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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists July 29, 2009 NOTE: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE, CLASSIFIED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE REPORT OR ITS CONTENTS WITHOUT THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. ACLU-RDI 5021 p.1 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 1 I. BACKGROUND 12 A. The Office of Professional Responsibility 12 B. This Investigation 13 C. The Office of Legal Coun Sel- 15 D. OPR's Analytical Framework and Professional . Standards 18 1. OPR's Analytical Framework 18 2. Professional Standards 19 a. The Duty to Exercise Independent Professional Judgment and to Render Candid Advice 21 b. The Duty of Thoroughness and Care 22 3. Analytical Approach 24 II. FACTS 25 A. Subject and Witness Backgrounds 25 B. The Bybee Memo and the Classified Bybee Memo (August 1, 2002) 30 1. The CIA Interrogation Program 30 2. Drafting the Bybee Memo 43 3. Key Conclusions of the Bybee Memo 67 4. Key Conclusions of the Classified Bybee Memo 68 5. The Yoo Letter 69 ACLU-RDI 5021 p.2 C. Military Interrogation, the March 14, 2003 Yoo Memo to DOD, and the DOD Working Group Report 70 1. Guantanamo and the Military's Interrogation of Detainees 70 2. Drafting the Yoo Memo 75 3. Key Conclusions of the Yoo Memo 80 4. The Working Group Report 81 D. Implementation of the CIA Interrogation Program 82 1. Abu Zubaydah 83 2. Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nishiri 85 3. Khalid Sheik Muhammed 87 4. 88 5. CIA Referrals to the Department 90 6. Other Findings of the CIA OIG Report 95 E. Reaffirmation of the CIA Program 97 1. The Question of "Humane Treatment" 97 2. The "Bullet Points" 100 3. The Leahy Letter 104 4. The CIA Request for Reaffirmation 106 F. AAG Goldsmith - Withdrawal of OLC's Advice on Interrogation 110 1. The NSA Matter 110 2. The Withdrawal of the Yoo Memo 112 3. The CIA OIG Report and the Bullet Points Controversy 114 4. Goldsmith's Draft Revisions to the Yoo Memo 117 5. The Withdrawal of the Bybee Memo 121 ACLU-RDI 5021 p.3 G. Case-by-Case Approvals and The Levin Memo 124 H. The Bradbury Memos 132 1. The 2005 Bradbury Memo (May 10, 2005) 133 2. The Combined Techniques Memo (May 10, 2005) 137 3. The Article 16 Memo (May 30, 2005) 145 4. The 2007 Bradbury Memo 151 a. Background 151 b. The 2007 Memo 154 II. Analysis 159 A. The Bybee Memo's Flaws Consistently Favored a Permissive Viewofthe Torture Statute 159 1. Specific Intent 161 2. Severe Pain 176 3. Ratification History of the CAT 184 4. United States Judicial Interpretation 186 a. Implementation of. CAT Article 3 186 b. The Torture Victim Protection Act 187 S. International Decisions 190 a. Ireland v. United Kingdom 191 b. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel 193 6. The Commander-in-Chief Power and Possible Defenses to Torture 196 a. The President's Commander-in-Chief Power 199 b. Criminal Defenses to Torture 207 (1) The Necessity Defense 207 (2) Self Defense 220 TORE NO ACLU-RDI 5021 p.4 7. Conclusion 226 B. The Legal Analysis Set Forth in the Bybee Memo Was Inconsistent with the Professional Standards Applicable to Department of Justice Attorneys 226 C. Analysis of the Classified Bybee Memo (August 1, 2002) 234 D. The Yoo Letter 238 1. Violation of CAT 238 2. Prosecution Under the Rome Statute 239 E. Analysis of the Bradbury Memos 241 F. Individual Responsibility 251 1. John Yoo 251. 2. Jay Bybee 255 3. Patrick Philbin 257 4. 258 5. Steven Bradbury 258 6. Other Department Officials 259 G. Institutional Concerns 259 CONCLUSION 260 ATTACHMENT A: Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Timeline ATTACHMENT B: Glossary of Acronyms ATTACHMENT C: Glossary of Names Used in OPR Report ATTACHMENT D: Chronological List of OLC Memoranda on Use of Enhanced Techniques RE '1 1PCS 11 -iv- ACLU-RDI 5021 p.5 TOP e1 - nP e ATTACHMENT E: Memorandum for Attorneys of the Office Re: Best Practices for OLC Opinions, authored by Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, May 16, 2005 (Best Practices Memo) ATTACHMENT F: Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel, December 21, 2004 (Guiding Principles) ATTACHMENT G: District of Columbia Rule of Professional Responsibility 2.1. ATTACHMENT H: District of Columbia Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.1. ACLU-RDI 5021 p.6 RN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY In June 2004, an August 1, 2002 memorandum from then Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Jay S. Bybee of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to Alberto R. Gonzales, then White House Counsel, was leaked to the press. The memorandum was captioned "Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A" (the Bybee Memo), and had been drafted primarily by OLC's then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John Yoo. The memorandum examined a criminal statute prohibiting torture, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (the torture statute), in the context of interrogations conducted outside the United States. One of the primary areas of discussion in the Bybee Memo was the statute's description of what constitutes "torture." The definition contained in the statute is as follows: (1) "torture" means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control; (2) "severe mental pain or suffering" means the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from - (A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (C) the threat of imminent death; or ACLU-RDI 5021 p.7 (D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt . profoundly the senses Or:personality. 18 U.S.C. § 2340. The Bybee Memo concluded that under the torture statute, torture: covers only extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult for the victim to endure. Where pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure. Severe mental pain requires suffering not just at the moment of infliction but it also requires lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental disorders like posttraumatic stress disorder. Additionally, such severe mental pain can arise only from the predicate acts listed in Section 2340. Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is sufficient range of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture. Further, we conclude that under the circumstances of the current war against al Qaeda and its allies, application of Section 2340A to interrogations undertaken pursuant to the President's Commander- in-Chief powers may be unconstitutional. Finally, even if an interrogation method might violate Section 2340A, necessity or self- defense could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal liability. Bybee Memo at 46. Some commentators, law professors, and other members of the legal community were highly critical of the Bybee Memo. For example, Harold Koh, then Dean of Yale Law School, characterized the memorandum as "blatantly ACLU-RDI 5021 p.8 wrong" and added: "[i]t's just erroneous legal analysis." Edward Alden, Dismay at Attempt to Find Legal Justification for Torture, Financial Times, June 10, 2004. A past chairman of the international human rights committee of the New York City Bar Association, Scott Horton, stated that "the government lawyers involved in preparing the documents could and should face professional sanctions." Id. Cass Sunstein, a law professor at the University of Chicago, said: "It's egregiously bad. It's very low level, it's very weak, embarrassingly weak, just short of reckless." Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, New York Times, June 25, 2004 at A14. In the same article, Martin Flaherty, an expert in international human rights law at Fordham University, commented, "The scholarship is very clever and original but also extreme, one-sided and poorly supported by the legal authority relied on." Id. Other commentators observed that the Bybee Memo did not address important Supreme Court precedent and that it ignored portions of the Convention Against Terrorism (CAT) that contradicted its thesis. Id. One article suggested that the Bybee Memo deliberately ignored adverse authority, and commented that "a lawyer who is writing an opinion letter is ethically bound to be frank." Kathleen Clark and Julie Mertus, Tor luring Law; The Justice Department's Legal Contortions on Interrogation, Washington Post, June 20, 2004 at B3; see R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos, Washington Post, July 4, 2004 at Al2. Other critics suggested that the Bybee Memo was drafted to support a pre-ordained result. Mike Allen and Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush, Washington Post, June 9, 2004 at A3. Similar criticism was raised by a group of more than 100 lawyers, law school professors, and retired judges, who called for a thorough investigation of how the Bybee Memo and other, related OLC memoranda came to be written.