CITYPERC Working Paper Series The Professional Politics of the Austerity Debate: Comparing the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund Cornel Ban CITYPERC Working Paper No. 2018-01 City Political Economy Research Centre
[email protected] / @cityperc City, University of London Northampton Square London EC1V 0HB United Kingdom The Professional Politics of the Austerity Debate: Comparing the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund Introduction More than ever before, central banks have become a critical feature of international and domestic public administration. Scholarship on the public administration of central banks is one of the oldest research traditions, with most research focusing on policy outcomes, administrative culture or institutional autonomy (Hawtrey 1925; Day 1961; Young and Ho Park 2013; Zahariadis 2013; Lombardi and Moschella 2016). More recently, however, the focus their economic ideas and discourses has become a focal point in this research (Gabor 2010; Moschella 2011; Johnson 2016; Braun 2016; Matthijs and Blyth 2017). Of particular interest in this regard are the ways in which central bankers act as transnational “issue professionals” asserting scientific authority and building networks of sympathetic interlocutors in order to gain legitimacy, establish cognitive dominance over certain niches (“issue control”) and, consequently, smooth the acts of transnational administration (Seabrooke and Henriksen 2017). This makes them sensitive to what happens in other elite niches of the economics profession, where scientific authority originates. All this begs the question: What professional structures (qualifications, experiences, hierarchies) shape the specific economic ideas with which central bankers derive legitimacy and authority. To find answers to this question, the literature on international financial institutions can be a useful proxy.