Fukushima: Life and the Transnationality of Radioactive Contamination 生命と国境を越える放射能汚染
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The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 11 | Issue 41 | Number 3 | Oct 13, 2013 Fukushima: Life and the Transnationality of Radioactive Contamination 生命と国境を越える放射能汚染 Adam Broinowski has now accumulated to make a realistic assessment of the human health impact, and to Japanese translationavailable discern how public understanding has been, (http://besobernow-yuima.blogspot.j and continues to be, confused. Finally, given p/2013/12/japanfocus.html) 生命と that the Fukushima disaster is distinguishable from other radiological events in scale and type 国境を越える放射能汚染 of contamination, this essay argues that far- reaching change is called-for in the current legal standards and institutional responses When Fukushima 1 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) which have been governed thus far by mid was torn apart by several explosions, whether twentieth century power relations. due to technical failings in correspondence with the earthquakes, tsunami or a combination I The Priorities of Sovereign Power of both, it not only dispersed radioactive Over nearly 70 years of the ‘postwar system’, contaminant but also exposed the bonds nuclear power has steadily become connecting people’s lives with nuclear power. synonymous with the political order in Japan Over the two and a half years since then, the and deeply integrated it within its international corruption, inadequacies and mendacities at institutional frame. Its introduction into Japan the centre of the sovereign power structure by a consortium of young politicians and that has prevailed in Japan since 1945 have become ever more visible. This essay first captains of industry (via the 1953-4 Eisenhower introduces the foundations of this structure, Atoms for Peace campaign) helped to solidify exploring how the long-standing relationship bilateral political and corporate relations between Government and major private electric between the US and Japan, within the wider utilities in Japan informs the present crisis, geopolitical re-formation. As part of the noting in particular the ramifications ofreconstitution of interlocking zaibatsu- decisions being made within this structure at government relations from 1949 on, with the the individual level in present and projected base value of a successful democracy in ‘free effects to human health. FollowingAsia’ commensurate with continuous consideration of the effects of radiation on construction and centralized energy production human health, the discussion then turns to (or ‘plutonium economy’) in all aspects of the visual and local testimonies of the effects of nation (the signature LDP policy ofdoken 2 other radiological events – Hanford, Hiroshima kokka or ‘construction state’), the destruction and Nagasaki, Chernobyl and Iraq – so as to of the natural environment was seen as a offer a comparative assessment of thenecessary contingency in the essential practice Fukushima disaster. While mindful of the of resource extraction, production and difficulty in arriving at an absolutely conclusive construction for optimizing economic growth position on these conditions, enough evidence and containing political tensions. 1 APJ | JF 11 | 41 | 3 Following the formation of the US Atomic the owner of radioactive matter released from Energy Commission (AEC 1954) and Japan the Fukushima Daiichi NPP. It claimed the Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA 1955), the materials were ‘res nullius’ (mushubutsu) – International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) things belonging to no one, like mist or fish – was established in 1957. Article 2 of its and that it was owned by those whose land foundational mandate referred to theupon which it fell. In this case the radiation promotion of ‘safe, responsible development of levels were equivalent to those in the uranium resources’ and the mission toChernobyl exclusion zone (Cs137 235,000 ‘accelerate and enlarge the contribution of bq/kg, Sr90 98 bq/kg). On the other hand, while atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity apparently not of their concern, TEPCO lawyers world wide’. Just as Japan eagerly committed counter-examined the technical accuracy of itself to the ‘peaceful use of nuclear power’, so government dosimetry and their understanding too did signatory nations to the nuclear club of radiation effects, using the oft-cited pro- agree to the IAEA assuming the role of key nuclear argument that 10 mSv of natural promoter of the nuclear industry worldwide. In radiation is to be found in inhabited parts of the 1959, the WHO agreed to the IAEA taking world with no ill health effects. Although the primary responsibility for reporting the health district court maintained the right of companies effects of nuclear radiation despite the heavy to file complaints, they held that the onus of concentration of IAEA expertise in nuclear decontamination rested on local and federal physics (28 May 1959, WHO WHA 12-40). governments, and absolved TEPCO of the duty Along with establishing radiation safety and to compensate the golf company.3 environmental protection standards, the IAEA and other radiation protection authorities have Although both TEPCO and the central consistently downplayed events and evidence Government had received adequate and pathologised health concerns for low dose forewarnings of the risk in 2008, both radiation as ‘radiophobia’, which itmaintained for more than a year after the characterised as more hazardous than radiation disaster that the tsunami and earthquakes were itself. Their understanding of and response to an ‘unforeseeable force of nature’ and ‘beyond the ongoing disaster at the Fukushima Nuclear prediction’. They refused liability for damage Power Plant (NPP) is no exception. caused from radioactive contaminant released beyond their respective private or national As a sovereign industry, controlled by powerful borders. Apparently, their position is supported forces in society, nuclear power in Japan came by The London Convention on the Prevention of to influence foreign policy, national security Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and and transnational ties. The insouciant over- Other Matters (1972) that limits liability to confidence displayed by Tokyo Electric Power radioactive waste released into the sea from Company managers (TEPCO) in the first two ships and not land-based sources.4 However, years of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, was the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention an expression of the long-held technicalcodifies the ‘precautionary approach’ and the monopoly over nuclear power plants enjoyed by ‘polluter pays’ principle. Rather than prohibit a the Federation of Electric Power Companies of certain list of hazardous materials, this Japan. In a 2012 court action by Sunfield Protocol shifts the Convention to include waste Nihonmatsu Golf Course for compensation over discharged from land as well by stating that losses incurred due to forced closure as a result anything not included on the said list, of which of high radiation levels, TEPCO argued that as contaminant from nuclear reactors is not a a private contractor its responsibilities to the part, cannot be discharged into the ocean and public were limited and that it was no longer must be managed on land. The case can be 2 APJ | JF 11 | 41 | 3 made that precautionary measures were has been granted immunity from either raw insufficient and that the polluter was negligent capitalist logic or due democratic process, in refusing to adequately store the materials. while being encouraged to manage a portfolio that promises to provide returns in the broader In this sense, TEPCO and the Government have effort to maintain the buoyancy of the nuclear operated in tandem. While the nationalindustry. In this sense, the reality of molten government took financial control of the utility, radioactive metal sitting beneath the ruined setting up a permanent government fund of 1 plant is abstracted into a financial liability that trillion yen (which includes public taxes and is ‘contained’ to prevent any loss of confidence international donations) to protect the utility on the part of prospective investors. Neoliberal (offset costs) from insolvency and collapse,5 free market principles permit state intervention TEPCO managers continue to own and run the where there is opportunity for financial benefit, plant, assuming ultimate authority on nuclear- but otherwise adhere to strict economic related operational issues including human and imperative. Moreover, the issues are not environmental health. A key functional problem restricted to Japan. Since the earliest days of underlying this position is that TEPCO is bound the disaster, all three administrations have to recoup the costs it has incurred during the proactively canvassed prospective buyers for clean-up. At the same time, the Government its nuclear technology exports. Confirmed can shift responsibility to TEPCO for the buyers include Vietnam, Turkey, Saudi Arabia disaster when it is expedient to do so. and the UAE, while negotiations with other central European and Asian buyers continue.6 TEPCO is a major representative of a sovereign Further, anticipating local obstruction, Hitachi industry, which is regarded as too important to and Toshiba have acquired or are acquiring be allowed to collapse, existing in this sense nuclear plants overseas (UK) to expand their beyond society. While technical problems posed nuclear power operations.7 by engineering operations, health safety limits, radiation detection methods, safety procedures While ceding responsibility to corporate and financial management have dominated entities