Cartesianism Revisited1

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Cartesianism Revisited1 Cartesianism Revisited1 Eric P. Lewis Virginia Tech In the summer of 2006 Daniel Garber opened the FME International Seminar in Early Modern Thought by commenting: “This has become the place to be.” The unexplained utterance generated smiles among the small room full of scholars, and could easily have been written off as an in- nocent bit of self-lauding or an ironic reference to the remoteness—even obscurity—of the seminar’s site.2 The list of seminar participants con- tained half a dozen philosophers from prestigious universities dotting the globe. Their research garnered a wide, if not deep, following. However, the dozen or so others listed on the program included graduate students, and tenured and non-tenured faculty who labored in greater obscurity in several academic disciplines. Together, these scholars seemed an unlikely group to deªne the remote town in Romania (at least at that moment) as “the place to be” for researchers of early modern thought. The seminar title, “Disseminating Knowledge in the Seventeenth Cen- tury: Centers and Peripheries in the Republic of Letters,” though innocu- ous enough, is indicative of a style of philosophical research that until fairly recently remained marginalized within the majority of English 1. This article discusses several recently published works about the reception of Des- cartes in the seventeenth century. It argues that the categories traditionally used by mod- ern philosophers to deªne the early modern period have been corrupted by the studies and works represented here. The result is not just a more nuanced view of early modern philos- ophy, but also a substantially different picture of the intellectual landscape. The editors of the books in this review share a similar methodological approach to their subject, an ap- proach that separates them from a more analytical style of philosophy that is practiced by many of their colleagues. The publications under review are: Ariew and Garber 2002, Schmaltz 2002, Schmaltz 2005, and Lennon 2003. 2. The seminar was held in the town of Bran, Romania, best known for the castle asso- ciated with Bram Stoker’s Dracula. Perspectives on Science 2007, vol. 15, no. 4 ©2007 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 493 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc.2007.15.4.493 by guest on 26 September 2021 494 Cartesianism Revisited speaking philosophy departments.3 The fact that Garber, chair of the de- partment of philosophy at Princeton, could conªdently make his opening proclamation underscored a methodological struggle to which he success- fully dedicated a career. Garber recently explained: What my generation of historians was reacting against was a bun- dle of practices that characterized the writing of the history of phi- losophy in the period: the tendency to substitute rational recon- structions of a philosopher’s views for the views themselves; the tendency to focus on an extremely narrow group of ªgures (Des- cartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in my pe- riod);...thetendency to treat the philosophical positions as if they were those presented by contemporaries; and on and on and on.” (Garber 2004, 2.) The young and old present at the seminar likely wished that more of Garber’s generation acted in concert with him; yet the emphasis of “pe- ripheries” and “disseminating knowledge” is precisely the result of this philosophical style. Similar conferences have cropped up over the last decade, often self- consciously struggling with the terminology of “outsiders” and “peripher- ies” as they have explored the role of the contemporaries of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza and Leibniz.4 Philosophers such as Walter Charleton, John Davies, Bernardo Telesio, Pierre-Daniel Huet, Pierre-Sylvain Regis, and Robert Desgabets, to name a few, were in no conventional way “out- side” their respective intellectual communities, yet they have been largely excluded from modern discourse about early modern philosophy.5 The par- ticipants of these conferences typically focus much less on the perceived internal coherence of a text such as Descartes’ Meditations than on under- standing the text through the reactions of the author’s contemporaries; or, conversely, understanding a primary philosopher as a reaction to his con- temporaries. They share an assumption that lay behind Garber’s criticism: 3. I call this a “style” of philosophy because I wish to avoid creating false dichotomies. As will be discussed, recent research into late scholasticism and the reception of Cartesian thought demonstrates a rich spectrum of views that challenge the dichotomies tradition- ally drawn. Likewise, modern methods of research span a spectrum that can best be de- scribed in terms of tendencies. 4. Participants at a colloquium titled “Outsiders in Early Modern Philosophy,” The Warburg Institute, London, Fall 2003, discussed the fallacy of calling the subjects of their research “outsiders” when many were at the center of their intellectual community. 5. We might also successfully apply the terms “outsiders” and “peripheries” in a self- reºective way. The methodological struggle precipitated by Garber and others has, at times, elicited attempts to ostracize those whose research has had a greater contextual fo- cus. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc.2007.15.4.493 by guest on 26 September 2021 Perspectives on Science 495 researchers can better recover the meaning of a text when their efforts are applied to intellectual context. The fact that Garber proclaimed to a group of scholars, united in their study of “centers and peripheries,” that they were in “the place to be” is nothing if not ironic as these scholars and their research subjects become better recognized on the “inside” of their respec- tive philosophical circles. No shortage of words has been spilled by philosophers concerning the merits of this increased emphasis on context.6 The late Margaret Wilson called Garber and Michael Ayers to task for comments they wrote in the introduction to The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. As editors, Garber and Ayers claimed that commentators in the “analytic tra- dition” not only ignored the philosophical complexities of their subjects and “distorted [philosophy’s] achievements, but also often denied them- selves the tools necessary for the interpretation of the very words and sen- tences they continue to expound” (Garber and Ayers 1998, 4).7 For her part, Wilson promoted a “softening of the ideological division, rather than to advocate any general thesis, factual or normative, about the relation of philosophy and history” (Wilson 1992, 195). But Wilson worried that the “detail and professionalism ...ofthesort desired for their volume by the Cambridge History editors . can tend to discourage “use” of historical ªgures by contemporary philosophers of a certain conscientiousness” (Wil- son 1992, 205). She quoted David Lewis who admitted that he had not discussed Leibniz’s views about the plurality of worlds in a recent work because he lacked the expertise to conªdently represent the philosopher’s ideas on the subject. Lewis had the choice between publishing something that he admitted might be “undeserving of others’ attention,” or sparing philosophers from those pages. Ostensibly, he had a further choice: to de- vote much more attention to Leibniz’s work on the topic. But Lewis said that after reading “what serious historians of philosophy” had to say, he gave up because of the lack of consensus among them (Wilson 1992, 204). He apparently had little desire to tackle the primary sources himself and instead appealed to “serious” historians of philosophy, whomever they might be. Pragmatic concerns thus trumped, in this case, any discussion of Leibniz’s contribution to the issue of the plurality of worlds. Wilson la- mented that Lewis failed to stray from his narrower philosophical project because the demands of current historical research were so high. Lewis 6. A conference titled: “Do Historians and Philosophers of Science Have Anything to Say to Each Other?” was recently held at Duke University, March 2007. 7. Wilson’s criticisms were published in The Philosophical Review, January 1992, well prior to the actual publication of the volume that contained Garber and Ayer’s comments. Garber (2004) later characterized his comments above as a “cartoon version of the “ana- lytic” history of philosophy” and a “useful demon to posit.” Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc.2007.15.4.493 by guest on 26 September 2021 496 Cartesianism Revisited simply left his reader to wonder how (or why) he would have used Leibniz in his work if there had been a consensus on his doctrine of the plurality of worlds, and if we should consider this shortage of words problematic. Beyond the pedagogical issues facing philosophers working in early modern history, Bernard Williams claimed that the two different styles of research inevitably yielded incompatible products “in rather the way that Impressionism, by exploring as intensely as possible the surface effects of light, was thereby debarred from giving as much information about struc- ture as was accessible to some other styles of painting” (Williams 1994, 20).8 Though Williams did not explicitly tell his reader which of the two styles was analogous with Impressionism, his claim that the more histori- cally inclined “naturally looks sideways to the context of a philosopher’s ideas” seemed to answer the question. The negative connotations of a “sideways” look may be avoided if Wil- liams meant that the resulting picture exists, or should exist, independ- ently of what he calls “present problems” in philosophy. Context, in this case, may say something novel and interesting about the ideas of an histor- ical ªgure such as Descartes, but tell the modern philosopher nothing (or worse—something distorting) pertaining to one’s present philosophical objectives. However, if Williams is correct, doesn’t this make the two “styles” irrelevant to each other? In Descartes Reinvented (2005) Tom Sorell, like Wilson, purports to offer a reconciliation of sorts between philosophers and their more historically oriented colleagues.
Recommended publications
  • One Hundred Years of Thomism Aeterni Patris and Afterwards a Symposium
    One Hundred Years of Thomism Aeterni Patris and Afterwards A Symposium Edited By Victor B. Brezik, C.S.B, CENTER FOR THOMISTIC STUDIES University of St. Thomas Houston, Texas 77006 ~ NIHIL OBSTAT: ReverendJamesK. Contents Farge, C.S.B. Censor Deputatus INTRODUCTION . 1 IMPRIMATUR: LOOKING AT THE PAST . 5 Most Reverend John L. Morkovsky, S.T.D. A Remembrance Of Pope Leo XIII: The Encyclical Aeterni Patris, Leonard E. Boyle,O.P. 7 Bishop of Galveston-Houston Commentary, James A. Weisheipl, O.P. ..23 January 6, 1981 The Legacy Of Etienne Gilson, Armand A. Maurer,C.S.B . .28 The Legacy Of Jacques Maritain, Christian Philosopher, First Printing: April 1981 Donald A. Gallagher. .45 LOOKING AT THE PRESENT. .61 Copyright©1981 by The Center For Thomistic Studies Reflections On Christian Philosophy, All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or Ralph McInerny . .63 reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written Thomism And Today's Crisis In Moral Values, Michael permission, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in Bertram Crowe . .74 critical articles and reviews. For information, write to The Transcendental Thomism, A Critical Assessment, Center For Thomistic Studies, 3812 Montrose Boulevard, Robert J. Henle, S.J. 90 Houston, Texas 77006. LOOKING AT THE FUTURE. .117 Library of Congress catalog card number: 80-70377 Can St. Thomas Speak To The Modem World?, Leo Sweeney, S.J. .119 The Future Of Thomistic Metaphysics, ISBN 0-9605456-0-3 Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R. .142 EPILOGUE. .163 The New Center And The Intellectualism Of St. Thomas, Printed in the United States of America Vernon J.
    [Show full text]
  • Christofidou Final
    Behavior and Philosophy, 44, 6-17 (2016). ©2016 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies JOSÉ E. BURGOS (2015) ANTIDUALISM AND ANTIMENTALISM IN RADICAL BEHAVIORISM: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION Andrea Christofidou Keble College, Oxford As the title makes clear, José Burgos’ (2015) is an ambitious paper, attempting to tackle a number of positions spanning three centuries or so in the philosophy of mind, and over a century in non-philosophical areas such as behaviourism, cognitive psychology, and other psychological accounts. It tries to draw on and include philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, none of whom is easy, as he acknowledges, each meriting a separate paper. Burgos’s paper is clear and well argued and achieves what it sets out to do, namely, to show the problems facing the various physicalist and behaviourist positions that he considers. In particular, I admire his painstaking examination of the non-philosophical positions that he discusses. My main aim is not to comment on such positions, though at the end of my discussion I shall offer some brief remarks. I am mainly concerned to raise a few points concerning the discussions Burgos has woven into his account. Three stand out that are of the first importance for metaphysics, which I shall take in turn: Descartes’ dualism; the metaphysics of causality; and Kant’s thesis of the self. I shall finish with some brief general comments on behaviourism. Descartes’ Dualism It is an intellectual duty of anyone who embarks on an exposition and discussion of another thinker to start by presenting as clearly as possible the positions and arguments of that thinker.
    [Show full text]
  • David Hume and the Origin of Modern Rationalism Donald Livingston Emory University
    A Symposium: Morality Reconsidered David Hume and the Origin of Modern Rationalism Donald Livingston Emory University In “How Desperate Should We Be?” Claes Ryn argues that “morality” in modern societies is generally understood to be a form of moral rationalism, a matter of applying preconceived moral principles to particular situations in much the same way one talks of “pure” and “applied” geometry. Ryn finds a num- ber of pernicious consequences to follow from this rationalist model of morals. First, the purity of the principles, untainted by the particularities of tradition, creates a great distance between what the principles demand and what is possible in actual experience. The iridescent beauty and demands of the moral ideal distract the mind from what is before experience.1 The practical barriers to idealistically demanded change are oc- cluded from perception, and what realistically can and ought to be done is dismissed as insufficient. And “moral indignation is deemed sufficient”2 to carry the day in disputes over policy. Further, the destruction wrought by misplaced idealistic change is not acknowledged to be the result of bad policy but is ascribed to insufficient effort or to wicked persons or groups who have derailed it. A special point Ryn wants to make is that, “One of the dangers of moral rationalism and idealism is DONAL D LIVINGSTON is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Emory Univer- sity. 1 Claes Ryn, “How Desperate Should We Be?” Humanitas, Vol. XXVIII, Nos. 1 & 2 (2015), 9. 2 Ibid., 18. 44 • Volume XXVIII, Nos. 1 and 2, 2015 Donald Livingston that they set human beings up for desperation.
    [Show full text]
  • Descartes' Influence in Shaping the Modern World-View
    R ené Descartes (1596-1650) is generally regarded as the “father of modern philosophy.” He stands as one of the most important figures in Western intellectual history. His work in mathematics and his writings on science proved to be foundational for further development in these fields. Our understanding of “scientific method” can be traced back to the work of Francis Bacon and to Descartes’ Discourse on Method. His groundbreaking approach to philosophy in his Meditations on First Philosophy determine the course of subsequent philosophy. The very problems with which much of modern philosophy has been primarily concerned arise only as a consequence of Descartes’thought. Descartes’ philosophy must be understood in the context of his times. The Medieval world was in the process of disintegration. The authoritarianism that had dominated the Medieval period was called into question by the rise of the Protestant revolt and advances in the development of science. Martin Luther’s emphasis that salvation was a matter of “faith” and not “works” undermined papal authority in asserting that each individual has a channel to God. The Copernican revolution undermined the authority of the Catholic Church in directly contradicting the established church doctrine of a geocentric universe. The rise of the sciences directly challenged the Church and seemed to put science and religion in opposition. A mathematician and scientist as well as a devout Catholic, Descartes was concerned primarily with establishing certain foundations for science and philosophy, and yet also with bridging the gap between the “new science” and religion. Descartes’ Influence in Shaping the Modern World-View 1) Descartes’ disbelief in authoritarianism: Descartes’ belief that all individuals possess the “natural light of reason,” the belief that each individual has the capacity for the discovery of truth, undermined Roman Catholic authoritarianism.
    [Show full text]
  • METAPHYSICS and the WORLD CRISIS Victor B
    METAPHYSICS AND THE WORLD CRISIS Victor B. Brezik, CSB (The Basilian Teacher, Vol. VI, No. 2, November, 1961) Several years ago on one of his visits to Toronto, M. Jacques Maritain, when he was informed that I was teaching a course in Metaphysics, turned to me and inquired with an obvious mixture of humor and irony indicated by a twinkle in the eyes: “Are there some students here interested in Metaphysics?” The implication was that he himself was finding fewer and fewer university students with such an interest. The full import of M. Maritain’s question did not dawn upon me until later. In fact, only recently did I examine it in a wider context and realize its bearing upon the present world situation. By a series of causes ranging from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in the 18th century and the rise of Positive Science in the 19th century, to the influence of Pragmatism, Logical Positivism and an absorbing preoccupation with technology in the 20th century, devotion to metaphysical studies has steadily waned in our universities. The fact that today so few voices are raised to deplore this trend is indicative of the desuetude into which Metaphysics has fallen. Indeed, a new school of philosophers, having come to regard the study of being as an entirely barren field, has chosen to concern itself with an analysis of the meaning of language. (Volume XXXIV of Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association deals with Analytical Philosophy.) Yet, paradoxically, while an increasing number of scholars seem to be losing serious interest in metaphysical studies, the world crisis we are experiencing today appears to be basically a crisis in Metaphysics.
    [Show full text]
  • Metaphysical Systems
    Table of Contents Volume I - The Distant Past On ‘being’: Cartesianism - Passive Observation Introduction: Metaphysical system number three #1: The Error of Zeno Resolving the problem of Abstraction #2: The Error of Aristotle Resolving the problem of Cartesianism #3: The Error of Boethius Resolving the problem of Free Will #4: The Error of Copernicus Resolving the problem of Centricism $5: The Error of Leibniz Resolving the problem of Theodicy #6: The Error of Kant Resolving the problem of Universal Ethics Volume II - The Recent Past On ‘being’ being: Non-Cartesianism - Active Observation Preface to Volume II #7: The Error of Hegel Resolving the problem of non-Cartesianism $8: The Error of Einstein Resolving the problem of ‘i’ #9: The Error of Russell Resolving the problem of Non-Members #10: The Error of Heidegger Resolving the problem of The Void of a Void #11: The Error of Philosophy Resolving the problem of Either/Or #12: The Error of ‘being’ being Resolving the problem of Nihilism Volume III - The Future On ‘being’ being ‘Being’: Cartesianism ‘within’ Non-Cartesianism: Active Observation within Passive Observation Preface to Volume III #13: Metaphysical System 28 Introducing the problem of Metaphysical Systems 7 & 9 #14: Principle Three Introducing the problem of Principles One and Two #15: Ockham’s Razor Introducing the problem of Reductionism #16: Wrong Again Introducing the problem of Being Right #17: The Beginning Introducing the problem of The End #18: Why Now? Introducing the problem of History’s Vector Conclusion: The Peer
    [Show full text]
  • Saint Bonaventure
    Saint Bonaventure and the Entrance of God Falque Into Theology Saint Bonaventure Saint Bonaventure by Emmanuel Falque and Saint Bonaventure and the Entrance of God Into Theology Into God of Entrance the and Bonaventure Saint translated from French by Brain Lapsa and Sarah Horton The Entrance of God Revised by William C. Hackett Into Theology Properly original, the new version of this essay intends both to nourish debate and differentiate points of view. In its new articulation, the book justifies work that has been carried out since. It justifies the sense of Franciscan rootedness that has never been denied and at the same time opens to the discovery of another reading of the Dominican Thomas Aquinas. The preface specially composed for this American edition, the opening debate with famous medievalist Etienne Gilson, and above all the afterword entitled “Saint Thomas Aquinas and the entrance of God into Philosophy” make it a radically new book. Emmanuel Falque, Professor and honorary dean of philosophy at the Institut Catholique de Paris (ICP), is a philosopher of religion whose research and writing focuses on patristic and medieval philosophy, phenomenology and philosophy of religion. A graduate of the University of Paris IV (Sorbonne), he received his license in Catholic theology summa cum laude from the Centre Sèvres, a university level Jesuit institution in Paris, in 1993, then returned to the Sorbonne to study with Jean-Luc Marion and earned a Ph.D. in philosophy summa cum laude in 1998 and the title of full Professor in 2006. He erved as the 2015 Tipton Visiting Professor in Catholic Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara and held the Gadamer Visiting Professorship Chair in 2016 (Boston College).
    [Show full text]
  • Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations Spring 2010 Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection Jason Skirry University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Skirry, Jason, "Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection" (2010). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 179. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/179 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/179 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection Abstract This dissertation presents a unified interpretation of Malebranche’s philosophical system that is based on his Augustinian theory of the mind’s perfection, which consists in maximizing the mind’s ability to successfully access, comprehend, and follow God’s Order through practices that purify and cognitively enhance the mind’s attention. I argue that the mind’s perfection figures centrally in Malebranche’s philosophy and is the main hub that connects and reconciles the three fundamental principles of his system, namely, his occasionalism, divine illumination, and freedom. To demonstrate this, I first present, in chapter one, Malebranche’s philosophy within the historical and intellectual context of his membership in the French Oratory, arguing that the Oratory’s particular brand of Augustinianism, initiated by Cardinal Bérulle and propagated by Oratorians such as Andre Martin, is at the core of his philosophy and informs his theory of perfection. Next, in chapter two, I explicate Augustine’s own theory of perfection in order to provide an outline, and a basis of comparison, for Malebranche’s own theory of perfection.
    [Show full text]
  • Farewell to Descartes
    Out of Revolution AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN MAN De Te Fabula Narratur Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy 1938 NEW YORK WILLIAM MORROW AND COMPANY CHAPTER EIGHTEEN Farewell to Descartes THE YEAR OF HARVARD’S TERCENTENARY, 1936- 1937, WAS ALSO the tercentenary of a great intellectual event. Three hundred years ago the rational foundations of modern science were established. It was then that the “ W eltanschauung” which lies at the root of our modern universities was first put into a book. Its author had intended to write some comprehensive volumes under the proud title, L e M o n d e . But that philosopher, René Descartes, was dissuaded by religious dangers from publishing them in full, and limited his task to the famous Discours de la M é t h o d e . In it the great idealistic postulate of the “ C o g i t o e r g o s u m ” was formulated, and therewith the programme of man’s scientific conquest of nature. Descartes’ “Cogito ergo s u m ” opened the way to three hundred years of incredible sci­ entific progress. When Descartes came forward with his “wondrous strange” Discourse, the scholastic type of university had long since been in decay. He replaced the principles by which mediæval thought had been guided ever since Anselm’s “ Credo ut intel- lig a m , ” with his “ Cogito ergo sum.” Among the possible start­ ing points for our powers of reason, scholasticism had singled out man’s faith in the revealing power of God: Descartes sec­ onded it with his no less paradoxical faith in the rational char­ acter of existence and nature.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-86613-2 - Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy Antonia Lolordo Excerpt More information Introduction This book is bothaninterpretation of Gassendi’s central metaphysical, epistemological, and natural philosophical views and an advertisement for their philosophical and historical interest. Historians of seventeenth- century philosophy can usually tell you that Gassendi was an atomist, an empiricist,oramitigated skeptic, as well as an opponent of Aristotle and Descartes. They might add that he attempted to revive Epicureanism. However, few are likely to have any clear conception ofthe theses Gassendi articulates, the argumentsheoffers in their defense, or the systematic connections between them. This is an unfortunatesituation, and I aim to remedy it. There are at leasttwo reasons why those of us who are interested in early modern philosophy and natural philosophy need to know more about Gassendi. The first is widely recognized. Gassendi’s influence and the importance he was accorded by his peers and close contemporaries is unquestionable. Gassendi was a central figure in seventeenth-century philosophy and, as such, very importantfor the development of mod- ern philosophical thought. He knew and was known by such figures as Descartes and Hobbes and is importantfor understanding Leibniz, Locke, and Newton. Were one a seventeenth-century intellectual who found Cartesianism unacceptable, Gassendi’s philosophy was the obvi- ous alternative. Less well known, however, is the philosophical interest
    [Show full text]
  • Two Varieties of Skepticism
    1 2 3 4 Two Varieties of Skepticism 5 6 James Conant 7 8 This paper distinguishes two varieties of skepticism and the varieties of 9 philosophical response those skepticisms have engendered. The aim of 10 the exercise is to furnish a perspicuous overview of some of the dialec- 11 tical relations that obtain across some of the range of problems that phi- 12 losophers have called (and continue to call) “skeptical”. I will argue that 13 such an overview affords a number of forms of philosophical insight.1 14 15 16 I. Cartesian and Kantian Varieties of Skepticism – A First Pass 17 at the Distinction 18 19 I will call the two varieties of skepticism in question Cartesian skepticism 20 and Kantian skepticism respectively.2 (These labels are admittedly conten- 21 tious.3 Nothing of substance hangs on my employing these rather than 22 23 1 The taxonomy is meant to serve as a descriptive tool for distinguishing various 24 sorts of philosophical standpoint. It is constructed in as philosophically neutral a 25 fashion as possible. The distinctions presented below upon which it rests are 26 ones that can be deployed by philosophers of very different persuasions regard- 27 less of their collateral philosophical commitments. A philosopher could make use of these distinctions to argue for any of a number of very different conclu- 28 sions. Some of the more specific philosophical claims that I myself express sym- 29 pathy for in the latter part of this part (e.g., regarding how these varieties of 30 skepticism are related to one another) do, however, turn on collateral philo- 31 sophical commitments.
    [Show full text]
  • Intro to Perception
    Intro to Perception Dr. Jonathan Pillow Sensation & Perception (PSY 345 / NEU 325) Spring 2015, Princeton University 1 What is Perception? stuff in the world 2 What is Perception? stuff in the world percepts process for: • extracting information via the senses • forming internal representations of the world 3 Outline: 1. Philosophy: • What philosophical perspectives inform our understanding and study of perception? 2. General Examples • why is naive realism wrong? • what makes perception worth studying? 3. Principles & Approaches • modern tools for studying perception 4 Epistemology = theory of knowledge • Q: where does knowledge come from? Answer #1: Psychological Nativism • the mind produces ideas that are not derived from external sources 5 Epistemology = theory of knowledge • Q: where does knowledge come from? Answer #1: Psychological Nativism • the mind produces ideas that are not derived from external sources Answer #2: Empiricism • All knowledge comes from the senses Proponents: Hobbes, Locke, Hume • newborn is a “blank slate” (“tabula rasa”) 6 Epistemology = theory of knowledge • Q: where does knowledge come from? Answer #1: Psychological Nativism vs. Answer #2: Empiricism • resembles “nature” vs. “nurture” debate • extreme positions at both ends are a bit absurd (See Steve Pinker’s “The Blank Slate” for a nice critique of the blank slate thesis) 7 Metaphysics 8 Metaphysics = theory of reality • Q: what kind of stuff is there in the world? Answer #1: Dualism • there are two kinds of stuff • usually: “mind” and “matter” Answer #2: Monism • there is only one kind of stuff “materialism” “idealism” (physical stuff) (mental stuff) 9 Philosophy of Mind Q: what is the relationship between “things in the world” and “representations in our heads”? 10 1.
    [Show full text]