Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program
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Domestic Politics and Stakeholders in the North Korean Missile Development Program DANIEL A. PINKSTON Daniel A. Pinkston is a senior research associate and Korea specialist at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California.1 he Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (here- earnings from exports. In the DPRK case, the missile after “the DPRK” or “North Korea”) and its mis- development program has tremendous distributional con- Tsile development program have generated inter- sequences for North Korean society, which includes a num- national concerns for several years. Most analysts agree ber of “stakeholders” with different preferences for the that the DPRK missile program is a threat to security and future of the missile program. stability in Northeast Asia and other regions, and North Given that Pyongyang’s policymakers must consider Korea’s missile exports are well documented. The Bush both international and domestic politics when deciding administration has accused Pyongyang of being “the missile development policy, predicting the future devel- world’s number one merchant for ballistic missiles—open opment path of the North Korean missile program is a for business with anyone, no matter how maligned the complex task. Most analysis tends to focus on the inter- buyer’s intentions.”2 national component of this problem, with little consider- Clearly North Korea’s missile program has had an ation for North Korean domestic politics and institutions. impact on international security; conversely, international Some analysts might argue that domestic politics is irrel- variables, or changes in the international strategic envi- evant because the North Korean leadership is completely ronment, influence the DPRK in determining the insulated from domestic pressures, or because all political program’s scope and future development. However, the and societal interests in North Korea converge on this North Korean domestic political economy is also a deter- issue. The DPRK is not a pluralistic polity; North Korean mining factor. Missile development is technically diffi- civil society is extraordinarily underdeveloped. Neverthe- cult and very expensive, especially for relatively small less, even the most authoritarian governments require a countries like North Korea with backward or poorly per- critical mass of supporters in order to remain in power forming economies. Missiles provide security benefits, at and to continue programs that consume significant resources. least in the short run,3 and arguably can provide economic This assumption raises key questions about the North benefits if we consider the potential foreign exchange Korean institutions and individuals that have particular The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 1 DANIEL A. PINKSTON political or economic interests in the status or continua- Pyongyang’s leaders are motivated to develop nuclear tion of the missile program. weapons and long-range missiles because of this experi- This paper identifies the main domestic “stakehold- ence.8 This analysis does not suggest that the United ers” in the North Korean missile program, and assesses States continues to threaten North Korea with nuclear their preferences, with the objective of contributing to a weapons; nevertheless, North Korean leaders have long better understanding of how decisionmakers in Pyongyang speculated about the utility of nuclear weapons and the might proceed with DPRK missile policy. The first sec- costs to develop them. tion will examine the historical background and political The end of the Korean War in 1953 did not mean the motivations behind North Korea’s missile development, potential for nuclear conflict in Korea had completely and the second section will explain North Korea’s politi- disappeared. Several incidents since the war could have cal orientation, or institutional setting. The third section provoked the United States into using nuclear weapons will identify the main stakeholders in the program before in Korea: the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo in identifying their probable preferences regarding missile 1968, a North Korean commando raid on the South development policy. Korean presidential residence in 1968, the axe murders of two U.S. soldiers at P’anmunjom in 1976, the assassi- nation attempt against South Korean President Chun HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND MOTIVATIONS FOR Tu Hwan in Burma in 1983, and the standoff over DEVELOPING MISSILES Pyongyang’s refusal to permit the completion of Interna- Throughout its history, the DPRK has confronted several tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspec- external and internal security problems.4 Korea is sur- tions in 1994.9 rounded by major powers, and the peninsula has been sub- Given Pyongyang’s threat perception and security ject to numerous invasions. Colonialism and war during needs, North Korea has sought to strengthen its military the 20th century still resonate with policymakers in capabilities by forming security alliances and by allocat- Pyongyang, and the experience continues to influence the ing a tremendous number of resources to the military sec- perceptions of the ruling elite and their supporters. A tor. However, despite North Korea’s security alliances with strong military posture and advanced weapons systems not China and the Soviet Union, DPRK leaders have been only have helped the leadership to deal with external dissatisfied with North Korea’s alliance partners on sev- threats, but they have also been popular among national- eral occasions. For example, even though China and the istic citizens who are constantly reminded of the poten- USSR provided assistance during the Korean War, Kim Il tial external threats to the DPRK.5 Sung desired more support than he received. Kim was dis- U.S. military forces have been stationed in South appointed that Stalin did not provide ground forces and Korea since the end of the Korean War to deter a repeat of other resources to expel the Americans from Korea, and the North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel on following Soviet acquiescence during the Cuban missile June 25, 1950. However, all North Koreans are taught that crisis, North Korea quickly implemented an import sub- the United States invaded the DPRK on that day, and stitution policy in the arms sector to reduce its depen- that the “Great Leader Marshal” Kim Il Sung repulsed the dence on foreign weapons suppliers.10 Other events that American invasion during the “victorious Fatherland Lib- shook Pyongyang’s confidence in its allies include the eration War.”6 The North Korean media continue to pro- normalization of U.S.-China relations, the collapse of the vide extensive reports of the U.S. military intervention USSR and the socialist countries in Eastern Europe, the in 1950 and of the need to remain vigilant against the normalization of relations between Moscow and Seoul, possibility of “another American attack.”7 and the normalization of relations between Beijing and Despite Pyongyang’s historical revisionism, the his- Seoul. In sum, these events led North Korea to question torical facts have justified acquiring the capability to strike the credibility of its alliance partners, and they increased U.S. targets in order to deter future American military Pyongyang’s perceived utility of an indigenous ballistic intervention. At a minimum, North Korean leaders desire a missile program. strong conventional capability to achieve this objective, Much has been written about the developmental his- but weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic tory of the DPRK ballistic missile program, but less has missiles are likely the preferred choice. During the Korean been written about the decisionmaking process that will War, North Korea and China were subjected to nuclear determine the future of North Korean missile develop- threats by the United States, and some analysts argue that ment.11 This policymaking process is critical because 2 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 THE NORTH KOREAN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM Pyongyang’s short- and intermediate-range missiles now July 1998, 443 new members were elected, and Kim Jong threaten regional stability in Northeast Asia, South Asia, Il was elected by district 666, a Korean People’s Army con- and the Middle East. Furthermore, North Korean long- stituency.18 This large turnover of legislators in the SPA range missiles could be capable of striking the continen- marked the beginning of Kim Jong Il’s formal ascension tal United States before 2015, unless the DPRK changes to power after his father’s death in 1994. its political orientation.12 Separation of Powers NORTH KOREA’S POLITICAL ORIENTATION OR Nominally, North Korean policymaking and policy imple- INSTITUTIONAL SETTING mentation are divided among the party, the government, and the military. However, this “separation of powers” is The DPRK is an authoritarian one-party state character- exploited by a small number of ruling elite who hold mul- ized by a cult of personality built around Kim Il Sung and tiple posts across these three “dimensions of power,” while his son Kim Jong Il—the only leaders the country has manipulating electoral rules and powers of appointment known since it was founded in 1948. The Kim family’s to exclude any political opposition. In general, the Korean political legitimacy is based on Kim Il Sung’s armed resis- Workers Party (KWP) screens political access at all lev- tance to Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). Although els, beginning with party membership, which begins at Kim did lead a small group of guerilla fighters, his military the local level and is necessary for personal advancement background and achievements have been exaggerated by in North Korean society. 13 the North Korean government and media. Despite con- The KWP bylaws proclaim that the party represents trary evidence, the North Korean government claims that the interests of all the Korean people; however, stringent Kim Jong Il was born at a secret military base on Mt. Paektu membership requirements exclude those opposed to the (Paektusan), where Kim Il Sung is said to have led the doctrines established by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The 14 anti-Japanese insurgency.