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SUCH IS WAR’S EFFECT

Hedges, Chris. War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. New York: PublicAffairs, 2002. 211pp. $23

Chris Hedges’s timely and moving re- an addiction to the “jag” of combat. flection War Is a Force That Gives Us Michael Herr, a reporter during the Meaning is about how war destroys the Vietnam War, summarized this addic- people who experience it. He elo- tion: “[Under fire] maybe you couldn’t quently argues throughout his short love the war and hate it inside the same book that no one who is caught up in instant, but sometimes those feelings al- war ever emerges unscathed or un- ternated so rapidly that they spun to- scarred. Hedges wants the reader to see gether in a strobic wheel rolling all the war for what it is—an evil designed by way up until you were literally High On humans to empower great violence War like it said on all the helmet covers. against other humans. Hedges depicts Coming off a jag like that could really this evil graphically, many times and in make a mess out of you.” many ways, throughout the book. He As a “cure” for his addiction, Hedges feels compelled to make his case in ex- spent a year in self-reflection and study tremely stark terms because he knows at Harvard; the result is this book. He that for all its wickedness, war is also a argues that war is so attractive because most addictive psychological and social it provides meaning and purpose to our drug. Worse, Hedges states, war is lives and fills a void in our existence. sometimes a necessary evil, a poison The Faustian bargain is that war also that civilized and humane peoples must demands sacrifice—the destruction of take to defeat horribly deformed na- everything and everyone who is impor- tions and peoples who have completely tant to the combatants, including the surrendered their humanity to it. culture in which they live. Hedges knows of what he writes. For Hedges would have the reader believe that over fifteen years, he covered wars for war really expresses the Freudian notion various news agencies. He was one of of Thanatos, or death wish—that humans those reporters who, like Ernie Pyle of a find meaning in their lives through their generation past, travel to the front to self-sacrifice, through dying. One imme- get their stories. Hedges got something diately thinks of the suicide bombers in else, for which he had not bargained—

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Israel or the hijackers of “9/11.” However, an aerospace company for over forty he argues further that if Freud is correct, years and never missed a day to sick- the balance to Thanatos is Eros, or the ness. Every night, after work, he drank love of life. While Thanatos drives hu- himself insensate. That is my most sa- mans to self-annihilation, Eros drives lient memory of him. Now, after my them to embrace each other with affec- war, I know that his drinking was a tion and support. The Freudian view is learned coping behavior that served that both concepts are real and in eternal him well after each landing. It also got struggle; there can never be a lasting him through the rest of his life. Such is peace between them. war’s effect. Hedges closes with a plea: “To survive With this book Hedges has rammed the as a human being is possible only issue of morality and ethics of war in our through love. And when Thanatos is as- faces. Will we take heed, or simply strike? cendant, the instinct must be to reach JON CZARNECKI out to those we love, to see them all in Associate Professor of Joint Maritime Operations their divinity, pity and pathos of the Naval War College, Monterey Program human.” Love alone, for the author, has the ability to overcome human destruc- tiveness. One feels almost compelled to regurgitate the Beatles line, “All you need is love.” Therein lies the serious Henriksen, Thomas H., ed. Foreign Policy for weakness of this book. Hedges is con- America in the Twenty-first Century: Alternative vincing in his analysis and reflection on Perspectives. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2001. 152pp. $15 war but superficial to the point of trivi- ality about its necessary counterbal- A brief, clean-cutting compendium ance, love. It is as if he remains with six well known scholarly contribu- addicted to the very thing that he recog- tors, Henriksen’s volume illuminates nizes will destroy him. the current cardinal directions in the Nevertheless, every civilian defense ex- debate over American foreign policy— ecutive, soldier, sailor, Marine, and air- unilateral versus multilateral interven- man should read War Is a Force That tionism along one axis, and aggressive Gives Us Meaning. Those of us who promotion of democracy (or global have known the intimate jag of war also markets) versus conservative harboring know its nightmares. Hedges’s work is a of national strength on the other. Be- cautionary tale implying that nations hind this compass hides the more theo- and peoples should enter war most re- retical discussion of whether the United luctantly. It warns that war should be a States needs or could possibly maintain last resort, and that tragic consequences a grand strategy in the absence of an may result even so. immediate national security threat. Henriksen’s own contribution (intro- My father made four opposed landings duction and chapter 5) is to lay out the with MacArthur’s army in the South- dynamics of the post–Cold War world, west Pacific theater, each one with the emphasizing the rise of China, threats first assault wave. He was never from rogue states, a stumbling Russia, wounded. After the war, he worked for and a series of regional crises that

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mandate “measured global activism” in stridency and the absence of the near- order to protect U.S. national interests. utopian rhetoric that marks his earlier, John Lewis Gaddis stresses the need to longer works. develop a coherent U.S. grand strategy Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution in the post–Cold War world—primarily scholar and founding coeditor of the as a tool for managing foreign policy in Journal of Democracy, stakes out the ac- a disciplined, proactive fashion rather tivist end of the other axis. He insists than simply responding to crises on a that building a world of liberal democ- case-by-case basis. Gaddis argues, “A racies, whether by unilateral or multi- country without a strategy is like a mis- lateral means, should be the primary sile without a guidance system. It’s objective of U.S. grand strategy. Not likely to dissipate resources ineffectually only does Diamond subscribe to the and spread potential damage far. It can “democratic peace” theory (that real pose as many risks to those who build democracies do not fight each other), and maintain it as it does to those at but he also argues that democratic in- whom it’s supposed to be aimed.” stitutions function as “elixirs” to all so- Gaddis is known as a key historian of cioeconomic ills. Unlike Falk, Diamond the Cold War. Under current circum- finds the solution for abusive power stances, he sees grand strategy as an and brutality through domestic democ- “endangered discipline,” suffering from ratization rather than in democratizing a shortage of generalists who under- international institutions—the latter a stand the “ecology” of the international process that (by implication) is at best environment rather than narrow re- moderately helpful and potentially dis- gional or functional specialties. tracting. At worst, “one nation, one Starting the directional debate, Richard vote” (or votes cast in international fora A. Falk argues that American grand by rulers of people who are not free) strategy should emphasize strengthen- thwarts the process of true (internal) ing global economic governance via in- democratization by allowing authori- ternational financial institutions, tarian states to subvert the evolving support for European Union–type re- global trend toward greater individual gionalism as a means of international freedom. Diamond identifies the Mus- security, and the transformation of the lim world, rogue states, and China as United Nations toward a global parlia- having cultural “dilemmas” that resist ment. In Falk’s view, all these develop- much direct U.S. support for demo- ments are in sync with the natural cratic change, but he maintains that instinct of America, although thus far they should remain the particular focus “the ’ position has exem- of U.S. efforts. plified the democratic paradox of favor- Sebastian Edwards, UCLA business pro- ing democracy at the domestic level but fessor, presents a scholarly defense of resisting its application at the global the beneficial aspects of economic glob- level.” Those familiar with Falk’s writ- alization and concludes that the United ings over the past four decades, advo- States must be the driver of free trade cating world federalism, might find and economic openness throughout these familiar arguments repetitive; the global system. Pointing to the evi- what is unique here is Falk’s lack of dence between openness and income

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distribution, Edwards sees an interna- and lands in between,” strengthening tional economic policy supportive of pan-American relations should be the globalization as a core aspect of U.S. main focus. As for the rest of the world, grand strategy. For Edwards, free capi- “helping to prevent wars among the big tal is as important as free institutions. powers is the most moral task the U.S. Walter McDougall, Pulitzer Prize– can perform,” a task that does not in- winning author and professor at the clude humanitarian crusades, promo- University of Pennsylvania, simulta- tion of free trade, or global democracy. neously anchors both the unilateral and “I am for them, by and large,” states noninterventionist ends of the twin McDougall, “but I know America can axes by arguing for “contra globaliza- live without their triumph abroad” and tion and U.S. hegemony.” His is not a should not squander vital, limited re- unilateralism of action but a conserva- sources in their pursuit. As in his book tion of American strength for vital in- Promised Land, Crusader State: The terests, of which strenuous efforts to American Encounter with the World establish international institutions is since 1776 (Houghton Mifflin, 1997), not one. McDougall also argues against McDougall compares the potential out- the need for an articulate and public come of America’s moral crusades American grand strategy, since “strat- overseas with that of the ephemeral and egy is by its nature secretive, deceptive, counterproductive results of the medi- and counterintuitive...andpartly eval Crusades. He concludes that Amer- reactive” and “democracies are ill- icans should “cease calling for the equipped to formulate or execute any conversion of all nations in this genera- long-term strategy except in time of tion...andhusband the assets they will war or obvious peril.” In his view, the need when and if strategic genius be- quest for a detailed grand strategy leads comes necessary.” nowhere, because quite simply “the As the most recent outline of America’s American people don’t want one.” He ongoing foreign policy/grand strategy equally refutes both the “Clintonian debate, Foreign Policy for America in the vision of globalization” and “the neo- Twenty-first Century successfully conservative crusade.” America must bridges the gap between one-sided me- carefully husband its international polit- dia op-eds and cautious scholarly ical resources (particularly military de- tomes. Appealing to both the interested ployments), since “the world today is in citizen and policy specialist alike, this a highly unnatural state” that will inevi- book indeed delivers on its promise to tably lead to balance of power politics bring together major opposing “alter- and spheres of influence. Continually native views” in a succinct, highly read- strong U.S. economic development is able way. the soundest policy; since “the most SAM J. TANGREDI predictable and direct challenges to Captain, U.S. Navy U.S. security are the invasion of illegal Arlington, Virginia immigrants and drugs, and the prospect of civil collapse in Colombia, Mexico,

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and fine-tuning result from the success- ful alternation of the political parties in power in these democracies, even when Orenstein, Mitchell. Out of the Red: Building Cap- italism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe. a postcommunist party returns to take Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2001. control. 184pp. $60 For example, some feared that the re- Historically, most countries first de- surgence of a postcommunist govern- velop a market economy, even under ment in Eastern Europe could lead to a oppressive conditions, before develop- total backlash of democracy in the re- ing a democracy. However, the 1989 gion or, worse, pander populist solu- revolutions in Central and Eastern Eu- tions to ease the pain of economic rope produced a counter case—the ini- restructuring. These fears did not mate- tiation of simultaneous democratic and rialize, and the postcommunists elected economic reforms. Many policy makers in Poland did not massively change the and academics outside the region have economic agenda. There was a slow- recommended that stability lies in a co- down in some areas of reform when the herent and rigid reform plan for all SLD, the Polish postcommunist party, such states. The United States, for ex- won in 1993, but there was no major at- ample, has suggested and still some- tempt to undo economic changes or al- times emphasizes a “cookie cutter” or ter Poland’s Western-oriented path. In “one size fits all” recommendation for the election of 1997, political power economic reform, emphasizing stabili- once again changed, this time swinging zation, liberalization, and privatization. to the right and to Solidarity Electoral Economic reform, Washington argues, Action. This not only further illustrated should be placed above the “whims” of Poland’s economic success despite al- politics and not fall victim to victories ternation of power but also showed of the left or right. how that change resulted in a more effi- Mitchell Orenstein is assistant professor cient and centrist economic policy. of political science at the Maxwell Government officials adapted and re- School of Syracuse University, where he sponded creatively to the wants and teaches courses on Central and Eastern needs of the electorate. Europe, as well as on transitions to Interestingly, it was in Prague that the democracy. traditional neoliberal “cookie cutter” In this work, Orenstein tests these pre- reforms were implemented and re- cepts for economic reform in the de- mained unchanged for eight years, be- mocratizing countries of Poland and tween 1989 and 1997. Orenstein argues the Czech Republic. He asks the hard that the Czech Republic was not as suc- question: Were the postcommunist cessful as Poland because of the rigidity governments definitely less than demo- of its reforms and its lack of ability to cratic reform minded, hostile to eco- change or adapt. He adds the other di- nomic and market-oriented reforms? mension of the Czech economic prob- Orenstein’s persuasive findings demon- lem—vouchers. In the 1990s, in an strate that the traditional model of the attempt at rapid privatization, the stick-to-it economic plan may not be Czech Republic gave citizens vouchers the only answer. Indeed, policy learning to restructure nationalized industries.

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The voucher program failed largely be- the War of 1812 and the war with Mex- cause of government corruption, which ico might rate a single dusty showcase led to a loss of public support. in some obscure corner. Tucked out of This book is insightful but incomplete. sight, rarely seen, and all but forgotten Orenstein’s arguments are concise and would be cabinets, crates, and cartons persuasive, but he only examines two packed with the jumbled stories of bush cases that neatly support his argument. wars, expeditions, occupations, paci- Hungary would have been an excellent fications, and reprisals—the often additional test, as would have the fledg- sanguinary and surprising “small wars” ling economies of the Balkans, where of the U.S. military experience. the process of democratization is af- Reporter and Wall Street Journal editor fected even more directly by domestic Max Boot provides us with a long- and international constraints. overdue survey of the all too often With possible entry into the European slighted and neglected realm of these Union just around the corner for most lesser conflicts. His work is of necessity of Central and Eastern Europe, the an overview, but it is eminently read- United States and Europe must look able and entertaining. Along the way, carefully at these practical experiments Boot reminds us that the conduct of in democratic and economic liberaliza- these small conflicts is as much an tion. With democracies emerging in “American way of war” as that which Southeast Asia and perhaps the Middle mobilizes and employs mass citizen- East, it is important to develop and test armies in protracted combat. Finally, models of economic reform to see what and perhaps most importantly, Boot works and how best to implement them suggests that many of the lessons learned in democratizing countries. from these small wars may be applied to the security dilemmas of today. EDWARD WAGNER Watson Institute This work deserves praise on several Brown University levels. To begin with, Boot has rescued the history of these conflicts from a re- grettable level of obscurity (as far as the general reading public is concerned). As the merits and limitations of the United Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars States taking on the role of an imperial and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic police force are increasingly debated, it Books, 2002. 428pp. $30 is useful to recall that this is not the first If the story of the military history of the time America has attempted to do so. United States could somehow be pre- The author has the courage to suggest sented in a single museum, the most that under certain conditions, imperial grand and widely visited halls would be police forces may provide a much those dedicated to the American Revo- higher quality of life for indigenous lution, the Civil War, and World War people than would otherwise be possi- II. Less visited, but still of interest, ble. Boot notes that Haiti’s greatest pe- would be much smaller exhibits de- riod of prosperity arguably occurred voted to World War I, Korea, Vietnam, during its long occupation by the U.S. and DESERT STORM. Conflicts such as Marine Corps. He also points out that

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the Dominican Republic actually bene- example, the first charging of a serving fited when forcibly placed on a fiscal flag officer with a war crime, the use of diet by the United States. Although the torture to extract information, and mu- U.S. Marines were ensuring that nearly tinies of such U.S. trained units as the half the Dominican Republic’s revenues Nicaraguan National Guard were part went to repay foreign creditors, their of the small-war experience. However, honesty in disbursing the remainder Boot discusses these events in clear and was so notable that the country received unequivocal terms, leaving the reader more funds than it had under its own to come to grips with how these aspects rulers. Boot also points out that of war played in U.S. successes. Veracruz reached a record standard of What make this book so timely and one cleanliness and hygiene, with an atten- that should be read by almost anyone dant improvement in public health, with an interest in political-military than it had known previously. Boot re- issues, are the tie-ins that Boot identi- minds us that far from resulting in fies as existing between the wars of the quagmires of despair and failure, many past and the realities of the present. Is- of these conflicts have to be seen as U.S. sues such as exit strategies, expected ca- successes. sualties, the difficulties of working with There are, however, several criticisms local allies, and the complexities of state that might potentially be leveled at this building are not things the United work. Some may say that like so many States is facing for the first time. In- correspondents before him, Boot deed, as Boot demonstrates, the nation excessively admires the U.S. Marines, has been dealing with these dilemmas extolling their triumphs at the expense since the beginning of its existence. of the other services. However, while Well written, timely, and provocative, there is no denying that Boot has high Savage Wars of Peace is well worth regard for leathernecks, he does provide attention. ample examples of Navy and Army ac- RICHARD NORTON tions. It is also important to remember Naval War College that the Marines were the service of choice for the great majority of these conflicts. A significant portion of the Marines’ senior leadership in the 1930s

felt that the future of the Corps should Vidal, Gore. Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: be bound up in mastering the chal- How We Got to Be So Hated. New York: Thun- lenges of these conflicts. This resulted der’s Mouth Press, 2002. 160pp. $10 in the Marines’ Small Wars Manual, It would be difficult to find a book on published in 1941. It was later shelved; world affairs more contrary to the opin- Boot believes that it would have bene- ions of most readers of the Naval War fited the United States in Vietnam had College Review or other members of the those in charge read the dusty tome. American national security community Another criticism that might be made than Gore Vidal’s Perpetual War for by some is that Boot glosses over the Perpetual Peace. darker aspects of small wars, focusing As a military officer myself, I disagree on the successes and personalities. For with many of Vidal’s assumptions and

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propositions, but the book is worth- Vidal’s sharp mind and readable writ- while because it challenges one to think ing style make his arguments on the about inconsistencies and issues in World Trade Center attacks and the af- American foreign policy as well as do- termath compelling. For instance, the mestic security. The book is extremely declaration of an ambiguous “war” on well written, as one would expect from terror has been the subject of much dis- a writer of Vidal’s caliber. It is highly cussion in the pages of foreign affairs engaging, and most military profes- journals and newspaper editorials. sionals interested in American national Vidal notes that insurance companies security will probably find it easy to benefit from a state of war due to ex- read (although fewer may find it easy to ception clauses in insurance agree- agree with). ments, although previous U.S. case law Gore Vidal is a noted novelist, perhaps has established that “acts of war” can one of the most prominent living originate only from “a sovereign na- American authors. In 1943 he enlisted tion, not a bunch of radicals.” in the Navy and served in World War Some of his other comments lean more II, so his background lends relevant ex- toward “Swiftian literary exaggeration,” perience in military affairs. He wrote of which he accuses H. L. Mencken in a his commentary shortly after the 11 letter to Timothy McVeigh. His por- September attack, but after both Vanity trayal of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld Fair and The Nation declined it, a ver- and Vice President Dick Cheney as ea- sion of this book was printed in Italy, ger for a police state seems excessive. where it became a best-seller. After Also, he compares the terrorist attacks subsequent publication in Europe, in the United States to such state- Vidal was finally able to get the book sponsored atrocities as the burning of published in its present form. the Reichstag (secretly perpetrated by Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace con- the Nazi government in order to con- tains seven chapters and an introduc- solidate Hitler’s police power) and tion, but much of the material predates rapes by bogus Vietcong squads to dis- “9/11,” which is one of the book’s chief credit the communist insurgency. This weaknesses. Three chapters were re- paranoid proclivity toward conspiracy printed from his The Last Empire theory is revealed in his assertion that (Doubleday, 2001), and these were re- Opus Dei is a conservative Catholic cycled from earlier articles. Another conspiracy in the United States. He chapter, “The Meaning of Timothy makes a point about Thomas Jefferson’s McVeigh,” appeared in the September and John Adams’s opposition to Jesuit 2001 issue of Vanity Fair. There are activity in America, which is probably sparse updates throughout the older more an indicator of American chapters, including asterisked footnotes anti-Catholic bigotry several hundred and comments, such as one briefly years ago than any prescient warning of comparing the Oklahoma City bomb- the dangers of religious incursion into ing to “Dark Tuesday” (“9/11”). How- state affairs. ever, the meat of the new work appears There are, however, several arguments in the first chapter, “September 11, that are more convincing. Vidal con- 2001 (A Tuesday).” tends that terror attacks caused more

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damage to civil liberties than to the na- American Scientists has published a tion’s physical well-being. “Once alien- twenty-page listing of American mili- ated, an ‘unalienable right’ is apt to be tary operations dating from 1948 to forever lost.” He documents this asser- 1999, documenting how the United tion with a list of police killings of in- States (like the nations of Orwell’s nocent people in their homes and of 1984) has an “enemy of the month indefensible searches and seizures. club” and thus engages in a “perpetual While a reasonable reader may dismiss war” hoping for “perpetual peace.” This these discomforting examples as well theme is underdeveloped, however, and researched exceptions to normal law Vidal’s discussion of the United States enforcement activity in the United emphasizes domestic repression, while States, Vidal also brings up the chang- his reprinted chapters focus too exclu- ing nature of the law. He refers to U.S. sively on an apology (in the Platonic v. Sandini (1987), which established sense of an explanation) of Timothy that police were able to seize property McVeigh. permanently from an individual if the Altogether, Perpetual War for Perpetual property has been used for criminal Peace presents a provocative argument purposes, even if the individual has had that will be of intellectual appeal to no involvement with any crime. This professional military officers. It is ad- ruling has highly negative implications, mittedly an alternative perspective, but considering that 90 percent of Ameri- it may give members of the American can paper currency has traces of narcot- national security community insight ics on it from use in the drug trade. into how our European allies think, as Vidal also points out a common prob- well as our Third World adversaries, lem that is not commonly pondered— who often share Vidal’s perspective. the incidence of homosexual rape in the Vidal’s arguments are intriguing, but U.S. prison system, a violation of the the brevity of the new parts of this cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause work ultimately leaves his thoughts of the Bill of Rights. For anyone who incomplete. doubts that such punishment is state sanctioned, Vidal quotes a state attor- MICHAEL MORGAN Captain, U.S. Army ney general who refers to this practice in a public statement made in the course of his official duties. He is remi- niscent of the military author Colonel Charles Dunlap, U.S. Army, in his ref- Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau, eds. The erences to blatant disrespect to Presi- Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in dent Bill Clinton on a naval vessel by the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico, Va.: U.S. Ma- seamen, who called Clinton “the Prae- rine Corps Studies and Analysis Division. 416pp. torian Guard of the Pentagon,” and our (no price given) “ruling junta.” What could be both more poignant and There is one other weakness: the book ludicrous than Commander Abdul Baqi fails to address properly the meat of the Balots’s account of his survival of a issue that its title promises—“how we firefight in which his closest friend was got to be so hated.” The Federation of killed? “I saw a lot of Soviets coming at

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me and they were all firing (they put operations as in Bear, but the works are ten bullet holes through my baggy trou- not parallel texts. sers)....Habib Noor told me that, un- The present work consists of fourteen less we crossed the stream to the north, chapters and a conclusion, composed of we would not be able to engage the So- two to sixteen stories apiece. Each viets....Iranacross and jumped but chapter illustrates a different type of landed directly into the stream. ‘Oh, Al- tactical combat. There is a short discus- lah,’ I cried, ‘you have killed me with- sion of the tactic before each chapter out dignity.’ Then I made a big jump, I and a commentary at the end. This for- don’t know how since even a tank can’t mat has been used in military writing for clear it, but I did and got out of the many years (such as in the study Infantry stream.” in Battle, edited by George Marshall, This episode is recounted in Ali Jalali Military History and Publications sec- and Lester Grau’s book The Other Side tion of The Infantry School, 1934). of the Mountain. The two editors are However, in recent decades the implicit well known for a sequence of publica- analysis this approach provides has tions on unconventional warfare going been greatly strengthened by the more back to the early 1990s. For those who explicit case-study method. If these sto- follow this field, it is no surprise that ries had been written and presented as they are employed at the U.S. Army’s formal case studies, some existing distinguished Foreign Military Studies weaknesses could have been avoided— Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. the chief one being burying the chapter Their highly readable compilation is a “Blocking Enemy Lines of Communica- significant contribution to the literature tion” halfway through the book, despite on guerrilla warfare, and it has im- the editors’ and contributors’ amply mense implications for the contempo- demonstrated contention that logistics rary (at this writing) U.S. intervention dominated the Soviet war in Afghani- in Afghanistan. stan and was its chief strategic (not tac- The work consists of ninety-two “vi- tical) factor. gnettes” of tactical action, with a few The thematic organization of the chap- longer accounts of more protracted op- ters is a powerful approach, but it erations, all based on interviews with means sacrificing any sense of chrono- mujahideen participants. The book was logical development. As a result, there inspired by a Russian text used at the is little sense of the evolution of Frunze Combined Arms Academy, de- mujahideen tactics during the war or of tailing Soviet tactical action in Afghani- their interaction over time with Soviet stan. Jalali and Grau earlier produced tactics, despite occasional references an English translation of that book un- to such evolution in the chapter com- der the title The Bear Went Over the mentaries. In fact, the work places Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Af- unreasonable expectations on the back- ghanistan (National Defense Univ. ground knowledge of the reader. A Press, 1996). The Other Side of the summary of the war’s origins, conduct, Mountain points out when one of its and outcome is badly needed. A table short stories covers the same actions or listing each major mujahideen faction, with its leader, ideology, and sponsors,

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would also be helpful, as these factions although their contributors always re- are referred to throughout the narrative. ferred to “Russians,” they have changed The book might also have addressed this throughout to “Soviets.” Did the popular myths or conceptions about same process occur in transcribing the the war—for example, the U.S. view interviewees’ descriptions of guerrilla that distribution of Stinger antiaircraft operations? In this book even the most missiles to the mujahideen broke the irregular of mujahideen commanders back of Soviet air support and hence seems to have a perfect grasp of U.S. was the decisive point of the struggle. military terms and phrasing, implying The editors at a number of points indi- an equal grasp of the concepts behind cate their disagreement with this view the words. but never provide a formal rebuttal. Unfortunately, the book’s proofing and On the other hand, the book capri- editing is distractingly bad, which is a se- ciously provides detailed background rious handicap in a work containing so information on such relatively trivial many foreign words and names. An end points as the official U.S. Army load sheet includes production credits for the weights for mules, Central Asian horses, book—it seems only appropriate that and camels. one is listed for “Book Editing and The book has a strong geographic Desing.” A particularly unfortunate re- bias—most of the actions it describes sult of this hasty editing is found in the are in the vicinity of Kabul or on the commentary following a chapter on ur- route connecting Kabul and Jalalabad. ban combat. On first reading, this evalu- Most of the remaining actions are in ation of a mujahideen bombing of a city the Kandahar area. There is nothing market appears actually to be a defense from the Herat region, or the area of terrorist attacks on civilian noncom- around Maz~r-e Shar§f, or the Panjshir batants. Closer attention, however, Valley. This bias may be explained by a shows that the editors were attempting point the editors make in their intro- to contrast this particular incident with duction, that a number of interviews the Soviet aerial bombardment cam- could not be completed because of the paign aimed at driving the population 1996 Taliban advance on Kabul and the from the Afghan countryside, but the north. Still, they need to explain how text certainly reads as though it is equat- they have compensated for this imbal- ing any air strike with terrorism. ance in their material, especially in view These flaws detract from but do not of their own contention that the con- negate the high value of this book. In duct of the war varied by region and by addition to its major strength of first- the ethnicities involved. hand accounts of the most significant There may be an issue in this book with guerrilla war of our time, the book has language as well. Good interpreters are many other useful features. Its use of well aware of the temptation to tidy up maps is particularly adept, and consis- the haphazard use of specialized termi- tent references to Defense Mapping nology by speakers of a foreign lan- Agency map sheets give a sense of detail guage, by rendering it in precise, and nuance to the work. While it is ex- professional English usage. The editors ceptionally riddled with typographical remark in the introduction that errors, the glossary covers nearly all the

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specialized and foreign terms used in the abruptly dismissed the government’s book, at exactly the right level of detail. case, because in the last few weeks evi- In sum, The Other Side of the Mountain dence had materialized showing that is a unique and valuable contribution to agents of the Richard M. Nixon admin- the study of unconventional warfare. In istration had denied Ellsberg his right view of the ongoing U.S. operations in to a fair trial by burglarizing his psychi- Afghanistan, the editors would be per- atrist’s office in search of material with forming a civic service were they to which to blackmail him into not releas- produce a revised and reedited version ing more documents. This revelation for general publication. became part of the unfolding drama of the Watergate scandal, the surreptitious WILLIAM C. GREEN forced nighttime entry into the Demo- Department of Political Science CSU San Bernardino cratic Party headquarters by the same agents of the administration. President Nixon attempted to buy the silence of one of the burglars, E. Howard Hunt, with a seventy-five-thousand-dollar bribe. Facing impeachment for at- Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking Pen- tempting to cover up the break-in, guin, 2002. 498pp. $29.95 Nixon wailed about Ellsberg: “The sonofabitching thief is made a national For Americans who were adults during hero....AndtheNew York Times gets a the Vietnam War, the name Daniel Pulitzer for stealing documents.” Ellsberg is portentous; it either suggests a whiff of treason or connotes heroic Secrets is a book that must be read by patriotism. Ellsberg is a Marine Corps anyone seeking to understand how the veteran, Harvard Ph.D., former senior United States formulates its strategy official in the Office of the Secretary of and policy. Ellsberg demolishes the Defense, a highly regarded analyst for “quagmire” thesis favored by such in- the RAND Corporation, and a civilian fluential liberal interpreters as Arthur M. observer of platoon-level combat in Schlesinger, Jr. By that interpretation, Vietnam who defiantly chose to “walk beginning with Harry S. Truman up to point” with the troops he was observ- the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, ing. In March 1971, Ellsberg released to each president made a deeper commit- the New York Times a seven-thousand- ment of American military power and page, highly classified Department of clandestine activity, under the convic- Defense history of American involve- tion that his actions would achieve a ment in Vietnam. Covering the war South Vietnamese victory over the in- from the Truman administration vaders from the communist North. through the Tet offensive of early 1968, From Ellsberg’s perspective, there was this study became known as “The Pen- no quagmire, only endless presidential tagon Papers” when the New York deception of Congress and the public, Times began publishing it on 13 June. who were led to believe decade after de- Ellsberg’s action earned him federal fel- cade that surely the next step would re- ony indictments and a protracted crim- sult in the successful establishment of a inal trial. On 11 May 1973 the judge permanently independent South

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Vietnam. Ellsberg served as the action Republican Barry Goldwater, who was officer for Vietnam, reporting person- advocating precisely the kind of sus- ally to John McNaughton, Secretary of tained air campaign that Johnson had Defense Robert S. McNamara’s princi- already planned and would begin once pal assistant for Vietnam. Ellsberg be- safely reelected president. came convinced that every president One can applaud or condemn Daniel knew that his commitments would Ellsberg for what he did in 1971. What prove insufficient to accomplish the one cannot do is ignore the power his goal of preserving South Vietnam’s in- memoir has to inform Americans about dependence. However, none of them how the executive branch conducted its could withdraw American support— foreign policy and military strategy because a communist victory in South from the 1940s until 1974. As the Vietnam would create an unbearable United States apparently heads (at this political liability in the Cold War climate writing) toward another major war, the of “wars of national liberation” backed skeptic is entitled to wonder if things at by the Soviets and China. the top have really changed. Ellsberg went to work as McNaughton’s KEN HAGAN aide for Vietnam on 4 August 1964. Professor of Strategy On that day his office was receiving Naval War College—Monterey, California live reports of North Vietnamese patrol-boat attacks on the U.S. de- stroyer Maddox, the presence of which off North Vietnam was one of several provocations staged by the Johnson Rohwer, Jürgen, and Mikhail S. Monakov. Sta- administration to elicit a military reac- lin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and tion from Hanoi. The administration Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 334pp. $57.50 publicly claimed that two distinct sets of attacks were made, first on the The collapse of the Soviet Union and Maddox and a short time later on the the opening of major Russian archives Maddox and a sister ship, USS Turner have provided an opportunity to add Joy. Drawing on his direct experience greatly to our understanding of the in the Office of the Secretary of De- character of the Soviet navy. Eminent fense, Ellsberg demonstrates that Mad- researchers Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail dox’s skipper raised doubts about the S. Monakov have contributed much to second set of attacks within a few hours this understanding with their study of of announcing them. The Johnson ad- Soviet naval shipbuilding and strategy ministration nonetheless went to Con- when Josef Stalin controlled the devel- gress describing both attacks as bona opment of the Soviet Navy, from 1935 fide, because together they appeared to until his death in 1953. They have un- justify a long-planned escalation of the covered extensive details of the massive air war. Once armed by Congress with shipbuilding program, most of which the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson never came to fruition. Strategy, how- made a few direct retaliatory air strikes ever, remains as murky as ever. This and then posed as the presidential peace study complements but does not re- candidate. He was running against place Monakov’s series of articles on

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Soviet naval doctrine and Stalin’s fleet battle cruisers, all of which were cancel- in Morskoi sbornik, 1992–98, or Robert led when Stalin died. The Sverdlov-class W. Herrick’s Soviet Naval Theory and cruisers and a new submarine force of Policy: Gorshkov’s Inheritance (1989). 284 boats became the shrunken legacy At the end of 1935 Stalin personally of Stalin’s naval dreams. yanked the Soviet navy from littoral de- The navy of Admiral Nikolai fense through air, submarine, and light Kuznetsov, under army operational surface forces into a grandiose ship- control but without strategic direction building program centered on large from the General Staff or the top, con- battleships and battle cruisers, while tinued to orient itself before, during, retaining “Young School” craving for and after World War II toward tradi- submarines. Stalin took naval strategy tional defensive roles—defeating at- into his own hands but never divulged tacking enemy fleets and amphibious any strategic precepts or plans to his expeditions in the near seas—with only naval leaders, who in fear of Stalin’s a limited submarine offensive on adja- wrath dutifully adapted themselves to cent enemy sea lines of communica- the imposed scheme, several falling to tions. the purges anyway. The result was a Stalin’s motive for building a battleship massive shipbuilding program and a fleet, according to the authors, was the naval officer corps stranded in a strate- vision of the Soviet Union gaining su- gic wilderness, with silent misgivings premacy in the four near seas and then about the apparent dissonance between becoming an oceanic power, with the the projected force structure and opera- battleship or battle cruiser “a symbol tional commitments arising from the of the highest grade of power, a most Soviet Union’s particular geostrategic powerful and mobile instrument of position. power politics, that the world had By 1939 an immense program had ever known,” the direct predecessor of evolved to build twenty-four powerful the atomic bomb in attaining super- battleships by 1947, with fifteen for the power status. Pacific Fleet and the rest divided among Stalin, however, left no direct evidence the Baltic, Black Sea, and Northern of his reasons, whereas several indica- Fleets. Concurrent plans called for a tors point toward a dominant mental submarine force intended to reach 438 construct of positional strategic de- units, of which 219 were earmarked for fense still guiding Stalin and his admi- the Pacific. These fleet goals, along with rals. He and his naval leaders agreed a modicum of light surface forces, were on a defense strategy but diverged on impossible for Soviet shipbuilding ca- preferred force structure. Stalin re- pacity, even by halting merchant ship jected the aircraft carrier, despite all construction. With the onset of the the evidence from the Second World Great Patriotic War, all long-term proj- War of the importance of airpower at ects were suspended; only submarine sea for a blue-water navy. Kuznetsov and light surface projects continued, as often pleaded in vain with Stalin for circumstances allowed. The defeat of stronger shipboard antiaircraft de- the Axis saw the prewar schemes re- fenses on ships, for aircraft carriers to duced to three battleships and three cover surface forces from enemy air

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attack out to three hundred miles from inherited Stalin’s schemes and built up naval bases, and to limit Soviet Kuznetsov’s fleet, extensive deploy- land-based air support. In 1946, ments did not replace deeply held Kuznetsov’s close associate Admiral positional and defensive assumptions. Vladimir Alafuzov developed a posi- Had Stalin’s “oceanic” fleet actually tional scheme of supremacy under been built, whether a shift of orienta- land-based air cover up to one hun- tion by him or his admirals toward dred miles from naval bases, and con- “global naval power” would have oc- ditional sea control by large surface curred remains undemonstrated and vessels with limited air support in a problematic. “far zone” out to three hundred miles. WILLARD C. FRANK, JR. This fell short of command of the ex- Old Dominion University panses of the Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas or of most of the Sea of Japan. Only submarines with long endurance could operate in the open ocean, but

Stalin preferred medium submarines, Buker, George E. The : Com- conceived for operations in near seas modore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspir- against an amphibious threat. The pro- acy of 1779. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, jected battleships would have had an 2002. 195pp. $32.95 operational radius only half that of In the various history books on the their contemporaries in oceanic na- American Revolution, the Penobscot vies. Only current Italian battleships, expedition is rarely mentioned in any also designed for near seas, had such detail, being overshadowed by the more limited autonomy. To operate across widely known and successful battles the open ocean was a ludicrous con- and campaigns. Perhaps this is due to cept to Stalin in 1945, arguing for a the dismal outcome of this early joint defensive posture for at least ten to fif- amphibious operation and to the desire teen years to come. Stalin’s projected by some, especially Massachusetts poli- “large sea and oceanic navy,” to use ticians of the time, to forget what had the Soviet term, was likely created for happened. a hoped-for more robust traditional This hastily conceived expedition was strategic defensive in contiguous seas. launched from in July 1779. The The evidence in this book, if not its expedition was given the task of ex- title, lends support to Herrick’s judg- pelling the mounting British military ment of a Stalinist strategy of limited presence on coastal , centered command of the near seas. To suggest around , but specifically that it was “the first step on the road at Castine. The expedition set off with to global naval power,” as does series full expectation of success on the part editor Holger Herwig in the preface, of the Massachusetts political leader- would require Stalin and his navy to ship. But from the beginning, the force demonstrate a conceptual leap for assembled was hampered by inadequate which neither had shown a proclivity. leadership, divided command author- Mind-sets resist change. Even in the ity, poor training and support, and a navy of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who

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significant lack of understanding of the loss of almost forty ships, recrimina- tactical situation. In this book, George tions were made against various leaders, Buker, a retired Navy commander, pro- including allegations against naval force fessor of history, and an accomplished commander Captain author, provides a significant account of responsibility for the overall result; of this much overlooked effort by the and against , an icon of the combined forces of the Massachusetts Revolutionary War who served in the and Maine militia, expedition as a lieutanant colonel in and Marines, and various privateer charge of the artillery, of unsoldierly groups. Buker also provides an interest- conduct. In the end, it was Captain ing glimpse of the internal politics and Saltonstall who bore the brunt of the personalities of the colonies, especially smear campaign by Massachusetts poli- in Massachusetts during the American ticians to shift the blame. Revolution. He further provides a com- In the final chapters, and through the plementary argument that the Massa- lens of history, Buker argues that in- chusetts political authorities, when deed a conspiracy by the Massachusetts confronted with the dismal failure of politicians, through their committee of the expedition, set in motion an inquiry inquiry, manipulated the results of their that may have been a conspiracy of po- investigation and attempted to influ- litical self-interest. ence the outcome of the court-martial The book appears well researched, with of Saltonstall by Continental Navy au- significant endnotes and bibliography. thorities. Their efforts ensured the de- Reading almost like a novel, it tells the sired results of exonerating their native story of the Penobscot expedition in son, militia general Solomon Lovell, great detail and addresses the issues that and provided the justification needed to led up to its failure and the resulting in- assess the Continental government for a quiry. In appropriately titled chapters portion of the monetary cost. Buker, Buker provides a historical overview however, provides technical and tactical leading up to the expedition, including reasons that may have led to the failure the British policy, orders for military of the expedition. Further, he indicates operations along coastal Maine, and, that only Captain Saltonstall fully ap- of course, the colonial response to the preciated the tactical and operational threat to the extended territory of circumstances, as well as the limited ca- Massachusetts, now the state of Maine. pability of his resources and ships in the As expected, the majority of the book confined waters around Penobscot Bay. deals with the actual operations, from These considerations were evidently ex- outfitting and the order of battle to the cluded or ignored by the politicians in assaults and resulting siege at Castine, their single-minded desire to find a to the hasty retreat and then rout of co- scapegoat for the failure. lonial forces when superior Royal Navy Overall, this is a fine historical account- forces arrived, and finally to the sequel, ing of this chapter in American history. in which the expedition’s personnel My one large criticism is that the one walked back to Massachusetts from simple map provided is inadequate for Maine after burning their ships. After a full understanding of the operations. the failure of the expedition and the This reviewer has the benefit of having

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been stationed in Castine, Maine, and is attack, endures brutal weather, and cre- geographically aware of the area; I have ates an increasingly difficult political walked the earthen ramparts of Fort situation for senior national security George and the various other entrench- leaders who believe the Pepperdogs are ments around Castine. It would have risking diplomatic solutions. There is at been most helpful to the general reader one point the suggestion that even the had additional detailed military maps murder of one Marine would not be been included with each phase of the worth upsetting diplomatic peace ini- expedition. Well placed photographs of tiatives. The Pepperdogs make political the area would have further added to matters worse by leaving a path of de- the historical understanding of the struction while ignoring direct orders events, as would photos of the various to end their chase. earthworks, trenches, the defensive Setbacks are many, but perseverance canal, and Fort George, which all still and tactical teamwork always (well, al- exist as historical landmarks. most always) gets them out of tight

JAMES B. GOODMAN spots. One remembers those great mo- Commander, U.S. Navy ments when the cavalry arrived and Naval War College everyone cheered. But this team is dif- ferent from the cavalry; the Pepperdogs take performance-enhancing drugs and rarely need to rest. One team member creates an Internet website that pro- West, Bing. The Pepperdogs. New York: Simon & vides the public with real-time informa- Schuster, 2002. 365pp. $25 tion on their progress and problems. The Pepperdogs ranks with The Hunt for The public cheers them on, reducing Red October. It is a work of fiction con- the policy-making flexibility of political structed around reality, brimming with leaders. West skillfully introduces the action and genuine insight into the Internet as a source of potential direct emerging warfighting capabilities of the information from individuals in the new ground soldier. West develops his battle to the public. That information story around a Marine reconnaissance would have obvious constraining effects team. That team, the “Pepperdogs,” is on future national security decision- made up of six reservists of varying ci- making latitude and would yield differ- vilian backgrounds; all have extraordi- ent perspectives on progress and nary courage, physical and mental problems. strength, expert tactical skills, and total The suspense and many sudden turns team commitment. of fortune keep the reader glued to the The Pepperdogs set out on their own to story. One cannot help but choose sides rescue a team member captured by between the Marine team and political rogue Serbian guerrillas who specialize leaders who wish to halt the pursuit of in casual atrocities. West’s story takes the kidnapped Marine. Even if the team place in Kosovo, mostly in mountainous succeeds and its members become pub- terrain and in the harshest of winter lic heroes, they may be court-martialed conditions. In pursuit of the kidnappers for disobeying orders. the team undergoes nearly constant

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Bing West is well qualified to write an secretary of defense. West has main- insider’s story of modern small-unit tained a close relationship with the Ma- tactics, having had experience of Oval rine Corps through his design of Office–level decision making and the combat decision-making simulations. conflicts faced by senior military leaders The Pepperdogs is a great read—as was, between political direction and unnec- by the way, West’s earlier Vietnam- essarily risky situations. West was a Ma- centered book The Village (Pocket rine reconnaissance leader in Vietnam Books, 2003, paperback). and has studied small-unit action since the 1960s. He was a Naval War College WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE Professor Emeritus professor and a former assistant Naval War College

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