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Afghanistan ICT Assessment.Docx
Assessment of Information and Communication Technologies in Afghan Agricultural Extension Written by Megan Mayzelle Maria-Paz Santibañez, Jessica Schweiger, and Courtney Jallo International Programs Office College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences University of California Davis December 2014 © 2014 International Programs of CA&ES Environmental Horticulture Building Room #1103 University of California, Davis One Shields Avenue Davis, CA 95616 Tel: (530) 754-0275 http://ip.ucdavis.edu/ This document was developed under the auspices of the e-Afghan Ag project, which was funded by the United States Department of Agriculture and implemented by the International Programs Office of the College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences at the University of California Davis from 2011-2014, as well as the Afghan Agricultural Extension Project, funded by the United States Agency for International Development and implemented by a consortium of universities led by the International Programs Office of the College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences at the University of California Davis from 2014-2017. The primary purpose of the assessment was to inform project efforts and build organizational knowledge. The results have been positive in this regard, and we therefore provide the document to others with the aim to inform organizations seeking to employ information and communication technologies in Afghan agricultural development. While we have attempted to be as thorough and objective as possible, the information in this report is not based on systematic field tests and surveys, but rather but rather interviews, case studies, and literature reviews. Consequently, we refrain from making concrete recommendations. Rather, this report should be viewed as an introduction to information and communication technologies for agricultural development in Afghanistan. -
Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties
112 Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 6 ARTICLE Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap __________________________ Margo Schlanger* * Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I have greatly benefited from conversations with John DeLong, Mort Halperin, Alex Joel, David Kris, Marty Lederman, Nancy Libin, Rick Perlstein, Becky Richards, and several officials who prefer not to be named, all of whom generously spent time with me, discussing the issues in this article, and many of whom also helped again after reading the piece in draft. I would also like to extend thanks to Sam Bagenstos, Rick Lempert, Daphna Renan, Alex Rossmiller, Adrian Vermeule, Steve Vladeck, Marcy Wheeler, Shirin Sinnar and other participants in the 7th Annual National Security Law Workshop, participants at the University of Iowa law faculty workshop, and my colleagues at the University of Michigan Legal Theory Workshop and governance group lunch, who offered me extremely helpful feedback. Jennifer Gitter and Lauren Dayton provided able research assistance. All errors are, of course, my responsibility. Copyright © 2015 by the Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College and Margo Schlanger. 2015 / Intelligence Legalism and the NSA’s Civil Liberties Gaps 113 Abstract Since June 2013, we have seen unprecedented security breaches and disclosures relating to American electronic surveillance. The nearly daily drip, and occasional gush, of once-secret policy and operational information makes it possible to analyze and understand National Security Agency activities, including the organizations and processes inside and outside the NSA that are supposed to safeguard American’s civil liberties as the agency goes about its intelligence gathering business. -
Corporate Social Responsibility in Afghanistan a Critical Case Study of the Mobile Telecommunications Industry Azizi, Sameer
Corporate Social Responsibility in Afghanistan A Critical Case Study of the Mobile Telecommunications Industry Azizi, Sameer Document Version Final published version Publication date: 2017 License CC BY-NC-ND Citation for published version (APA): Azizi, S. (2017). Corporate Social Responsibility in Afghanistan: A Critical Case Study of the Mobile Telecommunications Industry. Copenhagen Business School [Phd]. PhD series No. 11.2017 Link to publication in CBS Research Portal General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us ([email protected]) providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 27. Sep. 2021 COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN CORPORATE SOLBJERG PLADS 3 DK-2000 FREDERIKSBERG DANMARK WWW.CBS.DK ISSN 0906-6934 Print ISBN: 978-87-93483-94-1 Online ISBN: 978-87-93483-95-8 – A CRITICAL CASE STUDY OF THE MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY – A CRITICAL CASE STUDY OF THE MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS Sameer Azizi CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN – A CRITICAL CASE STUDY OF THE MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY Doctoral School of Organisation and Management Studies PhD Series 11.2017 PhD Series 11-2017 Corporate -
IT in Afghanistan
ICT in Afghanistan (two-way communication only) Siri Birgitte Uldal Muhammad Aimal Marjan 4. February 2004 Title NST report ICT in Afghanistan (Two way communication only) ISBN Number of pages Date Authors Siri Birgitte Uldal, NST Muhammad Aimal Marjan, Ministry of Communcation / Afghan Computer Science Association Summary Two years after Taliban left Kabul, there is about 172 000 telephones in Afghanistan in a country of assumed 25 mill inhabitants. The MoC has set up a three tier model for phone coverage, where the finishing of tier one and the start of tier two are under implementation. Today Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Kunduz has some access to phones, but not enough to supply the demand. Today there are concrete plans for extension to Khost, Pulekhomri, Sheberghan, Ghazni, Faizabad, Lashkergha, Taloqan, Parwan and Baglas. Beside the MoCs terrestrial network, two GSM vendors (AWCC and Roshan) have license to operate. The GoA has a radio network that reaches out to all provinces. 10 ISPs are registered. The .af domain was revitalized about a year ago, now 138 domains are registered under .af. Public Internet cafes exists in Kabul (est. 50), Mazar-i-Sharif (est. 10), Kandahar (est. 10) and Herat (est. 10), but NGOs has set up VSATs also in other cities. The MoC has plans for a fiber ring, but while the fiber ring may take some time, VSAT technology are utilized. Kabul University is likely offering the best higher education in the country. Here bachelor degrees in Computer Science are offered. Cisco has established a training centre in the same building offering a two year education in networking. -
Intelligence Failures in Countering Islamic Terrorism: a Comparative Analysis on the Strategic Surprises of the 9/11 and the Pa
Department of Political Science Master’s Degree in International Relations - Global Studies Chair of Geopolitical Scenarios and Political Risk Intelligence Failures in Countering Islamic Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis on the Strategic Surprises of the 9/11 and the Paris Attacks and the Exceptionality of the Italian Case SUPERVISOR CANDIDATE Prof. Giuseppe Scognamiglio Antonella Camerino Student ID: 639472 CO-SUPERVISOR Prof. Lorenzo Castellani ACCADEMIC YEAR 2019-2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………………5 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………..6 CHAPTER 1: Intelligence: A Theoretical Framework 1.1 – The Intelligence Cycle………………………………………………………………….11 1.2 – Intelligence Failures…………………………………………………………………….19 1.3 – The Strategic Surprises and Surprises Attacks………………………………………….24 1.4 – The Black Swan Theory………………………………………………………………...30 CHAPTER 2: The Case of USA: The Attacks of the 9/11 2.1 – The US Intelligence Community……………………………………………………….35 2.2 – Analysis of a Terrorist Organization: Al-Qaeda………………………………………..43 2.3 – The 9/11 Attacks: Facts, Causes and Consequences……………………………………52 2.4 – The US Involvement in the Middle East: The War on Terror………………………….61 CHAPTER 3: The Case of France: The Paris Attacks of November 13 3.1 – The French Intelligence Community…………………………………………………...73 3.2 – Analysis of a Terrorist Organization: The Islamic State………………………………..80 3.3 – The Paris Attacks of November 13: Facts, Causes and Consequences………………...90 3.4 – The French Involvement in the Middle East: Opération Chammal…………………….98 -
Corporate Social Responsibility in Afghanistan: a Critical Case Study of the Mobile Telecommunications Industry
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Azizi, Sameer Doctoral Thesis Corporate Social Responsibility in Afghanistan: A Critical Case Study of the Mobile Telecommunications Industry PhD Series, No. 11.2017 Provided in Cooperation with: Copenhagen Business School (CBS) Suggested Citation: Azizi, Sameer (2017) : Corporate Social Responsibility in Afghanistan: A Critical Case Study of the Mobile Telecommunications Industry, PhD Series, No. 11.2017, ISBN 9788793483958, Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Frederiksberg, http://hdl.handle.net/10398/9466 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/209019 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend -
Social Media and Articulation of Radical Narratives in Afghanistan
Social Media and Articulation of Radical Narratives in Afghanistan Niamatullah Ibrahimi | Musab Omer | Mohammad Irfani November 2015 Kabul, Afghanistan This Page Intentionally Left Blank Social Media and Articulation of Radical Narratives in Afghanistan Authors: Mr. Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Mr. Musab Omer and Mr. Mohammad Irfani Project Coordinator: Mr. Musab Omer Research Design and Report Peer Review § Dr. Sarah Logan, Research Fellow, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia § Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Research Professor, Faculty of Arts and Education, Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University Australia, Melbourne, Australia Field Researchers § Mr. Khalid Yousafzai § Mr. Fazel Obaid § Mr. Basir Moheb § Mr. Bashir Ahmad Osmani With support from November 2015 United States Institute of Peace Kabul, Afghanistan This Page Intentionally Left Blank CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................................... 6 ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................................... 7 GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................... -
Joint Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information
Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information Prepared by the Inspectors General of the: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MARCH 2017 Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit Division Report 17-21 REVIEW OF DOMESTIC SHARING OF COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... i INTRODUCTION . ............................................................................................................................................. 1 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................... 1 FIELD-BASED COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING ...................................................................................... 3 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................ 7 INTEGRATION, COORDINATION, AND NATIONAL STRATEGY .......................................................................... 7 EXAMPLES OF INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION ......................................................................................7 SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES ................................................................................................................................. 8 INTERCONNECTED MISSIONS OF FEDERAL PARTNERS -
Workforce Planning in the Intelligence Community
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that ad- dress the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for re- search quality and objectivity. WORKFORCE PLANNING IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY A Retrospective CHARLES NEMFAKOS, BERNARD D. -
Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 3
A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance THE FAA AND BEYOND DAVID S. KRIS Aegis Paper Series No. 1601 It is a strange time for national security. Beginning in 2013, Edward Snowden’s leaks caused the US government to significantly reduce the scope, and increase the transparency, of its foreign intelligence surveillance, while the president urged caution and restraint in response to the extraordinary rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). At the same time, US communications providers sought additional reforms and reduced their cooperation with surveillance directives in important cases. Finally, anti-surveillance politicians, on the right and left of the US political spectrum, prospered as part of a burgeoning populist movement. In Western Europe, by contrast, ISIL’s rise spurred a significant and overt expansion of surveillance authorities. European governments, particularly the United Kingdom, began National Security, Technology, and Law and Technology, Security, National making increasingly strident demands for communications data from US providers. And the European Union struck down the safe-harbor regime for trans-Atlantic data sharing on the grounds that US surveillance laws do not adequately protect privacy. Despite increased transparency, as of January 2016, the immense technical and legal complexity of US surveillance law continues to challenge informed debate across all of these fronts. In this highly charged and confused environment, Congress will soon take up the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act (FAA), which is set to expire at the end of 2017. I make six predictions about the issues likely to dominate that legislative process. -
Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: the FAA and Beyond
ARTICLES Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and Beyond David S. Kris* It is a strange time for national security. Beginning in 2013, Edward Snowden’s leaks caused the U.S. government to significantly reduce the scope, and in- crease the transparency, of its foreign intelligence surveillance, while the president urged caution and restraint in response to the extraordinary rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). At the same time, U.S. communi- cations providers sought additional reforms and reduced their cooperation with surveillance directives in important cases. Finally, anti-surveillance politicians, on the right and left of the U.S. political spectrum, prospered as part of a burgeoning populist movement. In Western Europe, by contrast, ISIL’s rise spurred a significant and overt expansion of surveillance authorities. European governments, particularly the United Kingdom, began making increasingly strident demands for communications data from U.S. providers. And the Euro- pean Union struck down the safe-harbor regime for trans-Atlantic data sharing on the grounds that U.S. surveillance laws do not adequately protect privacy. Despite increased transparency, as of January 2016, the immense technical and legal complexity of U.S. surveillance law continues to challenge informed debate across all of these fronts. In this highly charged and confused environment, Congress will soon take up the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act (FAA), which is set to expire at the end of 2017. I make six predictions about the issues likely to dominate that legislative process. Most of those issues concern incremental change, and a range of possible outcomes well within existing legal and policy * David S. -
DHS/ALL/PIA-086 DHS Counterintelligence Program Page 1
Privacy Impact Assessment for the DHS Counterintelligence Program DHS Reference No. DHS/ALL/PIA-086 August 31, 2020 Privacy Impact Assessment DHS/ALL/PIA-086 DHS Counterintelligence Program Page 1 Abstract The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Counterintelligence (CI) Program is a Department-wide effort designed to detect, deter, and disrupt foreign intelligence threats directed at the United States. CI encompasses those activities that identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents (including transnational criminal organizations and drug trafficking organizations conducting intelligence-related activities), or international terrorist organizations or activities, collectively hereinafter referred to as foreign intelligence entities (FIE).1 DHS is conducting this Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) because the DHS CI Program requires access to, collection of, and storage of personally identifiable information (PII) associated with individuals who are either involved in, witness to, or knowledgeable of CI-related activities that are the subject of inquiry by DHS, or supporting CI activities conducted by the DHS CI Program. Overview The DHS CI Program is a coordinated Department effort to detect, deter, and disrupt foreign intelligence threats directed at the United States. Within DHS, only two Components are members of the Intelligence Community (IC): the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which each have different authorities under Executive Order (EO) 12333 “United States Intelligence Activities” 2 (as well as through their own statutory authorities, which are explained in more detail below).