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Defoe‘s Review and the Language of Eighteenth-Century Information Alexander DeGuise Department of History McGill University, Montréal August 2009 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Arts © 2009 Alexander DeGuise Library and Archives Bibliothèque et Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de l’édition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre référence ISBN: 978-0-494-61536-2 Our file Notre référence ISBN: 978-0-494-61536-2 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non- L’auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par télécommunication ou par l’Internet, prêter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non- support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L’auteur conserve la propriété du droit d’auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author’s permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privée, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de thesis. cette thèse. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n’y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. 2 Table of Contents List of Illustrations……………………………………………………………………….. 2 Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………... 3 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………..... 4 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………. 5 Chapter 1 – Defoe, the Review and the world of early-modern information…………… 18 Chapter 2 – Taming the mystery of trade………………………………………………. 30 Chapter 3 – Shaping expectations: Defoe‘s Review and the South-Sea trade………….. 61 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………… 94 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………. 96 List of Illustrations Figure 1: Herman Moll‘s 1711 Map of the South-Seas...……………………………… 71 3 Abstract This thesis attempts to historicize our understandings of economic rationality and economic action, specifically in the period leading up to the South Sea Bubble of 1720, an event which seemingly remains shrouded in mystery. The fundamental question addressed is what sort of ―information‖ would have been available to people making decisions about financial assets in the early-eighteenth century? Related to this is a question of a more cultural nature: How did contemporaries determine what information was relevant and how did they evaluate its truthfulness and reliability? Through an investigation into the language used by Daniel Defoe in his widely read newspaper, Review of the Affairs of the British Nation (1704-1713), this thesis aims to show how one emblematic contemporary framed the information he deemed relevant for determining the potential of a British trade to the South-Seas and how he attempts to establish his authority as an interpreter of trade and finance. Sommaire La présente thèse vise à présenter en termes historiques notre compréhension des rationalités et des actions économiques, plus spécifiquement durant la période menant à la ―South-Sea Bubble‖ de 1720, un événement qui reste encore mal compris. La question fondamentale abordée est quelle sorte d‘« information » aurait été disponible aux personnes prenant les décisions sur les actifs financiers au début du XVIIIe siècle ? Liée à cette question en est une autre de nature plus culturelle : comment les contemporains ont-ils déterminé quelles informations étaient pertinentes et comment ont-ils évalué leur véracité et leur fiabilité ? Grâce à une étude du langage utilisé par Daniel Defoe dans son journal à grand lectorat, Review of the Affairs of the British Nation (1704-1713), le présent thèse cherche à démontrer comment un contemporain de renom a utilisé les informations qu'il jugeait pertinentes pour identifier le potentiel d'un commerce britannique avec les Mers du Sud et comment il tentait d'établir son autorité en tant qu‘interprète de commerce et de finance. 4 Acknowledgements While there are numerous people who have played a role in supporting me throughout the process of composing this thesis, I must first thank my mother, father and grandmother. They have tirelessly stood by me, and were always prepared to offer much- needed support and kind words of encouragement. Thank you for blessing me this opportunity. I must also thank my supervisor, Professor Catherine Desbarats, as she provided me with ardent support, asked challenging questions and delivered invaluable criticisms. This has undoubtedly had an enormous impact on my intellectual development, and I am exceedingly grateful for it. I am also deeply indebted to my dearest friend Drew Desai for bearing with me while I endlessly elaborated on the minutiae of Defoe scholarship and other such things. True friends are hard to come by, and I am blessed to have found one in Drew. Other individuals who must be thanked include; Professor Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, Jason Dean, Bok Hoong Young Hoon, Emma Park, and Facil Tesfaye. 5 Introduction Although the South Sea Bubble of 1720 is widely cited in today‘s popular press as one of the earliest examples of speculative ―mania‖ in financial markets, this event and the wider intellectual context in which it occurred, remain shrouded in mystery and are perhaps even misunderstood.1 Period interpretations of the Bubble located its origins in the greed and corruption of South Sea Company and government officials, the knavery of the Exchange-Alley Stock-Jobbers, and most importantly for today‘s scholarly debates, in the ―madness‖ of the British people.2 Scholarship in the field of economic history has recently grappled with the latter question of ―madness,‖ disputing whether agents made decisions ―rationally‖ or whether they succumbed to ―irrational‖ exuberance, buying assets whose prices were ―out of line with their fundamental values.‖3 This debate about rationality gives rise to a set of prior historical questions however. Borrowing from the language of economics, we might ask what sort of ―information‖ would have been available to people making decisions about financial assets in the early-eighteenth century? We might also ask a related question of a more cultural nature: How did contemporaries determine what information was relevant and how did they evaluate its truthfulness and reliability? These questions are of the utmost importance for understanding the South Sea Bubble, as both the collection of information and the intellectual framework within which the truthfulness and reliability of this information is evaluated are central in financial decision-making. This is due to the fact that investors expectations about a venture‘s potential profitability are based upon the collection and interpretation of information 1 Julian Hoppit, ―The Myths of the South Sea Bubble,‖ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 12 (2002): 141. Hoppit quite rightly points out that it is somewhat unusual for an early eighteenth-century occurrence to enter ―reasonably common usage.‖ He then goes on to make the claim that the ―Bubble has attained near legendary status, at once familiar if distant, to be used confident and freely.‖ Journalists today regularly refer to this event when discussing periods of market downturn, as a search of the New York Times or Financial Times web databases reveals. 2 For example, see Ellis, The Sense of the People… (London: 1721), 15. In discussing the aftermath of the Bubble, Ellis comments that ―Some People have observed, that the Execution of the late pernicious Scheme, was scarcely attended with more Villainy, than Madness and Folly.‖ See also Anon., The Rise of the Stocks the Ruin of the People… (London: 1721), 31. The anonymous author argues that the Ministry must ―use [their] Endeavours to apply such Restraints on the present Madness of the People, as may hinder them from running headlong to their own Destruction.‖ 3 Ann M. Carlos, Carlos Maguire, and Larry Neal, ―Financial Acumen, Women Speculators, and the Royal Africa Company During the South Sea Bubble,‖ Accounting, Business and Financial History 16 (2006): 220. 6 available to them. In other words, in determining the fundamental, or in the language of the eighteenth century, the intrinsick, value of a stock, investors make predictive or speculative judgements about uncertain future states of the world based on inherently incomplete information. As Richard Taffler and David Tuckett explain, investing is an activity that ―depends on making judgements about available information to resolve two different orders of uncertainty; that caused by unavoidable information asymmetries at the moment