CARLETON Why did Sir Guy Carleton choose not to attack Patriots retreating from Canada and upper New York in late 1776 and early 1777?

Viewpoint: Carleton failed to be as aggressive as he should have been because he overestimated Loyalist support in the colonies and was commit- ted to a policy of conciliation toward the enemy that had little possibility of success. Viewpoint: Carleton chose not to attack the retreating Patriots because of unfavorable weather, the poor state of reinforcements, limited intelligence, and logistical problems.

Early in the Revolutionary War the American Patriots made a deter- mined, yet unsuccessful, effort to conquer Canada (August 1775 to October 1776). Several factors encouraged them to launch an invasion of their North- ern neighbor: the hope that Canadians would join the American cause and transform themselves into the "fourteenth colony"; the legitimate fear that the British would use Canada as a base from which to launch military strikes into New England and New York; and the knowledge that Canada was lightly defended with fewer than 1,000 British regulars. However, the poorly planned invasion of Canada was carried out by undisciplined and inexperienced troops and officers and led to a costly military disaster. The great expedition itself was riddled with military and logistical setbacks that greatly weakened and demoralized the American troops. During the failed assault on the capital of Quebec (31 December 1775), the Americans lost more than 450 men, including General Richard Montgomery; the British dead and wounded num- bered fewer than 20. The subsequent unsuccessful American siege only served to further weaken and demoralize the Patriot forces. When American officers received news in early May 1776 of the arrival of fifteen British war- ships to Canada, they lifted the siege and ordered a withdrawal. At this point Guy Carleton, the reserved and dignified governor-general of Canada who had made an admirable and tenacious defense of Quebec (for which he received a knighthood), had the opportunity and the manpower to turn the tables on the retreating Americans and drive down the Hudson to cut off New England and end the war. Why he failed to do this is one of the most debated questions of the American Revolution. His critics have charged him with implementing an inept and overly cautious strategy that prevented him from achieving resounding victories that were within his grasp. His apolo- gists, on the other hand, have attributed his defeats to incompetence in Lon- don and various circumstances that were beyond his control. This debate is not a mere academic exercise, for Carleton's failure to defeat the hapless Americans when they were most vulnerable ultimately resulted in disastrous consequences for the British military. As such, it raises the related question of whether the invasion of Canada was actually a failure for the Americans. It also forces one to confront the logic of Britain's early mixed strategy of ending the rebellion through diplomacy (conciliation) and military action, a policy reflected in Carleton's conduct during the American invasion of Canada. 43 ever, consistently refused to utilize the Indians, finally explaining that "cruelties might have been committed, & for fear the innocent might have Viewpoint: suffered with the Guilty." While such humanitar- Carleton failed to be as aggressive ian sentiments were commendable, they also as he should have been because he indicate that Carleton was unwilling to resort to overestimated Loyalist support in drastic means to suppress the rebellion. the colonies and was committed Further evidence of Carleton's conciliatory to a policy of conciliation toward attitude is found when examining his conduct the enemy that had little possibility during the American invasion and his subse- of success. quent counterattack. In June 1775 Congress On 21 September 1775, as he attempted to authorized American forces to seize Canada, repel an American invasion of the province, hoping to induce its inhabitants to join their fel- Canadian governor-general Guy Carleton wrote low colonists and to remove the province as a to the British ministry: "I think that this war can British staging area. In early September, General not be carried on more advantageously, than Richard Montgomery advanced down Lake from hence, and that a body of ten or twelve Champlain toward Montreal, while Colonel thousand men here, early next spring, completely Benedict Arnold led a second force through the equipped, with some frigates might greatly Maine wilderness toward Quebec. Carleton was change the face of things on this Continent." unable to stop the incursions, and by early The ministry heeded Carleton's advice and sent December the Americans had overrun the entire him thirteen thousand troops the following province except for Quebec City. Carleton did a spring. Rather than "greatly changing the face of masterful job of defending the walled city and things on this Continent," however, Carleton repelling the bloody New Year's Eve assault that allowed the ragged, smallpox-infested Rebels to left Montgomery dead, Arnold wounded, and escape from Canada. He then failed to aggres- four hundred enemy soldiers in his custody. Sur- sively pursue them to Ticonderoga and cooper- prisingly, Carleton allowed ninety of the Ameri- ate with General William Howe's army in the can prisoners of war to enlist in the British lower Hudson River valley. This situation gave Army, thus demonstrating his great faith that the the colonists a chance to regroup and struggle American colonists could be reconciled with on for another year, the result of which was the Britain. Many of the new enlistees apparently disastrous Saratoga campaign of 1777. Through- joined in the hope of escaping, however, because out the Northern campaign in 1776, Carleton six quickly deserted back to the American lines. faced serious logistical obstacles and uncoopera- Only then did Carleton order the remaining tive weather. Still, these were not the reasons he Americans confined. let an opportunity to deliver a severe blow to the The governor-general acted in a similar man- rebellion slip through his fingers. Instead, Carle- ner toward prisoners several other times during ton lacked the will to destroy the American the northern campaign. On 6 May 1776 the first forces, mistakenly believing that most colonists detachments of British reinforcements arrived at remained loyal and that a policy of reconciliation Quebec. Carleton, who had not sallied forth could succeed. from Quebec since repelling the assault, immedi- Carleton manifested his conciliatory beliefs ately led them on a sortie. The Americans, in several different ways. The first involved the wracked by smallpox and low morale, fled in use of Native Americans. Throughout the spring great haste, abandoning what little supplies they and summer of 1775, the situation between Brit- had. They did not halt until they reached Des- ain and its American colonists deteriorated fol- chambault, forty-five miles west of Quebec, the lowing the Battles of Lexington and Concord on next day. They remained there for a week before 19 April. An army of American militia laid siege retiring to Sorel, east of Montreal. Rather than to Boston, and Ethan Allen and Benedict vigorously pursuing the Americans, however, Arnold captured Fort Ticonderoga in Northern Carleton ordered his men to search for sick and New York on 10 May. That same day, the Second wounded Rebels whom the Americans had left Continental Congress met in Philadelphia to behind and to give them medical treatment. Fur- begin coordinating the colonists' actions. Five thermore, over the course of the summer, Carle- weeks later British and American troops fought a ton released all the American prisoners and sent bloody battle at Bunker Hill in Boston. Against them back to the colonies with provisions. He this background of escalating war, Major Gen- continued to do this throughout the remainder eral Thomas Gage, the besieged commander of of the campaign with the hope that such kind- British forces in America, urged Carleton to cre- ness would "convince all His unhappy Subjects ate a diversion by sending the Native Americans that the King's Mercy and Benevolence were still against the colonists' frontier. Carleton, how- open to them."

44 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION Carleton's lackadaisical pursuit of the toward the American rear at St. Johns. Unfortu- retreating Americans further suggests his incli- nately for the British, this delay had far-reaching nation to reconcile with the colonists rather consequences. The Americans abandoned St. than inflict military defeat upon them. On two Johns on 19 June after burning several vessels separate occasions in June, he missed opportuni- and all other military supplies that they could ties to capture large portions of the American not take with them. As the last Rebels left, Bur- army in Canada. Immediately following the goyne's men arrived at St. Johns. Carleton's Rebels' retreat from Quebec, some of the gover- troops arrived there the next morning. nor's advisers urged him not to let the Ameri- In his defense, Carleton's plan was sound cans escape. Carleton did not heed their advice, and might well have worked had the wind not partly because the full detachment of British failed him. Still, he waited two days before land- reinforcements had not yet arrived. When ing his men and then did not rapidly march to another eight thousand British and German cut the American line of retreat. Furthermore, he troops under Major General John Burgoyne did not order Burgoyne to press the Rebels arrived in June, bringing Carleton's strength to harder to force them to stand and fight. As a ten thousand, he ordered a mere eight hundred result, the American army escaped from Canada men to Trois Rivieres, about halfway between with four small warships, giving them control of Montreal and Quebec. Lake Champlain. Meanwhile, the Americans had received two Having allowed the Americans to escape, thousand fresh troops at Sorel, encouraging Carleton spent the rest of the summer building them to attack Trois Rivieres. They landed near ships at St. Johns to challenge them on the lake. the town on the morning of 8 June but quickly This task was extremely difficult and time-consuming, became lost in an impenetrable swamp. When as warships on the St. Lawrence had to be disas- they finally emerged hours later, the soldiers sembled, transported by land around the Cham- came under fire from British warships in the St. bly Rapids to St. Johns, and then reassembled. Lawrence. Even worse, most of Carleton's army Carleton also had to construct barges to sail his had arrived, and it had little difficulty repelling army to Ticonderoga, because the rugged terrain the disorganized American attack on the town. made movement by land nearly impossible. The As the Rebels retreated back into the forest, governor had requested that barges be sent from Carleton landed troops above them to cut off Britain, but he only received ten of them. their escape. Other British troops blocked a Instead, most had been diverted to William bridge across the Riviere du Loup, the last Howe's army for the attack on New York City. remaining escape route. Amazingly, Carleton While this construction program inevitably recalled this detachment at the last minute, delayed his advance against Ticonderoga, Carle- allowing the Americans to get away. He also ton was again guilty of not moving as quickly as failed to send ships up the St. Lawrence to pre- the situation warranted. While it was necessary vent them from recrossing to Sorel on the South to counter the American ships on the lake, the shore. Some historians speculate that Carleton governor overdid it. His extensive construction let these troops escape because he lacked provi- activity caused Arnold, the American second-in- sions to feed them and would have been forced command at Ticonderoga, to begin building to release them anyway. While there is some additional warships on 12 July. Carleton, how- truth to this argument, Carleton missed an ever, failed to send any detachments to raid the opportunity to, at the least, capture and disarm American position and disrupt their work. Even the Rebels, thereby preventing their future resis- worse, he allowed Arnold to outbuild him and, tance and badly shaking American morale. on 1 September, reluctantly ordered that the Following the Battle of Trois Rivieres, the eighteen-gun Inflexible be transported from the governor-general made plans to trap the Rebel St. Lawrence to St. Johns. While this ultimately army, but again he did not actively implement gave the British undisputed supremacy on Lake the plan. Carleton ordered Burgoyne and four Champlain, it took another twenty-eight crucial thousand soldiers to drive the Americans south days to complete the task. Furthermore, as his from Sorel toward Chambly and St. Johns. Carle- fleet was being built, Carleton returned to Que- ton, in the meantime, intended to sail up the St. bec to help reinstitute civil government in the Lawrence with the rest of the army, land near colony. Such activities were undoubtedly impor- Montreal and Longueuil, and rapidly march tant, but Britain would have been better served if southeast to St. Johns. Carleton ordered Bur- Carleton focused more on his duties as general goyne not to push the Rebels too hard so that he and less as governor. would have time to envelop them from the rear. Finally, on 4 October, more than three By 14 June Burgoyne moved against the Rebels, months after he arrived at St. Johns, Carleton but the winds delayed Carleton. On 16 June he sailed south with twice the firepower of the finally landed his command and had them march American squadron. Despite Burgoyne's recom-

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 45 teen American vessels, gaining clear superiority on the lake. Carleton then transported his army to Crown Point, about twenty miles north of the main American position at Fort Ticon- RAIN, SWEAT, AND MUD deroga. The cautious Carleton waited an addi- tional two weeks before finally sending a probe The fallowing account & from a fetter written by an American soldier, Charles Gushing, to his brother on 13 June 1776, describing the misera- on 27 October to test the fort's defenses. He ble state of the American forces and their retreat from Montreal to Crown rejected Burgoyne's proposal to besiege the fort Point near Fort Ticonderoga in New York: because of the oncoming winter. Learning that Our army, consisting of about six thousand men, the Americans had been heavily reinforced, were now all retreated safely to St. John's, and the Carleton withdrew to Crown Point. He enemy at Montreal and Ghambly. We then sent the sick returned to Canada a week later with his entire and some of the stores to the isle-aux-Noix, the command. Significantly, he did not leave troops fsle~au-Motte and Point-au-Fer, not having boats to carry at Crown Point as a forward staging area for the the whole army and stores at once; and as soon as the next year's operations, despite Burgoyne's sug- boats came back, the whole army embarked and went to gestion that he do so. Carleton believed that he the lsle~aux~Noix. Here, what boats could be spared lacked adequate time, provisions, and transpor- were sent to Crown Point with sick and stores, as a great tation to supply such an exposed and distant part of the army were sick, many with the small-pox, and location during the winter. many of those who had it were sick with the flux. Here we were obliged to wait for boats eight days, where we That Carleton returned to Canada so could get nothing but pork and flour. The island being quickly is not surprising, considering his actions small, not more than one mile in length and a quarter of a throughout the campaign. Moreover, as early as mile In width, the land low, the days hot, and at night 28 September he had informed the British war great dews, and such a number of men on so small a minister that it was too late in the season to spot, and many of them sick—the place stunk enough to achieve any major successes, despite having breed an infection,.,. received an additional 3,000 troops. Instead, he About noon we marched for Point-au-Fer, and soon merely hoped his actions would prevent the came where there was only an Indian path and a wet Americans from detaching troops to fight Howe swamp, which was for a great distance almost up to our in the lower Hudson River valley. Carleton even knees in mud and water. Besides this, it rained very hard failed to accomplish this goal, however. In late all the afternoon. At dark we came out against a bay in November, with the British back in Canada, the lake, within about six miles of Point-au-Fer. We had Major General Horatio Gates marched 1,200 now nothing but the ground to lie on and the heavens to American troops from Ticonderoga to George cover us; and what with the rain, sweat and mud, we had Washington's army in Pennsylvania. Gates but little about us that was dry. We soon built fires and arrived in time to assist Washington's counter- dried ourselves as well as we could, and then lay down to attacks at Trenton and Princeton in December rest with our feet in the fire, I slept very well and got up in 1776 and January 1777. the morning refreshed. The weather cleared off pleasant; we got some breakfast; and about nine o'clock there Throughout the Northern campaign, Carle- came boats enough to take us all off. The remainder of ton repeatedly released American prisoners, the army came in batteaus from the Isle-aux-Noix, and ail missed opportunities to capture large portions of arrived at the lste~au~Motte that night. We soon had boats the Rebel forces, and generally did not vigorously enough to carry the whole army to Grown Point, and, I pursue a military solution to end the rebellion. think, nothing remarkable happened till we arrived here. Instead, he favored a policy of reconciliation.

Source: Henry Steele Commagerand Richard B, Morris, eds,t The Carleton maintained his conciliatory belief Spirit of *S0v@nty~Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told despite an abundance of evidence that the Ameri- by Participants (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 218-219. cans were not interested in reconciling with the British but were, instead, determined to fight. For example, many American prisoners, despite humane treatment from Carleton, escaped at the first opportunity. Furthermore, the ragged Amer- mendation, the governor-general failed to bring ican Army, plagued by disease and a serious short- along the army so that it could quickly attack age of provisions, counterattacked at Trois Ticonderoga after he gained control of the lake. Rivieres just weeks after fleeing from Quebec. Additionally, Carleton moved as slowly and The colonists also demonstrated their resolve deliberately as he had earlier in the campaign. It when, in late July, one of their patrols ambushed took him another full week to find Arnold's and killed a British brigadier general near St. fleet, even though it was deployed at the North- Johns. In August 1776 Carleton learned of the ern end of Lake Champlain near Valcour Island. Continental Congress's Declaration of Indepen- Between 11 and 14 October the British fleet dence and its vote not to return British prisoners sank or forced the scuttling of thirteen of six- captured in Canada. In the face of all these devel-

46 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION opments, Carleton still maintained his hope for tunity and means conspired to curtail Carleton's reconciliation. In fact, on 4 August he issued a ability to achieve a decisive victory. general order to his army instructing it not to The unfair criticism surrounding Carleton's blame "the Provincials at large, but a few wicked conduct early in the war was first made by Lieu- and designing Men" for the current state of tenant Colonel Gabriel Christie, who had a per- affairs. Six days later he wrote that these men sonal grudge against the Canadian governor- were precipitating "a revengeful War in order to general. Christie arrived in Canada in early June deprive all moderate men in the Colonies of the 1776 with a commission as quartermaster gen- least Hope or Thought of a Reconciliation." Car- eral from Lord George Germain, the secretary of leton consistently tried to counter this behavior state for the colonies. However, Carleton had throughout the Northern campaign. already appointed his brother, Major Thomas Carleton's belief in reconciliation was not Carleton, to the post of chief supply officer and unlike that of other high-ranking British officers had no intention of using Christie, who had a in America, such as William Howe and Henry reputation of mixing public and private business. Clinton. Still, his actions, based on this idea, had a In retaliation, Christie lambasted Carleton in let- serious negative impact on the British war effort. ters to Germain, accusing him of being a poor By not vigorously pursuing the Americans, he military commander and mismanaging his sup- allowed thousands of troops to escape from Can- ply system. These letters triggered an ongoing ada and fight again. Additionally, his methodical quarrel between Germain and Carleton that naval buildup on Lake Champlain allowed the grew more bitter with time. Lord Germain, a key Americans time to strengthen their fleet. More planner of British strategy, believed Carleton was important, it consumed so much time that Carle- too haughty and methodical. On the other hand, ton was unable to capture Fort Ticonderoga and Carleton thought Germain's plans were unrealis- cooperate with Howe's army near New York City. tic and questioned the secretary of state's ability His failure to overrun Northern New York in to formulate a viable strategy three thousand 1776 led to Burgoyne's disastrous attempt to do miles away from the theater of operations. Carle- so the following year. Finally, by returning to Can- ton also lacked respect for Germain because the ada when he did, Carleton freed American troops latter had been court-martialed for cowardice at who later helped Washington undo much of what the Battle of Minden (1759). Howe had achieved earlier in the year. Overall, Regardless of the personal animosities Carleton's belief in reconciliation bore bitter fruit between the governor-general and the secretary for the British. of state, the complaints against Carleton must be -MICHAEL P. GABRIEL, taken in context: they originated with Christie, a KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY disappointed, angry, and vindictive man. Aside from Christie and Major General John Bur- goyne, who conspired against Carleton in order to receive the command of the British Northern offensive of 1777, no one else in Canada found serious fault with the governor-general's conduct of the campaign. The official correspondence, Viewpoint: personal letters, and journals of his officers do Carleton chose not to attack the not exhibit any significant criticism. Major Gen- retreating Patriots because of eral Wilhelm, Baron von Riedesel, in particular unfavorable weather, the poor noted that the "competent" Carleton "knew the state of reinforcements, limited army thoroughly and enjoyed the confidence of intelligence, and logistical the officers and men." Moreover, King George problems. III and his prime minister, Lord Frederick One of the more persistent misconceptions North, thought highly of Carleton's abilities. to come out of Revolutionary War history is that With the arrival of eight thousand rein- Sir Guy Carleton missed a golden opportunity in forcements from England in May and June late 1776-early 1777 to crush the American 1776, it certainly seemed that Carleton had the army in Canada: as governor-general and com- necessary manpower to effect a stunning reversal mander in chief of all Crown forces in the region, of British misfortunes in Canada. The Rebels he should have acted more decisively in cutting immediately lifted the siege of Quebec and off the retreating Rebel forces and in seizing con- began a hasty retreat down the St. Lawrence trol of the Lake Champlain-Lake George corri- River. However, uncooperative weather plagued dor in Upstate New York. On the surface such Carleton's pursuit from the beginning. For an assumption seems to be correct; after all, example, Carleton determined to disembark Carleton had the reputation of being a cautious some of his troops at La Prairie, but the wind military commander. In reality, a lack of oppor- failed on 15 June, denying him the opportunity

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 47 Sir William Howe's army in New York.) Although his men worked diligently, Carleton warned Germain on 28 September that "the sea- son is so far advanced that I dare not flatter myself we shall be able to do much this summer." At the Battle of Valcour Island on 11 Octo- ber, inconsistent winds prevented the British ships from fully engaging the enemy flotilla and later pursuing it down Lake Champlain. Follow- ing his naval victory, Carleton sailed south to Crown Point but did not move farther to threaten Fort Ticonderoga because the winds shifted against him again and immobilized his vessels. Also, his army was scattered all along the lake and needed to regroup. By that time the sea- son was too far advanced to conduct any further military operations. With his magazines many miles away and his troops lacking the necessary clothing and accoutrements for harsh winter weather, Carleton abandoned Crown Point on 2 November and retired to Canada. Limited intelligence also influenced Carle- ton's decisions. His dislike of using Native American warriors allied to the King restricted his ability to obtain accurate information about enemy troop numbers and movements. Through- out the campaign Carleton had only a vague notion of enemy strength. At one point the Brit- ish general estimated the American army at close to cut off a large portion of the enemy army. to eight thousand men, but he had no way of Even after the British and German troops finally knowing that it was actually well below that fig- landed, they made little progress, marching only ure. In fact, not until Brigadier General Simon fifty miles in three days. This poor performance Fraser conducted a reconnaissance did Carleton was caused by most of the soldiers being con- have a clear picture of Rebel dispositions at Fort fined to crowded transport vessels for several Ticonderoga. By that time it was too late in the months; they needed time to regain their "land season to act upon this information. legs" and to toughen up their feet. In addition, Logistical problems represent the greatest dysentery quickly debilitated the rank and file as factor behind the limited progress of Carleton's many of the men, after weeks of subsisting on pursuit. The Rebel army had stripped bare the nothing but salt provisions, ate unripened fruit foodstuff throughout the St. Lawrence River val- stolen from roadside orchards. ley. As a result, Carleton could not pursue the Meanwhile, Rebel forces fled southward retreating Americans until he received the neces- down Lake Champlain to Crown Point and sary supplies. Additional circumstances devel- Ticonderoga on 19 June, leaving the British in oped that caused him even more delays. In command of the St. Lawrence waterway. How- March 1776 the Swift, one of four victuallers ever, Carleton had to postpone his pursuit in laden with provisions for the Quebec garrison, order to prepare an adequate naval force to caught fire and sank in the English Channel, and counter the four enemy warships on the lake. several weeks passed before another supply ship Over the course of the next three months his could be loaded with cargo and dispatched to troops painstakingly dismantled the British war Canada. Adding to the provision problem was vessels on the St. Lawrence, hauled them around the newly appointed commissary general ten miles of shallow rapids on the Richelieu Nathaniel Day, who lacked the necessary experi- River below Chambly, and then reassembled ence and reliable assistants. He quickly became them. Meanwhile he had the dockyards rebuilt at overwhelmed by his responsibilities. When the St. Jean, which the retreating Americans had first large shipments of supplies did begin to destroyed, in order to construct barges for the arrive in Canada, they were landed in a haphaz- transportation of men and supplies. (He had ard fashion along the shores of the St. Lawrence wisely anticipated this problem in November River from Deschambault to Montreal. The sup- 1775 and requested that London send him the plies were also placed in the open without the necessary watercraft, but they were diverted to benefit of tarpaulins, exposing them to both the

48 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION elements and pilfering civilians. By the end of Bowler, "Sir Guy Carleton and the Campaign of June these stores were nearly exhausted. In addi- 1776 in Canada," Canadian Historical tion, the British government had contracted to Review, 55 (June 1974): 131-140. supply provisions for only twelve thousand regu- lar troops, failing to take into account the many A. L. Burt, "The Quarrel Between Germain and Canadian militiamen, Native American allies, Carleton: An Invented Story," Canadian teamsters, and camp followers that brought the Historical Review, 11 (September 1930): total need for the British Army in Canada to 202-222. twenty thousand men and women. Conse- Stephen Conway, "To Subdue America: British quently, the provisions in no way kept up with Army Officers and the Conduct of the Rev- the demand. In September, the men manning olutionary War," William and Mary Quar- the magazines had enough provisions for only terly, 43 (July 1986): 381-407. twelve days. By December, when there was a four-month reserve of provisions on hand, the History Section of the General Staff, ed., A His- campaign season was already over. tory of the Organization, Development and Ser- vices of the Military and Naval Forces of Although he did not fulfill Germain's vision Canada From the Peace of Paris in 1763, to the of an assault on Northern New York and west- Present Time, 3 volumes (Ottawa: History ern Massachusetts, Carleton successfully expelled Section of the General Staff, 1919-1920). an invading army, destroyed the enemy's ability to control the Lake Champlain waterway, and set Eldon L. Jones, "Sir Guy Carleton and the Close the stage for a spring offensive. Germain's of the American War of Independence, attempts to find fault with these accomplish- 1782-1783," dissertation, Duke University, ments seem almost petty. For instance, he would 1968. later assert that Carleton's withdrawal from Crown Point made it possible for the Rebels to Gustave Lanctot, Canada and the American Revo- divert troops for the attack on Trenton, New Jer- lution, 1774-1783, translated by Margaret sey, but the correlation between these two events M. Cameron (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard is tenuous at best. University Press, 1967).

As the leading military and political figure Perry E. Leroy, "Sir Guy Carleton as a Military in Canada, Carleton did well given his circum- Leader During the American Invasion and stances. When fate intervened in the form of Repulse in Canada, 1775-1776," 2 volumes, poor winds, there was little that he could do. His dissertation, Ohio State University, 1960. pursuit of the retiring American army repre- sented a good balance between caution and Paul David Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, speed. The weight of responsibility for defending Lord Dorchester: Soldier-Statesman of Early all of Canada weighed heavily on his shoulders: British Canada (Madison & Teaneck, N.J.: he had more to lose than to gain in an immediate Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, offensive against the retreating Rebels. Such 2000). action would have been foolish until he had Nelson, "Guy Carleton versus Benedict Arnold: addressed his logistical problems. Consequently, The Campaign of 1776 in Canada and on time-consuming preparations prevented him Lake Champlain," New Tork History, 57 from delivering a fatal blow to the Americans. By (July 1976): 339-366. abandoning Crown Point, Carleton did indeed relinquish recent military gains that he would Kenneth Roberts, ed., March to Quebec: Journals have to regain in the spring. Yet, in the end, he of the Members of Arnold's Expedition (Garden had acted prudently. While a more inexperienced City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1945). commander would have been concerned with tactics, Carleton demonstrated his professional- Justin H. Smith, Our Struggle for the Fourteenth ism by wisely focusing on logistics. Colony: Canada and the American Revolu- tion, 2 volumes (New York: Putnam, 1907). -ANTHONY J. SCOTTI JR., MIDLANDS TECHNICAL COLLEGE Paul H. Smith, "Sir Guy Carleton: Soldier- Statesman," in George Washington's Oppo- nents, edited by George A. Billias (New York: Morrow, 1969), pp. 103-141.

References George F. G. Stanley, Canada Invaded, 1775-1776 (Toronto: Hakkert, 1977). R. Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783 (Prince- Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, 2 ton: Princeton University Press, 1975). volumes (New York: Macmillan, 1952).

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49