Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior Política Externa Brasileira em uma perspectiva histórica: características constantes, comportamento errático
Paulo Roberto de Almeida Sumário
Crônicas de direito internacional...... 1 Julia Motte-Baumvol e Alice Rocha da Silva
Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior...11 Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Aspectos geopolíticos do GATT e da OMC...... 28 José Fontoura Costa
A regulação internacional dos subsídios agrícolas: a contemporaneidade do paradig- ma realista para a compreensão do sistema de comércio agrícola internacional vigen- te...... 43 Natália Fernanda Gomes
Acordo TRIPS: one-size-fits-all?...... 57 Tatianna Mello Pereira da Silva
É interessante para o Brasil aderir ao acordo sobre compras governamentais da OMC?...... 72 Clarissa Chagas Sanches Monassa e Aubrey de Oliveira Leonelli
A defesa comercial e a restrição da liberalização e da integração comercial pelo au- mento da alíquota de ipi de veículos importados no Brasil...... 86 Ricardo Serrano Osorio e Clayton Couto
A cooperação internacional na defesa da concorrência...... 97 Vinicius Marques de Carvalho e Paulo Burnier da Silveira
Os acordos de comércio para além das preferências: uma análise da regulamentação sobre os “novos temas”...... 105 Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin e Lucas da Silva Tasquetto
Integração econômica no mercosul: opiniões consultivas e a democratização no aces- so ao tribunal permante de revisão...... 128 Eduardo Biachi Gomes
“Fundos abutres” vs. Estados nacionais: soberania e atuação do Tribunal Internacio- nal do Direito do Mar a partir do caso da fragata libertad...... 138 Alexandre Pereira da Silva e Mariana Yante Barrêto Pereira
Investimento estrangeiro: o padrão de tratamento justo e equitativo e o papel da boa-fé...... 154 Fernando Santos Arenhart
A emergência do direito administrativo global como ferramenta de regulação trans- nacional do investimento estrangeiro direto...... 171 Andréa Rocha Postiga
Is investment arbitration an appropriate venue for environmental issues? A Latin Ame- rican perspective...... 195 Nitish Monebhurrun
A jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça e a construção de um conceito de internacionalidade contratual...... 208 Frederico E. Z. Glitz
Impacto e influência dos tratados e convenções internacionais sobre a lei brasileira de arbitragem...... 219 Jamile Bergamaschine Mata Diz e Clarissa Correa Neto Ribeiro
A jurisprudência norteamericana e europeia sobre os acordos horizontais e verticais: substrato para análise da matéria no Brasil...... 232 Daniel Amin Ferraz doi:10.5102/rdi.v10i1.2393 Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior
Política Externa Brasileira em uma perspectiva histórica: características constantes, comportamento errático*
Paulo Roberto de Almeida1 Abstract
The essay, which adopts a historical approach, presents and discusses the Brazilian trade policies implemented since the 19th century, as connected with industrial and development policies, not always in a coordinated man- ner. Brazil was, and probably continues to be, one of the most protectionist countries in the world, at the beginning for fiscal reasons (financing of the State), then, in the 20th century, on behalf of deliberate industrializing and import substitution goals. The essay surveys the many policies followed in different phases of Brazilian economic history, including the regional in- tegration process of Mercosur and the multilateral and hemispheric trade negotiations; it also discusses the recent re-commoditization of its foreign trade and the retrocession to a series of patently defensive policies, justified by a lack of competitiveness of its industries, by the way due to the excessive taxation and the bureaucratic entanglements set up by the very State that seeks to protect those industries from foreign competition. It concludes that a new economic opening or trade liberalization are not likely to occur in the immediate future. Albeit not original in scope or methodology, the essay integrates various sources and specialized literature, offering a synthesis of the state of the art in this field of study. Keywords: Brazilian protectionism. Trade policies. Industrialization. Mer- cosur. WTO.
Resumo
O ensaio, que adota uma metodologia expositiva de caráter histórico, apresenta e discute as políticas comerciais brasileiras adotadas desde o sé- culo XIX, tal como correlacionadas com as políticas industriais e de de- 1 Ph.D. in Social Sciences, career diplomat, professor of Political Economy at the Post- senvolvimento econômico, embora implementadas de maneira nem sempre Graduate Studies in Law of the University coordenada. O Brasil foi, e provavelmente continua sendo, um dos países Center of Brasília (Uniceub); author of many mais protecionistas do mundo, anteriormente por razões fiscais (equilíbrio books and articles on international economic relations and diplomatic history of Brazil and das contas públicas) e, a partir do século XX, tendo em vista objetivos de- the regional integration process (pralmeida@ liberadamente industrializantes e de substituição de importações. O ensaio me.com; www.pralmeida.org). None of the ar- examina as várias políticas seguidas em diferentes fases da história econô- guments in this essay is representative of Bra- mica brasileira, inclusive no processo de integração regional do Mercosul e zilian official positions or policies of its Foreign ministry. no quadro das negociações comerciais multilaterais e hemisféricas; também * Artigo convidado discute a recente primarização do seu comércio exterior e o retrocesso re- economic introversion. As we shallsee,moved Brazil political nationalismand context of ded in astructural fensivestate policies and activism thatseem embed de various types of in alongcontinuum Brazil, of of rare inthe economic history are indeed ralization very anactive industrial policy. in absence of underliberal trade policies or undertaken as unfeasible if associated activities, which would be considered by them andits doctrines that seek topromote national industry inancient mercantilist policies take support those kindof mobilized by its political andeconomic elites infavor of its economic history, the arguments tionist duringmost of second feature, that is, forBrazilbeing astaunch protec the world’s GDP. of moderate growth Asanexcuse forthe exchanged goods, over the more with the faster increase of its foreign trade went along up to ourdays, asthe of share 1950s the flows, from trade of progression the with pace it could be argued that Brazilhas, at least, kept and services; goods the world’sa little over total interchange of 1%of globalcommerce hassince longstabilized around ratio of protectionist devices. elites tovarious kindsof industrial its of adherence undeniable an in reflected is anindustrialpolicy, which of leadership inthe virtues its political of the other isthe equally constant belief century, since andprobably the 19 last half the flows for trade global the of immutableshare most one is the country’sthroughout the ages: modest and al 1. I comerciais. Industrialização. Mercosul.OMC. síntese dosestudosdisponíveis nessecampodeestudo. cumentais e aliteraturaespecializada, oferecendo uma diferentes fontes do na metodologia, integra o trabalho no futuro imediato.não originalnatemática Embora ou comercial econômicaoudeliberalização uma abertura Concluipelaescassa viabilidade de competição externa. essas indústrias da mesmo Estadoque busca proteger ção excessiva e as dificuldades burocráticas criadas pelo das indústriasbrasileiras, que é aliás devida à tributa decompetitividade falta pela justificadas são que vas, defensi de políticas abertamente gistrado em termos h oet feconomic opening andtradelibe moments of The Brazil that true is it characteristics, first the regards As Trade policy has two constant features in Brazil Palavras-chave ion ntroduct : Protecionismo brasileiro. Políticas : basic
characteristcs th century; century;
------strict protectionist policy, butthiswas onlytoaccom regime (1964-85) adopted aless succeeded the military thisalmostsacredmission. plishment of was seen the as thetoolforaccom main industry and the 20 during mostof Brazilians of ideology tionist lines.development National was theconsensual trade policies industrial and along defensive andprotec thus the much and deliberate choice morediligent of this objective was pursued much moreconscientiously, the 20 of half drove Brazil toward industrialization, at least in the first wereCrises, the main factors that andexternal, internal economic relations. in itsexternal serious disequilibria of correction looking foratemporary stabilization or economic policy seeking an monetary a side effect of dustrialization; those moments, by the way, were almost fewa timesits successfulfor during drive towardin awayprotectionist industrialpolicyonly strong froma prhn h remaigadteesnilntr fthe essential meaning and nature of the true apprehend substitution. import mes of ti the old as in as vibrant again, industrialists emerged the political authorities and the protectionist instinct of the a raiseindomestic costs, the defensive posture of products Brazilian were slashed by competitiveness of the 2000’s, and the external foundered, at the end of “Chinese factor”).as the Assoon WTO negotiations mention the peaks in commodity prices, which was the (not to trade balance surpluses of in the form ble gains the following decade, conforta assured, during most of the real, which ved devaluation from the 1999 deep of deri relief sense of therewas alsoacertain gotiations; multilateral trade ne Round the Doha of conclusion of in,andacommitment to, the cause there was abelief from adoptinganopenprotectionist policy only be me a“customsunion”(thisinpaper, atleast). the 1990s, to be reversedstarted soon afterwards Mercosurbeca of half first the in adopted measures tion reduc policies trade liberalization and tariff years later: defensive afew a structural behavior that arose again on relief lists national (1994). But that was atemporary Tariff, External lower with a average thanthe preceding bymember countries had to be replaced a Common the in Mercosur;underits scheme, national tariffs of process the integration modate the requirements of In recent times, civilBrazilian that governments This isthebasicframeworkThis under which one must During the 2000s, refrained government Brazilian th century. After the Second World War, th century, ------
12 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 Press, 1985. America Latin of bridge history Brazil.In:BETHELL, L. (Ed.). of Leslie. independence The Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821. London: Bloomsbury, 2005; BETHELL, 2 bydertaken the Portuguese Prince, inBrazil, arriving designation). more correct by merchantsother European (slave traders, would be a under concession orbilateraltreaties to be performed allowed flows few very some except Lisbon, through by Portuguese hadtobe carried ships,goods pass and lony, asnottocompete with Portuguese supply). All (and prohibitedeven ports small industries in the co exerted the overmonopoly and ex the court imports was working under the “colonial exclusivity”, in which its foreign trade, forthe whole system ministration of a Napoleonic army. and nobles to scape Portugal’sentire court invasion by the Navy protected transatlantic retreat to Brasilof the pressure fromthe Englishcabinet, after the Royal Treaty,vigation which under had to accept Portugal spot was the 1810Trade departure then. The andNa andindustrial classes would exhibitproprietary since as it explains the protectionist instincts that Brazil’s re 1844, but it is interesting to trail the whole story, did not attain effective befo customs independence State, only in1822.In fact, Brazil which occurred 1808, precedes itsactual existence asanindependent B 2. H thosepolicies. of the detailedhistory macro andsectorial economic policies. Let’s now for go the Brazilian those are the constant features of short, lobbies (frombothindustrialandworkers’ unions). In payments, balance aswell to pressures exerted by internal of the of flows and trends the to linked be can which policies, industrial and trade official the of vior beha the erratic mic junctures it is possibletoobserve econo protectionist. At certain mercantilist and truly rical perspective, are always there, and they are simply trade policies.Brazilian constant features, The in histo Cf. WILCKEN, Patrick, ilan raz To be true, the first act of a commercial nature un nature commercial a of act first the true, be To Before that, Brazil didnothave ad an independent in Brazilasa“customs territory”, of birth The istorical
v. 3.
de tra
development
2 polices Empire adrift: Empire . Cambridge: Cambridge University Cambridge . Cambridge:
of the portuguese court in court the portuguese
Cam ------ues(af otgee afBrazilians)hadtostick Portuguese, half (half rulers thecountry, thenew of proclaimed the independence industries Evenin Brazil. afterhaving to the creation of obstacle first the historians, later to represent, to came temporaries asanexorbitant concession to England;it nufacturing system, the bilateral treaty was seen by con wereto invest preparing their capital in anincipient ma plied up to 1808, and inajuncture when local merchants sing at that time uponother peripheral countries. the unequal treaties Great Britain was impo manner of rights to His Majesty subjects,traterritoriality inthe same investment treaty, givingbesides beingalsoakindof ex (15%) that was (16%), applied to the Portuguese goods tariff lower a even with merchants English benefitted 1810 in the Americas. of bilateral trade agreement The England andRussia, inEurope, andafew other countries “friendly nations”, which at that time comprised only January open to all 1808,was to declare Brazilianports São Paulo: Senac-SP, 2005. no Brasil 3 defensive trade policies ever seen in the world. Based most in1844, Brazil embarked in oneof new tariff a treaties with foreignpowersthe enactment and of naturalresources. of professionsorthe exploitation certain land, exercise of of investments, acquisition as such foreigners, nefiting and economic concessions be trade negotiations of in matters classes throughout the ages ruling Brazilian constant defensive a posture maintained by the ce of the sour factors areprobably Those extraterritoriality). authorities,judiciary lian beingunderaspecial clause of British subjects (who could not be prosecuted by Brazi the the special andtreaty privileges conceded to treasury but for the small fiscal revenues it provided to the State hinderedany intention to industrialize the country, ff ted the humiliation, notexactly because the low tari between 1825and1834. new, albeit similar, bilateral treaties, that were negotiated under extended to those commercial partners gradually the Great Britain, the same concessions in tariffs were as the samefoothold Only toputothercountries on State. new the for financing external of source sole the to itsprovisions20 years,another for was asEngland Cf. ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. oigatrdcdso mercantilist policies ap Coming after decades of At least, after the denunciation of all commercial all At least, afterthedenunciationof badly suppor the First Empire class of ruling The : as relações econômicas internacionais no Império.: asrelações econômicas internacionais 2. ed. 3 Formação dadiplomaciaeconômica ------
13 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 1930 5 html>. Access:May 2,2013. iin n h oto f mot;teGPrtoo of the GDP ratio imports; the control of bitions and licy” at that time consisted only in quantitative prohi and astill fragmented industry.agriculture “Trade po became a Bismarckian state, backward albeit with a very nies was boostedwith the Second WorldWar; Brazil concession. porary wasauthorization required for its exploitation asatem activitiesurban –inpublicutilities, forinstance – State allnaturalresources to the and inmany Union trol of waslation enacted in each sector to giveevery and con build anindustrial,albeitintroverted, New Brazil. legis to that dismantled coffee the old Republicstarted and 1930 the Vargas era, the 15 years after the Revolution of love foreigncapitalists. foreigncapital,butmistrust usually Brazilians financing: foreign as empathy same foreign direct investment, not always with the regarded modest recipient to bea of started the sametime Brazil for the domestic tee “equivalent”.a market reserve 1945 8 neiro: FundaçãoGetúlioVargas, 1968. econômico: domínio 7 neiro: IPEA-INPES, 1975. economiabrasileira,1889-1945. da e crescimento governo 6 severe restriction on buying foreign exchange (dollars) a controlsand pleted as 1947, and, assoon new import tion, astheforeignexchange were quickly reserves de dura short trade liberalization: it was, nevertheless, of thefew instances of allowedwhole period, one of for the for imports as well exertedagainst asthe repression cumulateddities the trade surpluses and during the war, the commo At the sametime, the sustained prices of come taxation, that is, forallpolicy purposes. irrelevant war, receipts wereas were as marginal import direct in the purposes, constrained. At the end of was greatly overallsectorial for macroeconomicor publicplanning, sector in the the external of habit, astheimportance Anyway, defensive trade policies were maintained by foreignexchange did the rest. of intent; the shortage ring the First Republic, Brazil became a protectionist by the 19 reasons, duringmost of exchange. foreign concentrated on coffee) were the sole source of commodities (still afew number of of exports from foreign trade was inasteady decline, and the receipts Cf. ABREU, de Marcelo Paiva. Cf.FILHO, VENÂNCIO Alberto. Cf.Villanova; VILLELA,Annibal SUZIGAN, Wilson. Economic nationalismreceived boostduring adeep fe big poetoit y eest, o fiscal for necessity, by protectionist a being After . RiodeJaneiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1999. 8 o direito público econômico no Brasil. RiodeJa odireitopúblicoeconômicono 7 Ntoaiaino foreigncompa of Nationalization O Brasil e a economiamundial,1930- th century, andalsodu A intervenção doestado no A intervenção 2.ed.RiodeJa Política do 6 At ------ 14 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 Rio deJaneiro: LTC, 2012. doBrasil: externa 10 London: OxfordUniversity Press, 1970. 9 disorganization bybe rendered irrelevant the monetary blic tariffs was replaced in 1934 by a specific tariff, only to protectionist bias. alltariffs, this time with an explicit complete revision of dollars.1957, new tradepolicywas In a enacted, with a exchange of rate policy toaccommodate the penury flexible a with together created, were industrialization for oil,anotherthe energy,bank for andanational sustain the nation’s industrialsector. Astate company the State to promoteand of strong andvisible hand arestrictivethe trade policy and,forother, the very of thus,ratic commodity exports; for oneside, the need uponer depend to had exchange foreign of inflows payments justification: dollars, living under a scarcity of amacroeconomichadbalanceof nature or were of years.lian Stateplanningforthenextforty Brazi industrial policies that wereof tobethe hallmark tradeand of and adoption industrialization of terms yearsin the 1950s the 60s and were also extraordinary warin Korea, that1%. sharehasstabilizedBut around byAfter thehighpeaksincommodity prices brought inEuropeandAsia. was due only to the destructions the total, but this a little more than2% of represented the worldtrade time after the war, its share of a brief Brazil was still a commodity exporter, mainly coffee: for chanismsthe policies industrialsector,promoting and dead at its birth. Trade creating the International (ITO), Organization 1947 and March 1948, approved the Havana Charter Employmentand Conferencethat,between November theU.N.1947, activebecame an of Trade participant ral 3. R since then. exchange and traderegime for almost20years dictory contra to “manage” were implemented; started Brazil Cf. BERGSMAN, Joel. Cf. ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. h dvlrmbsso the Empire andFirst Repu advaloremThe basisof rationale forthe State activismThe in those areas the Gatt- the “founding fathers” of Brazil, one of de tra eform 9 system a diplomacia brasileira nocontexto a diplomaciabrasileira da globalização. and 10 Dsieteaoto fmany me Despite the adoptionof adjustment Brazil: Brazil: industrialization and trade policies.and industrialization Relações internacionais e política Relações internacionais to the multilate ------protection given (and remained tothe “infant industry” was industrializationàlaList, that is, with the required Keynesiannian mainprescription RaúlPrebisch. The the Argenti the famous Eclac, underthe guidance of the United Nations, of Caribbean Latin Americaand for studies and analysismadeatthe EconomicCommission literature about the period take from its main concepts Latin-American list-nationalist context. In fact, most of in adevelopmenta substitution process”, inserted port durable goods. other durable andnon as hundreds, many thousands of ble: allpersonal vehicles hadto be acquired locally, aswell becoming inexpugna law was reinforced to the point of to the Gatt. the Brazilianschedule of ring acomplete renegotiation valorem system, but at amuch higher levels, thus requi ad the reintroduced tariff 1957 the So inflation. running exchange patterns, andthe the world, the break-up of of ment. 6.ed.Lynne Rienner, 2007. 12 Brasilia,2012. sity of Relations, International (Ph.D.)—Institute UniverDissertation of comerciais multilaterais,o Brasile as negociações 1946-1967. 2012. 11 torestore theorder. theArmy querying soon, the middle class was protesting in the streets and crises made the rest: ned, and socialunrest and military investmentsand (1956-1960); economic growth decli Brasilia,by Kubitschek administration to the building of part in due derailed, inflation politicians; many of populist and xenophobic bias with the strengthening of badly, performed in general, administration together data. Not surprisingly, state companies, and the public tension with real world andthe empirical economic Prebisch’s heterodoxy,tenets of albeit with a certain theoretical economics at the faculties followed the main self-sufficiency. world of tradeandpraisedthevirtues fromthe yet in debate). Latin Americadetached itself and employmentgrowth (income distribution was not inflation was a lesser evil, to be tolerated for the sake of manufactured goods; aconstant rise in the price of of commodities, inface the value of of table depreciation exchange, due to the inevi of its terms deterioration of ther Prebisch thesis, would be hindered by the constant this purpose, otherwise the continent, explained ano as suchdecades).for should serve Regional integration Cf. BAER, Werner. Cf. FARIAS, Rogeriode Souza. Current historiography labeled this model asan“im historiography Current nBai,pbi oiisa ela h ecigo public policies as wellIn Brazil, asthe teachingof 11 At the same time, the “national similarity” 12 Import bansbecame the norm. Import The brazilian economy: economy: The brazilian Industriais, economistas e diplomatas growth and develop and growth ------: 15 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 the debt economic default crisis induced by the external in Gatt. upper status to an neverBrazil its graduation accepted to the same sectors in the so called advanced countries, areasevenconcrete in certain superior industrialization tion pathlike of Even Brazil. afterattainingadegree developing countries, speciallya industrializa those on all behavior and the accepted of tinued to be the norm course, protectionism con and foreigninvestments. Of imports discriminationagainst allowing for greater rules different non-reciprocity), through but also of principle Preferences, based on the GSP (Generalized System of the tries: it was by materializednotonly the creation of special and differential treatment for developing coun – Trade and Development – andaddingthe clause of its Part IV in the drafting of taking part Gatt reform, standards appliedtothe already industrializedcountries. could not beevaluateda developing by country the same of Gatt was that the industrializationprogram national payments equilibrium. Another argument in balance of Geneva; complaints in generated theusualexcuse was often multilateral traderules Brazil’s of transgressions the exports. shareof the had greater nufactured goods regime, ma the military foreign trade. At the end of the of the structure mechanisms inorderto transform subsidizationdevices protectiveand with plenty of supply.current by nationalization late 1970s in the domestic 95% of like. Except foroilandcapitalgoods, Brazilachieved ce), energy, telecommunications,the and shipbuilding (not excludingand nuclear a “dissuasive”industry devi power”into a“great Brazil inallareas:aerospace form studies.as by post-graduate intention was totrans The ted by researchtechnological and improvements, aswell sectors. was alsoboos and service Agriculture industry into investments direct foreign of flows strong hinder didnot the military economic nationalism of ched. The works werezilian State, infrastructure laun and huge the Bra advanced of the modernization reforms tary economic and politicalBrazilian life. Fiscal and mone the aspect of every technocratsmists and to reform launched during the Vargas econo era: they engaged the Bismarckian project that was ted a second phaseof The end of the military regime was abbreviatedby the military endof The the wasBrazil onethe most activeof promoters trade fortress, became a At thattime,truly Brazil who tookover generals The the power in1964 star ------tics, etc.); this lastonecouldbeoccasionallyused for communications, transports, oil, shipbuilding,aeronau strategic ghts”, or areas, whichwere many, like steel, the economy (the “commanding hei entire sectors of the GDP,time,literally monopolized and 35% forof for the state companies (which were responsible, atthat the third, and sometimes highly relevant, worked just resources, needed more government itprintedmoney); the financial authoritiesof (that is, whenever the central operated at the discretion budget, was alsoamonetary penditures (the onlyapproved by the Parliament); there ex and receipts of accounting fiscal normal the first, different provisions ineach: three budgets, with aset of vernors. At the level,Union Brazil hadnotonlyone, but the excess expenditures byrencies” to service state go cur adding tothe domestic debt, by creating “virtual the federation; moreover, regional bankswere levels of at all publicbudgets cy, of low disorganization growth, insolven external inflation, high consequences: its and fforeign exchange –the black market worked, some of duced more capital controls, adopted the centralization theeconomy. only by atotalindexationof rency had sixinless – Brazil than 8years – neutralized theflation”, cur that is, the continuous depreciation of “controlled hyperin ced the of curious phenomenon bymoney. paper Few countries in the worldexperien entitlements not properlyfunded by real resources, only public accounts, commanding many new of ganization and anew Constitution (in 1988) added to the disor socialexpenditures tic” pressures materialized inlarger “democra nothing to stabilize Brazil; onthe contrary: 100%). restrictions,the andhightariffs(sometimes more than trade, the quantitative the external of administration was that exchange restrictions dictated the “temporary” the Gatt: answerthe standard of triction toits partners wasBrazil frequently askedforeign trade res toexplain notthe exception. and protectionismbecame the norm, the economy, sector of atevery grew that distortions paymentssurprise, equilibrium; no them, balance of the of industrial andtradepolicies were at the service 1982 – which lasted throughout the 1990s – crisis of lending, attractingforeigninvestments, andsoon). payments (that is, toexternal purposes going balance of ttehih fthe crisis, authorities intro monetary At the height of toacivilian administration,in1985, did return The debt point,specially after theexternal certain At a ------ 16 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 Record, 2011. a luta dopovo em brasileiro defesa da sua moeda. Rio de Janeiro: Brasil. RiodeJaneiro:dou o Record, 2005; LEITÃO, Miriam. R. do.M. ensaios. ous stabilization planssee: FRANCO, Gustavo. 13 thodology, establishing a full free trade zoneandacus me the changed that dispositions with finally, 1990, in rket treaty (1988), due tobecompleted 10 years,in and acommonma sectorial protocols, then by under means of first democratization: the since pursued being 14%. duties toamore“normal” import to bring the averagethree years) started 44% of (scheduled in reform revoked,a tariff and norms of bans were lifted, hundreds ding trade policies: import the military,scratched and completely the correspon the “industrialStalinism” created by were atthe core of – that dized, suchinformatics for asthe market reserve and xenophobic,ms – discriminatory and heavily subsi touchedplan” “Collor thevariousindustrial mechanis launched atthe onset of the radical reform distortions), financial assets (that created many other the freezing of the subsequent civilian Notwithstanding government. by distorted regime that were further from the military economic mechanisms andsectorial devices inherited the old a complete overhaulMello (1990-92) started of de Collor tlements. administrationof modernizing The how or whowould fund the new enti the question of completely disregarding federal transferswere granted, rights foreveryone: health, education, social security, objectives. 1988 Constitution created new, The costly and trade policies were not respondingto any rational the 4. R inbetween).1994 (with andindexed currency real, soonafterwards, only to be superseded by the real in novo two in1991,andcruzeiro again years after, cruzeiro in1986), cruzado the cruzeiro (replacing cies: cruzado a year; inless than sixyears Brazilhadfournew curren two digits amonth, andthree digits over of the barrier went Inflation debt. external of service the on ratorium mo a declared and – rate official the of 60% at times, For a detailed account of hyperinflation in Brazil and the vari the and Brazil in hyperinflation of account detailed a For Bilateral economic integration with Argentina was with Argentina Bilateral economic integration the 1980s, the overstretched industrial By the end of M Rio de Janeiro: Rio Francisco Alves, 1995; PRADO,Clara Maria egional ercosur A real história do Real: A real integration path uma radiografia da moeda que mu que moeda da radiografia uma process O plano real e outros e outros O planoreal and 13 Saga: ------as the various – andthe protocolsthat came together were respected,which was never thecase. only the founding treaty commitments trade policy, if croeconomic and sectorial policies, including the erratic ma amorerational help, indue course, the cause of customs duties). Brazilian Mercosur, in 1995, the that replaced, of Tariff External the Common ty, for instance, besides the completion of the old industrialandtradepolicies (intellectual proper of heart the at also were that fields many in legislation new and openingpolicy spaces for the enactment of to completion, helping also to lock out some reforms beingapplieddomestically.many changes was signed, which contributed totheconsolidationof into the bilateral scheme in 1991, the Mercosur treaty Paraguay Uruguay and of 1995. With the incorporation thattime frame,for promised of in half toms union spectivas. SãoPaulo: LTr, 1998. 14 competition from thirdpartners, external and growing deficits) deepening Argentina, of case the (in surpluses afterwards,zil soon both confrontedto declining trade Bra first, Argentina January1995. in union”, “customs inception almost immediately after becoming an official the Mercosur(1991-1994). policies already inplace during the transitional phase of industries – and made no advancements to the trade old and new in producers inefficient to subsidies costly industrialpolicy – besides eliminating any new kind of foreign investors.and worrying Hebarelyconceived bia that were discouraging the domestic entrepreneurs pure xenopho and naked irrationalities of assemblage the 1988 Constitution, a ugly the economic chapter of Collor; he also undertook the amending difficult task of publicmonopoliesthat were initiated by dismantling of State companies andthe advanced the privatization of since the Vargas economic reform era: FHC process of in two mandates(1995 to 2002), lead the most relevant first as Finance minister (from 1993), after as president, completed, to besure). FernandoHenrique Cardoso, the economy (a task never the commanding heights of the State from the retreat of tion and,mostimportant, economicopening,tradeliberaliza process of ongoing added tothe Mercosurtradestructure building upof Cf. ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. The new WTO agreements – Gatt-1994, as well new WTO agreements The Round come,finally, Uruguay time,the same the At In fact, Mercosur started to derail from its original to derailfrom In fact, Mercosur started 14 Regional integration could Regional integration Mercosul: Mercosul: fundamentos e per ------ 17 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 Available at: ------started to proclaim the new virtues of the old deve theold of the newvirtues to proclaim started condemned as neoliberal,the “progressive” leaders tions duringthe 1990s; the previous years were outright followed Latin American administra by the reforming different path thanthe one to taking a very tries started del Plata, in November 2005, when those three coun at theAmericassummit Mar in clashintervened The ds,pure political(andideological) opposition. butfor implode the American project, not oneconomic groun ther with Chávez’s Venezuela, cooperated actively to that both Kirchner’s and Lula’s Argentina Brazil, toge America. South andNorth between aneconomic integration the idea of abhorred or Mercosureconomies: Lula’s simply government ahypothetical FTAA inBrazil’s sess the realimpact of project”; in fact,technical no studies were madetoas scheme but an “annexation not an integration proposal ment leaded by LuladaSilva, wholabeledthe American pralmeida.org/05DocsPRA/1811BrForPolicyPalgrave2009.pdf> . Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009. p. 167-183. Availableat: challenges les chemins de la puissance. Paris: 2010. L’Harmattan, illusions and and 16 deceptions lost Brazil under Lula Brazil opportunites Relations internation . New York: : ------ 18 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 finally, broughtLulato thepresidency. the presidential campaign that, all this at the height of financing, the of doubling the with year, following the than US$15 – onlytorenew for more billion the move with the IMF,to enter intoanew agreement in2001 – the year.had Brazil presidential turnover atthe end of mic fall, followed by the social unrest and anoverall free econo enterintoa 99 –itwasArgentina time for receivedfinancing the 1998- in of some repay to Brazil balance was restored in early 2000 – allowingexternal flotation system. the exchange policy, to work which started undera of the Real and aneconomic reversal matic devaluation of MinasGeraisin1995, provoked the dra of governor president Itamar Franco (1992-94), dent again turned boss,ments between vice-presi FHC andhisformer creditor countries.afterwards, Soon politicaldisagree rangement with the IMF and other the financial help of 1998, though, could onlybe defused by a stand-by ar July the Russianof moratorium effects of grievous The rise in interest rates. to an extraordinary by resorting Pacific. Brazil managed to contain the capital flight, only Asia of othercountry -economic crises almostevery in Kong in Hong ge (October), followed by the political insolvency (June 1997), then the stock exchange plun first with the Asian exchange crises started byThailand’s someworld months that later: occurred financial storm a for mark (December Mexico 1994) set the departure devaluation in currency crisis iniciated by the frustrated financial The 2002). (until mandates presidential two as Finance minister Cardoso (1993-94) and duringhis behavior, under economic normal finally, more ched, a chaos– introduced bypresidency, the Collor rea Brazil cy regimeestablishedby the1991Cavallo plan. fixedthe curren of ending catastrophic the of turmoil the in still Argentina and 1990s, the of crises financial the having stabilized soon after the turbulent times of the two countries, Brazil contrasted situation of very this difference sons for were notideological,butthe followed by Lula andhiseconomic advisers. rea The itinerary thaninthe Brazilian Argentina, in the case of activities. True, the reversionwas much moredramatic strategic economic nationalism and State control of of to the old times return regressiveses very in their naïf The main political effect of all those financial crises financial those all of effect political main The after the expected at the corner: But, new surprises –andsome political After the economic reforms ------three times previously, Lulachoose to be much more like America, andhisown unsuccessful electoral failures croeconomic andsectorialpolicies. overalladopted an “neoliberal” approach to otherma to payin the budget, for the public debt interests), and surplus tiated with the IMF (for instance, the primary authorities reinforced the economic mechanisms nego the previous years. the new economic Better: nment of technocratsthe social-democrat from goverpreserved announced optimistically,even nothing,and hechanged “changing it all”, ashiscampaignhad Indeed, instead of “neoliberal” policies implemented by his predecessor. conclusion that he had to stick pragmatically to the same attempts to become president, he assumed the practical ty. Having alreadybeendefeated in the previous three his own par receipts prescribed by the “economists” of ce Lula thathecouldnotpossiblyapplythe economic in economic and changes policy in Brazilwas to convin nfc f naraylwpteno domestic savings, of analready low pattern in face of crowding-out more levels), inflation and growth mic public expenditures (above and beyond econo rise of andeconomic policies were: the monetary pansionary crats), andsoon. the techno of social correctness through the alleged above (that is, notby employment and the markets, but entitlements for the people,poor redistribution from wages, dispensations forthe workers generous and of the Left: indexation beliefs of well as some permanent the State guiding the markets, as of in thevisiblehand publiccompanies, the belief penditures, the creation of admired by State ex the leftist economists): growing them wereso secretly no regime(some of the military not animpediment to renew with some bad habitsof applyingpractical economics. was This wayrational of his own party’s “economists” guidance,choose and the and open hostility towards foreign investments. landtenures, large pitalists oroutright expropriation of workers andsmallpeasants, economic pressure over ca to benefits large policies, sectorial and macroeconomic prone inflation command, State nationalization, receipts: into apolitical andeconomic disaster, due to hissocialist – than Salvador Allende, the men who launched Chile andunemploymenteconomic growth reduction inSpain Felipe Gonzalez –who presided over than adecade of In short, “thanks” for the many disasters in Latin “thanks” forthe many disasters inLatin In short, osmigu,terslso Lula’sTo moderate ex summingup, the results of alittle that, Luladisregarded from Having learned ------ 19 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 administration, Lula’s for years were alostopportunity adjustments made in the domestic policies by Cardoso’s and development, climate forgrowth and the external “deindustrialization”. Despite the favorable specter of to theprecocious companies and Brazilian veness of (even external domestic) competiti the worsening of factors that led to combination of joined in aperverse like the Parliament, no to mention public education), public institutions, economic policies (and even of ty of the quali with the erosion of taxation system), together (specially in the realeconomic reforms the absence of employment. But domestic – andexpanded levels of vulnerability – by foreignreserves accumulating huge gadgets. pieces, allkindsof them, electronics, textiles shoes,and apparel, and parts and manufactures from China,plenty of lian exports), Brazi 6, thattotaled (and just Brazil 95% 5 or of from earlier, that is,ties lonial from acentury commodities co former and Brazilwere of the perfect reproduction China between flows the “Americanempire”, the with relationship trade diversified more much the against supposedly prevailing inthe bilateral trade with the U.S.: waszil, but a new dependence created, worse thanthat became, as a consequence, the first trade Bra partner of (whatever itmeant). trade geography” In 2009, China creating a “new world from the United States”, and of [sic] “reducing the commercial dependence objective of proclaimedthe apoliticalchoice: Lula himself basis of in emerging countries, but as andecision taken on the new opportunities acareful study of the outcome of diversifying markets, not exactly as took the task of electoral device.portant BolsaFamilia, which isanim channeled by means of poverty, only consumption subsidies to the poor of infact, there was no elimination ments andreform; workers andentrepreneurs, than inexpanded invest wage albeit much more based on the over taxation of redistributive,total credit). Social policies were truly the public bankingequivalent to 40%of a share of by characterized market financial a (with credit tion consump mand, alsostimulated by the expansionof which de Brazilhasplenty of), andby internal (of forcommoditiesnal demand, mainly by Chinahunger ging market economy). Growth was pushedby exter more regulations (much morethan needed foraemer an expanded bureaucracy, more public servants, and In the end, Brazil reduced its historical external reduced In the end, Brazil its historical external tradepolicy, Lula’s of under government terms In ------property law granting patenting for previously exclu law granting property versedthe intellectual short), (albeit they were curtailed behave at least cautiously: privatizations were not re predecessor, – Lula telling abouthis“damnedlegacy” crisis for whichand creating the very heaccused his state.Brazilian – everything to change After promising the of revolution heart conceptual lead a the very in mic regime in place for manydecades before Cardoso the econo tothe worstoperated afullreturn aspects of talist economic policies, Lula’s two did not governments typical Keynesian-like, Latin Americandevelopmen of into 6. W globalization. to tackle thechallengesof economy Brazilian andforthe strengthening of reform generally respected the autonomygenerally – which does not exchange rates; it also or anextensive manipulation of many decades practice controls infor before the1990s, substitutionera, theextensive capital and port currency the im such asthe primitive protectionist devices of thateconomic Left, rendered tothe worst instincts of siderations. much“strategic partners”, morethaninpragmaticcon sed on ideological sympathies towards narrowly defined byalternativean foreigners;and foreigntradepolicyba land acquisition many sectors; a tentative limitation of foreign investmentsto barriers in legal of preservation productive localcontent in highlinkages branches; of overpricebureaucratic buying national; requirements for “national similaritylaw”, including allowinga 25% for informal procurement, an based on ces in government selective preferen new ones; a set of the creation of preeminence given,to theState companies, again, and companies; national for market reserve some type of the “economic Left”: the reintroduction of sessions of the traditional ob strengthen to accomplish or some of new clothes. was neoliberalism pursued,under eliminated; in short, foreigncompanies were the discriminationagainst of which most constitutional amendments by means of ded sectors was notabolished,neither were themany It is true that, despite the formal adherence to a set that, despite the formal It is true It is true, too,It is true, that Lula’s administration didnotsur new devices oldand were introduced But plenty of protectionsm hat went wrong ? B il raz des retroce ------ 20 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 cialist” travails onthe way in, andinthe manner of, and aside more concrete national economic interests. political objectivesplemented with grand inview, beyond commendable states, such asIran) were devised andim (Russia andChina,mainly, but alsowith some least re “Bolivarian states”, forinstance) andinother continents inthe regional scenario (with the “strategic partners” Special preferences giveneconomic integration. to some sive” fellow presidents, isanything but conducive to real Lula’s “progres practices, inimplementation by many of nationalism, the state dirigisme and associated populist the region. By any means, the retrocession to economic economic space in integrated creating atruly instead of ced rates fromBNDES, the national development bank), markets official(with financingplenty comingof at redu to big Brazilian companies in neighboring opportunities its priorities, was devised mainly to open new ther of economiccontent. true voiding its in apolitical forum, has been transformed tly conceived with this objective inmind,butsince Lula process.globalization Mercosur, originally, was explici economy the Brazilian in the morevigorously insert to market, than asafull scope strategy se the internal employmentand to stimulate and increa opportunities ceived much more asameansto create new domestic hisconstant appeals, was con ment, which was oneof which always analmostemptyslogan. represented development “policyspaces for policies”, of mantra new areas, the old kept repeating asLulagovernment concessions,enthusiasm to make greater including in butthere wasUnion; alliance with European great no which it sought a Mercosurtrade in the framework of multilateral trade negotiations, theRound Doha of of its priorities inforeign policy was the conclusion one of by the Left only because preferred tionism normally be clearly stated that it refrained from explicit protec partners. Itmust limited numberments with avery of Mercosurpreferential arrange a few totally irrelevant besides agreements, commercial significant achieve to realnegotiations start or tradeliberalization to further conversely, tomake advances ineconomicopening, other exchangeand mechanisms. But it didnothing, interest rates of the Central Bankinthe management committee of the monetary – of meant independence letntrsrigt h os xmlso “so to the worstAlbeit not resorting examples of Even the political offensive inSouth America, ano foreigndirect invest Incidentally, the attraction of ------prescribed macroeconomic or sectorial policies in subs sectorial policiesin prescribed macroeconomicor people than the poor receipts treatment a fair for of their first working summit, dispensed much more social both countries, before being approved by presidents in almost secretivelynegotiated by radical Keynesians of a so-called “Buenos AiresConsensus”: the document, in LatinAmericancountries in ten big principles–by adjustment and sensus – apracticalguide for reform the well-knowan attempt to replace Washington Con was presidents both by move first The times. liberal” “neo the same Menem of Lula inhiscampaignagainst ving already thebenefitted full of political support from 2003, ha his presidency,chnerstarted the middleof in 70s. wereafterwards unleashedsoon They Nestor Kir the 1960s and protectionist policies of of and lization substitution industria import wards the high times of whichpractice,implied, in backwards manysteps to economic features anyway to adopt acomplete set of Bolivariancountries, one country, decided Argentina, model on the trade front only after Dilma Rousseff model on the trade front only after Dilma Rousseff Brazildidn’tconcerned; go, orisnot (yet?) there. regimes are andcurrency the 1930s’, as farmonetary trade andinvestmentas regards policies, andperhaps to sense, was taken Argentina a certain back to the 1960s’, companies andindividuals. In sion onprivate activities of intru government the two presidents exertedalltypes of economic pressure over noncomplying media vehicles, foreign owned companies and to the renationalization of commodities – grains, meat and other primary of exports nal economy: fromabusive natio sector of measures inevery interventionist of array increased the gradually from the IMF –their governments alert official an prompted finally which – days our to up 2007 from indicators inflation manipulating with starting macroeconomic andsectorial policies: of cades, interms tor) to Kirchner went (Cristina), Argentina back many de than inLula’s Brazil.It’s afact that, fromKirchner (Nes applied in Kirchner’s inamore consistent way Argentina overall dirigiste approach to economic policy, which was ment was conceived offered, nevertheless, abasisforan themarket economy. to thehardrealitiesof alternative an for search bizarre a gratified indifference was the sole response: only South America, frustration Consensus tobewillingly adopted by othercountries in they expected the new John Williamsonsynthesis. If theoriginal titution to themarket recommendations of Brazil started to adoptavaguelystarted Brazil similar economic framework conceptual The under which the docu retenciones –that is, alevy on ------ 21 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 sistent with Mercosur but rules, the decision had already been taken, consideringthatitsintroduction was by incon Argentina, suggested compensation affairs –was opposedtothe mechanismgration of in inte inItamaraty – that is, engaged its diplomatic corps staff Argentina’sby proposal the technical the government, Brazilian of 17 restrictions imposedby Argentina. the unilateral legalizing justment, with theobjective of Competitive Ad be designed asMAC, Mechanism of appropriate,the more butonly bilaterally–asystem to Mercosur, which would be – notinthe framework of compensating devices, the two countries implemented those and after some squabble over the modalities of cial imbalances. Sometime between2005, 2004 and finan and commercial bilateral the of mechanism tive establish somecorrec to agreed Argentina and Brazil mechanisms;ve then, other correction limitationsand exchange devaluation, quantitati pensations in case of zil astrictly balanced bilateraltrade, allowing for com even fromitsMercosurpartners. trade, that is,impose restrictions onexternal imports, exchange and regimes,its monetary in change to started mal economic the life and radical after the moratorium toresume nor 2001-2002 crisis. struggling Argentina, afterthe breathing spacetoreindustrializethecountry a diplomacy”, giving “generosity Argentina some kind of balance inthe bilateral balance, and could, thus, display argument wasshowed that Brazil consistent a surplus protectionism in practice: the only ted with Argentinean –Lulaadopted a passivegeneral posture when confron in the white line, and light industry domestic utilities of industrialists Brazilian – specially those of were hurting administered by theWTO. the multilateral trade system in the manner context of Mercosur, anddiscriminatory but as well in anillegal a word, was acting Argentina not within only arbitrarily the Gatt system; in the safeguards protocol of tions of disposi place since 1995 the – but also opposingvery among the four member countries, that should be in – whichcommanded, inprinciple, afreetradezone Mercosur tradeagreements the letter and the spirit of particular. was contradicting not only In fact, Argentina in exports to counter Brazilian and general, in imports erected against ting protectionist devices that Argentina time, Lula was distor highly tolerant towards the truly 2011. in But, the mean in became president, starting I srlvn ocaiyta,a h nta tgso the evaluation Itisrelevant of toclarifythat, at the initialstages First, Kirchner tried to impose to Bra government Indifferent to the fact that those abusive restrictions 17 ------abusive trade restrictions taken unilaterally by Argen U.S., notcountingtheEuropeanUnionasabloc). the and (after China importance in major the third na, Brazil’s to Argenti exports actual absolute decrease of to multiply traderestrictions,started which resulted in its government cumulating inArgentina, distortions ge Worse,growth). inflation andwith exchanthe growing volumein value and (but always below theoveralltrade trade distribution,evenBrazilian progressive witha rise geographical the in 10% below remained flows gional foreign tradebeforethe1999 exchange crisis, intra-re its global almost16% of fromahighrateof Brazil: of exchanges the total external in Mercosur of the share those restrictions was the relative decrease of result of a negative renewing with economic growth, Argentina after countries two the between flows investment and increase in commercial bilateral tradeandthe normal politically, inthePresidency, scheme. thisbizarre toaccept ches, invariably the government invoked some reason after complaints by from exposed bran entrepreneurs ting manufactures used scenario: according to a very industrialcompe of imports riers were erected against gulated by Trims andotherWTOagreements. area, which included many restrictive requirements re terwards, a policy to stimulate investments in the same af defined, it again, measures); investment of aspects on Trimstent with the WTO agreement (Trade related 60% local content, a decision which is clearly inconsis not complying with a obviously abusive requirement of vehicles in 2011, an extra-taxonimported sed, starting Lula’s Workers’ impo government Party 1980. in The tral unionsthat were to be a basisforthe creation of the workers cen metallurgical trade unions andof of near SãoPaulo, whose industrial suburbsarethe core those industries are located also,it istrue, thatmost of marks; AmericanandEuropean mainly composed of ted from Asia,which the old localplants, were hurting sustain the competition cheaperfrom vehicles impor conceived, at first, to help the local automotive industry were the 1960s’ and 70s’. They with old practices of to implement its own trade restrictions, also renewing choosepost-crisis to a scenario. However,itself Brazil its adjustments point, asunintended consequences of tina, which couldbeconsidered, a neutralstand from u hs eecnrt aiettoso the But those were concrete manifestations of In the end, even allowing for the resumption of ttegnrllvlo tradepolicy, manynewbar levelAt the general of ------ 22 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 Política externa 18 almostevery the from standpointof person a trustful as and negotiator fine a as credentials his established Brazil,having as such and the foreigntrade policy of the most person aboutthe knowledgeable Doha Round Foreign Affairs,Azevedo Ambassador was oneof of inthe ministry Brazilian ponsible fortrade negotiations res official the as that, before and, years, previous five ving been representativethe Brazilian in Geneva forthe the multilateral trade? Ha as well as forthe future of as theBrazil, WTOmeansfor organization important what hissuccess in being chosen to lead to an discern Round. Uruguay atthe end of the case whenWTOemerged, was it than goods of flows world the in participation dia, Indonesia,andmanyothers –have today a larger in the world, with Brazil, Russia,exporter together In and importer among them – suchthe asChina, greatest trade players the biggest countries,loping some of and the worldtrade. But it isalsoafact that deve share of their whose relative numberthe inverse isprobably of trade partners, scant votes,or support, fromthe biggest developingthat hereceived membercountries and less he received hismanyvotes majority of from the large ber countries. issimple a fact, being alsofacts that This mem vastto a continent and visits in every number of WTO, after a tiresome campaign that led him to pay the Azevedo, as the new Director General of started or 7. W trade negotiations. perspectivefinishing theof Doha multilateral Round of any abandoned government could be saidthatBrazilian protectionist devices, it the extension and variety of In practice, takingintoaccount principle, temporary). exceptioncluded in anational list (which shouldbe, in in –theproductsare Tariff External the Common in duties higher instance, for – level Mercosur at fixes of rises (but also antidumping). In the absence tariff of adopt defensive measures, expressed in terms generally highsocial impact – that is, unemployment – to of Cf. RICUPERO, Rubens. mudança A maior dapolítica externa. The big question arisingfromthose simple facts is The diplomat,Roberto 2013, a Brazilian In September an hat opening lies , v. 21,n.3,p. 95-100,jan./mar. 2013. ahead to 18 globalization : a fortress B ? il raz ------to, abasiccommodity exporter, which it was untilthe preceding sections, returned became a, or thatBrazil ministries: FinanceandForeign Trade. people working atthe two economic most important trade policy, having being sideline from the center by of the decision making process in terms of the fulcrum that one have to recognize that Itamaraty was nomore economic affairsinthe Itamaraty.fact isanother There the multilateral the case even when he was of incharge rectives were taken atahigherdecision level thanwas he was receiving fromBrasilia;those di instructions that hewasthe policymakers notamong the behind days.2009 toour from isafact, being alsoafact This the Round,Doha phase of during the Brazil agonizing and technical competence as afrontlinefor operator countries, thatdeniedhimtheirfinal votes. the WTO members, including the advanced one of ca brasileira. ca brasileira. 38., May 23-25, 2003, Baltimore, Maryland. Historiografia econômi & BUSINESS OF THE ECONOMIC HISTORICALSOCIETY, synthesis.saybibliographical on In:ANNUAL CONFERENCE see ALMEIDA, Paulo an es economic R. historiography: Brazilian economists, industrialists and decision makers in Brazil,since long; tectionism were always praised andmuch appreciated among andby 19 lescu. Friedrich List Manoi and Mihail in the direction of were being tilted not towardsrulers AdamSmith, but the new had toadmitthat ideological preferences of amoresophisticated species. But they moderate and of kind, that palian is, Prebischian Keynesianism, albeit the classical Ce tion fordevelopmentalist policies of diplomats alsoshareadistinct apprecia the contrary: thinking amongthe mercantilists; classicalliberal to of theoldstyleattwo otherministries. Keynesians of developmentalist little froman lines arising bunch of guide policies designed at Itamaraty, but a new set of newed impulse. arenotthe multilateral trading Those since abandoned the 1990s, with a re are back again, and measures which could be supposed to have being ore.tural products and iron It is also clear that, policies agricul main six or five of dependent heavily became the middle 20 zation drive of commodities centuries,for primary untilthe industriali 1960s: muchlike few a concentration in itstraditional ohwl-nw doouso temngdtaeado pro of tradeand the managed Both well-known ideologues of It isclear,the been saidin what alreadyhas from No one, however, would deny his personal capacity Not that Itamaraty could be considered as abeacon 19 I hr,wt h rsso 2008-2009, and the with the crisis of In short, Revista de Economia e Relações Internacionais, Revista th century, its trade balance v. 11, n. 21, ------ 23 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 22, 2013. DO, Roberto. Onovodo livre guardião mercado. Azevedo clearly his free trade credentials; Cf. stated very AZEVE 20 p. 5-21,jul.2012. of double the average, the (in inflation high and rates state, characterizeda quasi-stationary by low growth economyBrazilian persists standstill in and enduresa deficits.growing accounts transaction in reflected be to position,which is surely its external ve deterioration of continue to assist, in the foreseeable future, a progressi the WTOmanagement. to hisdiplomatic career,two after one or mandates in relatively return who willprobably Ambassador junior the fact that heisalsoa as the General Directoragainst dly, neutrality and hehastobalancehisindependence the WTO. Secon RoundUruguay andthe creation of (Trims)agreement by accepted the outcome in of Brazil in the last two years seems to violate the investment the defensive measures adopted local content. Many of with connection in conceded facilities fiscal or devices foreignsuppliers,discriminating against either by tariff biased towardslocal companies, providers,national or trade andindustrialpolicy which areunquestionably of measures – against China forthe moment, of ception, Brazil–U.S., of and Japan,EU partners with the ex trading already made complaints by the most important begin with, hewill havetackle and toput inthe agenda WTO? the new Director Generalof re behaviorof nancial tsunami”. “fi and protectionism of EU U.S.and both accuse to loyal war, trade, State subsidies or currency preferring dis administration never blamed China forany kind of its political coherence, LulaandDilma Forthe sake of chairin theSecurity UN Council. quest a permanent for Brazilian the Asian giantforthe eternal of full support the including 2009), in partner trading first its become a reciprocally(havingbeneficial with Brazil relationship whichtnership” with China, was supposedtoestablish clearly its preference for a“strategic par declared very at the same time that Lula’swas construed government commodity specialization (or renewed) condition of the ironies: the new not the exception. of Irony norm, payments, protectionism became the Brazil’s balanceof Round, with the vanishing in together trade surpluses the Doha asuccessful conclusion of dim prospects of In an interview he gave shortly after beingelected, Ambassador he gave shortly interview an In It is also almost an established will almost an fact It isalso that Brazil Having those facts into account, what could befutu Veja , n.2322, May 20 To To ------t ic-elapoc oscoilrfrs aeo its piece-meal approach madeof to sectorialreforms, the continuation and government of Rousseff’s Dilma the protectionist instincts of tion isastrengthening of situa the current basis, the outcome most probable of vels and give a new impetus to its weakening industrial some time tobeeffective –toimprove productivity le – which inanycase would reforms require at structural acrisis. of be alreadytaken theformat might deficit transaction current looming the reserves, agribusiness, and the relatively foreign currency huge it wasits notfor high competitive tected markets. If and over its cartelized pro other negative features of cessive andmany State infrastructure, regulation, poor hightaxation,bureaucratic entanglements, ex made of the most of difficult business environment in the world, one suffer from itsentrepreneurs market, most of and lose competitiveness, as well abroad the internal asin its exporters other emerging countries); furthermore, ses, and that the Pacific coast neighbors – namely Chile, cri serious domestic and external are onthe verge of and Venezuela that Argentina context. But it is also true can strengthen the economic ties in the South American Mercosurandit of has to abide tosome existing rules commercial fortress, anational asBrazil the erection of a new economic crisis). It is also unlikely tribulations of the fall in a leaders(or itscurrent of economic ideology from the a radical departure nomic opening, least of decisivea towards road new eco a and globalization economicills.from thecurrent even or moderate alleviation that is showing uncertain to guaranteemarket economies. access at targeted But pacts trade significant of negotiation the and market, protection, more introversionporary” towards internal “tem problems; they ral willcontinue, then, to suggest and some official credits will not solve Brazilian structu devaluation that limited tax reduction, modest currency industrialists havesuccessful. The also alreadyperceived ve “champions”at world level have already proved un prospecti vertical stimulus to aselected chosen few of tion enhancement for the industry, and the initiatives at innova of program horizontal anyhuge of adoption worsening fiscal situation will probably not facilitate the all financialfor of borrowingalmost inhalf Brazil).The responsible are today (which banks official the by cing with credit largesse by the BNDES and extended finan tax reductions, andtemporary together limited, partial In the absence of a courageous serious attempt and acourageous In the absence of It seems improbable,should take then, that Brazil ------ 24 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 ALMEIDA, Pauloeconomic historio R.Brazilian espacodasophia.com.br/revista/>. p. 143-170, oct./dec. 2011. Available at: O Brasil e aeconomiamundial, Espaço daSophia , v. 5, n. 44, ------tan, 2010. v. 1,p. 249-259. Available at: v. 3. v. v. ------. , 25 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 LEITÃO, Miriam. Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1995. FRANCO, Gustavo. Brasilia,2012. nal Relations, University of Internatio (Ph.D.)—Institute1967. 2012.Dissertation of tas FARIAS, Rogerio deSouza. hier/2003papers/ 2003list.html>.Access:May 2,2013. (available at: 26 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 1, 2013 p. 11-26 Para publicar na Revista de Direito Internacional, acesse o endereço eletrônico www.rdi.uniceub.br ou www.brazilianjournal.org. Observe as normas de publicação, para facilitar e agilizar o trabalho de edição.