ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 5, pp 791± 820, 1997

Thefuture of revolutions at the ®n-de-sieÁcle

JOHN FORAN

Istheera ofrevolutionover? Did it end in 1989?And was thatsuch a longtime ago,in any case? Itdoesn’ t necessarilyseem tobe over in places like Mexico (Chiapas),Algeria, Peru or Zaire, and may be just around the corner elsewhere (Egypt?).The discourse of revolution may be changing; the international loci andfoci may be moving(with the demise of the Soviet Union and the tentative consolidationof democracies in Latin America); the actors may be changing (withmore women and ethnic minorities active; though both have long histories ofrevolutionary activism)Ð all of this may be (arguably) true. But this article willargue that revolutions are goingto be with us tothe end of history, andÐ pace FrancisFukuyamaÐ that is notin sight. SocialrevolutionsÐ in Theda Skocpol’ s nowclassic sense of`rapid, basic transformationsof a society’s stateand class structures¼accompanied and in partcarried through by class-based revoltsfrom below’ 1Ðare infact relatively rare eventsby virtue of thedeep degree of transformationthey require to qualify as such.While the issue of`how much’ transformation is enoughto merit the label`social’ is avexingone, most analysts can agree on the list of twentieth- centurysocial revolutions: Russia 1917,China 1949, Cuba 1959, Nicaragua 1979,Iran 1979 in the ® rst instance;and, arguably, Mexico 1910± 20, Vietnam 1945±75, Algeria 1954± 62, and Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique in the 1970s,among others, if the de® nition is relaxedsomewhat. (The dates here refer tothe making, not aftermaths, of these revolutions, which were, it should be evident,processes morethan `events’ .) Evenwith the more generous list, we haveno more than a dozeninstances in almost a hundredyears, a `rate’that wouldnot yield quite yet a singlefurther case sincethe momentous events of 1989in China and Eastern Europe, themselves not classi® ableas successful or quitesocial, respectively. Thus we shouldn’ t expectto see agreatdeal of revolutionaryactivity at any given time, and the prospects for `success’ (mea- suredby the seizure of state power and the initiation of a projectof social transformation)have always been poor. Nevertheless,the question posed by thecurrent craze for`globalisation’ in the socialsciences andpopular imagination is: has itbecomeharder for revolutions tooccurin aworldof globalcorporations and commodity chains, global cultural forms,instantaneous communication and swift travel, the collapse of socialism, anda nolonger bipolar political arrangement? This is thequestion which the presentarticle will take up, employing a theoryof the origins of Third World

JohnForan is attheDepartment of Sociology, University ofCalifornia,Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9430, USA.

0143-6597/97/050791-30$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 791 JOHN FORAN socialrevolutions to date. The task is toexplore the predictive utility of the comparative±historical revolutionary record, and to re¯ ect on the current con- juncturein the light of the elements of this theory. 2 Weshall do so by undertakinga briefsurvey of a numberof current and quite recent instances of non-attemptsat revolution, actual uprisings, one successful politicalrevolution, 3 andseveral potential revolutions in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.Further re¯ ections on the current conjuncture will be taken up in the conclusion.

Theories ofThird World social revolutions 4 Thestudy of social revolutions, and Third World revolutions, has takena great leapforward since the 1979 publication of Theda Skocpol’ s Statesand Social Revolutions ,astructuralist tourde force thatshowed how international pressures couldcombine with state and class arrangementsto produce political crises. WalterGoldfrank, John Walton, Jeff Goodwin,Theda Skocpol, Farideh Farhi, TimothyWickham-Crowley and Jack Goldstoneand his collaborators, among others,have produced important studies of sets ofparticularThird World cases. 5 Theseperspectives have all advocated multi-causal approaches to revolutions. Thequestion today has become:what particular mix of causes is mostuseful as anexplanation across (which)cases? Allof theabove theorists have emphasised structuralapproaches to revolution, often at the expense of agency and culture (Farhihas donethe most with culture in thisgroup). ManyÐ including Goodwin, Skocpol,and Wickham-CrowleyÐ have placed great emphasis on the particular kindof statethat is mostvulnerable to revolution,often at the cost of payingless attentionto social structure and the economy. Gradually a consensushas emergedthat both external and internal factors are atwork, but in whatways and towhat degree is notyet settled. Myown work draws on a numberof the speci® c insightsof this latest generationof scholars, but with its own particular synthesis that insists on balancingattention to such perennial dichotomies as structureand agency, politicaleconomy and culture, state and social structure, internal and external factors.Elsewhere I haveargued that ® veinterrelated causal factors must combinein a givenconjuncture to produce a successful socialrevolution: 1) dependentdevelopment; 2) a repressive,exclusionary, personalist state; 3)the elaborationof effective and powerful political cultures of resistance, and a revolutionarycrisis consistingof 4) an economic downturn, and 5) a world- systemicopening (a let-upof external controls). 6 Letus brie¯y examineeach of thesefactors in turn. Theconcept of dependent development, taken from the work of Latin Americanscholars Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, is aprocess thatmay be characterised as oneof `growth within limits’ : Itrefers tocertain ThirdWorld economies, at certain moments in their history, that undergo both developmentÐas measuredby increases in GNP,foreigntrade, industrial or agriculturaloutputÐ combined with the negative consequences of the attendant socialtransformation in the form of in¯ ation, debt, growing inequality, or overburdenedhousing and educational infrastructures, among others. 7 This 792 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE complexprocess de®nes achangingsocial structure that generates a fewwinners andmany losers, giving rise tosocial and economic grievances among diverse sectors ofthe population, ranging from the urban working, middle, and under- classes, toruralpeasants, farmers, andworkers, crossing gender and ethnic lines as well.Both classic dependencyand underdevelopment (as inmuchof theThird World),or realdevelopment (as inpartsof east Asia),are less likelyto produce suchsocial dislocation. Therepressive, exclusionary, personalist state which so often(but not always) accompaniesdependent development reposes onthe combination of repression oflower-class forces andexclusion of both the growing middle classes andthe economicelite from political participation. Such states possess anelective af® nityfor dependent development because they are goodat guaranteeing order, atleast for a time,but they also tend to exacerbatecon¯ ictual relations between stateand civil society. 8 Dictators,particularly of the dynastic variety (either by monarchicsuccession or imposition of new generations) or of long-lived duration(whether through patently fraudulent elections or other means), epito- mise thispersonalist type of rule. They fuel the grievances generated by dependentdevelopment, often alienating the upper classes fromthe state, and providea solidtarget for social movements from below. Because ofthis,under certaincircumstances, they facilitate the formation of a broad,multi-class allianceagainst the state, because middle and even upper classes mayjoin with lowerclasses, feelingless threatof being overturned along with the state. Conversely,collective military rule, or rule by the military as aninstitution, especiallywhen given a veneerof legitimation through regular elections, howeverfraudulent, tends to elicit more elite support and provide a less vulnerabletarget for cross-class socialmovements. Forthis to occur, an opposition must coalesce. To capture the ideological dimensionof this intervention of human agents onto the historical stage, I have developedthe notion of `political cultures of opposition and resistance’ in my previouswork. 9 Tomove from the structural determinants of the grievances producedby dependent development and the repressive, exclusionary, personal- iststate, broad segments of many groups and classes mustbe able to articulate theexperiences they are livingthrough into effective and ¯ exibleanalyses capableof mobilisingtheir own forces andbuilding coalitions with others. Such politicalcultures of opposition may draw upon diverse sources: formalideolo- gies,folk traditions and popular idioms, ranging from ideas and feelings of nationalism(against control by outsiders), to socialism (economic equality and socialjustice), democracy (demands for participation and an end to dictatorship), religion(resistance to evil and suffering), and the like. Different groups, classes andactors will embrace complex combinations of these, sometimes weaving theminto critiques of the regime with great mobilisational potential. How well thesemultiple political cultures are capableof bringing together diverse sectors intoa broadand uni® ed opposition, I shallargue, may spell the difference betweensuccess andfailure. In anycase, thisfactor insists on theirreducible role playedby human agency and meaning in the making (or not) of revolutions. The® nalelement in the model is theemergence of arevolutionarycrisis that bothweakens the state and emboldens the opposition. This has two 793 JOHN FORAN

World World-systemic system opening

Multi-class State repression/ Political Dependent alliance/ exclusion cultures development revolutionary personalism of opposition outbreak

Pre-existing Internal economic social structure downswing

FIGURE 1 Modelof Third World Social Revolutions .

determinants,one partly internal and the other external. Students of revolution fromAlexis de Tocqueville to James Davieshave insisted that economic downturnson the eve of revolutions sharpen existing grievances past breaking point.10 Recentscholars have disputed this point, both for their general models andin particularcases. 11 Ihavefound that it is presentin virtuallyall successful cases.12 Whenthis factor is combinedwith a `world-systemicopening’ for change,a powerfulconjuncture arises forrevolutionary movements to succeed (thisleaves open the question of the precise timing of such crises, whichmay precedeor followrevolutionary mobilisation, but do seem toprecede the taking ofpower). Such an opening refers tothe letting up of external controls by the dominantoutside power; it maybe theresult of distractionin thecore economies byworld war or depression, rivalries between one or more core powers, mixed messages sentto Third World dictators, or divided foreign policy when faced withan insurrection. 13 Thecombination of all® veofthesefactors makes fora favourableclimate in whichmay thrive the sort of broad coalitions that fuel successful social revolutions.Figure 1 illustratesthe conceptual schema justdescribed. Myprevious work has foundthese factors in thecases oftheMexican, Cuban, Nicaraguanand Iranian revolutions. 14 Asubsequentstudy attempted to extend themodel to the anti-colonial cases andinstances of shorter-lived social revolutions(looking for broad similarities), and to contrast these with several typesof `failure’ (failed attempts, reversals ofrevolution, political revolutions, andno attempt), looking for signi® cant patterns among these types. 15 All of these failuresor other forms ofrevolutionlack at least one of thefactors in themodel. Thechallenge now is toextend this solidly grounded comparative± historical analysisin a morespeculative direction still, by looking at the contemporary situationsthat are mostrelevant to testing its hypothesised causal features. We shalldo this by takingup foursets ofcases inturn:1) non-attemptsat revolution incases whereone or more of the causes are present(Iraq since 1991, Zaire before1996, Iran, Egypt, Cuba and the subtypes they represent); 2) unsuccessful revolutionaryuprisings (Peru’ s ShiningPath, the Islamist movement in Algeria, and,in the not so distantpast, China’ s TiananmenSquare episode and the 794 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE uprisingsin Iraq in 1991); 3) the recent political revolutionin Zaire; and 4) a revolution-in-progressthat may suggest the outlines of asomewhatnew type of socialtransformational movement (the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico).

Noattempt: the reasons why Letus beginthis survey of the revolutionary present with a lookat ® vesituations wherecountries possess botha historyof political agitation or instability and a numberof the factors identi® ed by the model as contributingto revolutionary outbreaks.This will serve tohighlight the importance of various other factors whichmay be lackingor incompletelydeveloped in eachcase, as wellas suggest theconditions which would have to obtain for future revolutions to occur. This exercisewill reveal the special salience of politicalcultures of oppositionand the internationalconjuncture.

Zaireand Iraq: dictatorship and (in)stability Iraqunder Saddam Hussein and Zaire under Joseph Mobutu Sese Sekopresent exclusionarypersonalist regimes of the ® rst order. 16 InZaire, Mobutu presided formore than three decades over a process ofgrowing deterioration and poverty.17 WhenI ®rst draftedthis article in 1996, I notedthat an exclusionary stateand economic downturns, particularly in the last three years, would seem tofavour Mobutu’ s ouster. 18 Iarguedthat, while this could indeed come at any time,it was notlikely to be the result of a socialrevolution, given the limits of economicdevelopment and disunity of theopposition. Development in Zaire has atno historical moment been of theorder that the term `dependent development’ requires:since Mobutu gained control in 1965,there has beenlimited industrial- isation,negative economic growth and little foreign investment outside the mineralenclave. 19 Theinternational conjuncture is notto be overlooked, either. Whileincreasingly unpopular in the Western circles which sponsored his rise andrule (Britain, France, the USA), Mobutuhung onto power into 1997 despite evermore widespread human rights abuses ofthe population generally and the oppositionin particular. Here is onecase wherethe dif® culties of constructing aneffective oppositional political culture, coupled with sheer underdevelopment, untillate in 1996 precluded a revolutionwhere we might otherwise expect one to occur.20 Again,in early 1996, I predicted:this does not preclude the emergenceof an effective civil opposition to thedictatorship; rather it highlights theimportance of it for success. Unlesssuch a formulais foundand such an oppositionarticulates a politicalculture capable of galvanising the population andgaining international support or atleast neutrality, the future would seem to holdfurther repression under Mobutu or thelimited change that a militarycoup wouldbring. I shalldiscuss therecent events in Zaire later in this paper. Asurprisinglysimilar case is presentedby Iraq, a far moredeveloped economic,military and political power. Indeed the presence of amarkeddegree ofdependentdevelopment in Iraqsince the rise ofSaddamHussein in 1979 and indeedfor a decadeor more before that, adds another of the features that the modelrequires for a revolutionto occur and succeed. Iraq clearly stands among 795 JOHN FORAN themost educated, urbanised, industrialised and dynamic societies and econom- ies ofthe Middle East over the whole period since the political revolution that overthrewthe monarchy in 1958. 21 Therise ofSaddam Hussein eventually crystalisedwhat had been a collectiveexclusionary state into a personalistone. 22 Diversepolitical cultures of oppositionexist in Iraq,including the long-standing Kurdishnationalist insurgency of the north and west, the militant Shi`ism of segmentsof the south around Basra andthe shrine town of Karbala, and a strugglingliberal reformist strand that would like to see areturnto democracy. But,even during the intense international and internal crises provokedby Iraq’ s invasionof Kuwait and the US-led Allied response to it, the regime stood ® rm. Theweaknesses ofthe opposition showed most clearly after most of the Iraqi armywas crushedin the retreat from Kuwait in March 1991, and the rebellions inthe south and in Kurdistan, while vigorous and determined, were unable to unitethe centre of the country or coordinate their plans and visions for a post-HusseinIraq. (Indeed their visions may have been rather more for a division ofIraq into several new states.) The remnants of the Iraqi army ruthlessly crushedthe Shi`ite rebels in the south while the USA stoodby (the world- systemicopening had quickly closed), then isolated and eventually contained the Kurdishthreat after that. Despite the long-standing international blockade and a fairlysevere internaleconomic downturn, 23 SaddamHussein remains in power todayin large measure becausethe opposition has beenutterly unable to ® nda basis forunity and effective organisation of anationwideresistance. The future appearsto hold more of the same, unlessthe post-Mobutu Zaire scenario holds forIraq too of amilitaryputsch against the dictatorship, an outcome apparently favouredby US policymakers sinceMarch 1991. 24

Iranand Egypt: repressive tolerance Evenmore remote from successful revolutionarychallenge would seem tobe the otherMiddle Eastern dependent developers of Iranand (arguably) Egypt. In the IslamicRepublic of Iran,itself the product of arevolutionagainst the shah (see theanalogy with Cuba below), the political economy is ade®nite instance of dependentdevelopment, as itwas underthe shah since the early 1960s: the countryhas beenand remains a regionaleconomic giant with feet of clay. Urbanisation,rising GNP andoil-fuelled growth continue to produce only hardshipfor much of the urban and most of the rural population. The regime, however,has createda set ofsturdy political institutions that have successfully outlivedthe charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini who, even as supremereligious authorityfrom 1979 to his death in 1989, could not qualify as anexclusionary personalistruler. This is notto deny that the rules of the political game restrict popularparticipation, but even the government’ s criticsmust acknowledge the abilityof theregime to involveenough of the population in theprocess tomake widespreadopposition dif® cult. 25 Theopposition draws on elementsof Marxism (theTudeh and Fada`ian), Islamic radicalism (the Mujahidin), secular and (yes) religiousliberalisms (the remnants of the National Front and some ofthe followersof Mehdi Bazargan, respectively) and, at the opposite end of the spectrum,the royalist aspirations of thediehard supporters of the ancienre Âgime . 796 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE

Allof the above operate largely in exile. This combination of relatively more inclusiverule and fragmented and dispersed oppositions means thatdependent developmentand its occasional economic downturns, even coupled with inter- nationalpressure emanatingfrom the USA (andlargely mitigated by the willingnessof Europe, Japan, China and other countries to invest in and trade withIran), make the short- and medium-term future look relatively calm, aside fromoccasional explosions of local popular unrest as haveoccurred over the courseof the post-revolutionary era. 26 Egyptunder Hosni Mubarak is aless solidbut nonetheless equally instructive case ofthe interplay of agovernmentclever enough to legitimate itself without looseningits grip on power and an opposition that, however vigorous, seems thusfar incapableof ®ndinga wayto build a broadcoalition of forces tooppose it.27 Sincethe political revolution that brought Gamal Abdal Nasser topower after1952 Egypt has embarkedon aprecariouspath of dependentdevelopment, ®rst withSoviet aid, and then, after the transition to Anwar Sadat, in partnership withthe USA. Duringthis period the country has seen vasttransformation and attendantupheaval of boththe rural and urban social structures. Hosni Mubarak succeededSadat after the latter’ s assassinationat the hands of militantIslamists inthe army in October 1981, 28 andhas controlledthe political system since, usingelections astutely to maintainhis hold on powerthrough the vehicle of the NationalDemocratic Party, and to avoid the outright characterisation of his regimeas personalist.Economic downturns have been common enough in the last15 years; whatis lackingin the Egyptian equation for revolution is thesort ofunitedand broad-based opposition that would be required(as inIraq, Iran and Zaire),as wellas anyworld-systemic opening, given the close relations and extensiveaid that have been forthcoming from the USA forover two decades. Interms ofpoliticalcultures of opposition,the really radical Islamic groups are repressed bythe government, but are verypopular on university campuses. Egyptis stilla secularstate, but many people are religious.The appeal of Islam grows,in part because both secularalternatives have been discredited: socialism underNasser andcapitalism under Sadat have been tried and have `failed’ , orat leastbeen found wanting. Whatdoes the future hold? One scenarioÐ which we might term the `EasternEuropean model’ Ð wouldsee thegovernment democratisin g suf® cientlyso that the population turns its back on violent strategies for change,but this seems ratherremote. Perhaps new social movements, involv- ingstudents, intellectual s, womenin varioussettings, the urban poor and others holdout a possibilityfor progressive change in the longer-term future. But the severityof theunderlyin geconomicproblems is alargequestion mark hanging overE gypt’sfuture,fuelling Islamic activism in the shantytowns of Cairoand theDelta and the villages of thesouth. 29 Themost likely future therefore is one offurther economic deteriorati onoffset by US aidand support, with opposi- tionalunity defused by thesecular± religious divide and successfully `managed’ bythe ruling party. Egypt, like Iraq above and Algeria below, would need a differentset ofrelationsamong the secular left, the liberal democratic currents, andthe variants of Islamicopposition to tiltthe balance toward a revolutionary outcome. 797 JOHN FORAN

Cuba:the advantages of culture If Iranand (to a lesser extent)Egypt look reasonably secure, Cuba in the late 1990srepresents an even more unlikely site of revolution. Dependent develop- ment,from a uniquelysocialist point of view, has operatedon the island since the1959 revolution (an extension and redirection of capitalist dependent devel- opmentbefore that). The enormous gains in qualityof livingindicators set Cuba apartfrom the rest ofLatin America and the Third World and make it a candidatefor real development, yet the problems of anaging sugar monoculture, incompleteindustrialisation (which was designedto be complementary to the nowdefunct socialist bloc), and the inevitable poverty of the resource base of Cubansocialism make for the mixture of positiveand negative indices we have termeddependent development. 30 Castro’s gripon power is onthe face ofit an instanceof a personalistregime, although its exclusionary character is rather moreuncertain, as willbecome evident when we examine political culture in a moment.The cut-off of the Soviet subsidy in the early 1990s certainly created asevere economicdownturn, with GNP droppingby as muchas 40%from 1989 to1992, trade shrinking drastically, oil imports plummeting, shortages in agricultural,industrial and infrastructural inputs, and attendant hardships for the population.Meanwhile, US pressure remainssubstantial, intensi® ed by the February1996 crisis provokedby the downing of two Cuban± American exile planesby the Cuban air force. 31 YetCastro remains rather securely in place despite the presence of these severalfeatures of the model. The explanation would seem torest heavilyon the resilienceof the political culture of the Cuban Revolution as asubstantial legitimatingvehicle for the regime and the gains of the revolution. Cuban socialism,as apoliticalculture, was neithera radicalturn from the earliest stated objectivesof theJuly 26 Movementnor a dutifultranslation of theSoviet model intoSpanish. In terms ofitsorigins, the ideology of Castro’s July26 Movement beforecoming to power in 1959was analready radicalised variant of 19th-cen- turyrevolutionary hero Jose ÂMartõÂ’samalgamof anti-imperialist nationalism, humanismand sympathy with the poor. From its formation in 1955 the July 26 Movementhad declared itself for the introduction of `social justice’ in Cuba; althoughits speci® c positionswere often deliberately vague and consciously keptmoderate in 1957± 58 to attract a diversesocial base, it was undoubtedly understoodby many Cubans as capableof providing the land reform it openly announcedin October 1958, as wellas moreindependence from the USA and otherradical goals. 32 Castro,like Khomeini in Iran, certainly modi® ed his message fordiverse constituencies, and muted it inthe interest of keeping them together,but there should be littledoubt that his radical followers understood his goalas oneof relatively deep social transformation well before they came to power.33 Cubasurely represents one of the most successful cases inthe history of revolutionsof revolutionaries working within their pre-existing ideological horizons,but also going beyond and outside them, in the process elaborating new,re-visioned cultures of opposition to try to keep a revolutionarycoalition togetherthrough a skilfulprocess ofconsolidation.Unlike in Iran,Cuba’ s broad 798 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE populistcoalition did not disintegrate (aided in this by the migration of oppositionalupper and skilled middle classes intheearly 1960s), but rather was heldtogether even as therevolution radicalised into a projectof deep social transformation.And it was heldtogether, in nosmallpart, by the enthusiasm of thepopulation for the new socialist political culture. The longevity of theCuban Revolutionsuggests that the process ofelaborating effective political cultures requirescomplex negotiations between such `universals’ as Marxism±Leninism andmuch longer-standing notions of a speci®cally Cuban nationalism, democ- racyand ideals of social, racial and economic justice. 34 Itwas thesein¯ ections thatgave the Cuban Revolution its particular imprint as apowerfulforce for socialistchange within Cuba and, indeed, as amodelfor further rearticulation withother local traditions elsewhere (interestingly, never as successfullyas in Cuba). Thequestion today, and the one on whichthe future of theCuban Revolution wouldseem tohinge, is howmuch remains of this effervescent support for Castroand Cuban socialism inside the country? Somehow, Castro retains a level ofpublicsupport, though how much is dif®cult to say.As onegrocer put it: `To putup withthings is anationalcustom’ . Andas Castrohimself said at the depth ofthe economic downturn in 1993: `It is anepic struggle in which we ® nd ourselves.We have had to give up many of the things in which we were involved,but what we will never give up is hope’. 35 Thevery intensity of the USanimositytowards Castro, expressed in the form of the embargo and the successive tighteningsof it undertaken by Torricelli, Burton, Jesse Helmsand BillClinton, has beenturned thus far bythe regime to politicalcapital, as ittaps thewellsprings of Cuban nationalism and pride in their revolution. Economic changehas comein theform of increasedtourism, foreign joint ventures, and the ebband ¯ owof small private enterprises, but Cuba to date, and for the foreseeablefuture, showcases theadvantages of political culture for sustaining revolutions(and thereby preventing counter-revolutio n)in a globalisingworld.

(As yet)unsuccessful uprisings Peruand Algeria: the limits of culture Tworecent and still ongoing cases ofrevolutionaryupsurge from quite different cornersof theglobe provide further evidence of thestrength of thecombination ofineffective political cultures of opposition, non-personalistic states andthe internationalconjuncture in limiting revolutions’ success. InPeru since the early 1980s a vigorousrevolutionary civil war has been conductedby the Sendero Luminoso movement, aimed at toppling the civilian governmentsof ® rst,centre-right populist Fernando Belau ÂndeTerry (1980± 85), thencentre-left APRA leaderAla ÂnGarciaÂPeÂrez (1985±90), and presently free marketpopulist conservative Alberto Fujimori (1990 to thepresent). 36 Gathering strengthin the Andean provincial capital of Ayacucho after 1980 under the shadowyleadership of a charismaticintellectual named Abimael Guzma Ân (knownas ComradeGonzalo), the movement represented an allianceÐ however problematicÐbetween radical intellectuals and the indigenous population of the 799 JOHN FORAN underdevelopedAndean highlands, proclaiming itself in pursuit of awholenew world.At its height in the late 1980s, the movement succeeded in establishing furtherbases ofsupport in the shantytowns of Lima, the lowland capital, more clearlythe site of dependent development and its contradictions in the Peruvian setting.Economic downturns occurred with some frequencyin thelate 1980s as Perustruggled with a hugeforeign debt and as successive developmentstrategies failedto control in¯ ation and unemployment. 37 Yetthe movement failed even at its height to attract suf® cientcross-class supportto builda broadpopulist coalition for revolutionary, extra-constitution al socialtransformation in Peru. Indeed, it never sought such an alliance, a fatal ¯awin its vision. Instead, explicitly targeting the traditional left, represented in theperson of President Ala ÂnGarcia(and to his left the optimistically named IzquierdaUnida, as wellas Peru’s otherarmed revolutionary current, the Tupac AmaruRevolutionary MovementÐ MRTA),Senderohad alienated its natural alliesin the political spectrum by the mid-1980s. The ability of political institutionsto maintain formal democracy throughout the period also undercut middle-classsupport for the movement, and the terror tactics practiced in the highlandsby themovement as itfoughtnot just the army but all civil opponents probablyalso undermined its original social base tosome degree. 38 Sendero’s politicalculture was anidiosyncratic blend of Maoism, the French Revolution, PolPot, Peruvian revolutionary theorist Jose ÂCarlosMaria Âtegui,and indigenous culturesof opposition, with a strongaccent on revolutionary chiliasm, a cultof leadership,and the purifying effects ofviolenceas strategyand goal. 39 Far more thanthe Marxism± Leninism of the revolutionaries in El Salvador in the same period,this ideology was notcalculated to appeal to broad segments of the population,and never achieved a hegemonicclaim even on the left. 40 Despite militaryrepression and the autogolpe (self-coup)of 5 April1992 by Fujimori thatconcentrated unusual (but not unlimited) discretionary powers in his hands, thepolitical institutions of Perunever approximated an exclusionary, personalis- ticdictatorship. 41 Andwhile dependent development has continuedunabated, as has economicsuffering for much of the population, Fujimori’ s neoliberalshock treatmenthas broughtdown in¯ ation and reinstituted the rhythms of inter- nationalcapital (aid, trade and investment). The international community (the USAfollowedby Europe), initially hostile to Ala ÂnGarcõÂa’s plansto limit debt repaymentas wellas tothe excesses ofthe counterinsurgency under Fujimori, hadalso swung behind Fujimori’ s politicaleconomic project by 1993± 94, closingoff any world-systemic opening from developing. Thus the fortuitous discoveryand capture of GuzmaÂninSeptember1992 set backSendero’ s project inde®nitely and has putthe movement clearly on the defensive. Now split into twofactions, one following Guzma Ân’s callfrom prison to negotiate peace, and theother, known as theRed Path, still committed to armed actions, its future prospectslook bleaker than ever. 42 Thesame holdstrue for the MRTA, a far smallerguerrilla opposition which remains even further from power than SenderoLuminoso after its late 1996 hostage-taking of diplomats ended in a governmentrescue operationthat killed all the participating guerrillas. Adifferentpolitical culture animated what until quite recently looked likethe most likely site of the world’ s nextrevolution in Algeria. 43 800 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE

Between1954 and 1962 the Front de Libe ÂrationNationale ( FLN)succeededin wagingone of the great historical anti-colonial revolutions against France, ultimatelytaking power and proclaiming independence in 1962. The revolution, however,quickly turned authoritarian and conservative, with the military gaining controlof the ruling party and running the economy in the name of `African socialism’and using Islam as thestate religion to push women out of paidwork intotheir old roles. 44 Fora while,in the 1970s, Algeria relied on oil revenues tokeep the economy a¯ oat through a process constitutingan oil-led form of dependentdevelopment, but by theearly 1990s the government had arrived at a deadend, no longer considered legitimate by the majority of the population. Afterriots and demonstrations for democracy in 1990,it announcedelections in thefall of 1991, which produced an overwhelming landslide for the opposition IslamicSalvation Front (known by itsinitials in Frenchas the FIS).Theprospect ofturning power over to Islamists splitthe ruling party, and a thinlydisguised militarycoup occurred just before the ® nalround of the elections scheduled for January1992 (with Western banks and governments promptly granting a $1.45 billioncredit to ease pressure onthe new military regime). Theworld will thus never know if the Islamic party could have governed democraticallyor solvedsome ofAlgeria’ s massive economicproblems because theold regime, backed by theWest, has shownit willnot give up powerthrough democraticmeans. The FIS was drivenunderground, its leadership arrested, and some groupswithin it turned to guerrilla tactics. Over 20 000Algerians have diedin theviolence since 1992, including government of® cials and FIS activists, butalso many civilians and other public ® guresopposed to Islamic rule. From timeto time the military government has promisedto negotiate open elections, andthese were duly held at the end of 1995,con® rming the FLN inpowerunder retiredgeneral and new president Liarnine Zeroual. The FISÐlikethe govern- mentÐsplit over the issue, with a moderatewing taking part in 1995 and an intransigentopposition literally sticking to its guns. The FIS was excludedfrom theJune 1997 elections, whose conduct was criticisedby United Nations observers,and its military wing continued to engage in armed actions. 45 Ananalytic assessment ofAlgeria’ s trajectoryin light of the model suggests thatthe political culture of militant Islamism propoundedby the FIS found signi®cant but not quite clear-cut majority support in 1991± 92. 46 When the governmentforced the issue byabrogating an FIS electoralvictory, it approxi- matedthe exclusionary, near personalist type of regime that is mostvulnerable tooverthrow. But its repeated promises to negotiatecreated a smallopening for it,and the natural response of the FIS togo underground and initiate a violent civilwar undermined the latter’ s chancesof building a broadcoalition (already somewhatproblematic on the electoral plane, as muchof the anti- FLN-govern- mentpopulation remained and remains fearful of an Islamic government as well).Finally, the international conjuncture has beenmost inhospitable to the FIS as evenan electoral alternative to the FLN:inthe anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim atmospherestirred up by the 1991 Gulf War; thecontinuing isolation of Iran, Iraq,Libya and the Sudan by theWest, led by theUSA, andthe strong economic andmoral support tendered by successive socialistand conservative regimes in Franceto the FLN,itis hardto imagine anything like a world-systemicopening 801 JOHN FORAN inoperation since 1990 in Algeria. The future here thus seems cloudedby a politicalstalemate: splintered government and opposition circles that make politicaldialogue and economic reconstruction dif® cult for a tragicallytrauma- tisedcivil society.

China1989 and beyond: dependent development and the issue of democracy Chinais anotherpost-revolutionary society where revolution has beenplaced backon the agenda in the past decade, in theform of thedemocracy movement thatwas repressed inJune1989. These events are inmanyways the opposite of whathappened in Eastern Europe, where peaceful movements to democratise societysucceeded. The order of reform is alsoreversed: inEastern Europe politicalreform is nowbeing followed up by economic changes; in China there was aseries ofeconomic liberalisations in the 1980s after Mao’ s deaththat encourageda certainamount of private enterprise, foreign investment and marketrelationships. These led by 1988 to various social problemsÐ in¯ ation, housingshortages, unemployment, growing income inequality, and a perception (undoubtedlytrue) of rampantcorruption in thegovernment and ruling Commu- nistParty. There was thusa feelingamong students, intellectuals and many othersthat what China needed were political reforms grantingmore democratic participationto mitigate the contradictions of dependent development and to solvethe problems economic liberalisation was causing. Andso, between April and June 1989 a vastnew social movement sprang up, initiatedby students but soon joined by many workers and ordinary citizens, centredin Beijing but also present in many other cities. 47 Thestudents engaged innon-violent forms ofprotestÐ demonstrations, occupying the huge central squareof thecapital, hunger strikes. When the number of protestorsreached one millionpeople, the government declared martial law. But for two weeks the demonstrators,now increasingly consisting of working people, prevented the armyfrom entering the centre of thecity. The government could tolerate student demonstrators;what terri® ed it was theorganisation of the working class into independentunions, and the possibility that the army might not be reliable at repressingthe movement. There was agreatfear onthe part of the entrenched rulingbureaucracy, led by octogenarian Deng Xiaoping, that the scenario that latertranspired in Rumania, where the army and populace together violently overthrewthe dictator Ceausescu, would occur in China. In the end, the movementwas crushedby the army with substantial loss oflife, not just of studentsin TiananmenSquare but of ordinarycitizens trying to prevent the army fromreaching the square. 48 Inorder to prevent this emerging cross-class solidarityand to wipe out the opposition for a generation,great violence was resortedto. Thefuture will be thejudge of whetherthis attempt to liberalisethe economy withoutdemocratising the state can succeedÐ a system whichis sometimes jokinglyreferred to as `MarketLeninism.’ 49 Thequestion of whetherChina is on theverge of asecondtwentieth-century social revolution and the Chinese people willsucceed in the next round of protests for democracy can also be thought throughin terms ofthe model: if in 1989 we ® ndthe presence of dependent 802 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE development,a vibrantpolitical culture of opposition, an economic downturn (or atleast dislocations), a statethat verged on an exclusionary personalist regime (albeitwith deep ties to a sectionof civilsociety), and a world-systemicopening thatmight be described as `permissive’(in the sense ofno strong outside ally comingto theregime’ s aid),we cansee howthe country came so closeto social and/orpolitical revolution. The post-1989 conjuncture seems decidedlyless favourable:the same structuralconditions of dependent development and re- pressiveregime obtain, to be sure, but the opposition was dealta severe blow fromwhich it has notrecovered, the economy barrels along at high rates of growth,and the West stands more solidly behind the regime, which it views as amajoreconomic player in the coming century. Unless the opposition ® nds waysto regroup, and this is coupledwith the inevitable downturns ahead in the neweconomic cycle and tensions over human rights or otherviolations ( vis-aÁ -vis Taiwanor Hong Kong, for example, or China’ s supportfor international terrorismand arms races), themoment of revolution in China may have passed withthe massacre of1989. 50

Recentevents in Zaire: apolitical butnot social revolution Sincethis paper was ®rst writtenin 1996, a majorpolitical change has cometo Zairein the form of the overthrow of Mobutu by an armed insurgency led by LaurentKabila’ s Allianceof Democratic Forces forthe Liberation of Zaire± Congo (ADFL).51 Arisingout of relative obscurity in October 1996, the rebels madeshort work of Mobutu’s disintegratingnational army in alongmarch to the capital,Kinshasa, where they took power in May 1997. Whathad changed in the sociopolitical equation to facilitate this successful politicalrevolution? Two of the `missing’ factors fell into place: Kabila’ s relativelysuccessful mobilisationof an opposition to Mobutu, and a world-sys- temicopening occasioned by the West’ s acknowledgementthat the ailing dictatorcould no longer be sustained.The political culture that Kabila has tapped is as yetdif® cult to evaluate critically: the journalistic accounts of his own backgroundsuggest deep revolutionary roots coupled with uncertain intentions forfurther popular mobilisation. It is clearthat the armed movement succeeded onthe widely popular minimal platform of ousting the dictatorship. In a useful earlyanalytic assessment, GeorgeWright considers the ADFL a`Zairean-based multi-ethniccoalition’ , drawingon groups in all parts of the country. 52 On the otherhand, its roots in the civilian opposition to Mobutu do not appear to run thatdeep, as shownby the banning of demonstrations in the capital and the arrest ofcivilian opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi on 26 June 1997. 53 The internationalconjuncture ® nallyfavoured the opposition’ s success as well:the endof thecold-war rationale for Western support of Mobutu;the spillover of a complexrefugee situation in Rwanda; signi® cant unrest in a numberof the countriesbordering Zaire; Angolan, Kenyan and especially South African efforts tobroker a peacefulend to the regime; and the rapid spread of the movement itselftook Mobutu’ s traditionalsupporters in France, Belgium and the USA by surprise.Led by the USA, theseoutside forces ®nallyswitched their strategy to tryingto in¯ uence the new regime. 803 JOHN FORAN

Theresult has beennot quite the ouster I anticipatedin 1996,but a successful politicalrevolution nonetheless. The coming together of four of the ® vefactors inthe model may explain both the reasons forthis success andits limits. There is notlikely to be a thoroughgoingrevolutionary transformation of Zaire (now renamedCongo) as theopposition is neitheruni® ed nor agreed on this,the social structuraldislocations of dependent development do not exist in the country to fuelit, and the international community will not favour such an outcome. The degreeto which Kabila can change social and economic arrangements thus seems likelyto berathercircumscribed. The events in Zairemay herald a model forfuture political revolutions in Africaand elsewhere, but these will only rarely resultin the deep social transformation of the great social revolutions.

Towardsa newtype of revolution? Mexico:the ® rst postmodernrevolution? Our® nalcase fordiscussion is theone which may suggest the outlines of the mostlikelyÐ and most hopefulÐ face ofrevolution as theworld faces thenext century. As thelong boom of the 1940s through 1980 brought on a characteristic process ofdependent development in Mexico, the long-ruling PRI (theuninten- tionallyironically named Institutional Revolutionary Party) has foundin thelast 10years thatit can no longer buy political stability with economic growth, whichhas cometo a halt.Nor can it any longer try to legitimate itself by an appealto nationalism as economicdependence on the USA grows.In the electionsof July 1988 a newpolitical force arose. Workers, peasants and professionalssupported the left coalition known as theNational Democratic Front,whose candidate was popularformer president Lazaro Ca Ârdenas’s son, CuauhteÂmocCa Ârdenas.Ca Ârdenashad left the PRI torun in a coalitionwith socialistsand other progressives on a platformof land reform, income distri- butionand a moratoriumon foreign debt payments. This was enormously popularand manyÐ indeed mostÐ observers believe that he actually won the election.But the government announced computer failures when it was counting thevote, and several days later declared its candidate, Harvard-trained economist CarlosSalinas de Gortari, the winner. 54 From1988 to 1994 Salinas de Gortari presided over a situationof political andeconomic crisis. Politically the PRI madeimplicit deals with the conservative opposition,the pro-business Party of National Action ( PAN),inorder to counter thechallenge from the Democratic Revolutionary Party on its left (this is the currentincarnation of Ca Ârdenas’organisation, known as the PRD). Thus the PAN was allowedto winthe 1989 elections for governor in BajaCalifornia, while the DemocraticRevolutionary Party’ s candidateswere deprived of theirvictories in MichoacaÂnandGuerrero. In addition,serious violations of humanrights contin- uedon a dailybasis, aimed at intimidating and in some cases eliminating dissidentvoices among intellectuals, labour leaders, peasants and other opposi- tional® gures. 55 Economicallythe government has beenselling off state-owned industry 804 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE

(including70% of the petroleum sector, which is nowin private hands), supportingthe conversion of small communal land holdings into large agribusi- ness projects,and banking on acloserrelationship with the USA symbolisedby thenegotiations for the North American Free TradeAgreement ( NAFTA). The effects ofthe agreement are noteasy tosee withcertainty. NAFTA willgradually eliminateall trade barriers between the two countries and permit unlimited expansionof US companiesinto the Mexican economy. It seems clearenough thatit will unleash a thirdwave of US investmentin Mexico, generalising the system of maquiladora factoriesthat already exist along the borderÐ industrial zones,many amounting to conditionsof sweatshoplabour, in whichthe workers, whoare mostlywomen, are paidas littleas 80cents an hour for work that is tedious,dif® cult and environmentally dangerous. 56 Theenvironmental problems causedby lack of safeguards along the border are atrocious,and the air of MexicoCity (far fromthe border) contains so muchlead from car pollutionthat itaffects theIQ ofnewborn children, lowering it by as muchas 10%. 57 Since wagedifferences between the USA andMexico will not be legislated out of existence,it is fairlyclear that there will be some loss ofjobs by US industrial workersas theirplants move south (this is why,when Clinton met Salinas de Gortariin January 1993 to discuss theirrelationship, there were US protestors outsidethe meeting place with posters that read, rather poetically, `Afta Nafta theShafta’ ). Inthe long run, some analystsconclude jobs will be createdin the USAsincemore US productswill ¯ owintoMexico. But this will push Mexican businesses producingfor the home market into bankruptcy, costing jobs there. Thus,while it is hardeven for economists to add up all the consequences of adoptingthe agreement, it willclearly bind the two countries closer together, in whathas tobe an unequal relationship of dependency and a continuing,and deepened,process ofdependent development. Salinas de Gortari staked his futureon the pact which he arguedwould help Mexico grow, even if thismeant becomingmore of an appendage of the USA. Interestingly,the latest textbooks onMexican history issued by the government contain some changesfrom previouseditions when it comes tothe history of the Mexican Revolution. Whereasthe old fourth grade texts had said that Por® rio Dõ Âaz `was verybad for thelife of Mexico, because the people were not given the chance to elect their leaders’, thenew version teaches that the Por® riato was aperiodof stabilityand peace,in which industrial growth occurred by attracting foreign investment. On theother hand, the revolutionary land reform programme of Zapata is not mentioned,nor is thename of Cuauhte ÂmocCa Ârdenasuttered in the account of the1988 election. The subtext seems tobe that economic modernisation comes ®rst,democracy second, in the priorities of the present administration. 58 Butthere are politicalconsequences to the rewriting of history, and the analogyof the Por® riato with the present regime may be dangerous, for it begsthe question: Is theMexican Revolution ® nished,or not? The startling eventsof 1 January1994 in the southern state of Chiapas underline this question.59 Onthat day, the very day that NAFTA wentinto effect as atreaty amongCanada, the USA andMexico, some 2000supporters (including 200 women)60 ofa previouslyunknown guerrilla group calling itself the Zapatista Armyof National Liberation (the EZLN)seizeda numberof towns, labelling 805 JOHN FORAN

NAFTA andits free-market reforms `a deathsentence for the indigenous people of Mexico’ .61 Whilesome oftherebels, who are almostall indigenous people of Mayanorigin, have said their goal is `forsocialism, like the Cubans have, but better’,62 theirdemands have been for such things as land,health care, education anddemocratic elections. The most popular leader, a manlong known only as SubcomandanteMarcos, 63 issues poeticcommuniqu Âes anduses theinternational media,including the internet, to make the call for radical reform. Theroots of thisrebellion run deep: in the1910 revolution and after, Chiapas was largelyby-passed, as anelite of cattle ranchers and coffee growers ran the stateallied to the PRI.About60% of theworkers of thestate made less thanthe $3.33minimum daily wage in 1990; 30% are illiterate;one-third have no electricityand over 40% have no running water in their homes. 64 The govern- ment® rst reactedto the rebellion with massive armyrepression that resulted in 100`of® cial’ deaths (but as manyas 500in reality), numerous cases oftorture andother abuses. It followed this with a series ofpromises and reforms: dismissalof the state’ s governor,pledges of food and scholarship aid, and an agreementwith the two national opposition parties to reform the electoral process (caps oncampaignspending, equal access tothemedia, and so forth, but stoppingshort of allowing independent observers at the polls). They continue negotiatingwith the rebels, who have issued a set offour basic demands: `ªeconomicdemandsº related to the poverty of Indians in Chiapas, ª social demandsºstemming from racism andother problems, a callfor democratic libertiesthroughout Mexico, and issues relatedto the formal cessation of hostilities’. 65 Whenthe government offered an amnesty, one of theleaders asked ina letterprinted in the Mexico City newspapers: `What do we have to ask pardonfor?¼ For not dying of hunger? For not shutting up about our misery? Forhaving shown the rest ofthe country and the entire world that human dignity survivesand is intheir most impoverished people?’ 66 Indeed,the world’ s attentionis nowfocused on thesituation in Mexicoso, in thatrespect, the rebels havealready won a largemeasure ofsuccess. Alotof hard questions are being askedin Mexico about issues suchas free electionsand the economic conse- quences of NAFTA.As onegraf® ti in Mexico City has putit: `Chiapas is Mexico’ .67 Meanwhile,later in 1994,elections were held once again. The PRI’scandidate, LuisDonaldo Colosio, was assassinated on23 March 1994 in Tijuana, in what nowappears to have been a powerstruggle between reformist and conservative wingsof the party. His replacement as PRI candidate,the third consecutive US-trainedeconomist who has governedMexico, Ernesto Zedillo, was electedin August.In December 1994 interest payments on the debt of $160 billion could notbe met,causing the value of the peso to crash andleading to anotherbail-out bythe banks (itself a signof internationalÐ especially USÐ supportfor the regime)and a newround of economicbelt-tightening for the people, in theform ofa dropin wages accompanied by rising in¯ ation and unemployment. 68 In the meantime,ex-president Salinas de Gortarihad to ¯ee thecountry, his brother in prisonon charges of fraud, drug laundering and involvement in anotherpolitical assassination(that of PRI SecretaryGeneral Jose ÂFranciscoRuõ ÂzMassieu). Therebellion in Chiapas poses some dif®cult and important questions for 806 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE studentsof revolution to ponder: what is thefuture of revolutions in a globalis- ingworld? Can Third World revolutionaries on thedoorstep of theUSA, facing acagy`institutionalised dictatorship’ , ®ndnew formulas to create the type of cross-class (andin Mexico, trans-racial) populist alliance that the historical recordof socialrevolution suggests is requiredfor success? Andin thepost-cold warera, what would `success’ looklike, in anycase? Afewthoughts on thiswill beoffered in the conclusion to this essay.

Comparativelessons Theresults of thissurvey are provisionallysummed up inTable 1. We mayalso analysethese cases comparatively,using Boolean techniques of qualitative comparison.The ® rst stepin this process is toconstruct a `truthtable’ showing allthe cases andthe hypothesised features of each. This is depictedin Table 2. Booleananalysis allows us tosort these cases forthe salient patterns among them.This involves representation of each case interms ofthe presence, absence,or partial effectiveness of the ® vefactors (here `1’ becomes coded as acapitalletter denoting factor A, B,C,etc, and `0’ is denotedby a, b, c, and so forth).Thus, for example, the pattern for Zaire (row 1) canbe represented as aBcDe,meaning that Zaire until 1996 possessed onlythe factors of anexclusion- ary,personalist state and an economic downturn (here we are codingungener- ously:thus `1 2 ’underworld-systemic opening is consideredas itsabsence; alternatively,and for other purposes (see below),a `1 2 ’maybe consideredthe presence,or partial effectiveness, of the factor in question). If weadopt the `ungenerous’ interpretation of all variables that are tosome degreeabsent in the 12 cases (China,Iraq and Zaire being counted twice in tablesone and two), we may array the cases as shownin Table 3. Simpleinspection shows that the 12 instances produce 10 distinct patterns, with,interestingly, Iran and post-1989 China possessing the same pattern(two ofthe most unlikely candidates for further revolutionary change), and China in 1989and Mexico today also giving the same pattern(two of themost revolution- arycases inthegroup). If thetheory holds that it is theabsence of oneor more factorsthat precludes chances for successful revolution,then we may note that, inascendingorder of revolutionarypotential, we haveEgypt (none of thefactors infull force); Iran,Peru, and post-1989 China (only one factor); Cuba, Zaire before1997, post-1991 Iraq and Algeria (two of the factors), and 1989 China, 1991Iraq, 1997 Zaire and Mexico (three of the factors). If wedoasimplecount, we®ndthatdependent development is presentin sevenof thecases (Iraqbefore andafter 1991, Iran, Algeria, China before and after 1989, and Mexico); the personalist,exclusionary state in four of the cases (Zaireand Iraq at both time points);strong political cultures of oppositionin twoof thecases (Chinain 1989, Mexico);an economic downturn in eight of the cases (Zaireat both moments, Iraqin 1991,Peru, Algeria, Cuba, China in 1989 and Mexico); and a favourable world-systemicopportunity in just two cases (Cubaand 1997 Zaire). In these simpleterms, it would seem thatworld-systemic openings, strong political culturesof resistance, and vulnerable states are therarest ofthe elements in the 807 JOHN FORAN ; ; y y y t t t i i i / s l l l s ’ i i i e t o b b b c m l r a a a e t n t a t t o s e s l p o s s s c s n g i e a s a t s d d d d d e t l i c o t n e e e o l u e e e e t i e i C s u b e r s y l o i u u u u n u l l h e ; ; m m m l l p p m s a l t t P i i e i i o n n n a n n e e e s t a t d u u c a a i i i i i l l o g c g g v l t t t t t k e o c r o n e o o h u u e e s e e i o l n n n n n r c p r c l r o l p r p I c r u d i r o o o o o a C C C C C F s a r n o A i t A h S c S C a U s m f U y , e o n o l y l r e r r n n f b a m e u p f ? o t n t s r n o o t o s s r r s d o u e r t r r e o / / / / e n o o e f e i s l b A d n o u s s s s l t s f f r t o / l ? r n e c p S p i p p p s c e e E W p d d d d , a t t g g r n o i t i i i i c o r r  i e p i n e r i e e r e l i e i e , U n t n h h h h i / u u t s s s u s g s g e a i i f u o o d s s s s n s i i i i n s s t j s s a m f l m o n n i n n S p p i a i d s d s d i d e r d s d d d m c n o s - p t o o e t e i r i r i r i r p p p e e p i d g o u o r r o o n s s s s a r p a r u a a p o p e r a u a t u t l e r n o b b b b c i w h p H s o h p b J h s s r h s f s c o p o C d i c u u u u - E S S S S D n i F n ; o s t n i e e t n o r i - i d h e s t r - u e i t h t e e o e t m s l d l l i s i i p p t e t o u t d d l r d v x p p s v c w p n i a l 1 a r d s ; i d o e u o o i r a p l a , d u n n n n n d p d e i m t e o n a a E d o o o e o d n s m m p K s n b r a t i n i i i c t g / e l i L i l n m t t t u i t i t e o a s d r r o l s i i i n i d d a t s t a s a i g i i B r n i e e a s s s I m i s e e e t m n n t t l l d n e l e t t i k i d e k s s o o o r o i A m l i i l o e i n u s o r r g a p s s d M u e p a p p p a t a c d v s t e o l e a a o l n u T P m m i p p i i p y r p l m h l l x e t s i i n n p t o r o v l o a I w s o d d o c l c c i e i b s w o t r i p e i i t v D O L S V V e r y r t r s o a i f l n r t a o n e t u s i n , p p a t r d e n s t b i i i n y o y s t a n r e u s i a c h h c r l , a l i r a k t u s s a a n t u e t r m c r r s e n r a i c n u S i i p a l e r n x o o r i c p p l t o o e a t t r r o a - i e r s o o a i m u s i m a a e r e - t m m p t b s i t s t h n m e o s - a a v o d n t m m u u r u l m c c i g u l o a l r i d i o h e n o u o b e s o s e u t c d d H d m a I g f d u M r n r C s c r o P u x a e e M S S A P E e r u t t t t t t t n n n n n n c e e e e e e u t t f t t y r o n n n n t t m m m m m m t i e e e e s t s p p p p p l p s n d d d d u - u s a l o o o o o t o e r l n l n l n l l n l o e o s u a d i e i e e e e e e e e e e i d d c h r q l n d t c r v p v p v p v v p v e e o a e a i e l l e n e e e e e r e e e i e e o c - - n p e c u d l d d l d d p d d d w i d d S e i i e h r o S O O P D S e 6 1 9 c t 9 9 8 a l e n a p l 9 9 9 n i r i b i q n y i t 1 s 1 1 a a u h a g r r Z I I E C C

808 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE N y t i A l i P y e ) l b n , s l a g I l ( o a t l g a d n n s R n l c m c e r u u o i o n o e P i t l l f r e i i a i y d d : t t a s a o v a t d t t g t m e i i s e e e g d s i c e c a w u s l u e s o g l i l i m l e e r l u t u n l i t t d - l h o i m n n e c i e i o i n n i a o t b l w l d l p a o i d i i o c r b s w v v t a t a e e o c o c p m c h i m n t t u e e o l n o t n n n p a e c i r i s l s c s p r u f a a o u e o o r a R F C C O C u t t r u r d o s b o f n r ? d o p a e g t e n r t p r e d n e / / a n M o w l a S e c u o c s s o f r o i o / s u m r g p n i p p p n / U n n s i t o m t t t i i p i c o a n r i r p i m r i r o s h i t h t g p c i c h h h s / / t S e e s g g u i g o o o d i c e d a s n s s t p t s u s s s m l : e o n n r r i i n s p s p n w U e n v e d d d r n I m r u c o s s p o o e r e r a i r e o c p p e o u r i i a o S r r t o n r R r f o p a a a c c r b r r u t u t i q o t n n o e g W a o n s o r h s W s h s F f c w a h c U P i a e y o c e r D W S F E C d . a d y e r a c e t p n h s u h s t i e e t t t i t e n i , t - r g n g t n a i s s d i r w o r i t n n w i e l d s p i u d p - r o o e a n o d s s s y m e w i t d n n n p u p d 2 i d r s t e i n c n a Z o r e r ; o o o o a l u e c 9 p r i l a n a m l a i i i n a s l s p i a h i n t s r t m t u 9 t o e L n C i e i t t i i c r I i h i d l u i s a l x a c t c 1 : l s s c - s u s s g r l i e o - b i . a e d t i n s i r h t e f d i s o c o r o e l o r r p t d i o h s n r e i r 1 s b m u s o e x p r r t p p d t b o d o a p a o o t s u i a a a e a m p o r p p n o u n m o r l f u l e n i n n E m h a o a i K n c M w c s b o l c m a o u K f i p p s e l i y i L s D I A V R D B A T t s e i l l u a r n , , p p t s ) t i i d o y s y s l n e s i r r h r h i i c r o l s s o p e a n a i r i l e r r n t a h t n u t n i o N w t o p o a o n o o u i o e t t - r o y g i m t i L o u m i s n e a a m c i t s i s p k o s s t t t F e b j a t t m o r s u a u l u m c s l c u l l u ’ d i u u e f i n o e b h u a n I m c c s c r d H d i ( F a b p o d s o o e x x a R E S D E M P t t t t t t n n n n n n A e e e e e e t t t t T f n n n n F m m m m m m t o e e e e p p p p p p n A d d d d d - e t o o o o o o e e r n l n l n l n l l l e s N t d i e e e e e r e e e e e e i d d l n d p v p v g p v p v r v v d e e a e l m l i e e e e e e e e e e n e e n i - - p c l e d d l d d d d d l d d u d d a i i e o h S O A O S D e a o 9 1 7 i c c 8 9 9 a r i e n 9 9 e 9 n i u r x n i q i s 1 1 r g i 1 e l a h a e r C I P A Z M

809 JOHN FORAN ’ e n n i e o ( r i 2 s g t 1 r b e c d e f n ` e e ) ) ) ) d e r v l l l l s v g e o l l l l a e g m f r n a a a a 6 ) a ) ) ) h e f f f f l l a h l t 9 ) e e e l v n n n n a c a h l l l t 9 a i e ) ) o c c u b b b f t w w w w t 1 i n v v s a a a t n a n o o o o m e t t t e e i e y ) s c e l d d s d s s r r d l w i l t s m ( ( ( ( ( ( ( v ( ( g r o a i o d o e e a n p c g r d n i e r P i i ( ( % % % % % % % % % e l t d i r p a 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 n o l o a u t 5 2 2 2 2 2 7 2 5 c % % o t t i 0 0 p c n a n . . , , , , , , , i i 5 a 5 b a l e u a r d d t g e C a c e g - g . i l . n a ) n d t a m 5 2 2 2 2 i ) i l m g d r x r t n t s e 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 E n e o 1 t o e ( a x n t e o s e e p ; y w h W e s o i t s l e m l h ’ a t n e p n m n k e o i o n i l o i t i s l i t . e e t ) c s b f c v a i n d i m g e o r n a d o o d n m u e 2 2 2 r ) s i o r t r t o t e , d h i n o 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 p D n i n r d o ` ( l a r , w e o e c e s r c o N d o v i k t e e d n A i E h l g s P e w e T n s p f i 5 r o h . e n s o t ) o h d a 0 o d r , i f s e ) ( t r n e e o . s r l i o N r o ) o d c o u a d e L i f e r d s e c l c t h n Z ) i i h i o e ` s o d ! l t o s i E r 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 b C i o 2 e n e c l g o d ( u n 1 a 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 h v o e t k i o n p i l i t i I e ( E a i l h 1 t l l p t P u ` s e h . L c b o f n c a ) h k u I t a B a h i o e o t t l i . d r n r , i r t A s e o c u o e f e u e r e w v s d r l T l t o d a d t a n , o r b n e r c i , e y t a o v F c e n i e r s s p e i e n i r e n d r v a g r e ( l i n r a a h a a n n d e i a t l s o o ) v i n l t e s o a n w l s 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 l i o a f n B e c n g a a i o s t m ( i r i a o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 t o y s s e t n u o r h p i r i r u l n r o e d t l l i e s e a c c f c n o a o l e n x p B R n a p a e y v n e d o ( l e r i e e o r s t b a r c r i n e i t o i b e u s e l l e ( c : a d , r s i r a o s s r p g o c o d v t n i n o e u n e i p t e t n ( m r ( i o d o r n o e e l i / p c t i e l c o a n n D i m t a , t d 2 1 2 n ) e o p r v R S p o u i n t e i e u I 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 P A n t t r o s s l e c o F ( b l o u o e t n p i b e l o e r t e g n s . e o a h v o p p ) v a u e t n h e v l i t D s s u m d e h e d e o o e e n o y o r r h r y v e g d c t o b o r l b e p i n f l , t h s e r t a t i t o a s a e o a l c h i a t a c r t i v e e r i i e t s e a r f t e i e f k t f o u i 0 l e l e i t - e - l n e r l s q - - b o 9 d p 4 d - - d 2 e o d s s e e a ± p f u s s 9 r e 9 r i l - - p l m 0 0 9 s l t t m o r 0 s s 0 7 9 r a 9 a e 9 9 8 r a s 0 p a y r p t r 9 0 0 9 1 9 u i o r 1 r 1 t 9 9 9 o 8 s v o o f 9 9 9 9 9 9 o e m o , l m t , a 1 1 1 t 9 t p y 1 9 9 1 e 9 1 p d a e e c o l c , t 1 l . c , , r i u e u 1 1 1 l e o , t t , , c a h v r e e a a r , l o i o t l e e a o l a n , , p a , e e n h e n n e c r u r e x c c e b i i q n y q a d p i i e : r g g : e e t T l a a a a u h h a g a e h h e h h o r n h n r r r a h i p g g n g g Z I I E C C C I P A Z M g a c c s w e i i u u o t u u e s u a s ...... s l i d h o o o o e o a e e 1 2 3 4 5 6 e 7 8 9 0 1 2 o r r r h r r n r e s t w i p p 1 1 1 h h o c l h h h a y y f e P T T B T T o o T C T T a t t b c o d e f g d

810 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE

TABLE 3 Patterns ofvariables in potentiallyrevolutionay countries Typeone: no attemptat revolution Zaire (till1996) aBcDe Iraq(after 1991) ABcde Iran Abcde Egypt abcde Cuba abcDE China(1990s) Abcde

Typetwo: attempted or ongoing civil/revolutionarywars China(1989) AbCDe Iraq (1991) ABcDe Peru abcDe Algeria AbcDe Zaire (1997) aBcDE Mexico AbCDe presentconjuncture, and that they are, crudely put, the factors that most often preventrevolutions from occurring. The 10 patterns that have failed to bring abouta revolutioncan thus be arrayed: Failure5 aBcDe 1 ABcde 1 Abcde 1 abcde 1 abcDE 1 AbCDe 1 ABcDe 1 abcDe 1 AbcDe 1 aBcDE Booleantechniques also allow these patterns to be simpli® ed further: when two patternsdiffer in only one variable, that variable can be eliminated from the model(because the same resultÐin this case, norevolutionÐ occurs whether it is presentor not). For example, the pattern for Egypt (abcde) differs from that ofIran or China in the 1990s (Abcde) only in the presence or absence of dependentdevelopment (factor A); thetwo patterns can be simpli® ed to bcde. Whenall possible combinations of ® vefactors are thuscompared, we arrive at thefollowing formula for failure (or lack of revolutionary success): Failure5 BcDe 1 acDe 1 aBcD 1 Acde 1 ABce 1 bcde 1 Abce 1 acDE 1 abcD 1 AcDe 1 AbDe1 bcDe Thatis, 10 differentpatterns of fourvariables account for all 12 cases offailure. Infact, this same procedurecan be repeated with these sets offour variables. Theequation for failure then becomes: Failure5 cDe 1 acD 1 Ace 1 bce 1 AbDe Finally,through a procedureknown as theprime implicant chart, it can be discernedthat the ® rst patternÐcDeÐ is redundant,because the other four accountfor all twelve cases withoutit. 69 Thismeans thatthe 12 cases, analysed interms ofwhy they have failed as socialrevolutions, sort into four multiple causalpatterns. 70 Despitethe occasional presence of A(dependentdevelopment) andD (aneconomic downturn) in these patterns, the conclusion appears to be 811 JOHN FORAN

TABLE 4 Most likelypaths torevol- utionin countriesstudied Zaire before1997 aBcDE Iraqafter 1991ABCDe Iran ABcDE Egypt ABCDe Cuba ABcDE China 1990s ABCde China 1989 ABCDE Iraq 1991 ABCDE Peru AbCDe Algeria ABCDe Zaire 1997 aBCDE Mexico ABCDe

thatit istheabsence of any ofthe® vefactors that prevents success. Inthreeof thefour patterns, the world-systemic opening is absent(and in the fourthÐ acDÐit is irrelevant);the same is truefor the elaboration of effective political culturesof opposition. Each of the other factors (dependent development, an exclusionary,personalist state, and an economic downturn) is alsoabsent or irrelevantin at least two of the patterns. Thesame analysiscan be performed using `generous’ codings: that is, consideringany factor that is somewhatpresent (the many `1 2 ’entriesin the table,as wellas theone `1 1 ’)tobe fully present. The purpose of this assumptionis toexplain the most likely paths to revolution in these 12 cases which,after all, were chosen as amongthe most potentially revolutionary scenariosin the present global conjuncture. The cases thenline up as in Table 4. Inthis reading, all 12 cases possess atleast three of the ® vefactors to some degree.Iraq (in March 1991) and China in 1989 have all ® ve,and indeed, both wereat those moments a hairsbreadthaway from revolution. 71 Mexico,Egypt, Algeria,Iraq since 1991, Iran, Cuba and Zaire in 1997 each possess fourout of ®veofthefactors, clustering in threedistinct groups: the ® rst fourof these cases haveall but the world-systemic opening, suggesting not only the signi® cance of thisfactor, but constituting two (Mexico and Algeria) of the three (with Peru) cases whererevolutions are actuallybeing attempted at the present moment. Cubaand Iran constitute a secondgroup, possessing all but the factor of a `revolutionary’oppositional culture (ie opposed to the regimes, which are themselvesproducts of revolution!).I haveargued that these are twoof themost stablecases inthe group; surely this underscores the importance of political culturesof opposition in making revolutions (just as the® rst set offour underscoresthe signi® cance of the world-systemic conjuncture in preventingÐ or,conversely, facilitatingÐ revolutions). Zaire in 1997is athirdinstance of the presenceof four factors: inthis case thecoexistence of all but dependent developmentled to a politicalrevolution. The remaining casesÐ Zaire before 1997,China since 1989 and PeruÐ each have three of the ® ve,suggesting 812 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE relativestability. as wellas thesigni® cance of theremaining factors in prevent- ingrevolution, in various combinations. Letus nowdivide these into two subsets ofcases: 1)stable or no attempt (Zairebefore 1997, Iraq since 1991, Iran, Egypt, Cuba, China in the1990s); and 2)an attempted revolution of some kind(Iraq in 1991, China in 1989, Peru, Algeria,Zaire in 1997and Mexico). If Booleananalyses are performedon each set,the results are: Stable/noattempt 5 BcDE 1 ABCe Attemptedrevolution 5 BCDE 1 ACDe Inthe ® rst instance,there are twopaths to non-attempts: BcDE in pre-1997 Zaire,Iran and Cuba means thatthe inability of anoppositional political culture tocoalesce prevents revolution from breaking out (dependent development is irrelevantto thispattern), while in Egypt,Iraq after 1991 and China since 1990, ABCesuggests that the world-system is unfavourableto revolution (economic downturnsdrop out of this path). There are alsotwo paths to attempted revolutions:The pattern ACDe in Peru, Algeria and Mexico suggests that revolutionwas attemptedbecause of the presence of dependent development, politicalcultures of opposition and an economic downturn, in the absence of a world-systemicopening, with regime type irrelevant to the attempt. This means thatrevolutionaries here have launched movements regardless of the type of regimethey faced or the international conjuncture. The second patternÐ BCDEÐfound in 1989 China, 1991 Iraq and 1997 Zaire suggests that revolu- tionswere attempted in the presence of all factors except dependent development,which is irrelevantto this pattern. Most signi® cant here, these are theonly cases inthe revolutionary group where the world-system was atleast somewhatfavourable, and contain two cases ofvery near successÐ China and IraqÐand the one case ofa successful politicalrevolution. We note that, in all attempts,there are oppositionalpolitical cultures and an economic downturn; revolutionariesignored regime type and the international conjuncture to their detriment,it seems. Amongthe conclusions to be drawnfrom this exercise are demonstrationsof thehypotheses that all ® vefactorsare neededfor a socialrevolution to occurand succeed; thatthe most revolutionary situations are thosein whichfour or ®veof thefactors are present;and that of the ® vefactors, threeÐ political cultures of opposition,world-systemic opportunity, and a vulnerablestate formÐ may be the mostsalient, but the absence of any of the ® vefactors is suf® cientto block revolutions.

Conclusions: the future ofrevolutions in aglobalising world Itis timeto draw this exercise to a provisionalclose. I havepromised some thingsin thisconclusion. First are thequestions posed by theevents in Chiapas, andhere I wouldonly wish to open a largerdiscussion that must be continued elsewhere.I believethat Chiapas offers anewand hopeful model of revolution- arychange for us tostudy, one which may go further than the classic cases of thepast along the lines of creating a trulyparticipatory, more democratic, less 813 JOHN FORAN racistand sexist society. And this in spite of the collapse of socialism and the proclamationof a newUS-led world order on Mexico’ s frontdoorstep, and carriedthrough by means amongthe more peaceful in the historical record of attemptedrevolutionary transformations. For now, we will have to wait and see howthe rebellion goes; thismay be a longwait unless some fairlysubstantial concessionsare madeby the government, for the rebels have said they are preparedto ® ghtfor 20 or 30 years ifnecessary. One future scenario would involveunacceptable levels of military repression, further governmental scandal andcorruption, and economic mismanagement of a kindthat might make the regimeappear less opento reformand change as wellas alienatethe USA tothe degreethat all ® vefactorswould then be fullypresent (the classic pathto social revolution).An alternative(and quite different) scenario would be thesuccessful transformationof the EZLN intopart of anewsocial movement and an electoral forcecapable of defeating the PRI inopen and fair elections, which would then initiatea process ofrealchange (the Chilean path in anewworld context). Either way,Chiapas, writ large upon Mexico and beyond, could indeed transform what wemean by `revolutionary success’ ,ifit prospersÐ a large`if’ . As forthe question of the future of revolutions in a globalisingworld, a few observationsmust suf® ce.This paper has highlightedthe importance of the internationalconjuncture in the causality of revolution. Since this factor has alwaysbeen important, the question must be re® ned:Has theinternational settingchanged in ways that radically alter the prospects of revolutionaries succeeding? 72 Theworld economy is changing,to be sure, as transnational companiesdevelop ever greater capacities to escape theregulation of states, controlthe distribution of pro®ts alongcommodity chains, and depress thewages ofworkers. The bipolar world of the post-1945 conjuncture has alsobeen qualitativelytransformed with the demise of the USSR. North± South relations, however,remain hierarchical and unequal, meaning that dependent development as aprocess continues.Exclusionary, personalist states, while out of voguein the post-1980movement towards formally democratic polities in muchof theworld, are stillan option for dependent developers (and this global democratisation process remainsfragile). In the wake of the collapse of Soviet-style socialism, politicalcultures of oppositionhave lost one arrowÐ but only oneÐ in thequiver ofrevolutionary cultures of resistance. The Third World leftÐ like the First World’sÐ suffered a shockand crisis ofcon®dence in 1989±91, but it is already transformingitself creatively in variousplaces (Chiapas among them). Economic downturnsare endemicto capitalist business and other accumulation cycles and waves,and the neoliberal model that seeks hegemonyin the Third World will periodicallyproduce these along with dependent development. Thatleaves the world-systemic opening to consider. The impact of the new globalconjuncture on this factor is dif®cult to grasp fully, but it is far from uniformlydampening. The end of the Cold War may in fact have opened up opportunitiesfor revolutionaries to operate if theother four factors are inplace, preciselybecause the countries in questioncan no longerbe treatedas pawnsin alargergeopolitical struggle between the USA andthe USSR. Democratic revolutionariesand non-violent movements in particularmay ® ndnew spaces in whichto manoeuvre (here one thinks of the 1997 electoral gains of the former 814 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE guerrillaleft in ElSalvador).A USAthatis nolonger(or not yet) certain of the bases ofits global political± economic strategic vision may also be loathe to intervenein con¯ icts in certainparts of theThird World, at least militarily. Thus presenttrends towards globalisation do not unambiguously portend a more limitedscope for future revolutions. This study, at least, in surveying ten Third Worldsites ofpotential revolutionary instability since 1989, ® ndsit far fromthe case thatrevolutions are headedfor extinction as aspecies ofsocial change in thenear future. The odds for success willremain long and the dif® culties of socialtransformation daunting, but this has alwaysbeen the case. Inclosing, I wouldsubmit the following re¯ ection of Douglas Kellner on a relatedsubject:

Whither,then, Marxism? Certainly it canno longerbe regardedas the master theory andnarrative it appeared to be in its classical forms, butit remains an important perspectivefor criticaltheory today. We continueto live in a capitalistsociety and aslong as we do,Marxism will continue to be relevant. A reconstructedMarxism, aMarxismwithout guarantees, teleology, and foundations, will be more open, tolerant,skeptical, and modest than previous versions. A Marxismfor thetwenty- ®rst centurycould help promote democracy, freedom, justice, and equality, and counterattackconservative ideologies that merely promote the interests of the rich andpowerful. As longas tremendous class inequality, human suffering, and oppressionexists there is the need for criticaltheories like Marxism and visions of radicalsocial change that the tradition has inspired. Marxism will disappear either whenthe nightmare of capitalism is ® nallyover or when a democraticand free societyemerges that will produce its own philosophy and way of life. If Marxism hasinspired such a project,then the doctrine can pass on to a happyobsolescence andthe sufferings and struggles of those in the Marxian tradition will be re- deemed.73 Substitute`revolution’ for `Marxism’ , and`path to social transformation’ for `criticaltheory’ in thispassage, and you have one of thebasic conclusions of this essay.

Notes Manythanks to Eric Selbinand Jack Goldstonefor detailed comments onthe ® rst versionof this paper. 1 ThedaSkocpol, Statesand Social Revolutions: A ComparativeAnalysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1979),p 4.In an article onthe Iranian Revolution interestingly, she later modi®ed this de® nition to read `rapid,basic transformationsof a country’s state andclass structure, andof itsdominant ideology ’.`Rentierstate andShi’ a Islam inthe Iranian Revolution’ , Theoryand Society , 11,1982, p 265,emphasis added. 2 Ihavedecidedly mixed feelings about theorising revolutions in a way thatencourages prediction. In a nutshell,this stems froma profoundbelief and background assumption in myscholarship that social change is directedin substantialpart by theactivities ofpeople,and that no structuralist explanation can dojustice tothis irreducible element. Thismeans thatany model or theoryof how people behave can befalsi® edby peoplethemselves, inpartbecause knowledgeof sucha theoryalters thecircumstances inwhich people act, andin part because people’s actionscan notbe controlled and predicted by our theories about them (this is aninsight taken up in the work of Anthony Giddens on structuration theory). As forpredicting revolutions,on theone hand I feel thatif the model I am developingis capable ofexplaining past instances, itis likelyto be able tosay somethingabout the present and future too, but only with the caveats justnoted. Thatis, the epistemological status of this exercise as predictionis dubious;a discussionunderstood in terms 815 JOHN FORAN

oftrends, of possible futures, or as educatedguesses aboutpotentials for change, is perhapson more solid ground.I believethat `scienti® c’ predictionis aperniciouschimera inthe social sciences and,appearances tothe contrary, this study should not be read as anexample ofit, again for the reasons noted,as well as others.For two discussions of the role of prediction in the social sciences generallyand in the study of revolutionsin particular, see MichaelHechter, TimurKuran, Randall Collins, Charles Tilly,Edgar Kiser, James Coleman& AlejandroPortes, `Symposium on prediction in the social sciences’ , AmericanJournal ofSociology ,100(6),May 1995, pp 1520± 1626; and the contributions by Nikki Keddie, Timur Kuran and Jack A.Goldstoneto Nikki Keddie (ed) DebatingRevolutions ,New York:New YorkUniversity Press, 1995,constituting part one of the book: `Can revolutions be predicted? Understood?’ . Iam amongthe sceptics inthese debates aboutthe utility of the exercise ofprediction. 3 Apoliticalrevolution involves a changein the state withmass participation,but no deep social transformationafterwards. 4 Mostof thissection is borrowedfrom another piece ofmine:`The comparative± historical sociology of Third Worldsocial revolutions:why a few succeed, whymost fail’ ,JohnForan (ed), TheorizingRevolutions , London:Routledge, 1997, pp 227± 267. 5 Walter LGoldfrank,`Theories of revolutionand revolution without theory: the case ofMexico’ , Theory and Society,7,1979, pp 135± 165; John Walton, ReluctantRebels: ComparativeStudies of Revolution and Underdevelopment ,New York:Columbia University Press, 1984;Jeff Goodwin& ThedaSkocpol, `Explainingrevolutions in the contemporary Third World’ , Politics& Society ,17(4),1989, pp 489± 509; FaridehFarhi, Statesand Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua ,Urbana,IL: Universityof Illinois Press, 1990;Timothy P Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillasand Revolution in Latin America. A Comparative Studyof Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1992;and Jack A Goldstone,Ted Robert Gurr & FarrokhMoshiri (eds), Revolutionsof theLate Twentieth Century , Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1991.For critical evaluationsof much of this work, see JohnForan, `Theories of revolutionrevisited: toward a fourthgeneration?’ , SociologicalTheory ,11(1),1993, pp 1± 20; and Foran `Revolutionizingtheory/ revisingrevolution: state, culture,and society in recent workson revolution’ , Contention:Debates in Society, Culture and Science ,2(2),1993, pp 65± 88. 6 JohnForan, `A theoryof Third World social revolutions:Iran, Nicaragua, andEl Salvador compared’ , CriticalSociology ,19(2),1992, pp 3± 27; Foran, FragileResistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500to the Revolution ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1993);and Foran, `The causes ofLatin American social revolutions:searching for patterns in Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua’ ,inPeter Lengyel& Volker Bornschier(eds), WorldSociety Studies , volume 3: Con¯icts andNew Departuresin World Society , New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers, 1993, pp 209± 244. 7 See FernandoHenrique Cardoso & EnzoFaletto, Dependencyand Development in Latin America , trans MarjoryMattingly Urquidi, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979;and John Foran, `An historical±sociological framework forthe study of long-term transformations in theThird World’ , Humanity and Society,16(3),1992, pp 330± 349. 8 Thevulnerabilities of this type of state are nowwidely agreed uponin theliterature onrevolutions; all that varies is theterminology used to characterise it.Thus, in Wickham-Crowley’ s colourfullanguage, it is a `ma® acracy’ ;forFarhi, `personalist authoritarianism’ ; forGoldstone, a `neopatrimonial’state; forMatthew Shugart,a `sultanisticregime’ .See Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillasand Revolution , p 9; Farhi, States and Urban-BasedRevolutions ;Jack Goldstone,`Revolutions and superpowers’ , JRAdelman (ed) Superpowers andRevolution ,New York:Praeger, 1986,pp 38±48; and Matthew Soberg Shugart, `Patterns of revolution’, Theoryand Society ,18(2),1989, pp 249± 271. Robert Dix probably ® rst identi®ed the weaknesses ofthis typeof state in`Why revolutions succeed andfail’ ,in Polity,XVI(3),1984, pp 423± 446. 9 See Foran, FragileResistance ;Foran`A theoryof ThirdWorld social revolutions’; Foran`Discourses and social forces: therole of culture and cultural studies in understandingrevolutions’ , inForan (ed) Theorizing Revolutions ,pp203± 226, London and New York:Routledge, 1997. As Imake clear inthat chapter, this conceptdraws onthe work of A Sivanandan,James Scott,Farideh Farhi, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall andAntonio Gramsci, amongmany others. 10 Alexisde Tocqueville, TheOld Regime andthe French Revolution ,transStuart Gilbert, Garden City, NY: Doubleday& Company,1955 [1856]; and James CDavies, `Towarda theoryof revolution’ , American SociologicalReview ,27,1962, pp 5± 19. 11 OnIran, for example, see MansoorMoaddel, Class,Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution , New York:Columbia University Press, 1993. 12 Foran,`The comparative± historical study of Third World social revolutions’. 13 Thisnotion was pioneeredin 1979 by Walter Goldfrank,who refers toit as a`permissive worldcontext’ in`Theories of revolutionand revolution without theory’ . Itturns somewhat onitshead Skocpol’ s attention tointernational pressures as thecause ofrevolution in the case ofthepowerful agrarian empires she studied. 14 Foran,`A theoryof Third World social revolutions’and `The causes ofLatin American social revolutions’. 15 Foran,ª TheComparative± historical sociology of Third World social revolutionsº. 16 SaddamHussein, it is true,legitimates hisrule through institutional arrangements thatinclude elections. And 816 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE

FidelCastro in Cuba does the same, apparently.But I shallargue that Hussein and Mobutu are theclosest tothe pure type of dictatorthat has provenvulnerable to revolution, in themould of Por® rio Dõ Âaz, Batista, theshah of Iran,or Somoza,whereas theCuban Revolution has deeproots in Cuban society, and the current Iranianregime, thoughless solidlylegitimated, can claim somethingsimilar. 17 Peter Evanshas usedZaire as theprototype case ofhis evocatively labelled `predatory state’ .Evans, EmbeddedAutonomy: States and Industrial Transformation ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1995.The predatory state is onein which maximisation of individual wealth byan elite takes precedence overand prevents attainment of collective social goals. 18 Thisearlier version,with these speculations,appeared as a1996working paper of the International Institute at theUniversity of Michigan. 19 Evansreports World Bank and other data showinga declinein per capita GNP of2% a year since 1965,as well as adestructionof the road system from90 000to 6000 miles. Evans, EmbeddedAutonomy , p 43. 20 Zaire is discussedin Richard Snyder, `Combining structural and voluntarist explanatory perspectives: paths outof sultanisticdictatorships’ , forthcomingin H EChehabi& JuanJ Linz(eds), SultanisticRegimes . Some ofthe disarray of the opposition before 1996 is conveyedby John Darnton, `Zaire driftsinto anarchy as authoritycollapses’ , NewYork Times ,24May 1994. Other relevant works include Winsome J Leslie, Zaire: Continuityand Political Change in an Oppressive State (Boulder,CO: Westview,1993; Makau wa Mutua, Zaire:Repression as Policy: A HumanRights Report ,New York:Lawyers Committee forHuman Rights, 1990;Michael G Schatzburg, TheDialectics ofOppression in Zaire ,Bloomington,IN: IndianaUniversity Press, 1988;Cindy Shiner, `Zaire’ sweightycrisis persists’ , Africa News,36(1),1992, pp 1±3; andC Young, `ZaireÐthe shattered illusions of the integral state’ , Journalof Modern African Studies ,37(2),1994, pp 247±263. 21 Onthe political economy of Iraq see: MarionFarouk-Sluglett & Peter Sluglett, IraqSince 1958: From Revolutionto Dictatorship ,London:Kegan Paul, 1987. 22 Onthe nature of theregime see Samir al-Khalil, Republicof Fear: The Politics of ModernIraq , Berkeley, CA:University of CaliforniaPress, 1989;Middle East Watch, HumanRights in Iraq ,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1990;and CARDRI (eds) Saddam’sIraqÐRevolution or Reaction? ,London:Zed Press, 1985. 23 Economicconditions in Iraq have been hard, especially in1991± 92, followed by some stabilisation(and continuedhardship) at alowerlevel of activity since. 24 AWhiteHouse of® cial saidon 18 March 1991: `We hadbeen assuming all alongthat Saddam would survivethe war andthat he would survive the current ® ghtingin Iraq. The feeling was thatafter thedust settled,and Iraq found itself stillsaddled with sanctions and war reparationspayments, they would start lookingfor scapegoats andSaddam would eventually fall’ . New YorkTimes ,18March 1991. Hopes are arousedperiodically by reports of internaldisagreements amongHussein’ s innercircle, mostrecently when twoof his sons-in-law defected inAugust 1995; when they returned in February 1996, they were gunned downin a Baghdadstreet, NewYork Times ,25February 1996. 25 Thisrefers toa successful process ofconsolidation of the revolution, in addition to its institutionalisation. Onthis distinction, see Eric Selbin, ModernLatin American Revolutions ,Boulder,CO: Westview, 1993. 26 Ondevelopments in Iran since 1989,see AnoushiravanEhteshami, After Khomeini:The Iranian Second Republic,New York:Routledge, 1995; Massoud Karshenas &MHesham Pesaran, `Economicreform and thereconstruction of the Iranian economy’ , MiddleEast Journal ,49(1),1995, pp 89± 111; Homa Omid, Islamand the Post-Revolutionary State in Iran ,New York:St Martin’ s, 1994; Haggay Ram, `Crushingthe opposition:adversaries ofthe Islamic Republicof Iran’ , MiddleEast Journal,46(3), 1992, pp 426±439; and Saeed Rahnema &SohrabBehdad (eds) IranAfter theRevolution, Crisis ofan Islamic State , New York: StMartin’ s Press, 1996.For scattered evidenceof local agitations and unrest inside the country, see New York Times,1,12June, 1992; 5 April/30May 1995. 27 OnEgyptian political economy, see Galal AAmin, Egypt’sEconomicPredicament: A Studyin the Interactionof ExternalPressure, PoliticalFolly and Social Tension in Egypt, 1960± 1990 ,Leiden:E JBrill, 1995;Robert Springborg, ThePolitical Economy of Mubarak’ sEgypt ,Boulder,CO: Westview,1989; and Derek Hopwood, Egypt:Politics and Society 1945± 1990 ,London:Routledge, 1993. On the opposition, see Karim el-Gawhary, `Reportfrom a war zone:Gama’ at vsgovernment in Upper Egypt, Middle East Research andInformation Project (MERIP), Report,number194/ 95,May± June/ July±August 1995, pp 49± 51; Giles Keppel,`Islamists versusthe state inEgypt and Algeria, Daedalus,124(3),1995, pp 109± 127; and PatrickD Gaffney, TheProphet’ sPulpit:Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt ,Berkeley,CA: Universityof California Press, 1994. 28 Likemany Middle East specialists, Iprefer theterm `Islamist’ to`fundamentalist’ because ofthe imprecisionand stereotypical connotations of the latter (amongother reasons). 29 Casandra,`The impending crisis inEgypt’ , MiddleEast Journal ,49(1),1995, pp 9± 27. 30 Inwhat sense was Cubadependent on the USSR? Eighty percent of trade was withthat country and there was theyearly subsidy of $3± 5 billionthat was usedto keep Cuba going. But was theUSSR exploiting Cuba inthe way we usuallymean whenwe speakof dependency? It was notmaking a pro®t inCuba. The 817 JOHN FORAN

problemnow is thatafter theSoviet Union’ s collapse,as Russia goesthrough the process ofputtingits own economichouse in order, it has longsince concludedthat it can nolonger afford to subsidise Cuba. 31.See the¯ urryof articles inthe NewYork Times ,27,28, 29 February, 1, 15 March 1996. 32 OnCastro’ s views andthe July 26 Movement’ s positions,see Terence Cannon, RevolutionaryCuba (New York:Thomas Y Crowell,1981. pp 54± 57, 97; United States NationalArchives ( USNA),737.00/8-458, ForeignService Despatch 5,Park Wollam, Santiago de Cuba, to State Department, 4August1958, p 11; `Idearioeconomico del Veinte ySeis deJulio’, foundin USNA,837.00/3-959,Foreign Service Despatch 982, Gilmore,Havana, to State Department, 9March1959; and Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillasand Revolution , pp176± 178. The argumentsin this and the next two paragraphs are takenfrom Foran, `Discourses andsocial forces’ . 33 Interestinglythe reception of Castro’ s message inthe USA echoes theCuban side of the story, both in its diversityand diffuseness, but also in the transparency of its reading by radicals. See theextraordinary revisionistaccount of these matters byVan Gosse, Wherethe Boys Are: Cuba,Cold War America andthe Makingof a New Left ,London:Verso, 1993. 34 Thisreading contradicts Forrest Colburn’ s thesis(in TheVogue of Revolutionin Poor Countries ,Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1994)that Third World revolutionary regimes havebeen uniformly Marxist±Leninist in political culture. Cuba is, to be sure, Marxist± Leninist, but aÁ la cubana. 35 Quotesare fromthe New YorkTimes 11,12 January 1993. 36 Asampler ofrecent workson Peruand Sendero Luminoso would include: Manuel Jesu ÂsGranados, El PCP SenderoLuminosa y suIdeologõ Âa, Lima: EAPSA,1992;Nelson Manrique, `Political violence, ethnicity and racism inPeru in time ofwar, Journalof Latin American Cultural Studies ,4(1),1995, pp. 5± 18; Philip Mauceri,`State reform, coalitions,and the neoliberal autogolpe in Peru, LatinAmerican Research Review , 30(1).1995, pp 7± 37; `Fatal attraction:Peru’ s ShiningPath’ , NorthAmerican Report on the Americas , XXIV(4),1990/ 1991;David Scott Palmer, `Rebellionin rural Peru: the origins and evolution of Sendero Luminoso’, ComparativePolitics ,18,1986, pp 127± 146; David Scott Palmer (ed), TheShining Path of Peru,New York:St Martin’ s Press, 1992;David Pion-Berlin, TheIdeology of State Terror: Economic Doctrineand Political Repression in Argentina and Peru ,Boulder,CO: LynneRienner, 1989; Deborah Poole& GerardoRenique, Peru:Time ofFear ,New York:Monthly Review Press, 1993;Linda J Seligman, BetweenReform and Revolution: Political Struggles in the Peruvian Andes, 1969± 1991 ,Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1995:Orin Starn, `New literature onPeru’ s SenderoLuminoso’ , LatinAmerican Research Review ,27(2),1972, pp 212± 226; Susan J Stokes, Culturesin Con¯ ict: SocialMovements and the Statein Peru ,Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1995;and Simon Strong, ShiningPath: The World’sDeadliestRevolutionary Force ,London:Harper Collins,1992. 37 Per capita GNP declinedby 20% from 1988 to 1989. Benjamin Keen, AHistory ofLatin America , Boston, MA:Houghton-Mif¯ in, 1996, p 405. 38 There is nodoubtthat the army engagedin a viciouscounterinsurgency in thecountryside against Sendero. Senderodenies that it has practisedterror against non-military targets, but this has beendocumented to some degree,at least. Alivelydiscussion of the politics of Sendero from various points of viewhas takenplace onthe internet on the `marxismlist’ ([email protected] 17 February and 3 March 1996). 39 Selbin, ModernLatin American Revolutions , p 148. 40 Ihaveelaborated on thethesis of the limits of the political culture of theSalvadoran left in`Discourses and social forces’ . 41 `Pollsshowed that between 70and 90 percent of the public approved of the autogolpe’ . Keen, A History, p407.However suspect,this appears toindicate real supportamong some segment ofthe population. 42 Daniel Wayne,`Shining Path endures’ , LatinamericaPress ,21March 1996, pp 1, 8. 43 Thisdiscussion is basedon areadingof the English-language press, especially the New YorkTimes and the WashingtonReport on Middle Eastern Affairs .Recent scholarlywork on the movement includes Abdellah Hammoudi& StuartSchaar (eds) Algeria’s Impasse ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Center of InternationalStudies, 1995; Robert Mortimer, `Islamists, soldiers,and democrats: thesecond Algerian war,’ MiddleEast Journal ,50(1),1996, pp 18± 39, Reporters Sans Frontie Âres, Le dramealge Ârien:un peuple en otage,Paris:Editions La DeÂcouverte,1994; and Susan Waltz, HumanRights and Reform: Changing the Face ofNorth African Politics ,Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1995. 44 Val Moghadam,`Gender and revolutions’ , inForan, TheorizingRevolutions ,pp137± 167; and Marnia Lazreg, `Feminism anddifference: theperils of writing as awomanon women in Algeria’ ,inMarianne Hirsch &EvelynFox Keller (eds), Con¯icts inFeminism ,New York:Routledge, 1990, pp 326± 348. 45 NewYork Times ,26June 1997. 46 Interestingly,elections require less popularsupport for a regime changethan the great social revolutions. Theclassic case ofa narrowlyelected revolutionaryregime is thatof Salvador Allende’ s PopularUnity governmentwhich took power in Chile in 1970 with 36.6% of the vote. 47 Onthe movement and its background, see CraigCalhoun, Neither Godsnor Emperors: Students and the Strugglefor Democracy inChina ,Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1994;and Joseph 818 FUTURE OFREVOLUTIONS ATTHE FIN-DE-SIEÁ CLE

Fewsmith, Dilemmas ofReform in China: Political Con¯ ict andEconomic Debate ,Armonk,NY; ME Sharpe,1994. 48 RobinMunro, `Who died in Beijing, and why’ , The Nation,11June 1990, pp 811± 822. 49 Thesituation in China today is coveredin Li Minqi, `China: six years after Tiananman’, MonthlyReview Press,47(8),1996, pp 1± 13. 50 Fora predictionof a far less stable futurefor China based on the factors ofpopulation growth, faltering agriculture,and rising popular discontent, see Jack A.Goldstone,`The coming Chinese collapse’ , Foreign Policy,99,1995. A recent journalisticreport suggests that the current student generation’ s outlookis decidedlymore pro-regimeand nationalistic than that of 1989.Patrick E Tyler,`China’ s campus modelfor the90s: earnest patriot’, New YorkTimes ,23April1996. The demobilisation of student political fervour is alsochronicled in Jianying Zha, ChinaPop: How Soap Operas, Tabloids, and Bestsellers Are Transforming a Culture,New York:The New Press, 1995. 51 Mysources forthese eventsinclude a readingof theinternational press, especially the NewYork Times and the UK GuardianWeekly ,whichran dozens of articles onZaire inthe ® rst halfof 1997. 52 GeorgeWright, `Mobutu was ªChaosº’ , Z Magazine,June1997, p 39. 53 NewYork Times ,27June 1997. 54 Thisaccount of contemporary Mexico draws onKeen, A History andJames Cockcroft, Mexico:Class Formalion,Capital Accumulation, and the State ,New York:Monthly Review Press, 1983.Other useful titlesinclude Roger Bartra, AgrarianStructure and Political Power in Mexico ,Baltimore,MD: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1993;JM Cypher, Stateand Capital in Mexico:Development Policy since 1940 , Boulder,CO: Westview,1990; Nora Hamilton, TheLimits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico , Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1982;and Philip Russell, Mexicounder Salinas ,Austin,TX: MexicoResource Center,1994. 55 Keen, A History, p 301. 56 SusanTiano, Patriarchyon the Line: Labor, Gender, and Ideology in the Mexican Maquila Industry , Philadelphia,PA: Temple UniversityPress, 1995.The ® rst wave ofUS investmentoccurred during the dictatorshipof Por® rio Dõ Âaz (1876±1910), the second between the1940s and 1970s. 57 UTNE Reader, January/February1993, p 94. 58 NewYork Times ,21September 1992; and LatinamericaPress ,10December 1992. 59 OnChiapas, see TomBarry (with Harry Browne), Zapata’s Revenge: Free Tradeand the Farm Crisis in Mexico,Boston,MA: South End Press, 1995;Thomas Benjamin, ARichLand, A PoorPeople: Politics and Societyin Modern Chiapas ,Albuquerque,NM: University of New MexicoPress, 1989;George A Collier (withElizabeth Lowery Quaratiello), Basta!Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas ,Oakland,CA: FoodFirst/ Institutefor Food and Development Policy, 1994; Dan LaBotz, Democracy inMexico: Peasant Rebellionand Political Reform ,Boston,MA: South End Press, 1995;Philip Russell, TheChiapas Rebellion , Austin,TX: Mexico Resource Center,1994; John Ross, Rebellionfrom the Roots: Indian Uprising in Chiapas,Monroe,ME: CommonCourage Press, 1995;and Shadowsof Tender Fury: The Letters and CommuniqueÂsofSubcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista Army ofNational Liberation , New York: MonthlyReview Press, 1995.The works of anthropologist Jan Rusare alsocrucial forunderstanding the rebellion,among them `Landadaptation to global change: the reordering of native society in highland Chiapas,1974± 1994’ , in RevistaEuropea de EstudiosLatinoamericanos y delCaribe ,58,1995, pp 82±91. 60 On women see SantaBarbara News Press ,21January 1994. The Mexican paper La Jornada (9 March 1996)reported a demonstrationof 5000 indigenous women in San Cristobal de las Casas onInternational Women’s Day,1996. 61 LatinamericaPress ,20January 1994, quote rephrased. 62 NewYork Times ,4January1994. 63 TheMexican government revealed hisname inFebruary 1995, hoping to undermine his incredible charismatic popularity,which seems notto have happened. New YorkTimes ,11February, 5 October5, 1995; and ChristianScience Monitor ,14February 1995. Rafael SebastiaÂnGuilleÂnVicente is variously describedas `a prize-winningsociology student’ , former professorof communications, son of a furniture salesman fromTampico, and comrade ofthe Sandinistas. 64 NewYork Times ,4,9 January1994. 65 Accordingto the NewYork Times ,26January 1994. 66 NewYork Times ,23January 1994. 67 New YorkTimes ,21January 1994. It is worthnoting that there are reportsof local guerrilla insurgencies in`a widearray ofplaces’ ,accordingto a personalcommunication from Eric Selbin,6 May1996. 68 Ondaily life inMexico today, see JudithAdler Hellman, MexicanLives ,New York:New Press, 1994.On USsupportfor the regime, see Jeff Garth& ElaineSciolino, ` IMF head:he speaks,and money talks’ , New York Times,2April1996. 69 Allof these features ofBoolean analysis are clearly explainedin Charles CRagin, TheComparative Method:Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies ,Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1987. 819 JOHN FORAN

70 Notethe assumption in this kind of work that there may bemultiplepaths to the same outcome.A second assumptionis thatcausality tends to be conjunctural;that is, that combinations of factors produceoutcomes. 71 Or,as EPThompsondescribed England in 1831± 32, `within an ace ofa revolution’. Thompson, The Makingof the English Working Class ,New York:Vintage, 1966 [1963]), p 817;see alsopp 808± 809. 72 Forother analyses alongsomewhat similarlysceptical lines,see DougMcAdam, SidneyTarrow & Charles Tilly,`To map contentiouspolitics’ , Mobilization ,1(1),1996, pp 29± 31; and Sidney Tarrow, `Fishnets, internets,and catnets: globalizationand transnational collective action’ , forthcomingin Michael Hanagan et al, ThePast and Future of Collective Action . 73 DouglasKellner, `The end of orthodox Marxism’ , inAntonio Callari, StephenCullenberg & Carole Biewener (eds) Marxismin the Postmodern Age: Confronting the New WorldOrder ,New York:Guilford, 1995, p 40.

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