CARLETON Why did Sir Guy Carleton choose not to attack Patriots retreating from Canada and upper New York in late 1776 and early 1777? Viewpoint: Carleton failed to be as aggressive as he should have been because he overestimated Loyalist support in the colonies and was commit- ted to a policy of conciliation toward the enemy that had little possibility of success. Viewpoint: Carleton chose not to attack the retreating Patriots because of unfavorable weather, the poor state of reinforcements, limited intelligence, and logistical problems. Early in the Revolutionary War the American Patriots made a deter- mined, yet unsuccessful, effort to conquer Canada (August 1775 to October 1776). Several factors encouraged them to launch an invasion of their North- ern neighbor: the hope that Canadians would join the American cause and transform themselves into the "fourteenth colony"; the legitimate fear that the British would use Canada as a base from which to launch military strikes into New England and New York; and the knowledge that Canada was lightly defended with fewer than 1,000 British regulars. However, the poorly planned invasion of Canada was carried out by undisciplined and inexperienced troops and officers and led to a costly military disaster. The great expedition itself was riddled with military and logistical setbacks that greatly weakened and demoralized the American troops. During the failed assault on the capital of Quebec (31 December 1775), the Americans lost more than 450 men, including General Richard Montgomery; the British dead and wounded num- bered fewer than 20. The subsequent unsuccessful American siege only served to further weaken and demoralize the Patriot forces. When American officers received news in early May 1776 of the arrival of fifteen British war- ships to Canada, they lifted the siege and ordered a withdrawal. At this point Guy Carleton, the reserved and dignified governor-general of Canada who had made an admirable and tenacious defense of Quebec (for which he received a knighthood), had the opportunity and the manpower to turn the tables on the retreating Americans and drive down the Hudson to cut off New England and end the war. Why he failed to do this is one of the most debated questions of the American Revolution. His critics have charged him with implementing an inept and overly cautious strategy that prevented him from achieving resounding victories that were within his grasp. His apolo- gists, on the other hand, have attributed his defeats to incompetence in Lon- don and various circumstances that were beyond his control. This debate is not a mere academic exercise, for Carleton's failure to defeat the hapless Americans when they were most vulnerable ultimately resulted in disastrous consequences for the British military. As such, it raises the related question of whether the invasion of Canada was actually a failure for the Americans. It also forces one to confront the logic of Britain's early mixed strategy of ending the rebellion through diplomacy (conciliation) and military action, a policy reflected in Carleton's conduct during the American invasion of Canada. 43 ever, consistently refused to utilize the Indians, finally explaining that "cruelties might have been committed, & for fear the innocent might have Viewpoint: suffered with the Guilty." While such humanitar- Carleton failed to be as aggressive ian sentiments were commendable, they also as he should have been because he indicate that Carleton was unwilling to resort to overestimated Loyalist support in drastic means to suppress the rebellion. the colonies and was committed Further evidence of Carleton's conciliatory to a policy of conciliation toward attitude is found when examining his conduct the enemy that had little possibility during the American invasion and his subse- of success. quent counterattack. In June 1775 Congress On 21 September 1775, as he attempted to authorized American forces to seize Canada, repel an American invasion of the province, hoping to induce its inhabitants to join their fel- Canadian governor-general Guy Carleton wrote low colonists and to remove the province as a to the British ministry: "I think that this war can British staging area. In early September, General not be carried on more advantageously, than Richard Montgomery advanced down Lake from hence, and that a body of ten or twelve Champlain toward Montreal, while Colonel thousand men here, early next spring, completely Benedict Arnold led a second force through the equipped, with some frigates might greatly Maine wilderness toward Quebec. Carleton was change the face of things on this Continent." unable to stop the incursions, and by early The ministry heeded Carleton's advice and sent December the Americans had overrun the entire him thirteen thousand troops the following province except for Quebec City. Carleton did a spring. Rather than "greatly changing the face of masterful job of defending the walled city and things on this Continent," however, Carleton repelling the bloody New Year's Eve assault that allowed the ragged, smallpox-infested Rebels to left Montgomery dead, Arnold wounded, and escape from Canada. He then failed to aggres- four hundred enemy soldiers in his custody. Sur- sively pursue them to Ticonderoga and cooper- prisingly, Carleton allowed ninety of the Ameri- ate with General William Howe's army in the can prisoners of war to enlist in the British lower Hudson River valley. This situation gave Army, thus demonstrating his great faith that the the colonists a chance to regroup and struggle American colonists could be reconciled with on for another year, the result of which was the Britain. Many of the new enlistees apparently disastrous Saratoga campaign of 1777. Through- joined in the hope of escaping, however, because out the Northern campaign in 1776, Carleton six quickly deserted back to the American lines. faced serious logistical obstacles and uncoopera- Only then did Carleton order the remaining tive weather. Still, these were not the reasons he Americans confined. let an opportunity to deliver a severe blow to the The governor-general acted in a similar man- rebellion slip through his fingers. Instead, Carle- ner toward prisoners several other times during ton lacked the will to destroy the American the northern campaign. On 6 May 1776 the first forces, mistakenly believing that most colonists detachments of British reinforcements arrived at remained loyal and that a policy of reconciliation Quebec. Carleton, who had not sallied forth could succeed. from Quebec since repelling the assault, immedi- Carleton manifested his conciliatory beliefs ately led them on a sortie. The Americans, in several different ways. The first involved the wracked by smallpox and low morale, fled in use of Native Americans. Throughout the spring great haste, abandoning what little supplies they and summer of 1775, the situation between Brit- had. They did not halt until they reached Des- ain and its American colonists deteriorated fol- chambault, forty-five miles west of Quebec, the lowing the Battles of Lexington and Concord on next day. They remained there for a week before 19 April. An army of American militia laid siege retiring to Sorel, east of Montreal. Rather than to Boston, and Ethan Allen and Benedict vigorously pursuing the Americans, however, Arnold captured Fort Ticonderoga in Northern Carleton ordered his men to search for sick and New York on 10 May. That same day, the Second wounded Rebels whom the Americans had left Continental Congress met in Philadelphia to behind and to give them medical treatment. Fur- begin coordinating the colonists' actions. Five thermore, over the course of the summer, Carle- weeks later British and American troops fought a ton released all the American prisoners and sent bloody battle at Bunker Hill in Boston. Against them back to the colonies with provisions. He this background of escalating war, Major Gen- continued to do this throughout the remainder eral Thomas Gage, the besieged commander of of the campaign with the hope that such kind- British forces in America, urged Carleton to cre- ness would "convince all His unhappy Subjects ate a diversion by sending the Native Americans that the King's Mercy and Benevolence were still against the colonists' frontier. Carleton, how- open to them." 44 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION Carleton's lackadaisical pursuit of the toward the American rear at St. Johns. Unfortu- retreating Americans further suggests his incli- nately for the British, this delay had far-reaching nation to reconcile with the colonists rather consequences. The Americans abandoned St. than inflict military defeat upon them. On two Johns on 19 June after burning several vessels separate occasions in June, he missed opportuni- and all other military supplies that they could ties to capture large portions of the American not take with them. As the last Rebels left, Bur- army in Canada. Immediately following the goyne's men arrived at St. Johns. Carleton's Rebels' retreat from Quebec, some of the gover- troops arrived there the next morning. nor's advisers urged him not to let the Ameri- In his defense, Carleton's plan was sound cans escape. Carleton did not heed their advice, and might well have worked had the wind not partly because the full detachment of British failed him. Still, he waited two days before land- reinforcements had not yet arrived. When ing his men and then did not rapidly march to another eight thousand British and German cut the American line of retreat. Furthermore, he troops under Major General John Burgoyne did not order Burgoyne to press the Rebels arrived in June, bringing Carleton's strength to harder to force them to stand and fight. As a ten thousand, he ordered a mere eight hundred result, the American army escaped from Canada men to Trois Rivieres, about halfway between with four small warships, giving them control of Montreal and Quebec.