Islam and Democratic Federalism in Nigeria
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AAFFRRIICCAA NNOOTTEESS Number 8 March 2002 Islam and Democratic The most recent census in Nigeria (1991) did not ask religious identities. The common wisdom—based on Federalism in Nigeria previous census data—is that the population of about John Paden 120 million is approximately 50 percent Muslim, 40 percent Christian, and 10 percent explicitly “tradi- The Nigerian return to democratic federalism in 1999, tional,” making Nigeria one of the larger Muslim popu- after 15 years of centralized military rule, has raised lation states in the world. Whether the next census, questions about how to decentralize without provoking scheduled for 2002, in preparation for the 2003 elec- sentiments for partition. In addition, the 1999 presiden- tions, will ask religious identity is not clear. However, tial election witnessed a voluntary “power shift” from there is a fairly even balance across Nigeria’s 36 states: the northern region to the southwest, and in both major 13 are predominantly Muslim (especially in the north); parties—the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the 13 are predominantly Christian (especially in the mid- Alliance for Democracy/All Peoples Party dle belt and southeast); and 10 are mixed (in the middle (AD/APP)—the presidential candidates were from the belt and southwest).2 A more political way of charac- “Christian” southwest and the vice presidential candi- terizing patterns of Muslim demographics is to recog- dates from the “Muslim” north. This paper examines nize that the 19 northern states are predominantly Mus- how regional and ethno-religious factors have emerged lim and the 17 southern states are predominantly Chris- since the transition to civilian rule in 1999. The most tian. The emergence of six geocultural zones as a obvious issues are the revival of Shari’a law in the means of political clustering emerged in the 1990s, as criminal domain in the far northern states, the subse- the number of states increased to 30 in 1991 and then quent patterns of ethno-religious conflict (especially in to 36 in 1996.3 The new capital at Abuja is meant to be the large northern urban centers), the impact of the a crossroads of such cultural, religious, and demo- events of September 11on elite and grassroots popula- graphic patterns, as well as a true “Federal Capital Ter- tions, and the challenge of insulating democratic proc- esses from religious polarization. The global context too has changed. In October 2001 at 2. The 36 states, with estimated religious identity patterns, are the Muslim foreign ministers meeting in Qatar, the 56 as follows: 1) predominantly Christian: Abia, Akwa Ibom, members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Anambra, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, (OIC) agreed to condemn terrorism and ignore the Enugu, Imo, Ondo, Rivers; 2) predominantly Muslim: Taliban’s call for jihad against Christians and Jews. Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Yet, OIC national leaders also must deal with public Kebi, Nasarawa, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, Zamfara; 3) mixed: Be- opinion in their own countries, and the question of ex- nue, Kaduna, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, ternal influences is never far from the surface. As a Taraba. large and complex “religiously mixed” country in the 3. The six zones include: 1) northwest (Kano, Sokoto, Kaduna, midst of a political transition, Nigeria is a special chal- Katsina, Jigawa, Kebbi, Zamfara); 2) northeast (Bauchi, Borno, 1 lenge. Adamawa, Taraba, Yobe, Gombe); 3) Middle Belt (lower north): (Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa and FCT); 4) southwest (Lagos, Ondo, Oyo, Ogun, Osun, Ekiti); 5) 1. See, “Rising Muslim Power in Africa Causes Unrest in Nige- southeast (Enugu, Anambra, Imo, Abia, Ebonyi); and 6) ria and Elsewhere,” New York Times, November 1, 2001, sec. south-south (Rivers, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Edo, Cross River, A, p. 12. Bayelsa). Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 2 ritory,” in terms of equal political access, intentionally Trend Lines of Muslim Identities situated in the middle of the country. The three predominantly Muslim areas of Nigeria are Since January 2000, the 12 far northern states have in- the nineteenth century Sokoto caliphal “emirate states” troduced Shari’a law.4 Clashes in Kaduna state be- in the northwest, the historic Borno state in the north- tween Muslims and Christians in February 2000 re- east, and certain parts of Yorubaland in the southwest. sulted in about 2,000 dead. This was followed by back- At present, at least seven cross-cutting tendencies lash violence in the far north (e.g., Sokoto) against within the Muslim community are identifiable: 1) emir- southern Christians and backlash violence in the south- ate authorities and traditional nonsectarian mainstream east (e.g., Aba) and southwest (e.g., Lagos and Ibadan), Muslim groups; 2) sufi brotherhoods, especially the followed by about 2,000 more deaths in Kaduna in Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya; 3) anti-innovation legalists, May. In late 2001, ethno-religious riots emerged in Jos especially the Izala; 4) intellectual reformers; 5) anti- and Kano, with hundreds killed. Official commissions establishment syncretists, especially remnants of the of inquiry reports will be forthcoming, but an obvious Maitatsine movement; 6) antiestablishment “Muslim preliminary question is whether such violence is ethnic, Brothers” (Ikhwan), sometimes labeled as “Shi’ites;” ethno-religious, more explicitly “religious,” political, and 7) unemployed urban youth and Qur’anic student or some other pattern based on socioeconomic status movements, formed around local schools and teachers. and competition. An overarching question is whether such violence and tension may destabilize Nigeria as a Traditional Ethno-religious Affiliation whole, as it prepares for local, state, and national elec- tions in 2003. The emirate states share the legacy of having been part of the Sokoto caliphal experience in the nineteenth In any discussion of politics, religion, or violence in century. Within the “northern region” of the twentieth Nigeria, distinguishing those patterns that are predomi- century, they stretch from Sokoto in the west to nantly “elite” and those that are “grassroots” is impor- Adamawa in the east and to Ilorin and Niger in the tant. At the elite level there has been a long pattern of south. By definition they are predominantly Muslim in Muslim-Christian interfaith cooperation (during both their traditional political structure. In the twentieth cen- civilian and military periods), while at the grassroots tury they have evolved into distinctive “emirates” (i.e., level, there have been sporadic instances of both in- with an emir, or equivalent, as symbolic head of the trafaith and interfaith conflict. Especially in the Muslim unit). Although Hausa tends to predominate as the lin- states there have been significant confrontations be- gua franca, the emirate states are a multilingual cluster, tween antiestablishment groups and northern Muslim including Fulfulde, Yoruba, Nupe, and several minor- elites, which in turn, are causing these elites to recon- ity languages. Often there are traditional rivalries sider how to strengthen their own politico-religious among these states (e.g., Kano and Sokoto split into credentials. Significantly, with the return to civilian civil war in the 1890s), and this cluster has not always rule in 1999, the impetus for the establishment of acted as a unified block. Yet, within this zone, the Sul- Shari’a law has emerged largely from grassroots pres- tan of Sokoto has special salience in spiritual matters, sures rather than from the elites. To understand these and the Emir of Kano has a special place because of patterns more fully, this essay will look at 1) trend lines the socioeconomic importance of Kano emirate. of Muslim religious and ethno-religious identities; 2) Muslim leadership and ecumenical movements; 3) the Borno (and environs) in the northeastern corner of Ni- interplay of religion and politics in Nigeria; and 4) the geria is the oldest continuous Islamic community in extent of external influences and links. sub-Saharan Africa, dating from the eleventh century, and is similar in structure to the emirate states, but with a “Shehu” as chief religious-political leader. In the nineteenth century, when Sokoto tried to conquer Borno, there was a standoff, and “resistance to Sokoto” 4. The 12 states with Shari’a law, as of December 2001, are: became part of Borno’s historical legacy. The outgroup Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Niger, Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Ji- identity designation for people from Borno is “Beri- gawa, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe, and Borno. Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 3 beri.” The dominant language group in Borno is In turn, the Qadiriyya also experienced a “reformed” Kanuri, although, like Sokoto, Borno is a multilingual development, associated with Shaykh Nasiru Kabara of cluster (increasingly with Hausa as a lingua franca). Kano. Students from throughout Nigeria would come to Kano to study in his schools and libraries. With the There has been an indigenous pattern of Islamic culture death of Nasiru Kabara in the fall of 1996, the mantle in Yorubaland throughout the nineteenth and of leadership fell to his son, who maintains the 20twentieth centuries, especially in the areas that be- mosque/school across from the emir’s palace in the came Oyo, Ogun, and Lagos states. Major urban bases center of the old city. for Yoruba Muslim populations include Lagos and Ibadan. In addition, Ilorin city (and emirate) in Kwara Anti-Innovation Legalists state is a historic component of the Sokoto caliphal system. Ilorin, as a Yoruba society, but with predomi- The anti-innovation legalists are associated with the nant patterns of Yoruba and Hausa bilingualism and leadership of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, an outstanding with mixed Yoruba/Fulani/Hausa leadership patterns, Arabist and legal scholar from Gumi village in Sokoto.