Towards a Coherent Treatment of International Parallel Proceedings
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Bridging the Gap: Addressing the Doctrinal Disparity Between Forum Non Conveniens and Judgment Recognition and Enforcement in Transnational Litigation
Bridging the Gap: Addressing the Doctrinal Disparity Between Forum Non Conveniens and Judgment Recognition and Enforcement in Transnational Litigation ALEXANDER R. Moss* TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................................... 210 1. CURRENT DOCTRINES OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ................................ 214 A. FORUM NON CONVENIENS ............................ 215 1. Introduction . ................................. 215 2. The Adequate Alternative Forum ................. 216 3. Private and Public Interest Factors ................ 217 4. Degree of Deference to Plaintiff's Choice of Forum .... 218 B. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS .................. 220 1. Introduction . ................................. 220 2. The Roots of the Current Doctrine ................ 221 3. Harmonization of Recognition & Enforcement Standards .................................. 223 C. THE DOCTRINAL GAP BETWEEN FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT .............. 225 II. ISSUES RAISED BY THE CURRENT GAP IN STANDARDS ............ 225 A. INADEQUACY OF THE "ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE FORUM" STANDARD . ...................................... 227 * Georgetown Law, J.D. 2017; Georgetown University, B.S.F.S. 2011. © 2017, Alexander R. Moss. I am extremely thankful to Professor David Stewart for his guidance and insight in helping me develop my topic and improve this Note over the course of the production process. Many thanks are also due to The Georgetown Law Journal's exceptional editors and staff, especially Allie Berkowitch, Spencer McManus, Elizabeth Janicki, Ryan Giannetti, and the Notes Committee, for all of their hard work and thoughtful suggestions along the way. Finally, I would like to thank my wonderful family and friends, who have been with me every step of the way during my law school experience, and without whom none of this would have been possible. 209 210 THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 106:209 B. -
Application of the Theory of Dépeçage to Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts
University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2018-03-29 Application of the Theory of Dépeçage to Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts Karimi, Sahar Karimi, S. (2018). Application of the Theory of Dépeçage to Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary. AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/31771 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/106483 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Application of the Theory of Dépeçage to Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts by Sahar Karimi A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS GRADUATE PROGRAM IN LAW CALGARY, ALBERTA MARCH, 2018 © Sahar Karimi 2018 Abstract Determination of the applicable law in upstream oil and gas contracts plays an important role with regards to the parties’ rights and liabilities. There are various approaches regarding the choice of applicable law and different theories have been expressed relating to choice-of-law provisions. This research explores one of these theories called Dépeçage in private international law and conflict of law. The theory of Dépeçage is a concept in private international law that refers to the process of cutting a case into individual issues whereby each issue is constrained to a different applicable choice-of-law analysis. -
The Problem of Trans-National Libel, 60 Am
University of Miami Law School University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository Articles Faculty and Deans 2012 The rP oblem of Trans-National Libel Lili Levi University of Miami School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons Recommended Citation Lili Levi, The Problem of Trans-National Libel, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 507 (2012). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LILI LEVI* The Problem of Trans-National Libelt Forum shopping in trans-nationallibel cases-"libel tourism"- has a chilling effect on journalism, academic scholarship,and scien- tific criticism. The United States and Britain (the most popular venue for such cases) have recently attempted to address the issue legisla- tively. In 2010, the United States passed the SPEECH Act, which prohibits recognition and enforcement of libel judgments from juris- dictions applying law less speech-protective than the First Amendment. In Britain, consultation has closed and the Parliamen- tary Joint Committee has issued its report on a broad-ranginglibel reform bill proposed by the Government in March 2011. This Article questions the extent to which the SPEECH Act and the Draft Defama- tion Bill will accomplish their stated aims. -
Comity Concerns Are No Joke: Recognition of Foreign Judgments Under Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption
Fordham Law Review Volume 82 Issue 5 Article 13 2014 Comity Concerns Are No Joke: Recognition of Foreign Judgments Under Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption Marc P. Epstein Fordham University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Marc P. Epstein, Comity Concerns Are No Joke: Recognition of Foreign Judgments Under Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2317 (2014). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol82/iss5/13 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTES COMITY CONCERNS ARE NO JOKE: RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS UNDER DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION Marc P. Epstein* This Note gives the legal background of the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs preemption, examines the laws governing the recognition of foreign judgments under the lens of dormant foreign affairs preemption, and argues that courts should adopt an objective standard for future dormant foreign affairs preemption cases. Dormant foreign affairs preemption is premised on the idea that the federal government should have exclusive control over foreign affairs. The doctrine allows courts to preempt state laws in some cases where there is no conflicting federal policy or statute. The U.S. Supreme Court has only once held a state statute unconstitutional under the doctrine. -
Pending Litigation, Impending Brexit: What Next for Dispute Resolution Clauses?
October 2020 Pending litigation, impending Brexit: What next for dispute resolution clauses? There has been a recent influx of cases before the English courts in relation to jurisdiction to determine a dispute. Whether this is linked to the impending departure of the UK from the European Union or whether this is just a coincidence is unclear. What is apparent is that this complex area of law is about to become increasingly complicated as well as contentious. Selecting a future-proof dispute resolution clause is never easy. In the current uncertain times, it is particularly challenging. In this article, we highlight the key issues to be aware of from a review of recent case law. What are the key differences between the Under the Lugano Convention (and earlier Brussels legislative instruments in the European Regulation3), if parties commence parallel Regime? proceedings in the courts of contracting states, priority is always given to the court first seised. That An outline of the European Regime (including the is the case whether the court first seised is the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005, the “Hague chosen court in a jurisdiction clause or not. All other Convention”) is available in our Brexit Disputes courts must then stay proceedings until the court guide here . By way of a brief reminder, the Brussels first seised determines jurisdiction. This is known as Recast1 will no longer apply to the UK from the end the “lis alibi pendens” rule. The rule is open to abuse of the transition period (31 December 2020). The UK by a litigation tactic called the “Italian Torpedo”, has applied to join the Lugano Convention 20072 but where a party deliberately commences proceedings has not yet received the consent of the other in a slow-moving jurisdiction (in breach of a contracting states (notably the EU). -
A Comparative Study of the Fundamental Juridical
A Comparative Study of the Fundamental Juridical Nature, Classification and Private Law Enforcement of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Agreements in the English Common Law of Conflict of Laws, the European Union Private International Law Regime and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements A thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law at the University of Aberdeen Mukarrum Ahmed LLB (Hons) (University of London), LLM (City University London), Barrister-at-Law (Lincoln’s Inn) 2015 1 Declaration This thesis has been composed solely by the candidate, Mukarrum Ahmed. It has not been accepted in any previous application for a degree. The work has been carried out solely by the candidate. All quotations have been distinguished clearly and the sources of information specifically acknowledged. Signed: ..................................................... Mukarrum Ahmed 16 December 2015 2 Hypotheses are nets: only he who casts will catch. Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg, Novalis Schriften (Friedrich Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck ed, 1802) Dialogue 5, 429. There is nothing more necessary to the man of science than its history, and the logic of discovery . : the way error is detected, the use of hypothesis, of imagination, the mode of testing. Lord Acton cited in Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics, Routledge 2005) xvii. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to my doctoral supervisor, Dr Jonathan Fitchen, whose encouragement and guidance were at all times generous and cheerfully administered. I am indebted to Professor Paul R Beaumont, the internal examiner of my PhD thesis and a mentor at the Centre for Private International Law, University of Aberdeen. -
Glossary in English) Belongs to Asa
Авторские права на оригинальный текст принадлежат Швейцарской Арбитражной Ассоциации (ASA) COPYRIGHT TO THE SOURCE TEXT (GLOSSARY IN ENGLISH) BELONGS TO ASA Glossary of Arbitration and ADR Terms and Abbreviations Словарь терминов и сокращений в области арбитража и альтернативных способов разрешения споров E: English F: French D: German Esp.: Spanish I: Italian L: Latin NL: Dutch R: Russian = equivalent, also called …(то же, что и…) : means… (означает) term for which there is an entry in this Glossary. see…(см. термин в Словаре) (1), (2) various meanings (sometimes one more specific included in the other) in the same entry. For an example ADR. (разные значения одного и того же термина) term to be preferred because it is best understood internationally (предпочтительный термин) term to be avoided because it is incorrect, misleading, rare or too local, means dif- ferent things to different people, or may appear offensive (термин, использование которого не рекомендуется). A AAA = American Arbitration Association = Американская арбитражная ассоциация, ААА (R), the leading arbitration institution in the United States of America. Issued (a) International Ar- bitration Rules, (b) other rules, (c) with ABA, Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, 1977, amended, 2005. www.adr.org. ICDR. ABA = American Bar Association = Американская ассоциация адвокатов (R). www.abanet.org abuse of right = злоупотребление правом (R) = abus de droit (F) = Rechtsmissbrauch (D) = abuso de derechos (Esp.): a civil law(2) concept similar to estoppel, venire contra factum pro- prium (L), or fraus legis (L). accept jurisdiction = признать наличие юрисдикции (R) = find that own jurisdiction exists. Kompetenz-Kompetenz(2). Contrast decline jurisdiction. ACIArb = член Королевского Института арбитров (R) = Associate of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. -
2 High Court Cases Highlight Comity Principles by Egishe Dzhazoyan and Kabir Bhalla (October 14, 2020, 5:11 PM EDT)
Portfolio Media. Inc. | 111 West 19th Street, 5th Floor | New York, NY 10011 | www.law360.com Phone: +1 646 783 7100 | Fax: +1 646 783 7161 | [email protected] 2 High Court Cases Highlight Comity Principles By Egishe Dzhazoyan and Kabir Bhalla (October 14, 2020, 5:11 PM EDT) A number of recent decisions grapple with the concept of comity in English law where there are concurrent English and foreign proceedings, including National Bank of Kazakhstan v. Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV[1] and RiverRock Securities Ltd. v. International Bank of St. Petersburg.[2] The decisions are a powerful restatement of the flexibility of comity, and a useful reminder that comity might require the English court to exercise judicial restraint, even where its assistance has been sought by foreign courts. Comity is a concept often relied on by litigants, but rarely analyzed in detail in Egishe Dzhazoyan submission or judgments, and so developments in the law of comity are difficult to identify. As Justice Christopher Clarke put it in Ecobank Transnational Inc. v. Tanoh, "Comity has a warm ring. It is important to analyze what it means. We are not concerned here with judicial amour proper but with the operation of systems of law."[3] Comity arises in concurrent foreign proceedings in three broad and related contexts: 1. Comity can come into play where an English decision, or its effects, is or are sought to be deployed in a foreign jurisdiction. Whether comity requires an English Kabir Bhalla court to make findings for that purpose, or prohibits it from doing so, depends on a range of factors, including what has been asked of the English court, by whom, and whether answering those questions would trample on territory properly reserved for the foreign court. -
The History of Comity
THE HISTORY OF COMITY Thomas Schultz* and Jason Mitchenson** The principle of comity has received little modern academic attention. Its history, even less so.1 What academic work there is has generally sought to understand the principle by reference to its use in practice – an application of what common law scholars refer to as the case method. To be sure, the case method is an effective way to distill general principles of law. Yet, by itself, it is limited. Rather like looking at a painting through a straw, it prevents us from seeing the whole picture. This article explores the history of comity through events and the ideas of those who most influenced its development. By doing so, a number of important aspects may be revealed about the principle which have been hidden from view. This may shed new light on comity and open the door to new ways of thinking about the principle. Comity was created to resolve the vexed question of how, and under what circumstances, sovereign States ought to recognize each other’s authority. Although originally developed as a means to facilitate international trade and commerce, it became a principle of justice. States act with, or ought to act, with comity because the recognition of foreign authority will, in many cases, be the most just exercise of their own. The principle embodies the idea that whereas every State is sovereign, often the most just exercise of one State’s own authority will in fact be to recognize the authority of another. The history explored here is a simplification and cannot fully or accurately describe the diversity and complexity of the events and ideas presented. -
THE CHINESE PRACTICE of PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW the Chinese Practice of Private International Law QINGJIANG KONG* and HU MINFEI†
THE CHINESE PRACTICE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW The Chinese Practice of Private International Law QINGJIANG KONG* AND HU MINFEI† CONTENTS I Introduction II Jurisdiction A General Rule of Territorial Jurisdiction B Exceptions to the General Rule of Territorial Jurisdiction 1 Exclusive Jurisdiction 2 Jurisdiction of the People’s Court of the Place in Which the Plaintiff is Domiciled 3 Jurisdiction over Actions Concerning Contractual Disputes or Other Disputes over Property Rights and Interests 4 Jurisdiction over Actions in Tort C Choice of Forum 1 Recognition of Jurisdictional Agreement 2 Construed Jurisdiction D Lis Alibi Pendens E Effect of an Arbitration Agreement on the Jurisdiction of People’s Courts 1 Independence of Arbitration Clause 2 Approach of People’s Courts to Disputes Covered by Arbitration Agreements III Choice of Law A Choice of Law in General 1 Characterisation 2 Renvoi 3 Proof of Foreign Law 4 The Time Factor in Applying Laws 5 Cases Where There is No Provision in Applicable Chinese Law B Contracts 1 Choice of Law for Contracts 2 Applicable Law for Contracts in Cases Where No Law Has Been Chosen C Torts Involving Foreign Elements D Marriage, Family and Succession 1 Marriage 2 Husband-Wife Relationships, Guardianship and Maintenance Relationships 3 Application of Law Concerning Succession IV Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Awards A Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments B Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards * BSc (Nanjing), LLM (East China Institute of Politics and Law), PhD (Wuhan); Associate Professor, Law Faculty, Hangzhou Institute of Commerce. † LLB, LLM (Northwest Institute of Politics and Law); Lecturer, Law Faculty, Hangzhou Institute of Commerce. -
Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism
University of Pennsylvania Law Review FOUNDED 1852 Formerly American Law Register VOL. 147 JANUARY 1999 No. 3 ARTICLES THE PROMISE OF COOLEY'S CITY: TRACES OF LOCAL CONSTITUTIONALISM DAVID J. BARRONt INTRODUCTION We do not think of local governments, such as towns and cities, as im- portant components of the federal constitutional structure. The text of the Constitution does not mention local governments, and black-letter constitu- tional law formally deems them to be the mere administrative appendages of the states that "create" them.1 This doctrinal depiction accords with a deep- t Attorney-Advisor, Office of Legal Counsel. I wish to thank Juliette Kayyem, Jerome Barron, Robert Kayyem, Gerald Frug, H. Jefferson Powell, Robert Brauneis, William Treanor, Robert Delahunty, Lisa Bressman, Daniel Halberstam, and Marty Lederman. The views expressed in this article do not represent those of either the Office of Legal Counsel or the Department of Justice. I See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (upholding a state statute giving extraterritorial force to a municipal ordinance on the grounds that political (487) 488 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 147:487 seated intuition that local governments are islands of private parochialism which are likely to frustrate the effective enforcement of federal constitu- tional rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent defense of what has sar- donically been termed "our localism,"'2 in cases such as Milliken v. Bradley3 and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,4 has been the subdivisions such as cities and counties are created by the state and that states have "extraordinarily wide latitude .. -
Choice of Law in Complex Litigation
CHOICE OF LAW IN COMPLEX LITIGATION LARRY KRAMER* Nearly all proceduralistsagree that all the claims in a complex case should be de. cided under a single substantive law or, at the very least, under a uniform choice-of- law rule In this paper, ProfessorKramer challenges the assumptions at the foun- dation of that consensus. In so doing, he confronts two myths of late-twentieth century procedure: that the sort of proceduralmaneuvers used to circumvent un- ambiguous Supreme Court precedents precluding federal courts from creating choice-of-law rules are legitimate;and that the unusualnature of complex litigation justifies such measures. ProfessorKramer exposes the fallacies underlying the first premisse then presents historicaland normative arguments against the second. He questions both the principle that the parties in complex litigationare similarly situ- ated with respect to the applicable law and the notion that adjudicatingsuch litiga- don under more than one law is unmanageable. Consensus is increasingly rare in today's legal world. Our profes- sion has grown so big and has such a wide assortment of groups repre- senting diverse interests that advocates are found on more than one side of almost any issue. This is especially true if the stakes are high, as in complex litigation. Few questions about how to handle these gigantic lawsuits are matters of general agreement. Choice of law is even worse, though not necessarily because the stakes are high. Con- flicts scholars just seem to like disagreement, and they have helped to confuse courts and make a mess of choice-of-law analysis. All things considered, then, it's surprising to find even partial consensus on choice of law in complex litigation.