Behavioral Guide to Customer Experience Design BEST PRACTICES for TAPPING INTO CUSTOMERS’ INTUITIVE THINKING
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Critical Thinking and Debiasing: Experimentation in an Academic Writing Course
JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR LANGUAGE TEACHING JALT2019 • TEACHER EFFICACY, LEARNER AGENCY NOVEMBER 1–4, 2019 • NAGOYA, JAPAN Critical Thinking and Debiasing: Experimentation in an Academic Writing Course esearch and interest in cognitive heuristics (shortcuts in thinking) and cognitive Guy Smith R biases (thinking predispositions or tendencies) has grown rapidly in the past 10 to 15 years. What is known about cognitive biases today owes much to work drawn from International Christian University behavioral economics, social psychology, decision making, and error studies. Recently, the cognitive bias discussion has found a much wider audience with the publication John Peloghitis of popular science books such as Nudge by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008), International Christian University Predictably Irrational by Dan Ariely (2009), Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), and Robert Cialdini’s Pre-suasion (2016). These books provided the general public with a fascinating and, in some ways, unsettling look into how we think. The Reference Data: research demonstrated that judgments and decisions often emerge from taking thinking Smith, G., & Peloghitis, J. (2020). Critical thinking and debiasing: Experimentation in an academic shortcuts, relying on our intuitions and feelings, and attending to certain stimuli while writing course. In P. Clements, A. Krause, & R. Gentry (Eds.), Teacher efficacy, learner agency. ignoring others. Some of the biases that emerge from these cognitive processes include Tokyo: JALT. https://doi.org/10.37546/JALTPCP2019-51 confirmation bias (to look for or interpret information that confirms a previous belief), in- group bias (a tendency to favor members of your in-groups) and the aptly named ostrich In the last two decades, interest in cognitive biases has rapidly grown across various fields of effect (the tendency to ignore negative situations). -
Contingent Reliance on the Affect Heuristic As a Function of Regulatory Focus
Contingent Reliance on the Affect Heuristic as a Function of Regulatory Focus Michel Tuan Pham Tamar Avnet Results from four studies show that the reliance on affect as a heuristic of judgment and decision-making is more pronounced under a promotion focus than under a prevent ion focus. Two different manifestations of this phenomenon were observed. Studies 1–3 show that different type s of affective inputs are weighted more heavily under promotion than under prevention in person-impression formation, product evaluations, and social recommendations. Study 4 additionally shows that valuations performed under promotion are more scope- insensitive—a characteristic of affect-based valuations—than valuations performed under prevention. The greater reliance on affect as a heuristic under promotion seems to arise because promotion-focused individuals tend to find affective inputs more diagnostic, not because promotion increases the reliance on peripheral information per se. Although decision research has historically focused affective responses to make judgments and decisions, on the cognitive processes underlying decision making, to begin with? a growing body of research from multiple disciplines The purpose of this research is to test the suggests that affective processes play an important role hypothesis that an important determinant of the as well. In particular, there is strong evidence that reliance on affect as a heuristic for evaluations and decisions are often based on subjective affective decisions is the self-regulatory orientation of the responses to the options, which appear to be seen as decision-maker. Building on recent findings by Pham indicative of the options’ values (Bechara, Damasio, and Avnet (2004), we propose that the reliance on Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, affect as an evaluation heuristic is more pronounced & Welch, 2001; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). -
A Neural Network Framework for Cognitive Bias
fpsyg-09-01561 August 31, 2018 Time: 17:34 # 1 HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY published: 03 September 2018 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01561 A Neural Network Framework for Cognitive Bias Johan E. Korteling*, Anne-Marie Brouwer and Alexander Toet* TNO Human Factors, Soesterberg, Netherlands Human decision-making shows systematic simplifications and deviations from the tenets of rationality (‘heuristics’) that may lead to suboptimal decisional outcomes (‘cognitive biases’). There are currently three prevailing theoretical perspectives on the origin of heuristics and cognitive biases: a cognitive-psychological, an ecological and an evolutionary perspective. However, these perspectives are mainly descriptive and none of them provides an overall explanatory framework for the underlying mechanisms of cognitive biases. To enhance our understanding of cognitive heuristics and biases we propose a neural network framework for cognitive biases, which explains why our brain systematically tends to default to heuristic (‘Type 1’) decision making. We argue that many cognitive biases arise from intrinsic brain mechanisms that are fundamental for the working of biological neural networks. To substantiate our viewpoint, Edited by: we discern and explain four basic neural network principles: (1) Association, (2) Eldad Yechiam, Technion – Israel Institute Compatibility, (3) Retainment, and (4) Focus. These principles are inherent to (all) neural of Technology, Israel networks which were originally optimized to perform concrete biological, perceptual, Reviewed by: and motor functions. They form the basis for our inclinations to associate and combine Amos Schurr, (unrelated) information, to prioritize information that is compatible with our present Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel state (such as knowledge, opinions, and expectations), to retain given information Edward J. -
Integrity: Its Causes and Cures
Fordham Law Review Volume 72 Issue 2 Article 4 2003 Integrity: Its Causes and Cures David Luban Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 279 (2003). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INTEGRITY: ITS CAUSES AND CURES David Luban* Integrity is a good thing, isn't it? In ordinary parlance, we sometimes use it as a near synonym for honesty, but the word means much more than honesty alone. It means wholeness or unity of person, an inner consistency between deed and principle. "Integrity" shares etymology with other unity-words-integer, integral, integrate, integration. All derive from the Latin integrare,to make whole. And the person of integrity is the person whose conduct and principles operate in happy harmony. Our psyches always seek that happy harmony. When our conduct and principles clash with each other, the result, social psychology teaches us, is cognitive dissonance. And dissonance theory hypothesizes that one of our fundamental psychic mechanisms is the drive to reduce dissonance. You can reduce dissonance between conduct and principles in two ways. The high road, if you choose to take it, requires you to conform your conduct to your principles. -
Society Persuasion In
PERSUASION IN SOCIETY HERBERT W. SIMONS with JOANNE MORREALE and BRUCE GRONBECK Table of Contents List of Artwork in Persuasion in Society xiv About the Author xvii Acknowledgments xix Preface xx Part 1: Understanding Persuasion 1. The Study of Persuasion 3 Defining Persuasion 5 Why Is Persuasion Important? 10 Studying Persuasion 14 The Behavioral Approach: Social-Scientific Research on the Communication-Persuasion Matrix 15 The Critical Studies Approach: Case Studies and “Genre-alizations” 17 Summary 20 Questions and Projects for Further Study 21 2. The Psychology of Persuasion: Basic Principles 25 Beliefs and Values as Building Blocks of Attitudes 27 Persuasion by Degrees: Adapting to Different Audiences 29 Schemas: Attitudes as Knowledge Structures 32 From Attitudes to Actions: The Role of Subjective Norms 34 Elaboration Likelihood Model: Two Routes to Persuasion 34 Persuasion as a Learning Process 36 Persuasion as Information Processing 37 Persuasion and Incentives 38 Persuasion by Association 39 Persuasion as Psychological Unbalancing and Rebalancing 40 Summary 41 Questions and Projects for Further Study 42 3. Persuasion Broadly Considered 47 Two Levels of Communication: Content and Relational 49 Impression Management 51 Deception About Persuasive Intent 51 Deceptive Deception 52 Expression Games 54 Persuasion in the Guise of Objectivity 55 Accounting Statements and Cost-Benefit Analyses 55 News Reporting 56 Scientific Reporting 57 History Textbooks 58 Reported Discoveries of Social Problems 59 How Multiple Messages Shape Ideologies 59 The Making of McWorld 63 Summary 66 Questions and Projects for Further Study 68 Part 2: The Coactive Approach 4. Coactive Persuasion 73 Using Receiver-Oriented Approaches 74 Being Situation Sensitive 76 Combining Similarity and Credibility 79 Building on Acceptable Premises 82 Appearing Reasonable and Providing Psychological Income 85 Using Communication Resources 86 Summary 88 Questions and Projects for Further Study 89 5. -
Mechanisms in Risky Choice Framing
Mechanisms in Risky Choice Framing Affective Responses and Deliberative Processing Liva Jenny Martinussen Master of Philosophy in Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience Department of Psychology University of Oslo April 2016 II Mechanisms in Risky Choice Framing: Affective Responses and Deliberative Processing By Liva Jenny Martinussen Department of Psychology UNIVERSITY OF OSLO III © Liva Jenny Martinussen 2016 Mechanisms in Risky Choice Framing: Affective responses and Deliberative Processing Author: Live Jenny Martinussen http://www.duo.uio.no/ IV Summary Author: Liva Jenny Martinussen Supervisors: Anine Riege (Supervisor) and Unni Sulutvedt (Co-Supervisor) Title: Mechanisms in Risky Choice Framing: Affective Responses and Deliberative Processing Background: The risky choice framing effect is a decision making bias, where people tend to be risk-averse when options are presented as gains and risk-seeking when options are presented as losses, although the outcomes are objectively equivalent. The mechanisms involved in risky choice framing effects are still not fully understood. Several individual differences are assumed to moderate the processing of framing tasks and the magnitude of framing effects. Objectives: The aim of the current study was to investigate the framing effect across six framing task in a within-subject design, and explore whether gain and loss frames were associated with different levels of affective responses and deliberative processing. An additional aim was to investigate how individual differences in emotion management ability and numeracy affected performance and processing of framing tasks. Method: The study was an independent research project and the author collected all the data. Eye-tracking technology was employed; number of fixations, duration of fixations, repeated inspections of options and pupil dilations were recorded from 80 predominantly young adults while performing on six framing tasks. -
Influence of Social Proof Bias on the Investment Decision Making Process – an Investors Perception
AEGAEUM JOURNAL ISSN NO: 0776-3808 Influence of Social Proof Bias on the Investment Decision Making Process – An Investors Perception Dr. Mahesha. V* & Dr. Sukanya. R** Abstract Making decisions in our daily life is complicated and making investment decisions is all the more complicated. The traditional theories of finance stated that the investors are very rational in making their investment decisions. However, this is far from reality. A new paradigm of finance has developed, known as the Behavioral Finance Theory which clearly states that it is not only the social and economic factors which affect the investors decision making process, whereas there are several behavioural factors which may influence the investment decisions made by individual investors. However, many investors are unaware of the fact that behavioural factors affect investment decisions. Many of the behavioural biases like anchoring bias, social proof bias, cognitive dissonance bias, mental accounting bias, endowment bias, choice paralysis bias etc. Among the various behavioural biases influencing the investment decisions of the investor’s, social proof bias is also a predominant one. Social proof bias is the tendency of investors to follow the opinion, advice of others predominantly in making investment decisions. It is also called as the herd mentality. People have a tendency to follow the crowd in making investment decisions. The research study aims to investigate the influence of social proof bias by considering gender as the basis for the study. The study is relevant as there is a need to identify if social proof bias influences the investors in the true sense and if it has an influence there is a need to find out ways of getting rid of the bias to avoid mistakes committed in making investment decisions. -
4. Cognitive Heuristics: an Approach
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by OTHES DIPLOMARBEIT Titel der Diplomarbeit Cognitive Heuristics and Biases and Their Impact on Negotiations Verfasserin Martina Györik Angestrebter akademischer Grad Magistra der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Mag. rer. soc. oec.) Wien, im November 2010 Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 157 Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Internationale Betriebswirtschaft Betreuer: O. Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Rudolf Vetschera Dedicated to my parents Table of Contents Table of Contents 1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 2. The Nature of Human Decision Behavior .............................................. 3 2.1 The Architecture of Cognition .................................................................................................. 3 2.2 Problem Solving, Choice and Judgment .................................................................................. 4 2.3 An Outlook on Decision Analysis ............................................................................................ 6 3. Models of Rationality................................................................................... 9 3.1 Homo œconomicus ..................................................................................................................... 9 3.2 The Concept of Bounded Rationality ..................................................................................... 11 4. Cognitive -
Social Influence: Obedience & Compliance Classic Studies
Social Influence: Obedience & Compliance Psy 240; Fall 2006 Purdue University Dr. Kipling Williams Classic Studies • Milgram’s obedience experiments Psy 240: Williams 2 1 What Breeds Obedience? • Escalating Commitment • Emotional distance of the victim • Closeness and legitimacy of the authority • Institutional authority • The liberating effects of group influence © Stanley Milgram, 1965, From the film Obedience, distributed by the Pennsylvania State University Psy 240: Williams 3 Reflections on the Classic Studies • Behavior and attitudes • The power of the situation • The fundamental attribution error Psy 240: Williams 4 2 Social Impact Theory Latané, 1980 Multiplication Division Psy 240: Williams 5 SocialSocial InfluenceInfluence Have I got a deal for you… 3 Defining Social Influence • People affecting other people. • Conformity: Do what others are doing (without the others trying to get you to do it!) • Social inhibition: Stopping doing something you’d normally do because others are present. • Compliance: Getting you to do something you wouldn’t have done otherwise • Obedience: Ordering others to behave in ways they might not ordinarily do • Excellent book and reference: – Cialdini, R. (1996). Influence (4th edition). HarperCollins College Publishers. Psy 240: Williams 7 Weapons of influence Useful metaphors… • Click, Whirr… – these weapons work best on us when we are on “auto-pilot” - not processing the message carefully. • Jujitsu – Compliance professionals get you to do their work for them…they provide the leverage, you do the work Psy 240: Williams 8 4 Six weapons of influence • Reciprocity • Commitment and consistency • Social proof • Liking • Authority • Scarcity Psy 240: Williams 9 Weapon #1: Reciprocity Free hot dogs and balloons for the little ones! • The not-so-free sample • Reciprocal concessions (“door-in-the-face”) large request first (to which everyone would say “no”) followed by the target request. -
David G. Rand
DAVID G. RAND Sloan School (E-62) Room 539 100 Main Street, Cambridge MA 02138 [email protected] EDUCATION 2006-2009 Ph.D., Harvard University, Systems Biology 2000-2004 B.A., Cornell University summa cum laude, Computational Biology PROFESSIONAL Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2019- Erwin H. Schell Professorship 2018- Associate Professor (tenured) of Management Science, Sloan School 2018- Secondary appointment, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences 2018- Affiliated faculty, Institute for Data, Systems, and Society Yale University 2017-2018 Associate Professor (tenured) – Psychology Department 2016-2017 Associate Professor (untenured) – Psychology Department 2013-2016 Assistant Professor – Psychology Department 2013-2018 Appointment by courtesy, Economics Department 2013-2018 Appointment by courtesy, School of Management 2013-2018 Cognitive Science Program 2013-2018 Institution for Social and Policy Studies 2013-2018 Yale Institute for Network Science Applied Cooperation Team (ACT) 2013- Director Harvard University 2012-2013 Postdoctoral Fellow – Psychology Department 2011 Lecturer – Human Evolutionary Biology Department 2010-2012 FQEB Prize Fellow – Psychology Department 2009-2013 Research Scientist – Program for Evolutionary Dynamics 2009-2011 Fellow – Berkman Center for Internet & Society 2006-2009 Ph.D. Student – Systems Biology 2004-2006 Mathematical Modeler – Gene Network Sciences, Ithaca NY 2003-2004 Undergraduate Research Assistant – Psychology, Cornell University 2002-2004 Undergraduate Research Assistant – Plant Biology, Cornell University SELECTED PUBLICATIONS [*Equal contribution] Mosleh M, Arechar AA, Pennycook G, Rand DG (In press) Cognitive reflection correlates with behavior on Twitter. Nature Communications. Bago B, Rand DG, Pennycook G (2020) Fake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines. Journal of Experimental Psychology:General. doi:10.1037/xge0000729 Dias N, Pennycook G, Rand DG (2020) Emphasizing publishers does not effectively reduce susceptibility to misinformation on social media. -
Concepts of Rationality in Management Research
No. 57 - March 2011 Concepts of Rationality in Management Research From Unbounded Rationality to Eco- logical Rationality by Jörn Basel and Rolf Brühl Concepts of Rationality in Man- agement Research From Unbounded Rationality to Eco- logical Rationality ISSN: 1869-5426 AUTHORS Dipl.-Psych. Jörn Basel Chair of Management Control ESCP Europe Business School Berlin Heubnerweg 6, 14059 Berlin Germany T: +49 (0) 30 / 3 20 07-139 F: +49 (0) 30 / 3 20 07-107 [email protected] Prof. Dr. Rolf Brühl Chair of Management Control ESCP Europe Business School Berlin EDITOR Heubnerweg 6, 14059 Berlin © ESCP Europe Wirtschaftshochschule Berlin Germany Heubnerweg 6, 14059 Berlin, Germany T: +49 (0) 30 / 3 20 07-136 T: +49 (0) 30 / 3 20 07-0 F: +49 (0) 30 / 3 20 07-107 F: +49 (0) 30 / 3 20 07-111 [email protected] [email protected] www.escpeurope.eu ABSTRACT: This paper sketches important concepts of rationality. It concentrates on bounded ration- ality and provides descriptions of the heuristics and bias program and of the fast and fru- gal heuristics program by Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues (Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). One objective is to link the underlying concept of ecological rationality in judgment and decision making with the field of management research. This area has been mostly dominated with ideas of the heuristics and biases program coined by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (2000), with an emphasis of irrationality and lapses of peoples judgments and decisions. After an over- view of the historic development in this debate on rationality, this paper presents a sketch of the fast and frugal heuristic program as well as short impressions from two manage- ment disciplines in order to illustrate the fruitfulness. -
Cooperation in Public Good Games. Calculated Or Confused?
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Goeschl, Timo; Lohse, Johannes Working Paper Cooperation in Public Good Games. Calculated or Confused? Discussion Paper Series, No. 626 Provided in Cooperation with: Alfred Weber Institute, Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg Suggested Citation: Goeschl, Timo; Lohse, Johannes (2016) : Cooperation in Public Good Games. Calculated or Confused?, Discussion Paper Series, No. 626, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg, http://dx.doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00022247 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162969 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu University of Heidelberg Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series No. 626 Cooperation in Public Good Games.