Published in Tbilisi 24 Saati April 16, 2007

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Published in Tbilisi 24 Saati April 16, 2007 24 Saati April 16, 2007 Under the Radar! David J. Smith* It has been just over a month since a handful of Russian Mi-24V helicopters slipped under Georgia ’s inadequate radar coverage to attack Upper Abkhazia . Western countries urged Georgia to keep cool and then went into a state of diplomatic somnolence that only invites further aggression. On the night of March 11, several helicopters, described by eyewitnesses as the type known to the west as HIND-E, entered Georgia from the Russian Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia. They were bound for Upper Abkhazia . Upper Abkhazia, also known as the Upper Kodori Gorge, is the only part of the breakaway Georgian province of Abkhazia controlled by the Tbilisi Government. As the helicopters loitered above the valley, the villages of Chkhalta and Ajara came under ground-launched rocket attack, presumably from territory controlled by the Russian-backed de facto authorities that control most of Abkhazia. Georgian and United Nations investigators have since found remnants of more than a dozen 9M22 rockets fired by a BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher. The attack culminated with a helicopter launch of an AT-9 Ataka anti-tank guided missile. The Ataka was reportedly of recent Russian manufacture—unlikely to have been in Abkhazian or Georgia hands—with a serial number that Russian authorities can surely trace. Fortunately, the attack did not kill anyone. It was directed at government buildings, empty at night—a warning of Russia ’s interest and capability in the region. Russia, of course, denied any involvement and called for calm during investigation of the incident. However, in the Caucasus region, only Russia is capable of flying helicopters across mountainous terrain at night. And Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kamynin could not resist saying that the attack was “the logical result of last year’s increased tension in connection with the introduction of Georgian forces and the Abkhazian ‘Government in Exile.’” This seems an odd justification from a side uninvolved in the attack! Western governments praised Tbilisi for remaining calm, and then fell into a state of diplomatic somnolence, ostensibly awaiting a UN report. It is difficult to imagine what western capitals expect because the Joint Fact-Finding Group, which carries out such investigations, operates by consensus of the UN, Georgia, Russia and the de facto Abkhazian authorities. It is a typical UN recipe for obscurantism. It is like writing a police report that requires the concurrence of the suspected criminal! At best, the UN document will record the details—debris found, witness accounts, etc. Oh, and expect the Russian so-called peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia to have heard and seen nothing. The document will not draw any politically sensitive conclusions. Avoiding political sensitivity was also a perceived diplomatic requirement during the weeks before renewal of the mandate for the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Maintaining UNOMIG is a good idea because this group of 142 military and police officers affords an impartial presence—albeit limited to observation and reporting—in the face of the far from impartial Russian peacekeepers. However, there is something surreal about maintaining 1 quiet about an armed attack to keep the likely perpetrator of the attack from mucking up the mandate for an observer group. Whatever the wisdom of the diplomatic tactics, on April 13, the UN Security Council renewed UNOMIG’s charter for another six months. But do not now expect the west to mount a robust response to the March 11 attack. The delay will have had a soporific effect on western foreign ministries. To be fair, the entire affair is a tad hard to believe. But truth is stranger than fiction, and Moscow excels in bizarre behavior that requires willful suspension of disbelief—dioxin poisoning, assassination by irradiation, mysterious gas pipeline explosions. For most westerners, Russia ’s helicopter hop into Upper Abkhazia seems like a wacky upshot to a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom they know little! Of course, Georgia ’s public relations and diplomatic efforts could be more effective at changing such perceptions. However, the country’s remoteness and underdeveloped communication skills are compounded tenfold by the west’s perennial reluctance to face uncomfortable facts. For disastrous example, as Adolf Hitler re-armed Germany during the 1930s, British leader Stanley Baldwin found the nerve to say, “If it could be proved that Germany was re-arming,” then something would have to be done. “But that situation has not arisen.” There is no need to abuse the historical metaphor to say that the west’s hewing to a UN report on the Kodori attack is, at least in part, of the same stuff as Baldwin ’s abandon of the 1930s. If a thorough, impartial investigation is necessary, then the international community must take responsibility for a situation that precludes such a report. The Joint Fact-Finding Group is hobbled by the requirement for consensus among parties to the conflict that may be the subject of its investigations. The Commonwealth of Independent States—in reality, Russian—peacekeepers in Abkhazia perpetuate the conflict there. UNOMIG can only observe—and it is no accident that Moscow muddied the waters with the March 11 attack weeks before the group’s mandate was up for renewal. With that, Moscow can play the falsely accused but nonetheless constructive partner as it moves from the UNOMIG resolution to UN consideration of matters such as Kosovo independence and Iran ’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends on Abkhazia plods along, more a part of the landscape of conflict than a forum for diplomatic solution to it. Far from being deaf and dumb, the west heard and saw what happened in Chkhalta and Ajara—it just does not want to acknowledge the message. Of course, turning the other cheek can sometimes be good diplomacy. But Russia ’s behavior has grown steadily worse under the sway of petro-dollars and secret policemen. Silence in the face of the March 11 Kodori attack will encourage the Kremlin to press forward, not to pull back. And Georgia is not so far away as some westerners would like to believe. Playing with matches in a dry field, Russia will eventually ignite a fire in the Caucasus that the west cannot ignore. Emboldened by the west’s supple response, Moscow may also impinge further on western interests elsewhere. The attack on Kodori is too important for us all to consign to obscurity. 2 UNOMIG should complete its report soon and release it to the public—as a minority report, if consensus is elusive. Then, the western countries must resist the temptation to hew to the details, and instead assume responsibility to draw the appropriate political conclusions. They must tell Moscow calmly, but firmly that this sort of behavior must stop—now—period! Then the international community must establish effective mechanisms to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia. Stop tripping over the semi-annual UNOMIG renewal and create an international police force to complement UNOMIG and to replace the Russian peacekeeping force. ( Russia should be welcome to participate in this multinational police force.) Internationally enforced rule of law in Abkhazia will create the opportunity for the western countries to mount a robust diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict. Meanwhile, Georgia , with western assistance, must upgrade its air surveillance and defense capabilities. Moscow will no doubt cry, “Provocation!” But where lies the provocation? Is it in a Georgian air defense system or in armed incursions into Georgia ’s sovereign territory? In the grand sweep of history, if the west stands up for Georgia, it will also be standing up for itself. *David J. Smith is Director of the Georgian Security Analysis Center , Tbilisi , and Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington. 3.
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