Ie, Forensic Science

The Peter A. Allard School of Law Allard Research Commons Faculty Publications Allard Faculty Publications 2014 Admissibility Compared: The Reception of Incriminating Expert Evidence (i.e., Forensic Science) in Four Adversarial Jurisdictions Gary Edmond Emma Cunliffe Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, [email protected] Simon A. Cole Andrew J. Roberts Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons Citation Details Gary Edmond et al, "Admissibility Compared: The Reception of Incriminating Expert Evidence (i.e., Forensic Science) in Four Adversarial Jurisdictions (2014) 3 U Den Crim L Rev 31. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons. ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED: THE RECEPTION OF INCRIMINATING EXPERT EVIDENCE (I.E., FORENSIC SCIENCE) IN FOUR ADVERSARIAL JURISDICTIONS Gary Edmond,* Simon Cole,† Emma Cunliffe,‡ and Andrew Roberts§ INTRODUCTION The single most important observation about judicial [gate-keeping] of forensic science is that most judges under most circumstances admit most forensic science. There is almost no expert testimony so threadbare that it will not be admitted if it comes to a criminal proceeding under the banner of forensic science. The applicable legal test offers little assurance. The maverick who is a field unto him- or herself has repeatedly been readily admitted under Frye, and the complete absence of foundational research has not prevented such admission in Daubert jurisdictions.1 There is an epistemic crisis in many areas of forensic science. This crisis emerged largely in response both to the mobilization of a range of academic commentators and critics and the rise and influence of DNA typing. It gained popular and authoritative support through the influence of the National Academy of Science (NAS) and a surprisingly critical report produced under its auspices by a committee of the National Research Council (NRC). Interestingly, as this article endeavors to explain, the courts themselves seem to have played a rather indirect, inconsistent and ultimately ineffective role in the supervision and evaluation of forensic science evidence. Indeed, in the * Professor, School of Law, The University of New South Wales. This research was supported by the Australian Research Council (FT0992041, LP100200142 and LP120100063). Thanks to David Faigman, Jeremy Gans, Mehera San Roque, and William Thompson for comments. Versions of this paper were presented at Law & Society Conferences in San Francisco (2011) and Hawaii (2012). † Associate Professor, School of Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine. ‡ Associate Professor, School of Law, University of British Columbia. § Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Melbourne. 1 Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES J. 16, 29 (2005). 32 UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 aftermath of recent criticism of the forensic sciences, this essay considers the effect of the dominant admissibility standards that operate in four common law jurisdictions. The revealing result seems to be that although admissibility standards vary across these jurisdictions, actual admissibility practices are remarkably consistent. In this article we will question the extent to which courts (and legal personnel) are able to meaningfully invigilate the use of forensic science evidence in criminal proceedings and consider some of the ideological commitments and institutional pressures that might lead judges in all jurisdictions to prefer inclusive approaches to incriminating expert opinions. In the first part of the article, we compare rules, jurisprudence and practices, across four jurisdictions: the United States, England and Wales, Canada, and Australia.2 All profoundly shaped by the English common law, these jurisdictions (and their sub- jurisdictions) tend to use a mixture of common law (e.g. England and Wales and Canada), judge-made rules (e.g. the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence) and statutory schemes (e.g. the Australian Evidence Act 1995 Cth and many states in the United States) to regulate the admission of evidence, including expert opinion.3 These jurisdictions tend to maintain criminal trial processes that remain reasonably similar and facilitate broad brush comparisons.4 Forensic science and medical techniques are used routinely in criminal proceedings. We have selected techniques (and technologies) that are not necessarily standardized, but are regularly used in each of the four jurisdictions.5 Legal recognition and treatment as distinctive types of evidence enables us to consider what these advanced jurisdictions, with different, though evolving, admissibility standards have done (and are doing) in response to the various techniques and opinions. Our findings suggest that admissibility standards, including the first generation of reliability-based standards, seem to make little, if any, difference to (traditional) admissibility decision-making and practice. Allowing for some variation, the same sorts of forensic science evidence are admitted across all jurisdictions, even where the techniques are not demonstrably reliable and the jurisdiction in question has explicit reliability standards and other rules regulating the admission of expert opinion evidence. Moreover, it is our contention that the legal accommodation of the techniques considered in this article exemplifies a more general response to admissibility and the regulation of forensic science and medicine evidence. In the second part of the article we will consider possible explanations and some of the implications of our findings. 2 Our study surveys and summarizes the leading decisions rather than a detailed empirical study of actual case practices across jurisdictions. Both would be interesting and informative, but this offers a first attempt to survey leading decisions against formal rules and overarching criminal justice objectives and values. 3 See generally FED. R. EVID.; FED. R. EVID. 702 (Federal Rule of Evidence concerning expert testimony); Australian Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (a statutory scheme covering everything from cross examination to admission of evidence). 4 It should be noted, however, that there are many differences, not all of which should be considered trivial. Canada, for example, has fewer trials before juries than the other jurisdictions. Many prosecutors and judges in the United States are elected, and the United States retains civil juries, making the admissibility of expert opinion evidence an important, and frequently controversial, issue in civil proceedings (e.g. tort and product liability litigation). There are no capital cases or capital juries in England, Canada, and Australia. Australia and England tend to provide relatively well-resourced defense lawyers and are more likely to expend state resources on defense experts than most U.S. states. Undoubtedly, these and a myriad of other differences in practice, traditions, and resourcing (of courts, police and forensic sciences, as well as parties) influence the ways in which forensic science and medicine evidence is developed, contested, and admitted. 5 While there can be quite significant differences in actual practices, many of the techniques feature remarkably similar ingredients across our sample. Many of these similarities flow from information and technology sharing or the use of proprietary systems. 2013] ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED 33 A. Rules of Evidence and Procedure A fundamental condition of admissibility is that evidence must be relevant.6 That means it must be capable of rationally influencing the assessment of facts in issue (i.e., the contested or material facts).7 Ordinarily, opinion evidence is not admissible. Witnesses are normally required to testify about facts.8 There are exceptions for some kinds of opinion evidence. Lay witnesses are frequently allowed to express opinions, especially those necessary to make sense of the witness’ perceptions or impressions.9 It is, for example, not uncommon for a witness to be allowed to express an opinion on events within their experience: such as a person’s emotional state; whether someone was intoxicated; and even whether a car was being driven fast or dangerously.10 Most of the forensic science evidence considered in this article is opinion evidence and subject to exclusionary rules operating in all of our jurisdictions. Because of its great potential to assist the tribunal of fact, all jurisdictions maintain an exception for the opinions of “experts” or for opinions based on “specialized knowledge.”11 Though not all require evidence about the reliability of the method or technique, or the expert’s ability, for admissibility purposes. In most common law jurisdictions (with a jury), where the admissibility of expert opinion evidence is contested, the trial judge will conduct a hearing (a voir dire or Daubert hearing) into the admissibility of the evidence. Such hearings are normally held in the absence of the jury. Once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, the expert witness is subject to direct (i.e., examination-in-chief) and limited re-direct (i.e., re-examination) by the party calling the witness and cross-examination by the other parties. It is not uncommon for

Load more