Town headquarters of SADF, which was set up with the specific aim of undermining the work of EEC. The three believed that SADF had no right to defame ECC. They were initially tried in a military court durinq January 1988, under the charqe of attempting to expose the anti-BOC propaganda of SADF. Their appeal was heard before the Cape Town Supreme Court, where SADF argued that South Africa was in a state of war and consequently any of its actions against "subversion" could be justified. In August 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that

- 13 - a military court could not be impartial, therefore had no right to try them, and that the sentences imposed on the conscripts should be set aside. 45/ The existence of such views amongst conscripts must place SADF in a vul-erable position, as the loyalty of its troops became increasingly questionable. At that stage, BEC was the fastest qrowinq white anti-apartheid oraanization. But the size of the proqressive white constituency meant that it quickly reached the limits of its potential qrowth. 46/ Its stress on moral arguments against conscription meant that BCX app ared hostile to serving conscripts. BCC had alienated many conscripts and failed to convince them that it could represent their interests. 47/ According to Nick Boraine, the 1987 national orqanizer of EOC, "conscripts who are joining us are brinqinq that gut popular understanding of politics into our organization". As a result, EYC was taking "quite a massive shift to a sympathetic approach to the conscripts' experience", and was incorporating an understanding of their experience into its work. "Our activity must be organic to the white experience", he stressed. 48/ INTEGRATIN OF EXPERIENCES What experiences would BCC have to integrate into its work? The experiences of conscripts and their families in relation to brutalization while undergoing training, repression of internal resistance in the townships, counter- insurgency in Namibia and battle situations in Angola, proved to be important sources. The defeats and relatively high death rate among white conscripts sent to Angola undermined white confidence in SADF. After the mutiny of the black troops of the South West African Territorv Force (SWATF) of the 101 Battalion, white conscripts were sent into battle. Though better equipped than black troops, their death rate fast approached levels politically unacceptable to white South Africans. By January 1988, SADF had begun to lose air superiority. That month an SADF analysis indicated that the r~gime could capture Cuito Cuanavale without air cover, but only if it was prepared to lose not less than 300 white troops, and 2,000 members of SWATF. There had already been one SWATF mutiny at an earlier stage in this conflict. This exploded the myth that SADF was a modern, well- equipped army. 49/ On 17 Novemrber 1987, SADF and SWATF admitted 25 deaths in Angola during the precedinq three weeks. They claimed to have killed 3,600 and wounded 10,000 Angolan and Cuban soldiers durinq these encounters. However, given the extent of the fiqhtinq the Angolan claim that since 6 February 1988, 230 South African troops had been killed, is more likely. These figures largely comprise deaths of white conscripts. The deaths of members of the prestigious President's Guard and the capture intact SADF tanks at Cuito Cuanavale in March 1988, shook white South Africans out of their complacent racist belief that their "boys on the border" were inherently superior to black enemy soldiers. 50/

- 14 - Incidents, such as the death of four conscripts in an armoured personnel carrier during a counterattack by FAPLA in February 1988, also generated resentment and suspicion among surviving relatives that conscripts were taking the losses, while professional soldiers were kept out of the fighting. The father of one of the conscripts killed in the Ratel told the press: "Our young boys leave school, get called up for service, train for three months and then face rocket fire while the permanent force are sitting behind their desks controlling them from a distance". The death toll forced many conscripts and their families to realize that to fight for apartheid was to die for a Government that made unacceptable demands of them. 51/ The manner in which troop deaths were announced and covered up also caused alarm and suspicion among whites. Though they passively accepted state propaganda and the suppression of virtually all resistance, the whites became deeply concerned about the lack of information on how their sons, lovers or husbands had died. This was also apparent in the suspicion that officials were abusing their privileoes to protect relatives from combat situations. As a reader of the Johannesbura Star asked: "What is the commitment of ministerial sons to SADF, especially in connection with the two months every year for 12 years after the basic 2 years? Have any of them ever been on cross-border sorties, or are they shuffling papers in the Castle in Cape Town. Is Mr. P. W. Botha's youngest son enjoying the discipline his father admires so, as he is about the right age?" 52/ The stand of the 23 and the effect of the SADF defeat in Angola on the white morale has exposed one of the r6gime's greatest weaknesses - its reliance on consenting or compliant conscripts. But only the more articulate and politically conscious sections of the white youth make public their opposition to apartheid conscription. Many who are marginally involved in democratic and progressive organizations, or who are simply concerned, identify with their actions but will never follow their examples. As Ivan Toms said after completing a speaking tour of universities shortly before his trial: "I have often been told by young white men that they support what I have been doing and respect me, but that thev could not do it themselves. At the same time they are thankful that I am doina it, almost on their behalf". 53/ The combination of moral arguments, mass opposition to apartheid from the oppressed black majority, collective refusal and the effects of war had given the regime cause for concern, but resistance had not reached a critical threshold. Most conscripts were still reporting for duty and the majority of whites were not calling for an end to conscription itself but for changes in the way the army operated. Their criticisms of the army were not determined by the overall role of SAWF in maintaining an unjust society, but by the specific situations in which conscripts found themselves and the effect of conscription on white lifestyles. Consequently, criticism of SADF and the conscription would decline as the army made fewer demands on conscripts. Politically, this suggested to EXX that one of its initial campaigning

- 15 - demands, the right to non-punitive alternative service outside state structures, could be sympathetically received. ALTERNATIVE SERVICE Building on its 1986 project, entitled "Workinq for a just peace", and the 1988 campaign by EOC, entitled "Action for alternative service", set out to persuade bi business, as well as the community, reliqious and welfare organizations to back its call for non-punitive alternative service to be performed outside State structures. That year, a survey of male students at Rhodes University in the Eastern Cape revealed that 56 per cent of respondents gave conscription as a reason for intended emigration. 54/ At the same time, it published a booklet entitled Know Your Rights, which gave conscripts information about their rights and duties in SADF. By providing this information, it aimed to meet the needs of serving conscripts by helping "the reluctant conscript and the conscripted community" - those whose sons, husbands or lovers have been conscripted - to challenge SADF and assert basic rights in the army. 55/ This search for a wider appeal among more conservative whites was no obstacle to action against conscription itself. On 25 July 1988, David Bruce became the first conscript to receive the maximum six-year sentence for refusing conscription in defence of apartheid. On his own admission, Bruce was "just an ordinary guy" with no political profile. His refusal was based on two points: (a) a fundamental opposition to apartheid and to the war SADF was waging in defence of apartheid throughout South Africa; and (b) his family's experience in Nazi Germany: "Being aware, as I am, of how European Jews and in fact the entire people of Eastern Europe suffered durinq the period of the Holocaust, I feel that I have no choice but to set myself aqainst those who choose the path of increasing racial intolerance and racial hatred in the firmest way which is possible to me". 56/ THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THREE On 3 Aucust 1988, 143 war resisters from Cape Town, Durban, Grahamstown and Johannesburg publicly voiced their refusal to serve in SADF. "We believe that SADF helps to uphold the system of apartheid", they said in a joint statement. At least 105 of them faced the same sentence as David Bruce. The remainder had all done various periods of army service. Many had been sent into Angola and had witnessed atrocities, which had led them to refuse further service. Etienne Marais served in 1980 and 1981. He said: "The kind of things that involved the men I was with ranged from the shootinq of a 30-year-old woman in cold blood, to the torture of a 16-year-old girl for eight hours in Anqola." 56/ The reasons for refusal were as varied as the Qroup itself. Mark Patrick completed his national service in January 1979, the month that his younqer brother Timothy went into the army. Seven months later, he died 300

- 16 - kilometres inside Ancola. He was painted black and he was wearing a UNITA uniform. He carried on him a Portuguese bible and a Portuguese passport. Mark later realized the futility and injustice of the actions of the apartheid army in Angola, Namibia and the South African townships. Peter Anderson refused to serve "for a variety of reasons. My religious background has always stressed reconciliation and the peaceful pursuit of human relationships. Dogmatically, the Anglican church has made allowance for the concept of'just war'. I can find nothing just in the actions by SADF, neither within South Africa nor in Angola, nor elsewhere". Andre Zaaiman held the rank of captain before renouncing his commission as one of the 143. "From a soldier's perspective, SADF was a fine army", he said. However, he continued: "It has become an instrument of deliberate and large-scale repression, serving narrow political ends in the name of democracy and freedom. I and many other young South Africans are not prepared to sacrifice our lives in the defence of tyranny." 58/ Thouqh BOC had no connection with the 143, the regime blamed it for their stand. Shortly after the stand of the 143, Magnus Malan, the Minister for Defence, indicated that EOC would be banned when he accused it of "being in the vanguard of forces intent on wrecking the present dispensation", and rejected calls for alternative service. On 22 August 1988, EC was forbidden to carry out "any activities whatsoever". 59/ BES IER AND BATZOFIN It was soon clear that restriction would not stop public stands. Four days after the banning of BC, six Cape Town conscripts publicly declared their refusal to fight. Simultaneously, 50 national, regional and local member organizations of BOC undertook to continue campaiqninq against conscription. Much of the work fell on GCOGS, out of which BCC had originally emerged in 1983-1984. COSGs became the cutting edge of war resister organization and mobilization as conscientious objectors took public stands and required organized structures of support to publicize the reasons for their refusals. 60/ Another important national organization was the Conscription Advice Servce (CAS). It continued to advise potential and serving conscripts and their families about their options if they had doubts about national service and about their rights as soldiers. On 5 December 1988, 18-year-old Charles Bester became the second objector to receive the minimum 6-year sentence for refusing to serve in SADF. His opposition to conscription was based on deeply-held religious and political beliefs: "In South Africa, we have lived and are living under a political system which belies the fundamental tenets of Christianity... The ideology of apartheid has been responsible for untold human suffering and humiliation in the pursuit of power by a small minority." 61/ Another aspect of the campaign against compulsory conscription has been the involvement of the mothers of conscripts. In February 1989, the first of

- 17 - the two annual call-ups was marked by press conferences and meetincis in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesbur. More than 500 women - the wives, mothers and sisters of national servicemen - called for alternative service. In a parallel initiative about 1,000 mothers and wives signed a petition listinq similar demands. There have been further developments in traditional constituencies of support for the campaign aqainst conscription. The Church Alternative National Service Proqrarme (CANSP) commits participatin denominations to identify projects where skills are needed for communitv development. The denominations then raise funds to employ conscripts who refuse to serve in SADF or to submit themselves to BgO in qenuine alternatives to military service. The Programme, however, cannot protect participatinq objectors from prosecution. Rates of pay are equivalent to those paid by the Department of Manpower to officially recognized reliqious objectors. The impact of work with the business community on alternate service which had started in 1988 bore fruit in the campaign around Saul Batzofin. A personnel development officer for a laroe South African life assurance firm, Batzofin was one of the 143. In April 1989, he was sentenced to 18 months in qaol. The origins of his refusal lie in his experiences as a conscript in Namibia. There he saw SADF armoured cars riding over kraal fences and the corpses of SWAPO combatants being eaten by wild dogs because they had not been properly buried. After completinq his national service Batzofin net township residents as a member of EOC. They told him more about the SADF role in maintaininq apartheid. He said: "I came to see that SADF was being used as part of a repressive strategy to uphold the apartheid system, and was not acting in the interests of the broad South African community." 62/ Batzofin's support qroup has campaigned actively amonq business people seeking support for his stand and for companies to quarantee the employment and salaries of employees imprisoned for their refusal to serve, just as they do for conscripts serving in SADF. After his conviction, 14 senior businessmen came out in support of Batzofin and called for non-military alternatives to national service. Pressures from the business community for alternative service and a reduction in conscription are not altruistic. The business community is concerned about costs to the economy caused by the high emigration rate of qraduates evading service. The system of camps for the Citizen Force Reserve removes men from employment for up to three months every year, it is disruptive and the practice of quaranteeinq salaries and jobs in their absence is expensive. 63/ RECENT DEVELOPMENTS The period between April and September 1989 has seen two significant political trends in South Africa: the emergence of cplits within the ruling bloc and a Qreater cohesion and confidence among the broad grouping of

- 18 - anti-apartheid forces known as the Mass Democratic Movement. In the weeks prior to elections for the tricameral Parliament, resistance to racially segregated facilities, such as beaches and hospitals, increased dramatically. Simultaneously, numerous restricted orqanizations defied the authorities and declared themselves unbanned. EC was amonq them. On 22 August 1989, EOC announced a fresh drive against conscription. Gavin Evans, EBC spokesman at Johannesburg, said: "From today, as far as we are concerned, we are an unbanned orqanization. We are speaking as ECC. We are back on the road aqain." On the same day in Durban, the police arrested nine EDC activists who were displaying posters and tyinq yellow anti-war ribbons to lamp posts. 64/ Do these actions herald the return of EC at the national level? The r6qime is concerned about the cost of conscription and its expensive military commitments. In the context of an increasinglv beleagured economy, the State may be more amenable to calls for a reduction in military service. It could cut the length of military service as SADF is withdrawing from Namibia. There are also at present peace initiatives in Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, F. W. de Klerk wishes to appear as a regional peace-broker. Defence Minister Malan has already cut the period of camp service for those in the Commandoes and in the Citizen Force Reserve, conscripts who have already served their two year's basic traininq, by almost a third. But these reductions are rationalizations of currently underutilized manpower. Citizen Force reservists generally only serve an average of sliqhtly over half of their required 720 days. In March 1989, Chief of the Army Lt. Gen. Liebenberq stated that many national servicemen underqoinq their initial two year's training are not fully utilized and are demobilized after serving only 22 of their 24 months' commitment. A separate set of Defence Force statistics issued in May 1989 revealed that less than half of the men volunteering for the permanent force were not taken on. 65/ SADF is capitalizing on currently reduced military comitments to rationalize anomalies in existing manpower distribution. It has also suggested that any further reductions in service will take the form of more cuts to camp commitments, not reductions in national service. National service is an intensely ideological experience which plays a major part in keepinq whites within the laaqer. SADF will not give up the opportunity to impress its propaqanda on a captive audience of young whites for two years. More likely, it will use the current situation as a means to divide elements of the campaign for alternative service in the way it tried, unsuccessfully, to divide reliqious from political objectors. The business constituency and the professional associations, for instance, miqht accept schemes accommodatinq their skill requirements which other qroupinqs, such as students or the churches, would regard as insufficient. There are, however, already siqns of qrowing political militancy amonq those currently engaged in "alternative service". The terms of their service forbid them from being politically involved. But increasing numbers of them are ignoring these restrictions by collectively supporting imprisoned war

- 19 - resisters or by criticizing the function of the State-directed "alternative service". In addition, Reverend Douglas Torr, another member of the 143, faces prosecution and six years in gaol. Torr supports the Church Alternative National Service Project and as a universal pacifist he qualifies for State-approved alternative service. But he rejects this privilege just because he is religious. "From an ideological point of view", he said, "apartheid is a heresy. Because SADF supports apartheid policy by maintaining the state of emergency, I can have nothing to do with it". 66/ CONCLUSION The South African anti-conscription and anti-war movement unites a diverse range of forces and motivations. Over the vears, the range of reasons for refusal has grown, but no addition has been at the cost of its earlier reasons for refusal. Initially, the clearest reasons advanced were religious and political motivations. This was articulated in two directions - courageous individuals prepared to suffer aaol and exiles who formed COSAWR, an external organization that has mounted strong critiques of SADF and alerted the international comunity to the function of conscription in maintaining apartheid. Each extension of military commitments has invariably followed from a perceived threat to the future of apartheid. These increases have created a culture of apolitical resistance to the army, which increases as South Africa's economy deteriorates. The State has attempted to separate religious from political objectors by introducing a formula of punitive alternative service or imprisonment worked in the short term. In the longer term, it created the conditions for a structured, issue- based anti-conscription organization. EX emerged out existing qroupings at a time when the perceived need for mass based anti-apartheid organizations working towards a non-racial and unitary South Africa was strong. The r4qime's response to resistance in South Africa and Namibia was increased repression and widespread deployment of conscripts. In Angola, many conscripts confronted for the first time the realitv that fighting for South Africa meant dying for aoartheid. In all spheres of engaoement - South Africa, Namibia, neiqhbouring States - conscripts participated in or witnessed atrocities committed bv fellow conscripts. Coupled with brutal treatment during basic training, it has led to a rapid increase in attempts of suicide amona conscripts and to high levels of post-traumatic stress. The r4gime's attempts to gloss over these trends have only compounded the concern felt by conscripts and their relatives. By creating a community of experience among potential conscripts and veterans, SADF brought whites from diverse backgrounds together in opposition to apartheid and conscription. This iade possible collective stands of refusal among an already-politicized constituency.

- 20 - The limits of this constituency forced reassessment: even a powerful combination of religious, moral and material factors could not vet effect a qualitative change in white attitudes to conscription and apartheid. Greater concentration on issues of direct concern to the conscript required reduction in political profile. The cumulative effect of these factors has created the conditions for a broad front supporting changes in the law on alternative service. Initially, this coincided with intensified restrictions on many fronts of anti- apartheid work, but could not prevent individuals from exposing conscription in defence of apartheid by courageous decisions to suffer imprisonment. The current resurqence of defiance, of which BCC is a part, does not contradict or undermine the alliance of forces campaiqninq for alternative service. But the State is in a stronq position to make limited concessions in this area. The r&Iime's military and political defeat in Angola and its withdrawal from Namibia strengthened the cynicism and the disillusionment among conscripts who increasingly wonder when SADF, which failed to hold the apartheid line in Angola and Namibia, will be incapable of maintaining apartheid in South Africa. The stage is set for the re-emerqence of nationally co-ordinated action against conscription, renewed articulation of a strong moral and political critique of apartheid and for the State to make potentially divisive concessions. Whatever the future holds for ECC in the current context of repression and resistance, a national war resistance movement exists. Whatever minor chances the r~aime introduces, conscripts will continue to make up the strength of SADF. Since the South African economy cannot support a large, full-time, white professional army, conscription will remain the backbone of SADF, and SADF will still be used to maintain apartheid. While these conditions prevail, there will always be fertile grounds for resistance to conscription as part of the struggle for a democratic and non-racial South Africa. Notes 1/ G. Cawthra, Brutal Force, London, 1985, p. 262. 2/ As quoted in Moses Kotane, South African revolutionary, Inkuleleko Publications, 1975. 3/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 24 May 1985. 4/ Hansard (Cape Town), 18 May 1961, cols. 7005-7. 5/ J. Barber, South Africa's foreign policy, 1945-1970, London, 1973. 6/ Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Southern Africa: the escalation of a conflict, Stockholm, 1976.

- 21 - 7/ Resister (London), journal of the Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR) No. 19, April/May 1982. 8/ Resister (London), journal of the Committee on South African War REsistance (COSAWR) No. 7, February/March 1980. 9/ Resister (London), journal of the committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR) No. 19, April/May 1982. 10/ Financial Mail (Johannesburo), 15 Januarv 1982. 11/ Fiqhtinq for apartheid: A job for life, Brussels, 1988, p. 20. 12/ Catholic Institute for International Relations (CII n conscience, London, 1982 13/ ECU News Bulletin (Johannesburq), 5 Auqust 1981. 14/ South African Outlook (Johannesburq), Auaust 1974. 15/ Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburq), 15 Auqust 1974. 16/ Burchett, South Africa stands up, New York, 1978. 17/ Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburq), 14 December 1977; and ibid., 16 December 1977. 18/ Resister (London), No. 5, November/December 1979. 19/ Daily Dispatch, 17 November 1981. 20/ Resister (London), No. 19, April/May 1982. 21/ Resister (London), No. 20, June/July 1982. 22/ Resister (London), No. 21, Auqust/September 1982. 23/ Resister (London), No. 22, October/November 1982. 24/ Resister (London), No. 25, April/MaV; and ibid., No. 26, June/July 1983. 25/ CIIR,oD. cit., London 1982. 26/ Nationa.. 'Inion ot Sou,;i African 3tidnts, in whose detnce? cons.ciption and SADF, Amiouct 1984. 27/ Objz:tor, News,-ttor o-t :ho Cat>, Town Cons.ientiou, .uonxrt Group, vol. 2, No. 7, Caoetown, 1984. 28/ BBC Monitori-ii R-}xorts, 4 July 19. 29/ Re:sist: (Uondon) , No. 40, Oe-ftohr/,]ovember 39$3 5.

- 22 - 30/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 11 October 1985. 31/ Cape Times (Cape Town), 8 April 1986. 32/ Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC), Phillip Wilkinson, conscientious objector 28 February 1986. 33/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 8 Mav 1986. 34/ SACBC, op. cit. 35/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 15 Mav 1987. 36/ Ibid. 37/ Resister (London), No. 59, Auqust/September 1986. 38/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 7 October 1986. 39/ The Star (Johannesburg), 17 February 1987. 40/ New Nation (Johannesburg), 5 February 1987; and The Citizen Joha esburq, 12 February 1987. 41/ BOC Focus, May 1987. 42/ The Independent (London), 12 January 1987. 43/ Daily Dispatch, 14 April 1987. 44/ Resister (London), No. 52, October/November 1988. 45/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg) 18 Auust 1989. 46/ Southscan, 6 January 1988. 47/ South (London), 10 March 1988. 48/ Southscan, 6 January 1988. 49/ Southscan, 4 May 1988. 50/ Resister (London), No. 53, December 1987/Januarv 1988. 51/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 17 February 1988. 52/ The Star (Johannesburg), 28 March 1988. 53/ South (London), 10 March 1988. 54/ Resister (London), No. 54, February/March 1988. 55/ South (London), 10 March 1988.

- 23 - 56/ Resister (London), No. 57, Auqust/September 1988. 57/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburq), 5 Auqust 1988. 58/ Resister (London), No. 60, February/March 1989. 59/ BBC Reports (London), 5 August 1988 and Morning Star, 23 August 1988. 60/ The Weeklv Mail (Johannesburq), 26 Auaust 1988. 61/ New Nation (Johannesburq), 29 September 1988. 62/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 17 March 1989. 63/ Cape Times (Cape Town), 8 May 1989. 64/ Reuters dispatch, 22 Auqust 1989. 65/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburq), 12 May 1989; and ibid., 28 May 1989; Star 30 March 1989. 66/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburq), 18 Auqust 1989.