AAFFRRIICCAA NNOOTTEESS Number 8 March 2002

Islam and Democratic The most recent census in Nigeria (1991) did not ask religious identities. The common wisdom—based on Federalism in Nigeria previous census data—is that the population of about John Paden 120 million is approximately 50 percent Muslim, 40 percent Christian, and 10 percent explicitly “tradi- The Nigerian return to democratic federalism in 1999, tional,” making Nigeria one of the larger Muslim popu- after 15 years of centralized military rule, has raised lation states in the world. Whether the next census, questions about how to decentralize without provoking scheduled for 2002, in preparation for the 2003 elec- sentiments for partition. In addition, the 1999 presiden- tions, will ask religious identity is not clear. However, tial election witnessed a voluntary “power shift” from there is a fairly even balance across Nigeria’s 36 states: the northern region to the southwest, and in both major 13 are predominantly Muslim (especially in the north); parties—the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the 13 are predominantly Christian (especially in the mid- Alliance for Democracy/All Peoples Party dle belt and southeast); and 10 are mixed (in the middle (AD/APP)—the presidential candidates were from the belt and southwest).2 A more political way of charac- “Christian” southwest and the vice presidential candi- terizing patterns of Muslim demographics is to recog- dates from the “Muslim” north. This paper examines nize that the 19 northern states are predominantly Mus- how regional and ethno-religious factors have emerged lim and the 17 southern states are predominantly Chris- since the transition to civilian rule in 1999. The most tian. The emergence of six geocultural zones as a obvious issues are the revival of Shari’a law in the means of political clustering emerged in the 1990s, as criminal domain in the far northern states, the subse- the number of states increased to 30 in 1991 and then quent patterns of ethno-religious conflict (especially in to 36 in 1996.3 The new capital at Abuja is meant to be the large northern urban centers), the impact of the a crossroads of such cultural, religious, and demo- events of September 11on elite and grassroots popula- graphic patterns, as well as a true “Federal Capital Ter- tions, and the challenge of insulating democratic proc- esses from religious polarization.

The global context too has changed. In October 2001 at 2. The 36 states, with estimated religious identity patterns, are the Muslim foreign ministers meeting in Qatar, the 56 as follows: 1) predominantly Christian: Abia, Akwa Ibom, members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Anambra, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, (OIC) agreed to condemn terrorism and ignore the Enugu, Imo, Ondo, Rivers; 2) predominantly Muslim: Taliban’s call for jihad against Christians and Jews. Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Yet, OIC national leaders also must deal with public Kebi, Nasarawa, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, Zamfara; 3) mixed: Be- opinion in their own countries, and the question of ex- nue, Kaduna, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, ternal influences is never far from the surface. As a Taraba. large and complex “religiously mixed” country in the 3. The six zones include: 1) northwest (Kano, Sokoto, Kaduna, midst of a political transition, Nigeria is a special chal- Katsina, Jigawa, Kebbi, Zamfara); 2) northeast (Bauchi, Borno, 1 lenge. Adamawa, Taraba, Yobe, Gombe); 3) Middle Belt (lower north): (Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa and FCT); 4) southwest (Lagos, Ondo, Oyo, Ogun, Osun, Ekiti); 5) 1. See, “Rising Muslim Power in Africa Causes Unrest in Nige- southeast (Enugu, Anambra, Imo, Abia, Ebonyi); and 6) ria and Elsewhere,” New York Times, November 1, 2001, sec. south-south (Rivers, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Edo, Cross River, A, p. 12. Bayelsa).

Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 2 ritory,” in terms of equal political access, intentionally Trend Lines of Muslim Identities situated in the middle of the country. The three predominantly Muslim areas of Nigeria are Since January 2000, the 12 far northern states have in- the nineteenth century Sokoto caliphal “emirate states” troduced Shari’a law.4 Clashes in Kaduna state be- in the northwest, the historic Borno state in the north- tween Muslims and Christians in February 2000 re- east, and certain parts of Yorubaland in the southwest. sulted in about 2,000 dead. This was followed by back- At present, at least seven cross-cutting tendencies lash violence in the far north (e.g., Sokoto) against within the Muslim community are identifiable: 1) emir- southern Christians and backlash violence in the south- ate authorities and traditional nonsectarian mainstream east (e.g., Aba) and southwest (e.g., Lagos and Ibadan), Muslim groups; 2) sufi brotherhoods, especially the followed by about 2,000 more deaths in Kaduna in Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya; 3) anti-innovation legalists, May. In late 2001, ethno-religious riots emerged in Jos especially the Izala; 4) intellectual reformers; 5) anti- and Kano, with hundreds killed. Official commissions establishment syncretists, especially remnants of the of inquiry reports will be forthcoming, but an obvious Maitatsine movement; 6) antiestablishment “Muslim preliminary question is whether such violence is ethnic, Brothers” (Ikhwan), sometimes labeled as “Shi’ites;” ethno-religious, more explicitly “religious,” political, and 7) unemployed urban youth and Qur’anic student or some other pattern based on socioeconomic status movements, formed around local schools and teachers. and competition. An overarching question is whether such violence and tension may destabilize Nigeria as a Traditional Ethno-religious Affiliation whole, as it prepares for local, state, and national elec- tions in 2003. The emirate states share the legacy of having been part of the Sokoto caliphal experience in the nineteenth In any discussion of politics, religion, or violence in century. Within the “northern region” of the twentieth Nigeria, distinguishing those patterns that are predomi- century, they stretch from Sokoto in the west to nantly “elite” and those that are “grassroots” is impor- Adamawa in the east and to Ilorin and Niger in the tant. At the elite level there has been a long pattern of south. By definition they are predominantly Muslim in Muslim-Christian interfaith cooperation (during both their traditional political structure. In the twentieth cen- civilian and military periods), while at the grassroots tury they have evolved into distinctive “emirates” (i.e., level, there have been sporadic instances of both in- with an emir, or equivalent, as symbolic head of the trafaith and interfaith conflict. Especially in the Muslim unit). Although Hausa tends to predominate as the lin- states there have been significant confrontations be- gua franca, the emirate states are a multilingual cluster, tween antiestablishment groups and northern Muslim including Fulfulde, Yoruba, Nupe, and several minor- elites, which in turn, are causing these elites to recon- ity languages. Often there are traditional rivalries sider how to strengthen their own politico-religious among these states (e.g., Kano and Sokoto split into credentials. Significantly, with the return to civilian civil war in the 1890s), and this cluster has not always rule in 1999, the impetus for the establishment of acted as a unified block. Yet, within this zone, the Sul- Shari’a law has emerged largely from grassroots pres- tan of Sokoto has special salience in spiritual matters, sures rather than from the elites. To understand these and the Emir of Kano has a special place because of patterns more fully, this essay will look at 1) trend lines the socioeconomic importance of Kano emirate. of Muslim religious and ethno-religious identities; 2) Muslim leadership and ecumenical movements; 3) the Borno (and environs) in the northeastern corner of Ni- interplay of religion and politics in Nigeria; and 4) the geria is the oldest continuous Islamic community in extent of external influences and links. sub-Saharan Africa, dating from the eleventh century, and is similar in structure to the emirate states, but with a “Shehu” as chief religious-political leader. In the nineteenth century, when Sokoto tried to conquer Borno, there was a standoff, and “resistance to Sokoto” 4. The 12 states with Shari’a law, as of December 2001, are: became part of Borno’s historical legacy. The outgroup Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Niger, Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Ji- identity designation for people from Borno is “Beri- gawa, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe, and Borno. Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 3 beri.” The dominant language group in Borno is In turn, the Qadiriyya also experienced a “reformed” Kanuri, although, like Sokoto, Borno is a multilingual development, associated with Shaykh Nasiru Kabara of cluster (increasingly with Hausa as a lingua franca). Kano. Students from throughout Nigeria would come to Kano to study in his schools and libraries. With the There has been an indigenous pattern of Islamic culture death of Nasiru Kabara in the fall of 1996, the mantle in Yorubaland throughout the nineteenth and of leadership fell to his son, who maintains the 20twentieth centuries, especially in the areas that be- mosque/school across from the emir’s palace in the came Oyo, Ogun, and Lagos states. Major urban bases center of the old city. for Yoruba Muslim populations include Lagos and Ibadan. In addition, Ilorin city (and emirate) in Kwara Anti-Innovation Legalists state is a historic component of the Sokoto caliphal system. Ilorin, as a Yoruba society, but with predomi- The anti-innovation legalists are associated with the nant patterns of Yoruba and Hausa bilingualism and leadership of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, an outstanding with mixed Yoruba/Fulani/Hausa leadership patterns, Arabist and legal scholar from Gumi village in Sokoto. is a potential bridge (or flash point) between emirate Gumi studied in Khartoum and was a key liaison with and Yoruba culture zones. Saudi authorities. Shortly after independence in 1960, Gumi was appointed Grand Kadi in northern Nigeria Sufi Brotherhoods and hence was responsible for the regional Shari’a le- gal system. Gumi became the teacher of many younger The Sufi brotherhoods evolved throughout the nine- university-educated elements, and many of the civil teenth and twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth cen- servants and professionals in northern Nigeria. His tury, Qadiriyya brotherhood affiliation became part of influence was extensive in the modern sector. Among the identity of the Sokoto Caliphal leadership, because the urban youth of the new towns in the north, of the association with the caliphal founder, Usman especially cities such as Jos and Kaduna without a dan Fodio, who died in 1817. In the 1830s and after, brotherhood tradition, social organizations and Umar Futi and his followers spread the Tijaniyya teaching networks developed under the umbrella name brotherhood in northern Nigeria. Thus, the Qadiriyya of Izala, taken from the Hausa version of Usman dan and the Tijaniyya became the two major Sufi brother- Fodio’s book, In Favor of Sunna and against hoods in what came to be northern Nigeria, especially Innovation. Although Gumi directly influenced some within the caliphal areas. By contrast, the leaders and of the Izala groups, others set off in their own scholars of Borno have not been affiliated with Sufi directions. This led to some confrontations between the brotherhoods. Izala and the youth wings of the reformed brotherhoods, especially in Kano, because the Izala During the twentieth century, the Tijaniyya spread ex- condemned the brotherhoods as “innovations,” (i.e., tensively in Kano, which was the commercial and in- developments after the time of the Qur’an and the dustrial capital of the north. Because of the social net- Sunna). Gumi became influential through his transla- works that extended out of Kano through the long dis- tion of the Holy Qur’an into the Hausa language. His tance “Hausa trader” system, the Tijaniyya spread translation was widely distributed throughout northern throughout Nigeria (including Ibadan) and throughout Nigeria and was the basis of a fundamental West Africa. A “reformed” version of Tijaniyya was reassessment or “reformation” within the Muslim developed, which accommodated many of the mod- community, which thereby had direct access to holy ernization developments of the post–World War II era. writ in a vernacular language. Gumi died in September This reformation was associated with the leadership of 1992, and whatever cohesion the Izala movement may Ibrahim Niass, a Wolof speaking shaykh from Kaolack, have had began to splinter into a variety of localized Senegal, but had its Nigerian base in Kano, under the agendas.5 leadership of Tijjani Usman, and the late emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi. In the mid-1990s, leadership fo- cused on a wealthy Hausa businessman, Shaykh Ab- dulrazaq, who maintains a lavish mosque/school. 5. See Sheik Abubakar Gumi, Where I Stand (Ibadan: Spec- trum Books, 1992). Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 4

Intellectual Reformers An itinerant preacher, Muhammad Marwa, also known as Maitatsine, led the most significant of such fringe The intellectual reformers are most noticeable within cults to emerge, in Kano in the late l970s. A violent the northern universities system, especially Usuman confrontation between the “Yan Tatsine” and the au- dan Fodio University in Sokoto, Bayero University in thorities in Kano City occurred in December 1980, Kano, and Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. There is with thousands of resulting deaths. Even with the death a fine line between Nigerian Muslims who would like of Maitatsine in these Kano riots, his followers vio- to apply Islamic principles to contemporary Nigerian lently challenged authorities in Gombe, Borno, and political life, and those who try to identify what an elsewhere in the north throughout the 1980s and even “ideal” Islamic political system would look like. in Lagos in the 1990s. In general, mainstream Muslims Clearer is the gap between those who reflect on the do not regard this movement as “Muslim,” but as a cult ideal nature of neoclassical Islamic systems in the con- outside the bounds of orthodoxy. temporary world, and those who feel that they should impose such systems on themselves and others. The in- Antiestablishment “Muslim Brothers” tellectual reformers, often members of departments of Islamic, Arabic, or legal studies, represent two tenden- The antiestablishment “Muslim Brothers” (Ikhwan or cies with regard to an ideal model: those who refer ‘yan brotha) emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s back to the Sokoto reformation period as a source of as a younger generation of semi-educated and even bet- ideas and values, and those who prefer to downplay the ter educated youth found that they had no employment Sokoto experience and refer directly to the time of the prospects in the economic austerity of the time and be- Prophet Muhammad, looking to the Madina model as gan to challenge the corruption and wealth of the Mus- the standard by which an ideal system should be lim establishment on Islamic grounds. The leader of the judged. Many scholars involved with the study of the group in Zaria was Ibrahim El-Zak Zaky, who had history of the Sokoto caliphate are also concerned with graduated in economics from Ahmadu Bello Univer- the contemporary relevance of such history. There have sity. Because he then had received training in Iran and been many efforts to reprint the writings of the Sokoto Iranian funding appeared to be involved, his movement reformist leaders in Arabic, Hausa, and English. For was termed “Shi’ite” by the larger Nigerian commu- the most part, such intellectuals debate the interpreta- nity, which was also an attempt to marginalize his in- tion of Qur’anic and caliphal principles within an aca- fluence because Nigerian Muslims are Sunni rather demic setting, but their influence in the media and in than Shi’ite by tradition. Throughout the 1990s the political life is considerable.6 Ikhwan and the authorities clashed, culminating in the arrest of Ibrahim on September 13, 1996, in Zaria and Antiestablishment Syncretists his jailing in Port Harcourt. Subsequently, his follow- ers protested in Zaria and Kaduna and about 40 were The antiestablishment syncretists emerged in the late killed in direct clashes with the police. In February 1970s when the oil boom in Nigeria made rapid 1997, at the end of the month of Ramadan, several of change, urbanization, and modernization a powerful the followers tried to take over the central mosque in force. Their “syncretism” was a blend of traditional Kano and were killed in the resultant clash with police. Hausa folk beliefs, and highly selective bits and pieces The exact nature of this “Shi’ite” movement remains of the Qur’an. They tended to represent the “dispos- obscure, but the antiestablishment challenge is clear. sessed” newcomers in the urban centers, who saw the Zaky, released after the death of General Sani Abacha Muslim establishment getting richer and more western- in 1998, continues to be a vocal critic of the Muslim ized to the detriment of poor and non-Western seg- establishment, and, more recently, of Shari’a criminal ments of society. law in some northern states.7 Unemployed Youth and

6. For example, see Mahmud Tukur, Leadership and Govern- 7. For a journalistic account of this movement, see Karl Maier, ance in Nigeria: The Relevance of Values (Zaria: Hudahuda This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria, chapter 6; “The Press, 1999). Faithful,” Public Affairs, 2000. Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 5

Qur’anic School Movements Islam in Africa Conference in 1989, which resolved to establish the Islam in Africa Organizations network Large metropoles with high immigration rates have with headquarters in Abuja, the federal capital. The hundreds of local Qur’anic schools that may form council handled the construction of the Abuja National around a local teacher (mallam). In the north, such Mosque and maintains the Abuja National Mosque schools often form just outside the “traditional” walled Management Board. cities (or in the newer wards), because the traditional ward structures in the “old cities” are usually well inte- In 1987, in the aftermath of the Organization of the Is- grated into local politics. In places like Fagge in Kano, lamic Conference (OIC) controversy in Nigeria over which attract immigrant students from throughout the whether to be a member of the OIC, the federal gov- north and from surrounding countries, such as Niger, ernment established the National Council for Religious Chad, and Cameroon, students are poor (talibai), root- Affairs (NCRA). In modified form, this council ulti- less, and perhaps easily swayed by itinerant Muslim mately came to have 12 Christian and 12 Muslims preachers. These students come from rural Sunni fami- leaders who were intended to discuss matters of mutual lies, and often make their living by begging or working concern and report directly to the Ministry of Interior. as day labor. The key to understanding this phenome- In practice the NSCIA represented the Muslims, and non is to recognize that there is no stable leadership the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) repre- structure in place and often no respect for more estab- sented the Christians. After a period of deadlock in the lished forms of religious authority.8 council, the Christian leaders stopped attending, and the NCRA became moribund. Muslim Leadership and Ecumenical Movements In March 1996, the Sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim Dasuki, was deposed and jailed by Head of State General

Abacha. Dasuki was replaced as Sultan by Muhammad The early Muslim ecumenical movement of the 1960s Maccido, but because Dasuki had been a prime mover in Nigeria, especially the Jamatul Nasril Islam, broad- behind the NSCIA the future of this organization re- ened into the national arena, mainly through the vehicle mains unclear, especially because Maccido is seen of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs more as a local leader. The release of Dasuki after the (NSCIA), established in 1974. The head of the Su- death of Abacha did not result in a challenge to Sultan preme Council was the Sultan of Sokoto, the vice Maccido, and Dasuki now lives quietly in Kaduna. president was the Shehu of Borno, and the secretary general was a leading Yoruba Muslim lawyer, Abdula- A second Muslim umbrella organization, which is teef Adegbite. The vice presidents are drawn from the similar to NSCIA, is the Federation of Muslim 36 states of the federation and include distinguished Women’s Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN). In the emirs and other Muslim notables (including the late mid-1980s, the impact of the spread of education began Alhaji Chief Moshood Abiola, Baba Adini of to be felt more clearly among Muslim women. Part of Yorubaland in Ogun State, and Alhaji Abdul Azeez the response to such education was to become even Arisekola Alao, the Aare Musulumi of Yorubaland, more Western, and some Muslim women participated Oyo State). The NSCIA has regular meetings that bring in organizations like Women in Nigeria. Others began Muslim leaders from all states of the federation to de- to reclaim their own sense of Muslim identity. The liberate on matters of common interest. At the interna- Muslim Sisters Organization was established in Kano, tional level, the council maintains close links with and later FOMWAN was established to give coherence counterparts in other countries and cosponsors the Is- to Muslim women’s organizations throughout Nigeria lamic Council in London. The NSCIA cosponsored the and focused on the need to counteract the role of “cus- tom” in Nigeria Muslim societies. By the early 1990s, FOMWAN had about 400 member organizations 8 See, for example, the work of Paul Lubeck, Islam and Urban throughout Nigeria, with a majority of member Labor in Northern Nigeria: The Making of a Muslim Working associations in the Yoruba-speaking areas. Each state Class (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1986). selects representatives to a national committee, which

Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 6 publishes a magazine (The Muslim Woman) and holds observance if such instruction, ceremony or observance annual conferences on a topic of special concern to relates to a religion other than his own, or a religion Muslim women. The main language of communication not approved by his parents or guardian. (3) No reli- is English, and the FOMWAN acts as a liaison with gious community or denomination shall be prevented other national and international Muslim women’s or- from providing religious instruction for pupils of that ganizations. Today, FOMWAN remains the major pan- community or denomination in any place of education Nigerian association for Muslim women, even though a maintained wholly by that community or denomina- wide variety of nongovernmental organizations focus tion. (4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any per- on particular issue areas. sons to form, take part in the activity of, or be a mem- ber of, a secret society. Religion and Politics Because of Nigeria’s long history of colonial and mili- tary rule, the role of the judiciary in the interpretation This section will touch on four aspects of religion and of fundamental rights has been uncertain at best. Many politics in Nigeria, because the perception of a level of the issues of conflicts of rights or limits of rights political playing field and ethno-regional balance are have been determined by edict or decree. The limits of seen to be the keys to ethno-religious harmony and po- unorthodox opinion, especially in religious matters, are litical stability: (1) religion and constitutional law; (2) a delicate but essential judgment made by political and religion and electoral politics; (3) religion and military religious leaders, but also by constitutional lawyers. A politics; and (4) the Shari’a law issue and ethno- number of legal issues remain to be addressed through religious violence since the establishment of Shari’a case law: the tax status of religious organizations, the law in many far northern states. right to public broadcast time, the right to be repre-

sented on national advisory boards, the basic right to Constitutional Law preach, the right to have time off to worship (e.g., for

Friday prayer or holidays), the right of religious leaders The constitution announced by the military government to protection from defamation, the right to be included in May 1999, which set up the Fourth Republic, was in a nonpreferentialist model of government, the right similar to that of 1979, which set up the Second to religious education, the protection from having to Republic. The l999 constitution states that the gov- change religious affiliation in order to acquire educa- ernment of the federation or of a state shall not adopt tion, the right to change religious affiliation, and, of any religion as state religion. The sections on “funda- course, the issue of Shari’a law in the criminal domain. mental rights” refer to “freedom on thought, con- science, and religion.” With regard to the judiciary, the The general practice in Nigeria is not to utilize legal Shari’a Courts of Appeal of a state are established to services in pursuit of fundamental or religious rights. deal with personal law, where all parties are Muslim. Rather, grievances are addressed through the political

process, even when that process is military rather than With this mixed constitutional mandate—for the Nige- civilian. The lack of federal case law is partly the result rian state not to adopt any religion, but to allow for of the fragility of constitutional order and the high Muslim civil law within the legal system—the “funda- stakes placed on political solutions. mental right” of every Nigerian to freedom of religion is even more salient. The “Freedom of Religion” clause Electoral Politics is articulated as follows. (1) Every person shall be enti- tled to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, The federal elections of 1959, 1964, 1979, and 1983 including freedom to change his religion or belief and were remarkably consistent in the alliance patterns be- freedom (either alone or in community with others, and tween geocultural/religious zones. The election of June in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his 1993, which was annulled, was an exception. The 1999 religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and election echoed some of the earlier patterns: five of the observance. (2) No person attending any place of edu- six zones supported the winner, and the southwest zone cation shall be required to receive religious instruction supported the loser. or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 7

During the First Republic (1960–1966) the dominant politics tend to revolve around city-state loyalties, has northern party (Northern Peoples’ Congress) made lessened the tendency to politicize religion. Yet, when- every effort to find allies among the Christian middle- ever a political “crisis” occurs—including a military belt factions, and ended up with a coalition that in- coup—the question of religious balance is a matter of cluded northern Muslims and middle-belt and eastern immediate calculation. Christians. This coalition faced a Muslim/Christian Yoruba alliance. During the Second Republic (1979– Military Politics 1983), the same alliance pattern prevailed.

On July 29, 1975, General Murtala Ramat Muhammad, During the election in 1993, which was intended to be a Hausa-Fulani from Kano, emerged as the first Mus- a transition to a Third Republic, the dominant alliance lim military head of state in Nigeria. He had replaced was Yoruba-based and excluded many of the emirate General Yakubu Gowon, an Angas Christian from the states and the Christian east. Ironically, the apparent middle belt, who in turn had replaced Major General winners in the June 1993 election were a Yoruba Mus- Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo Christian in July 1996. On Feb- lim (Moshood Abiola) for president and a Borno Mus- ruary 13, 1976, Murtala Muhammad was assassinated lim (Babagana Kingibe) for vice president, who ap- in a failed coup attempt apparently led by Christian peared to defeat a Muslim from Kano and a Christian middle-belt officers. Murtala Muhammad was replaced from the east. by his next in command, General Olusegun Obasanjo,

a Christian Yoruba from Ogun, who, for the next three During the election of 1999, as mentioned earlier, both and a half years—prior to the return to civilian rule in presidential candidates were Yoruba/Christian, and 1979—continued the policies of his predecessor, in- both vice presidential candidates were northern cluding the creation of a new federal capital at Abuja. Hausa/Muslim. Hence, there were no overt ethno- The next-in-command and close confidant to Obasanjo religious overtones to the election, which was won by was Shehu Musa Yar ‘Adua, a dynamic Muslim per- Olusegun Obasanjo (Yoruba/Christian, from Abeo- sonality from Katsina emirate, who later died in prison kuta) and Atiku Abubakar (Hausa-Fulani/Muslim, under mysterious circumstances during the Abacha from Yola). military regime.

The clear pattern is that electoral politics do not divide The general pattern of top military leadership has usu- along Christian/Muslim lines in Nigeria. To the con- ally been a Muslim-Christian or a Christian-Muslim trary, every effort has been made, through different team. The exception was the military regime of Mu- combinations of elements, to link coalitions that in- hammad Buhari (a Fulani-Hausa Muslim from Daura clude both Christians and Muslims. The stated intent of emirate) and Tunde Idiagbon (a Yoruba Muslim from the 1995 constitution (unpromulgated) was to create a Ilorin) during l984–1985. The subsequent regime of rotational system for the highest federal offices, so that Ibrahim Babangida (a Gwari Muslim from the middle no one zone or region may predominate and making belt) was religiously balanced (l985–1993), as was the cross-zonal/cross-religious coalitions mandatory. This successor regime of Sani Abacha (a Muslim who grew idea was scrapped in 1998–1999 as too cumbersome, up in Kano but was originally from Borno) and his but the idea of “federal character”(or ethno-religious next in command General Oladipo Diya (a Yoruba balance) was preserved in other ways. Christian). Muhammad Buhari (FulaniHausa/Muslim)

and Ernest Shonekan (Yoruba/Christian) were two top Religious and ethnic political parties have been banned civilian members of the Abacha regime. The successor in Nigeria since the First Republic. The idea of “federal regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar (Muslim, character,” which has been implemented since the civil from Niger state), which handed over to the civilian re- war (1967–1970), has meant that each of the states— gime on May 29, 1999, was also ethnically and relig- and hence religious segments—must be represented at iously balanced. the federal executive level. The fact that the critical swing area—the Yorubaland southwest—is almost In short, despite some of the prevailing perceptions that equally divided between Christians and Muslims while Hausa Muslims have dominated the top military lead- Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 8 ership, military politics is not much different from elec- convened to try to prevent further violence. As of toral politics on the matter of religious balance. The 2001, 9 of the 17 Supreme Court justices were Muslim, annulment of the June l993 election was clearly not the and it was hoped that the issue could be settled politi- result of religious factors, because both Abiola and his cally while running its course through the courts.10 opponent, Bashir Tofa, were Muslims. The issue of Shari’a law is of concern both within Ni- 11 With the return to civilian politics in May 1999, every geria , and externally. The U.S. Commission on Inter- effort has been made to “reprofessionalize” the mili- national Religious Freedom has a section in its 2001 tary, that is, remove them from politics. In the process, report that focuses on Shari’a developments, and has however, the perception has been widespread in the expressed a concern about extra-judicial enforcement 12 north that a disproportionate number of north- of Shari’a laws. Recent conflicts are also being ern/Muslim officers have been pressured into retire- evaluated through the analytical perspectives of “feder- ment, or marginalized in other ways. Two former mili- alism theory,” which balance powers at the state level, tary heads of state from the north—Buhari and Baban- and raise the issue of the responsibilities and structure 13 gida—remain key political figures in the Nigerian of the Nigerian police in state and local matters. Fourth Republic, although there is still tension between them from the 1985 coup. External Influences and Links

Shari’a Law Even prior to the globalization of communications and transportation of the 1990s, each of the tendencies With the inception of democratic federalism under the mentioned above within the Nigerian Muslim commu- Fourth Republic, the newly elected governor of Zam- nity had some pattern of external influence or linkage fara state announced that Shari’a law (including crimi- within the broader Muslim community (ummah). Yet, nal law), an issue on which he had campaigned in fall with the emergence of a Nigerian oil economy in the 1998, would be introduced, to be applied to Muslims 1970s, the most noticeable external linkage pattern was only.9 Other states from the far north began to follow the sharp increase in numbers of annual Nigerian pil- this approach. In the turmoil that followed (even the grims to Mecca, and the increased ties to Saudi Arabia Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammadu Maccido, be- (plus, of course, the extensive links and settlements in came a target when he tried to mediate) there was Britain). The oil economy has also allowed for exten- clearly both mass and elite support among northern sive Nigerian investments in road and air links with Muslims. neighboring countries and international locations. Needless to add, the national borders—drawn by colo- Subsequently, various human rights groups have nial powers and basically artificial—are porous, be- started to challenge the issue of Shari’a law in Zamfara through the state court system, with the expectation that eventually it will go to the Supreme Court. At the 10. A more detailed discussion is available in John Paden, Is- same time, various respected leaders on all sides were lam and Constitutionalism in Nigeria, forthcoming.

11. As of November 22, 2001, one Web site (http://www.gamji.com/NEWS113.htm) that carries Nigerian 9. For details on the Zamfara endeavor, see Zamfara State of English-language newspaper articles, listed 441 recent articles Nigeria, Shari’ah Penal Code Law, January 2000, which in 55 dealing with “Shari`a in Nigeria.” Needless to add, Hausa- pages, defines terms, criminal responsibility, punishments and language newspapers are also focusing on this issue. compensation, joint acts, abetment, attempts to commit of- fences, criminal conspiracy, hudud and hudud related offences, 12. Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious qiyas and qiyas related offences, and criminal intimidation (in- Freedom, May 1, 2001. The chapter on Nigeria appears on cluding offenses by or relating to public servants, offenses re- pages 91–100. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, lated to religion, and offenses relating to ordeal, witchcraft, and D.C., 20402-0001, ISBN 0-16-050796-0.) juju). The author is grateful to Governor Ahmad Sani for ex- tensive personal discussions of these issues in May 2000, dur- 13. See Rotiomi Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ni- ing the governor’s visit to Washington, D.C. geria (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001). Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 9 cause they cut all major ethnic groups (Hausa, Fulani, Conclusions Yoruba, Kanuri, and Igbo). Finally, the problems of immigration and customs inefficiency and corruption at The fact that the Muslim elite establishments in the many ports of entry also reinforce the permeability of emirate states, Borno and Yorubaland, have normally boundaries. felt comfortable working with mainstream Christian counterparts, should not obscure the fact that at the Historically, the following “international” patterns are grassroots level since 1999, highly localized Muslim also clear. 1) The traditional emirate authorities in the and Christian groups, often competing for land or jobs northern states derive from the jihad that established or educational opportunities, have found cause to chal- the Sokoto caliphate in the early nineteenth century, lenge each other, as well as the establishment. The and clearly have ethnic—especially Fulani—and reli- boom and bust cycles of an oil economy (e.g., in late gious ties that link into the Sudanic belt in West Africa. 2001, oil revenues in Nigeria dropped by one-third) Even prior to the establishment of Sokoto, trans- plus the often high expectations for change in the new Saharan trade and Islamic culture flourished in the civilian political arena—including a demand for “law Hausa city-states, especially via the commercial capital and order” based on recognizable principles, rather of Kano. 2) The Sufi brotherhoods are all trans- than military decrees—have created a rich drama of national, with the Tijaniyya linked closely with Mo- ethno-religious expression based on the hopes and rocco and Senegal, and the Qadiriyya with the fears of ordinary Nigerians. 14 Maghreb and Iraq. The Tijaniyya, being more associ- ated with Hausa long distance traders, has extensive Within the emirate states, a cleavage has been forming links throughout West Africa. There is hardly a market between the Muslim establishment and Muslim grass- or commercial center in West Africa which does not roots elements. This has had spillover effects on Mus- have posters of Tijaniyya saints and leaders. 3) The lim-Christian relations, as the hard driving evangelism anti-innovation legalists have close ties with Saudi of some Christian groups, who have made it their mis- Arabia, sometimes by way of Khartoum, and have been sion to convert Muslims at the local level, created the instrumental in linking northern Nigeria to the broader potential for inter-faith confrontation in various socio- world of Sunni Islam, and in challenging the Sufi tradi- economic domains. These conflicts are increasingly 15 tion. 4) The intellectual reformers clearly have schol- difficult for emirate and civilian gubernatorial authori- arly ties throughout the Muslim and Western worlds. 5) ties to contain or mediate, without asking the federal The anti-establishment syncretists have ties with local authorities to call in national police and military re- groups in neighboring African countries, especially sources. Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. 6) The so-called “Muslim Brothers,” surprisingly, have their ties with the Shi’a Into this mix, the revival of Shari’a law during 2000– world, especially Iran (since 1979), rather than the 2001, combined with the impact of contemporary glob- Sunni world, and are often ready to challenge the vari- alization and communication trends—especially ous authorities within the Sunni world. 7) The urban through the Saudi connection–created a volatile situa- youth and migrant students may be more insular in tion. Yet, a clear consequence of the Shari’a revival their experiences, but have access to radio and cas- was partially to close the gap between Muslim elites settes from a variety of external sources. 8) Finally, the and grassroots elements in the north, even though the elites of the ecumenical movements have extensive interpretation of Shari’a law is left to councils of ulema contacts worldwide. within each of the far northern states, and hence does not have a standardized impact.

14. See John Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano This Shari’a revival was further inflamed after Sep- (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973). For a tember 11, in the fog of confusion as the “war on ter- map of international trade and religious routes, see p. 33. rorism” took on global proportions, and the “Osama riots” unfolded in the Fagge area of Kano. Several 15. See John Paden, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto: Val- weeks passed before traditional authorities, such as the ues and Leadership in Nigeria (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986). Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org Page 10 Emir of Kano, could be mobilized to condemn Osama 16 bin Laden. Africa Notes is published by the Center for Strate- gic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax- A major key to stability in Nigeria is the continued pat- exempt institution focusing on international public tern of religious balance and coalition building, both policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and non- within the military and among the civilian political proprietary. class. Nigeria remains a multi-religious—rather than a secular—society, and religious balance issues are at CSIS does not take specific public policy positions. least as important as ethnic or state balances in the Accordingly, all views, opinions, and conclusions various “federal character” endeavors. The larger is- expressed in this publication should be understood sues of democratic rule, federalism, human rights, rule to be solely those of the author(s). of law (including Shari’a law), and equity of access to resources will have to take account of the fragile bal- © 2002 by the Center for Strategic and Interna- ance of geocultural and religious zones in Nigeria, and tional Studies. the need for conflict resolution efforts across such zones. At present, the weakest link seems to be the challenge of decentralizing power—including the po- lice force—without “balkanizing” or partitioning the country, or creating a situation of such chaos that the military is tempted to intervene. One hopes that no side will use the Shari’a issue as an excuse to destabilize the entire country. The polarization of ethnic, religious, and regional clusters must be addressed politically, constitutionally, and economically if Nigeria is to meet the test of the three-tier federal elections coming up in 2003, and make a real transition to democratic federal- ism.

John Paden is Clarence J. Robinson Professor of In- ternational Studies at George Mason University. His publications include a prize-winning study of Nigerian political culture and Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, a biography of a Nigerian Muslim leader.

16 BBC, “Nigeria’s Emir opposes bin Laden,” November 23, 2001. “One of Africa’s top Islamic leaders, the powerful emir of the northern Nigerian state of Kano has told the BBC he is opposed to Osama bin Laden’s version of jihad against the United States. The emir also said he was monitoring U.S. bombing of Afghanistan to ensure that it was aimed solely at what Washington called terrorism, and not Islam in general...” Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org