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Strategies for Reaching Digital Media Users in MENA: One Region, MulPle RealiEs

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Strategies for Reaching Digital Media Users in MENA: One Region, Mul�Ple Reali�Es BBG Research Series Strategies For Reaching Digital Media Users In MENA: One Region, Mulple Reali=es. Gallup World Poll Coverage 2 Copyright © 2013, 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Gallup World Poll Methodology § Nationally representative samples of population § Interviews conducted in Arabic and English aged 15 and older collected in 2015 § Probability-based selection of: § Approximately 1,000 interviews conducted § interviewing locations (Primary Sampling per country annually Units) § Face-to-face, hour-long interviews in § households respondents’ homes or 30-minute telephone interviews § adult respondent in household 3 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved One Region, Multiple Realities The Economics 4 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Regional GDP Per Capita *PPP in current international dollars, estimates from IMF 5 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Right now, do you feel your standard of living is getting better or getting worse? Among total population, % getting better Lebanon 27% Tunisia 32% Palestinian Territories 32% Egypt 48% Jordan 53% Saudi Arabia 77% 6 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Thinking about the city or area where you live, would you say that now a good time or a bad time to find a job? Among total population, % good time 64% 33% 32% 20% 19% 13% Saudi Arabia Egypt Jordan Lebanon Tunisia Palestinian Territories 7 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Would you rather work for the government or a business? Government Business Neither Lebanon 39% 26% 35% Tunisia 40% 33% 24% Palestinian Territories 43% 33% 22% Jordan 66% 29% 5% Egypt 68% 17% 14% Saudi Arabia 69% 24% 5% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 8 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved One Region, Multiple Realities The Politics 9 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved GDP and Life Evaluations 35% $16,000 30% $14,000 29% 25% $10,877 $11,194 $12,000 25% $10,496 $10,656 $10,742 $9,620 $9,922 $10,318 $8,994 $10,000 18% 20% 17% 15% 19% $8,000 $8,343 14% 14% 15% 13% 11% $6,000 Arabuprising 14% 10% 13% 12% 11% 9% $4,000 8% 9% 5% $2,000 0% $- 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Egypt % Thriving GDP per capita, PPP* *In current international dollars, estimates from IMF 10 Copyright © 2014, 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Regional Life Evaluation Among total population, % thriving 2010 2014 2015 43% 37% 36% 30% 29% 29% 21% 22% 20% 19% 18% 17% 17% 14% 14% 14% 12% 11% Saudi Arabia Jordan Lebanon Tunisia Palestinian Egypt Territories 11 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Does your home have internet access? Among total population, % yes 71% 69% 47% 42% 41% 22% Saudi Arabia Lebanon Tunisia Palestinian Jordan Egypt Territories 12 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Thank you Mohamed Younis Gallup World Poll [email protected] Follow us on Twitter @GallupAnalytics 13 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Strategies for Reaching Digital Media Users in the MENA Region What The Data Tells Us Online Data describes audiences Analytics you ALREADY have Digital Media Strategy National Data describes audiences Survey you WANT to have Data 15 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Methodology: National Surveys § Nationally representative samples of population § Interviews are conducted in local Arabic dialect aged 15 and older in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, or standard Arabic Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, and Yemen and § Probability-based selection Saudi Arabia in 2013-2015 § Face-to-face, one-hour-long interviews in § At least 1,200 interviews per country respondents’ homes or 30-minute telephone interviews 16 Copyright © 2014, 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Methodology: Qualitative Studies n In-depth interviews and focus groups with YouTube users in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (2014) n In-depth interviews with smartphone owners in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (2014) n Focus groups with TV viewers in Egypt and Morocco (2015) 17 Copyright © 2014, 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Digital Media in Context in the MENA Region Aggregate number of adults age 15+ using each platform within the past week in nine surveyed countries (millions of people) 154.2 84.5 49.5 42.8 30.4 10.9 TV Friends and Internet Facebook YouTube Twitter Family (for news) Source: Nationally representative surveys in Algeria (n=2034), Bahrain (n=2003), Egypt (n=2000), Iraq (n=2015), Kuwait (n=1200), Morocco (n=2008), Qatar (n=1500), Yemen (n=1500) and Saudi Arabia (n=2008). 18 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Internet: Maghreb and Iraq for Largest Audiences… Number of adults aged 15 and older using the Internet within the past week (millions of people) 15 7.1 7.7 8.1 8.1 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.2 Bahrain Qatar Kuwait Yemen Morocco Saudi Iraq Algeria Egypt Arabia Percent of adults aged 15 and older using the Internet within the past week 84% 86% 89% 50% 40% 25% 30% 32% 8% Yemen Egypt Algeria Morocco Iraq Saudi Kuwait Bahrain Qatar Arabia 19 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Gear Web Content Both for Mobiles… Percent of past week Internet users who accessed the Internet via a mobile phone in the past week Egypt 75.5% (n=498) Iraq 80.0% (n=812) § Virtually 100% in Qatar, Morocco Kuwait, and Bahrain 47.0% (n=640) accessed the Internet via a mobile phone within the past Algeria 32.6% week. (n=617) 20 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved …and Computers. n In the Gulf, most people use both mobile devices AND laptops to access the Internet; 70% of Kuwaitis who access the Internet via mobile devices also access it via laptop. n In Egypt, 56% who have watched an online video in the past week have used a laptop. “I access the Internet via mobile (when I’m out) and via computer at home.” (Female, Cairo) “Sometimes I prefer a laptop because it has a clearer screen.” (Male, Saudi) “If I am not working, I will watch an online video for two hours.” (Male, Kuwait) 21 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Mobile Apps are Popular, but Less so for Traditional News Percent of total population using mobile apps within the past week for news Bahrain 46% § In the 2014 Smartphone study, Qatar Saudi and Kuwaitis said they 44% used social networking apps (Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber, Iraq 27% BBM) much more than new apps. Egypt 21% Yemen 5% 22 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Facebook and Twitter: Maghreb for the Largest Audiences Past week use (millions of adults aged 15 and older) Facebook Twitter 14.1 8.5 5.8 5.8 6.0 2.9 3.1 1.6 1.7 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 Bahrain Qatar Kuwait Yemen Iraq Saudi Morocco Algeria Egypt Arabia Source: Nationally representative surveys in Algeria (n=2034), Bahrain (n=2003), Egypt (n=2000), Iraq (n=2015), Kuwait (n=1200), Morocco (n=2008), Qatar (n=1500), Yemen (n=1500) and Saudi Arabia (n=2008). 23 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Higher Penetration Countries for More Active Users Percent of population using Facebook within the past week 74% 65% 60% 38% 31% 27% 29% 23% 6% Yemen Egypt Morocco Iraq Algeria Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Qatar Source: Nationally representative surveys in Algeria (n=2034), Bahrain (n=2003), Egypt (n=2000), Iraq (n=2015), Kuwait (n=1200), Morocco (n=2008), Qatar (n=1500), Yemen (n=1500) and Saudi Arabia (n=2008). 24 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Higher Penetration Countries Have More Diverse Facebook and Twitter Audiences Egypt Facebook Users Qatar Facebook Users Mostly young males Balance of gender and age 71% male; 56% < 24 y/o 59% male, 22% < 24, 43% > 35 y/o Base: PW FB users (n=468) Base: PW FB users (n=928) 25 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved In Egypt, Twitter Will Reach Highly Educated, Super Digital Users % of pw Twitter % of pw Egypt Users Facebook users n=105 n=468 Trust Internet 73.4% 59.4% Facebook for news at least 1x/ 86% 74% day University education or above 47.5% 35% § In Egypt, 71% of Facebook and 78% of Twitter users are male; 56% under the age of 24. 26 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved Largest Number of YouTube Past Week Users Are in North Africa Used YouTube within the past week (number of adults in millions) 8.80 7.30 6.00 1.10 0.27 0.44 0.58 Bahrain Yemen Qatar Kuwait Morocco Algeria Egypt 27 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved For Some, YouTube is also an Important Source of “Truthful” News TV Coverage n In Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, YouTube is more popular than Facebook. n More Kuwaitis named YouTube than any other platform as their most important source of information. “Every (platform) completes the other. That means (neither) TV nor YouTube tells you the complete news.” (Kuwait, male, YouTube user) “You get things from the Internet you never get from TV. Most people watch YouTube.” (Oujda Morocco, male) 28 Copyright © 2015 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved A Digital Strategy § Pick one or two countries with high numbers and one or Audience two with high penetration § Facebook and YouTube for content. § Twitter to bring attention to content. Platforms § Mobile apps for citizen mediated news § Integrate digital and traditional platforms. § Egypt and Maghreb for large audiences. Countries § The Gulf for active and diverse users. § High penetration countries – content for men, women, young, and old.
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