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Combat Branch Conceptualizations of Warfare in the United States Army, 1983 - 1999 University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2017 Tribal Ways of War: Combat Branch Conceptualizations of Warfare in the United States Army, 1983 - 1999 Stephenson, Harris Stephenson, H. (2017). Tribal Ways of War: Combat Branch Conceptualizations of Warfare in the United States Army, 1983 - 1999 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/28527 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3700 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Tribal Ways of War: Combat Branch Conceptualizations of Warfare in the United States Army, 1983 – 1999 by Harris Robinson Stephenson A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF STRATEGIC STUDIES GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA APRIL, 2017 © Harris Robinson Stephenson 2017 Abstract: This thesis addresses the questions: how did the three primary combat branches, or tribes, of the United States Army – the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery – conceptualize warfare from 1983 to 1999? Additionally, how does that relate to the Army’s military culture, and strategic environment? Primary research of the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery’s professional journals is used to understand how intra-organizational units’ conceptualizations of warfare related and interacted with the international system, the American national security apparatus, and the Army’s military culture. These conceptualizations were characterized by complex relationships with events, where they were influenced by and shaped responses to changes in the international system, fluctuations in the American national security apparatus, and internal dynamics within the Army itself. Ultimately, this demonstrates the complexity of militaries and provides greater insight into how organizations function, but, more importantly, it reveals the power of tribal conceptualizations to shape responses in a bottom-up manner. ii Acknowledgements: This research would not have been possible without the supervision and mentorship of Dr. Terry Terriff, who graciously took me on as a student. It has been a great privilege to have him supervise my work, and I am eternally grateful for the wisdom and support he showed me throughout this, sometimes, harrowing process. Thank you to the Centre of Military, Security and Strategic Studies and the funding provided by the Arthur J. Child Scholarship allowed me to focus on my studies and grow as an academic. The behind the scenes work of Donna, Nancy, Shelley, Patrick, and Jamie make the Centre an excellent research institution. Many thanks goes out to all the students at the Centre who created a welcoming environment, especially Danny, Tim, Adam, Katie, Blake, Matt, Steffen, and Rebecca. All of whom offered support and advice, or encouraged I find inspiration at the bottom of a glass of crisp refreshing beer. A special thank you to Alex Salt, who, willingly or unwillingly I am still not sure, showed me the academic ropes, challenged me, and was eager to discuss the minutia of militaries over numerous whiskeys. To my parents, Gloria and Sam, thank you for sparking an interest in learning early on in my life. Sunday dinners with James and Spence under Napoleon, Wellington, and Disraeli provided everything I could ask for. I can’t thank you enough for your encouragement, and love. Lastly, Ceilidh, thank you for putting up with my constant declarations that it would be finished by this weekend or the end that month. You truly have been my rock throughout this whole adventure. Your patience, laughter, and gentle prodding to go to the mountains preserved at least a little of my sanity. iii Table of Contents: Abstract………………………………………………..………………………………………… ii Acknowledgements…...………………………………………………………………………… iii Table of Contents……………………...………………………………………………………… iv List of abbreviations …..………………………………………………………………………… v Epigraph … …………………………………………………………………………………..…vii Introduction: Tribal Strategy, War, and Warfare……………..…………………...………………1 Chapter 1: Analytical Framework and Literature Review……………………………………… 11 Chapter 2: Organizational Context in Narrative and Culture ……………………………..…… 25 Chapter 3: Cold Warriors, AirLand Battles ………………………………………………….… 45 Chapter 4: Strategic Upheavals and New Wars ………………………………………………... 93 Chapter 5: Uncomfortable Realities, Desired Futures, and Maneuver Warfare………………..129 Conclusions: Tribal Influence and Visions of War……………………………………………..169 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………...... 183 iv List of Abbreviations: Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) AirLand Battle (ALB) Armored Gun System (AGS) Army Chief of Staff (ACS) Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) Brigadier General (BG) Captain (CPT) Colonel (COL) Combat Training Center (CTC) Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Continuous Operations (CONOPS) Division Advanced Warfighting Experiments (DAWE) First Lieutenant (LT) General (GEN) High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) Intervehicular Information System (IVIS) Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Lieutenant General (LTG) Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) v Main Battle Tank (MBT) Major (MAJ) Major General (MG) Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) National Training Center (NTC) Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act (OODA) Officer Evaluation Report (OER) Operation Desert Hammer (ODH VI) Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Precision Guided Munition (PGM) Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI) Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (RSOI) Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Second Lieutenant (2LT) Sergeant (SGT) Sergeant First Class (SFC) Specialists (SPC) Staff Sergeant (SSG) Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) vi Every soldier generally thinks only so far as the radius of action of his branch of service and only as quickly as he can move his weapons. - General Karl Koller, Luftwaffe vii Introduction: Tribal Strategy, War, and Warfare War is a multifaceted concept. Carl von Clausewitz states that war is analogous to a duel and that at its most basic level “war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”1 On the danger of war, Thucydides quotes the Spartan king Archidamus “I have not lived so long, Spartans, without having had the experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age as myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for war from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety.”2 For Peter Paret, war “never has been, and is not today, a unitary or even a wholly military phenomenon, but a compound of many elements, ranging from politics to technology to human emotions under extreme stress.”3 The US Army’s 1982 doctrinal manual, FM 100-5 Operations AirLand Battle (ALB), defined war as “the [application] of whatever degree of force is necessary to allow attainment of the political purpose or aim for which the war is being fought.”4 Yet, however war is defined, its operationalization as warfare forms an essential foundation for the concept as a whole. Again, Clausewitz provides insight into this when he wrote, “essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war… The art of war is the art of using the given means in combat; there is no better term for it than the conduct of war.”5 As a social construct, the reality of warfare interacts with various discourses and narratives that seek to explain it.6 Instead of defining war and warfare through an objective, universal lens – 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds., and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 75. 2 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Robert B. Strassler ed. and Richard Crawley trans., (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996), pp. 1.80.1. 3 Peter Paret, “Introduction,” in Peter Paret ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 8. 4 Headquarters Department of the Army, Operations FM 100-5, (Fort Leavenworth: Training and Doctrine Command, 1982), pp. B-1. 5 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 127. Emphasis in original. 6 See Appendix A in, John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America, (New York: Westview Press, 2003). 1 which has its uses – a constructivist approach perceives warfare as an intensely subjective, cultural phenomenon.7 Therefore, who is doing the defining matters a great deal, especially when those tasked with the ‘conduct of war’ are doing the conceptualizing. Why examine militaries and their conceptions of warfare, battles, and combat? Are battles too far removed from the level of policy to merit study? Does understanding how soldiers think matter when it comes to how states operate in the international system? As one
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