Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program
Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program
DANIEL A. PINKSTON
Daniel A. Pinkston is a senior research associate and Korea specialist at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California.1
he Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (here- earnings from exports. In the DPRK case, the missile after “the DPRK” or “North Korea”) and its mis- development program has tremendous distributional con- Tsile development program have generated inter- sequences for North Korean society, which includes a num- national concerns for several years. Most analysts agree ber of “stakeholders” with different preferences for the that the DPRK missile program is a threat to security and future of the missile program. stability in Northeast Asia and other regions, and North Given that Pyongyang’s policymakers must consider Korea’s missile exports are well documented. The Bush both international and domestic politics when deciding administration has accused Pyongyang of being “the missile development policy, predicting the future devel- world’s number one merchant for ballistic missiles—open opment path of the North Korean missile program is a for business with anyone, no matter how maligned the complex task. Most analysis tends to focus on the inter- buyer’s intentions.”2 national component of this problem, with little consider- Clearly North Korea’s missile program has had an ation for North Korean domestic politics and institutions. impact on international security; conversely, international Some analysts might argue that domestic politics is irrel- variables, or changes in the international strategic envi- evant because the North Korean leadership is completely ronment, influence the DPRK in determining the insulated from domestic pressures, or because all political program’s scope and future development. However, the and societal interests in North Korea converge on this North Korean domestic political economy is also a deter- issue. The DPRK is not a pluralistic polity; North Korean mining factor. Missile development is technically diffi- civil society is extraordinarily underdeveloped. Neverthe- cult and very expensive, especially for relatively small less, even the most authoritarian governments require a countries like North Korea with backward or poorly per- critical mass of supporters in order to remain in power forming economies. Missiles provide security benefits, at and to continue programs that consume significant resources. least in the short run,3 and arguably can provide economic This assumption raises key questions about the North benefits if we consider the potential foreign exchange Korean institutions and individuals that have particular
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 1 DANIEL A. PINKSTON
political or economic interests in the status or continua- Pyongyang’s leaders are motivated to develop nuclear tion of the missile program. weapons and long-range missiles because of this experi- This paper identifies the main domestic “stakehold- ence.8 This analysis does not suggest that the United ers” in the North Korean missile program, and assesses States continues to threaten North Korea with nuclear their preferences, with the objective of contributing to a weapons; nevertheless, North Korean leaders have long better understanding of how decisionmakers in Pyongyang speculated about the utility of nuclear weapons and the might proceed with DPRK missile policy. The first sec- costs to develop them. tion will examine the historical background and political The end of the Korean War in 1953 did not mean the motivations behind North Korea’s missile development, potential for nuclear conflict in Korea had completely and the second section will explain North Korea’s politi- disappeared. Several incidents since the war could have cal orientation, or institutional setting. The third section provoked the United States into using nuclear weapons will identify the main stakeholders in the program before in Korea: the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo in identifying their probable preferences regarding missile 1968, a North Korean commando raid on the South development policy. Korean presidential residence in 1968, the axe murders of two U.S. soldiers at P’anmunjom in 1976, the assassi- nation attempt against South Korean President Chun HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND MOTIVATIONS FOR Tu Hwan in Burma in 1983, and the standoff over DEVELOPING MISSILES Pyongyang’s refusal to permit the completion of Interna- Throughout its history, the DPRK has confronted several tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspec- external and internal security problems.4 Korea is sur- tions in 1994.9 rounded by major powers, and the peninsula has been sub- Given Pyongyang’s threat perception and security ject to numerous invasions. Colonialism and war during needs, North Korea has sought to strengthen its military the 20th century still resonate with policymakers in capabilities by forming security alliances and by allocat- Pyongyang, and the experience continues to influence the ing a tremendous number of resources to the military sec- perceptions of the ruling elite and their supporters. A tor. However, despite North Korea’s security alliances with strong military posture and advanced weapons systems not China and the Soviet Union, DPRK leaders have been only have helped the leadership to deal with external dissatisfied with North Korea’s alliance partners on sev- threats, but they have also been popular among national- eral occasions. For example, even though China and the istic citizens who are constantly reminded of the poten- USSR provided assistance during the Korean War, Kim Il tial external threats to the DPRK.5 Sung desired more support than he received. Kim was dis- U.S. military forces have been stationed in South appointed that Stalin did not provide ground forces and Korea since the end of the Korean War to deter a repeat of other resources to expel the Americans from Korea, and the North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel on following Soviet acquiescence during the Cuban missile June 25, 1950. However, all North Koreans are taught that crisis, North Korea quickly implemented an import sub- the United States invaded the DPRK on that day, and stitution policy in the arms sector to reduce its depen- that the “Great Leader Marshal” Kim Il Sung repulsed the dence on foreign weapons suppliers.10 Other events that American invasion during the “victorious Fatherland Lib- shook Pyongyang’s confidence in its allies include the eration War.”6 The North Korean media continue to pro- normalization of U.S.-China relations, the collapse of the vide extensive reports of the U.S. military intervention USSR and the socialist countries in Eastern Europe, the in 1950 and of the need to remain vigilant against the normalization of relations between Moscow and Seoul, possibility of “another American attack.”7 and the normalization of relations between Beijing and Despite Pyongyang’s historical revisionism, the his- Seoul. In sum, these events led North Korea to question torical facts have justified acquiring the capability to strike the credibility of its alliance partners, and they increased U.S. targets in order to deter future American military Pyongyang’s perceived utility of an indigenous ballistic intervention. At a minimum, North Korean leaders desire a missile program. strong conventional capability to achieve this objective, Much has been written about the developmental his- but weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic tory of the DPRK ballistic missile program, but less has missiles are likely the preferred choice. During the Korean been written about the decisionmaking process that will War, North Korea and China were subjected to nuclear determine the future of North Korean missile develop- threats by the United States, and some analysts argue that ment.11 This policymaking process is critical because
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Pyongyang’s short- and intermediate-range missiles now July 1998, 443 new members were elected, and Kim Jong threaten regional stability in Northeast Asia, South Asia, Il was elected by district 666, a Korean People’s Army con- and the Middle East. Furthermore, North Korean long- stituency.18 This large turnover of legislators in the SPA range missiles could be capable of striking the continen- marked the beginning of Kim Jong Il’s formal ascension tal United States before 2015, unless the DPRK changes to power after his father’s death in 1994. its political orientation.12 Separation of Powers
NORTH KOREA’S POLITICAL ORIENTATION OR Nominally, North Korean policymaking and policy imple- INSTITUTIONAL SETTING mentation are divided among the party, the government, and the military. However, this “separation of powers” is The DPRK is an authoritarian one-party state character- exploited by a small number of ruling elite who hold mul- ized by a cult of personality built around Kim Il Sung and tiple posts across these three “dimensions of power,” while his son Kim Jong Il—the only leaders the country has manipulating electoral rules and powers of appointment known since it was founded in 1948. The Kim family’s to exclude any political opposition. In general, the Korean political legitimacy is based on Kim Il Sung’s armed resis- Workers Party (KWP) screens political access at all lev- tance to Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). Although els, beginning with party membership, which begins at Kim did lead a small group of guerilla fighters, his military the local level and is necessary for personal advancement background and achievements have been exaggerated by in North Korean society. 13 the North Korean government and media. Despite con- The KWP bylaws proclaim that the party represents trary evidence, the North Korean government claims that the interests of all the Korean people; however, stringent Kim Jong Il was born at a secret military base on Mt. Paektu membership requirements exclude those opposed to the (Paektusan), where Kim Il Sung is said to have led the doctrines established by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The 14 anti-Japanese insurgency. It is interesting to note that KWP is defined as a “revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party North Korea named the missile launched on August 31, based on chuch’e, which was established by the Great 1998, the Paektusan-1, which can be viewed as symboli- Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.” The party bylaws also pro- cally linking the past “heroic liberation efforts” of Kim Il claim that the KWP is to “enforce a dictatorship of the Sung with the future hope of building a “strong and pow- proletariat, complete the revolution, and liberate the 15 erful nation” under the leadership of Kim Jong Il. southern half of the peninsula from American imperialist 19 New Consitution occupation forces.” The term chuch’e, which literally means “self-reliance” Following Kim Il Sung’s death in July 1994, the North or “independence,” first appeared in North Korean poli- Korean presidency remained vacant until a constitutional tics in December 1955 when Kim Il Sung still faced threats revision on September 5, 1998, one day after the North from factional rivals, and when Kim was beginning to Korean media speciously announced that a Korean rocket navigate through the turbulence of the emerging Sino- had successfully placed a satellite into earth orbit on Au- Soviet dispute. As Kim strengthened his grip on power gust 31.16 The revised constitution marked Kim Jong Il’s though the 1960s, chuch’e ideology developed into an formal rise to power, established Kim Il Sung as the important part of North Korean politics and government. “eternal president of the republic,” and declared that In 1972, chuch’e became part of the revised North Korean “the entire Korean people will uphold his ideas and constitution, and prospective KWP members now have exploits…under the leadership of the Korean Workers to display their knowledge and devotion to chuch’e Party.”17 thought in order to qualify for party membership.20 While the new constitution elevated the National According to KWP bylaws, North Korean citizens Defense Commission (NDC) to the highest authority over applying for KWP membership must submit an applica- military affairs, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA, the tion form and receive sponsorship from two KWP mem- DPRK’s legislative branch of government) also reelected bers. The sponsors must have been party members for at Kim Jong Il chairman of the NDC. The constitutional least two years, be knowledgeable about the applicant’s revision in September followed an SPA election on July “social and political life,” and take responsibility for the 26, 1998, whereby 107 active duty military members out applicant. Local party committees deliberate and approve of 687 total legislators were elected—an increase over the the applications on a “case-by-case basis.” All party mem- 62 military legislators that were in the previous SPA. In bers are given a list of responsibilities such as “being loyal
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 3 DANIEL A. PINKSTON
to the party and leader,” but there is enough ambiguity in tary capabilities of the armed forces, organize and pro- the requirements for local party committees to have dis- mote the development of defense industries, and command cretion over who is granted membership. Party commit- the armed forces.”27 However, the chairman’s position, pre- tees exercise this discretion when considering the songbun viously held by Kim Il Sung, has been vacant since Kim’s or “character and background” of the individual.21 death in July 1994.28 Even though the party bylaws have Because the KWP is hierarchically structured, subor- not been amended, the Military Affairs Commission’s dinate organizations and committees implement direc- authority and functions have now been superseded by tives from above. The Party Congress is nominally the those of the NDC. highest decisionmaking authority in the KWP, and a party The Party Central Committee nominally deliberates congress is supposed to be held once every five years. How- and decides national policies, but the KWP General Sec- ever, the Party Central Committee has the authority to retary, Kim Jong Il, controls the agenda and policies shorten or extend the period between party congresses through his command of the KWP Secretariat and Politi- “as necessary.” The last party congress was the Sixth Party cal Bureau. The NDC and its chairman, Kim Jong Il, now Congress in October 1980.22 During the period between control all military affairs, including national security party congresses, or should a party congress fail to con- policy and the management of defense industries. It is very vene, the Party Central Committee has full authority over unlikely that dissimilar policy preferences would emerge party affairs and organization. This authority includes the from these top state institutions since they are controlled power to decide the electoral rules and to determine the by Kim Jong Il and are staffed by the same Kim loyalists. number of members in the Party Central Committee.23 A Power Elite The highest state authority in the DPRK is the Supreme People’s Assembly; however, the SPA Presidium exercises The redundancy in the North Korean system ensures con- real authority since it assumes complete SPA powers trol by the elite, while the KWP’s “entry barriers” deny between SPA sessions, which are normally convened once political access to those who might be opposed to the sys- or twice a year. The SPA has the power to elect and “trans- tem. At the same time, state security agencies have cre- fer” or “remove” several officials, including the NDC ated almost insurmountable collective-action costs for chairman and other NDC members (but according to the dissidents hoping to replace the regime.29 The result is a recommendation of the NDC chairman), the SPA Pre- stable system that has survived well beyond numerous sidium president and other members, the premier of the predictions of collapse. However, political system rigidity cabinet, and the chief justice. However, the SPA Presidium and intolerance for political opposition mean political has the authority “to interpret” the constitution and laws, change is only possible through top-down directives from and to overturn the decisions of other state agencies that Kim Jong Il, or through revolution. A decade of continu- violate the constitution. SPA Presidium members serve ous economic decline has led to speculation that regime the same term that regular SPA members do, or until the collapse was imminent or inevitable, but the DPRK con- election of a new SPA Presidium.24 tinues to survive. The SPA has the authority to appoint cabinet minis- North Korea began to implement very limited eco- ters, including the minister of the People’s Armed Forces. nomic reforms in the mid 1980s, and signs of potential However, the National Defense Commission is the high- sweeping economic liberalization have emerged on numer- est authority over national defense, and the NDC com- ous occasions. In July 2002, Pyongyang abandoned its state mands the armed forces. The NDC has the power to distribution system for rice and other commodities in establish or abolish defense-related institutions, declare favor of markets.30 However, no signs of political reforms war, confer military ranks of general and above, and in the DPRK are apparent, despite past reports of small appoint or dismiss “major military cadres.”25 The NDC rebellions and some social unrest. A few military insur- was established to assist the Party Central Committee when rections, coup d’état plans, assassination plots, and riots the DPRK Constitution was revised in 1972, but the NDC due to food shortages have been reported, but none of these became independent from the Party Central Committee incidents appears to have seriously threatened the regime.31 when the constitution was revised again in April 1992.26 Nevertheless, succession can be problematic in authori- The KWP bylaws stipulate that the Party Central tarian governments, and North Korea’s personality cult Committee’s Military Affairs Commission is to “deliber- could suddenly disintegrate with the abrupt or unexpected ate and decide all party military policies, increase the mili- passing of Kim Jong Il.
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NORTH KOREAN MISSILE STAKEHOLDERS policy. The NDC and the KWP elite have the greatest influence over DPRK missile policy, while the influence Policy changes have distributional effects; this maxim also of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces and the applies to the DPRK, especially in reference to policy Korean People’s Army is probably moderate. The nuclear changes in its missile program or munitions industry. coalition’s influence is low to moderate because this group Major North Korean actors with a clear vested interest in is dispersed across different organizations and probably the missile program can easily be identified, but given faces collective action problems due to the program’s North Korea’s opaqueness and undeveloped civil society, inherent secrecy. The munitions industry’s influence is it is much more difficult to identify every domestic actor probably low to moderate, and that of the “reformers and that would be affected by changes in the DPRK missile civilian economy” is the lowest, but probably increasing program. Therefore, for simplicity and brevity, I have because of recently implemented economic reforms. identified the following entities as the program’s major domestic stakeholders: the Korean Workers Party elite, The KWP Elite and the National Defense the National Defense Commission, the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces and the Korean People’s Army, the Commission “nuclear coalition,” the munitions industry, and a group The KWP elite includes the KWP Central Committee’s of reformers and civilian enterprises (see Table 1). Political Bureau and Secretariat.33 The Politbureau con- These stakeholders have preferences about North sists of Kim Jong Il and six close confidants as regular Korean missile policy, but their preferences are not clearly members and seven alternate members. Kim Jong Il is the expressed in public. In general, there are three methods sole member of the Politbureau Standing Committee. The of deriving preferences: assumption, observation, and Secretariat includes General Secretary Kim Jong Il and deduction.32 I have used a combination of assumption and 10 secretaries with specific functional responsibilities. The observation to assign or derive the preferences of the KWP ruling elite and the National Defense Commission North Korean missile stakeholders. Deduction, or the use nominally have the ultimate decisionmaking authority of theories to derive preferences, is more difficult to apply over the DPRK missile program; however, Kim Jong Il and and has been avoided in this paper. None of the three his close confidants hold the senior positions in both of methods is perfect, but the objective is to derive a set of these institutions. plausible preferences that can help explain the behavior The KWP elite and the NDC must consider both the of actors as they try to influence policy outcomes. domestic and international levels of politics and security Assumption is the easiest method and is commonly when contemplating missile policy. North Korean missile used in economics to describe the goal of firms as “profit development, production, deployment, and exports gen- maximization.” This method is more useful in assigning erate four benefits to the KWP elite and NDC: 1) security preferences to the munitions industry and the civilian from external threats, 2) foreign exchange earnings, 3) economy, in part because they more closely resemble domestic employment, and 4) nationalistic prestige for firms. Assumption is also used in the case of the nuclear North Korean citizens, which translates into some level coalition, a term loosely applied to a group of individu- of support for the leadership. The Kim Jong Il regime als in various organizations that prefer nuclear weapons receives the benefit of deterrence against foreign threats development. and a greater military capability should the DPRK decide The second method, observation (or induction), is to take aggressive action to unify Korea by force. Foreign more useful in deriving the preferences of the KWP rul- exchange from missile exports provides the regime with ing elite, the National Defense Commission, and the Min- fungible hard currency, and missile production provides istry of People’s Armed Forces and Korean People’s Army. employment for thousands of citizens. To derive the preferences of these actors, it is possible to North Korea’s missile exports are a significant source draw upon the DPRK constitution; the KWP bylaws, trea- of foreign exchange for the regime. According to a U.S. ties, and other international agreements; statements of military source, missile export earnings were $580 mil- political leaders; and other documents. lion in 2001.34 The same military source claims that Another important element is the political access or Pyongyang earns about $500 million a year through nar- influence that stakeholders have in policy decisions. cotics exports, but according to the Bank of (South) North Korean domestic political institutions structure the Korea, North Korea’s total exports for 2001 were only $650 way domestic preferences are aggregated into national million.35 Estimating the national income of countries
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 5 DANIEL A. PINKSTON
TABLE 1 DPRK MISSILE STAKEHOLDERS
KWP Elite NDC MPAF/KPA Nuclear Munitions Reformers Coalition? Industry & Civilian Economy Main interests Maintain Defend Defend DPRK; Develop Maintain or Reform and or policy one-party territory of realize business nuclear expand open preferences state; DPRK profits from weapons; production economy for “complete military firms acquire and profits economic revolution” delivery (and exports) recovery systems? Influence on High High Moderate Low to Low to Low, but policymaking moderate moderate probably increasing Influence on 2nd 1st 3rd 5th 4th 6th missile policy by rank Effects from Uncertain* Uncertain* Gains Greatest Gains Losses missile gains program expansion Effects from Uncertain* Uncertain* Unchanging Unchanging or Unchanging Losses missile or possible possible gains program status gains quo Effects from Uncertain* Uncertain* Unchanging Losses Losses Gains partial curtailment of missile program Effects from Uncertain* Uncertain* Unchanging Losses Greatest Greater joining MTCR losses gains
Effects from Uncertain* Uncertain* Unchanging Greatest Greater Greatest joining MTCR losses losses gains and launch consortium
*The gains and losses of the KWP ruling elite and the NDC primarily depend on their perceptions of external threats. See Table 2.
with opaque planned economies is extremely difficult, and efit from the missile program’s abandonment are less likely data on the transfers of advanced weapons systems are to support the regime, and international actors, primarily particularly sensitive. However, if these figures are roughly the United States and South Korea, react to the deploy- accurate, then missile sales could account for as much as ment and export of North Korean missiles. For example, a third of North Korea’s exports. South Korea has responded with its own missile develop- Despite its benefits, the North Korean ballistic mis- ment program, and Washington has ordered theater deploy- sile program does impose costs on the KWP elite and the ments of advanced U.S. weapons systems. The United States NDC. Domestic groups in North Korea that would ben- has also refused to normalize relations with Pyongyang,
6 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 THE NORTH KOREAN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM maintaining economic sanctions and depriving North pletely free from domestic constraints. Its role in the mis- Korea access to international financial institutions. sile development program is to establish all policies and While the KWP elite and the NDC must weigh the deliver its policy directives to other government agen- costs and the benefits in both the international and cies. The Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces provides domestic realms, where this calculus will lead is not clear. information and requests to the NDC, but the ministry is Some argue that the DPRK leadership will abandon the merely an agent of the NDC in implementing defense program if the international community threatens to raise policies. The command and control of ballistic missiles is the costs for Pyongyang to continue its missile develop- under the authority of the Missile Division, General Staff ment. However, the credibility of such threats is question- Department, Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces; how- able, and Pyongyang could actually accelerate the program ever, little is known about the missile doctrine or operat- as a countervailing move. Should the KWP elite and the ing procedures established by the NDC. The level of NDC expect external threats to increase in the future, military support for the missile development program is they would probably feel more secure with an expanded unknown, but it is probably high given the prestige of missile program.36 On the other hand, a reduction in high-technology weapons such as ballistic missiles. Fur- external threats would decrease the utility of ballistic mis- thermore, the number of deployed missiles in the DPRK siles for the ruling elite, who would become more secure continues to rise, which means the number of military by reallocating missile development resources to the officers who support the maintenance or expansion of civilian economy (see Table 2). On the one hand, expand- North Korean missile forces is probably also increasing.37 ing the missile development program in a threat environ- Given that the main task of the Ministry of the ment would reduce the domestic political costs for the People’s Armed Forces is to defend the DPRK, and that leadership, even though it would require greater resources. its secondary task is to “liberate South Korea” if Kim Jong On the other hand, domestic pressures to curtail the pro- Il gives the order, the military probably views the missile gram should increase in a less threatening environment, program as a net gain. The Korean People’s Army is an raising the political costs of maintaining the program. integral part of the missile export process, and it would The National Defense Commission is unrivaled in the probably prefer that exports continue or increase. How- sphere of North Korean security and military affairs; but ever, the Korean People’s Army also has numerous firms the NDC does not operate in a vacuum, nor is it com- engaged in civilian business activities, so some elements
TABLE 2 RULING ELITE THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE UTILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILES
KWP Elite NDC KWP Elite NDC Perception of Increasing external threats Decreasing external threats external threat Missile program Gains Gains Losses Losses expansion Missile program Losses Losses Losses Losses status quo Partial curtailment Losses Losses Gains Gains
Joining MTCR* Greatest losses Greatest losses Greater gains Greater gains
Joining MTCR and Greater losses Greater losses Greatest gains Greatest gains launch consortium
*MTCR = Missile Technology Control Regime
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 7 DANIEL A. PINKSTON
of the military would be dissatisfied if the missile program Korea’s Yong’aksan General Trading Company has been caused escalating tensions that damaged any lucrative side subject to U.S. trade sanctions for years because of the businesses. firm’s role in the export of DPRK missiles.43 Further- more, the Yong’aksan General Trading Company has been The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, the accused of being responsible for shipping other weapons Korean People’s Army, and the Munitions and weapons-related cargo,44 and the firm is reportedly Industry under the Second Economic Committee’s External Eco- 45 The National Defense Commission exercises ultimate nomic Bureau. However, while the Yong’aksan General control over all defense industries, but it delegates the Trading Company engages in weapons exports, the company 46 management details to the Second Economic Commit- also trades civilian goods such as electronics products. tee (SEC), which operates a “second economy” separate Details about North Korean missile exports were from the civilian economy.38 The Second Economic Com- revealed when the North Korean ship Ku Wol San was mittee was established in the early 1970s to oversee the detained in June 1999 by Indian customs officials who promotion of domestic defense industries, which have suspected the ship was transporting missiles or other weap- increasingly become greater recipients of scarce resources. ons to Pakistan. The Ku Wol San’s shipping documents It is very difficult to accurately estimate North Korea’s listed the cargo as “machines and water refining equip- national income, and even more difficult to determine ment,” and the consigner was the “Korea Chongchengang the magnitude of the military’s role in the economy; how- Trading Corporation.” The investigation revealed that the ever, some reports estimate that North Korea’s “second ship had departed from the North Korean port of Namp’o, economy” accounts for about 60 to 70 percent of domes- and that the “Korea Buhung Shipping Company” owned tic economic output.39 the ship. Some of the boxes in the Ku Wol San’s cargo Missile production is difficult and expensive, and the were marked “water filtering equipment” and “water missile sector undoubtedly accounts for a significant refining equipment,” but they were found to contain “a portion of economic activity, but the exact proportion is converter test stand, an inverter, electrical loading wire, unclear. The Second Economic Committee’s Fourth and special alloy steel rods.” Other boxes contained Machine Industry Bureau (also known as the “Fourth Gen- “sketches, technology transfer documents, inspection [sic] eral Bureau”) is responsible for the management of mis- and calibration equipment, special components for the sile production facilities,40 most of which are underground manufacture of missile subsystems, machines for manu- in the Pyongyang area and in Chagang Province, which facturing missile components, and testing or measuring borders on China. Given Pyongyang’s policy of “military equipment used for Scud or similar missiles, a hydraulic first politics,” central planners and economic bureaucrats press, bending machine, theodolites, and different forms undoubtedly have been giving preferential treatment to of steel and sheet metal suited for missile parts and assem- military organizations when deciding how to allocate blies.” Indian officials concluded the shipment included scarce resources.41 However, Pyongyang’s missile program information that provided a “complete technology trans- is more than just an end user of economic resources. Since fer for the manufacture of the Scud-B, Scud-C, and SS-1 the mid- to late 1980s, ballistic missiles, missile compo- missile components.”47 nents, and missile technology have become major sources Since Pyongyang probably fears that more missile of foreign exchange. Pyongyang will certainly consider shipments could be interdicted at sea, North Korea now export earnings that would be lost if the missile program ships some missile components by air. There is no clear were to be scrapped. One indication of the missile U.S. policy to seize North Korean missile shipments, but program’s monetary value for Pyongyang is the amount of some members of the Bush administration have made compensation DPRK negotiators have requested during veiled threats to do so, even before the change of admin- bilateral negotiations with the United States: During talks istrations in January 2001.48 The administration followed held in Pyongyang in March 1999, North Korea asked for through with this threat on December 10, 2002, when $1 billion a year for three years in return for halting its Spanish and U.S. naval vessels intercepted a shipment of missile exports.42 15 Scud missiles to Yemen.49 The North Korean ship The United States has so far refused to compensate Sosan was stopped and boarded, ostensibly for being North Korea for halting missile exports, but instead has unflagged, but the ship was later released and the cargo targeted DPRK entities with punitive sanctions. North was delivered to Yemen.50
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The North Korean government on several occasions spective organizations to promote the deployment of has asserted that Pyongyang has the right to develop mis- nuclear-capable long-range ballistic missiles. But it is siles for self-defense, and that its missile exports are not unclear whether the coalition would prefer an expanded in violation of any international law or treaty. The Recon- civilian nuclear power program to a nuclear weapons pro- naissance Bureau of the KPA General Staff handles the gram, or if it could be swayed to support a civilian nuclear air delivery of North Korean missiles, which are loaded energy program such as represented by the light water onto aircraft at air fields near Pyongyang. The Korea reactor project under the Agreed Framework. Ch’anggwang Credit Bank manages the financing and North Korea has maintained a nuclear research cen- payments for DPRK missile exports, and this financial ter in Yongbyon-kun, North P’yong’an Province, since institution is also under U.S. trade sanctions.51 1964. This research center is one of four organizations Other North Korean firms under the Second Eco- under the General Bureau of Atomic Energy Industry, nomic Committee that have engaged in the missile trade which is under control of the cabinet. The other three include the Puhung (Buhung) Trading Company, the organizations under the general bureau are the Isotope Ch’anggwang Trading Company, and the Yonhap Trading Application Committee, the Atomic Energy Committee, Company. The Yong’aksan General Trading Company and and the Pyongyang Atomic Energy Academy.55 Little is the Puhung Trading Company reportedly have strong ties known about these latter three organizations, but much with Russian firms, and Yonhap Trading has procured Japa- has been written about the Yongbyon Nuclear Research nese parts and components for North Korean munitions Center, which became the focus of intense international factories. Yonhap Trading buys the parts through compa- scrutiny following inspections by the IAEA in 1992 and nies associated with the pro-North Korean General Fed- 1993. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is believed eration of Korean Residents in Japan.52 North Korea has to be managed by the 5th Machine Industry Bureau, also established front companies in Europe to deal with under control of the Korean Workers Party.56 However, the missile trade. For example, Slovak authorities discov- ultimate control of the nuclear weapons program is in the ered that a North Korean couple had established a firm hands of NDC Chairman Kim Jong Il. There has been called “New World Trading Slovakia” in March 2001 for much speculation about whether North Korea would allow importing and exporting missile-related materials and the IAEA to complete inspections that began in 1992; components. The company’s operations extended into however, at the conclusion of Japanese Prime Minister China, Europe, the Middle East, Singapore, and Thailand.53 Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang on September 17, In sum, the North Korean missile program generates 2002, North Korea and Japan issued a joint statement foreign exchange for Pyongyang, but proliferation con- declaring that “Both sides affirmed the pledge to observe cerns for much of the world. However, the missile pro- all the international agreements for a comprehensive solu- gram also employs a large number of people in the DPRK, tion to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.”57 and many of these people are loyal supporters of the regime. Despite the optimism after Koizumi’s Pyongyang visit, It would be difficult to estimate the number of personnel the situation surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program engaged in the procurement of inputs, missile systems began to deteriorate rapidly following Assistant Secre- design, testing, production, deployment, maintenance, and tary of State James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang in October exports; nevertheless, the number must be substantial. 2002. Kelly told his Korean hosts that Washington was Those employed in the missile development program must aware of a secret uranium enrichment program, and the be an important part of the ruling elite’s constituency North Korean delegation acknowledged its existence.58 since the military received the highest wage increase The U.S. responded in November by announcing the under the economic reforms that were implemented in suspension of heavy fuel oil shipments, as required un- July 2002.54 der the Agreed Framework.59 North Korea then expelled IAEA inspectors in December, and announced its imme- The Nuclear Coalition diate withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003.60 Another group that could influence the future of the Unless these developments are reversed, the nuclear weap- DPRK missile program is a loose coalition of individuals ons advocates in Pyongyang will get their nuclear bombs, with an interest in developing and deploying nuclear and their influence will gain momentum. In April 2003, weapons. These individuals—such as scientists, engineers, North Korean officials began to say that a “strong physi- and military personnel—could exert influence in their re- cal deterrent” is necessary to avoid war on the Korean pen-
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 9 DANIEL A. PINKSTON
insula, but in June 2003, a Korean Central News Agency of these problems, but U.S. law requires Washington to editorial declared that “if the U.S. keeps threatening the veto North Korean entry because Pyongyang is on the DPRK with nukes instead of abandoning its hostile policy State Department’s list of states that sponsor international toward Pyongyang, the DPRK will have no option but to terrorism. Since Pyongyang has failed to receive sufficient build up a nuclear deterrent force.”61 It is still unclear whether inflows of capital, technology, and energy, many people the officials implied a “nuclear deterrent,” but North Ko- now consider the reform effort a failure.66 However, if the rea has asserted it has a right to develop nuclear weapons reform process eventually does succeed, it will almost cer- for self-defense. In sum, if North Korea assembles a nuclear tainly increase the societal position and influence of firms arsenal, the nuclear coalition would certainly prefer a ro- and individuals in the civilian economy. This sector would bust missile program to complement a nuclear weapons benefit if North Korea were to abandon its ballistic mis- arsenal. sile program in exchange for entry into international financial institutions and for integration into the world Reformers and the Civilian Economy economy. However, political access for actors in the civil- North Korea has initiated widespread economic reforms ian economy is limited; therefore, their influence on mis- in the past, only to retreat before they could be imple- sile and security policies is also limited. mented. In the early 1970s, the DPRK expanded trade and used debt financing to modernize factories, but bal- SPACE LAUNCHES AND KOREAN NATIONALISM ance of payments problems forced Pyongyang to default In addition to providing concrete assets to the Pyongyang 62 on its loans. The DPRK passed a joint venture law in leadership, the missile program also affords intangible 1984, but direct foreign investment was insufficient. Fol- political benefits beyond the realms of security and eco- lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist nomics. In particular, the Paektusan-1 missile launch in countries in Eastern Europe, North Korea experienced a August 1998 has been widely publicized in the DPRK as leadership transition and then severe flood damage and part of a peaceful space program—which North Koreans poor food production. Consequently, the leadership may view with a strong sense of national pride—even have been too insecure to risk implementing economic though the launch failed to place a small satellite, reforms until recently. Kwangmyongsong-1, into earth orbit.67 Almost all coun- During his rise to power in 1998, Kim Jong Il approved tries have a legitimate interest in acquiring satellites or a package of economic reforms and replaced 16 of the access to satellites and related technologies, including the country’s 23 main economic bureaucrats.63 However, Kim DPRK. And while a satellite launch capability (or North was hesitant to implement the reforms because of the per- Korean satellites launched on foreign rockets) would sat- ceived risks in the wake of the 1997-1998 East Asian fi- isfy Pyongyang’s desire for the technical benefits of satel- nancial crisis. In the spring of 2002, the North Korean lites, abandonment of the space program would eliminate government sent hundreds of bureaucrats throughout the the sense of national pride that comes with independent country to inform managers about the reforms,64 and the space launches. reforms were finally implemented in July 2002.65 Eco- North Korean nationalism and the perceived links nomic policy reforms have included the lifting of price ceil- between Kim Jong Il and the space program are not trivial. ings on certain commodities, including rice, and an In 1998, the Kim Jong Il regime was ushered in with a adjustment of the exchange rate to more accurately re- new state ideology based upon building a kangsongdaeguk, flect the value of the North Korean won. The large de- a “strong and powerful country.” This term first appeared valuation of the currency indicates that North Korea in reference to Kim Jong Il’s providing “on-the-spot guid- probably is seeking to open its economy with the hope of ance” during a visit to Chagang Province in early 1998,68 making North Korean products price-competitive in the and then the term came into widespread use in late international market. August 1998.69 The concept of kangsongdaeguk has not Although the government has lifted price controls, replaced chuch’e, but in practical terms, it has now become devalued the currency, and changed microeconomic incen- the predominant theme in the regime’s management of tives for firms and individuals, North Korea desperately domestic affairs. needs foreign capital, technology transfers, and energy The concept of building a kangsongdaeguk has three assistance to obtain economic recovery. Access to inter- elements. In order to become strong and powerful, accord- national financial institutions would help alleviate some ing to the regime, North Korea must be strong in “politi-
10 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 THE NORTH KOREAN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM cal ideology, military capabilities, and economic capac- satellite in the sky. A man in Pyongyang reportedly said ity.” The leadership apparently believes that chuch’e has in- that “the world should take note of North Korea’s satel- stilled in the people a strong political ideology, and that lite, which is a mighty symbol of a strong and powerful the country has acquired the military capabilities to be country under chuch’e.” Another citizen said that “the considered strong and powerful.70 However, the nation’s whole world will be envious now that it has seen the bril- economic performance is admittedly inadequate,71 and the liant future for our strong and powerful country.”74 The leadership seems to have a clear view of the linkages North Korean media also emphasize that the space between security and economics given a Korean Central program’s success is a direct result of Kim Jong Il’s interest News Agency commentary on June 9, 2003, that said and leadership in rocket development since the 1980s.75 Pyongyang desired nuclear weapons so that it could cut its conventional military and allocate more national CONCLUSION resources to the economy.72 The DPRK has long had the motivation to develop bal- In general, the concept of kangsongdaeguk provides listic missiles. The bitter history of colonialism and war North Koreans with hope for the future, and their sup- and the lack of confidence in Pyongyang’s security alli- port of Kim Jong Il and the KWP is necessary if this hope ance partners have driven the North Korean leadership is ever to be fulfilled. The ideology is directly linked to to allocate a tremendous number of resources to its mis- Kim Jong Il, the man many hope will lead the country out sile program. The missile program has been a serious con- of a backwards economy. Much has been written about cern to the United States, the Republic of Korea and to Kim Jong Il’s interest in information technologies and his U.S. allies because of Pyongyang’s past behavior, its com- daily Internet surfing, and Kim’s political future could mitment to reunify Korea under the rule of the Korean depend on North Korea’s development of high technol- Workers Party, and its willingness to export missiles and ogy. North Korea has targeted computer software and high missile-related technologies around the world. The con- technology as the keys to economic recovery and growth, tinental United States is not yet within the range of North and the space program is a part of the high-tech sector. In Korean missiles, but the U.S. intelligence community fact, the North Korean media have publicized space estimates that the DPRK could deploy an ICBM by 2015 launches as an indication of national economic prowess. unless Pyongyang changes its “political orientation.” For weeks after the August 1998 launch, DPRK print The DPRK’s political system is opaque and North and broadcast media published stories about the basic Korea’s civil society is underdeveloped. However, exist- technical requirements for satellite launches, as well as ing domestic interest groups or stakeholders have vested the human and economic resources needed to create and interests in the North Korean missile program. On the maintain a space program infrastructure. For example, on surface, those groups favoring continued missile develop- September 16, 1998, the Rodong Sinmun, the official daily ment would appear to have greater influence over policy, of the KWP, listed a number of items that comprise the but recent developments in North Korea indicate that “on-the-ground infrastructure” in the North Korean space policy influence could be increasing for groups that would program, and concluded that only a few countries are benefit from curtailment of the missile program. Economic capable of creating such an infrastructure. The article also reforms will strengthen reformers and actors in the civil- claimed this capability indicated that the DPRK is a for- ian economy, which could present an important opportu- midable economic power. Even more noteworthy is that nity for the United States to reach a negotiated agreement the article began with the following quote from Kim Jong to end North Korea’s ballistic missile program. Il: “In order to bring the nation’s science and technology The Korean Workers Party elite and the National up to the world level, we have to accept science and tech- Defense Commission have the greatest influence over nology (transfers) while developing our own. Then the missile development policy, but the absolute gains or losses people’s economy must actively absorb this science and for these two stakeholders are uncertain with any policy technology.”73 change because these groups are subject to both external The North Korean press also reported that in Sep- and domestic pressures. If external threats increase, the tember 1998 citizens were calling from around the coun- ruling elite will prefer an expansion of the missile pro- try to describe their sightings of the Kwangmyongsong-1 gram, but in a less threatening world, the ruling elite will satellite. North Koreans were described as having expressed likely prefer program reductions, reallocating missile strong emotions and great national pride when seeing the resources to the civilian economy.
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Finally, the North Korean leadership has exploited 1950, when he stated that the use of nuclear weapons in Korea was under con- sideration; General MacArthur’s request for 34 atomic bombs to use in Korea and the national pride generated by space launches. The Manchuria; and statements by candidate and President Eisenhower and others attempted satellite launch in August 1998 was symbolic in his administration about using nuclear weapons to end the Korean War. See of Kim Jong Il’s domestic high-tech image, which the re- Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 750; Roger gime has promoted as the means to achieve economic Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” International Security 13 recovery. An expansion of the North Korean missile pro- (Winter 1988/1989), pp. 65-66; Rosemary J. Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University gram will require a greater number of resources—at the Press: 1985); Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea expense of the civilian economy. Therefore, any future (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991), pp.9-11; Stanley Weintraub, flight-tests associated with an expansion of the ballistic MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 257-259 and 263-264. missile program would most likely come in a space-launch 9 The past deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea increased the configuration as an effort to increase sources of domestic likelihood of use in the case of conventional conflict on the peninsula. For ex- political support. ample, see Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington, MA: Lexing- ton Books, 1991). 10 1 The views in this paper do not represent those of the Center for Nonprolifera- In December 1962, the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party adopted tion Studies or the Monterey Institute of International Studies. I would like to “four policy lines” to: 1) improve political and technical discipline in the military, 2) modernize the military, 3) “arm” all the people with “class conscientiousness thank Gitty Amini, Michael Barletta, Eric Croddy, Jody Daniel, Jeffrey Fields, and military technology” and 4) fortify the “whole country.” See Chang Myong Stephan Haggard, Gaurav Kampani, Ibrahim al-Marashi, Timothy McCarthy, Sun, Pukhan’gunsayon’gu (Seoul: P’albog’won, 1999), pp. 118-119; Chang Chun Victor Mizin, Mari Sudo, and Sebnem Udum for their comments. Of course, I am Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chonjaeng (Seoul: Somundang, May 1999), p. 246; Re- solely responsible for all errors and shortcomings. public of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Min- 2 Condoleezza Rice, National Security Council Advisor, “Remarks to the Ameri- istry of Unification, December 1999), pp. 160-161and 262-263. can Conservative Union Political Action Conference,” Arlington, Virginia, 11 For example, see Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Devel- January 31, 2002, Federal News Service, in Lexis-Nexis,
12 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 THE NORTH KOREAN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
19 ROK Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Unifica- The Central Committee consists of the Political Bureau and its Standing Com- tion, December 1999), pp. 629-630. mittee (Kim Jong Il is the lone member), the Secretariat, and the Inspection 20 Chuch’e has a strong appeal for Koreans because it was presented as the opposite Committee. See “Pukhan Net Pukhanbaekkwa: Tangjung’ang’wiwonhoe,” of, or as an alternative to Sadaejuui (serving the great) or “toadyism,” which Korea Joongang Ilbo, December 21, 2000,
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Theory,” FBIS Document KPP20010927000093; Ko Yu Hwan, “Pukhan’ui 53 Bertil Lintner and Steve Stecklow, “Paper Trail Exposes Missile Merchants,” Son’gunjongch’iwa Chunggug’ui Sonbongnon,” Kukpang Journal, September 1, Far Eastern Economic Review 166 (February 2003). 2001,
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Skyrocket as Many State Subsidies End,” Washington Post, September 13, 2002, p. tion, December 1999), pp. 88-89; Chong Nak Kun, “Kim Jong Il’ui ‘Kyogje A1, in Lexis-Nexis,
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