Petrocaribe : the Current Phase of Venezuela's Oil Diplomacy in The
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Petrocaribe: The Current Phase of Venezuela’s Oil Diplomacy in the Caribbean* Francine Jácome** Introduction The integrationist movement that has been under way through the first decade of the 21st century in Latin America and the Caribbean has been marked by two fundamental factors (Benítez, Celi and Jácome, 2010). The first one is the growing fragmentation and disintegration at the continen- tal level, as a number of countries (Mexico, Central America, and the Ca- ribbean) have turned more toward the north, whereas South America has sought to promote an identity that has been unable to overcome the di- fferences between two blocs: on the one hand, the Andean region, where tensions and conflicts among neighboring countries have increased in re- cent years; and the Southern Cone, on the other hand, which has worked to advance mutual trust measures and peacekeeping operations especially within the framework of the United Nations. These differences have had an important impact on perceptions about the main threats faced by countries in terms of security and defense, as well as on the agendas and mechanisms that are designed to address them, thus resulting in a setback for regional cooperation on these issues des- pite the creation and implementation of new regional bodies such as the South American Defense Council of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Moreover, this opposition between two different views on Latin American and Caribbean has recently played itself out in the Caribbean, especially as ties between Brazil and Cuba have grown stronger and as Suriname and Guyana have entered UNASUR. policy paper 40 Noviembre de 2011 The second factor is related to the on- are addressed: first, the components of going weakening of democratic sys- the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples tems in many countries in the continent of Our America-Peoples’ Trade Agree- and to the increased influence of actors ment (ALBA-TCP) for the Caribbean; such as drug traffickers and organi- and, secondly, Petrocaribe’s initiative zed crime, which has worsened states’ currently covering 18 countries: Anti- many preexisting problems and beco- gua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, me a threat for democratic governan- Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Granada, ce—namely, the incidence of violence, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Ni- and its recent escalation, resulting from caragua, the Dominican Republic, Saint the expansion of non-state armed ac- Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vin- tors. Even the Caribbean has been tou- cent and the Grenadines, Suriname, ched by this phenomenon. and Venezuela. The second section provides some considerations regar- In addition to these two elements, the- ding possible future scenarios. re are some additional factors playing a role, such as the impact of natural ALBA in the Caribbean disasters and environmental problems, and the role of the United States and Historically, Venezuela has deemed the other extra-regional actors, especially Caribbean to be a natural area of in- the European Union (with its close ties fluence because of its geographic lo- to most Caribbean countries) and the cation as well as their mutual cultural growing presence of Russia and China affinity. It has seen itself as a bridge bet- in the region. ween the Caribbean and even Central America, on the one hand, and South Within this context, it has been argued America, on the other hand. Thus, the that public debates on defense and se- use of oil as a fundamental pillar of Ve- curity cooperation should include a se- nezuelan diplomacy by the government ries of new topics. Some of them have of President Chávez and its interest in to do with (1) access to natural resour- the Caribbean region do not represent ces (water, gas) and environmental pro- much of an innovation on its part. Be- blems, (2) growing social and political ginning in the 1970s, oil became the unrest, (3) the role of non-state armed center of Venezuela’s international re- actors, (4) small arms and light weapons lations, especially during the first pre- trafficking, and (5) the militarization of sidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974- security. It is also important to consider, 1979). Likewise, the Caribbean was an on the one hand, the growing parti- important focus of Perez’s government cipation of armed forces in the fight and that of its predecessor, Rafael Cal- against organized crime and drug tra- dera (1969-1974), and its importance fficking and in the management of se- grew even more in the 1980s with the curity at the domestic level; and, on the San José Agreement (see Annex). other hand, the militarization of police institutions. However, after President Hugo Chávez came into power in 1999 (12.5 years Within this framework, this paper’s ago), Venezuelan foreign policy un- main objective is to examine the role derwent an important change, focusing of Venezuela’s so-called “oil diploma- on the formation of an anti-American cy” in the Caribbean sub-region. For axis under Venezuela’s leadership, with Programa de Cooperación en Seguridad Regional Programa this purpose, two fundamental issues oil as a fundamental instrument. This Noviembre de 2011, Página 2 view is based on a perspective inherited The following are the main proposals from the Cold War, according to which that are currently being carried out an increased presence in the Caribbean within ALBA: and stronger ties between Caracas and Havana were part of a strategy to cha- • The creation of a monetary zone llenge the United States. with a common currency: Unitary System of Regional Compensation The strategy for political cooperation (SUCRE), in which Dominica partici- and concerted action that the Vene- pates as an observer. Bolivia, Ecua- zuelan government has put forward dor, Cuba, and Venezuela are the for Latin America and the Caribbean is only countries whose public and embodied by ALBA (Altmann, 2011), private banks are using this currency which, insofar as it has been defined as an “alternative for the peoples,” does • ALBA Bank not represent an obstacle for its mem- bers to participate in other integration • ALBA Food, which funds proposals schemes such as the Caribbean Com- for agrifood projects munity (CARICOM) and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). Still, there are some obvious overlaps between • Telesur: a continental initiative in these bodies’ and ALBA’s proposals, as which Cuba is the only participant it became clear when English-speaking country from the Caribbean region Caribbean countries opted out of parti- cipating in ALBA’s security and defense By 2008, Venezuela had invested an mechanisms, as it will be explained la- estimated $32,952 million dollars in ter on. cooperation with ALBA countries, a sum which amounted to 23.51% of its ALBA is a mechanism in which ideology annual fiscal revenue (Arellano, 2008). and politics have a central role, but it is Venezuela is the only contributor to the also guided by pragmatism on the part ALBA Bank, with the exception of very of most of its members in terms of ob- small contributions from others,1 whi- taining access to oil at reduced prices le most other countries are receptors. and preferential payment options for With regard to the Caribbean more members. Despite its alternative pers- specifically, ALBA’s work has focused pectives concerning integration, its ins- on three major issues. titutional structure is a traditional one, as it is based on a presidentialist view The first and foremost aspect concerns which holds Presidential Summits as the situation of Cuba. In every interna- the central core of its activity, followed tional instance, ALBA’s priority has been by ALBA’s Political Council (made up of the end of the US blockade, as well as member countries’ foreign affairs mi- the possibility of a military intervention nisters) and its commissions and wor- either in Cuba or in Venezuela. king groups. A Secretariat in Caracas has been created recently with the pur- The second one is the problem of Hai- pose of managing ALBA’s organizatio- ti, concerning which there has been a nal and administrative affairs. discourse calling for the end of US mi- litary interventionism. During the Poli- tical Council’s meeting on January 25, Petrocaribe: the current Phase of Venezuela´s Oil Diplomacy in the Caribbran Phase of Venezuela´s the current Petrocaribe: Noviembre de 2011, Página 3 2010, an agreement was reached to defended by the Venezuelan govern- create ALBA’s Humanitarian Fund for ment. They also have not echoed Pre- the purpose of providing health, edu- sident Chávez’s militaristic approach to cation, and housing assistance, as well security and defense. In this respect, his as a power generation plant. In recent main project for ALBA, namely the de- years, the governments of ALBA mem- fense against imperialism and the need ber states and the government of Haiti for a joint response to the threat of US have also moved closer together, and aggression, has not resounded much today Haiti takes part in ALBA meetings among other countries. as an observer. At the Seventh Summit held in Co- The third issue is the ALBA-Caribe Fund, chabamba in 2009, the ALBA Perma- whose mission is to fund social projects nent Committee for Sovereignty and (www.petrocaribe.org) on areas such as Defense was created with two funda- tourism, health, education, road infras- mental goals: to define a Strategy for tructure, environmental cleanup, ac- Joint Popular Defense and to establish cess to drinking water, housing, sports, an School for Dignity and Sovereign- and agriculture in various Caribbean ty of Armed Forces. The latter was in- countries. During the fifth Petrocaribe augurated in Bolivia in 2011. At this Presidential Summit, the President of meeting, however, cracks within ALBA Venezuela announced the creation of became apparent as English-speaking Petroalimentos, which would include Caribbean countries expressed their the formation of a Permanent Council reservations given that they also be- of Agriculture Ministers, and the ALBA- long to the Regional Security System.2 Caribe Fund, with an initial contribution Likewise, following Costa Rica’s com- in the amount of $50 million dollars on plaint about what it considered an in- the part of Venezuela.