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Ayman Batarfi Current/True Name Andaliases SECRET 20330429 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATES COMMAND HEADQUARTERS , JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION , GUANTANAMO BAY , CUBA APOAE09360 JTF- GTMO- CDR 29 April 2008 MEMORANDUMFORCommander, UnitedStates SouthernCommand, 3511NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnderDoDControl(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN 000627DP(S) JTF - GTMO Detainee Assessment 1. (S) PersonalInformation: JDIMS /NDRC Reference Name: Ayman Batarfi Current/ True Name and Aliases: Ayman Saeed Abdullah Batarfi, Doctor Abu Ayman Place of Birth : Cairo, Egypt (EG ) Date of Birth: 16 August1970 Citizenship: Yemen (YM ) Internment Serial Number ( ISN) : -000627DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is on a list of high-risk detainees from a health perspective. Detainee is in overall fair physical health but poor mental health. Detainee has medical conditions that are not life threatening. He has a mental health history of paranoid schizophrenia. He has a history of noncompliance with medical treatment as a result of his psychosis 3. (U ) JTF-GTMOAssessment: a. (S) Recommendation : JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) . JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 20 October 2007 . b . ( S //NF) Executive Summary: Detaineewas the chief medical advisor for the al- Wafa Humanitarian Organization, an al-Qaida and Taliban linked non- governmental organization CLASSIFIED BY : MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON : E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED , SECTION 1.4 ( C DECLASSIFY ON : 20330429 SECRET NOFORN 20330429 SECRET 20330429 JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN - 000627DP (S (NGO) which operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Detainee acknowledged associations with numerous senior al-Qaida members including Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and provided assistance to Yazid Sufaat, one of al-Qaida’s anthrax researchers in Afghanistan who also had ties to the 11 September 2001 attacks . Detainee traveled to Pakistan (PK) in the late 1980s for medical training, received militant training inAfghanistan, fought against the Soviet occupation forces, and attempted to travel to Chechnya to support extremist activity. Detainee participated inhostilities against US and Coalition forces during which he is assessed to have held a leadership position. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT .] -GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGHrisk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A HIGH from a detention perspective Of HIGHintelligencevalue . (S ) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes inthis assessment will be annotated by to the footnote. ). Updateddetainee's capture events 4. (U ) Detainee'sAccount of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account . These statements are included without consideration of veracity , accuracy , or reliability . a S//NF) Prior History Detainee's family lived in Egypt until 1977 when they moved to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (SA) . In Saudi Arabia, detainee's father opened a clothing where detainee worked inthe evenings. In 1987, detainee's father sent him to Pakistan to begin his medical education. In addition to pursuing his medical degree, detainee also 3 enrolled in English courses. While in medical school, detainee became passionate about the Soviet occupation inAfghanistan and, during a school break in the summer of 1988, he traveled to the Khogay Training Camp in Afghanistan. Detainee trained with the mujahideen 1 AnalystNote: Al-Wafa is a NationalIntelligencePrioritiesFramework( NIPF) Counterterrorism(CT) Priority 3 Terrorist Support Entity( TSE). Priority 3 TSE have demonstratedintentand willingnessto provide financial supportto terroristorganizationswillingto attack US persons or interests, or provide wittingoperationalsupportto Priority 1-2 terroristgroups . 2 6 034 0178 03 3 6 034 1424 03 2 SECRET 20330429 SECRET 20330429 JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN - 000627DP (S ) on various weapons to include the AK-47 assault rifle and anti-aircraft weaponry . After receiving the training, detainee participated innight- time raids against Soviet forces before 6 returning to Pakistan, where he entered the medicalprogram at Karachi University Detainee studied general surgery, plastic surgery and orthopedic surgery until 1994. At that time, he began studies at the General Post Graduate Medical College inKarachi and 8 remained there until 1997.? InJanuary 1997 detainee traveled to Yemen to visit his family. Detainee then returned to Pakistan and transferred to the General Post Graduate Medical Institute inLahore, PK. Detainee remained at the Medical Institute until 2000, completing several internships at Services Hospital, Lahore General Hospital, and Jinnah Hospital. Detainee studiedunder Doctor Amer Aziz at all three hospitals.10 b . (S ) Recruitment and Travel In 2000, detainee heard news reports of the Chechen conflict and decided to travel to the area to provide medical assistance . " Detainee returned to Yemen to visit his father during which he learned he could obtain assistance in Afghanistan for travel to Chechnya. Detainee returned to Pakistan and inJune 2000 traveled to the Hajji Habash Guesthouse operated by al-Qaida operative Abu Zubayr inKandahar, AF . After making inquiries into traveling to Chechnya , detainee learned that Dhahak, who 12 lived near the Kandahar Airport, would be able to help him . Dhahak told detainee he would make some calls to see ifit was possible to get detainee to Chechnya. After ten days, detainee told Dhahak he could not wait for the road to Chechnya to “ open up” and had to return to Lahore. Detainee asked for Dhahak’s contact information and another point of contact that would be able to help him travel to Chechnya. Dhahak provided detainee with 13 the satellite phone number for Abu Musab and detainee returned to Lahore. Detainee contacted Abu Musab who informed detainee the Azerbaijan government was searching for 14 him (Abu Musab) and he was unable to assist detainee. Approximately May 2001 4 IIR 034 0178 03, 000627 SIR 13- MAR- 2007, AnalystNote: InIIR6 034 1455 03, detainee'stimelineis somewhatvague, with this training occurringsometime between 1989 and 1991. 5 IIR6 034 1455 03 6 IIR6 034 1424 03 7 IIR6 034 0178 03 8 IIR6 034 1424 03 9 IIR6 034 0178 03 10 IIR 6 034 0088 04, Analyst Note: DoctorAmer Aziz is a Pakistaniphysicianwith admitted associationswith senior al- Qaida members, includingUBL, and has suspected connectionswith the al- Qaida weapons ofmass destruction program . 11 IIR 6 034 0178 03 12 AnalystNote: Al-Qaida operatedthe HajjiHabashGuesthouse. Dhahakis Abu Dhahakwho operateda guesthouseknownforhousingjihadistswith Yemeniconnections. SeeTD - 314/48158-02. AbuDhahakservedas ChechenjihadistcommanderIbnKhattab'srepresentativeinAfghanistan. See TD-314/ 37810-03. In additionto monitoringIbn Khattab'sequipmentinAfghanistan, AbuDhahakfacilitatedthe movementofArabsto Georgiaand Chechnya. See IIR 6 034 1515 03. 13 IIR 6 034 0459 02 14 IIR 6 034 1515 03 3 SECRET NOFORN 20330429 SECRET 20330429 JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN - 000627DP (S ) detaineereturned to Afghanistanin search of employment. Detaineereturnedto the Hajji HabashGuesthouseand worked as a medic in the clinic across the street. After an unspecifiedperiod of time, an associate namedAbuAssem took detainee to the Ghulam Bacha Guesthousein Kabul, AF, where he spent five days. Abu Abd al-Rahmanal-Masri escorted detainee to local hospitals to continue his searchfor employment. At the Ghulam Bacha Guesthouse, detainee learnedabout the al-Wafa HumanitarianOrganizationfrom al Wafa employeeAbd al-Rashid. The Director of the Kabuloffice, Adel ZamelAbd al Mahsenal-Zamel, aka (Abu Muaz , ISN 000568DP (KU-568, transferred), arranged for detainee to meet the al-Wafa directorfor Afghanistanand Pakistan, Abdallah Aydhah Abdallah al-Matrafi, aka (Abd al-Aziz) aka (Sayf al-Makki), ISN - 000005DP (SA 15 005, transferred). Detaineetraveled from Kabulto Kandahar for the meetingand was convincedto travel to Karachiand assist al-Wafa personnelthere with the purchase of medicalsupplies. Detaineewas initially not compensated, but laterreceived$2,500 US for five months salary c. ( S ) Training and Activities: Detainee traveled between Afghanistan and Pakistan numerous times purchasing, transporting, and distributing medical supplies and equipment for al-Wafa . Following the arrest of the Karachi al-Wafa office director on October 2001, detainee learned Pakistani authorities were also looking for him. To escape the authorities on 11 November 2001, detainee traveled from Lahore to Jalalabad , AF via Islamabad and Peshawar, PK taking with him a truck -load of medicines provided partly byhis mentor Doctor Amer Aziz, who detainee noted had treated UBL for a minor injury. Detainee requested and received permission from the Jalalabad Taliban Intelligence Director Awal Gul, aka (Malim Awal Gul) , ISN US9AF -000782DP (AF-782), to set up medical operations in the Jalalabad University Hospital. assisted at the hospital until the US bombing campaign approached the city later that month. Detainee fled into Tora Bora where he provided
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