Symposium C2: Consciousness, Body and Self perception

Chair: Prof. Joseph Glicksohn (Bar-Ilan University)

Presentation no. 1: A 3D Consciousness model - its relation to the Self and its possible development

Dr. Aviva Berkovich-Ohana (The Weizmann Institute)

The neuroscientist and philosopher Antonio Damasio (Damasio, 1999; Damasio & Meyer, 2009) distinguishes between two types of consciousness: "core consciousness" and "extended consciousness". The first, core-consciousness, correspond to the core-self or experiential-self, a transient self, un-depended on memory, reasoning or language, and without identity or personhood. The second, extended-consciousness, relates to the autobiographical-self or narrative-self, which is heavily dependent on the formation of enduring experiential memories, attention and language, and its inevitable concomitant is personal identity. These two selves stem from a primary, body-anchored proto-self, a coherent collection of neural patterns that map, moment by moment, the physical state of the organism and its internal milieu, viscera, and musculoskeletal frame. This greatly echoes the attitude of another prominent neuroscientist and philosopher, Francisco

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Varela's, who considered consciousness as not restricted to the brain, but rather being 'radically embodied' (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).

In our model, consciousness is described as a sphere, constrained by the boundaries of one's possible perception field. Consciousness states have three dimensions. The first is awareness, the ability to perceive, to feel, and cognitively react to conditions. The second is affect, the ability to react emotionally to internal and external events, and the third is time, the capacity to mentally represent and become aware of subjective experience over time. All the three dimensions are embodied, as evidenced by neurophysiologic data .

This model is not a static one, but a rather dynamical description of the constantly changing experienced phenomenon of consciousness. Consciousness emerges from a continuously changing state of vast neuronal networks, which interact with the internal bodily environment and external environment (Varela, 1999). While one's consciousness state can be experientially located in any point within the sphere, people usually tend to dwell in attractors, dynamical tendencies of the system's behaviour. The location of some ordinary consciousness states will be shown on the sphere for reference, as well as the location of altered states of consciousness, characterized by lower self boundaries, 239

alterations in spatial and temporal cognition, higher creativity and an altered sense of meaning (Glicksohn, 1993).

Most notably, this model enables insight into the possibility of transforming one's consciousness following intentional training. The field of humanistic and trans-personal psychology posit that self-transcendence is the ultimate goal of the adult human development (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Jung, Jaff, Winston, & Winston, 1963; Maslow, 1968, 1971). The model draws the outline of human self-transcendence, not only from the psychological and phenomenological points of view, but also from the neuroscientific perspective, thus bridging philosophy of mind, psychology and neuroscience. Finally, supporting evidence to the developmental aspect of the model will be presented from our work with Mindfulness meditators (Berkovich-Ohana, Glicksohn, & Goldstein, 2011a, 2011b).

Bibliography:

Berkovich-Ohana, A., Glicksohn, J., & Goldstein, A. (2011a). Temporal cognition changes following mindfulness, but not transcendental meditation practice. Proceedings of the 27th annual meeting of the international society for psychophysics .

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Berkovich-Ohana, A., Glicksohn, J., & Goldstein, A. (2011b). Mindfulness-induced changes in gamma band activity – implications for the default mode network, self-reference and attention. Clinical Neurophysiology, In press .

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). The flow experience and its significance for human psychology. In M.Csikszentmihalyi & I. S. Csikszentmihalyi (Eds.), Optimal experience: Psychological studies of flow in consciousness (pp. 15-35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .

Damasio, A. R. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace .

Damasio, A., & Meyer, K. (2009). Consciousness: An overview of the phenomenon and of its possible neural basis. In S. Laureys & G. Tononi (Eds.), The neurology of consciousness: Cognitive neuroscience and neuropathology (pp. 3-14). Oxford: Elsevier Academic Press .

Glicksohn, J. (1993). Altered sensory environments, altered states of consciousness and altered-state cognition. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 1-12 .

Jung, C. G., Jaff, A., Winston, R., & Winston, C. (1963). Memories, dreams, reflections. Collins London .

Maslow, A. H. (1968). Toward a psychology of being. New York: Van Nostrand .

Maslow, A. H. (1971). The farther reaches of human nature. New York: Viking .

Varela, F. J. (1999). Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem. Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem, 337 . 241

Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .

Presentation no. 2: Self Without a Body: Examining The Relationship between the Boundaries of the (Sense of)

Self and the Boundaries of the Body

Mr. Yochai Ataria (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

The relationship between the sense of self and the sense of body has been examined at length from the perspective of various disciplines — yet today we are still far from reaching a complete understanding of the topic. Scientifically, it is clear that it is impossible to discuss the soul/mind without reference to the body; similarly one cannot discuss the self without the body, since the sense of self is embodied (Lakoff 1999, Thompson 2001, Varela 1991). Usually, we feel that the sense of self is not restricted to the physical boundaries of the body but rather reaches beyond the body and into the outside world (Merleau-Ponty 1962). As Hume argued (Hume, 1739/2007, p. 232), the subject only discovers the self through perceived objects and not independently. Indeed, we feel that the world is outside ourselves and thus also the sense of self is to be found with objects outside of the body — we do not feel that we see the audience in our heads, but rather where they "truly" are . 242