Bernard williams utilitarianism and

Continue Lecture Supplement on Against Utilitarianism (1973) Copyright © 2013 Bruce W. Hauptly Bernard Williams argues that utilitarianism (and consequence in general) relies on the extreme notion of impartiality that focuses solely on the consequences of our actions. Williams uses two examples to try to show that there is a serious problem with utilitarianism here: the doctrine deprives agents of their integrity. He argues that this is because utilitarianism separates an agent's actions from his projects. Text: 245 Consequentialism is basically indifferent to what I do, or produced what I do, where the concept itself is broad enough to include, for example, situations in which other people do what I did them do, or allowed them to do, or encouraged them to do, or to give them a chance to do. All that's interested in making these cases are the consequences of what I do, and that attitude is broad enough to include the relationships just mentioned, and many others. -Please note that this sentence is only clear after one has read the entire article! 246 Utilitarianism is excessively committed to the strong doctrine of negative responsibility, which stems from the fact that it assigns ultimate value to States. (See page 225 below! -... from a moral point of view (for utilitarian and subsequent) there is no clear difference, which is only to lead to a certain result, not to its production. The fact that the doctrine of negative responsibility thus represents the extreme of impartiality and abstraction from the identity of the agent, leaving only the locus of causal interference in the world, is not just a superficial paradox. 247 Williams notes that while the use of specific examples in moral theory (as one attempt to disprove a counter-example) is prone to problems (for example, examples may be arbitrarily cut off from alternative course of action, or they can be arbitrarily cut off from the rest of the agents' lives), the examples to be presented should be sufficiently detailed to indicate, at least, serious problems. -Indeed, he argues in moral thought ... discussions about how one might think and feel about situations are somewhat different from the actual... plays an important role in the actual discussion. First example: George (unemployed new Ph.D.): Should he work on biological and chemical warfare? Someone else will if George doesn't; George has a family; Jobs are not enough; George's wife is not against this kind of research. Second example: Jim in the jungle: either Pedro kills twenty Indians, or Jim kills one. -To these dilemmas, it seems that utilitarianism meets, in the first case, that George should take the job, and in the second that Jim should kill the Indian. Utilitarianism not only gives us these answers, but if the situations are essentially described and there are no additional features, it treats them as what seems to me as clearly the right answers. 248 The peculiarity of utilitarianism is that it carves out a kind of consideration that for some others matters for what they feel about such cases: consideration related to the idea of how we could first and very simply say that each of us has a special responsibility for what he does, not for what other people do. It's an idea that's intimately linked to the value of integrity. -We should maybe ask ourselves: What is integrity? Then we have to ask whether Williams captures him correctly, and whether he is right in his assertion that utilitarianism cannot explain, or allow, it. -While utilitarianists may suggest that we should forget about integrity, we cannot do so, and this indicates a weakness in utilitarianism: ... The reason utilitarianism cannot understand integrity is because it cannot consistently describe the relationship between human projects and their actions. -248-250 Utilitarians often consider the psychological impact of the course of action on the agent. But the bad feelings of George or Jim may be, from a purely utilitarian point of view, irrational! Indeed, the utilitarian should assume that any squeamishness felt, such as Jim, is actually self-indulgent and should be ignored rather than valued or followed! --249-250 The reason why squeamishness appeal can be very disturbing, and one can be a nerve-wracking proposition of indulging ourselves in going against utilitarian considerations, is not that we are utilitarians who are not sure what utilitarian value give us moral feelings, but that we are partly at least not uitartilians, and cannot treat our moral feelings as objects of utility value. Because our moral attitude to the world is partly given by such feelings, and by a sense of what we can or cannot live with, to relate to these feelings from a purely utilitarian point of view, that is, as events outside of their moral self to lose the sense of their moral identity: to lose, in the most literal sense, their integrity. At this point, utilitarianism alienates a person from his moral feelings; we'll see a little later as, more generally, he alienates from his actions as well. --250 Utilitarianism and punishment of an innocent minority by a majority. Moral feelings of disgust here are irrational! It is excluded from our text that Williams discusses the case effect, an effect that such a precedent could create for other people. But none of the the cases in question are such that there must be such an effect: Jim's case is relatively unique and George's situation is relatively private. For the case effect to be relevant, others must be in the same situation, and the likelihood of such development must be significant. 251Consequentialism offers a strong doctrine of negative responsibility: -Negative responsibility: ... if I know that if I do X, O1 will eventuate, and if I refrain from doing X, O2 will be eventful and that O2 is worse than O1, then I am responsible for the O2 if I voluntarily refrain from doing X. You could prevent it from being said, indeed Jim, if he refuses, relatives of other Indians. -It might be enough for us to talk, in a sense, about Jim's responsibility for this result if it happens; but it's certainly not enough... for us to talk about Jim making these things happen. Pedro is a man who makes effects (kills Indians). The problem Williams points to here is perhaps the next question: What projects (life) does (or maybe) a utilitarian agent? -... among the things that make people happy not only makes other people happy, but are accepted or involved in any of the wide range of projects, or ... You can be committed to things like man, business, institute, career, your own genius, or the pursuit of danger. -Happiness... requires participation in something else, or at least something else. -252 But utilitarianism requires, in fact, that we move away from our projects and appreciate them only if we promote the common usefulness: ... what the outcome will actually consist of will depend entirely on the facts, on what people are with what kind of projects and what potential satisfaction there are within the calculated reach of the causal levers next to which it is located. His own substantial projects and commitments come into it, but just as one lot among others- they potentially provide one set of satisfaction among those he may be able to help from where he finds himself. He is an agent of a meet-up system that happens at some point at a certain time: in Jim's case, our man is in South America. His own decisions as a utilitarian agent are a function of all the pleasures he can influence from where he is; and that means that the projects of others, to a certain extent, determine its solution. -253 It is absurd to require such a person when the sums come from the communal network, which the projects of others have partially determined that he should simply move away from his own project and decision and recognize a decision that requires a utilitarian calculation. It is to push it away in real from his actions and the source of his actions in his own own It is to turn it into a channel between entering all projects, including his own, and getting out of the optimal solution; but that should be ignored in the extent to which its actions and decisions should be seen as actions and decisions that stem from the projects and approaches with which it is most closely associated. So, in the most literal sense, it's an attack on its integrity. 253-254 The importance of immediate should not be underestimated. Philosophers, not only utilitarian ones, repeatedly urge one to look at the world of sub specie aeternitatis, but for most human purposes, that is not a good sight to watch it underneath. For excellent criticism of William's essay, explore Peter Railton's Alienation, Consequentialism, and The Demands of Morality. Notes: (click on the note number to return to text for note) Return to PHI 3601 Home File revised to: 09/28/2013. English philosopher of morality For other people named Bernard Williams, see Bernard Williams (disambiguation). Sir Bernard WilliamsBorn (1929-09-21) September 21, 1929Westcliffe-on-Sea, Essex, England10 June 2003 (2003-06-10) (age 73)Rome, ItalyEducationChigwell SchoolAlma materBalliol College, OxfordSpouse (s)Shirley Williams, hosted by Kathleen (m. 1955; div. 1974)Patricia Williams (m. 1974)EraContemporal PhilosophyRegionWestern PhilosophyThe School of TheOratic PhilosophyInstituteAll Souls College, OxfordNew College, Oxford University College, LondonBedford College, LondonKing's College, CambridgeUniversity California, BerkeleyCorpus Christie College, OxfordAcademic AdvisorsGilberteNotable StudentsMyles BurnyeatMain interestsEthicsNotable ideas Turn reasons for action, moral luck, dirty hands sir Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, FBA (September 21, 1929 - June 10, 2003) was English philosopher. His publications include I (1973), Ethics and The Limits of (1985), Shame and Necessity (1993), Truth and Truth (2002). He was knighted in 1999. As a professor of philosophy at Knightbridge University in Cambridge and professor of doych philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, Williams became known for his efforts to refocus the study of moral philosophy on psychology, history and, in particular, on the Greeks. Colin McGinn described him as an analytical philosopher with the soul of a common humanist and was skeptical of attempts to create a basis for moral philosophy. Martha Nussbaum wrote that he demanded philosophy that it be a pleasure and contain the difficulties and complexity of human life. Williams was a strong supporter of women in academia; Nussbaum said he was as close to being a feminist as a powerful man of his generation could be. He was also famously sharp in conversation. Gilbert Ryle, one of the mentors said that he understands what you are going to say better than you realize it yourself, and sees all possible objections to it and all possible answers to all possible objections before you have to finish your own sentence. The life of the early life and education of Chigwell School, Epping Forest, Essex Young Bernard was in perpetual intellectual motion as a dragonfly, hovering over a sea of ideas. Everything he encountered, every event that happened, was material for his insight and his wit. He was educated at Chigwell School, an independent school, where he first discovered philosophy. The reading of D. H. Lawrence led him to ethics and problems of himself. In his first book, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (1972), he approvingly quoted Lawrence's advice , Awarded a scholarship to Oxford, Williams read the Great (pure , followed by ancient history and philosophy) in Balliol. His influences at Oxford included W. S. Watt, Russell Meiggs, R. M. Hare, Elizabeth Anscombe, Eric Dodds, Edward Fryenkel, David Pierce and Gilbert Ryle. He shone in the first part of the course, pure classics (especially the writing of Latin poems in the style of Ovid) and graduated in 1951 with a congratulatory first in the second part of the course and a prize scholarship to All Souls. After Oxford, Williams spent two years in national service flying Spitfires to Canada for the Royal Air Force. While on vacation in New York, he became close to Shirley Britten Kathleen (born 1930), the daughter of writer Vera Britten and political scientist George Kathleen. They were already friends in Oxford. Kathleen moved to New York to study economics at Columbia University on a Fulbright scholarship. Williams returned to England to receive a scholarship to All Souls and in 1954 became a fellow at New College, Oxford, a position he held until 1959. He and Kathleen kept seeing each other. She joined the Daily Mirror and was seeking to be elected Labour MP. Williams, also a member of the Labour Party, helped her with the 1954 Harwich election, in which she was a failed candidate. The first marriage, London Shirley Williams, 2011 Williams and Kathleen married in London in July 1955 in St. James, Spanish Place, near Marylebone High Street, and then honeymooning on, Greece. The couple moved into a very basic ground-floor flat in London, on Clarendon Road, Notting Hill. Given how difficult it was to find decent housing, they decided instead to share with Helge Rubinstein her husband, literary agent Hilary Rubinstein, who at the time was working for her uncle Victor Gollantz. In 1955, four of them bought a four-storey, seven-bedroom house in Fillymore Place, Kensington, for a house they had lived in for 14 years. Williams described it as one of the happiest periods of his life. In 1958, Williams taught at the University of Ghana in Legon. When he returned to England in 1959, he was appointed Philosophy Teacher at University College London. In 1961, after four miscarriages in four years, Shirley Williams gave birth to a daughter, Rebecca. Williams was a visiting professor at Princeton University in 1963 and in 1964 was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Bedford College in London. His wife was elected to Parliament the same year as a Labour mp for Hitchin in Hertfordshire. Two years later, The Sunday Times described the couple as the new left at the mightiest, the most generous and sometimes the most eccentric. Andy Beckett wrote that they entertained refugees from Eastern Europe and politicians from Africa and drank sherry in remarkable numbers. Shirley Williams became junior minister and shadow home secretary in 1971. Several newspapers saw her as the future prime minister. In 1981, she co-founded a new centrist party, the Social Democratic Party; Williams left the Labour Party to join the SDP, although he later returned to Labour. Cambridge, Williams' second marriage spent more than 20 years at King's College, Cambridge, eight of them as vice-chancellor. In 1967, at the age of 38, Williams became Professor of Philosophy at Knightbridge University at Cambridge University and a fellow of King's College. According to Jane O'Grady, Williams was central to King's decision in 1972 to take women, one of the first three men's colleges in Oxbridge, to do so. In both the first and second marriages, he supported his wives in their careers and helped with children more than was common to men at the time. In the 1970s, when Nussbaum's dissertation supervisor, G. E. L. Owen, pursued female students, and yet she decided to support him, Williams told her, while walking on her back in Cambridge: You know, there's a price you pay for that support and support. Your dignity is being held hostage. You really don't have to put up with this. Shirley Williams' political career (The House of Commons regularly sat until 10pm) meant the pair spent a lot of time apart. They bought a house in Furneux Pelham, Hertfordshire, near the south Cambridgeshire border, while she lived in Phillimore Place for a week to be near the Houses of Parliament. Sunday was often the only day they were together. Differences in their personal values - he was an atheist, she strained their relationship even more. (n 1) It reached a critical point in 1970 when Williams formed a relationship with Patricia Lowe Skinner, editor of Cambridge University Press and wife of historian quentin Skinner. She turned to Williams to write the opposite point of view on utilitarianism for utilitarianism: for and against with JJ C. Smart (1973), and they fell in love. Williams and Skinner began living together in 1971. He got a divorce in 1974 (at the request of Shirley Williams, the marriage was later annulled). In the same year, Patricia Williams married him, and in 1975 the couple had two sons, Jacob and Jonathan, in 1980. Shirley Williams married political scientist Richard Neustadt in 1987. Berkeley, University of Oxford, Berkeley In 1979, Williams was elected vice-chancellor of King's, a position he held until 1987. He spent a semester in 1986 at the University of California, Berkeley as a visiting professor at Mills, and in 1988 left England to become a philosophy professor of Monroe Deutsch, announcing to the media that he was leaving as part of a brain drain by British scientists in America. He was also a professor of classical literature at Berkeley in 1989; Shame and Necessity (1995) grew out of his six Sather lectures. Williams returned to England in 1990 as a professor of moral philosophy for White at Oxford and a Corpus Christi Fellow. His sons were at sea in California, he said, unaware of what was expected of them, and he was unable to help. He regretted making his departure from England so public; he was persuaded to do so to highlight the relatively low academic salaries in the UK. (n 2) When he retired in 1996, he rejoined the All Souls Scholarship. Royal Commissions, All Souls College, Oxford Williams have served on several royal commissions and government committees: the Public Schools Commission (1965-1970), drug abuse (1971), gambling (1976-1978), the Committee on Obscenence and Censorship of Films (1979), and the Social Justice Commission (1993-1994). I've done all the basic vices, he said. While at the Gambling Commission, one of his recommendations, ignored at the time, was for the national lottery. (John Major's government introduced it in 1994.) Mary Warnock described Williams' 1979 report on pornography as chair of the Film Obscenity and Censorship Committee as pleasant, actually compulsive to read. He relied on a state of harm that no behavior should be suppressed by law unless it is proven that it can harm someone, and concluded that as long as children are protected from pornography, adults should be able to read and watch it freely in their own opinion. The report the view that pornography was usually the cause of sexual offences. Two cases, in particular, highlighted by Moors Murder and Cambridge Rapist, where the impact of pornography was discussed during trials. The report argued that both cases appeared to be more consistent with pre-existing traits, which were reflected both in the choice of reading and in acts committed against others. Opera Williams enjoyed opera from an early age, especially Mozart and Wagner. Patricia Williams writes that he attended the performances of Carl Rose Company and Sadler Wells as a teenager. In an essay about Wagner, he described being reduced to a virtually uncontrollable state during John Vickers' performance as Tristan in Covent Garden. From 1968 to 1986, he worked on the board of the English National Opera and wrote the recording of The Nature of the Opera for The New Grove. The collection of his essay On The Opera was published posthumously in 2006 under the editorship of Patricia Williams. In 1971, Williams became a member of the British Academy and an honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1983. The following year he became a syndicate at the Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge and then a chair. He was elected to the Royal Society of Arts in 1993 and was knighted in 1999. Several universities awarded him honorary doctorates, including Yale and Harvard. Williams died of heart failure on 10 June 2003 while on holiday in Rome; he was diagnosed in 1999 with multiple myeloma, a form of cancer. He is survived by a wife, two sons and her first child, Rebecca. He was cremated in Rome. The written approach to the ethics of A.W. Moore writes that Williams's work lies in the analytical tradition, though less typical of her in her latitude, in her erudition and, above all, in her deep humanity: although he was never an energetic apologist for this tradition, he has always maintained the standards of clarity and rigor that she values, and his work is a model of all that is best in tradition. It's brilliant, insightful and creative. It's also extremely tight. There may not be many critics of his work who haven't thought of some objections to what he says, only to find, on finding appropriate quotes to turn into a goal that Williams carefully presents his views in a way that precisely pre-empts objections. Williams doesn't stick out any ethical theory or system; some commentators have unfairly pointed out, in the view of his supporters, that he is largely a critic. Moore writes that Williams has not suffered from this criticism: He simply refused to allow the philosophical system to overshadow the subtlety and diversity of the human ethical experience. He equated ethical theories with the tidiness, systematicness and economics of ideas, Moore writes, which was not up to the description of human lives and Williams tried not to lose touch with the real problems that enliven our usual ethical experience, unlike many arid, ahihistorical, second-order debates about ethics in philosophy departments. In his first book, Moral: An Introduction to Ethics (1972), Williams wrote that while most moral were mostly empty and boring... Moral philosophy has found an original way of being boring, which is not to discuss moral issues at all. He argued that studying ethics should be vital, compelling and difficult, and he was looking for an approach that would be accountable to psychology and history. Williams was not an ethical realist; unlike scientific knowledge, which can come close to the absolute concept of reality, ethical judgment is based on a point of view. He argued that fat ethical concepts, such as kindness and cruelty, expressed a union of fact and value. The idea that our values are not in the world was liberated: A radical form of freedom can be found in the fact that the world cannot force us to accept one set of values and not the other. Williams often emphasized how luck permeates ethical life. He coined and developed the term moral luck, and illustrated the idea of moral luck with a number of extremely influential examples. One well-known example of Williams' moral fortune concerns the decision of artist Paul Gauguin to move to Tahiti. Criticism of the work of Kant Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Williams throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (1972), Problems of Yourself (1973), Utilitarianism: for and against with J. J. C. Smart (1973), Moral Luck (1981) and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985) laid out their attacks on two pillars of ethics: utilitarianism and the moral philosophy of the 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Martha Nussbaum wrote that his work condemned the trivial and evasive way in which moral philosophy is practiced in England under the auspices of these two dominant theories. Both theories have simplified moral life, she wrote, by neglecting emotions and personal attachments and how luck shapes our choices. (Williams said in 1996, Roughly speaking, if it's not about obligations or consequences, it doesn't count.) In Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) Kanta sets out a moral system based on a categorical imperative, one formulation of which is: Act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time that it will become a universal law. (n 3) Rational agents must act on the basis of principles of purely rational agency, Moore writes; that is, the principles governing all rational agents. But Williams was different from thinking and acting. Thinking rationally is thinking the way it is With faith in the truth, and what it takes to believe the truth in the same way as what it takes for those who believe in the truth, Moore writes. But one can act rationally by satisfying one's own desires (internal reasons for action), and what it takes to do so may not be what it takes for anyone else to satisfy them. According to Williams, Kant's approach to thinking and acting is wrong. Williams argued that Kant gave a pure, deep and thorough representation of morality, but the honorable instincts of cantianism to protect the individual's individual from the agglomerative indifference of utilitarianism may not be effective against the Kantian abstract nature of people as moral agents. We should not be expected to act as if we are not who we are in the circumstances in which we are. Criticism of utilitarianism Additional information: An act of utilitarianism, utilitarianism, and a preference for utilitarianism Williams to fabricate a case against utilitarianism - a consistent position of the simplest version of which is that the actions are right only if they contribute to the greatest happiness of the greatest number - in utilitarianism: For and against (1973) with J. J. One of the thought experiments of the book includes Jim, the botanicist doing research in the South American country. Jim finds himself in a small town in front of 20 captured Indian rebels. The captain who arrested them says that if Jim kills one, the others will be released in honor of Jim's status as a guest, but if he doesn't, they'll all be killed. A simple act of utilitarianism would have favored Jim killing one of the men. Williams argued that there was a critical distinction between the man killed by Jim and the slain captain because of Jim's act or inaction. Captain, if he decides to kill, it's not just a means of impact Jim has on the world. He is a moral actor, a man with intentions and projects. The utilitarian loses this distinction by turning us into empty vessels with which the consequences arise. Williams argued that moral decisions should preserve our psychological identity and integrity. We must abandon any system that reduces moral judgment to multiple algorithms. Reasons for action Additional information: Internal and externalism - Reasons why Williams argued that there are only internal reasons for action: There is a reason for φ if A has any desire, the satisfaction of which will be served by his φ-ing. The external reason would be I have reason to φ, even if nothing in the subjective motivational set A is φ-ING. Williams argued that it was pointless to say that there were external causes; reason alone does not move people to action. that without external reasons for action it becomes impossible to establish that the same set of moral reasons applies to all agents equally. Where someone has no internal reason to do what others think is right, they cannot be blamed for not doing so because internal causes are the only reasons, and blame, Williams wrote, includes the treatment of a person who is accused as someone who had a reason to do the right thing but did not do so. The truth in his last completed book, Truth and Truth: Essays in Genealogy (2002), Williams defines the two core values of truth as accuracy and sincerity and tries to bridge the gap between the demand for truth and the doubt that such a thing exists. Jane O'Grady wrote in the Guardian Williams obituary that the book is an examination of those who mock any perceived truth as ridiculously naive because it is inevitably distorted by power, class bias and ideology. The debt to Friedrich Nietzsche is clear, most obviously, in the adoption of the genealogical method as a tool of explanation and criticism. While part of Williams' intention was to attack those who he believed denied the value of the truth, the book warns that to understand it simply in this sense, it would miss part of its purpose; rather, as Kenneth Baker wrote, it is Williams's reflections on the moral cost of intellectual fashion to circumvent the notion of truth. Williams' legacy offered no systematic philosophical theory; indeed, he was suspicious of any such attempt. He became known for his dialectic abilities, although he was suspicious of them. Alan Coad wrote that Williams was never impressed by the manifestation of a simple dialectic skill, least of all in moral philosophy: On the contrary, one of the most notable features of his philosophical worldview was the unwavering insistence on a number of points that may seem obvious, but which are nonetheless too often neglected: that moral or ethical thought is part of human life; that philosophers write about it in writing about something really important; that it is not easy to say anything worth saying on this issue; that what moral philosophers write is subject to the realities of human history, psychology and social affairs; and that a simple mind is not really an appropriate measure of value. Being in the presence of Williams is sometimes painful because of this intensity of liveliness that challenges a friend to something or another, and yet it was, and it is, it is not very clear, to what. For authenticity, I now think: to be and express yourself more courageously and clearly than one has done so far. Martha Nussbaum, 2015 Martin Hollis said Williams is well positioned to lead philosopher of his time, but he had a beautiful for central questions, he had no answer. Alan Thomas defined Williams' contribution to ethics as a comprehensive scepticism about attempts to create a basis for a moral philosophy explicitly articulated in the ethics and boundaries of philosophy (1985) and Shame and Necessity (1993), in which he argued that moral theories could never reflect the complexities of life, especially given the radical pluralism of modern societies. According to Sophie Grace Chappell, learning to be yourself, to be authentic and to act honestly, rather than conform to any external moral system, is perhaps a fundamental motivation for Williams' work. If all my works have one theme, it's authenticity and self-expression, Williams said in 2002. It's the idea that some things in some real sense actually you, or express something that you and others don't... It's all about presenting the notion of inner necessity. He weaned the moral philosophy from the Kantian question, What is my duty? and returned to the question that matters to the Greeks: How should we live? Morality: Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Problems of yourself, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. (with JJ C. Smart) Utilitarianism: Over and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Descartes: The Clean Investigation Project, London: Pelican Books, 1978. Moral luck: Philosophical documents 1973-1980, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. (with Amartya Sen) Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Ethics and Boundaries of Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard University Publishing House, 1985. Shame and necessity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. On the Meaning of Humanity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Great Philosophers: Plato, Abingdon: Rutledge, 1998. Truth and Truthfulness: Essays in Genealogy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Posthumously published in the beginning was the act: Realism and moralizing in political arguments, ed. Jeffrey Hawthorne, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. Sense of the past: Essays in the philosophy of history, ed. Miles Burnyeat, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. Philosophy as a humanistic discipline, ed. A. W. Moore, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. Opera, oh. Patricia Williams, New Haven: Yale University Press University, 2006. Essays and reviews: 1959- 2002, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014. Selected works Morality and Emotions, in Bernard Williams, Problems of Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 207-229, first delivered in 1965 as Williams' first lecture at Bedford College, London. The Makropoulos case: at the tedium of immortality, in Bernard Williams, Self Problems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pagan Justice and Christian Love, Apeiron 26 (3-4), December 1993, 195-207. The theory of names and their refutations of Steven Everson. Actus Reus of Dr. Caligari, Pennsylvania Law Review 142, May 1994, 1661-1673. Descartes and the historiography of philosophy, John Cottingham Acting as a Virtuous Man Acts, in Robert Heinaman (ed.), and Moral Realism, Westview Press, 1995. Ethics, in A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy: A Guide to the Subject, Oxford University Press, 1995. Identity and Identity, by Henry Harris (note), Identity: Essays based on Herbert Spencer Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Truth in Ethics, Odds, 8 (3), December 1995, 227-236. On Hate and Despised Philosophy, London Book Review, 18 (8), April 18, 1996, 17-18 (courtesy link). : Second Look, in N.F. Bunnin, Blackwell's Companion to Philosophy, Blackwell, 1996. History, Morality and The Test of Reflection, by Onora O'Neill, Sources of Normality, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Reasons, Values and Theory of Persuasion, by Francesco Farina, Frank Hahn and Stafano Vannucci (e.g.), Ethics, Rationality and Economic Behavior, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Politics of Trust, Patricia Yeager, Geography of Identity, Ann Arbor: Press, 1996. The Women of Trachis: Fictions, Pessimism, Ethics, by R. B. Louden and P. Schollmeier (eds.), Greeks and Us, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Demolition: Impossible virtue? in David Hyde, Toleration: Exclusive Virtue, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. True, Politics and Self-Deception, Social Research 63.3, Autumn 1996. Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom, Cambridge Law Journal 56, 1997. Stoic Philosophy and Emotions: Answer to Richard Sorabji in R. Sorabji. Tolerance of tolerance in Susan Mendus, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Philosophy 75, October 2000, 477-496. Understanding Homer: Literature, History and Perfect Anthropology, in Neil Rowley's Film (Ed.), Being Human: Anthropological Universality and Feature in Transdisciplinary Perspective, Walter 2000. Why Philosophy Needs History, London Book Review, 24 (20), October 17, 2002 (reference to politeness). Notes and Shirley Williams, 2002: Ours was very lively marriage, but there was something of a tension that comes from two things. One is that we were both too bogged down in what we accordingly did - we didn't spend all that much time together; the other, to be entirely honest, is that I am pretty unjudgmental, and I found Bernard's ability for a rather drastic putting down of people he considered stupid unacceptable. ... Sometimes it can be very painful. He could someone off. Those who are left behind are, one or four, dead personalities. Bernard Williams, 2002: I was convinced that there was a real problem with academic conditions and that if my departure was made public, it would bring these issues to the public's attention. It did a bit but it made me seem narky, and when I came back again for three years it looked pretty absurd. I'm back for personal reasons - it's harder to live there with my family than I thought. Kant: Der categorische Imperativ ist also nur ein einziger, und zwar dieser: pen nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, da sie ein allgemeines gesezt werde. Inquiries: Mark. Jenkins, Bernard Williams, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, 3. a b Colin Cookman, Bernard Williams on the need for philosophy for history, Review, 64 (1), September 2010, 3-30. JSTOR 29765339 - Colin McGinn, Isn't It True?, New York Book Review, April 10, 2003. Martha K. Nussbaum, Tragedies, Hope, Justice, in Daniel Callkat Film, Reading Bernard Williams, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, 213. a b c d Martha C. Nussbaum, Tragedy and Justice Archive December 8, 2004 at wayback machine, Boston Review, October/November 2003. Brian Magee, Confession of the Philosopher, Modern Library, 1999, 83. a b Shirley Williams, Climbing bookshelves, London: Virago, 2009, 90. Shirley Williams 2009, 115. a b c Christopher Lehmann- Haupt, Sir Bernard Williams, 73, Oxford Philosopher, Dies, New York Times, June 14, 2003. Addition to the London newspaper, 10 June 1961, 4157. a b c d e f h i j Stuart Jeffries, In Search of Truth, The Guardian, November 30, 2002. b Bernard Williams, Distrust of Animals: Conversation with Bernard Williams, in Alex Voorhoeve, Ethics Conversations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 196-197. a b c d e f g John Davis, Pigeon Hole Fugitive, Times Higher Education, November 1, 1996. Bernard Williams, Moral: Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 79. a b c d e f h i j k A. W. Moore, Williams, Sir Bernard Arthur Owen (1929-2003), Philosopher, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, January 2007. a b c Professor Sir Bernard Williams, Times, 14 June 2003. a b c d e Alan Code, Samuel Scheffler, Barry Stroud, In Memoriam: Bernard A. O. Williams Archive April 16, 2015 Wayback Machine, University of California. Shirley Williams 2009, 104, 114. Shirley Williams 2009, 116-117. Shirley Williams 2009, 120, 136, 154. Shirley Williams 2009, 132. Shirley Williams, God and Caesar: Personal Reflections on Politics and Religion, ASC Black, 2004, 17; Shirley Williams 2009, 132, 139. Shirley Williams 2009, 143, 155. b Andy Beckett, Centre Forward, The Guardian, April 2, 2005. Maya Oppenheim, Baroness Shirley Williams: The Lib Dem co-founder once predicted to become Britain's first female prime minister, The Independent, February 11, 2016. a b Jane O'Grady, Professor Sir Bernard Williams, The Guardian, 13 June 2003. Martha K. Nussbaum, Don't Smile So Much: Philosophy and Women in the 1970s, by Linda Martin Alcoff, Singing on Fire: Stories of Women in Philosophy, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003 (93-108), 100. a b Shirley Williams 2009, 156-157. Shirley Williams: Views from Peers, Hertfordshire Life, 13 January 2010. Mike Peel, Shirley Williams: Biography, London: Biteback Publishing, 2013, 157. Bernard Williams, The Economist, June 26, 2003. Mary Warnock, Williams Report on Obscenity and Censorship of Films, Political quarter, 51 (3), July 1980 (341-344), 341. Bernard Williams (ed.), Obscenity and Film Censorship: Williams Report Reduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015 (1981), 69. Professor Sir Bernard Williams, The Daily Telegraph, 14 June 2003. Anthony Skillen, Crime Rating: Williams Report on Obscenity, Philosophy, 57 (220), April 1982 (237-245), 237. JSTOR 4619562 - Williams Report, 6.7, 85. Patricia Williams, Editorial foreword, On Opera, New Haven, Yale University Press Office, 2006, 1. Williams, in opera, 165; also see Bernard Williams, Wagner and Politics, New York Review of Books, November 2, 2000. a b Kenneth Baker, Bernard Williams: Wearing a Torch for Truth, San Francisco Chronicle, September 22, 2002. a b Martha K. Nussbaum, Moral (and Musical) Danger, The New Rambler, 2015. Jerry Fodor, Life in Tune, The Times Literary Supplement, January 17, 2007. b with A. W. Moore, Bernard Williams (1929-2003) Philosophy Now, 2003. Larissa McFarquhar, How to Be Good, The New Yorker, September 5, 2011 (archive). Williams, Morality, 1972, xvii. Onora Nell, Review: Morality: An Introduction to the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Journal of Philosophy 72 (12), 1975, 334-339. JSTOR 2025133 - Bernard Williams, Ethics and Frontier Philosophy, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 193. Williams, Ethics and Boundary Philosophy, 139, 154. A. W. Moore, Realism and Absolute Concept, by Alan Thomas, Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 24-26. Williams, Ethics and Boundaries 143–144. A. W. Moore, Bernard Williams: Ethics and Boundaries of Philosophy, by John Shand, Central Works of Philosophy, Volume 5: The Twentieth Century: the quean and the aftermath, Montreal: McGill-King Press, 2006, 217. Williams, Ethics and Boundary Philosophy, 142. Carol Rovane, Williams find the truth in relativism? In Daniel Callcut, Reading Bernard Williams, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. Bernard Williams, Truth in Relativism, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, Cambridge University Press, 1981. First published in the journal Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXXV, 1974-1975, 215-228. Living in a life authentic: Bernard Williams on Paul Gauguin - Daniel Callcut Aeon. Received on December 18, 2018. Nussbaum 2009, 213. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in Moral Luck, 1981, 20-39. First published in the journal Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, additional volume 1, 1976, 115-135. Immanuil Kant, the basis of moral metaphysics: German-English edition, 1786 (1785), Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 4:421, 70-71. Moore 2006, 213. Williams, Ethics and Boundary Philosophy, 194. Bernard Williams, Faces, Character and Morality, at Amelie Ochsenberg Rorty. JJ C. Smart, Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: Over and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 98-99. Smart and Williams 1973, 109ff. - Daniel Markowitz, Architecture integrity, in Daniel Callcut, Reading Bernard Williams, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. Williams, Ethics and Boundary Philosophy, 117. Bernard Williams, Internal and External Reasons, in Moral Luck, 1981 (101-113), 101. First published in Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 17-28. John Skorupski, Internal Causes and Scales of Guilt, by Alan Thomas, Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 74. Bernard Williams, Internal Causes and Innocence of Guilt, 1989, reissued in Williams, about the meaning of humanity, and other philosophical papers 1982-1993, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 35-45. Bernard Williams, Answers, by J. E. J. Altham, Ross Harrison (eds.), World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on The Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Bernard Williams, Postscript: Some additional notes for internal and external reasons, in Elijah Millgram (ed.), Variety of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. Jenkins 2014, 89. a b Sophie Grace Chappell, Bernard Williams, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, November 8, 2013 (February 1, 2006). - Williams 1989, in a sense 42. Skorupsky 2007, 93-94. David E. Cooper, Truth and Truthfulness: Essay in Bernard Williams Genealogy, Philosophy, 78 (305), July 2003, 411-414. JSTOR 3752065 - Daniel Callkat, Introduction, in Callcut 2009, 1-2. Alan Thomas, Williams, Bernard, in Robert Audi (ed.), Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 (2nd edition), 975. Further reading Nagel, Thomas. Moral Luck, Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Nagel, Thomas. Sir Bernard Williams, Encyclopedia Britannica. Perry, Alexandra; Herrera, Chris. Bernard Williams' Moral Philosophy, Newcastle: Cambridge Publishing Scholars, 2011. External links by Bernard Williams's Wikipedia sister from Wikiquote Data from Wikidata Spell of Linguistic Philosophy, Byran Magee interview Bernard Williams, BBC, 1977, from 00:03:32. Bernard Williams, London Review of Books. Bernard Williams, New York Review of Books. Bernard Williams: Ethics from a human point of view, Paul Russell, Times Literary Supplement. Bernard Williams: Philosopher, Links to articles, interviews, videos and more. Academic offices preceded by Edmund Leach Vice-Chancellor of King's College, Cambridge1979-1987 SuccessfullyPatrick Bateson extracted from bernard williams utilitarianism and integrity. bernard williams utilitarianism and integrity summary. bernard williams utilitarianism for and against pdf. utilitarianism for and against by jjc smart and bernard williams. bernard williams utilitarianism for and against. j.j.c. smart & bernard williams utilitarianism for and against. bernard williams and utilitarianism

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