THE URALIAN IRON and STEEL INDUSTRY by Clifford Charles Eric
THE URALIAN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY
by
Clifford Charles Eric Denike
B. A., The University of British Columbia, 1960
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Geography
We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard.
The University of British Columbia
April 1964 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of •
British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study, I further agree that per• mission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by.the. Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that;copying or publi• cation .of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission*'
Department of Geography
The University.of' British Columbia, Vancouver 8v, Canada
Date. • April, 1964» ABSTRACT
This study examines the Uralian iron and steel industry distribution, its changes through time and the reasons for these changes. At present, this is one of the important iron and steel producing regions in the world. At one time it was the most important.
In order to obtain the information on which to base this study, it was necessary to resort mainly to published materials, largely Soviet. The American Iron and Steel Institute also supplied some non-published material.
In order to collect the published materials it was necessary to make use of the libraries of .the University of British Columbia the University of Washington and the Geographical Branch of the
Department of Mines and Technical Surveys in Ottawa. Other
Ottawa libraries, the personal collections of Dr. Hooson and Dr.
Jackson, various bookstores, notably Kamkin's bookstore in
Washington, D. C, the bookstore at the United Nations in New
York and Davis bookstore in Montreal, were also very useful.
The primary problem when conducting a study of this nature is the collecting of sufficient relevant materials for a balanced appraisal of the phenomena being examined. A knowledge of Russian is mandatory and an acquaintance with French is also useful. The information gathered was organized into tables and
plotted on maps. These bodies of data were then described and
analyzed.
Analysis of the Uralian iron and steel industry indicated
that this industry was initially essentially located on the iron
ore supply. But none of the major plants are at present located
on iron ore resources that are large enough to amortize the
plant. Also the major plants, are on the whole, based on low
quality ores.
The major economic advantage of the Uralian iron and
steel industry production is its association with the Eastern
coal supplies. But this advantage is common to all Eastern
plants. Expansion at Magnitogorsk will result in more expensive
production, than the construction of new plants would, even
though Magnitogorsk is the most efficient Uralian plant.
The Urals is well located for the introduction of natural
gas into its metallurgy. This is proceeding. Nevertheless, the
use of natural gas is only a partial solution to the fuel problem
because it can not completely replace coke. Therefore, the Urals will have to continue bringing in coking coal over great distances.
The de-emphasis of iron and steel announced in 1962 will
help the Urals to perpetuate its present status as a producer (it
supplies about one-third of the Soviet production). On the other hand, no significant increase in its relative importance can be expected.
The bulk of the Uralian iron and steel production is located in the Eastern Urals, more particularly in the South
Eastern Urals. In 1956, the three largest plants: Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk in the South Eastern Urals, and Nizhne Tagil'sk in the Central Urals produced 77 per cent of the Uralian pig iron and 67 per cent of the steel smelted. This has not signi• ficantly changed subsequently.
Considerable expansion, based on Kachkanar ores, is planned for Nizhne Tagil'sk. But, all things considered, most of the expansion will be located at the major South Uralian plants. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writer wishes to acknowledge the invaluable aid given by Dr. D. J. M. Hooson in the preparation of this study.
The writer is also indebted to Dr. J. D. Chapman, Dr. W. A.
Douglas Jackson and Dr. R. M. Bone for encouragement, advice
and materials. Messrs. Ronald Boyes, James BateE and Denis
Kerfoot helped with criticism of the techniques used in the
study and in the gathering of materials. TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION..... 1
II. THE CHARCOAL IRON INDUSTRY. 10
BEGINNINGS 10
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 12
RELATIVE DECLINE 22
ABSOLUTE DECLINE...... 48
SUMMARY. 61
III. THE RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY.. 63
IRON ORE... 63
The Nature of the Ores 63
The Nature of the Deposits.. 66
Production. 67
Evaluation of Supply... 71
COAL. *...... 76
General.. 76
Local Supply.... 77 Reserves .... 77 Production 78
Import of Coal 79
Production of Coke 81
AUXILIARY MATERIALS 81
Alloying Agents 81
Refractory Materials 91
Water. 93 (ii)
CHAPTER PAGE
III.(cont'd)
Flux .... 94
Scrap 94
SUMMARY. ... , 96
IV. THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY USING COKE 98
BEFORE WORLD WAR II 98
WORLD WAR II 108
POST WORLD WAR II...... 112
SUMMARY. 116
V. INDIVIDUAL PLANTS ...... 121
MAGNITOGORSK 121
Iron Ore Supply...... 121
Iron and Steel Production... 126
NIZHNE TAGIL'SK... 131
Iron Ore Supply 131
Iron and Steel Production 133
CHELYABINSK. 137
Iron Ore Supply 137
Iron and Steel Production ..140
ORSK-KHALILOV.SK 143
Iron Ore Supply .....143
Iron and Steel Production ..145
SMALL PLANTS. 148
SUMMARY ...... 154 (iii)
CHAPTER PAGE
VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE URALIAN IRON AND
STEEL INDUSTRY 137
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 157
RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY 161
VII. CONCLUSIONS 175
BIBLIOGRAPHY 180 (iv)
LIST OF MAPS
MAP PAGE
1 LOCATION OF THE URALS. 6
2 ELEVATION AND DRAINAGE IN THE URALS...... 7
3 URALIAN DEPOSITS IMPORTANT TO FERROUS
METALLURGY 8
4 URALIAN WATERWAYS 14
5 RUSSIAN PENETRATION OF THE URALS 15
6 LOCATION OF MAJOR PLANTS, 1631-1696 16
7 BASHKIR UPRISINGS, 1705-1755. 23
8 LOCATION OF OPERATING PLANTS, 1701-1735 24
9 PROBABLE FOREST COVER IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.-. - 26 10 INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE URALS DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 27
11 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION-1800...... 29
12 THE COMING OF THE RAILWAYS-1873-1898. 42
13 MAJOR PLANTS - 1913 44
14 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION -1913 46
15 MAJOR IRON AND STEEL PLANTS -LATE 1930'S 57;
16 CHARCOAL PIG IRON PRODUCERS-1940-1956 59
17 CHIEF IRON ORE PRODUCERS -1955 74
18 MAJOR DEPOSITS OF COAL IN WESTERN USSR OF COKING QUALITY..;.... 82
19 URALS-KUZBASS-THE SECOND METALLURGICAL BASE 1935-1938 85 •?v)
MAP PAGE
20 MAJOR OPERATING PLANTS - 1938.. 105
21 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION -1938 ..107
22 CONSTRUCTION IN FERROUS METALLURGY IN THE URALS DURING WORLD WAR II. 113
23 FERROUS METALLURGICAL PLANTS-1956. 122 (vi)
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
I. INTRAREGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IRON AND
STEEL, 1800-1913...... 47
II. THE URALIAN IRON ORE SUPPLY.... 73
III. MINERALIZATION OF THE FUEL BALANCE OF THE
URALS METALLURGY. 84
IV. COAL PRODUCTION IN THE URALS 84
V. INTRAREGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IRON AND STEEL, 1913-1938.....*....*.* .- 110 VI. PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL IN THE
URALS, 1940-1945 *.. 120
VII. INPUTS IN ONE TON OF PIG IRON-1956 120
VIII. INPUTS IN ONE TON OF STEEL -1956 120 IX. IRON ORE RESOURCES-1 JANUARY 1956...... 167 X. TOTAL GEOLOGICAL RESERVES OF COAL BASINS PRODUCING METALLURGICAL COKING-COALS IN THE USSR. ..*...... ,. 167
XI. IRON CONTENT IN ORES UTILIZED-1956 ...... 168
XII. YIELD OF METALLURGICAL COKE 168
XIII. PROPORTION OF TOTAL OUTPUT OF VARIOUS IRON ORE BASINS AND DEPOSITS 169
XIV. PROPORTION OF COKING COAL SUPPLY OF VARIOUS COAL BASINS FOR-FERROUS METALLURGY in-%...... 169
XV. DISTANCES BETWEEN MAJOR IRON ORE AND COAL DEPOSITS...... 170
XVI. AVERAGE TON-KM ASSEMBLY OF RAW MATERIALS FOR THE LARGEST PLANTS...... 170 (vii)
TABLE PAGE
XVII. PRODUCTION OF IRON AND-STEEL-SELECTED PRODUCERS-1955...... ,...... 171
XVIII. INPUTS IN ONETTON OF STEEL-MAKING PIG - IRON-1956...... 172
XIX. OPERATING DATA ON BLAST FURNACES USING HIGH SINTER BURDENS...... 173
XX. COMPARATIVE COST OF OPEN HEARTH CARBON STEEL IN 1958...... 174
XXI. REGIONAL COST OF PRODUCTION OF PIG IRON FOR STEEL MAKING...... 174 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The general aim of this study is to examine the distri• bution of the Uralian iron and steel industry. An analysis of the distribution is to be attempted both as to internal structure and relative position in the world iron and steel pattern. On this basis some conclusions are to be drawn as to the nature of the Uralian iron and steel industry and in what manner its distribution is likely to change.
In 1955, the Urals was the seventh pig iron smelting region in the world. It was surpassed by the Donets-Krivoy Rog region, the Pittsburgh-Youngstown region, the United States
Eastern region, the Chicago region, the Rhine-Westphal region, and Great Britain. By 1958, the Urals ferrous metal production surpassed all foreign nations except the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.*-
Yet this major industrial phenomenon has been only super• ficially or incompletely treated in Western geographical litera• ture. Part of the reason for this lack is that the Urals covers an area larger than most countries and its iron and steel industry
*T. V. Komar, Ural. Ekonomlka-Geograficheskava Kharakteristika. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959, pp. 180, 199; and Metal Statistics 1960. New York: American Metal Market, 1960, pp. 34, 103. 2. has attained a state of considerable complexity with wide vari• ations from unit to unit. In addition it is necessary to examine a time span of over three hundred years.
The Uralian iron and steel industry falls into two great overlapping periods - the charcoal era and the coke era. The pre-eminent locational factors changed with technological change.
Only one of the old charcoal locations was suitable for massive expansion in the coke era. In the charcoal era the prime require• ments were ready access to transportation routes and a good timber supply. In the coke era the prime requirement has been a very
large raw material supply.
It is necessary to evaluate the raw material supply before the present distribution can be adequately examined. The develop• ment of the coke based industry in general is further amplified when the most significant plants are individually examined. Only when all the preceding material has been gathered can a worth• while analysis of the Uralian iron and steel industry distribution be attempted.
There is an appalling lack of detailed Soviet studies on the distribution of their iron and steel industry. The best 2 source is undoubtedly Livshits (1958) but this book does not contain a single map. Some other sources are of considerable
R. S. Livshits, Razmeshchenie Chernov Metallurgii SSSR. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1958. 3. interest in explaining the distribution of the Uralian industry. 3 Bardin (1960) provides an authoritative account of the economic rationale behind the Uralian iron and steel distribution. Clark 4 (1956) is the best comparable Western source.
Roepke (1956)"* is an invaluable model of the format for 6 such a study. Pounds (1952) is not very useful because his area is so restricted in size as to have little relevance for a study on the areal scale of the Urals. Furthermore, he deals with a coalfield location which was never very significant in the char• coal era.
Historical material on the Uralian iron and steel industry is more plentiful than most other types of information. Nolde
(1952)^ is an excellent source for material dealing with the eighteenth century. Kafengauz (1949) treats the development of
3 I. P. Bardin, Ekonomika Chernov Metallurgii SSSR. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoe Izdatel'stvo Literatury po Chernoy i Tsvetnoy Metallurgii, 1960. 4 M. G. Clark, The Economics of Soviet Steel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. **H. G. Roepke, Movements of the British Iron and Steel Industry - 1720 to 1951. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences: vol. 36, 1956. N. J. G. Pounds, The Ruhr. A Study in Historical and Economic Georgraphy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1952.
^B. Nolde, La formation de 1*Empire russe. etudes, notes et documents. Paris: Institut de'etudes slaves, tome Premier,1952. 8 B. B. Kafengauz, Istoriva Khozvaystva Demidowkh v XVIII- XIX w. opyt Issledovaniya po Istorii Ural'skoy Metallurgii torn 1: Moskva-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1949. 4. g the Demidov industrial interests in depth. Scott (1942) provides an extremely detailed account of the early development of
Magnitogorsk. Lipatov (1960)^ thoroughly covers the expansion during World War II. 11 12 Komar (1959), Ponomaryov (I960), and Ostinsev (1960) supply important background material necessary for any valid appreciation of the environment in which the Uralian iron and steel industry developed. Unfortunately Osintsev is prone to errors apparently through inefficient proofreading. Also he is an economist and deals with the actual distribution of the in• dustry in a most cavalier fashion.
Virtually all the data was gathered from published sources excepting only some materials supplied by H. C. Rossrucker,
Satistician, The American Iron and Steel Institute. Livshits supplied a fund of statistics as did Komar. Other useful sources
9 J. Scott, Behind the Urals. An American Worker in Russia's City of Steel. Cambridge Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1942.
^"°N. P. Lipatov, Chernava Metallurgiva Urala. v godv Velikov Otechestvennov Vovnv (1941-1945). Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1960.
*"^B. N. Ponomaryov, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960.
12 A. S. Osintsev, Chernava Metallurgiva Urala. Sverdlovsk: Sverdlovskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1960. 5. were: Nolde, Osintsev, Kutaf'ev (1959),13 Khlebnikov (I960)14 15 and Minakov (1961). These materials were then reduced to maps and tables, and the study was based on the explanation and inter• pretation of these materials.
Russian; names have been transliterated rather than trans• lated unless common English usage has otherwise indicated. The transliterated form used is that of the root of the words as opposed to the nominative singular form unless usage has otherwise indicated. The transliteration system used is essentially that of the United States Board on Geographic Names.
S. A. Kutaf'ev, Rossivskava Sovetskava Federativnava Sotsialisticheskava Respublika. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Geograficheskoy Literatury, 1959. 14 V. B. Khlebnikov, "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy, During 1959-1965," from Sovetskava Chernava Metallurgiva 1959-1965. Moscow: Gosplanizdat, 1960, pp. 3-7, 50-243 (In Joint Publications Research Service, 12,474, 7 February 1962). ^M. Minakov, "Problems of Raising the Efficiency of Interregional Industrial Links," Voprosy Ekonomiki. No. 3, 1961, pp. 121-129 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (11), Joint Publi• cations Research-Service* 10,046, 6 September 1961, pp. 5-21).
7.
ELEVATION AND DRAINAGE IN THE URALS
/ MAJOR MOUNTAIN RANGES
80 0 80 160 KM. 8.
URALIAN DEPOSITS IMPORTANT TO FERROUS METALLURGY - 1956 MAP 3
N
r
75 0 75 150 225 KM. • • 1
0 50,000,000 TONS OF RESERVES ©IRON ORE • COAL • MANGANESE 9.
URALIAN DEPOSITS IMPORTANT TO FERROUS METALLURGY - 1956 - LEGEND
S-I — Serovo-Ivdel1sk B = Bakal
Ki = Kizelovsk Coal Basin Z = Zigazinsk
Ka = Kachkanar M = Magnitogorsk
T-K Tagilo-Kushvinsk K = Kustanay
A = Alapaevsk Kh = Khalilovsk
V-P Visimo-Pervoural* sk
Sources: Komar, op. cit.. foldout map facing p. 28, Fig. 3 - "Greatest Raw Materials"; and I. P. Bardin, Zhelezorudnava Baza Chernov Metallurgii SSSRt Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1957, p. 317. 10.
CHAPTER II
THE CHARCOAL IRON INDUSTRY
The Uralian charcoal iron industry was the precursor to
the modem Uralian iron and steel industry. To trace the develop• ment of this industry it is necessary to rely primarily on major
published sources, both Soviet and non-Soviet. Books were used
as opposed to periodical materials. The Uralian charcoal iron
industry was developed during the eighteenth century, underwent
a relative decline in the nineteenth century and an absolute decline in the twentieth century.
I. BEGINNINGS
The bulk of the Urals was captured by the Russians between
1552 (the fall of Kazan) and the end of the seventeenth century.
This included all of the Urals North and West of the Ural River.
Therefore, by the end of the seventeenth century the Russians more or less ruled all of the area to develop metallurgy in the next two hundred years.
The first significant development of iron working in the
Urals occurred on the Nitsa River in 1631,^ just thirty-three 2 3 years after the area had first been settled by Russians.
*Komar, pj>. cit.. pp. 82-83. 2A settlement, Verkhotur'e was established on the Tura in 1598, the Nitsa is a tributary of the Tura. jc C/, JB. Nolde states that the natives had worked iron ore for some time. La formation de l'Empire russe. etudes, notes et documents. Paris: Institut d'etudes slaves, tome I, 1952, pp.238-9. 11.
In 1676, Czar Alexis sent two Germans, Samuel Fitsch and Harms
HeroId, to search for copper and iron. They reported occurrences of these minerals but stated that the country was too wild to develop. Therefore no systematic development was attempted at 4 this time.
By 1696, when Peter I promulgated his ukase concerning the intensification of the search for Uralian iron ore, four signi• ficant and many minor operations had been established,1 in spite of serious Bashkir uprisings."* During this period, the ever present threat of histilities with the Bashkirs made the Urals south of a line along the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset• rivers impractic• able for the establishment of metal-working. Although the first penetration into the Urals had occurred, no government south of this line had been established, other than the small post of Ufa founded in 1585.^
The earliest plants established were: the above-mentioned
Nitsa Plant in 1631; the Neiva Plant in the 1660's on a tributary of the Nitsa; the Krasnoborsk plant in the 1660*s on the Kama; and the DaLmatovsk Plant in the 1680's on the Iset1. Therefore, from the earliest developments there was a preference for the
Nolde, loc. cit. ^Serious uprisings occurred during 1662-1667 and 1676- 1683. Atlas Istorii SSSR. Chast' I, Fig. 22. 6 Nolde, op. cit.. p. 191. 12.
Eastern slopes of the Urals, because of more suitable ore resources.
The early expansion of the iron working industry in the
Urals was limited primarily by the lack of demand but other
factors played a part in hindering development. For example, deposits of easily processed ore (limonite)^ were rare, much of
the area was occupied by hostile peoples, and the number of
suitable sites was limited by the necessity of using river trans• port .
II. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Iron-working was an important aspect of Peter I's plans
to bring Russia out of its backward state. Prior to Peter's reign iron for 'fabricating military equipment was imported through
Archangel - hence, the development of a home industry became
imperative after the Swedish war cut off supplies.
New plants were initially set up in established areas of
the Center, close to the regions of consumption. But the short•
age of wood was already critical in the Center, and measures were
taken to reduce even the old-established small-scale iron indus•
tries. New works were set up in North Western European Russia
(in the Olenets Gubernia), but fuel and iron ore were running"
short there, even more so than in the Center.
^Easily fusible limonite, chiefly in small reserves, served as the initial raw material base of the iron working industry of the Urals. Komar, op. cit.. pp. 217-218. 13.
Peter was forced to turn to the Urals; an area which was distant, poorly-developed, and sparsely populated. In this area, g however, ore, wood and water power were available. In 1697, 9
Andre Vinius, the son of a Dutchman discovered iron ore of as high a quality as Swedish ore along the Tagil River. Besides these deposits, there were enormous forested areas which could be utilized for charcoal, a prime requirement for the smelting of pig iron. The metal could be exported down the Kama and its tributaries, the Chusovaya and Belaya.
At the urging of Vinius, Peter hired some Saxon engineers for the task of developing the Urals iron industry. Prince
Cherkasski was ordered to develop iron works. Between 1698 and
1704, he had six constructed. The most successful early govern• ment iron works were the Nev'yansk works (begun in 1699),
Kamensk (1700) and Alapaevsk (1704). Nikita Demidov, who had caused significant production of iron ore and armaments at Tula was sent to organize Uralian production. He was granted the most successful government plant - Nev'yansk. State serfs, established in Siberia as farmers in the seventeenth century, were used as labour.^Somewhat later entrepreneurs began to construct iron g R. S. Livshits, Razmeshchenie Chernov Metallurgii SSSR. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1958, pp. 555-556. 9 10 Nolde, on. cit.. p. 240; Nolde, ooj. cit.. pp. 240-245.
15.
RUSSIAN PENETRATION OF THE URALS MAP 5
75 0 75 150 225 KM • i 1 1 Sources: Atlas Istorii SSSR, Chast' I, fig. 18, 27; Chast' II, fig. 6, 11+; and Nolde, p. 191. 16.
LOCATION OF MAJOR PLANTS, 1631-1696
MAP 6
KRASNOBORSK ( 1660's)
Sources: Vvedenskiy, B.S.E.; Komar, pp. 82,85; and Atlas Istoril SSSR, Chast' I, fig. 23.
75 0 75 150 225 KM. »••••• j i J 17. works. The first private development was in 1728 by Gabriel
Osokin and associates at Irginsk. This was a copper and iron plant.
Once Peter's ukase (1696) had been promulgated strenuous efforts were made to expand iron production, but by 1733 the only extension south of the former Kama-Chusovaya-Iset1 river line was 12 to the Sylva, a tributary of the Chusovaya. The Bashkirs had risen again, in 1705-1711, overrunning the Iset' where the 13 Karaensk and Uktussk plants were located. Nonetheless, in 1733, 14,000 metric tons of pig iron, or more than a,third of the 12 Russian total, were produced in the Urals. In 1735 Nev'yansk 14 and Nizhne Tagil'sk were the centers of the iron industry.
In 1735-1740, the Bashkirs rose again as far as the South banks of the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset1. *"** Thus little progress had been made toward pacifying the Southern Urals by 1740, although
Ufa had a population of 19,266 by 1739. In 1736, Kirilov after taking the first effective steps to occupy Bashkiria founded a copper foundry at Tabynsk. In 1744 the plant was ceded to
Tverdyshev along with a large concession. By 1762 Tverdyshev *"*"Nolde, op. cit.. p. 252. •*-2Komar, op. cit.. p. 86. ^13Atla s Istorii SSSR. Chast' II, fig. 2. 14, ^Nolde, pp. cit.. p. 247. 15 'Atlas Istorii SSSR. Chast' II, fig. 3. 163Nolde , opj. cit.. p. 199. 18. was operating two iron furnaces and two other blast furnaces were under construction. There were several other blast furnaces 17 operating in the Southern Urals by 1762. 18
By 1750, 23,000 metric tons were produced in the Urals.
The 1755 Bashkir uprising covered a considerably less extensive area,1^ thus by that time their power was on the wane. Virtually all the South banks of the Kama-Iset' line were not concerned and the uprising was localized in the Belaya-Ufa system basin. This was the last major Bashkir uprising as such, and hence after 1755 all of the Urals North and West of the Ural River and the Iset' and its tributaries was effectively in Russian hands. Then the only limit on the extent of iron working was the forest areas that could supply charcoal, which was approximately along the
Belaya and the tributaries of the Iset1. The great expansion in the eighteenth century thus was in two major phases: 1 - from 19 20
1701 to 1754 with all construction along or to the North of the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset'; and 2 - from 1755 - 1800 with construction throughou17t the forested area. 18 Nolde, op. cit. pp. 259-262. Komar, op. cit.. p. 90 19 The first result of Peter's program, the Nevyansk Plant, was completed then,a lag of five years after the ukase. 20 The first plant constructed well to the South of the Kama-Iset' line was Zlatoust in 1754. Atlas Istorii SSSR. Chast' fig. 3; and B. A. Vvedenskiy, Bol'shava Sovetskava Entsiklopediva. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatel'stvo Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1952, vol. 17, p. 103. 19. The prime factor limiting the spread of the iron industry through the Urals in the pre-Petrine period had been the lack of demand. Demand increased once Peter's ukase of 1696 came into effect. Lack of demand was not a problem again until after the end of the eighteenth century. It was still not possible to develop some large areas populated by hostile peoples, and only sites along accessible rivers were capable of being brought into production.
By 1733, all of the production of the Urals was in the
Western and Central Urals, concentrated along the Kama, Sylva,
Chusovoy, Iset', Tagil and Neiva. Thus the early production was
located first in regard to transport because all of these plants were relatively accessible to the Kama transport route to the
West. They were also located in reference to easily worked
limonite ore deposits, and all had abundant stands of forest around them.
After the Bashkir power had been broken, the great Pugachev revolt overran all of the area of the former Bashkir uprisings in
1773-4, as well as the North bank of the Kama to Perm', across the Chusovaya and half way between the Iset' and Tura. That is to say, two-thirds of the area where iron working had been developed or about three-quarters of the area of the Urals then under Russian jurisdiction was lost. A considerable number of important plants, notably Avzyma-Petrovsk, Beloretsk, Zlatoust, 21 Satkinsk, Votkinsk and Izhevsk were seized. 20. Notwithstanding this exceptional revolt, after the des• truction of the Bashkir power by 1755, a whole new area had been thrown open for development. The prime limitation became the availability of trees, which more or less coincided with the
Belaya-Iset' river systems. The industry was still tied to river transport and thus it rapidly spread to the limit of the trees to the South, but it achieved penetration North of its previously established plants only after 1758 because of difficulties of transport. By 1770 there were furnaces at four locations in the 22 region, but the region remained isolated.
The Uralian plants were large for that time and had fairly modern technical equipment. Each plant had a dammed pond with a head of water which was utilized as motive force for its equipment,
Thanks to the Urals Russia at the end of the eighteenth century was the world's largest producer of iron, which was ex• ported in great quantities to foreign countries, particularly
England. V. V. Danilevskiy, in Russkava Tekhnika. even claims
"the fact of worldwide historical significance - the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century in England - was based to a significant extent on the utilization of the labour of the 23 Russian people, producing ore, smelting pig iron and coking in
2IAtlas Istorii SSSR. Chast' II, fig. 5, "Rossiyskaya imperiya s 1762 po 1800 g." 22 Nolde, op. cit.. p. 263. 23 A term used to signify charcoal burning in this instance. 21. the Urals for iron, shipped to England".
The combination of good, easily accessible ore reserves, forest resources, cheap labour, and numerous rivers, convenient for water power and the export of products provided the Urals plants significant advantages relative to the metallurgical 24 plants of the central guberniyas and Olenets Kray.
There were twenty works in the Urals by the end of Peter's reign; this had increased ,to 115 by the end of the eighteenth century. Two-thirds of Russian blast furnaces were in the Urals, producing over two-thirds of the pig iron. In 1760, 45,000 metric tons were produced, in 1770 - 65,000 tons, and in 1800 - 130,000 25 tons. In 1767, 56,000 tons of pig iron were produced in the
Urals, twice as much as in Britain. Exports of iron from the
Urals were: 1762, 19,000 tons; 1773, 44,900 tons, and 1794,
63,600 tons.
Only hemp and flax were more important Russian exports at 26 that time.. Iron went mainly to Britain, which was short of wood.
By 1800, three major subregions had developed in the Urals.
These were the-Central Urals, South Central-Urals and Western
Urals. The Central Urals was the most important accounting for
70 per cent of the pig iron and 48 per cent of the refined iron.
This was2 4th e oldest region and had numerous limonite deposits. Kutaf'ev, op. cit., pp. a555.-556. 253iKomar , op. cit., p. 90.
26T 'Livshits, op. cit.. p. 110. 22.
Next most important was the South Central Urals, the newest region, which supplied 23 per cent of the pig iron and 25 per cent of the refined iron. Conditions here were similar to the
Central Urals.
The Western Urals supplied only 6 per cent of the pig iron, but 26 per cent of the refined iron. This was the most accessible region but it lacked abundant suitable ore reserves.
Considerable amounts of pig iron were refined here while being transported to the West along the Chusovaya-Kama route. This region had ample fuel, and as it was common practice to refine pig iron at a different plant than the pig iron was smelted in any case, this was a rational development.
III. RELATIVE DECLINE '
Between 1800 and 1913, the Uralian ferrous- metal industry entered the modern period. The large scale smelting of steel was introduced, production became concentrated into relatively few producers, and production became more strongly differentiated by region within, the Urals. During the first part' of the period, from say 1800 to 1870, the Uralian iron and.steel industry expanded slowly because foreign coke based production made in- 27 roads on its world markets.
27 The bulk of the national market was retained but its demands were not sufficient to maintain a growth rate remotely comparable to the Western coke based producers. In England pig iron smelting from 1796 to 1860 increased from 128,000 to 3,827~,000 tons or by almost thirty times j in the Urals during 23.
BASHKIR UPRISINGS, 1705-1755 MAP 7
Source: Atlas Istorii SSSR, Chast' II, fig. 2,3.
75 0 75 150 225 KM.
25
LOCATION OF OPERATING PLANTS. 1701-1735 -LEGEND
N = Nevyansk (1701) E = Ekaterinburg (1723)
K = Kamensk (1702) N-T = Nizhne-Tagil'sk (1725)
U = Uktussk (1702) C = Chernoistochinsk(1728)
A = Alapaevsk (1703) I Irginsk (1728)
S = Shuralinsk (1716) Ut = Utkinsk (1729)
B = Byngovsk (1718) Bi = Bilimbay (1733)
V-T = Verkhne-Tagil'sk (1718) R = Revdinsk (1734)
Sha = Shaytansk (1721)
Sources: Komar, OP. cit.. pp. 85-86; Atlas Istorii SSSR. Chast' II, fig. 2, "Rossiyskaya Imperiya pri Petre I (Evropeyskaya Chast')"; and Nolde, OP. cit.. pp. 241-253 and Carte 3-"L,? industrialisation de l'Oural au course du xviiie siecle." 26
I i i i r I I I 1 27
• major plants ^ Central Urals ^ South Central Urals ^Northern Urals 75 0 75 150 225 KM. ^Western Urals U~LJ-Lj ' ' ' 28.
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE URALS DURING THE 18TH CENTURY -LEGEND
I = Izhevsk Ukt = Uktussk V = Votkinsk V-I = Verhhne-Isetsk Ir = Irginsk Sys = Sysert• P = Petropavlovsk Ka = Kamensk B Bogoslovsk NS - Nizhne Serginsk T = Turinsk VS = Verkhne Serginsk N-P = Nikola-Pavdinsk R - Revdinsk VT = Verkhne Turinsk Se — Seversk K = Kushvinsk Po = Polevskoy Ba = Barantshinsk N-Pe - Niaze-Petrovsk NT Nizhne Tagil1sk Uf = Ufaleysk Ch = Chernois tochinsk Kas = Kasli By = Byngovsk Ky = Kyshtym N = Nevyansk Z = Zlatoust V-Ta = Verkhne-Tagil1 sk Sat = Satkinsk Sh = Shuralinsk Sim = Simsk S = Suszansk U-K = Usf-Katavsk Si = S inyachikhinsk Yu Yuryuzan1 A = Alapaevsk K-I Katav-Ivanovsk Sy - Sylvinsk Be = Beloretsk U — Utkinsk Uz = Uzyansk Bi = Bilimbay A-P = Avzyano-Petrovsk Sha = Shaytansk Kag = Kaginsk E = Ekaterinburg
Sources: Komar, opj. cit., pp. 85, 87, 92-93; Istorii Atlas. Chast* II, fig. 2,3,5; Bol'shava Sovetskava Entsiklonediva. various vol.; Kratkava Geograficheskava Entsiklonediva. vol. 1, 2; and Nolde, op. cit., carte 3 - "Llndustriali- sation de 1* Oural au cours due xviiie sieele". 29.
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION
- 1800 MAP II
• PIG IRON % CENTRAL AND NORTHERN URALS • IRON ® SOUTH CENTRAL URALS @ WESTERN URALS SOURCE^ KOMAR, OR CIT., PP. 92-93. 30. The impact of foreign coal based iron and steel production had a profound but not an immediate effect on the Urals. No appreciable inroads on Uralian prosperity were made until the discovery of the puddling process of iron refining in 1781 in
Britain. Pig iron had been smelted on coke since 1709 but there 28 were many technical as well as traditional objections to the widespread adoption of this process. Britain was an exception in having the conditions necessary for the adoption of this process- forest exhaustion, good coking coals and relatively large furnaces.
Pig iron so produced was, even so, generally of a low quality and charcoal based production could still effectively compete*
The puddling process did not actually require coal as such but it demanded vast quantities of fuel which was much more dif• ficult to supply with wood or charcoal than with coal. Any type of coal could be used, it did not have to be coking coal, but it had to be abundant. Abundant coal resources were exactly what 29 the Urals lacked. Puddling spread rapidly in Britain, and was rapidly established in .Continental Europe although it did not really get there until after 1815"^ at the end of the Napoleonic 31 wars. J- • . , the same period it rose from 102,000 tons to 242,000 tons. Komar, op. cit.. p. 96. 28 For example injurious impurities of sulphur were imparted to the metal rather than being oxidized as happens in today's blast furnaces. N. J. G. Pounds, The Geography of Iron and Steet. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1959, p. 18. 29 Pounds, op. cit.. p. 19. 31.
Therefore, although the Urals did not change in this period its competitors adopted the new more effective technology and the Urals entered the doldrums. By 1760 coke pig iron ac- 32 counted for the preponderance of British production. With the advent of coke pig iron and puddling Britain's production expanded from the low of about 10,000 tons in 1750 to more than 3,000,000 tons by 1854.
In the face of such competition the Urals declined to the role of, a second order supplier', in world markets, which were flooded by the cheaper coke pig iron. In 1801-1805, the British annual average export was 132,000 tons of iron, by 1856 Britain 33 exported 1,275,000 tons of iron. Exports of Russian (essenti• ally Uralian) iron declined from 30,000 - 50,000 tons in the final decade of theeighteenth century to 12,000 tons in 1850.
The high quality of Uralian iron aided in the retention of a partial market. It was purchased by England (3900 tons in 1850) for the manufacture of steel, and the USA (1700 tons in 1850) in the form of sheet iron.
Then, in the latter part of the 19th century, the Urals lost its dominant position within Russia because of the appearance of new producing regions based on coal. In 1860, the Urals supplied3 08 0 per cent of the Russian smelt of pig iron, 85 per cent There was a 1785 puddling furnace at Le Creusot, in Central France, but this was exceptional. ^Pounds, op. cit,, p. 97. 32. 34 of the finished iron, and 90 per cent of the steel. By 1880 it supplied 79 per cent of the pig iron, but only 45 per cent of the steel because of the emergence of the Center and North West 35 steel producers. From 1800 to 1880 the Uralian pig iron pro- 36 duction increased from 130,000 tons to 300,000 tons. Its steel production had reached 220,000 tons by 1880.
After 1880 the Urals relative position declined consis• tently. By 1890 the Urals produced only 58 per cent of the pig iron and 43 per cent of the steel. In 1880 the South produced
5 per cent of the pig iron and 6 per cent of the steel. In 1890 these figures increased to 28 per cent of the pig iron, 21 per cent of the steel. From then on until the First World War the 37 Southern share increased and the Urals declined. Until the 1890*s development was hampered by the lack of 38 suitable transport to the main consuming centres of Russia, especially St. Petersburg. There was some new construction (26 plants during the first half of the nineteenth century for 32 H. G. Roepke, Movements of the British Iron and Steel Industry - 1720 to 1951. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. 36, 1956, p. 19. 33 34 Ibid.. p. 24; Komar, op. cit.. p. 96. 35 Livshits, op. cit.. table 18 "The Distribution of the Production of Pig Iron in Russia in 1860 - 1913", p. 116. 36 37 Komar, op. cit.. p. 90; Livshits, op. cit.. p. 116.
38Ibid.. pp. Ill - 112. 33. instance), but this was essentially auxiliary to and replacement for pre-existing plants. Therefore, there was no significant change to the preceding distribution pattern. The Central Urals remained the leading subregionj actually its position was some- 39 what improved. 40
From 1870 growth revived with considerable new con• struction and rationalization of existing plants virtually all of which were based on charcoal. The larger more efficient char• coal producers were able to compete with coke based production.
Thus this period saw two major phases, first the disappearance or fossilization of the less efficient plants, and then new growth on the more favourable sites, some of which were occupied by existing plants. This growth occurred after the depletion of forests around the long established plants caused them to become less economic, and also in conjunction with the construction of railroads which made the export of metal easier.
Komar, op. cit... p. 97 40 Holloway claims that the spur to development was rail• road construction which became important from 1868, There were two major phases - 1868 - 1874 when 8,200 miles of track were lain and from 1890 - 1900 when 13,700 miles were lain. In the latter period this has been calculated to amount to 7,200,000 tons of pig iron. By 1890 the Urals was rapidly losing its im• portance, but up until 1880 it supplied about 80 per cent of the production or the bulk of that required in the earlier period. Robert J. Holloway, "The Development of the Russian Iron and Steel Industry", Stanford: Stanford University Graduate School of Business: Business Research Series: No. 6, 1952, p. 3. 34.
Up to the 1890's when the Urals were linked up with the nation's rail network, Ural iron was quite incapable of competing with Southern metal on the markets of the Center and North West.
It mainly supplied the needs of its own and neighboring areas, which were quite small.
The Urals declined relatively during the latter part of the nineteenth century, partly for lack of coking coal, partly because of its position. Growth continued to be exclusively on charcoal, which meant that furnaces could not be as big as on 41 coke, and that the industry depended on ever-diminishing forests.
Nonetheless, production increased from the 1880 totals of 300,000 tons of pig iron and 220,000 tons of steel to 450,000 tons of pig iron and 290,000 tons of steel by 1890.
But after the railways were built from 1885 - 1893 from
Samara (Kuybyshev) to Chelyabinsk, and from 1894 - 1896 the con- 42 necting link from Chelyabinsk to Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk) and the pre-existing (1873-1878) Uralian mine plant railroad, 43
Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk)-Kama , the possible market for Uralian iron became larger, though there was the problem of competition 44 with the highly organized rapidly growing industry in the South. 41 Actually a little inferior coal was mined inthe Kizelovsk Basin from the 1870's. Kutaf'ev, op. cit.. pp. 557-559; and Livshits, OP. cit.. pp. 115-129.
^TComar, OP. cit.. p. 117. 43Ibid., p. 108; and Atlas Istorii. Chast' II, fig. 17. 44 Livshits, ojg, cit.. pp. 115-129. 35.
The Russian demand for metal had grown to such an extent that considerable expansion was instituted in the Urals even with the overshadowing growth of the South based on cheap coke fuel, and in spite of the paucity of suitable coking coal in the
Urals, and the economic unfeasibility of importing coal from other regions based on the then existing railway technology.
Thus the bulk of the new growth was on charcoal despite the ini• tiation of coal mining in the Kizelovsk basin in the 1870's which supplied only marginal coking coals.
In the final quarter of the nineteenth century ten new plants were built, noteworthy among which were Chusovsk (1879),
Teplogorsk (1884)4"* and most important, the Nadezhdinsk plant 46
(1884). By 1900 the Urals produced 820,000 tons of pig iron and 670,000 tons of steel. By 1913, production had reached a prerevolutionary peak of 900,000 tons of pig iron and a like amount of steel.^
Costs were often still below those of the South in 1913.
Even at Nadezhdinsk, supplied mainly with ore over a considerable distance (mainly from Goroblagodat1 near Kushva some 150 lcilo- 48 meters away), ore costs in 1913 were less than 40 per cent of those in the South, while charcoal cost little more than coke. 4^Komar, op. cit.. p. 107; 4*Wedenskiy, op.cit.. vol.38,p.596, 47 48 Livshits, OP. cit.. table 18, p. 116; Ibid.. p. 121. 36.
Technological development remained at a low level in the
Urals throughout this period - partly due to the lack of large rivers for cheap transport, a factor which helped split the pro• cesses in the industry into separate undertakings on small rivers which provided water. The average Southern works had 4.3 times as many workers as a Urals works or 14 times as much output of pig iron.
Output from the South was much more varied than from the
Urals, which concentrated mainly on sheet iron, necessary for the 49 production of consumer goods, in which the Urals specialized.
In 1913 in the Urals there were 125 iron works, of which
96 were in operation."^ In the same year, the average cost of assorted rolled iron in the Urals was 20 per cent more than in
Southern plants."'1 The more recently equipped and relatively large plants of Nadezhdinsk and Chusovsk could compete with
Southern metallurgy because of their nearness to the local metal market in the Urals and Western Siberia. But, by and large, the
Urals were hampered by the retention of obsolescent practices and equipment. Furnaces built in the eighteenth century were 49 Livshits, o£. cit., pp. 115-12r9. "^A. S. Osintsev, Chernava Metallurgiva Urala. Sverdlovsk: Sverdlovskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1960, p. 12.
"^Ibid., p. 18. 37.
retained, which required manual charging and other such
operations.
The 1880-1913 period was a period during which Uralian metallurgy underwent considerable absolute growth, but continu•
ously lost ground relatively to the then emerging South. In this
period the Urals tripled its pig iron production from 300,000 to
900,000 tons, but underwent a decline in its proportion of the
Russian smelt from 79 per cent to 21 per cent. The South in the
same period increased from 5 per cent to 68 per cent. The Urals
relative decline in steel production was not so marked because
the output quadrupled in this period (from 220,000 tons to 900,000
tons), and by 1880 it had already lost its 1860 hegemony when it
produced 90 per cent of the Russian steel smelt. Therefore, the
Urals declined from 45 per cent to 21 per cent of the total steel
smelt, while the South increased from 6 per cent to 63 per.cent in
the same period. In 1913, the remainder of the steel produced,
16 per cent, was supplied by the Center and North West which had 53
accounted for 49 per cent in 1880.
By 1913 with the development of the Nadezhdinsk Plant, the
Northern Urals became much more important. It produced about one-
fifth of the pig iron and one-sixth of the steel of the Urals. Of ______Kutaf'ev, op. cit.. pp. 557-559.
53 Livshits, op. cit.. p. 116, table 18. 38. the Northern Uralian pig iron total of 199,600 tons, 169,000 were 54 produced by Nadezhdinsk, as was all of the steel and rolled metal.
Thus it was by far the largest plant in the Urals.
It was then possible to develop such a plant that could not have existed earlier because of progress in three directions: transportation, technology and finance. Nadezhdinsk was founded in 1894 just as the Urals was being linked by railway to the major metal markets of Russia. Technology had by then advanced to such a stage that it was feasible to build such a large plant, and supply a market for the metal therein produced. It was possible to finance such a venture through the joint stock company as opposed to the family enterprise which had preceded it.
The Central Urals - the oldest region - lost some of its relative position with the emerging of the new region and the greater proportional development of the other regions. Nonethe• less, it still experienced the greatest absolute growth in this period. It started the period as the most important area and finished it in the same manner. None of the then existing areas have ever replaced it as a pig iron producing region. The abso• lute gap of production was actually widening between it and each of the other three regions.
The Central Urals production in this period quadrupled and certain plants emerged as major ^producers while others disappeared.
54 Livshits, op. cit., table 20 "The Distribution of Ferrous Metallurgy in the Urals in 1913", p. 120. 39.
Alapaevsk, Kushvinsk, Nizhne Tagil*sk and Nizhne Saldinsk emerged as the most important pig iron producers in this region. They were associated with superior ore resources - the Alapaevsk deposit and the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group of deposits. These four plants produced 34 per cent of the total Central Urals pig iron smelt by 1913, more than the total 1800 smelt. They produced 44 per cent of the steel as well in 1913. If the two other major steel plants - Verkhne Isetsk and Verkhne Saldinsk - are added, the total for steel reaches 61 per cent. Verkhne Isetsk was
located at Sverdlovsk with its major market and was a steel only plant. Verkhne Saldinsk was also a steel only plant associated with the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group of iron and steel plants, notably
Nizhne Tagilsk which had excess pig iron capacity.
Thus by 1913 the iron and steel industry in the Central
Urals had proved most successful where iron ore resources were the most suitable except in the case of the Verkhne Isetsk plant which served the Sverdlovsk steel market.
The South Central Urals underwent a sevenfold increase in the smelt of pig iron. Three plants emerged as major pig iron 55 producers - Zlatoust, Satkinsk and Ashinsk. By 1913, they pro• duced 54 per cent of the pig iron of the region or over three
This was the Zlatoust metallurgical plant which pro• duced all of the Zlatoust pig iron as compared with the Zlatoust mechanical plant which produced the steel. 40. times the 1800 total. All were associated with the major
Bakal'sk iron ore deposit. They were on the Ufa to Chelyabinsk portion of the Trans Siberian Railway which had been completed to 56
Chelyabinsk in 1893. There were only two major steel plants in this subregion in 1913 - Ashinsk and Beloretsk. Between them they smelted two-thirds of the total steel.
Ashinsk was one of the three major pig iron producers and
Beloretsk was linked by a direct rail line to them, but was one hundred kilometers further South. The reasons Beloretsk was im• portant was that it had a highly developed metal rolling operation and the steel plant supplied it. It was one of the oldest plants in the Urals, but by 1913 had lost most of its significance as a pig iron producer: and the other operations remained important largely through inertia and the initiative of the local manage- _ 57 ment. The Western Urals underwent a twelvefold increase in the smelting of pig iron. Three plants emerged as significant pig iron producers - Chusovsk, Teplogorsk and Pashiysk. Between them they accounted for 84 per cent of the subregional pig iron smelt.
These plants were close to the Tagilo-Kushvinsk ore reserves on the most direct rail line between the deposits and Perm1. There
56Komar, op., cit.. pp. 107-108, 117. 57 Vvedenskiy, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 464. 41. were four major steel plants in the Western Orals by 1913, the
Chusovsk plant, Lys'vensk and Chermozsk and Dobrayansk. These
four accounted for 71 per cent of the regional steel smelt.
Chusovsk was also an important pig iron producer and it, and the neighboring Lys'vensk were both near Perm' as were Chermozsk and
Dobryansk. Thus three of the four major steel plants were market
oriented. This was the only region where steel production ex•
ceeded pig iron production, and it was three times as great as
pig iron production. Its production was predominantly market
oriented and the major producers grew up adjacent to the major market - Perm' and also along transportation routes - the
Chusovaya and Kama rivers.
The Northern Urals, for all intents and purposes, was
inaugurated in 1894 when the Nadezhdinsk plant was started into
operation. The Nadezhdinsk plant was located far from the esta•
blished metallurgical centres, in the North LUrals, near the
remaining forest reserves. This was the largest and technically most advanced metallurgical works in the Urals before the
revolution.
By 1913, Nadezhdinsk was producing 19 per cent of the iron
and 16 per cent of the steel of the Urals. It was based on char•
coal production but because it employed modern technology, had
an efficient scale of operations and depended on an abundant wood
58 Livshits, op. cit.. pp. 115-129. 2 k2.
THE COMING OF THE RAILWAYS, 1873-1898
• MAJOR PLANTS BUILT DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
w 1873-1878 —I— 1885-1893 I89I4.-I896 43.
THE COMING OF THE RAILWAYS-1873-1898
LEGEND
Ch Chusovsk (1879)
T Teplogorsk (1884)
S Sos'vinsk (1880-5)
N Nadezhdinsk (1894)
Z Zigazinsk (1890s)
A Ashinsk (1898)
Sources: Komar, op. cit.. pp. 107, 108, 117; Atlas Istorii. Chast* II, fig. 17, "Rasvitie Kapitalizma v Rossii s 1861 po 1900g."; Kratkava Geograficheskava Entsiklopediva. vo. 1, p. 172; and Bol'shava Sovetskava Entsiklopediva. vol. 38, p. 596. MAJOR PLANTS. - 1913
MAP 13
7.5 ,. .0 75 150 225 KM. 150,000 TONS CENTRAL URALS l» SOUTH CENTRAL URALS CD WESTERN URALS Q 30,000 TONS ^ NORTHERN URALS
• OTHER MAJOR PLANTS Sources: Livshits, p. 120; Komar, p. 129» 45
MAJOR PLANTS - 1913
LEGEND
N = Nadezhdinsk (Serov) E = Eka t erinburg(Sverdlovsk)
P = Pashiysk Ash= Ashinsk (Asha-Balashovsk)
NT = Nizhne Tagil1sk S = Satkinsk
NS = Nizhne Saldinsk Z = Zlatoust
A = Alapaevsk B = Beloretsk 46.
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION
Sources: Livshits, p. 120; Komar, p. 129. 47. supply it was very economical, being one of the better operations in Russia.
This is the most clear cut example of a plant being esta• blished in relation to a fuel resource, rather than an ore re• source or a market. It is the only major plant in the Urals that is so located, being some 150 kilometers from its original ore source and at least as far from any potential market at that time.
TABLE I
INTRAREGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IRON AND STEEL, 1800-1913
SUBREGION 1800 1913
pig iron iron pig iron steel
1,000 % 1,000 % 1,000 % 1,000 % tons tons tons tons
Central 91 70 48 396 44 325 36 Urals
South Central 30 23 25 207 23 132 15 Urals
Western i, - ' 8 6 26 92 10 287 32 Urals
Northern - - - 198 22 146 16 Urals
TOTAL 129 99 99 893 99 890 99
Note: Percentage totals do not quite equal 100 per cent because some production is unassigned as to region; and also because of rounding.
Sources: Komar, op. cit.. pp. 85, 87, 92-93; and Livshits, op. cit.. p. 120. 48.
IV. ABSOLUTE DECLINE
During the First World War production increases were ordered and new construction was undertaken. However the total pig iron smelt declined from 920,000 tons in 1913 to 750,000 in
1916, and 720,000 in 1917. Substantial changes occurred in the product assortment with civil production (roofing iron, rails) being strongly curtailed and military production (variety rolled products, wire, rolling stockoetc.) increased. The total quantity of workers rose, however their productivity fell 59 sharply. The main reasons for this were conscription and des• ertion which by 1915 had caused the loss of 60 per cent of the experienced workers.^
Thus this period began with a gradual decline in production caused by the dislocations of war. By 1914 the production of pig iron had declined to 720,000 tons or 80 per cent of its 1913 level, and steel to 830,000 tons or 92 per cent of its 1913 level.
Then in 1918 came a collapse of production associated with the uncertainties of civil war and the breakdown of civil admini• stration during the institution of War Communism. Thus in 1918 production of pig iron fell to slightly over one-third of the previous year's total and production of steel fell to less than one-fifth of the previous year's total. From 1919 to 1922/23 59 Kutaf'ev, op. cit.. pp. 557-559. 60 Osintsev, op. cit.. p. 21. 49.
inclusive, the production of pig iron was below 20 per cent of
the 1913 level; and the production of steel was below 20 per cent of the 1913 level from 1918 to 1921/22 inclusive.
With the establishment of NEP (New Economic Policy) in
1922, and the reinstitution of civil order, production steadily
climbed back toward the 1913 level. Pig iron production increased by about 100,000 tons per year. Steel recovered at a somewhat
faster rate, due to the abundance of scrap and the possibility of using it as a raw material in steel making. Thus by 1923/24
iron production had reached 250,000 tons or 28 per cent of its
1913 level and steel had reached 310,000 tons or 35 per cent of
its 1913 level.61
1924 and the first switch to Kuznets coke marked the be•
ginning of the permanent decline of charcoal metallurgy. For
some years after 1924 charcoal production was augmented in
absolute terms but it continually lost relative position.
By 1928 iron and steel production had approximately re•
gained the 1913 level, iron was still somewhat short of this but
steel production had more than made good the former level. The
explanation behind this difference in rate of recovery was the greater use of scrap in steel making partly because of techno•
logical changes but essentially accounted for by the super•
abundance of scrap resulting from the civil war (1918-1920).
61 Livshits, op. cit., table 27, "Production of Pig Iron and Steel by Regions of USSR in 1913-1921"; and table 30/Pro- duction of Pig Iron and Steel in 1913-1927/28", pp.134-140-141. 50.
It is doubtful if any scrap occasioned by the German in• vasion ever got as far as the Urals, and as a matter of fact, there was little serious fighting in the Urals during the civil war, but the period of stagnation and unrest occasioned by this caused a great deal of plant to become -^unusable because of lack of maintenance. This was the primary source of scrap for the
Urals in the immediate post civil war period.
In 1928, the First Five Year Plan was initiated with the crippling German advance into the Ukraine a recent memory. To forestall the repetition of such an experience, it was deemed advisable to develop another major metallurgical region and the
Urals seemed to be the obvious choice for several reasons. It had sizable proven ore resources, was distant from the frontiers, but fairly close to the major industrial regions of the Soviet
Union.
Rapid absolute decline in charcoal metallurgy set in after
1935 when 850,000 tons of charcoal pig iron were produced. By
1940, this was down to less than 360,000 tons. There was a con• siderable shift in the old plants from charcoal to coke technology.
The production of charcoal pig iron declined from 870,000 tons in
1913 to 470,000 in 1938. Coke pig iron production increased from 29,000 tons to 370,000 tons in the old plants during this 62 period. In 1936, 36 blast furnaces operated on charcoal, by 62 Livshits, op. cit.. p. 167. 51.
1940, this was down to 8. One of the old regions - the Central
Urals, and one of the major producers in the Western Urals -
Lys'vensk were converted from charcoal to,coke.
In areas where the wood supply was better, charcoal metallurgy persisted. Some of the plants even underwent consi•
derable expansion, although in some cases this was on the basis of
coke. But for charcoal metallurgy to co-exist with coke metal•
lurgy in the same plant indicates a not too unfavorable cost
structure. Regions which retained charcoal metallurgy in signi•
ficant plants were: the South Central Urals, the Northern Urals
and the Western Urals. The South Central Urals had experienced
some relative decline with the inauguration of the Magnitogorsk
Plant, but had actually managed to slightly increase its share of
metal rolling. The regional smelt of pig iron had increased
from 205,000 tons (23 per cent of the Urals) to only 215,000 tons
(9 per cent) in 1938, and its smelt of steel had increased from
130,000 tons (15 per cent) to 400,000 tons (14 per cent).
Concentration of production proceeded. The major plants
- Zlatoust, Ashinsk, Satkinsk and Beloretsk increased their share
of the pig iron production from 59 per cent to 100 per cent.
Actually Zlatoust produced 19 per cent in 1913 and later dropped
production entirely. Therefore, Ashinsk, Satkinsk and Beloretsk
increased from 40 per cent to 100 per cent of the almost station•
ary production. Ashinsk and Satkinsk were associated with the 52. superior Bakal'sk ore source which was slightly better than the
Tagilo-Kushvinsk ore supply in regard to ore quality. Satkinsk was only a few kilometers from Bakal'sk and Ashinsk was a 63 relatively new plant, having been constructed in 1898, which was within reasonable distance of Bakal'sk. Beloretsk was associated with the Zigazino-Komarovskoe ore source which con• tained adequate reserves of 40 per cent limonite. These were the only two major ore sources in the region.
In the production of steel the four major plants had in• creased from 75 per cent of the total to 97 per cent. Actually
Satkinsk had dropped steel production, but it had only produced
5 per cent of the regional total in 1913 in any case. Ashinsk had increased a scant 10,000 tons for a relative decline from
37 per cent to 14 per cent and Beloretsk had more than doubled, but declined from 33 per cent to 27 per cent; and Zlatoust had risen from 0 to 214,000 tons (53 per cent) to make it by far the largest producer in the region.
Thus Satkinsk produced only pig iron and Ashinsk produced a surplus of pig iron. Both plants supplied Zlatoust with pig iron. The capacity of Satkinsk Was augmented by 70,000 tons of pig iron and Zlatoust by 230,000 tons of steel, instead of establishing one entirely new integrated works. 63 A. A. Grigor'ev, Kratkava Geograficheskava Entsiklo• pediva. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya", 1960, vol. I, p. 172. 53.
These piecemeal additions to capacity helped perpetuate both of these plants rather than the alternative establishment of one more efficient plant which was certainly feasible, even given the difficulty of finding a suitable site in this moun• tainous area. As Satkinsk was itself about 15 kilometers distant from its ore source, and twice as much new capacity was added to its existing plant, it could have been otherwise situated.
Zlatoust, even more than Satkinsk, could have been other• wise located because all of its steel capacity was newly built in this period. There is no question that major increases in cap• acity were desirable in the general Bakal'sk-Chelyabinsk area, given the local ore and market situation. This need was not properly supplied until the 1940's when the Chelyabinsk plant was developed to succeed the earlier inefficient piecemeal measures.
Beloretsk had a balanced pig iron and steel production.
Beloretsk, on the basis of its location, would appear to have been the obvious plant to link up with the new Magnitogorsk plant but at the time it was not linked by a-direct..-rail line and its local ore source was adequate for its own needs. Therefore, other plants, notably Zlatoust and Verkhne Isetsk, had much closer relations with the superior Magnitogorsk pig iron supply, which was not completely utilized at site.
The Northern Urals pig iron production increased from
199,000 tons (22 per cent of the Urals total) in 1913 to 236,000 54. tons (1G per cent) in 1938. Therefore, its growth was not impressive and with the emergence of Magnitogorsk its relative 64 position declined. Its steel production doubled in the same period, but also experienced a relative decline from 16 per cent to 10 per cent, which was not as large as in pig iron. Possibly the most significant development in the region was the alteration of the name Nadezhdinsk to Serov, which indicates that this plant was still a showpiece of sorts.
The Western Urals smelted its pig iron on charcoal throughout the 1913-1938 period. Production only increased from
92,000 tons to 110,000 tons and experienced a relative decline from 10 per cent to 5 per cent of the Urals smelt. The Chusovsk
Plant increased its share pf the Western Uralian total from 25 per cent to 85 per cent and thus became the predominant producer.
It managed to displace its 1913 rivals - Teplogorsk and Pashiysk because it was much better situated with regard to the Lys'vensk and Perm' markets. Lys'vensk required pig iron for steel making and Perm' required finished steel. It was also an integrated plant which made it a more efficient producer.
The steel production of the Western Urals experienced a decline from 287,000 tons to 267,000. Nine thousand tons of the 1913 total came from Omutninsk, which through boundary changes — Production increased from 146,000 tons in 1913 to 286,000 tons in 1938. 55. ended up outside of the Urals, therefore, the figures are not entirely comparable. But when the coke based Lys'vensk is subtracted from the 1938 total, that leaves only 148,000 tons of charcoal steel. Of this 148,000 tons, 81,000 or, 55 per cent, was produced by Chusovsk, where in fact, production had increased less than 5 per cent. The other two large steel plants Chermozsk and Dobryansk had experienced a similar increase. These three supplied all of the charcoal steel of the region. Thus they had increased from 63 per cent of the non-Lys'vensk total to 100 per cent because the other steel plants had all:;.ceased production during this period.
In the Western Urals the charcoal steel smelting declined with the disappearance of such plants as Votkinsk not being com• pensated for by the marginal increases in the plants retained.
The plants retained were near the important Perm1 market and were relatively large, but they had to work on scrap and imported pig iron to a considerable degree, there being no suitable iron ore source closer than the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group.
By 1940, there were only eight charcoal blast furnaces left. The Central Urals had one at the Verkhne-Sinyachikhinsk
Plant producing casting pig iron. The South Central Urals had five furnaces; two at Satkinsk smelting high quality pig iron for acid open hearth steel making, two at Belorets and one at
Ashinsk smelting regular pig iron for open hearth steel making. 56.
The Northern Urals (the Serov Plant) contained one charcoal furnace which smelted chrome pig iron and the Teplogorsk Plant 65 in the Western Urals had one smelting chrome nickel pig iron.
The only region that contained more than a single charcoal blast furnace in 1940 was the South Central Urals which had five, three of which were producing common pig iron. The reason for this is that charcoal smelting was developed in this region later than the Central Urals and the Western Urals. Thus this appears to be the most backward iron and steel region prewar.
The six plants, retaining charcoal blast furnaces to 1940, were in the less accessible parts of the Urals, away from the earliest major routeway along the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset1. Only in the more mountainous and remote areas did sufficient timber survive to supply it.
The Urals output of charcoal-based iron continued to drop after the war. In 1956, only two charcoal producing units were left. One blast furnace in the Staro-Utkinsk Plant in the Central
Urals smelting chrome nickel pig iron, and one blast furnace in the Serov Plant smelting forging iron. These two blast furnaces smelted in all 78,000 tons of charcoal pig iron, or 0.6 per cent 66 of the total Uralian pig iron production.
65
Livshits, op. cit.. pp. 165-166
66Ibid.. p. 209. 57
MAJOR IRON AND STEEL PLANTS - LATE 1930's
MAJOR IRON AND STEEL PLANTS - LATE 1930s LEGEND s = Serov (Nadezhdinsk) V-I = Verkhne-Isetsk Ch = Chusovsk Sa = Satkinsk L = Lys'vensk Z = Zlatoust NT = Nizhne Tagil'sk B = Beloretsk NS = Nizhne Saldinsk Sources: Komar, oj>. cit., map facing p. 52; Balzak, op. cit.. fig. 33, p. 249; Livshits, op. cit., p. 167; Geograficheskiv Atlas diva 7 & 8 Klassov Srednev Shkoly. op. cit.. p. 36; and Bol'shava Sovetskaya Atlas Mira. op. cit., pp. 69-70. 59. CHARCOAL PIG IRON PRODUCERS - 1940-1956 60. CHARCOAL PIG IRON PRODUCERS - 1940-1956 - LEGEND S = Serov B = Staroutkinsk T = Teplogorsk St = Satkinsk V-S = Verkhne-Sinyachikhinsk Sa = Ashinsk A = Beloretsk Source: Livshits, op. cit., pp. 165-166, 209. 61. Since 1940, five of the six plants then operating to some extent on charcoal had ceased to do so and the one remaining - Serov - had switched from producing chrome pig iron to forging iron. The other 1956 charcoal producer, Staro-Utkinsk had not been operating -inco. 1940. V. SUMMARY In the charcoal era the location of production altered for several reasons. Easy access to transportation routes was always necessary as was a good supply of timber. A ready avail• ability of iron ore was desirable but not strictly necessary as is illustrated by the development of iron refining along the Chusovaya transportation route based on Central Uralian pig iron. In the early period the Bashkirs made penetration into the Southern Urals impossible. After the Bashkir power was destroyed (by approximately 1755) the smelting of iron spread to the tree limit along the Belaya-Miass river systems. Production pene• trated to the Northern Urals at about the same time because transportation difficulties had retarded its development. Forest exhaustion and advances in coke technology caused the price of charcoal iron to become no longer competitive. But it was not until the 1920's that common grades of charcoal pig iron became uneconomical to produce. Specialty grades remained competitive with coke smelted metal considerably longer. Forest 62. exhaustion affected the Central Urals and the Western Urals regions first. These were the earliest established regions. Thus coke began replacing charcoal in the Central Urals and the Western Urals regions before the introduction of large scale coke metal• lurgy at Magnitogorsk. But charcoal metallurgy persisted in the more remote areas such as the South Central Urals and the Northern Urals long after Magnitogorsk appeared. These regions had better forest supplies because of the more recent establishment of charcoal metallurgy within their borders. They were also more difficult to supply with coking coals because of their location away from the major rail routes. The last remnants of charcoal metallurgy persisted at those plants that produced specialty metal. The charcoal plants that had suitable ore bases were converted to coke, those that did not were closed. 63. CHAPTER III "THE RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY The raw material supply is the most important locational factor in the Soviet iron and steel industry. In order to de• termine the nature of the raw material supply in the Urals extensive use of Soviet materials, both book and periodical,is necessary. This examination is organized topically into iron ore, coal and auxiliary materials supplies. I. IRON ORE The Nature of the Ores In 1959 the probable Uralian iron ore reserves were estimated to be 5,900,000,000 tons, but the average iron content of these ores was only 23 per cent.** The bulk of the increase in ore reserves from the 1938 figure of 2,400,000,000 tons was accounted for by considering as ore, lower content iron bearing bodies. If only the better ores are considered, the reserves in 1956 were only 1,800,000,000 tons or considerably less than the 1938 figure. The Uralian ores are extremely varied as to genesis, age and composition. They include magnetite, limonite, titano - magnetite and complex ores. In 1955 the reserves of magnetite together with martite and semimartite amounted to 860,000,000 .. *V. B. Khlebnikov, op. cit,. p. 16. 6It. tons or 15 per cent of the total probable reserves. Magnetite and associated ores are worked at Magnitogorsk; Mount Blagodat1 and Mount Vysokaya of the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group; and the Perv, Vtoro and Tret' Severn mines of the Serovo-Ivdel'sk group among others. These deposits have relatively high iron contents (generally 40 to 50 per cent Fe). Limonites are also widely worked in the Urals. Limonites provide the basis of the Bakal'sk, Komarovo-Zigazinsk (Bashkirsk), Alapaevsk, and Kamensk-Sinarsk groups of deposits and many small deposits scattered throughout the Gorno-Ural and its slopes. Its iron content is somewhat less than magnetite, but a signifi• cant proportion of the ores has 40 to 45 per cent and higher Fe content (for example, the Bakal'sk group). In conjunction with the limonite occur larger lean iron siderites (primary ores). In 1955 the reserves of the siderites and limonites amounted to 400,000,000 tons or 7 per cent of the Uralian ore reserves. The largest deposits of titano-magnetite are: the Kachkanarsk group, Visimsk, Pervoural'sk, Kusinsk and Kopansk deposits. The Uralian titano magnetites are a mixture of magne• tite iron with ilmenite and contain besides iron, titanium and vanadium^ They have only recently been utilized with preliminary beneficiation of ores resulting in the production of iron (magnetite) and titanium (ilmenite) concentrates. The reserves of titano magnetites in the Urals are enormous - in 1955 65. 2 estimated to be 4,200,000,000 tons or 74 per cent of the total Uralian ore resources. The richer iron, vanadium and titanium deposits are of solid ores (Kusinsk), but the preponderance of titano magnetite consists of impregnated ores with a small iron content, (17 per cent). The Urals have an abundance of complex iron ores including chromium, nickel, copper and cobalt admixtures. Iron in its turn occurs as a component of copper, aluminum, pyrite and other com• plex ores. A peculiar industrial ore of the Urals is the iron-chrome-nickel ore of the Khalilovsk group of deposits. In 1955 complex iron ores accounted for 230,000,000 tons or 4 per 3 cent of the Uralian reserves. Uralian ores are frequently troubled by a high sulphur content, but some of the ores are conspicuously free from harmful admixtures. The better Bakal'sk ore is almost sulphur free and contains only one thousandth part phosphorus. The titano-magne- tite has an extremely low content of sulphur and phosphorus as well. Still almost all of the iron ores of the Urals require some type of preliminary preparation for smelting - screening, By 1962 Kachkanar reserves were estimated to be eight billion tons. P. Kazakov, "Establish More Quickly the New Ore Base for the Metallurgy of the UralsJ" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. Moskva, 15 January 1962 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (24)", Joint Publications Research Service, 13,018, 16 March 1962, p. 5. 3 In addition to these, there are the recently discovered complex Serovsk ores which contain iron, chromium and nickel and, what is more, are comparatively free of phosphorus. In 1957 66. washing, roasting, magnetic separation, sintering and so forth. The Nature of the Deposits The iron resources of the Urals occur in a large number of various sized deposits scattered throughout the region. In the Urals there are in total about 2000 deposits, 1200 of which are located in Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Permsk Oblast's. However, 99 per cent of the reserves are concentrated in ten iron ore regions or groups of deposits. The chief deposits are located along the boundaries of the Central Urals Anticline and the Magnitogorsk-Nizhne Tagil'sk Syncline. Thus the preponderance of reserves - 1955 over five billion tons4 (88.3 per cent) - are on the Eastern slopes. Although characteristic earlier, this predominance was reinforced by the exploration of the titano - magnetite deposits. Important shifts have occurred between the iron ore re• serves of the Southern and Central Urals. In the prewar period (in 1938) the Southern Uralian reserves were estimated to be 1,500,000,000 tons (64 per cent) and the Central Urals - 850,000,000 tons (36 per cent); by 1956, the Southern Uralian reserves had experienced an absolute decline to 900,000,000 tons, these reserves were estimated to exceed a billion tons, but new treatment methods must be found before these ores can be used. 4 The American billion of 1,000,000,000 is used here and throughout the study. 67. but the Central Urals had increased to 4,800,000,000 tons. But for an accurate appraisal of the raw material basis of metallurgy it is necessary to take into account the proximity of the Southern Urals to the Kazakhstan iron ore regions. The iron ore reserves are very concentrated in the Urals. The Kachkanar, Gusevye (Kachkanarsk group), Magnitnaya, Blagodat', Vysokaya, Shaytansk Magnit and the group of ore-bearing mountains of Bakal' contain more than nine-tenths of all the iron ore re• serves, of which more than two-thirds of the reserves are in Kachkanar. In addition there are a series of iron ore regions composed of a great number of small deposits which complicates their ex• ploitation (Alapaevsk, Kamensk-Sinarsk, Bashkirsk, and Serovo-Ivdel'sk regions)."* Production One of the more pronounced features of the Uralian mining industry during the Reconstruction Period (1922-1928) was mine enlargement. Three hundred minute open pit mines were replaced by 22 mines of only 60,000 tons average annual output each. Effort, was concentrated on the development of industrial iron ore reserves in the Tagilo-Kushvinsk region, in the Bakal'sk Komar, op. cit, pp. 217-219. 68. Alapaevsk, Magnitogorsk and Sinarsk deposits. Then a series of large concentrators were constructed.^ Uralian iron ore pro• duction increased from 1,800,000 tons in 1913 to 8,100,000 tons in 1940. Ore production reached 25,000,000 tons of dressed ore or 34,800,000 tons of crude ore in 1955. In 1955, the production of magnetite and the products of its modification amounted to more than 24,000,000 tons or over 70 per cent of the total iron ore output. Limonite and siderite accounted for about seven million tons (20 per cent), titano-magnetite - three million tons (8 per cent) and complex ores - less than a million tons (2 per cent). The most noteworthy economic reserves are the Tagilo- Kushvinsk group, Magnitogorsk deposit, Bakal'sk, Khalilovsk and Kachkanar groups. The first three with reserves of about one billion tons (16.8 per cent of Uralian reserves in 1955) provided 29,100,000 tons or 83.7 per cent of the ore output in 1955 and the fourth was just commencing operations. No other reserves were extensive enough to be considered good sources except the Visimo-Pervoural'sk group which was of marginal quality. In 1955 the production of ore was very differently distri• buted than the reserves. Almost half of the output (46.5 per cent) ^Osintsev, op. cit.. pp. 33, 41. ^For example the Magnitogorsk, Goroblagodatsk, Lebyazhinsk, Serovsk and Kusinsk operations. 69. came from Magnitogorsk (with only 5.7 per cent of the total reserves). It was producing ore at a rate (sixteen million tons g a year) that would exhaust the probable reserves (three hundred 9 million tons) in about twenty years. The Tagilo-Kushvinsk group supplied another 25 per cent, or about eight million tons, but its known reserves would last over fifty years at that rate, ample time to amortize the equipment based on it. The Bakal'sk group supplied 12.2 per cent or about four million tons a year and could utilize this reserve for fifty years at that rate. The Khalilovsk reserves were just coming into production, therefore, these reserves were not being effectively utilized. The Visimo-Pervoural*sk titano magnetite was supplying about 1,500,000 tons, and could keep production going at that rate for some two hundred years, but with rather low quality ores. The Kachkanar reserves were not being utilized at all because of their low quality. Therefore, most of the suitable reserves were being either fully utilized or over-utilized except for Orsk Khalilovsk which was more marginal, and where major production was just beginning, and Kachkanar where development began in 1957. In 1955, 34,800,000 tons of crude ore were produced which Komar, p_>_ cit.. pp. 216-219, 221-222; and Kutaf'ev, OP. cit.. pp. 574-576. 9 Osintsev, opT cit.. p. 134. 70. were reduced to 25,000,000 tons of either high grade or bene- ficiated ore.10 On the basis of this about 13,000,000 tons of pig iron were produced.11 The average iron content in the ore was low by Soviet standards. But the Uralian ore was compara• tively cheaply produced (i.e. considerably cheaper than Krivoy Rog ore, which on the average was richer, but deeper and more difficult to extract), and supplied a good raw material base for the 1955 level of production. No appreciable expansion could be undertaken without either turning to low grade 17 per cent ores of bringing in raw materials because a modem iron and steel plant requires something in the order of three hundred million to four hundred million 12 tons of ore for amortization purposes and only Kachkanar had that much uncommitted reserves. The course taken was to both bring in Sokolov-Sarbaysk ores to the Southern Urals and to use the Kachkanar deposits in the Central Urals. By 1959 the supplying of ores from the neighboring Kustanay deposits had reached an appreciable level for the Chelyabinsk Plant, and the Magnitogorsk Combine was to 10Kutaf'ev, op. cit.. p. 576 •^In the Urals 11,900,000 tons were produced and about 1,000,000 tons of Kuznets production was based on Magnitogorsk ore. Twenty per cent of the ore requirements were supplied by Uralian ore in 1953, but as the ore was much richer than local ore, it probably accounted for about 40 per cent of the output total of some 2,600,000 tons in 1956. 12Livshits, opj. cit.. p. 32. 71. 13 use it to supplement the local deposits. By July 1961, the Sokolov-Sarbaysk deposits had supplied ten million tons of ore, 14 mostly to Chelyabinsk. Construction had started at Kachkanar in 1957 but the Kachkanar plant did not produce its first con• centrate until mid-1963.^ Evaluation of Supply Originally the iron and steel industry was established in the Urals because of its iron ore resources. But now the Urals is becoming an iron ore deficiency area. The greater part of the substantial increase of reserves in the past twenty years is due to the consideration of ever poorer sources. All the same, exhaustion of resources is just becoming a major problem because the only really large scale production has been in the last few decades. Also the over optimistic appraisal of quantity and quality of resources has helped in this matter - for example at Magnitogorsk, where trouble is becoming acute. This has forced the use of the best ores in Northern Kazakhstan to supply the Southern Urals. This should tend to enhance the position of these plants. Also it will be possible to use the existing type of plants. The export of Magnitogorsk ores, which presently aggravates the problem, to the Kuznets 13 Kutaf'ev, op. cit.. p. 577. 14 V. Buresh, "Posrednik iii Rasporyaditel'Izvestiva. Moskva, 4 July 1961, p. 3. 72. Metallurgical Combine, which started more than a quarter of a century ago, is slated to be decreased, being replaced by Siberian 16 ores, with possible use of Sokolov-Sarbaysk ores in the interim.17 The development of Kachkanar will enable the Central Urals to stop importing ore, a measure it has been recently forced to adopt. Therefore, in the long run Nizhne Tagil'sk will be well provided with ore from the Kachkanar and Tagilo-Kushvinsk sources, and Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk will increasingly depend on Sokolov-Sarbaysk ores. The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine will in all probability never reach the status of the three largest oper• ations. Serov will increase its share of the total output because of its chrome nickel iron ores and Chusovsk will become more important with the supply of raw material from Kachkanar. In the final analysis there will be a worsening in the Uralian iron ore supply. Both the Sokolov-Sarbaysk and Kachkanar ores will be more expensive than the sources they will augment and replacei . 18 ^P. Kazakov, op. cit., pp. 5, 6; and D. Markish, "Kachkanar - Town for Trail-Blazers," Soviet Union. No. 163, 1963, p. 18. 16 17 Komar, op. cit.. pp. 220-221; Minakov, op. cit.. p. 19. *"^V. B. Khlebnikov, pp. cit.. pp. 131-132. 73. TABLE II THE URALIAN IRON ORE SUPPLY REGION DEPOSIT TYPE OF IRON RESERVES PRODUCTION ORE CONTENT (Millions (millions of (in of tons- tons -1955) worked 1956) ore) Northern Serovo- magnetite 37-57% 60 1.5 Urals Ivdel'sk & limonite Central Tagilo- magnetite 30-40% 440 8.7 Urals Kushvinsk martite & semi- martite Visimo- titano- 17-50% 300 1.9 Pervoural' magnetite sk Alapaevsk limonite 38-41% 50 0.45 Kachkanar titano- - 3,900 - magnetite Kamensk- limonite — 60 — Sinarsk Southern Magnito• magnetite 34-59% 300 16.2 Urals gorsk Bakal1sk limonite 32-45% 210 4.25 siderite Khalilovsk complex 30-40% 260 0.6 iron- chrome- nickel ores Bashkir limonite 41-42% 110 0.5 Other - - 60 0.7 Deposits Kazakh Kustanay magnetite 36-60% 4,900 - limonite 34-38% TOTAL 10.650 34.8 Sources: Komar, op., ext., pp. 216,219; Osintsev, op. cit.. pp. 125-139; Kutaf'ev, op. cit., p. 576; and I.P. Bardin, Zhelezo- rudnava Baza Chernov Metallurgii SSSR. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1957, pp. 315-317. 7k. CHIEF IRON ORE PRODUCERS - 1955 i i • ^ 8,000,000 TONS £ 4,000,000 TONS ^ 16,000,000 TONS • 2,000,000 TONS •» ORE FLOW FROM MINE TO O CHIEF MARKETS MARKET 75 CHIEF IRON ORE PRODUCERS - 1955 - LEGEND M = Magnitogorsk deposit O-Kh = Orsk-Khalilovsk T-K = Tagilo-Kushvinsk group Z-K = Zigazino-Komarovskoe B = Bakal'sk A = Alapaevsk P = Pervouralsk I = Ivdel'sk Bo = Bogoslovsk Sources: Kutaf'ev, OP. cit.. pp. 574-575; Ekonomicheskaya Karta Urala - "Rossiyskaya Federatsiya", Geografgiz, Moskva, 1959; and Livshits, op. cit. p. 64. 76. II. COAL General The Urals iron and steel industry depends on imported coal from the Kuzbass and Karaganda Basins. The Kuzbass coal unfortunately has a relatively small proportion of coking coal in 19 20 its mixture, and Karaganda suffers from a high ash content. A possible alternate source, the Pechora Basin, is considerably closer to the Northern Urals at least, than either of these, but 21 its coal is expensive to mine. This explains why this coal has not been utilized in the Urals before this, and, in fact, there is still not direct rail link in spite of much talk on the matter. The Urals could also conceivably be supplied from the Donbass, 22 but these are high-sulphur, and by now expensive coals to 23 mine, and markedly inferior to Kuzbass and somewhat inferior to 19 N. Jasny, "Prospects of the Iron and Steel Industry", Soviet Studies. January 1963, p. 290. 20 I. P. Bardin, Ekonomika Chernov Metallurgii SSSR. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoe Izdatel'stvo Literatury po Chernoy i Tsvetnoy Metallurgii, 1960, p. 227. 21 Jasny claims the Vorkuta (Pechora Basin) coke (or the respective amounts of coking coal) costs not less, and possibly more, to produce at the mine than the price of Kuznetsk coke delivered to the Urals. Jasny, op. cit.. p. 291. 22 The insignificant sulphur content of the Kuznetsk coke makes it possible to smelt iron without introducing manganese ore into the blast furnace charge, while about 100 kg of manganese are used per ton of iron when Donets coke is used in the blast furnace process. Minakov, op. cit.. p. 7. 23 Donbass coking coals cost 55 to 60 rubles more to mine than Kuzbass and Karaganda coals. Ibid.. p. 8. 77. Karaganda coals.^ Local Supply Reserves. Uralian coking coal is only of minor signi• ficance, but for a balanced appraisal of the energy base it must be kept in mind that the Urals ars: located more favorably in relation to the zone of cheap fuel and energy of the USSR, than the largest old industrial regions (the Center and the North West). In 1938, the Urals (with Kurgansk Oblast') had possible coal reserves estimated at 7,700,000,000 tons. Since then new deposits have been explored and overstated estimates of reserves have been reduced. In 1955, the total possible reserves of the Urals were estimated at 5,500,000,000 tons with probable reserves of 4,000,000,000 tons. Since almost 80 per cent of this is brown coal, there is only approximately 800,000,000 tons of bitumi• nous coal. Coal deposits are scattered on both slopes of the Uralian mountains. Bituminous coal is related basically to coal bearing deposits of lower carboniferous age. These deposits trend in discontinuous strips through the Western slopes of the Northern and Central Urals, and also through the Central and Southern parts of the Eastern foothills. The caloricity of coal reaches The average consumption of coking coal per ton of cast iron at the plants of the South in 1957 was 1.3 tons, while it was about 1 ton at the modern plants of the Urals. Minakov, op. cit.. p. 7. 78. 5,500 - 6,000 calories in worked fuel. But the deposits are characterized by complexity of geological structure, brokenness of beds, and on the Eastern slopes strongly metamorphized coal changing here and there into anthractie, and also into graphi- tized and ironized coals. The coals of the Kizelovsk Basin (possible reserves of one billion tons) are the most significant. These deposits are located in the transitional zone from the Urals folded structure to the Russian Platform. The coals are suitable for coking, but because of high sulphur and ash content can be used for pig iron smelting only in conjunction with high quality coals. Amongst the remaining deposits of the lower carboniferous age are Egorshinsk (97,000,000 tons), Makhnevsk (185,000,000 tons), Poi- tavo-Bredinsk (55,000,000 tons), and Domberovsk, situated in the 25 Eastern foothills of the Urals. Production. The Kizelovsk Basin started production in 1797, but the first coal used for coking was extracted in 1880. In 1957 Kizelovsk produced 11,600,000 tons of coal of which 17.8 26 per cent was used for coking. Thus some 2,000,000 tons of coking 25 Komar, op. cit.. pp. 202-203. 26 V. P. Ponomarev, Kizeloviskiy Kamennougo11nw Basseyn. Perm1? Permskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1958, pp. 4-5, 7-8. 79. coal were produced, but Kizelovsk coal has an extremely low yeild 27 of coke from coal. Therefore, the proportion of production based on local supply was even lower than would first appear. Furthermore, this coke is high in both sulphur and ash content, consequently it is not very desirable. The total production is sufficient to supply less than 2 per cent of the Uralian pig iron production. The approximately 200,000 tons of coke yielded are 28 used mainly in Nizhne Tagil*sk and Chusovsk mixed with a pre• ponderance of coke made from Kuzbass coals. Import of Goal In spite of the considerable local production of lignite, more than two-fifths of the total and even approximately one- fourth of the energy coal consumed is imported. Local sources supply only approximately 20 per cent of the fuel used in metallurgy. Around 1959, the annual flow of coal into the Urals was more than thirty million tons. Almost two-thirds of this came from the Kuzbass and one-third from Karaganda. In its turn, the Urals sends part of its coal, chiefly from the Kizelovsk Basin (the only extensive, if marginal, coking coal deposits), into the European USSR aggravating the fuel deficiency. In recent It requires 10.2 tons of Kizelovsk coal to produce one ton of very inferior coke as opposed to 1.6 tons for Kuznets coke. Bardin, op. cit.. p. 227. 28 Vvedenskiy, op. cit.. vol. 20, p. 610 80. years these shipments have reached 25 - 30 per cent of the total output of the Kizelovsk Basin, but this export of coal from the 29 Urals shall be gradually eliminated. Every effort has been made to increase the use of Karaganda coals in the Urals. The reason behind this is that the increase in the ferrous metal production has caused an increasing strain 30 to be placed on the Donbass and Kuzbass coals. In 1961, although the Kuzbass delivered sufficient coal overall, it did not supply sufficient quantities of the best grades. Because of this, the quality of the coke was lowered, and it was impossible 31 to intensify the blast furnace process. Extensive use of Karaganda coal would to a significant degree relieve the strain that has been placed on the coking coals balance.30 Because of the strain it is very tempting for the coal suppliers to ship inferior coal in less demand to make up their quota. But the Karaganda coal is not as good as the Kuzbass and it tends to have too high an ash content to be used by itself29 . Komar, op. cit.. pp. 205-206 30 Minakov, op. cit.. p. 8. 31 "Raw Material Shortages in the Iron and Steel Industry," Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. No. 13, Moscow, 26 March 1962, p. 2 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (41)", Joint Publications Research Service, 13,939, p. 2. 81. Production of Coke Although some 80 per cent of the coking coal is imported, the overwhelming part (99 per cent) of all the Uralian pig iron is smelted on coke which is locally produced. The local pro• cessing of coke permits the utilization of the wastes of coking (gas etc.) for chemical and energy purposes. The rest of the coke is brought from Siberia, from the Kemerovo Chemical Combine. The average cost of one kilogram of metallurgical coke in 1959 was twenty kopeks in the Urals. This is identical with the Donbass and cheaper than the Center (twenty to thirty kopeks), the North West (twenty to thirty kopeks) and the Far East (twenty- five to thirty), but more expensive than Kazakhstan (fifteen to 33 twenty kopeks) and Western Siberia (twelve kopeks). III. AUXILIARY MATERIALS Alloying Agents The Urals has a ready supply of the special alloy materials such as chrome, nickel, titanium and vanadium, but it is not so well provided with manganese, the most important alloying agent. 32 Komar, op. cit... pp. 220-221. 33 L. A. Melent'ev and E. 0. Shteyngauz, Ekonomika Energetiki SSSR, Moskva-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Energeticheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1959, p. 132. CD ro 83. MAJOR DEPOSITS OF COAL IN WESTERN USSR OF COKING QUALITY LEGEND K = Kizelovsk Basin B = Bulanashskoe E = Egorshinskoe Ch= Chelyabinsk M = Magnitogorsk South Western Boundary o£ significant permafrost formation • deposits utilized for the Urals © deposits not utilized for the Urals ®> The Urals . 0 Bukhara-Ural Pipeline termini - Bukhara-Ural gas supply Sources: B. I. Andreev, D. V. Kravchenko, Kamennougo1'nye Basseynv SSSR, Moskva, 1958, loose map inside cover: "Fizicheskaya Karta SSSR" Geograficheskiy Atlas dlya 7 e -8 «E1956opp*32S3.Kand. Tablitsa Kart Rayonov SSSR, MoskvaV GUGIK MVD SSSR, 1955; and Aytmatov, Ch. and Mukimov, Yu. "'Trassa Druzhby "Bukhara-Ural1", Pravda 5 November 1963, p.. 2.- 84. TABLE III MINERALIZATION OF THE FUEL BALANCE OF THE URALS METALLURGY (in percentages) 1913 1922/23 1926/27 Wood 56.0 55.0 25.3 Charcoal 36.3 20.4 25.7 Coal 7.7 24.6 47.7 Substitute Fuels (coniferous needles, - - 1.3 s tumps, s awdus t) 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Osintsev. op. cit.. p. 32 TABLE IV COAL PRODUCTION IN THE URALS (in million tons) Coal Basins 1913 1916 1940 1950 1955 Proportion of total output in 1955 Chelyabinskiy 0.13 0.15 5.60 12.40 17.70 37.6 Bogosloviskiy 0.18 0.30 1.40 9.10 15.30 32.5 Kizelovskiy 0.80 1.00 4.60 10.20 11.10 23.6 Southern Urals - - - - 1.80 3.8 Other Deposits 0.09 0.05 0.40 0.80 1.20 2.5 Total 1.20 1.50 12.00 32.50 47.10 100.0 Source: Komar, op. cit.. p. 205. URALS-KUZBASS - THE SECOND METALLURGICAL BASE (1935-1938) — < 1,500,000 TONS c= < 3,000,000 TONS CD < 6,000,000 TONS bull I I I I I SCALE 1 = 10,000,000 1/4 SQ. MM. IRON I MILLION TONS RESERVES — COAL 1/4 SQ. MM. COAL: 250 , Ml LL I ON TONS RESERVES IRON • IRON ORE DEPOSITS DIRECTION OF FLOW O MAJOR COAL DEPOSITS SMALL COAL DEPOS TS O MAJOR IRON AND STEEL SMELTERS OTHER CENTRES • MAJOR COAL PRODUCERS 86, URALS-KUZBASS - THE SECOND METALLURGICAL BASE 1935-38 - LEGEND DEPOSITS I = Ivdelsk-Serovsk-Severouralsk O-Kh = Orsk-Khalilovsk T-K s Tagilo-Kushvinsk K = Kizelovsk A = Alapaevsk E = Egorshino KU = Kamensk Uralski D = Dombrovka B = Bakal Ka = Karaganda Z = Zigazinsk Kuz = Kuznetsk M = Magnitogorsk TT = Temir Tau CITIES 2 = Serov 9 = Zlatoust 3 = Lys'va-Chusovoy 10 = Chelyabinsk 4 = Nizhne Tagil-Nizhne Salda-Kushva 11 = Magnitogorsk 5 = Alapaevsk 12 = Karaganda 6 = Sverdlovsk 13-14 = Anzhero-Sudzhensk, Kemerovo, Leninsk Kuznetskiy, 7 = Verkhne Ufaley Kizelovsk, Prokop1evsk 15 = Stalinsk Sources: Bol'shava Sovetkava Atlas Mira. vol. II, section 40, "Skheme Uralo-Kuzbassa (1935-1938 gg)", p. 79. 87. Since the preponderance of Uralian steel is of the common variety - only during World War II were quality steels an important proportion of the total output - the existence of these materials is not very significant to the operation or competitive position of the Uralian iron and steel industry. Manganese ores are important because ferro manganese, the most widely used reducing agent, accounts for 0.7'rl.O per cent of the inputs in all smelted steel and also in greater quantities as an alloying additive in many special steels. The Urals contain many deposits of manganese ores, but these are not extensive and are generally of poor quality gravelly 34 ores. The better deposits - the Polunoch and Marsyatsk deposits in the Northern Urals - were extremely important during World War 35 II. But at present all the manganese used in the Urals is 36 imported. It is planned to reintroduce production at Polunoch. The tendency in the Urals has been to find substitutes for man- 37 ganese rather than to bring in manganese ores. There are deposits of chrome iron ore (chromite) but these 34 Bardin, op_j. cit.. pp. 207-208. 35 ° Ibid. 3 6 Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 24. 37 Minakov, op. cit.. p. 7; and N. Dunaev, "Chugun bez margantsa-VygodneeJ" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. No. 12, Moskva, 19 March 1962, p. 31. 88. are predominantly low grade, suitable for the chemical and re• fractory industries, but only to a minor degree for the production of ferroalloys. The most important reserves are concentrated in the large Saranovsk deposit located in the axial zone of the Central Urals among Serpentine rocks. Quality chromite metallurgy in the Urals is supplied from the extremely large Kimpersaysk deposit (Khrom Tau) in Kazakh SSR. Ferrochrome for the Urals is 38 produced at the Chelyabinsk and Aktyubinsk ferroalloy plants. In the Urals or near it also occur deposits of other alloy metals - nickel, vanadium and titanium for example. Nickel is in 39 short supply in the Soviet Union. This is the reason behind the fabulously expensive development of Noril'sk. The Urals has ready access to a disproportionate share of the meagre Societ nickel supply. The smelting of nickel in the USSR was first started in the Urals in 1934 at the Verkhne Ufaleysk Plant uti- 40 lizing the Ufaleysk nickel ores. Nickel production was started 38 V. Zhuravlev, "Problems of the Ferroalloy Industry", Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. Moscow. No. 18, 4 December 1961 (in Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (28), Joint Publications Research Service^ 13, 633, 2 May 1962, p. 16. 39 N. Klunichenko, "New Type of Steel for High Pressure Equipment", Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. Moscow, 2 April 1962, p. 43, (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (41)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,939, 31 May 1962, p. 16. 40 - Komar, op. cit.. pp. 225, 227. :, 89. so recently because the raw material supply was poor, but the desire for self-sufficiency necessitated such a development. Subsequently the center of nickel production moved South (the 40 Orsk Plant). The bulk of the Uralian nickel resources are in the form of iron-chrome-nickel ores and in Orsk there is a competition between producing naturally alloyed pig iron and refining nickel itself.41 The smelting of naturally alloyed pig iron has not been very successful, which aggravates this problem. Newly discovered iron-chrome-nickel ores in the vicinity of Serov42 are supplying 43 the basis for the development of ferroalloy production. Nickel 44 ore. is also brought in from the Aktyubinsk Oblast' in Kazakhstan. The only supplier of ferrovanadium in the Urals is the 45 Chusovsk Plant. In the future Chusovsk is to use Kachkanar ores which contain vanadium as a side product. The Kachkanar ores also contain titanium and will supply Nizhne Tagil'sk and 45 Chusovsk41 with titanium and magnetite ores. L. Gol'denberg, "Orsk-Khalilovo Combine is Making Poor Use of Its Naturally Alloyed Ferronickel Ores", Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. Moscow, 5 February 1962, p. 11 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (40," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,768, 15 May 1962, pp. 4-5. 42 Komar, op. cit.. p. 218. ^3G. Garbuzov, "The Ferrous Metallurgy Industry in 1962", Stroitel'nava Gazeta. Moscow, 27 December 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (27)", Joint Publications Research Service, 13,340, 4 April 1962, p. 15. 44 Komar, op. cit.. pp. 225, 227. 90. 47 Ferroalloy plants are receiving increased investment in connection with the desire to increase the proportion of high grade steel. These plants suffer from being supplied with mat• erials that do not meet their stringent requirements. The main reason for this is that they usually depend on suppliers who deliver only a small proportion of their output to the ferroalloy plants. The bulk of the suppliers' materials are intended for other users whose requirements are not nearly so demanding. Furthermore, there is no tendency to raise the standards. The Orenburg Sovnarkhoz for instance in 1961 lowered the technical specifications of the limestone supply to the Aktyubinsk Ferro• alloy Plant. The waste rock content was increased from one to three per cent and the permissible percentage of phosphorus pent- oxide was almost twice as high as the actual level experienced during 1960. The phosphorus content of the limestone in i960 permitted the production of standard refined ferrochrome alloy close to the upper limit of tolerance. The lower standards will necessitate further and hence more expensive processing with 48 greater scrap output. 45 G. Zabaluev, G. Sapiro, Ye. Odinstov, Ye. Ivanov, G. Derevyanko, V. Bulgakov, "My Mozhem Rabotat' Pribyl'no, Problemy Metallurgii Zapadnogd Urala", Izvestiya. Moskva, 27 April, 1962, p. 3. ^^Kazakov, op. cit.. p. 5. 47 Khlebnikov, op. cit.. pp. 59-60. 48 Zhuravlev, op. cit.. pp. 11-16. Refractory Materials The common refractory materials are: quartzitic materials (dinas quartzite and molding sand), refractory clay, magnesite, dolomite, ferrochrome (chromite), talc and talcose rock, carbon• iferous bricks and blocks, carborundum and graphite. Refractory materials are extensively used in metallurgy and are faily ubiquitous, hence local deposits located near exis• ting transport facilities are usually developed. The Urals is especially well endowed in dinas sandstone, refractory clay, magnesite and chromite. Although used extensively, refractory materials account for only a small proportion of the total cost of metallurgical production. In open hearth production, for 4' example, they amount to 2 - 3 per cent of the cost of the steel. In 1961 the Urals was somewhat short of refractory pro• ducts. This is explained by the fact that the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Sovnarkhozes were delaying the commissioning of new shops and installations at the enterprises of the refractories industry. Furthermore, during 1961 the funds which had been allotted for the reconstruction of existing and construction of new cap• acity in the refractory departments of the Magnitogorsk Combine, and Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant and at the Bogdanovich -49 Bardin, op. cit... pp. 210-211. 50 "Raw Material Shortages in the Iron and Steel Industry", OP. cit.. p. 2. 92. Refractory Plant were not properly utilized. The construction of the chrome-magnesite and fosterite departments of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Metallurgical Combine lagged considerably behind the completion date. Nonetheless, during 1961 the refractory plant of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine produced more refractory clay and the Pervoural'sk Plant produced more refractory brick than planned.^1 In addition the position of the refractory department of the Magnitogorsk Combine, in spite of its unfavorable expansion record, is still unusually good. The cost of current repairs of open hearth furnaces is 27 per cent lower at Magnitogorsk than at the Kuznets Combine and 51 per cent lower than at the Dzerzhinsk 52 Plant's No. 3 shop. On the other hand, through inefficiency, Beloretsk and Zlatoust refractory production suffers heavy losses from rejects. Beloretsk produces approximately 3 per cent and 53 Zlatoust over 2 per cent rejects. During the Seven Year Plan an appreciable increase in the "Production of Refractory Materials After the 22nd Party Congress," Ogneuoorv. No. 12, 1961, pp. 541-544 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallury (22)", Joint Publications Research Service, 12,884, 9 March 1962, pp. 12, 15. 52 G. N. Sergeyev, "Production Costs at Magnitogorskk Steel Combine are the Lowest in Industry," Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. Moscow, No. 15, 9 April 1962, p. 12 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (49), " Joing Publications Research Service, 14,006, 5 June 1962i p. 5* 53 Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 128. 93. capacities of the Bogdanovich, Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk refractory clay production is to be added. To supply the re• fractory clay plants high grade refractory clay the Turgay Re• fractory Clay Burning Plant is being developed in the Kustanay Oblast* using Novoselitsa kaolins. The capacity of the Pervoural'sk silica brick plant is being increased and the production of burned metallurgical dolomite is being expanded by putting into operation dolomite burning shops at the Magnitogorsk and Orsk-Khalilovsk Metallurgical Combines. The Nizhne Tagil'sk Metallurgical Combine refractory production 54 will also be improved. Water Water is used for cooling and steam generation in the iron and steel industry, it is a permissive rather than an attractive factor. The water supply position in the Urals is adequate on the whole. In the Southern Urals water supply becomes a problem. In Magnitogorsk for example, the Ural River flowing past the ore deposits at a distance of less than ten kilometers provided a water supply which, though seasonally inadequate, could be made to suffice by the construction of two artificial lakes.*'"' But even in the Southern Urals there is nowhere the problem 54 Khlebnikov, op. cit. pp. 110-111. j. Scott, Behind the Urals. An American Worker in Russia's City of Steel. Cambridge Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1942, p. 68. 94. of Kazakhstan where otherwise suitable sites are rendered un• desirable for this very reason. The development of Kazakhstan's ferrous metallurgy is being delayed by the inadequacy of its water reserves. Owing to the arid nature of Central Kazakhstan, the major part of the iron ore resources of this region must be shipped to metallurgical plants in the Urals and Siberia. Construction of the Irtysh-Karaganda Canal could prove to be the cardinal solution to the problem of supplying Central Kazakhstan 56 with water. This, of course, would be an extremely expensive undertaking. Flux Flux materials, or for all intents and purposes - limestone and dolomite - are fairly ubiquitous. Consequently, deposits are developed in close proximity to plants, and often in conjunction with existing transportation facilities. They account for approxi• mately 3-5 per cent of the cost of pig iron and only 0.4 - 1.0 per cent of the cost of open hearth steel. The Urals is not especially well endowed in this regard, but it does not matter very much. Scrap Scrap is one of the more important raw materials of modern steel production by the open-hearth method (as opposed to the Bessemer converter which does not require scrap for efficient 56 Minakov, op. cit.. p. 8, 57Bardin, o£_ cit.. pp. 210-211. 95. 58. operations ). In 1956 the Urals had a deficit of, or in other words, imported 2,600,000 tons of scrap or over half of the total con• sumed (4,900,000 tons) in this region. This is the third largest deficiency of the Urals (after coal and iron ore) as a metallur• gical producers. But in one way it is worse than both the other problems. The Urals can obtain both coal and iron ore at compe• titive prices, but scrap costs as much as it does elsewhere plus the added cost of transporting it into the Urals. The South does not suffer from nearly as great a deficiency - 900,000 tons, or 59 less than a quarter of the tonnage consumed (4,300,000 tons). About one million tons of scrap are shipped from the Central Volga area, the Center and the North which tend to gravitate toward the Urals plants on the principle of the shortest shipping distance. The use of this quantity of scrap at the plants of the South and the Center could reduce the total steel production cost by about eighty million rubles - an amount muhh larger than the increase in shipping costs (ten million rubles). Therefore, most of the scrap metal collected in the European part of the Soviet Union should be directed to the Southern plants. The scrap metal shipping routes should be taken into 58 "The use of enriched air makes it possible to decrease the nitrogen content of steel, to increase the quantity of steel scrap which can be re-melted in converters, and to increase the productivity of the converter." United Hations, Long-Term Trends and Problems of the European Steel Industry, Geneva: Economic Commission for Europe, 1959, p. 110* 96. account in determining the development of blast furnace and steel smelting production at the plants of the various metallurgical regions. In 1957, the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine, for example, used 365 Kilograms of scrap per ton of steel for a direct cost of 266 rubles per ton of iron; at the "Azovstal"' Plant, the specific consumption of scrap was 252 Kilograms while the direct cost of 6b the iron came to 332 rubles. IV. SUMMARY The Soviet iron and steel industry has a pronounced 61 prejudice toward raw material location (as opposed to, say, market or break of shipment of materials). This is so because of three main forces: government intervention, the cost structure of the iron and steel industry, and the inland location of raw materials. Even in pre-Soviet times there was an unusual amount of government intervention in the iron and steel industry with the general aim of self-sufficiency. This was effected by the govern• ment operating plants, setting import tariffs and supporting pricing policies which collectively discouraged imports of cheap foreign finished products and raw materials, although the latter "^Livshits, op. cit.. p. 367; ^Minakov, op. cit.. p. 14. 61 At the present time 67 per cent of pig iron is smelted in such locations. M. Minakov, op. cit.. p. 16. 97. was definitely a side effect. But the net result was the pro• duction based on imported materials never developed on any scale in Russia. Gnce the Soviets seized power this drive for self- sufficiency was intensified. The bulk of the costs of iron and steel production is 62 involved in the procurement of raw materials, consequently the most efficient procurement of these items will in most cases result in the cheapest production. The location of the domestic raw material resources is such that possibilities of cheap water transportation of materials are very rare, consequently transportation of materials must be by the same expensive rail media as for finished goods, and as these materials do not have the unit value of the finished product they are obviously at a disadvantage in absorbing rail transport charges. In addition, although transportation costs are not a large proportion of total production costs they tend to be re• garded as of an elastic, and hence minimizable nature, and there• fore, have probably had a greater effect on the location than their proportion of the total costs would indicate at first glance. Once a plant is established, inertia takes over, and thenceforth, materials are increasingly imported to it, especially because in the Soviet Union there has been a marked tendency to be exceedingly optimistic in the appraisal of deposits of resources. 62 two-thirdsI n ometallurgicaf all productiol production expendituresn costs., Khlebnikovmaterial expense, op.cit.s for.p.219m . 98. CHAPTER IV THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY USING COKE It is necessary to trace the historical development of the coke iron and steel industry before the present in distribution can be meaningfully examined. In order to do this main recourse is to Soviet sources with some consultation of Western materials in order to arrive at a balanced appraisal of this development. This industrial development is divided into three stages - before World War II, World War II and post World War II I. BEFORE WORLD WAR II The use of coke in the iron and steel industry of the Urals began in the 19th century, but did not become significant until Kuzbass coal was supplied during the rehabilitation period. There was no pressing need for such a development, in any case, until 1925-26 when the increasing cost of wood fuel caused the cost of Uralian charcoal pig iron to exceed that of the Southern coke pig iron for the first time. The first use of coke from the Kuzbass, 1800 kilometers away, in tfeeaUrals blast furnaces occurred in 1924 in the Nizhne Saldinsk Plant. By 1926/27, some 180,000 tons (27 per cent of the total) were smelted on coke, as opposed to 30,000 tons (3 per cent) in 1913. In 1926/27 coal supplied almost 50 per cent of the overall fuel consumption, but most of this was not coking coal and was used in heat treatment furnaces, open hearth gas 99. generators and other auxiliary uses. By 1940, 2,300,000 tons of pig iron (86 per cent of the total) were smelted on coke.""" Once the feasibility of using Kuznets coal had been demonstrated, a new phenomenon began to appear - the metallurgi• cal plant for which fuel was imported by rail. Formerly, rail had only been extensively used in the transport of finished products. With the evolution of more efficient railways and the determination to become self-sufficient in iron and steel at all costs, the large scale movement of low unit value raw mater• ials became a rational proposition. The South's coal extraction costs had been climbing with the depletion of easily worked reserves making Eastern development still more attractive. The main consideration in choice of site for new plants was the size of ore deposits, which had to be very large by Urals standards, and if of high quality and easily worked, so much the better. Magnitogorsk was chosen first. It had the additional 2 advantages of a level site and an ample water supply. The decision to construct the Magnitogorsk Plant was passed by the XIV party congress (1925) and the first plans were •""Livshits, op. cit.. pp. 138, 160; and Osintsev, op. cit.. pp. 31-32. 2 Magnitogorsk, being developed during a depressed period in the American iron and steel industry, had the additional advantage of experienced American design and direction of con• struction. Holloway, op. cit.. p. 10. 100. drawn up in 1926-1928. These provided for 656,000 tons pig iron, 662,000 tons steel and 574,000 tons rolled metal capacity. Although this scale of production was greater than Tsarist prac• tice, it was still far below the then current world level. Therefore, it was felt that the realization of these plans would slow the technical development of the Soviet iron and steel industry, and consequently they werecrejected. New plans were executed which increased the previous 3 capacity figures by over five times. Magnitogorsk came into operation in 1932, immediately becoming the largest iron producer in the Urals. It rapidly became the leading steel and rolled metal producer as well. In 1937, a similar unit, the Novo Tagil'sk Plant started operations in Nizhne Tagil, the site of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Plant dating from 1725. This plant was based on the ore supplies of Mount Vysokaya which were much larger than the pre-existing plant required. Novo Tagil'sk had a less desirable ore base in size, quality and ease of mining than Magnitogorsk. The main reason for the development of the East was the belief that the Ural-Kuzbass scheme would produce cheaper steel 4 than the South. Another matter considered in the allocation of - - Bardin, op. cit.. p. 91. 4 Holzman claims that provided all normal cost elements, besides the absence of differential rent which could be regarded as a_legitimate aspect of the relative low cost of combine coal anappeared steeld ,attractiv had beeen enougtaken h inton o economiaccountc groundthe combins alonee woul, tdo havnot ehav e 101. investment was that the South had proven more susceptible to foreign interference than the Urals, but this was more than com• pensated for by the fact that similar investment added to Southern 4 plants would have provided more steel which was regarded as the highest priority at that time.*' Meanwhile, the long established plants had been changing. Their number was being gradually reduced, and most of those retained had substantial increases in capacity. The large steel only plants were closely associated with the larger urban areas, Verkhne Isetsk was in Sverdlovsk, Zlatoust was near Chelyabinsk, and Lys'vensk was near Perm'. The iron only plant - Satkinsk - was in the vicinity of Zlatoust, and supplied it with pig iron, Satkinsk was also near Bakal from which it derived its ore supply. The fully integrated plants of Serov and Magnitogorsk were associated with large ore reserves. The Chusovsk plant was fully integrated but was not near any large ore reserves. It was fairly close to Perm' though, and thus could be regarded as the only strictly market oriented integrated plant. Nizhne Tagil1sk and Nizhne Saldinsk both produced more iron than steel, but as they were associated with the superior Mount Vysokaya and merited the emphasis it received in the first two Five Year Plans. Holzman, op. cit.. pp. 375-376, 398, 401; and Livshits, op. cit.. p. 31. "'B. N. Ponomaryov, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, p. 453. 102. Blagodat1 ore sources this is not surprising. Both of these plants had undergone disproportionate increases of iron produc• tion since 1913 which also is not too surprising because many steel only plants required the iron they produced. Therefore, by 1937, two types of plants had appeared, the raw material and the market oriented. But the raw material oriented did not tend to be larger as might be expected (except Magnitogorsk of course) or even consistently more integrated. The advent of coke metallurgy changed the distribution of the Uralian iron and steel industry more profoundly than any other event since the introduction of factory smelting. For the first time the Central Urals lost its leading position, being replaced by a single plant - Magnitogorsk. Although one of the first regions to be converted to coke, the Central Urals experienced a worse relative decline than any t other region in the prewar period. Its forests had been exploited more intensively than any other region and thus forest exhaustion was more severe here, and there was a lag in the change from charcaol to coke. The regional smelt of pig iron had actually decreased from 400,000 tons (44 per cent) to 280,000 tons (12 per cent), and the smelt of steel had only increased from 320,000 tons (36 per cent) to 400,000 tons (14 per cent). Within the region a redistribution of production had occur• red. Certain plants experienced considerable growth with three of 103. them producing over 100,000 tons. Two of these - Nizhne Tagil'sk and Nizhne Saldinsk - were associated with the superior Tagilo Kushvinsk group of ore deposits. This ore only averaged 30-40 per cent Fe content, but the reserves were ample, easily worked and chemically suitable. The other - Verkhne Isetsk - was located at Sverdlovsk with its large market and ready scrap supplies. Nizhne Tagil'sk quadrupled and Nizhne Saldinsk more than doubled its pig iron production. Neither plant's steel production was significant throughout the period, being capable of utilizing no more than 40 per cent of the pig iron output even if no scrap were added. Verkhne Isetsk on the other hand, was a steel plant which produced no pig iron whatever. These three plants accounted for two-thirds of the pig iron and 43 per cent of the steel produced in the Central Urals by 1938. These figures had increased from one-fifth of the pig iron and 30 per cent of the steel in 1913. If Verkhne Isetsk is considered by itself, its share of the pro• duction of steel had increased from about 10 per cent to over 30 per cent. Beside the Magnitogorsk Plant and the major Central Uralian producers, the Lys'vensk Plant in the Western Urals was an early coke based producer. It smelted only steel but it was the biggest steel producer and, furthermore, it was the only Western Urals Livshits, opf cit.. pp. 120, 162, 167. 104. steel plant to show a significant increase in its steel smelt from 1913 to 1938, almost doubling its output. In 1913, it had pro• duced 22 per cent of the regional smelt, by 1938 this had increased to 45 per cent. Thus Lys'vensk had doubled both its output and its relative position by replacing the production of charcoal plants that were closed down. Lys'vensk is a good example of the replacement of charcoal by coke based production. It should be noted that the replacement occurred through an increase of capacity at one plant and a decline at others, not by the direct replacement or conversion of furnaces at the same plant. The Lys'vensk Plant had, besides its cheaper coke technology, an extremely good location in re• lation to the Perm' market. 106. MAJOR OPERATING PLANTS - 1938 -LEGEND s = Serov (Nadezhdinsk) P = Pervoural'sk Ch = Chermozsk V-I = Verkhne-Isetsk D = Dobryansk R = Revdinsk L = Lys1vensk Sev = Seversk Chu = Chusovsk NSe = Nizhne Serginsk T = Teplogorsk U = Ufaleysk K = Kushvinsk Zl = Zlatoust NT = Nizhne Tagil"sk Sa = Satkinsk V-S = Verkhne-Saldinsk Ash = Ashinsk NS = Nizhne Saldinsk B = Beloretsk V-Si = Verkhne-Sinyachikhinsk M = Magnitogorsk A = Alapaevsk Sources: Livshits, op_, cit.. p. 162; and Komar, op^. cit,map facing p. 201. 107. 108. TABLE V INTRAREGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IRON AND STEEL 1913-1938 SUBREGION 1913 1938 pig iron steel pig iron steel 1,000 % 1,000 % 1,000 % 1,000 % tons tons tons tons Central 396 44 325 36 278 12 406 14 Urals South 207 23 132 15 216 9 403 14 Central Urals Western 92 10 287 32 110 5 267 9 Urals Northern 198 22 146 16 236 10 286 10 Urals South - - - - 1,549 65 1,495 52 Eastern Urals TOTAL 893 99 890 99 2,389 101 2,857 99 Note: Percentage totals do not quite equal 100 per cent because some production is unassigned as to region; and also because of rounding. Source: Livshits, pp. cit.. pp. 120, 162. II. WORLD WAR II Frpm 1936 tp 1941 the effect pf the purges pn management 7 perspnnel was felt and preductipn stagnated. Cpnstructipn was ^N. P. Lipatpv, Chernava Metallurglva Urala. v gpdv velikpy ptechestvennpy vpynv (1941-1945). Mpskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1958, p. 31. 109. pushed during the war with large new units being added to Mag• nitogorsk, and Novo Tail'sk coming into production. During the war,2,433059 tons of pig iron production and 2,600,000 tons of steel production were added. The wartime additions to capacity were large, but not of a different scale to those of the Second Five Year Plan (1932-37). In addition the bulk of the wartime capacity addition was based on prewar construction. Also the Second Five Year Plan had started from a much smaller base, and, in fact, the earlier period's rates of growth had been higher, 9 very much so in steel. It should be remembered that although it is easier to add capacity to existing capacity, this must be added in large blocks if rapid substantial increases are to be achieved, and consequently, there was no pronounced advantage in increasing production during the war over the Second Five Year Plan. But even provided this proviso is introduced, the point is that the increase in pro• duction was not markedly larger than the comparable prewar period, which is the view generally held. The main reason for this mis• conception is a misunderstanding of the nature of the problem of increasing ferrous metal production. 8 During the Second Five Year Plan, 1,400,000 tons of pig iron and 2,600,000 tons of steel capacity were added. 9 The comparable rates were 110 per cent and 96 per cent for pig iron, and 220 per cent and 71 per cent for steel. 110. The basic iron and steel units, the blast furnace and steel furnace, which essentially determine the level of production, are of such a size as to preclude either their rapid movement or rapid construction. Also they are extremely expensive and require major investment, which can be ill-afforded in wartime. Conse• quently, no suitable plant was rescued from the area overrun by the Nazis,^ and although intensive efforts were exerted to in• crease capacity, these only succeeded in adding capacity at the prewar scale, which was a considerable achievement, but it is false to imagine that the wartime period was a time of unusually rapid increase of capacity in the Urals. The Urals gained so dramatically on the capacity of the South during the war because of the South's destruction, and 11 through no acceleration of its own growth. The wartime capacity additions were mainly on the Magnito• gorsk and Novo Tagil'sk plants, with the Chelyabinsk, Chusovsk and Zlatoust plants gaining major additions. Some of the initial construction was undertaken on the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine, but """^Holloway, op. cit.. p. 14. For example, the Stalin Metal Works in Stalino, in one of the last areas occupied by the Germans, managed to evacuate only 1500 of 10,000 employees, and none of its blast furnaces or other similar equipment to the Urals. S." M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union. Syracuse University Press, 1951, pp. 227-228, 11 Holloway states that US Lend Lease supplied the USSR with war materials but did not provide-her with steelmaking equip• ment. Holloway, op. cit.. p. 15. 111. this did not come into operation until long after the war (in 1955). These plants - Magnitogorsk, Novo Tagil1sk, Chelyabinsk, Chusovsk and Zlatoust - along with Serov - were the major plants at the end of the war. Magnitogorsk and Novo Tagil'sk were in the million ton class, with Chelyabinsk being brought to it. The others were in the 200,000-500,000 ton range. All of these plants were inte• grated, with the exdeption of Zlatoust which only produced steel, Zlatoust, of the major plants, was the only really old plant, dating originally from 1754. Thus by 1945, none of the pre - nineteenth century plants were major pig iron producers, and since Zlatoust's steel capacity was post-revolutionary, it was for all intents and purposes a twentieth century plant. During 1941-1945 the distribution of production had altered less than between 1932-1937 because wartime exigencies had re• quired increases in production capacity by all possible means. Therefore, small uneconomic producers experienced growth that otherwise they would not have. By and large, additions to their capacity did not make them efficient producers, it just increased the amount of uneconomic production. This tended to introduce inertia into the distribution and made the postwar ideal economic distribution that much more difficult to approximate. By 1945, the South Eastern Urals, thanks to Magnitogorsk, remained pre-eminent, the Central Urals, thanks to Novo Tagil'sk was next most important. The other three regions, the Northern 112. Urals, the South Central Urals and the Western Urals had all become secondary with no large plants and only a single second order producer each. They all lacked a suitable ore base for a major development, III. POST WORLD WAR II With the end of the war, the bulk of the Soviet Union's efforts to increase capacity were directed toward reconstruction of the metallurgical regions that had been devastated during the war, especially the South. This de-emphasis of the Urals lasted until 1950. Capital construction in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) continued to concentrate on the South and Center and to a slightly greater extent that in the preceding Five Year Plan, on the Urals. This latter trend resulted from the fact that earlier projects for the enlargement of Magnitogorsk and other plants had not been carried out during the Fourth Plan period (1946-1950) and were therefore transferred to the Fifth. Actually a significant proportion of the open hearth con• struction was located in the Urals from 1949, when 28.7 per cent of total Russian capacity installed was in the Urals. This rose to 52.4 per cent in 1950. By 1950, the Urals Production reached 7,200,000 tons of pig iron, an increase of 2,100,000 tons over 1945, or about 40 per cent. This was somewhat smaller than in the preceding five year period and came from wartime installed capacity coming into 113. CONSTRUCTION IN FERROUS METALLURGY IN I THE URALS DURING WW K MAP 22 • IRON ORE MINING • COAL MINING O PIG IRON SMELTING DSTEEL SMELTING AND 75 0 75 150 225 KM. METAL ROLLING • 1 1 1 114 CONSTRUCTION IN FERROUS METALLURGY IN THE URALS DURING WORLD WAR II -LEGEND s Serov Si = Sinarski K Kizel Vu = Verkhne Ufalale Chu = Chusovoy Nu = Nizhne Ufalaeys D Dobryanka Ku = Kusa Cher= Chermoz Ch = Chelyabinsk M Maykor Cheb = Chebarkul' 0 Omutninsk Zl = Zlatoust L = Lys1va Sa = • Satka VT = Verkhne Tura Ba = Bakal V Vysokaya T = Turgoyak j NT = Nizhniy Tagil K-I Katav-Ivanovsk NS = Nizhne Salda Mi = Min'yar VS = Verkhne Salda A = Asha Al = Alapaevsk B Beloretsk Le = Lebyazh1ya Z = Zagzinsk SU - Staro Utkinsk Mag = Magnitogorsk Bi = Bilimbay E Egorshinsk P Pervoural1sk Br - Bredy R Revda Dom = Dombarovskiy N Se= Nizhne Sergi Kh - Khalilovo Sev = Seversk G = Gremyachinsk Sources: Lipatov, OP. cit.. p. 15; and Geographic Atlas for Middle School. 1954, pp. 34-35. 115. production to a considerable extent. Steel reached 10,700,000 tons, from 6,500,000 for an increase cf9,200,000 tons or about 65 per cent, considerably better than the wartime increase in absolute terms. This was the result of wartime construction plus continual addition to open hearth units, which became especially significant in 1949, but had never fallen below 10 per cent of the total Russian additions, even in 1947 and 1948, the lowest 12 years. Rolled metal production increased to 7,800,000 tons, a 3,400,000 tons or 77 per cent increase over 1945. This was better not only in absolute terms, but also in relative ones, which to a large degree reflected the greater ease of switching from a war• time assortment to a peacetime one, rather than vice versa. By 1955, the Urals was producing 11,900,000 tons of pig iron, for an increase of 4,700,000 tons or about 65 per cent over 1950, a considerably better performance than in the Fourth Plan. The Urals produced 16,400,000 tons of steel or 5,700,000 tons or 53 per cent more steel than in 1950. It produced 12,600,000 tons of rolled metal, or 4,800,000 tons or 62 per cent more than in 13 1950. This production was concentrated essentially into three major operations, Magnitogorsk, Novo Tagil'sk and Chelyabinsk, 12 Livshits, op. cit., table 58 "Introduction of New Metal• lurgical Capacity by Region of USSR in 1946-1950"; table 62 "Distribution of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR in 1940-1950", pp. 197, 204, 206. 13 Komar, op. cit., p. 221. 116. which together in 1956 produced 9,900,000 tons of pig iron, or over 77 per cent of the total Urals output as well as 11,800,000 tons of steel or over 67 per cent of the steel. Orsk Khalilovsk, the fourth major operation was just coming into production and other significant plants were Zlatoust, Chusovsk and Serov which all produced 500,000 tons of steel or more, and Serov produced 500,000 tons of pig iron. Thus the four biggest pig iron pro• ducers supplied 82 per cent of the pig iron and the six biggest steel producers supplied 91 per cent of the steel. Thus by 1956 there were only six important plants with one new one in the process of being constructed.*"4 IV. SUMMARY The Urals iron and steel industry's distribution has changed down through the years. From 1631 until 1750 the Bashkirs forced all construction to occur North of the Kama-Chusovaya-Iset• line, that is, in the North and Central Urals. Very little of this development occurred in the Northern Urals because of difficulty of transport of finished product. Therefore, virtually all pro• duction down to 1755 occurred along the middle reaches of the Kama, the Chusovaya and in the Tura and Iset' basins. From 1755 onwards, with the destruction of the Bashkir power, the South Central Urals in the Belaya basin, that area of __ Livshits, op. cit., table 12 "Significance of Plants of Various Productivity in the Production of Pig Iron and Steel in the USSR in 1956", p. 64. 117. the South where trees and:iron deposits coincided, was developed as a metallurgical region. It never became more important than the leading Central Urals region, but it diminished the Central Urals' preponderance. The next important stage in the development of the present distribution began in the 1880*s when Sos'vinsk and Nadezhdinsk were developed in the formerly very distant North. Rail trans• portation did not reach these plants, but it reached the Urals, and thus made access to these plants for the movement of metal much easier. Thus by 1913 ,there twere essentially four metallurgical regions. First and foremost, the Central Urals, then the Northern Urals, then the Western Urals and finally the South Central Urals. Soviet developments have added a fifth, and now largest region. This is the South Eastern Urals which includes Magnitogorsk Chelyabinsk and Orsk-Khalilovsk, three of the four major oper• ations. The fourth, the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine is in the Central Urals. On the basis of this, the Central Urals is in the second region. The South Central Urals and the Northern Urals, which consists of only Serov (Nadezhdinsk) which is a second order plant, are next in rank. Serov produces more pig iron, but less steel and rolled metal than the South Central Urals. The Western Urals 15 is the fifth region. Three of the four major plants are associated with major *""'Komar, op. cit.. pp. 223-224. 118. ore sources, which are located in the Eastern half of the Urals, and the Chelyabinsk Plant is well situated to get ore from either Bakal or Kustanay. The second order plants are rather ambiguously located. Zlatoust which has the best access to a major ore source (Bakal) is the one that produces no pig iron at all. Chusovsk produces some steel and is not too far from the Kushvinsk group of deposits which also support the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine. Serov has fairly close local ore sources, but they are not very good. Yet this is the largest pig iron producer of the three. Of the three only Zlatoust is well situated for ore supply but it is overshadowed by the neighboring Chelyabinsk Plant which is slightly better situated for the import of Kuznets coking coal and Kustanay ores, but further from the Bakal deposit. As the Bakal deposit is not large enough to adequately supply Chelyabinsk there is no good raw material reason to develop pig iron pro• duction at Zlatoust although an integrated works would be able to produce a cheaper final product. Production has been concentrated in a few very large pro• ducers. This is due to the greater efficiency of large units in the iron and steel industry. There are four such plants: the Magnitogorsk, Nizhne Tagil'sk, Orsk-Khalilovsk combines and the Chelyabinsk Plant; which now produce more than four-fifths of the 16 pig iron and a slightly lower proportion of the steel and rolled *"^Komar, op. cit.. p. 222. 119. metal of the Urals. Also significant and of long standing has been the general intensification of the preponderance of the Eastern slopes of the Urals. The main reasons for this are its relatively rich, easily accessible reserves of raw materials and closer location to the Kuzbass and Karaganda fuel sourcesi Of some interest has been the North-South shifting of the center of gravity. Between 1932-1940, the center of gravity moved from the Central Urals, southwards to Chelyabinsk Oblast'.""7 This move reflected the advent of Magnitogorsk which came into production in 1932 and by 1940 accounted for more than half of the production of pig iron, steel and rolled metal of the Urals. After 1940 this process was arrested with the advent of the Novo Tagil'sk' plant in Sverdlovsk Oblast'. Since that period, two more major plants, Chelyabinsk and Orsk-Khalilovsk, have appeared, both in the Southern Urals. Livshits, op. cit.. table 43, p. 162 TABLE VI PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL IN THE URALS. 1940-1945 PRODUCT 1940 1945 Growth by Absolute % of USSR Absolute % of 1945 as % of 1,000,000 1,000,000 USSR 1940 tons tons pig iron 2.7 1318.2 5.1. 58.1 18844 steel 3.9 21.4 6.5 53.0 165.5 rolled 2.8 21.5 4.4 51.6 155.6 metal Source: Promvshlennost' SSSR. Moskva, 1957, pp. 112-114. TABLE VII INPUTS IN ONE TON OF PIG IRON -1956 Plant Ore and Coke (kg) Total Cost Agglomerate (rubles) (kg) Manitogorsk 1,754 665 169 Novo Tagil'sk 1,805 706 253 Chelyabinsk 2,053 807 282 Source: Livshits, op. cit.. pp. 224, 226-9. TABLE VIII INPUTS IN ONE TON OF STEEL - 1956 Plant Pig Iron Iron (kg) Fuel (kg) Total Cost (kg) (rubles) Magnitogorsk 669 301 144 229 Novo Tagil'sk 700 343 150 358 Chelyabinsk 702 366 217 422 Source: Ibid.. pp. 230-231. 121. CHAPTER V INDIVIDUAL PLANTS The present distribution of the Uralian iron and steel industry is the crux of the examination of the industry. In order to study this distribution extensive use of both Soviet and non-Soviet materials is necessary with wide use of periodical materials in order to bring this examination reasonably up to date. The distribution is treated by individually examining the major plants - Magnitogorsk, Nizhne Tagil1sk, Chelyabinsk and Orsk-Khalilovsk - and collectively treating the small plants. I. MAGNITOGORSK Iron Ore Supply Magnitogorsk was originally founded to exploit the high grade ore of the Magnitogorsk deposit. This deposit was formed with two layers of ores - an upper rich one and a lower poor one - with total reserves of three hundred million tons in 1956. This was the largest deposit of rich ores in the Urals but the high grade ore has been all but exhausted by now. The rich ores had a high iron and a low phosphorus and sulphur content. The poor ores on the other hand, not only have a modest iron content but also a high sulphur content - usually over 2 per cent.1 Hi. Gardner Clark quotes an American authority E. W. Davis "Iron Ore Mining, Beneficiation and Reserves," ABC of Iron and Steel. Cleveland, 1950, pp. 5, 6., who states "for metallurgical 122. FERROUS METALLURGICAL PLANTS - 1956 ^> \ MAP 23 A 1,500,000 TONS CENTRAL URALS # SOUTH CENTRAL URALS ® A 500,000 TONS WESTERN URALS 0 £ OTHER PRODUCERS NORTHERN URALS (f) 75 Q 75 150 225 KM.SOUTH EASTERN URALS Q) Magnitogorsk - M - 5,000,000 tons 123. FERROUS. METALLURGICAL PLANTS - 1956 LEGEND S = Serov K-U = Kamensk-Ural'sk I = Izhevsk Se = Seversk N = Nytva VU = Verkhne Ufaleysk Chu = Chusovsk Ka Kasli L = Lys1vensk Ch = Chelyabinsk K = Kushvinsk Cheb a Chebarkul' NS = Nizhne Saldinsk Zl = Zlatoust NT = Novo Tagil'sk Sa Satkinsk Al = Alapaevsk Mi = Min'yarsk Bi = Bilimbay A = Ashinsk P = Pervoural'sk B Beloretsk R = Revdinsk M = Magnitogorsk SV ——Sverdlovs k O-Kh = Orsk-Khalilovsk Sources: Ekonomicheskaya Karta Urala - "Rossiyskaya Federatsiya" Geografgiz, Moskva, 1959; and Livshits. op. cit.. p. 64. 124. Magnitogorsk ore is mined in two open pits. The ore is prepared for smelting by the following methods: rich oxidized ores are subjected to crushing and sorting; lean oxidized and alluvial ores are enriched by gravity beneficiation with some magnetic separation; and sulfide ores are enriched by magnetic separation. The resulting concentrates are then subjected to 2 agglomeration. In 1955, the sixteen million tons of ore produced supplied the needs of the Magnitogorsk Combine and also to some 3 extent those of the Kuznets Combine. The shipment of Magnitogorsk ore to Kuznets has been a subsidiary, but significant factor in the depletion of the rich ores. Twenty million tons of ore have been shipped out in the postwar period alone. This quantity of ore would have been suf• ficient for two to three years' operation of the Magnitogorsk Combine. It is judged expedient to reduce these shipments and make up the iron ore shortage of the Kuznets Plant with Sokolov- Sarbaysk ores until the local Gorno-Shorskaya and Khakasskaya ore bases are completely developed. This supply scheme will make reasons they (the operators) want the ore's sulphur content as low as possible, certainly not over 0.10 per cent.... shipments from the Lake Superior district over the past 20 years have averaged 0.02 per cent sulphur." M. G. Clark, The Economics of Soviet Steel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, p. 173. 2 Osintsev, oo. cit.. pp. 134,135. 3 Kutaf'ev, op. cit.. p. 574. 125. it possible to avoid duplication of shipments over the Tobol- 4 Magnitogorsk rail line as well. The capacity of the Magnitogorsk mine is slated to decline during the Seven Year Plan in connection with the gradual ex• haustion of resources and narrowing the front of mining operations at Mount Magnitnaya.^ By 1960 the share of sinter in Magnitogorsk's blast charge had reached 90 per cent. In other words over 90 per cent of the ore used was of the lower poorer quality type. With the exhaustion of the rich Magnitogorsk ores two substitu• tions have been attempted. They are the switching to the poorer local ores and the use of Sokolov-Sarbaysk ore from the adjacent part of Kazakhstan. In 1961, Sokolov-Sarbaysk was just coming into operation and only ten million tons of ore had been shipped^ mostly to the Chelyabinsk Plant. Therefore, it is impossible to say what the exact effect of the use of these ores will be. But it is certain that the Sokolov-Sarbaysk ore will cause the ore charge to be somewhat more costly, and consequently will raise the cost of g Magnitogorsk's pig iron. The substitutions for the rich 4 Minakov, op. cit.. p. 19. •^Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 17. Osintsev, op. cit.. p. 91. ^Buresh^Sergeyev, ,op .op .cit. cit... ,p . p.13 .6 . 126. Magnitogorsk ore were not completely satisfactory by 1961 because the Magnitogorsk Combine was unable to fulfill its plan for the 9 first time. Iron and Steel Production Magnitogorsk is one of the great metallurgical producers of the world. In 1932, Magnitogorsk produced 26 per cent of the Uralian pig iron production, but no steel at all. By 1937, it produced 60 per cent of the Urals pig iron and 37 per cent of the steel. By 1940, it managed to increase its share to 63 per cent of the pig iron and 53 per cent of the steel. At this time Magnitogorsk had a capacity of 2,300,000 tons of both pig iron and steel. Its actual production was lower because of discon• tinuous and below capacity operation. ""^ The Novo Tagil'sk Plant came into operation in 1940, and the Chelyabinsk Plant was just starting operations in 1945. But by the end of the war, the Magnitogorsk Combine was producing about 55 per cent of the Urals iron and 58 per cent of the steel. Therefore, it had experienced a slight relative decline in pig iron production and had gained slightly in steel. By 1958, Magni• togorsk was producing about 5,800,000 tons of pig iron,""*" (two- 9 B. Beloborodov, "Production Disrupted at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine," Sovetskaya Rossiya. Moscow, 7 January, 1962, p. 2 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (26)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,510, 18 April 1962, p. 26. ""^Livshits, op. cit.. p. 163. *"*Jasny, op. cit.. p. 72. 127. fifths of the Urals total) and a similar amount of steel (about a third). In 1959, both the Sparrows Point and Gary Plants in the USA had considerably more steel capacity than Magnitogorsk 12 with about eight million tons each. Nonetheless, in 1960 the Magnitogorsk Combine exceeded the iron producing capacity of the 13 largest US plant - Sparrows Point. The reason for this state of affairs is the greater use of scrap in steel making in the USA because of its more ready availability. Magnitogorsk is still the largest single concern, and is undergoing considerable absolute expansion, but it is declining relatively because of the emergence of other large units. At present it provides more pig iron, steel and rolled metal, than were produced in 1913 in all Russia. During the Seven Year Plan (1959 - 1965) new large units are to be introduced. As a result the production of steel shall rise by 50 per cent and pig iron - double by comparison with 1956. Rolled metal is to increase from 5,200,000 to 8,500,000 tons during the Seven Year Plan. In India Premier Khruschev indicated that in the next few years the capacity of the Magnitogorsk Combine will be brought to 12 G. Alexandersson, "Changes in the Location Pattern of the Anglo-American Steel Industry: 1948-1959," Economic Georgraphv April 1961, vol. 37, no. 2, p. 107. 13 Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 77. 128. 14 ten million tons, but no date for completion of this expan• sion was announced.*""' In 1961 it was predicted that Magnitogorsk wouldvjeach a capacity of twelve million tons before the end of 16 the Seven Year Plan. The Magnitogorsk blast furnace production is developing at a slower ratd than the steel smelting and rolling operations. This has caused the proportion of liquid pig iron in the smelt to decrease, while the proportion of scrap metal has risen. The scrap always arrives light weight. To counter this difficulty a faggoting press was procured in the summer of 1961, but had not been put into operation by January of 1962. *"7 Therefore, in 1961 it was planned to smelt a large quantity of steel from imported pig iron, the import of which was projected to increase in 1962. It complicates the work of the Magnitogorsk open hearth furnaces. The bringing in of Sokolov-Sarbaysk ore and external pig will result in a somewhat higher cost of 18 smelted steel. In 1961, as a result of the above-mentioned difficulties, in spite of supplying more metal than ever before, the open 14 Osintsev, op. cit.. pp. 101, 102; and Komar, op. cit. pp. 222, 225. l^x. Shabad, "News Notes," Soviet Geography; Review and Translation. May 1960, p. 89. 16V. Khvostovets, "Pyl" Nad Gorodom," Trud. Moskva, 18 March, 1961, p. 2. 1 7 •"-'Beloborodov, "Production Disrupted....", p. 27. •^Sergeyev, op. cit.. pp. 6-7. 129. hearth production of Magnitogorsk ended up thousands of tons of steel in arrears. Because the open hearth production lagged, it was necessary to bring in steel ingots from outside. But to preheat the imported cold ingots before rolling is not the same as internal metal. The internal metal has to be heated in the soaking pits only three and a half hours, while eight hours are required for the ingots from Nizhne Tagil'sk or Kuznetsk. It was found that the existing soaking pit capacity 19 was insufficient and a second group of pits had to be built. Magnitogorsk is the cheapest producer of iron, steel and rolled metal in the Soviet Union. This is largely the result of economies of scale but hinges to some extent also on the 20 relative cheapness of Kuzbass and Karaganda coal and the cheapness of both the local and Kazakh iron ores. In 1960, Magnitogorsk steel production costs were the lowest in the Soviet Union. Other leading major plants were all considerably more expensive. The main reason for this is that Magnitogorsk has the cheapest charging materials. Furthermore, it consumes twenty to thirty kilograms less of them per ton of 19 Beloborodov, "Production Disrupted....", pp. 26-28. 20 Holzman states that because of their poorer quality. Karaganda coals are mixed with Kuzbass coal. He does not state in what proportion. Holzman, op. cit.. p. 386. The import of Kuzbass coal was still continuing to Magnitogorsk in 1961. Minakov, op. cit.. p. 16. 130. output than most other enterprises. A considerable effect is also exerted by the comparatively low cost of converting pig iron for steel making purposes. One field in which Magnitogorsk is not pre-eminent is in the consumption of the metallic ore charge, the expense of which amounts to at least three quarters of the production cost of steel. "Azovstal1" uses thirty kilograms less of metallic ore per ton of steel. In Magnitogorsk it is feasible to save fifteen to twenty kilograms or 2 per cent of the metallic ore consumption. This would require the reduction to approximately one-half the iron lost in the slag in the form of oxides and metallic regulus, and the elimination of accidental formation of unfit metal and the loss of metal in the slag cups. This 21 would not require large capital expenditures. As mentioned above, in 1961, for the first time in its history Magnitogorsk ended up in arrears. The main reason for this was that new construction was not completed according to 22 plan:. Because of this 1961 lag Magnitogorsk was included in the projects that received increased emphasis in 1962. A 40 per 23 cent increase in capital investments was planned. 21Sergeyev, OP. cit.. pp. 1,2,7,8. 22Beloborodov, "Production Disrupted....." , pp. 26,30. 23 ' Garbuzov, op. cit.. p. 14. 131. During the Seven Year Plan appreciable expansion of iron, steel and rolled stock production is planned at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine. Six billion rubles of capital investments were earmarked for industrial construction at the Magnitogorsk Combine, with the intention of putting into operation the main industrial units by 1965. This includes two blast furnaces, eight open hearth furnaces, three coking batteries and two roi- ,. 24 ling mills. II. NIZHNE TAGIL1SK Iron Ore Supply The Nizhne Tagil1sk Combine was constructed to utilize the Tagilo-Kushvinsk group of deposits. In 1956, the Tagilo-Kushvinsk probable reserves were estimated to be 440,000,000 tons. These ores have a widely ranging, but generally low iron content and significant admixtures of sulphur and phosphorus. They are largely magnetite with smaller deposits of martite and semi- mar tite. In view of their low iron content they are concentrated 25 through wet magnetic separation. In 1955, the more than eight million tons of ore produced were.used to supply the Nizhne 26 Tagil'sk Combine and the Nizhne Saldinsk and Kushvinsk plants. 24 Khlebnikov, ap. cit.. p. 65. 25 Osintsev, op. cit., p. 129. 26 Kutaf'ev, op. cit.. p. 575. 132. The Kachkanar deposit is being developed to augment the ore supply of Nizhne Tagil'sk and the other operations of the 27 Central Urals (also Chusovsk). Kachkanar, not far from Nizhne Tagil, is the biggest deposit of iron ore in the Urals with reserves estimated at eight billion tons. The Kachkanar ore is relatively low grade - containing on the average 16 to 17 per cent iron. But because it occurs essentially on the surface, it is economic to exploit by open strip mining. The Kachkanar ores are to be concentrated by magnetic separation which will yield concentrates containing 63 to 64 per cent iron and 2 to 3 per cent silicon dioxide. The pig iron cost will be partially offset by the slag formed during its smelting which will contain a great deal of valuable vanadium. The ore concentrating combine is being built in two sec• tions. The first section is designed to extract 33,000,000 tons of ore annually in the Gusevorsk Pit which will yield 6,000,000 tons of sinter and pellets. After the second section is com• pleted, with raw material also being mined from the Kachkanar Mountain, the enterprise will yield sixty million tons of raw ore annually. Once full capacity is reached the shipments of iron ore from other regions to the metallurgical enterprises of the Northern and Central Urals will be discontinued. Zabaluev, op. cit.. p. 3 133. The first builders arrived in the Kachkanar Mountain 28 region in the spring of 1957. The schedule provided for putting into operation the so-called minimal complex of the ore mining combine (approximately one-fourth of capacity of the 29 stage) in 1961. It is designed to extract 7,500,000 tons of raw ore and produce 1,500,000 tons of concentrate annually. By 1961, five years after the beginning of construction not one object was yet released for regular operation. Therefore, the target date for activating the minimal one-fourth of the first section of the combine was first postponed until 1962, then to 28 1963. The Kachkanar Plant produced its first concentrate in June 1963.30 Iron and Steel Production Nizhne Tagil1sk, the second largest metallurgical oper• ation in the Urals, is the only major plant to be located in the Central Urals. Initially developed during the Second Five Year 31 Plan, it went into operation in 1940. In 1957, the new Novo 28 Tagil'sk KazakovMetallurgica, op. lcit. Plan. t ppwa.s 5-6combine, 9, d12 wit. h the old Nizhne ^y"The Kachkanar Ore-Concentration Combine," Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. Moscow, 28 January 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (8)," Joint Publications Research Service, 9869, 21 August 1961, ' P- 4i 30 Markish, op. cit.. p. 18. JiLipatov, op. cit.. pp. 17, 169. 134. Tagil'sk Plant and ore deposits in the neighborhood, and the new 32 enterprise received the name of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine. In 1945, the Novo Tagil'sk Plant smelted some 1,800,000 33 tons of pig iron, and 300,000 tons of steel. By 1958, the 34 Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine was producing 2,600,000 tons of pig iron and a similar amount of steel. Nizhne Tagil'sk is experiencing difficulties in expanding its production. By January 1962, Nizhne Tagil'sk was a full year 35 behind the schedules specified by the Seven Year Plan. The main causes for this state of affairs are: the expansion of the ore supply has been lagging, the scrap metal supply is poor, rationalization of production processes has not been achieved and possible technical innovations have not been implemented. The construction of the Kachkanar Ore Concentration Combine is not proceeding satisfactorily. The original mining enterprises of the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine are also slow to expand. Because of the lag in the construction of mining based on local ore 32V. P. Petrov, "Soviet Industry," Washington, W. P. Kamkin, 1960. In this study only the Novo Tagil'sk portion of the combine will be examined prior to the 1957 union, conse• quently the nomenclature of this operation will not be consistent. 33 Lipatov, op. cit.. p. 169. 34 Jasny, opT cit.. p. 151; Soviet Geography: Review and Translation, vol. 1, no. 1-2, p. 72. 35v> Biryukov, and A. Uryashev, "Pokazanaya Kopiya Pyl'nogo Originala," Izvestiva. Moskva, 25 January 1962, p. 3. 135. deposits, large quantities of ore from other regions are being 36 brought in. The delivery of such ores is expensive. Furthermore, the iron making materials supplied to Nizhne Tagil'sk are inferior. The iron received for smelting contains twice as much sulphur as specified by the norm. Likewise, the sinter used is not suitable for open hearth furnaces. In 37 addition the limestone is poor in calcium oxide. But in spite of the above mentioned difficulties, the steel making component of Nizhne Tagil'sk is very efficient. In 1961 the open hearth shops of Nizhne Tagil'sk and "Zaporozhstal'" achieved the best utilization of open hearth production facili- 38 ties in the Soviet Union. In 1962, the Nizhne Tagil'sk Metallurgical Combine started the construction of a large converter shop equipped with 39 oxygen converters. It will contain the largest converters in the Soviet Union, each one of them replacing the capacity of 40 several large open hearth furnaces. The first section of 36 "Ore Mining Lags Behind Requirements," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Moscow, 28 January 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (8)," Joint Publications Research Service, 9,-869 21 August 1961* p. 2. 37 Yu. Ploskonenko and A. Morogov, "How to Exploit the Potential for Increasing Steel Output at-the Nizhnyy-Tagil' rs Combine, " Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Moscow, 7 February 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (10), " Joing Publications Research Service,-10, 036, 7 September 1961,-pp. 4-5. 38 A. Ryasnoy, "Metallurgy, an Important Link," Agitator Moscow, No. 24, December 1961, pp. 10-13 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (23)," Joint Publications Research • Service,- 12,818, 6 March 1962, p.-4. 136. this shop was planned to be put into operation in the first 41 quarter of 1963. This shop makes it possible to efficiently 39 utilize the ores of the Kachkanar deposit. By early 1964 42 Nizhne Tagil'sk was producing oxygen converter steel. Because of its inferior raw material supply the cost of production at Nizhne Tagil'sk is considerably higher than at Magnitogorsk. In 1958, the overall cost of a ton of pig iron 43 was 60 per cent higher at Nizhne Tagil'sk than at Magnitogorsk and in 1956, the overall cost of a ton of steel was 56 per cent 44 higher. During the Seven Year Plan at the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine a new blast furnace, and an open hearth furnace have been put into operation, and r:.v.1-operation of two open hearth furnaces 45 and two coking batteries is planned. This is in addition to the 39 N. I. Sheftel, "New Equipment of the Metallurgical Plant of the RSFSR in 1962," Metallurg. Moscow, No. 3, March 1962, pp. 1-3 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (42)," Joint Publi• cations Research Service, 14,025, 6 June 1962, p. 6. 40 N. Il'inskiy, "Moshchnyy Konvertornyy Tsekh," Pravda. Moskva, 22 January 1962j p. 1. 41 "Kislorodnye Konvertory dolzhny byt' v srok.'" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. 15 December 1962, p. 16. 42 I. Peshkin, "Molodef Staryy Ural," Ekonomicheskava Gazeta. 18 January 1964, p. 42. 43TBardin , op. cit.. p. 522. 44Livshits, op. cit.. pp. .230-: ^Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 65. 137. converter shop mentioned above. III. CHELYABINSK Iron Ore Supply The Chelyabinsk Plant utilizes the Bakal'sk deposit which 46 is 270 kilometers distant. In 1956, probable reserves were estimated at 210,000,000 tons. These ores, having a low Fe but insignificant sulphur and phosphorus content were of two types - limonites with 85,000,000 tons and siderites with 125,000,000 tons. The limonites are prepared by crushing and sorting and especially phosphorus free ores are derived through roasting as well. The siderites are similarly prepared by crushing and sorting, 47 but in the future some of the siderites will be agglomerated. The Bakal'sk ore is not uniformly deposited, and its iron content varies sharply - from 35 to 50 per cent. A good grade of agglomerate could be obtained by "neutralization" - the mixing of rich and poor ores together. This can produce a good blast furnace charge after the mixture is sintered. It is usually performed in special intermediate warehouses where the ore is delivered, mixed, and sent to an agglomerating factory. This is at present not done at the Bakal'sk deposit. 46 V. Azbukin, V. Beloborodov, "The Fate of the Bakal Iron Ore Deposits," Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow,-29 January 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (8)", Joint Publications Research Service, 9869, 21 August 1961, p. 18. 47 Osintsev, op. cit.. p.136. 138. Largely because of the lack of neutralization of ores, the agglomerating plant of Bakal is much less productive than at Chelyabinsk itself - based on imported ores. Similar equipment at Chelyabinsk is 48 per cent more productive. A suggested solution to this problem is the formation of a Chelyabinsk Combine including the Bakal'sk ore source with the Chelyabinsk Plant. This is considered to be quite feasible because : a similar organization is successfully operated at the Kuznets Combine which includes the Gornaya Shoriya mines some distance removed from the plant.48 In 1955, the 9,300,000 tons of ore produced were utilized 49 by the Chelyabinsk, Satkinsk and Ashinsk plants, but in fact, provided less than half of the requirements of these plants. In the Seven Year Plan it is intended to increase production by 40 per cent.5° Numerous disorders, obsolete facilities, and poor organi• zation have led to deplorable results. Bakal did not fulfill the plan in 1961. The Novo-Bakal mine should have been put into operation during 1960 to produce one half a million tons of ore but was not in operation by 1961. Further, labour turnover was -, „ 48 also extreme. 48 Azbukin, Beloborodov, op. cit., pp. 16-18. 4^Kutaf'ev, op. cit.. p. 575. 50M. Leshchiner, "Perspektivy Razvitiya Chernoy Metallurgii -Chelyabinskogo Ekonomicheskogo Administrativnogo Rayona," Planovoe Khozyaystvo. XXXVI year of issue, No. 12, December 1959, p. 78. 139. Possible auxiliary supplies of ore for the Chelyabinsk Plant are the Akhtensk and Techensk deposits, but their total probable reserves only amount to some 65,000,000 tons. Therefore, even with the development of these deposits Chelyabinsk would be deficient in ore supply. The large scale use of Kustanay ores ..51 is proceeding. The first section of the Sokolov-Sarbaysk mining combine 52 was scheduled to start operation in 1961 and to be completed in 53 1962. The development of the import of ores from Central Kazakhstan (around Karaganda) is to some extent desirable because this region is arid and lacks an adequate water supply for in situ 54 smelting, but this region is considerably further removed from the Urals than the Kustanay reserves. The Sokolov-Sarbaysk Ore Concentration Combine is building a factory for treating sulfide ores. When in full production it will process 26,500,000 tons of ore annually. The first stage will have an annual capacity of 12,000,000 tons of crude ore.*'*' 51 Osintsev, op. cit.. p. 137. 52"Shock-Work Construction Projects of the Third Year of the Seven-Year Plan, " Pravda, 4 January 1961, p. 3 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (6)", Joint Publications Research Service, 10,032, 1 September 1961, p. 2. JGarbuzov, op. cit.. p. 17. 54 Minakov, op. cit.. p. 8. 55 V. Martem'yanov, "Samaya Moshchnaya v mire," Izvestiva. Moskva, 27 April 1961, p. 3. • • 140. In 1960, the first part of the Sarbaysk ore mine with an annual 56 capacity of 1,500,000 tons was completed. In 1961, the capacity of Sokolovka and Sarbaysk mines was slated to increase by 3,500,000 tons of ore.57 Iron and Steel Production Chelyabinsk, the third major metallurgical operation in the Urals, specializes in high quality metallurgy. This is not surprising because it is the only major Uralian plant located on a major metal market as opposed to directly on an ore source as the other three are. Its raw material supply is the least satisfactory of the major plants and it was the first to import major quantities of iron ore. Chelyabinsk's first steel was poured in 1942, but construc• tion, had been started in 1935, and the plant was not really 58 integrated until later. Chelyabinsk produced some steel before the end of the war but was only getting into production in a big way by 1956 when it produced about two million tons of pig iron and three million tons of steel. Because it specializes in high 56"Rudnyy," Komsomolskava Pravda. 1 January 1961, p. 1. ^7"New Metallurgical Projects in Kazakhstan," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. Alma-Ata, 3 February 1961, (in Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (10), Joint Publications Research Service, 10,036, 7 September 1961, p. 12. 58 Lipatov, op. city, p. 170. 141. quality steel making it is supplied with electric furnaces as well as the usual open hearth ones. It is also planned to develop a converter shop which was to have gone into production in 1961. 59 Construction had not even begun by this date. In mid 1961 Chelyabinsk pig iron production was well above the planned level, but steel and rolled products were lagging below it. Defect losses were high, as was the cost of production. Open hearth furnaces and blooming mills had excessive down times. Ordinary steel is still smelted in the electric furnaces. The reasons for this undesirable state of affairs are that the ferroalloys, and special scrap for the electric furnaces are in• adequately supplied.60 The essential feature of the ferroalloy problem is that ferroalloy plants do not as a rule have their own mines, quarries or supply bases. They are forced to depend on outside sources for their raw materials. As they are secondary consumers, the producers do not take sufficient pains to ensure that the raw 61 material supplied reaches their exacting specifications. Scrap 59 S. Afanas'yev, "Konvertoru - Dorogu v Metallurgiyu, Eto Vygodno, Progressivno, " Pravda. 13 December 1961, p. 3. 60 V. Beloborodov and N. Kartashov, "Crisis at Chelyabinsk", Sovetskava Rossiva. Moscow, 20 July 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (12)," Joint Publications Research Service, 10,286, 2.October 1961, pp. 3-4, 6. 61 Zhuravlev, op. cit.. pp. 11-12. 142. is in limited supply throughout the Soviet Union, and therefore, it is not surprising that special scrap should be in acute short supply. Especially since complaints concerning lack of intelli• gent handling of scrap are general.^ Steel smelting production is being developed more rapidly than blooming production. The existing blooming capacity cannot process the entire output of metal coming from the open hearth and electric smelting furnaces. In 1961, the Chelyabinsk blooming mill being of inadequate capacity, about 70,000 tons of metal were piled up in the cold ingot storage area. This occurs while the rolling mills at Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk work only intermittently because of shortages of billets and slabs. This situation will probably even deteriorate in the next few years, when new electric steel smelting furnaces and a new sheet rolling mill will go into operation. There is also a wide discrepancy at the Chelyabinsk Plant between the growth of the basic facilities and that of the maintenance services. During recent years the basic plant has increased five fold while the maintenance services have only 63 doubled and are now quite inadequate for good practice. The cost of production at Chelyabinsk is higher than at Nizhne Tagil'sk let alonja Magnitogorsk. In 1956, the overall 62 Ploskonenko and Morogov, op. cit.. p. 4; and "Raw Material Shortages in the Iron and Steel Industry," Op. cit.. p.l. 63 Beloborodov and Kartashpv. pp. cit.. pp. 6-7. 143. cost of a ton of pig iron was 68 per cent higher at Chelyabinsk than at Magnitogorsk, and the overall cost of a ton of steel was 84 per cent higher.64 During the Seven Year Plan significant development of the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant was planned. For industrial con• struction at this plant in the current seven year period, it was planned to earmark four billion rubles of capital investments, putting into operation new blast furnaces, coking batteries, converters, open hearth furnaces, electric furnaces, sheet rolling mill, cold rolling mill, blooming mill with a continuous 65 billet mill and structural and commercial mills. IV. ORSK-KHALILOVSK Iron Ore Supply 66 The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is based on the nearby deposits of Akkermanovsk, Novo-Kievsk and Novo Petropavlovsk. In 1956, the total possible reserves were estimated to be 260,000,000 tons. The Khalilovsk ores are largely limonites with low iron content; containing nickel and chrome, but besides being friable, they have a high content of hygroscopic moisture - from 20 to 25 per cent. 64 Livshits, ozu cit.. pp. 226-229, 230-231. 65 Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 65. 66 Novo-Kievsk is only some 40 km distant from Novo- Troitsk, the site of the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine. 144. The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is being developed to ease the Soviet nickel situation. There is quite a severe shortage and great efforts are being made to develop other alloys with pro- 68 perties similar to nickel steel. Also there is competition for the Orsk ore for the production of nickel itself. In 1956, the Novo-Kievsk deposit was in production with an open pit mine and a crushing sorting plant and the Akkermanovsk 6 7 deposit was being prepared for production. In 1955, the Novo- 69 Kievsk Deposit produced six hundred thousand tons of ore. The processing of the Khalilovo ores, which contain titanium as well as nickel and chrome, is much more difficult than ordinary iron ores. More fuel must be consumed in their blast furnace smelting and this of course increases the cost of the metal. Rolling it costs 18 to 25 per cent more than carbon ores. The Combine also has a bloomery iron shop. A pig con• taining iron and nickel is obtained from the ore by direct reduction. But this pig is greatly contaminated by slag inclu• sions, sulphur, and in part, phosphorus. Attempts to use pig containing nickel in the production of steel have not been very successful. Consequently the pig goes into the blast furnace charge to increase the nickel content in the alloyed pig iron. 67 Osintsev, op. cit.. pp. 138-139. 68 Klunichenko, op. cit.. p. 16. 69 ^Kutaf'ev, op. cit.. p. 145. This use of it, however, is not advisable, inasmuch as the existence of nickel in Khalilovo iron does not actually result in an improvement in the Soviet nickel situation. Moreover, to obtain the pig Novo-Troitsk nickel ores are used which are destined for the nonferrous metallurgical industry, i. e., for the production of metallic nickel. The Central Scientific Research Institute of the Iron and Steel Industry has developed a process for refining the pig, which makes it possible to obtain conditioned commercial ferronickel, i.e. a nickel-iron alloy. This method was successfully tested in 1960 at Novo-Troitsk itself, but has not been followed up by the commercial production of ferronickel at the bloomery shop.70 Iron and Steel Production The fourth major plant - Orsk-Khalilovsk - in the process of being developed - is,like Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk, located in the Southern Urals. It initially began production in 1955, but construction had started as early as 1943. The construction of the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine was not undertaken because rich iron deposits had been found, but because they contain a valuable metal - nickel - which is in scant supply in the Soviet Union.70 It is worthy of note,that although generally considered important, the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is not a priority project ^Gol'denberg, op. cit.. pp. 2-5. 146. of the Seven Year Plan. The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine has been under construction for more than twenty years now, but many more recent enterprises, for example, the Cherepovets Metallurgical Plant, are more fully in operation. Because of poorly integrated construction, the Orsk- Khalilovsk Combine is forced to send seven ton steel ingots to the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine in order to obtain slabs for rolling steel sheet. The transportation of the slabs for rolling steel sheet to Magnitogorsk and back to Novo-Troitsk is extremely costly. To circumvent this problem it was decided to stop sending metal to Magnitogorsk and instead to make small ingots and roll sheet steel from them in situ. But the transition to teeming steel into small molds reduced the productivity of the open hearth furnaces. Moreover, in view of the forthcoming opening of another open hearth at the open hearth furnace shop there is a shortage of: molds again. Hence it will be necessary again to cast seven ton ingots and dispatch them to Magnitogorsk for rolling into slabs. The finances allocated to the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine to insure the construction and opening in 1961 of the blooming mill, heat treatment department and the first section of the sintering factory fell 139,000,000 rubles short of the required sum, including 61,000,000 rubles for assembly operations. The 147. Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is also adversely affected by delays in deliveries of equipment necessary for expansion. Part of this problem stems from the Combine's need for considerable and varied, non-standard equipment - racks, frames, fastenings, etc. The Combine underfulfilled its 1960 yearly plan. Its out• put fell short of the goal by thousands of tons of steel, rolled stock and iron ore. The open hearth and rolling shops greatly overspent their wage funds. The plan on construction and assembly operations at the sintering factory was only 16.9 per cent ful• filled - at the heat treatment department, 57.3 per cent; This 71 did not improve in the early part of 1961. Khalilovsk steel resists metal fatigue about twice as much as ordinary steel and its impact strength is about nine times greater. This steel has both great strength and good weldability. In producing metal products made of this type for transportation uses, it was possible to utilize the whole complex of elements contained in Khalilovsk ore with sufficient effectiveness. The experience acquired in obtaining stronger metal from Khalilovsk ores has long since failed to be reflected in the production by the Combine. Over a number of years, it has been smelting low quality steels designed for products which do not 72 require great strength. 71Rudenko, op. cit.. p. 1. 72 Gol'denberg, op. cit.. pp. 3-4. 148. The essential problem of the Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine is that the production of naturally alloyed steel has proven much more difficult than it was originally supposed. This is the reason why more concerted effort and investment have not been forthcoming to establish this combine as a full fledged metal• lurgical unit. Technology and economic conditions are only now becoming ripe for this operation to become really economically viable. In the current seven year period, the construction of the Orsk-Khalilovsk Metallurgical Combine is to be finished essentially, putting into operation a new blast furnace, seven open hearth furnaces and one converter, two coking batteries, 73 and four rolling mills. V. SMALL PLANTS The small metallurgical plants in the Urals invariably predate the large ones and also the revolution. They were renovated in the modern period because the demand for metal has always exceeded the supply in the Soviet Union. Thus although these plants are often less efficient and only a few of them produce unusual products difficult to duplicate in the large plants, some twenty of them continue in operation. The small — Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 65. 149. plants produced the entire production of iron and steel until 1932 when Magnitogorsk came into operation. Since that time, their share of the total production has progressively decreased, but their absolute production has increased to a considerable extent; more than doubled for pig iron and quadrupled for steel by 1956. The larger old plants, are quite competitive with the more expensive major plants. In 1956, for example, three of the old plants, Satkinsk, Kushvinsk and Ashinsk, spent less on the metallic part of the pigiron charge than Chelyabinsk, which was the highest cost major plant, but only Ashinsk was cheaper than Novo Tagil'sk. No plant even approached Magnitogorsk. All of the old plants consume more and pay more for fuel than the major plants. The differential in fuel expenses is great enough that none of the old plants have as low total raw material and fuel costs as the major operations. The total cost of a ton of pig iron at Satkinsk was 320 rubles as opposed to 284 in Chelyabinsk and 253 in Novo Tagil'sk.74 Actually these old plants were not even as competitive as their pig iron costs would seem to indicate because they often lacked the volume of production necessary for efficient further processing. For example, a modern continuous hot strip mill Livshits, OPJ. cit.. pp. 226-229, 236-237 150. requires a capacity of 1,250,000 tons in order to operate effi- 75 ciently, none of the older plants produced this much metal. The Serov Plant depends on the local Serov-Ivdel'sk ore sources. It has been altered from charcoal to coke and derives its coal from the Kuzbass, there being no direct rail link with the relatively close, but expensive Pechora Basin. In the early Soviet period, Serov (Nadezhdinsk) was exceptional among the Tsarist plants in that it was fairly modern, relatively large and quite efficient. Little effort to expand or alter it was carried out before the war, but during the war both pig iron and steel capacity were added to it. It is isolated to the North of the rest of the Urals plants but is situated on an adequate ore base with promise of much augmented supply if some recently dis• covered ore finds are firmed up. The newly, discovered ores contain appreciable amounts of 76 chrome and nickel which the Soviets are short of. Therefore, a Serov ferroalloy plant was considered among the most important construction work being done in 1961,and investment was increased in 1962. This was in accordance with the general program of channelling 1962 investment toward the most important construction Long-Term Trends and Problems of the European Steel Industry, op. cit., p. 110. 76 Komar, op. cit.. p. 218 151. 77 projects that had been initiated earlier. It is planned to fully modernize the blast furnace shop, with the construction of new blast furnaces to replace the old furnaces to be 78 demolished. This unusual situation indicates that Serov is to increase in importance, possibly even to rival Orsk-Khalilovsk eventually. The Chusovsk Plant draws its ore from Tagilo-Kushvinsk which has other important plants associated with it. Chusovsk's coal supply is derived from the Kizelovsk and Kuznetsk basins. What is somewhat unusual in Soviet practice is that is iron pro• duction has been considerably increased since 1913, because it is the only producer of ferrovanadium, and its steel production has not nearly kept pace. Chusovsk supplies pig iron to the local plants, especially the L^s'vensk steel plant, which specialize in quality metallurgy. Chusovsk is unfavorably situated with regard to coal supply - it is one of the most distant pig iron producers supplied from the Kuznets Coal Basin (Serov is slightly further removed), and Garbuzov, op. cit., pp. 14-15. i Khlebnikov, og. cit., p. 66 152. the Kizelovsk coal supply is of generally inadequate quality. Chusovsk's unfavorable coal supply coupled with its concentration oti production of high quality metal has induced the Soviets to 79 experiment with the introduction of mazut into its furnaces. The larger old plants are to be retained for: the foreseeable future. In the Seven Year Plan it is planned to modernize Serov, 80 Zlatoust, Verkhne-Isetsk and Chusovsk. Certain of the other old plants supply unusual products and hence will probably be retained for some time to come. The Lys'vensk Plant produces valuable grades of thin steel sheets, black iron plates, and tin plate; the Nytva Plant is a prominent supplier of a wide assortment of 81 bimetals and other important products. In 1962, the Beloretsk Metallurgical Combine was to have been given a special department for precision alloy rolling and strip alloy production was being 82 organized at theMin'yar and Izhevsk plants. 83 Other plants undergoing additions are Ashinsk Omut- 84 ninsk and Pervoural'sk. The Pervoural'sk new tube manufacturing plant is the largest automated tube rolling mill in the Soviet 85 Union. 79Th e first batch of tubes were rolled by January 1962. a petroleum residue. ^°Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 66; 8""Zabaluev, etc.. op.cit..p.3, 82 Sheftel, op. cit.. p. 9. 83 N. V. Matyushin, "The Trend in Standardization of Metallurgy," Standartizatsiva. Moscow, No. 1, 1962, pp. 30-34 (in-"Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (31)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,311, 3 April 1962, p. 8. 153 Plants like Ashinsk, Saldinsk, Nizhne Serginsk, Kushvinsk, Seversk and Alapaevsk, oh the other hand, do not appear to have a very bright future. Furthermore, Ashinsk is to cease iron smelting in its own blast furnaces and be converted to cheaper imported iron for steel making. Iron smelted in the old blast furnaces of the Ashinsk Plant costs 42 per cent higher than aver- 86 age. Seversk, in spite of considerable local initiative in 87 rationalization of production, is still an extremely high cost 88 producer. Alpaevsk is plagued by difficulties with its iron ore source, which requires considerable investment if an efficient 89 production is to be attained. This is extremely unlikely because even the more favorable plants such as Chusovsk have considerabl84 e difficulty in acquiring investment capital for new OH"Garbuzov, op. cit.. p, 15. 85 "Prokatany Pervye Truby ," Trud. Moskva, 13 January 1962, p. 1. 86 Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 132. 87 A. Rusin, P. Kolotilov, I. Mamontov, P. Yakupov, V. Toropov, V. Medvedev, V. Mershinin, "For Larger Production and Fewer Expenditures," Sovetskava Rossiya. Moscow, 29 March 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (13)," Joint Publications Research Service, 10,432, 11 October 1961, pp. 16-20. 88 It is much more expensive than Lys'vensk for instance. Zabaluev, op. cit.. p. 3. 89 The Alapaevsk Combine mines its ore by selective ex• ploitation of a system of small mines. The result of giving preference to sectors containing rich ore is an impoverished deposit area and t.:a:; reduced mining front. Such a method of 154. equipment to decrease the lag behind the leading major plants. Chusovsk produces open hearth steel cheaper than Makeevka, Cherepovets, Orsk-Khalilovsk and Chelyabinsk do. Yet the only important work done on it from 1946-1960 was the modernization of one blast furnace.^ VI. SUMMARY The erection of major metallurgical plants in the Urals was deemed desirable for a large number of reasons, but the main points are: the general belief that the larger the unit the more efficient it would be, which to some extent at least is supported by the mineralization of the fuel balance, the intro• duction of integrated plants, the processing of furnace charge, the necessity to import fuel, and the great size of the Urals. Most of these items have been dealt with to some extent earlier in this study, but to recapitulate:- The belief in size being a good thing is self-explanatory; the mineralization of the fuel balance enabled, and, in fact made desirable the increase in size of blast furnaces - the basic unit in an iron and steel works; the introduction of integrated plants allowed economies of materials through better utilization of inputs, which in turn exploitation increases the cost of mining the ore (up to nine-ten rubles per ton). It is possible to indiscriminately mine all of the ore and reprocess it by the bloomery method. But this requires capital investment. P.V. Vlasov, MThe Ferrous Metallurgy Section of the Engineering and Economic Council of the Sverdlovskiy Sov- narkhoz."Byulleten1 Tekhniko-Ekonomicheskoy Informatsii. Moscow, No-.__2_, pp. 83-84 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy(44)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,843, 22 May 1962, p. 26. 155. was most readily arrived at in the form of big units; the pro• cessing of furnace charge made the utilization of huge, but formerly substandard deposits of ore practicable, and these deposits supplied the raw material bases for such plants; and the necessary import of fuel was easiest arranged to a limited number of locations eliminating the necessity of duplication of transport facilities, maintenance of said facilities and such units as coking plants, that otherwise would be necessary. It is worthwhile to elaborate on the great size of the Urals area. The immense size of the Urals causes it to be, not a closely knit region like, for example, the Ruhr, but much more like the North Eastern United States. Consequently the distances involved in internal transportation generate more force toward integration of units - both horizontal and vertical - than in a smaller area. Therefore, the Urals iron and steel industry evolved very large integrated units. By 1959, the bulk of the production was concentrated into three producers; the Magnitogorsk, Nizhne Tagil*sk, and Chelyabinsk plants; and one other major operation 91 was developing - Orsk-Khalilovsk - in Novo Troitsk. These plants are supplied with ore from the mines of Magnitogorsk, the Zabaluev, etc., pp. cit.. p. 3. 91 Orsk-Khalilovsk started operation in 1955, but has not yet reached the level of the other three. 156. Tagilo-Kushvinsk, the Bakal'sk, the Khalilovsk, the Kachkanar, .92 and the Sokolov-Sarbaysk deposits. In 1932 the major plants (at that time only Magnitogorsk was in operation) accounted for 26 per cent of the Uralian pig 93 iron production, and no steel. Byl937 this had increased to 62 per cent of the pig iron, and 38 per cent of the steel. By 1956 the proportion was 77 per cent of the pig iron and 67 per cent of the steel. ^"TSomar, op. cit.. pp. 221-222. 93 Nizhne Tagil'sk was producing a little pig iron and steel, but this was on the basis of plant predating the later Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine, and had little to do with the latter, but the same site. 157. CHAPTER VI AN ANALYSIS OF THE URALIAN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY The distribution of the Uralian iron and steel industry is distinguished essentially through its historical development and raw material supplies. Therefore, an analysis on these bases is included. I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT It should be borne in mind.j.as a limiting factor that when metallurgy was introduced in the Urals the whole region had just entered the Russian sphere of influence. Ivan IV had only cap• tured Kazan in 1552 and the land North and West of the Ural 1 River was annexed at the end of the seventeenth century. The whole area of the Urals was little visited and virtually unsur- veyed by 1696 when the great expansion began. This was certainly one of the most successful gambles ever undertaken by a nation trying to industrialize itself by its bootstraps. If it had failed, Russia would have had extreme difficulty in emerging as the great modern power it did in the 1700*8. Although most of the cannon in this period were still made of brass, the bulk of the accoutrements and all of the muskets were of iron, consequently, an assured supply was necessary to a leading power. ""P. I. Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of Russia, to the 1917 Revolution. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949, p. 232 and map facing p.214."Moscow State in the XVII Century 1600-1694". 158. The first period was followed by a period of stagnation partly engendered by the rising Western European nationalism and the protectionism this gave rise to in some traditional Uralian iron markets. It was also partly attributable to the lack of progress in charcoal technology, the only type of operation the Urals had any advantages in at that time. This was due to the scarcity of local coking coal and the difficulty of importing it because of the rudimentary state of transport in that period. On the basis of the existing technology 200,000 tons was about the optimum size of production, all of the most advantageous sites were operated as well as a great number of marginal ones. Some of the locations that persisted have had remarkable longevity in the industrial scale of time, an indication of the appropriateness of their location. A singular example is the Alapaevsk Plant founded in 1701, which was still in operation in 1959, although admittedly rebuilt from time to time; there were some twnety other examples that persisted well over 150 years. Consequently, it is reasonable to regard the original siting of these plants as remarkable achievements, although admittedly they were only the extreme examples of success. It is now regarded by the Soviets that it takes forty years to amortize equipment, and probably in the earlier period this time was sub• stantially less, therefore, a great number of plants that have 159. long since disappeared were, all in all, quite profitable ventures. The period of equilibrium lasted until about 1870 when improved technology and the increased demands of the expanding Russian Empire caused another growth period to set in. But the new surge of growth was markedly different in nature from the initial one. It was based primarily on the consolidation of production into a relatively few producers. Average pig iron smelt per plant had only increased from 2,500 tons in 1800 to 2 9,000 tons in 1913 but by 1913 the largest plant (Nadezhdinsk) produced 170,000 tons of pig iron or 19 per cent of the total 3 output and in the eighteenth century the largest plant, Nizhne Tagil'sk, produced only 7,000-9,000 tons or from 16 per cent in 4 1763 to 6 per cent in 1799. After 1913, production was disrupted by the First World War, then by the civil war, and only after civil order was restored in the early 1920's was it possible to receover the prewar level of production, largely by simply renovating pre-existing plant. The possibility of a general coke technology which this development indicated supported the concentration of production 2 Lyashchenko, op. cit.. p. 330; Livshits, op. cit., table 23, pp. 125-126. 3 Livshits, op. cit.. table 46, p. 167. 4 B. B. Kafengauz, Istoriva Khozvaystva Demidovykh v XVIII-XIX W.. Qpvt issledovaniy po istorii Ural'skoy Metallurgii Tom 1. Moskva-Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1949, pp. 315, 336-337; and Komar, op. cit.. p. 90. 160. into units of a size hitherto unknown. These major producers required large suitable ore sources which were limited in number. Thus the few suitable ore sources provided the best sites for these major plants. Once established (providing the present level of technology is assumed) inertia assures these plants of a protracted and increasing role in the iron and steel industry of the Urals. In 1955, the Uralian production of iron and steel was exceeded by only three foreign countries. There are eight other comparable units in the world of which one (the South) is also in the USSR, four in the United States (Eastern, Pittsburgh- Youngstown, Chicago and Cleveland-Detroit) and the sovereign states of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, are the remaining three. All but Cleveland-Detroit and France exceed the Urals in output.5 At the beginning of the seven year plan it was accepted that during this period the Urals was to increase its iron and steel production but decline relatively. By 1980 it was to double its production but undergo a relative decline of 15 per cent. All of the increase was to be obtained through most economical -ways: expansion and reconstruction of existing enterprises, 5A letter from H.C. Rossrucker, Statistician, The American Iron and Steel Institute; Long-Term Trends and Problems of the European Steel Industry.op* cit.. pp. 52-53, 64-65; Komar, pp. cit.. p. 221; and Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov USSR, Promvshlennost1 SSSR. Statisticheskiv Sbornik. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Statisticheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1957, p. 113. "Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 65. 161. equipping them with improved units and introducing new technical 7 units. With the de-emphasis of iron and steel in favour of chemi- g cals it is probable that the planned expansion at least until the end of the Seven Year Plan will take place in the Urals, but not in the new regions. Therefore, the Urals will probably not experience the decline predicted for it, at least not to the full extent indicated previously. II. THE RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY The present Uralian raw material supply is very good, at least in so far as the major plants are concerned. It is doubtful that this situation will continue with the steady appreciable 9 diminution of the extremely limited high quality local resources, which are being progressively replaced by imported materials. With the increasing import of raw materials the Urals is losing its advantages of cheap supply over the areas it is importing from. For example, the Kuzbass and Karaganda in coal, Northern Kazakh• stan in iron ore and the Center in scrap. Still, because of its location it is better situated for 7S. M. Fillipov, "Results and prospects in Metallurgy," MetallureT Moscow, No. 24 February 1962, pp. 1-4 (in "Soviet • Ferrous Metallurgy (34)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,560 24 April 1962, p. 21. Q T. Shabad, "Soviet to Put Mote Funds Into Agriculture for 1963," The New York Times, vol. CXII, No. 38, 290, November 24, 1962, pp. 1, 3. 162. the import of cheap raw materials than is the South. In 1956, Magnitogorsk had the cheapest supply of pig iron raw materials, being almost 25 per cent cheaper than its nearest competitor - Kuznetsk - which depended largely on very inferior local iron ores,*"**1 and imported the more bulky ore rather than coal."""*'""3 Magnitogorsk has been efficient partly because of being developed on iron ore rather than coal. At present this is fairly typical in the Soviet Union where 42 per cent of the production comes from plants located near iron ore bases, as 12 opposed to only 25 per cent fuel base oriented. But all of the previous large plants had not been located on iron ore be• cause when they were developed there was a pronounced advantage to coal location because of the greater amounts of it needed. By the time Magnitogorsk was developed, the amounts of coal needed 14 had been drastically reduced per unit of output, and more iron 9 Minakov, op. cit.. p. 9. Jasny, op. cit.. p. 281; and Holzman, op. cit.. p. 386. Holzman states that 80 per cent of the Kuznetsk requirements were locally met in 1953. "**Tn 1940 transport costs per ton of pig iron produced on the basis of imported ore at Kuznetsk were 65 rubles, and on imported coal at Magnitogorsk - 25 rubles. Livshits, op. cit.. p. 234. 12 Minakov, op. cit.. p. 16. 13 Jasny claims that the development of Kuznets at the same time as Magnitogorsk was inadvisable because of the inefficiencies of having two such major competing projects going forward at once. Jasny, OP. cit.. p. 279. 14 In early times seven or eight tons of coal were used per 163. was needed because of depletion of the limited extremely rich ore sources. At present the amount of iron ore used to produce one ton of iron is always 0.5-1 ton higher than the consumption of coking coal.15 Novo Tagil*sk had the third cheapest supply of pig iron raw materials and Chelyabinsk the fourth. All the large Southern plants were more expensive, being almost twice as expensive as Magnitogorsk. Since the cost of the raw material supply accounts for two-thirds of the net cost of pig iron, it is readily under• stood why the Urals appears so favorable. It is important to note that cheapness of raw material supply is not directly correlated to the initial quality of mater• ials. Much more important, within limits of course, are the ease of mining and the industrial characteristics of the material 16 attained. After these two fundamental qualities come quality of materials extracted and the distance they must be shipped to the consumer. Magnitogorsk has the cheapest supply of raw materials because it is situated on a large relatively easily mined rich ore ton of iron produced. Now only 1.2-1.4 tons, or 2-2.5 tons including coal for fuel etc. are used. 15Minakov, op. cit.. p. 16. 16 Khlebnikov states "The cost of iron ore is basically determined by the condition of occurrance of the iron ore, volume of its production, method of mining, system of extraction, mechanization of operations and moisture content in the ore; p. 127. 164. 17 resource adjacent to large easily mined, but not particularly 18 rich auxiliary iron sources in Kustanay. It is partly supplied by cheaply mined, but rather inferior coking coal over a consi• derable distance, and partly with superior coking coal over a-/very long distance.""^ Nizhne Tagil'sk and Chelyabinsk are based on inferior iron ore sources and import coal over greater distances than Magnito• gorsk. They also have poorer and more expensive ore sources than the Krivoi Rog based plants. On the other hand, Nizhne Tagil'sk and Chelyabinsk are based on Kuznets coking coal, the best metal• lurgical coking coal in the Soviet Union. The cheapness of the 20 coal more than compensates for the high cost of the iron ore, and Nizhne Tagil'sk and Chelyabinsk were third and fourth in cost of raw material and fuel. This carried over to total cost of pig 17 In 1958, at the Magnitogorsk Combine the cost of iron in one ton of crude ore mined was 10 rubles, whereas at the Beloretsk Combine, it was 140 rubles and at Lipetsk and Tula underground mines, it was over 180 rubles. Cost per ton of iron in agglomer• ate at the Magnitogorsk Combine was 46 rubles, at the Zakavkazskiy Plant, 146 rubles, at the Lebezhdinskiy Mine, 222 rubles and in the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly, 253 rubles. Cost of iron in agglomer• ate is especially high in enterprises which use.ores and concen• trates transported over great distances. The cost per ton of iron in the agglomerate at the Abagur Factory at the Kuznetsk Combine was 335 rubles and at the Cherepovets Plant, 248 rubles. ^Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 127; and Jasny, op. cit.. p. 280. 18 Jasny, op. cit.. p. 283. 19 Magnitogorsk is the only Uralian plant to use Karaganda coal, which is mixed with Kuznets coal. Holzman, op. cit. p. 386. in the early 1950's Karaganda coal was mixed with 60 per cent Kuznets coal. Holloway, op. cit.. p. 37. 165. iron as well. In 1956, Magnitogorsk also had by far the cheapest supply of steel making materials, with Kuznetsk second, and Novo Tagil'sk third, but Dzerzhinsk in the South had a cheaper supply than Chelyabinsk. This was attained by the greater substitution 21 of scrap for pig iron, and underlines one of the basic weaknesses of the Uralian raw material supply. The major pig iron producing nations in the world are: The A Federal Republic of Germany, France, The United Kingdom, The United States of America and The Soviet Union. In 1955, the Urals had a higher ratio of iron ore to pig iron production than the major producing nations with the exception of the United Kingdom. If crude ore is considered the Urals required 2.9 tons of ore for every ton of pig iron produced as opposed to 1.6 for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1.7 for the United States, 2.2.for the whole _( Soviet Union, 218 for France and 3.0 for the United Kingdom.. If only rich and concentrated ores are considered, this reduces the requirements to 2.1 tons which is still greater than either the Federal Republic of Germany of the United States, both of which,of course, work to a considerable degree on rich imported ores. 22 Still, all in all, iron ore is cheap in the Urals, there- 20 22 KhlebnikovJasny, op., cit.pp. .cit. p. 285. p.. 63 21 Livshits, ppj. cit.. table 76, pp. 230-231. 166. fore, these figures tend to be misleading, the point being not that the Urals has rich ore, but that it has cheap ore, which is quite a different matter. The coke supply is better than most in the Soviet Union, where theuse of inferior coking coals is the rule, not the ex- 23 ception. On the other hand, the Urals steel making raw material 24 supply is somewhat less favorable because of a scrap deficiency. Jasny, OP. cit.. p. 286. 24 In 1956, the Urals imported 2.6 million tons of scrap out of its total requirements of 4.9 million, whereas the South imported only 0.9 out of a total requirement of 4.3 million tons. The North West and Center were net exporting regions. Livshits, jap. cit.. table 105, p. 367. 167. TABLE IX IRON ORE RESOURCES - 1 January 1956 (in % - omitting KMA and Krivoy Rog quartzites) Geological Reserves Industrial Reserves Center and European 10.6 15.5 North South 42.7 35.7 Urals 17.3 19.2 Siberia, Far East, 29.4 29.6 Central Asia 100.0 100.0 (57 billion tons) (30 billion tons) Source: Bardin, op. cit.. p. 164. TABLE X TOTAL GEOLOGICAL RESERVES OF COAL BASINS PRODUCING METALLURGICAL COKING-COALS IN THE USSR— 1 JANUARY 1958 (billions of tons) Kuznetsk Basin 905.0 Donetsk Basin 240.0 Karaganda Basin 51.0 Pechora Basin 344.0 Kizelovsk Basin 1.1 Coal Deposits of Georgia SSR 0.7 Source: Ibid.. p. 221. 168. TABLE XI IRON CONTENT IN ORES UTILIZED -1956 REGION PLANT % RANK Urals Magnitogorsk 56.6 1 Novo Tagil'sk 50.5 9 Chelyabinsk 46.4 10 South Azovstal' 53.9 2 Zaporozhstal' 52.5 4 Krivo Rog 53.3 3 Makeevsk 52.5 4 Dzerzhinsk 52.1 5 West Siberia Kuznets 51.6 7 Center Novo-Lipetsk 51.4 8 Novo-tul'sk 51.8 6 Source: Livshits, op. cit.. p. 224. TABLE XII YIELD OF METALLURGICAL COKE Coal Basins % Ash in Coal % Ash of Charge Tons of Coal in 1 tons of Metallurgical Coke Donetsk 17.0 7.6 2.0 Kuznetsk 12.0 7.6 1.6 Pechora 14.0 7.6 1.8 Karaganda 21.0 7.6 3.6 Kizelovsk 20.0 7.6 10.2 Source: Bardin, op. cit.. p. 227. 169. TABLE XIII PROPORTION OF TOTAL OUTPUT OF VARIOUS IRON ORE BASINS AND DEPOSITS Producer 1932 1940 1950 1955 1957 Krivoy Rog 65.8 64.3 53.0 50.3 52.2 Kerch 4.3 3.4 - 4.0 3.7 Central Regions 4.2 3.7 2.3 2.7 2.0 Olenegorsk - - - - 1.8 Magnitogorsk 11.1 19.0 19.4 17.5 16.2 Tagilo-Kushvinsk group 3.8 4.0 9.7 7.9 6.8 Bakal'sk 4.9 1.5 6.1 5.7 5.2 Gornaya Shoriya and Abakan 0.4 1.7 5.5 5.2 4.6 Others 5.5 2.4 4.0 6.7 7.5 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Bardin, op. cit.. p. 418 TABLE XIV PROPORTION OF COKING COAL SUPPLY OF VARIOUS COAL BASINS FOR FERROUS METALLURGY"IN % Basins 1927/28 1940 1950 1955 1958 Donetsk 100.0 74.7 59.0. 56.3 58.0 Kuznetsk - 19.9 32.2 27.0 27.4 Karaganda - 3.1 4.2 9.3 7.0 Kizelovsk - 2.3 4.6 2.7 2.4 Gruzinsk - - - 2.5. 2.5 Pechorsk - - - 2.2 2.7 T022AL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Ibid.. p. 418. 170. TABLE XV DISTANCES BETWEEN MAJOR IRON ORE AND COAL DEPOSITS Ore Deposits and Basins Coal Basins Distance, km (by rail) USSR Go may a Shoriya Kuznetsk 150 Abakansk Kuznetsk 250 Group Atasa Karaganda 360 Krivoy Rog Donetsk 480 Kerch Donetsk 650 Magnitogorsk Karanganda 1180 Khalilovsk Karaganda 1330 Bakal'sk Kuznetsk 1970 Tagilo-Kushvinsk Kuznetsk 1910 Kola Peninsula Pechora 2660 USA Great Lakes Pennsylvanian 1500-1800 (the bulk of the distance is by water) EUROPE Lotaring Ruhr 325-400 Source: Bardin, op. cit.. p. 412 TABLE XVI AVERAGE TON-KM ASSEMBLY OF RAW MATERIALS FOR THE LARGEST PLANTS Plant Ton-KM Southern Plants 900-100 Magnitogorsk 1800 Chelyabinsk 2850 Orsk ^ 3750 Kuznetsk 500 1-By working completely on local ores. Source: Ibid.. p. 413. 171 TABLE XVII PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL - SELECTED PRODUCERS - 1955 (in millions of metric tons) PRODUCER PIG IRON STEEL Urals 11.9 16.4 France 11.1 12.6 United Kingdom 12.7 20.1 Federal Rep. of Germany 16.6 21.3 Belgium 5.4 5.9 Italy 1.7 5.4 Sweden 1.2 2.1 Japan 5.4 9.4 China 3.6 2.8 Ukraine 16.6 16.9 Soviet Union 33.3 45.3 Pitts burgh-Youngs town 24.5 37.3 Chicago 14.5 23.6 Eastern 14.5 22.7 Detroit-Cleveland 8.2 10.9 United States 70.9 106.4 Sources: Long-Term Trends and Problems of the European Steel Industry, op. citt. pp. 52-53,64-65; Komar, op. cit.. p. 221; Promyshlennost1 SSSR. Statisticheskiy Sbornik, Moskva: Gosstatizdat, 1957, p. 113; and. a letter from H. C. Rossrucker, Statistician, The American Iron and Steel Institute. 172. TABLE XVIII INPUTS IN ONE TON OF STEEL-MAKING PIG IRON -1956 - Raw Mat• Total Total Plant Metallic Charge Fuel in Charge erials Plant Plant - and Fuel Cost Cost as % of MMK tons rubles tons rubles rubles rub les Magnitogorsk 1.769 39.25 0.618 119.02 159.46 169.13 100 Novo 1.842 106.47 0.640 126.90 240.29 252.73 149 Tagil'sk Chelyabinsk 2.080 117.68 0.713 134.37 265.10 284.24 168 Satkinsk 2.055 108.53 0.819 154.53 269.45 320.27 189 Kushvinsk 1.9.89 109.41 0.926 184.57 304.21 351.18 208 Nizhne 2.102 118.84 0.838 174.00 208.28 354.29 210 Tagil'sk Serov 1.973 142.10 0.800 150.75 301.79 359.13 212 Ashinsk 2.135 100.26 0.832 173.28 283.80 367.31 218 Chusovsk 2.330 138.46 0.933 212.84 360.40 399.57 236 Nizhne 2.287 128.95 1.031 203.97 342.91 414.39 245 Saldinsk Alapaevsk 2.392 145.39 0.998 172.29 339.69 422.13 250 Verkhne Sin- 2.508 164.26 1.205 214.30 405.14 522.62 309 yachikinsk Beloretsk 2.317 196.60 0.994 250.12 460.83 529.94 313 Source: Livshits, op. cit.. pp. 226-9, 236-7. 173. TABLE XIX OPERATING DATA ON BLAST" FURNACES USING HIGH SINTER BURDENS Furnace Sinter Slag Total Bur- Coke Con• - % Vol• den sumption ume kg/ rank kg/ton rank kg/ ton ton WESTERN EUROPE - SWEDEN Elagersta 100 230 1600 1 570 3 Domnarvet 100 375 1700 2 550 1 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY Phoenix-Rheinrohr-Ruhrort - works: Huttenbetriebe open - hearth iron 67 353 1803 8 675 15 open hearth iron 61 409 1816 9 630 8 Thomas iron 53 579 2000 13 672 14 Hoesch 70 400 1864 10 619 5 August-Thyssen 53 472 1975 12 652 10 Huckingen 52 828 2499 18 818 20 Salzgitter 63 1123 2691 20 814 19 Dillingen 100 890 2300 17 720 18 BELGIUM Seraing 95 820 2194 16 687 17 UNITED KINGDOM Appleby-Frodingham • 100 1300 2607 19 855 23 FRANCE Knutange 66 1015 2775 21 830 22 Mt. St. Martin 44 1100 2880 22 815 21 Chiers 52 1200 2960 23 885 24 NORTH AMERICA - UNITED STATES OF AMERI CA Sparrows Point 94 - 520 1700 3 665 13 Garry1 80 470 1900 11 660 12 Fairless 50 350 - - 680 16 CANADA Steel Co. of Canada2 • 100 400 1715 4 635 9 Hamilton 96 485 1750 6 625 6 ASIA - JAPAN Kokura 96 440 1750 5 550 2 USSR Magnitogorsk 94 510 1801 7 630 7 Kuznetsk 77 590 2025 14 652 11 Cherpovets 100 707 2047 15 589 4 1 ? sinter & pellets ^self-fluxing Source: Long-Term Trends and Problems of the European Steel Industry^ op. cit.. p. 91. 174. TABLE XX COMPARATIVE COST OF OPEN HEARTH CARBON STEEL IN 1958 Plants Cost as % of Magnitogorsk Integrated Plants Magnitogorsk 100.00 Kuznetsk 132.5 Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine 133.6 Dzerzhinsk 157.0 Zaporozhstal' 164.0 Petrovsk 166.7 Enakievsk 177.4 Stalinsk 196.6 Kons tantinovsk 204.4 Ashinsk 264.3 Non-integrated Plants Krasnyy Oktyabr' 176.8 K. Libknekht 182.4 Serp i Molot 191.5 Revdinsk Metizno-Metallurgical 196.9 Zlatoust 204.4 Amurstal' 238.9 Omutinsk 245.0 Source: Bardin, OP. cit.. p. 534. TABLE XXI REGIONAL COST OF PRODUCTION OF PIG IRON FOR STEELMAKING as a % of the as a % of USSR average Western Siberia USSR 100.0 133.2 South 112.3 149.5 Urals 82.9 110.3 Western Siberia 75.1 100.0 Center 178.0 237.1 Source: Livshits, op. cit., p. 238. 175, CHAPTER VII CONCLUSIONS The Uralian iron and steel industry was initially essen• tially located on the iron ore supply, but none of the major plants are located on iron ore resources that are large enough to amortize the plant according to Livshits" estimate of four hundred million to five hundred million tons for an economic sized operation. Also, the major-plants are, on the whole, based on low quality ores. This in part, can be accounted for by the institu• tional optimism of the Soviets - more reserves would turn up - and partly to inflated initial estimates of reserves. Once the plants were established, the rational thing to do was to import supplies to them because of the economies of adding to existing plant over building new plant. But it is questionable if these plants should have been established in the first place, at least, in the Urals. If a more rigorous and exhaustive inventory of re• sources were carried out first while adding capacity to Southern plants, instead of starting new operations, possibly only Magnitogorsk would have been established to utilize the Uralian ores. The most questionable development is the existence of both the Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk plants when their relatively close ore supplies could adequately supply one major plant very nicely, but not nearly two. On the other hand the Nizhne Tagil1sk and Orsk-Khalilovsk combines are considerably removed from these 176. deposits and make use of other reserves, that are probably worth developing. But although the Nizhne Tagil'sk Combine is worth developing, the use of Kachkanar 16 per cent Fe ore is more expensive than its traditional supply. Nizhne Tagil'sk is also located in reasonable proximity to the possible, if expensive, Pechora coal supply. .The Orsk-Khalilovsk Combine has always experienced diffi-. culties with the expansion of its production facilities and the present is no exception. The fundamental reason is that the pro• duction of naturally alloyed steel has proven much more difficult than it was originally supposed. The major economic advantage of the Uralian iron and steel production is its association with the Eastern coal suppliers."" But this advantage is common to all Eastern plants, and it is argued by some that a coal location is preferable to an iron location when all the supplementary associated industries are considered. Furthermore, the parallel shipments of ore and coal on the Tobolsk-Magnitogorsk rail line are only justifiable because 2 Magnitogorsk is an efficient plant in being. Expansion at Magnitogorsk will result in more expensive production than the construction of new plants would, even though Magnitogorsk is the most efficient Uralian plant.*" "khlebnikov, oo. cit., pp. 63, 80. ^Minakov, op. cit.. pp. 16-17. 177. One mitigating factor for the Urals is the introduction of natural gas into ferrous metallurgy. The Urals is well located 2 for this development but was not converted to it until after theDneper Region, Donbass, the Central Zone and the Transcaucasus were.*"" The Bukhara-Urals gas pipeline was completed on November 3 1, 1963. It is to supply the Magnitogorsk, Orsk-Khalilovsk and Chelyabinsk plants. A furnace at Magnitogorsk was converted to the use of this gas at the beginning of 1964. After the first two weeks of operation, it was calculated that this economized on 4 up to 200 tons of coke daily. Nevertheless, the use of natural gas is only a partial solution to the problem because, although natural gas can be used for technological purposes in the smelting of iron, as well as for power purposes, it is only possible to replace something in the order of 25 per cent of the coking coal needed.*' The Urals will have to continue to import coking coal and the Southern Urals will be increasingly supplied with iron ore from Sokolov-Sarbaysk. The de-emphasis of iron and steel announced in 1962^ will help the Urals perpetuate its present status, but no 3 Ch. Aytmatov, Yu. Mukimov, "Trassa Druzhby 1 Bukhara-Ura11", Pravda. 5 November 1963, p. 2. 4 Peshkin, op. cit.. p. 42. "'Minakov, op. cit.. pp. 17-18. I. S. Senin, "0 Gosudarstvennom Plane Raxvitiya Narodnogo Khozyaystva SSSR na 1963 god, 0 Gosudarstvennom Byudzhete SSSR za 178. significant increase in its relative importance can be expected. Large scale development within the Urals is best located at the major Southern Uralian plants which are most accessible to the relatively cheap Kazakhstan ore sources and to the major Eastern coal basins. Considerable expansion is also planned for Nizhne Tagil'sk, but this will produce pig iron that will be 10 per cent more expensive than at Chelyabinsk,7 although based on the nearby Kachkanar ore source. Important second order developments will be related to quality metallurgy especially at the Serov and Chusovsk plants. It is doubtful if Orsk-Khalilovsk will ever seriously rival the leading three plants, or will any of the others for that matter, barring some unforeseen developments in metallurgy. Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk were initially founded for sound reasons. Magnitogorsk to utilize the high quality Magni• togorsk ores and Chelyabinsk to supply the Chelyabinsk metal market. Now because of inertia they are both worth retaining, being large efficient operations, but they do not express the most efficient distribution in the present circumstances. The local 1961 God." Sodoklad Predsedatelya Byudzhetnoy Komissii Soveta Soyuza. Pravda. 11 December 1962, pp. 6, 7.; T. Shabad. New York Times. op. cit.. November 24, 1962; and N. S. Khrushchev, Doklad na Plenume TsK KPSS 19 November 1962 - "Razvitie Ekonomiki SSSR i Partiynoe Rukovodstvo Narodnym Khozyaystvom," Pravda. 20 November 1962, pp. 1-8. 7 Khlebnikov, op. cit.. p. 63. 179. metal market cannot absorb all of their production and more than half of it is shipped out of the Urals after only preliminary rolling. If they both did not exist only one would be desirable, preferably Magnitogorsk because of its better location for the obtaining of materials. Future expansion in the Urals would be best located at Magnitogorsk which shall continue to be one of the better locations in the Soviet Union for iron and steel production. And, in fact, it is planned that Magnitogorsk shall increase at a faster rate than any other Uralian plant. 180. BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS Andreev, B. I., and Kravchenko, D. V. Kamennougo1'nye Basseyny SSSR. Moskva:'Ministerstvo Ugol'noy Promyshlennosti SSSR, Glavuglegeobgiya, 1956. Atlas SSSR. Moskva: Glavnoe Upravlenie Geodezii i Kartografii MVD SSSR, 1955. Balzak, S. S., Vasyutin, V. F., and Feigin, Ya. G. Economic Geography of the USSR.-New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. Baransky, N. N. Economic Geography of the USSR. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956. Bardin, I. P. 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History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. Melent'ev, L. A., and Shteyngauz, E. 0. Ekonomika Energetiki USSR. Moskva-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Energeticheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1959. Metal Statistics 1960. New York: American Metal Market, 1960. Nolde, B. La formation de 1'Empire russe. etudes, notes et Documents. Paris: Institut de'etudes slaves, tome Premier, 1952. Osintsev, A. S. Chernava Metallurgiva Urala. Sverdlovsk: Sverdlovskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, I960. Ponomarev, V. P. Kizelovskiv Kamennougol'nvv Basseyn. Perm': Permskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1958. Ponomaryov, B. N. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960. Pounds, N. J. G. The Geography of Iron and Steel. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1959. Roepke, H. G. Movements of the British Iron and Steel Industry - 1720 ta 1951. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences: vol. 36, 1956. Schwarz, S. M. The Jews in the Soviet Union. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951. Scott, J. Behind the Urals. An American Worker in Russia's City of Steel. Cabridge Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1942. 182. Stepanov, P. N. Geografiya Promyshlennosti SSSR. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Uchebno-Pedagogicheskoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Prosveshcheniya RSFSR, 1955* Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe,Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR. Promyshlennost' SSSR. Statisticheskiy Sbornik. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Statisticheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1957. United Nations. Long-Term Trends and Problems of the European Steel Industry. Geneva: Economic Commission for Europe, 1959. Vvedenskiy, B. A. Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediva. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatel'stvo Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1952 etc. PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES Afanas'yev, S. "Konvertoru-Dorogu v Metallurgiyu, Eto Vygodno, Progressivno," Pravda, 13 December 1961, p.3. Alampiyev, P. M. "The Objective Basis of Economic Regionalization and its Long-Range Prospects," Voprosy Razmeshcheniya Proizvodstva i Ekonomicheskogo Rayonirovaniya, Moscow: Gosplanizdat, 1960, pp. 239-53 (in Soviet Georgraphy; Review and Translation, vol. II, No. 8 (October 1961). Alexandersson, G. "Changes in the Location Pattern of the Anglo- American Steel Industry: 1948-1959," Economic Geography, vol. 37, No. 2 (April 1961), pp. 95-114. Aytmatov, Ch., and Mukimov, Yu. "Trassa Druzhby 'Bukhara-Ural'", Pravda, 5 November 1963, p. 2. Beloborodov, B, "Production Disrupted at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine," Sovetskaya Rossiya. Moscow, 7 January 1962, p. 2 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (26)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,510 18 April 1962, pp. 26-30. Azbukin, V., and Beloborodov, V., "The Fate of the Bakal Iron Ore Deposits," Sovetskaya Rossiya. Moscow, 29 January 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (8)," Joint Publications Research Service, 9869, 21 August 1961, pp. 15-21. Beloborodov, V. and Kartashov, N. "Crisis at Chelyabinsk," Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, 20 July 1961 (in Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (12)," Joint Publications Research Service, 10,286, 2 October 1961, pp. 3-8. 183. Berezhkov, P. I., "Production Reserves of Light-Section and Wire Rolling Mills of the Enterprises of the RSESR," Byulleten' Tekhniko-Ekonomicheskoy Informatsii, Moscow, No. 2, 1962, pp. 3-5 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (44)", Joint Publi• cations Research Service, 13,843, 22 May 1962, pp. 14-21. Biryukov, V., Uryashev, A "Pokazanaya Kopiya Pyl'nogo Originala" Izvestiya. Moskva, 25 January 1962, p. 3. Buresh, V., "Posrednik iii Rasporyaditel*?" Izvestiya. Moskva, 4 July-1961, p. 3. Dunaev, N. "Chugun bez Margantsa-VygodneeJ" Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. No. 12, Moskva, 19 March 1962, p. 31. Fillipov, S. M. "Results and Prospects in Metallurgy," Mettalurg. Moscow, No* 2, February 1962, pp. 1-4 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (34)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,560, 24 April 1962, pp. 16-25. Garbuzov, G. "The Ferrous Metallurgy Industry in 1962," Stroitel1- naya Gazeta. Moscow, 27 December 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (27)," Joing Publications Research Service, 13,340 4 April 1962, pp. 14-18. Gol'denberg, L. "Orsk-Khalilovo Combine is Making Poor Use of its Naturally Alloyed Ferronickel Ores," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. Moscow, 5 February 1962, p. 11 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (40)," Joint Publications Research Service, -13,768, 15 May 1962,pp. 2-5. Hamilton, F.E.I., "Location Factors in the Yugoslav Iron and Steel Industry," Economic Geography, vol. 40, No. 1, January 1964, pp. 46-64< Holloway, R. J."The Development of the Russian Iron and Steel Industry," Stanford University Graduate School of Business: Business Research Series, No. 6, 1952. Holzman, F. D. "The Soviet Ural-Kuznets Combine," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 71, 1957. Jasny, N., "Prospects of the Iron and Steel Industry," Soviet Studies, January 1963. "The Kachkanar Ore-Concentration Combine," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. Moscow, 28 January 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (8)," Joint Publications Research Service, 9869, 21 August 1961, pp. 4-5. Kazakov, P. "Establish More Quickly the New Ore Base for the Metallurgy of the Urals 1" Ekonomicheskaya'Gazeta. Moscow, 15 January 1962 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (24)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,018, 16 March 1962, pp.4-12. 184. Khrushchev, N. S. Soklad na Plenume TsK KPSS 19 November 1962- "Razvitie Ekonomiki SSSR i Partiynoe Rukovodstvo Narodnym Khozyaystvom," Pravda. 20 November 1962, pp... 1-8. Khvostovets, V. "Pyl' Nad Gorodom." Trud. Moskva. 18 March 1961, p. 2. "Kislorodnjje Konvertory Dolzhny Byt' v Srok.'" Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. 18 January 1964, p. 42. Klunichenko, N. "New Type of Steel for High Pressure Equipment," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. Moscow, 2 April 1962, p. 43 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (41)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,939, 31 May 1962, pp. 15-16. Komar, I. V. "On the Boundaries of the Urals Economic Region," Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriva Geograficheskaya. 1957, No. 3. Kuzyukov, F. F. "New Technology at the Enterprises of the Chelyabinskiy Sovnarkhoz, " Mekhanizatsiya i Avtomatizatsiya. Proizvodstva, Moscow, November 1961, pp. 5-7 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (36), " Joint Publications Research Service 13,865, 25 May 1962, pp. 6-12. Leshchiner, M. "Perspektivy Razvitiya Chernoy Metallurgii Chelyabinskogo Ekonomicheskogo Administrativnogo Rayona," Planovoe Khozyaystvo. XXXVI year of issue No. 12, December 1959. Markish, D. "Kachkanar - Town for Trail-Blazers," Soviet Union. No. 163, 1963, pp. 18-21. Martem'yanov, V. "Samaya Moshchnaya v Mire," Izvestiya. Moskva, 27 April 1961, p. 3. Matyushin, N.V. "The Trend in Standardization of Metallurgy," Standartizatsiva. Moscow, No. 1, 1962, pp. 30-34 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (31)" Joint Publications Research Service, 13,311, 3 April 1962, pp. 1-16. Minakov, M. "Problems of Raising the Efficiency of Interre• gional Industrial Links," Voprosy Ekonomiki. No. 3, 1961. pp. 121-129 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (11)," Joint Publications Research Service, 10,046, 6 September 1961,pp. 5-21. "New Metallurgical Projects in Kazakhstan," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Alma-Ata, 3 February 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (10)," Joint Publications Research Service, 10,036, 7 September 1961, pp. 11-12). 185. "Ore Mining Lags Behind Requirements," Ekonomicheskava Gazeta, Moscow* 28 January 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy^ 8)," Joint Publications Research Service, 9,869, 21 August 1961, pp. 1-4. Peshkin, I,, "Molodet' Staryy Ural," Ekonomicheskava Gazeta, 18 January 1964, p. 42. Ploskonenko, Yu., and Morogov, A. "How to Exploit the Potential for Increasing Steel Output at the Nizhnyy-Tagil' Combine" Ekonomicheskava Gazeta, Moscow, 7 February 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (10)," Joint Publications Research Service, 10,036, 7 September 1961, pp. 2-5. Pokovskiy, M. "Priority Expansion of the USSR Ore and Metal Base," Ekonomicheskava Gazeta, Moscow, 2 April 1962, p. 24 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (41)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,939, 31 May 1962, pp. 8-14. "Production of Refractory Materials After the 22nd Party Congress'!, Ogneupory, No. 12, 1961, pp. 541-544 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (22)," Joint Publications Research Service, 12,884, 9 March 1962, pp. 12-17). "Prokatany Pervye Truby," Trud, Moskva, 13 January 1962, p. 1. "Raw Material Shortages in the Iron and Steel Industry," Ekonomicheskava Gazeta, No. 13, Moscow 26 March 1962, p.2. (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (41)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,939, pp. 1-3). Rudenko, I. "Eto Vas Kasaetsya, Tovarishchi iz Gosplana RSFSR i Orenburgskogo Sovnarkhoza," Trud, Moskva 12 February 1961. p. 1. "Rudnyy," Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1 January 1961, p. 1. Rusin, A., Kolotilov, P., Mamontov, I., Yakupov, P., Toropov, V., Medvedev, V., Vershinin, V., "For Larger Production and Fewer Expenditures," Spyetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, 29 March 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (13)", Joint Publi• cations Research Service, 10,423, 11 October 1961, pp.16-20. Ryasnoy, A., "Metallurgy, an Important Link, "Agitator, Moscow, No. 24,-December 1961, pp. 10-13 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (23)," Joint Publications Research Service, 12,818, 6 March 1962, pp. 1-8. Senin, I. S., "0 Gosudarstvennom Plane Razvitiya Narodnogo KhozyaystVc SSSR na 1963 god, 0 Gosudarstvennom Byudzhete SSSR na 1963 God i ob Ispolnenii Gosudarstvennogo Byudzheta SSSR Za 1961 God." Sodoklad Predsedatelya Byudzhetnoy Komissii Soveta Soyuza. Pravda, 11 December 1962, pp. 6,7, 186. Shabad, T. "News Notes," Soviet Geography: Review and Translation. ' "Soviet to Put More Funds Into Agriculture for 1963," The New York Times, vol. CXII, No. 38,290, November 24, 1962, pp. 1,3. Sheftel, N.I. "New Equipment of the Metallurgical Plants of the RSFSR in 1962," Metallurg. Moscow, No. 3, March 1962, pp. 1-3 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (42)," Joint Publi• cations Research Service, 14,025, 6 June 1962, pp.1-9. Vlasov, P. V. "The Ferrous Metallurgy Section of the Engineering and Economic Council of the Sverdlovskiy Sovnarkhoz," Byulleten' Tekhniko-Ekonomicheskov Informatsii. Moscow, No. 2, pp. 83-84 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (44)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,843, 22 May 1962, pp. 24-29. Zabaluev, G., Sapiro, G., Odintsov, Ye., Ivanov, Ye., Derevyanko, G., and Bulgakov, V. "My Mozhem Rabotat" Pribyl'no, Problemy Metallurgii Zapadnogo Urala," Izvestiya. Moscow, 27 April 1961, p. 3. Zhuravlev, V. "Problems of the Ferroalloy Industry," Ekonomiches• kaya Gazeta. Moscow, No. 18, 4 December 1961 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (28)," Joint Publications Research Service, 13,633, 2 May 1962, pp. 9-18. OTHER SOURCES Rossrucker, H. C., Statistician, The American Iron and Steel Institute, letter on the production of various American iron and steel regions. Petrov, V. P. "Soviet Industry," Washington: W. P. Kamkin, 1960, (mimeographed). ADDENDUM (PERIODICALS) Isard, W. "Some Locational Factors in the Iron and Steel Industry Since the Early Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Political Economy, LVI (June, 1948) Khlebnikov, V. B., "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy, During 1959-1965," from Sovetskaya Chernaya Metallurgiya 1959-1965, Moscow: Gosplanizdat, 1960, pp. 3-7, 50-243 (in Joint Publications Research Service, 12,474, 7 February 1962). Sergeyev, G. N. "Production Costs at Magnitogorsk Steel Combine are the Lowest in Industry," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Moskva, No. 15, 9 April 1962, p. 12 (in "Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy (49)," Joint Publications Research Service, 14,006, 5 June 1962, pp. 1-9).