Bernard williams utilitarianism and Continue Lecture Supplement on Bernard Williams Against Utilitarianism (1973) Copyright © 2013 Bruce W. Hauptly Bernard Williams argues that utilitarianism (and consequence in general) relies on the extreme notion of impartiality that focuses solely on the consequences of our actions. Williams uses two examples to try to show that there is a serious problem with utilitarianism here: the doctrine deprives agents of their integrity. He argues that this is because utilitarianism separates an agent's actions from his projects. Text: 245 Consequentialism is basically indifferent to what I do, or produced what I do, where the concept itself is broad enough to include, for example, situations in which other people do what I did them do, or allowed them to do, or encouraged them to do, or to give them a chance to do. All that's interested in making these cases are the consequences of what I do, and that attitude is broad enough to include the relationships just mentioned, and many others. -Please note that this sentence is only clear after one has read the entire article! 246 Utilitarianism is excessively committed to the strong doctrine of negative responsibility, which stems from the fact that it assigns ultimate value to States. (See page 225 below! -... from a moral point of view (for utilitarian and subsequent) there is no clear difference, which is only to lead to a certain result, not to its production. The fact that the doctrine of negative responsibility thus represents the extreme of impartiality and abstraction from the identity of the agent, leaving only the locus of causal interference in the world, is not just a superficial paradox. 247 Williams notes that while the use of specific examples in moral theory (as one attempt to disprove a counter-example) is prone to problems (for example, examples may be arbitrarily cut off from alternative course of action, or they can be arbitrarily cut off from the rest of the agents' lives), the examples to be presented should be sufficiently detailed to indicate, at least, serious problems. -Indeed, he argues in moral thought ... discussions about how one might think and feel about situations are somewhat different from the actual... plays an important role in the actual discussion. First example: George (unemployed new Ph.D.): Should he work on biological and chemical warfare? Someone else will if George doesn't; George has a family; Jobs are not enough; George's wife is not against this kind of research. Second example: Jim in the jungle: either Pedro kills twenty Indians, or Jim kills one. -To these dilemmas, it seems that utilitarianism meets, in the first case, that George should take the job, and in the second that Jim should kill the Indian. Utilitarianism not only gives us these answers, but if the situations are essentially described and there are no additional features, it treats them as what seems to me as clearly the right answers. 248 The peculiarity of utilitarianism is that it carves out a kind of consideration that for some others matters for what they feel about such cases: consideration related to the idea of how we could first and very simply say that each of us has a special responsibility for what he does, not for what other people do. It's an idea that's intimately linked to the value of integrity. -We should maybe ask ourselves: What is integrity? Then we have to ask whether Williams captures him correctly, and whether he is right in his assertion that utilitarianism cannot explain, or allow, it. -While utilitarianists may suggest that we should forget about integrity, we cannot do so, and this indicates a weakness in utilitarianism: ... The reason utilitarianism cannot understand integrity is because it cannot consistently describe the relationship between human projects and their actions. -248-250 Utilitarians often consider the psychological impact of the course of action on the agent. But the bad feelings of George or Jim may be, from a purely utilitarian point of view, irrational! Indeed, the utilitarian should assume that any squeamishness felt, such as Jim, is actually self-indulgent and should be ignored rather than valued or followed! --249-250 The reason why squeamishness appeal can be very disturbing, and one can be a nerve-wracking proposition of indulging ourselves in going against utilitarian considerations, is not that we are utilitarians who are not sure what utilitarian value give us moral feelings, but that we are partly at least not uitartilians, and cannot treat our moral feelings as objects of utility value. Because our moral attitude to the world is partly given by such feelings, and by a sense of what we can or cannot live with, to relate to these feelings from a purely utilitarian point of view, that is, as events outside of their moral self to lose the sense of their moral identity: to lose, in the most literal sense, their integrity. At this point, utilitarianism alienates a person from his moral feelings; we'll see a little later as, more generally, he alienates from his actions as well. --250 Utilitarianism and punishment of an innocent minority by a majority. Moral feelings of disgust here are irrational! It is excluded from our text that Williams discusses the case effect, an effect that such a precedent could create for other people. But none of the the cases in question are such that there must be such an effect: Jim's case is relatively unique and George's situation is relatively private. For the case effect to be relevant, others must be in the same situation, and the likelihood of such development must be significant. 251Consequentialism offers a strong doctrine of negative responsibility: -Negative responsibility: ... if I know that if I do X, O1 will eventuate, and if I refrain from doing X, O2 will be eventful and that O2 is worse than O1, then I am responsible for the O2 if I voluntarily refrain from doing X. You could prevent it from being said, indeed Jim, if he refuses, relatives of other Indians. -It might be enough for us to talk, in a sense, about Jim's responsibility for this result if it happens; but it's certainly not enough... for us to talk about Jim making these things happen. Pedro is a man who makes effects (kills Indians). The problem Williams points to here is perhaps the next question: What projects (life) does (or maybe) a utilitarian agent? -... among the things that make people happy not only makes other people happy, but are accepted or involved in any of the wide range of projects, or ... You can be committed to things like man, business, institute, career, your own genius, or the pursuit of danger. -Happiness... requires participation in something else, or at least something else. -252 But utilitarianism requires, in fact, that we move away from our projects and appreciate them only if we promote the common usefulness: ... what the outcome will actually consist of will depend entirely on the facts, on what people are with what kind of projects and what potential satisfaction there are within the calculated reach of the causal levers next to which it is located. His own substantial projects and commitments come into it, but just as one lot among others- they potentially provide one set of satisfaction among those he may be able to help from where he finds himself. He is an agent of a meet-up system that happens at some point at a certain time: in Jim's case, our man is in South America. His own decisions as a utilitarian agent are a function of all the pleasures he can influence from where he is; and that means that the projects of others, to a certain extent, determine its solution. -253 It is absurd to require such a person when the sums come from the communal network, which the projects of others have partially determined that he should simply move away from his own project and decision and recognize a decision that requires a utilitarian calculation. It is to push it away in real from his actions and the source of his actions in his own own It is to turn it into a channel between entering all projects, including his own, and getting out of the optimal solution; but that should be ignored in the extent to which its actions and decisions should be seen as actions and decisions that stem from the projects and approaches with which it is most closely associated. So, in the most literal sense, it's an attack on its integrity. 253-254 The importance of immediate should not be underestimated. Philosophers, not only utilitarian ones, repeatedly urge one to look at the world of sub specie aeternitatis, but for most human purposes, that is not a good sight to watch it underneath. For excellent criticism of William's essay, explore Peter Railton's Alienation, Consequentialism, and The Demands of Morality. Notes: (click on the note number to return to text for note) Return to PHI 3601 Home File revised to: 09/28/2013. English philosopher of morality For other people named Bernard Williams, see Bernard Williams (disambiguation). Sir Bernard WilliamsBorn (1929-09-21) September 21, 1929Westcliffe-on-Sea, Essex, England10 June 2003 (2003-06-10) (age 73)Rome, ItalyEducationChigwell SchoolAlma materBalliol College, OxfordSpouse (s)Shirley Williams, hosted by Kathleen (m. 1955; div. 1974)Patricia Williams (m. 1974)EraContemporal PhilosophyRegionWestern PhilosophyThe School of TheOratic PhilosophyInstituteAll Souls College, OxfordNew College, Oxford University College, LondonBedford College, LondonKing's College, CambridgeUniversity California, BerkeleyCorpus Christie College, OxfordAcademic AdvisorsGilberteNotable StudentsMyles BurnyeatMain interestsEthicsNotable ideas Turn reasons for action, moral luck, dirty hands sir Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, FBA (September 21, 1929 - June 10, 2003) was English philosopher.