Volume 14 | Issue 4 | Number 1 | Article ID 4858 | Feb 15, 2016 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Focus

Abe’s 2016 Plan to Break the Deadlock in the Territorial Dispute with

James D.J. Brown

The territorial dispute between Japan and Russia has its origins in the closing stages of the Second World War. Specifically, after declaring war on Japan on the evening of 8 August 1945 (two days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima), the launched large-scale offensives against Japanese positions in , Korea, and . Even after the broadcast of Japan's surrender on 15 August, the Soviet advance continued. The Soviet forces recovered southern Sakhalin, which had been ceded to Japan in 1905 after Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. They also reclaimed the islands of the Kuril chain from northwards, which Russia had voluntarily transferred to Japan in the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg. Finally, and most controversially, Map of the disputed islands (Source:CartoGIS, between 28 August and 4 September, the College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian Soviet military occupied the islands of Etorofu, National University Kunashiri, , and the Habomai islets, territory that had never previously been Soviet or Russian.1

Although this action can be considered the initial cause, the territorial dispute did not take on its current status as enduring stalemate until the mid-1950s. Until this time the Soviet Union and Japan remained technically in a state of war since Moscow had refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. In order to normalise this situation, and hopefully conclude a peace treaty, negotiations were undertaken in 1955-56. It was at this time that the countries came closest to finalising the status of the four islands. In the course of the discussions, the Japanese side, led by chief negotiator Matsumoto Shun'ichi and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, came to accept the

1 14 | 4 | 1 APJ | JF position of considering the return of Shikotan distinct from the Kuril chain, Japan began to and Habomai to be sufficient for the conclusion insist that Etorofu and Kunashiri were also part of a peace treaty. In other words, Japan's of a separate geographical entity, which later diplomats were prepared to accept the loss of came to be called "the Northern Territories" southern Sakhalin and all of the Kuril chain, (Hasegawa 1998a: 120). including Etorofu and Kunashiri (Hasegawa 1998a: 109; Mizoguchi 2014). This wasSince the return of the two larger islands was consistent with the San Francisco Peace Treaty entirely unacceptable to the Soviet side, the in which Japan renounced "all right, title and hardening of Japan's position made it claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion impossible for a peace treaty to be concluded. of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over Instead, the governments agreed to sign a Joint which Japan acquired sovereignty as aDeclaration in October 1956. This document consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of formally ended the state of war, restored September 5, 1905." (United Nations 1952: 3). diplomatic ties, and cleared the way for Japan An agreement on the transfer of Shikotan and to join the United Nations. With regard to the Habomai could have provided the basis for a territorial dispute, Moscow left the offer of the permanent resolution to the territorial dispute two smaller islands on the table. Specifically, and enabled a peace treaty to be signed. article 9 states that During the course of the negotiations, however, the United States intervened. The State "the Union of Soviet Socialist Department was particularly concerned that reconciliation between the Soviet Union and Republics, desiring to meet the Japan would harm US interests by facilitating a wishes of Japan and taking into broader rapprochement between Japan and the consideration the interests of the socialist bloc, including the People's Republic Japanese State, agrees to transfer of China. In addition, they were worried that to Japan the and any territorial concessions from the Soviet the island of Shikotan, the actual Union would increase pressure for the United transfer of these islands to Japan States to return the Japanese territory that it to take place after the conclusion continued to occupy (Hasegawa 1998a: 114-5; of a Peace Treaty between the Mizoguchi 2014). Guided by such thinking, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Secretary of State John Foster Dulles boldly and Japan." (Joint Declaration by declared to his Japanese counterpart that Japan the USSR and Japan 1956). had no right to grant Etorofu and Kunashiri to the Soviet Union since these islands had been renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Moreover, if Japan were to cede this territory, the United States would demand comparable concessions and permanently annex Okinawa (Hasegawa 1998a: 124). Intimidated by this threat, the Japanese side strengthened its resolve and revived the demand for the return of Etorofu and Kunashiri as well. The Japanese authorities also altered their definition of the . Having previously only considered Shikotan and Habomai to be

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Signing of the Soviet-Japanese Jointare that 2016 will be the year in which Abe Declaration by Prime Minister Hatoyama and redoubles his efforts and makes a final push to Soviet Premier Bulganin, 19 Oct. 1956 deliver a conclusive settlement.

In addressing this topic, this article has four There have been numerous diplomatic ups and main purposes. First, it provides an overview of downs over the subsequent six decades. Abe's policy towards Russia during his second Nonetheless, the gap that the sides ultimately and third terms in office. Second, the paper failed to bridge in 1956 remains as wide as sets out a detailed description of Abe's ever in 2016. That is, while Moscow considers apparent plan for 2016, including a review of the transfer of the two smaller islands after the what he will specifically offer Russia in return signing of a peace treaty to be the maximum for a favourable outcome. Third, it presents a possible concession, Tokyo continues to insist discussion of why Abe is especially determined on the restoration of sovereignty over all four. to resolve this longstanding territorial problem and why he is optimistic about his chances of Upon taking power, all Japanese prime succeeding. And fourth, the article provides an ministers are expected to commit themselves to assessment of Abe's realistic chances of breaking this deadlock. Some have made particularly determined efforts, including success. In this final section, emphasis is Hashimoto Ryūtarō and Mori Yoshirō, while placed on how relations with Japan, and the others have just paid lip service. However, territorial dispute in particular, are currently irrespective of their level of commitment, none viewed within Russia. have been able to achieve a territorial Abe's Russia Policy resolution. Although it may have attracted less attention One might expect that this history of failure than some of his other diplomatic initiatives, would discourage Japanese leaders from seriously taking on this issue. And yet, Abe Abe's assiduous effort to strengthen relations Shinzō has devoted himself to resolving the with Russia has been one of the most territorial dispute with Russia with unusual prominent features of his foreign policy during enthusiasm. For instance, on several occasions his second spell in office. Indeed, on the very Prime Minister Abe has repeated hisday of the 2012 election that returned him to commitment that "my mission as a politician, as power, Abe declared that this would be a prime minister, is to achieve this no matter priority of his administration (Naka 2012). True what" (quoted in Naka 2014). What is more, to his word, after taking office he immediately this is not simply empty rhetoric to satisfy set about attempting to fulfill this ambition. The certain domestic constituencies. Rather, as will initial step was his trip to Moscow in April be seen, Abe has gone to great lengths and 2013, the first such official visit by a Japanese taken some political risks in his pursuit of prime minister in over a decade. What is more, closer relations with Russia. This has been a Abe has invested heavily in his relationship regular feature of his foreign policy during his with President Putin, correctly discerning that second and third terms as prime minister and, the Russian leader is central to everything of as will be explained below, the purpose has importance that takes place in his country's been to lay the groundwork for achieving a domestic and international politics. To this end, territorial breakthrough before the end of his Abe has publicly reiterated his positive attitude time in office. With much of this preparatory towards Putin, saying "President Putin has a work considered complete and now in his clear goal, to build a strong, flourishing Russia. fourth year as prime minister, all of the signs My current goal is to build a strong Japan. In

3 14 | 4 | 1 APJ | JF this way, the President and I share common unprecedented level when the sides held their values and ideals. I feel considerable affinity first "2+2" meeting in November 2013. This with him" (quoted in Gusman 2013). Abe has format, which brings together foreign and made it an explicit goal to hold "as many defence ministers, had previously been meetings as possible" with the Russian leader reserved for states with which Japan enjoys (quoted in Makarov 2014). Following through particularly close ties, specifically the United with this tactic, by early 2016 Abe had held 12 States and Australia. Further progress was also meetings with Putin. The most striking of these discernible in the entry into force of an was Abe's last minute decision to attend the agreement on the simplification of visa opening ceremony of the Sochi Olympics in procedures, as well as in the formulation of February 2014, an event that was boycotted by plans on the exchange of cultural centres. most Western leaders. Most importantly for the Japanese side, this improvement in bilateral relations also appeared to be generating the intended progress on the territorial and treaty issues. At the Moscow summit in April 2013, the two leaders issued a joint statement to announce that "We have instructed our foreign ministries to step up contacts on working out mutually acceptable options [for a peace treaty]" (quoted in Clover 2013). It was later clarified that these negotiations would be conducted at the vice- ministerial level. An informal session took place in August 2013 and the following January the Putin and Abe meet in Sochi, February 2014 first round of talks began formally in Tokyo between Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Igor' Morgulov and his Japanese counterpart Sugiyama Shinsuke. With the renewal of these For more than a year, this attemptedlong-stalled discussions, for the first time since rapprochement progressed smoothly (Brown 2001 there appeared to be a genuine 2014). To begin with, the commitment to opportunity for progress towards settling the frequent one-on-one meetings appeared to have territorial dispute. paid off as Abe was able to declare with satisfaction that "relations of personal trust and Despite the sense of promise generated by confidence have been established between these rapid steps forward during 2013 and President Putin and me" (Kremlin 2013). The early 2014, the relationship suffered a serious Japanese leader was also rewarded for his setback in March 2014. Following Russia's decision to travel to Sochi where he received a annexation of Crimea, the United States and friendly welcome from the Russian president the European Union imposed a series of and the two leaders moved to calling each increasingly punitive economic sanctions. Japan other by their first names. More substantively, was initially reluctant to follow suit but economic ties improved steadily and bilateral eventually felt it had no option but to conform trade exceeded US$35bn for the first time in to the policy of the other G7 members. Japan's 2013; this represented an increase of 3.3% sanctions on Russia were introduced later than from 2012 (Minekonomrazvitiya 2013). In the those of the US and EU, and they were security field too, relations reached ancarefully crafted to avoid having any serious

4 14 | 4 | 1 APJ | JF impact. For instance, although a visa ban was territorial deal with Russia. announced against 23 individuals, Japan refused to identify who had been targeted, Abe's Plan for 2016 leading to speculation that the list did not include any prominent Russian figuresThe diplomatic process ( 2014). In this way, the Abe As previously, the centrepiece of Abe's strategy administration signaled its commitment to for dealing with Russia in 2016 will be his continuing the rapprochement with Russia as personal engagement with the Russian leader. soon as international conditions permitted. And He made this clear in his New Year press yet, despite the fact that Japan's sanctions were conference of 4 January when he emphasised largely symbolic, their introduction has had a his intention to "keep taking opportunities to chilling effect on the atmosphere in bilateral continue having dialogue with President Putin" relations. Trade volumes, having reached (Kantei 2016). Abe followed up by making the record levels in 2013, subsequently plummeted, relationship with Russia the major focus of a falling around 30% in 2015 (Zakharchenko subsequent interview with theNikkei and 2015). Moreover, there has been no further Financial Times. He told the journalists, "I "2+2" meeting and the vice-ministerialbelieve appropriate dialogue with Russia, discussions on the peace treaty wereappropriate dialogue with president Putin is suspended. Perhaps most symbolic of the very important". He also stressed his contemporary difficulties, however, has been willingness to travel to Russia in 2016 and to the embarrassing situation pertaining to Putin's welcome the Russian leader to Japan (Barber official visit to Japan. Abe invited the Russian and Harding 2016). Although such engagement president to come to Tokyo as a follow-up to was presented as being in the interests of the the Japanese prime minister's successful trip to G7 as a whole, there is no doubt that Prime Moscow in April 2013. The visit was expected Minister Abe is primarily concerned with to take place in the second half of 2014, but achieving a territorial breakthrough. This he this proved impossible due to the Ukraine confirmed on 7 February 2016, Japan's "Day of crisis. Throughout 2015 there was regular talk the Northern Territories", when he promised to about continuing preparations for the visit, quickly resolve the territorial dispute with though no date was set. Finally, when Abe and Russia (Kommersant 2016). In particular, Abe Putin met on the sidelines of the G20 in Antalya appears confident that, in a one-on-one meeting in November 2015, the plans for the visit were with Putin, he can persuade the Russian leader shelved. of the merits of making a deal. Interestingly, in taking the lead himself, Abe appears to have Much of Abe's hard work therefore seemed to decided to minimise the involvement of Japan's be have been undone by the downturn in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). This may relations during the second half of 2014 and in be a reflection of the fact that, over the years, 2015. And yet, despite these difficulties, the the ministry has gained the reputation for Japanese prime minister did not give up on being unhelpfully dogmatic with regard to the rapprochement with Russia. Indeed, now that territorial dispute with Russia (Mori 2013: 51). the conflict in eastern Ukraine has entered a lull, and with the possibility emerging of The specific summit towards which Abe is increased cooperation between G7 countries directing his hopes is likely to take place in and Russia in confronting Islamic terrorism and Russia in the spring of 2016, not long before North Korea's nuclear test, there are strong Japan hosts the G7 summit in Mie prefecture on signs that Abe has decided that 2016 is the 26-27 May. The possibility of this meeting was year to resume efforts to secure a conclusive raised in November 2015 when the leaders met

5 14 | 4 | 1 APJ | JF at the G20. This summit will require Abe's third Minister Lavrov and Sergei Naryshkin, Speaker trip to Russia in a row (after April 2013 and of the Russian Duma and close Putin associate. February 2014), with no reciprocal visits from He was also tasked with delivering a personal the Russian leader in between. To minimise the letter from Abe to Putin, though his hopes of awkward appearance of this situation, the meeting the Russian leader himself were not suggestion is that the meeting will be described realised. Following up on Kōmura's visit, on 22 as an informal summit and will not be held in January phone discussions were held between the Russian capital. Initially it was rumoured the Japanese prime minister and Russian that the leaders would meet in Vladivostok, president. Organised at the request of the Khabarovsk, or St. Petersburg (Ishimatsu and Japanese side, these talks touched on recent Watanabe 2016). On 16 February, however, it developments in Korea and Syria. The leaders was reported in the Japanese media that the also took the opportunity to express their summit would likely take place on 6 May in mutual interest in deepening cooperation in the Russia's Black Sea resort of Sochi Nikkei( political, economic, and humanitarian fields. 2016). Most interesting, however, is that official reports of the phone conversation state that, Although the informal status of the spring "Agreement was reached on the continuation of summit is a product of circumstance, it suits personal contacts" (Kremlin 2016). This the Japanese prime minister's purposes well. suggests that plans for the informal summit This is because, unlike an official summit, there were discussed. What is more, in a significant will be less preceding pressure for a concrete move, on the same day the Abe administration result and less information will have to be announced the appointment of a special made public about the nature of therepresentative to oversee relations with Russia. negotiations. This will give Abe greaterThis new post will be assigned to Harada freedom to concentrate on his goal of privately Chikahito, a veteran diplomat and former convincing the Russian leader to accept a Japanese ambassador to Moscow (Rossiiskaya territorial deal. There is precedent for such Gazeta 2016). The creation of this position informal meetings between Japanese and represents yet further confirmation of the Russian leaders. In particular, two "no necktie" seriousness of Abe's ambition to achieve a summits were held between President Yeltsin breakthrough on the territorial dispute in 2016. and Prime Minister Hashimoto at Krasnoyarsk Mr Harada had his first opportunity to make an in November 1997 and Kawana in April 1998. impact in his new role on 15 February when he Although ultimately leading to nomet with Deputy Russian Foreign Minister breakthrough, these informal meetings were Morgulov in Tokyo. At this meeting, it was seen at the time as useful in making progress agreed that Foreign Minister Lavrov would visit on the territorial issue. In particular, the Japan in mid-April to confirm the final details of Krasnoyarsk summit led to a pledge tothe informal Putin-Abe summit to take place in conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000. early May (Lenin 2016).

In advance of Abe's own "no necktie" summit, the Japanese side has been eager to prepare the groundwork and to ensure the best possible atmosphere in bilateral relations. To this end, Kōmura Masahiko, Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was dispatched to Moscow on 10 January. During his four-day visit, Mr Kōmura held meetings with Foreign

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Russia, despite the continuation of sanctions (Lenin 2015). Finally, if all of these steps go well, a formal deal on resolving the territorial dispute and signing a peace treaty could be officially presented at a subsequent visit by President Putin to Japan during the second half of 2016.

The specifics of Abe's offer

The above are likely stages of Abe's plan to achieve a conclusive solution to the territorial problem with Russia in 2016. All of this is, however, entirely dependent on Abe's ability to secure Putin's agreement to a deal. What then Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Morgulov and does the Japanese leader intend to offer? This Japan's special representative Harada meet in is clearly something that cannot be known with Tokyo, 15 February 2016 certainty. In order for such sensitive negotiations to have any chance of success, they must be conducted in private. Were the anticipated Japanese concessions to be leaked in advance in the media, the government would In addition to this preparatory work, the Abe come under fierce attack from conservatives administration needs to consider what it would and it would become impossible to reach any do in the event of the successful completion of agreement. Leaks to the press, including from the summit. This is because, even if Abe were within MOFA, have had this effect on the to secure an agreement with Putin behind negotiations with Russia in the past (Hasegawa closed doors, many obstacles would remain to 1998b: 367). its implementation. Above all, the Japanese side would be likely to encounter opposition from Although we cannot therefore know the exact G7 members, principally the United States, details of Japan's negotiating position, we can who, as has been seen, has a record of nonetheless piece together its probable intervening in this territorial dispute. In this features. To begin with, Abe's starting point case, the US would be concerned about a major will be an attempt to convince his Russian rapprochement between Japan and Russia counterpart to recognise the legitimacy of taking place at a time when the latter remains Japan's claims to sovereignty over all four of in possession of Crimea and continues to be the islands. This hoped-for acknowledgement is controversially involved in developments in prized by the Japanese side because it would eastern Ukraine. For this reason it is helpful validate its long-held claim that the islands are that the informal meeting be held in advance of "inherent" Japanese territory and that Japan's the G7 summit. In this way, Japan will have the sovereignty was formally established by means opportunity to explain its position to itsof the 1855 . Not being seen Western partners and to justify the softening of to compromise on the principle of sovereignty its stance towards Russia. Abe attempted to do is also valued as a way of sending a message to something similar at the G7 summit inChina and Korea that Japan will never give Germany in June 2015 when he outlined his ground with regard to the Senkaku/Diaoyu intention to maintain intensive dialogue with Islands and Takeshima/Dokdo.

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It is, of course, all but unthinkable that Russia certain to offer some more immediate would readily agree to hand over all four of the incentives. The most significant of these will be islands. After all, it is Moscow's steadfast economic. To start with, Abe will offer to move refusal to consider any such thing that has quickly to end the economic sanctions that prevented the settlement of this dispute for Japan introduced against Russia in 2014. This over 70 years. Prime Minister Abe, however, promise is likely to have to remain informal as will not demand the immediate return of the the removal of sanctions is supposed to be four islands. Instead, he is likely to propose a conditional upon Russia's constructive compromise whereby, if Russia recognises contribution to resolving the Ukraine crisis. Japan's residual sovereignty over the four There would be opposition within other G7 islands, Japan will accept maximum flexibility countries if Japan were to be too obvious in its on the timing of the islands' actual transfer. use of the sanctions as political leverage for This proposal has already long been public pursuing its own national interests. (MOFA 2011), though its precise terms are less apparent. The probability is that Abe will push More important than ending its essentially for the rapid transfer of Shikotan and Habomai symbolic sanctions, Japan will commit to within five to ten years. With regard to Etorofu providing large-scale economic assistance to be and Kunashiri, however, Abe is likely to directed towards the development of propose that, as long as Russia recognises and the Russian Far East. The Japanese side Japan's residual sovereignty, these two islands will wish to avoid creating the impression that can be left to be administered by the Russian it is attempting to simply purchase the islands, authorities. This would allow the Russian something that would be expected to intensify residents – approximately 8,000 on Kunashiri opposition from the Russian public. and 6,400 on Etorofu – to continue to live on Nonetheless, it will be made clear that, if the the islands (Argumenty Nedeli 2014). Following territorial dispute is resolved, Japan will be this agreement, Japan would also reverse its willing to provide generous funding for major opposition to its own citizens visiting the infrastructure and industrial projects in islands and would instead actively encourage Russia's eastern regions. Additionally, the economic investment and joint projects. This prospect of lucrative long-term energy deals arrangement could be guaranteed for a period will be raised. of 50 years, after which a new agreement could be made either to transfer the islands to In offering these incentives, Abe will be seeking Japanese administration or to continue with the to exploit the Russian leadership's urgent preceding arrangement. It should be noted that desire to develop Siberia and the Far East, this is not actually a new suggestion. It has something that Putin has described as the st many similarities with the proposal made by "national priority for the entire 21 century" Matsumoto Shun'ichi in 1956, after he had (quoted in Zavrazhin 2013). The Japanese side been forced to expand Japan's minimum will also be calculating that Russia may at requirement for a peace treaty from two islands present be especially willing to make sacrifices to four (Hasegawa 1998a: 121). in exchange for financial assistance as a consequence of the country's parlous economic Prime Minister Abe will hope to persuade situation. Added to this, Abe will be looking to President Putin of the merits of a deal that make the most of any concerns on the Russian would enable Russia to retain control over the side about overdependence on China. In two largest islands – constituting 93% of the particular, as the growth engine of the Chinese total landmass – albeit on condition that the economy continues to sputter at the start of islands be demilitarised. Additionally, Abe is 2016, there will be the hope that Russian

8 14 | 4 | 1 APJ | JF decision makers will prioritise closer ties with one or two further positions to which he will other Asian partners. With regard to energy, reluctantly retreat if his first proposal is Japan will argue that, by diversifying its resolutely refused. This is standard practice in customer base away from China, Russia will be negotiations. What is more, Abe will be aware able to demand higher prices in Asian markets. of the difficulty of his task, yet, having invested so much in his personal diplomacy with Russia, The proposal for Russia to continue tohe will be unwilling to come away with nothing. administer Etorofu and Kunashiri (at least for Abe may therefore seek to seize his chance of the medium term) and the offer of economic becoming the Japanese leader who finally ends incentives are therefore likely to constitute the the territorial dispute, even if this means central element of Abe's plan. At the same settling for sovereignty over less than four time, however, Abe may seek to add a few islands. further sweeteners. This could include an additional easing of visa requirements for One possible fallback option is for Japan to Russian citizens to visit Japan, a reform in accept a 50-50 territorial split. This would which Russian diplomats have recently shown entail Japan regaining sovereignty over strong interest (Zakharchenko 2016). More Shikotan, Habomai, and Kunashiri, plus a intriguingly, Abe also seems to have in mind portion of Etorofu. A new international border the idea of offering Japan to serve as a would be established approximately a third of diplomatic bridge between the West and the way up this last island. Such a deal would Russia, thereby helping to reduce Russia's represent an equal division of landmass since recent isolation. It is far from clear that Etorofu is so much larger than the other three Washington would welcome Japan's mediation, islands. In implementing this deal, the offer of yet this proposal was aired during Kōmura's continued Russian administration over January 2016 visit to Moscow. Specifically, the Kunashiri and the southern section of Etorofu LDP Vice-President is reported to have told his for a fixed period of time could still apply. This hosts that Japan would be willing to speak up would ease the process of eventual transfer to for Russia during the 2016 G7 summit and Japan. A yet further concession would be for would demonstrate maximum consideration for Japan to give up its claims to Etorofu altogether Russia's interests (Ishimatsu and Watanabe and settle for sovereignty over only three 2016). It is unlikely that Kōmura would have islands. This would have the advantage of made so bold a suggestion about Japan's avoiding the creation of Japan's first land conduct at the G7 summit unless directly border. instructed to do so by the Japanese prime minister. Subsequently, Former Prime Minister These fallback options would involve the Mori, who has previously been used by Abe as abandonment of the Japanese government's an unofficial envoy to Russia, also publicly longstanding commitment to the principled promoted the idea of the Japanese leader position that Russia must simultaneously serving as a mediator between Russia and the recognise Japan's sovereignty over all four of West (Agafonov 2016). the islands. The acceptance of either option would therefore constitute a major compromise By means of these incentives, Abe will hope to from a Japanese leader. Despite this, it is not secure the Russian side's recognition of the inconceivable that Abe would consider making legitimacy of Japan's claims to sovereignty over such a deal. To begin with, Abe has previously all four of the islands. If he fails in this demonstrated a pragmatic streak in his ambition, however, what will be his fallback approach to foreign policy. This was most position? It is almost certain that Abe will have recently in evidence in the Japan-South Korea

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"Comfort Women" deal. It is well-known that including the League of Chishima-Habomai Abe takes a skeptical view of the "Comfort Residents and certain far-right organisations. Woman" issue. In 2007, he stated: "The fact is, For the majority of Japanese citizens, however, there is no evidence to prove there was this issue is not a political priority. For coercion," (quoted in Mizoguchi and Dudden instance, according to a survey conducted by 2007: 2). Moreover, in February 2014 the Abe the Japanese Cabinet Office in 2013, only administration let it be known that they were 40.5% of respondents had heard about the considering reviewing the apology offered in dispute and knew its details. A further 41% had the 1993 Kōno statement (Ryall 2014). And yet, heard about the dispute and knew its details to despite these personal beliefs, Abe agreed to a certain degree. Meanwhile, only 20.6% were put his name to the December 2015 "Comfort aware of the activities of the government and Women" deal, which included a formalprivate groups to recover the islands and knew expression of his own "most sincere apologies what these efforts entailed. Another 30.7% and remorse" (MOFA 2015). He did so because knew about these efforts to a certain extent. he evidently judged that a resolution to this Strikingly, only 3.2% of respondents stated that dispute was in Japan's broader nationalthey would be interested in actively interests. As a relatively popular nationalist participating in efforts to secure the return of leader, Abe is also in a stronger position than the islands (Naikaku-fu 2013). Separate most Japanese prime ministers to makeanalysis also shows that public interest in the concessions that will be unpopular with Japan's dispute with Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo now right wing. Finally, with specific regard to the actually exceeds that in the Northern territorial dispute with Russia, it is worth Territories (Bukh 2015: 60). On the basis of noting that the idea of a 50-50 territorial split these statistics, Abe has little to gain in terms has previously been floated by Asō Tarō and of public support by merely attempting to Yachi Shōtarō, both prominent members of the pursue a territorial resolution with Russia. Abe government Mainichi( Shinbun 2009; Sarkisov 2009: 45). On this basis, it is therefore Additionally, if the Japanese prime minister's not impossible to imagine Abe settling for a activities were purely for show, he could have territorial resolution that resulted in the return achieved this effect with much less effort and to Japan of only three islands or three and one expenditure of political capital. Instead, as has third. been noted, since the beginning of his second term Abe has put extensive effort into courting Explanations for Abe's Behaviour Putin, even at the risk of creating some distance between Japan and the United States, Those familiar with the tortuous history of something that Japanese leaders are usually territorial negotiations between Japan and loath to do. As a result, Washington has Russia will be surprised by Abe's apparent cautioned Japan about its accommodating optimism about being able to secure the return stance towards Russia, a warning that the of more than the two smaller islands. In fact, Japanese leader has evidently chosen to ignore some may be inclined to think that his efforts (Asahi Shimbun 2015). Abe would not have are not genuine and that he is just making a engaged in such bold action if he did not show of trying in order to garner public believe that there was the genuine possibility of support. This would be a reasonablea breakthrough in the territorial dispute. assumption, but it would not be correct. This determination to resolve the Northern The territorial dispute with Russia remains a Territories problem is consistent with other priority for some small domestic groups, aspects of the prime minister's political agenda.

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This is because Abe is an unusually ambitious with Russia, however, it is his father who is the Japanese prime minister and seems committed greater inspiration. Abe Shintarō was Japan's to sealing his legacy as a transformational foreign minister from 1982 to 1986 and was leader. In this regard, he has been assisted by therefore in office during the positive period in institutional changes since the late 1990s that Soviet-Japanese relations that followed Mikhail have shifted power towards the primeGorbachev's accession to general secretary in minister's office. He has also been encouraged March 1985. Encouraged by the optimistic by the lack of opposition since 2012, both from atmosphere that accompanied the ending of the other parties and within the LDP (Burrett Cold War, Abe's father succeeded in opening forthcoming). These developments have been negotiations with the Soviet Union. He also empowering for the Japanese leader. The developed an affection for the country and set ambitious way in which he has sought to use the target of signing a peace treaty during the this power, however, is specific to Abe. lifetime of the current generation. Abe Shinzō has openly expressed his determination to Since returning to office in December 2012, complete this unfulfilled goal of his father (Abe Abe has hurriedly pursued a series of bold 2006: 34-7). Most nostalgically, when in initiatives. These include the 2013 Secrecy Act, Moscow in April 2013, the Japanese prime reinterpretation of the Constitution to permit minister visited the sakura garden that had collective self-defence, the economicbeen inaugurated by his father in 1986. On that programme dubbed "Abenomics", and the occasion, Abe stated: "In accordance with the "Comfort Women" deal with South Korea. This will of my father, I wish to achieve such impatient attitude may owe something to Abe's development in relations with Russia that the unexpected political rejuvenation. Having failed cherry trees enter a period of full bloom" to leave a lasting impression during his first (quoted in Gusman 2013). term as prime minister in 2006-07, Abe will be especially eager to make the most of his second opportunity in power. The Japanese leader is also in much better physical health than during his first term when he was debilitated by the effects of ulcerative colitis. Due to new medication, this illness is now under control and, according to one of his advisors, Abe is consequently enjoying "a psychological transformation that has made the prime minister more forward looking than in his first administration" (Burrett forthcoming).

These considerations may help to explain Abe's political ambitions. There are, however, some factors that make him particularly keen to secure a peace treaty with Russia. First in this A young Abe Shinzō with his father, Shintarō regard is his family history. It is often suggested that Abe's determination to revise the Constitution is guided by his desire to fulfill the ambitions of his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, who was prime minister from 1957 Further to this emotional element, Abe's to 1960. When it comes to Japan's relations foreign policy towards Russia is powerfully

11 14 | 4 | 1 APJ | JF guided by his strategic vision for Japan. In this Rather, the goal is to maintain this close respect, the Japanese leader has two main relationship but to make it more of a priorities: first, to uphold Japanese security partnership of equals. That is to say, to make against the threat of an increasingly assertive Japan less dependent on the security guarantee China; and second, to return Japan to the status of the United States and to make it possible for of a normal great power that is able to play a Japan to act more autonomously when more independent role in international politics. necessary. To achieve this, Abe wishes to revise Resolving the territorial dispute with Russia (rather than simply reinterpret) the helps serve both goals. Constitution's article 9, which prevents Japan from maintaining armed forces and rules out To elaborate, by settling its northern border the use of force as an instrument of foreign and signing a peace treaty, Japan would policy. In addition, Abe is seeking to develop eliminate a major obstacle to closer relations stronger bilateral ties with other key powers. with Russia. This would in turn open up the This is why he has been so active prospect of Japan beginning to draw Russia internationally since returning to office, visiting away from China. As is well known, in recent a quarter of the world's countries in the first 20 years the relationship between Russia and months (Panda 2014). There are several China has become increasingly close, especially important relationships in this regard, but that in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis and with Russia is one of the most significant. This consequent deterioration in Moscow's relations is highlighted in the National Security Strategy with the West (Brown 2015a; 2015b). This is of 2013, which notes that "it is critical for Japan undoubtedly negative for Japan sinceto advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, cooperation between Russia and China in the including security and energy, thereby political, military, and economic spheres has an enhancing bilateral relations as a whole, in emboldening effect on Beijing. In particular, order to ensure its security" (Kantei 2013: 25). confidence about the security of its vast Interestingly, it was the same goal of enabling northeastern land border enables China to Japan to operate more autonomously that commit more resources to its maritimeinformed Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō's activities in the East and South China Seas. original decision to press for a territorial What is more, if regional tensions continue to resolution in 1955-56. As Hasegawa explains, grow in the coming years, Japan could find itself facing the strategic nightmare of being surrounded by a hostile Sino-Russian bloc, "Hatoyama, noted for his stronger while simultaneously growing ever more nationalistic tendencies, took a nervous about the dependability of the security position that Japan should seek a guarantee of the United States. If, on the other more independent foreign policy, hand, the territorial dispute can be resolved, not wholly faithfully following the Japan would be in a better position to entice American global strategy. This did Moscow to distance itself from what is not mean that Hatoyama was allied beginning to look like a fledgling alliance with with the left-wing/progressive Beijing and instead to adopt a more flexible, force since he also stood for the balancing role within East Asia. revision of the constitution and the rearmament of Japan. In forming With regard to the second goal of enabling his cabinet, Hatoyama considered Japan to pursue a more independent foreign the normalization of relations with policy, it is certainly not Abe's intention to the Soviet Union the first priority abandon the alliance with the United States. of his government." (1998a: 107-8).

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The above paragraphs provide a clearJapanese leverage over Russia. explanation as to why Abe is so determined to settle the territorial dispute with Russia. They Last of all, Abe's optimistic belief that he can do not, however, get to the bottom of why he is regain sovereignty over more than just so confident about his chances of success. Only Shikotan and Habomai has actually been the Japanese prime minister himself can encouraged by the Russian side. Most provide the full reasons for this optimism, but significant in this regard was Putin's statement part of the explanation would again seem to lie in March 2012 when he responded to a in Abe's own personality. In particular, the Japanese journalist's question by saying "we Japanese leader appears to have a strong sense really want to permanently close this territorial of self-belief and this encourages him to problem with Japan, and we want to do so in a concentrate on what he wants to achieve rather way that is acceptable for both countries." than on what might ordinarily be considered Going further, Putin described this desired possible. This conclusion is encouraged by outcome as a "hikiwake" (meaning "draw" in analysis of Abe's well-known "Japan is back" Japanese) (RIA Novosti 2012). Although not speech of February 2013 in which he stated: attracting much interest within Russia, this comment provoked great excitement within Japan. In particular, Suzuki Muneo, a former The time I spent - five long years Diet member with a long history of involvement since leaving office as Prime with Russia, interpreted the statement as being Minister was my time for of historic importance, saying reflection. First and foremost, I reflected upon where Japan should stand in the future. I didn't "Putin made it public that he was consider WHETHER Japan could considering more than the return do this or that. I thought, more of just two islands. It was often, what Japan MUST continue extremely brave of Putin to make to do (MOFA 2013). such in-depth statements about the Northern Territories dispute, which has to do with national Further to the conviction that the return of the sovereignty, at a conference days Northern Territories is something that Japan before the presidential election. must do, Abe's optimism is likely enhanced by a Putin's affection for Japan and his strong belief in the legitimacy of Japan's claims determination to resolve the to the islands. Such a view, which is common in territorial problem also come Japan, has been subjected to criticism by some across. It is a very sincere attitude academics. For instance, according to and you feel that he has the Hasegawa, "The petulance and tenacity with political toughness and the good which the Japanese government clung to the judgment of a leader. That is why, return of the Northern Territories can be without a doubt, we have a chance explained by their self-righteous belief that few with Putin." (Suzuki 2012: 198–9). people in Japan have questioned – a belief that all justice rested on their side." (Hasegawa 1998a: 141). As will be seen below, this one- It is not clear if Abe was as impressed by sided outlook owes much to a lack ofPutin's "hikiwake" statement as his former LDP understanding of Russian perceptions of the colleague. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the territorial dispute. It is also reinforced by a Japanese leader shares the belief that there is a tendency to overestimate the extent ofwindow of opportunity at present for Japan to

13 14 | 4 | 1 APJ | JF secure a favourable settlement to the territorial encourage concessions will talk of achieving a dispute. win-win situation, the reality is that territorial disputes are essentially zero-sum. In this case, Will Abe Succeed? this means that for Japan to secure a satisfactory result, it is necessary for the Prime Minister Abe should be applauded for his Russian side to resign itself to the permanent determined efforts to resolve this territorial loss of territory. Added to this, in the case of dispute and thereby put a conclusive end to the the "Comfort Women" agreement, the United abnormal situation in which no peace treaty States was able to lean heavily on Seoul to exists between two of the world's major accept a seemingly unpalatable deal. By powers. While other Japanese leaders have contrast, Washington has no such leverage vis- simply gone through the motions of demanding à-vis Moscow over the Northern Territories. the islands back, Abe has carefully sought to implement a plan that he genuinely believes to This being so, the only way in which Abe can have a chance of achieving a lasting resolution. succeed in securing the return of sovereignty In so doing, he has taken some risk. Firstly, as over the four islands (or at least three) is if noted, Abe's strategy of seeking to induce there are sufficiently powerful incentives for concessions by taking a soft stance towards the Russian leadership to decide that there is Russia is likely to irk the United States. more to be gained from voluntarily giving up Secondly, having involved himself so personally the islands than from retaining them. The in the courtship of Putin over the last three Japanese leader evidently believes that he can years, Abe will be seen to have failed if his present the Russian side with such a scenario. endeavour leads to nothing concrete. In this regard, he is clearly mistaken. In a So, having invested significant time and straightforward cost-benefit analysis, no political capital in the relationship with Russia, Russian leader would rationally opt to concede can Abe repeat his apparent success of the to Japan any sovereignty over Etorofu or recent "Comfort Women" deal by pulling Kunashiri and there is nothing that Prime another foreign policy rabbit out of his hat? It Minister Abe can realistically offer to change is difficult to be sure of anything inthis. I have outlined the reasons for this in international politics, especially when we detail elsewhere (Brown 2016). The main cannot be certain of what is being discussed by points, however, can be summarised as follows. the parties behind closed doors. Nonetheless, in the case of Abe's attempts to secure a Conflicting historical memory territorial deal with Russia in 2016, we can be as confident as possible in the prediction that Firstly, there is the issue of fervent opposition his efforts will prove to be in vain. to any territorial transfers from within the Russian political elite and broader populace. To begin with, the territorial dispute between Due to Japanese confidence about the Japan and Russia is considerably morerighteousness of its own position from a legal intractable than the "Comfort Women" issue. and historical perspective, there is a tendency This is because, for all the enormousto overlook the alternative narrative that sensitivities and symbolic importance of the prevails in Russia and to underestimate the subject of the "Comfort Women", it is a problem intensity of feeling that this engenders. To to which the resolution may involve an outcome briefly explain these two conflicting narratives, that can clearly benefit both sides. This is much the Japanese side regards the four islands as more difficult to achieve with regard to a "inherent" Japanese territory whose legal territorial dispute. Although those who wish to status was firmly established by means of the

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1855 Shimoda Treaty. This land was then Intervention, and the battle of opportunistically seized at the end of World Nomonhan/Khalkhin Gol. Furthermore, with War II when the Soviet Union, "like a thief at a regard to legal issues, the Russian side fire" (Kimura 2008: 51), exploited thefrequently draws attention to the Yalta circumstances of Japan's imminent defeat to Protocol, which states that, "The Kurile Islands forcibly occupy this territory. To make matters shall be handed over to the Soviet Union" worse, this action was preceded by Moscow's (Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference violation of the countries' Neutrality Pact, 1945). They also highlight the San Francisco making this attack a "stab in the back" (Kimura Peace Treaty in which Japan renounced "all 2008: 48). right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands" (United Nations 1952: 48). Lastly, emphasis is In opposition to this account, it is commonly placed on article 107 of the UN Charter, which argued in Russia that, far from being "inherent" Russian leaders interpret as having finalised Japanese territory, the islands were only the post-war settlement (Dolgopolov and colonised by Japan during the 19th century. Shestakov 2015). What is more, this seizure of the territory by Japan is claimed to have been "accompanied by The most sensitive issue from the Russian the same annihilation of local tribes that perspective, however, is the memory of the occurred in America with the Indians" (quoted approximately 12,000 Soviet soldiers killed in in Sabov 2005). Japan is therefore considered the course of fighting Japanese forces during to have no particularly strong historical or August 1945 (Zubov 2011: 181). Only 539 of moral claim to the territory. these losses were incurred on the Kuril chain In terms of more modern history, within Russia (during the Battle of ) and no combat it is generally believed that, rather than acting took place in the occupation of the four in the manner of an unprincipled looter, the disputed islands (Myasnikov 2014). Despite Soviet Union entered the war against Japan to this, in the Russian popular narrative, the uphold a solemn commitment it had made to its islands were obtained through the sacrifice of wartime allies, the United States and United Soviet lives. This view has been repeated by Kingdom. Having joined this conflict, Soviet Dmitrii Rogozin, Russia's outspoken deputy forces are regarded as having made a major prime minister, who has claimed that "the four contribution to the defeat of Japan. This opinion islands became Russian territory after a bloody was expressed by Putin in 2014 when he struggle and have now assumed the status of declared, "we did battle on the hills ofsacred territory" (quoted in Kimura 2008: 145). Manchuria and in the mountain passes of the Greater Khingan, crushing the Kwantung Army, and together we delivered a victorious end to the Second World War" (Kremlin 2014). On this basis, the islands are considered to have become Russian territory in legitimate recompense for the Soviet contribution to Allied victory. Although the four islands had never previously been Russian territory, this outcome is nonetheless seen as legitimate since it represented well-deserved payback for four decades of Japanese aggression, which included the Russo-Japanese War, the Siberian

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War memorial on the island of Kunashiri incentive that Abe plans to offer is Japanese economic investment in Russia, especially in Siberia and the Russian Far East. This is

unquestionably something that the Russian authorities desire. And yet, if one looks more The Japanese authorities would fiercely challenge many elements of this account. This closely at the way in which this issue is seen in matters little, however, when a successful Russia, it immediately becomes clear that resolution for Japan is dependent on the Russian enthusiasm for closer economic ties Russian government voluntarily makingwith Japan is not nearly strong enough to concessions. What is of significance is that, in persuade the country's leadership to make the views of a majority of Russians, any deeply unpopular territorial concessions. substantial transfer of territory to Japan would not be regarded as a reasonable compromise to To begin with, economic relations with Japan settle a longstanding problem in bilateral are not viewed as the prize they once were. relations. Instead, it would be understood as a Instead of being the number one Asian betrayal of those Soviet soldiers who gave their economy with which Russia would like to lives in their country's struggle against fascism develop closer ties, as was the case during the and militarism. Such views are particularly 1990s, Japan is now considered just one of strong in the Sakhalin region, whichmany Asia-Pacific countries with which Russia administers the islands. Indeed, according to is interested in doing more business. This shift one poll, 80 percent of residents would demand in attitude is the result of the enduring the president's resignation if the islands were stagnation of the Japanese economy. While in to be returned. More alarmingly, as many as 1999 Japanese gross domestic product was 17.8 percent stated that they would be willing approximately 23 times larger than that of to commit extreme acts, including taking up Russia, this had been reduced to just 2.3 times arms, if it were necessary to protect the status by 2013 (World Bank 2014). As a consequence, of the Southern Kurils as Russian territory the allure of the Japanese economy has been (Williams 2007: 189). Although these are not diminished significantly and there is now a new statistics, such attitudes are only likely to strikingly gloomy attitude within Russia have been strengthened by the nationalist towards Japan's economic prospects. For ferment stirred up by the Ukraine crisis and by instance, Dmitrii Strel'tsov, one of Russia's th the grandiose celebrations of the 70 leading Japan experts, describes the current anniversary of the end of the Second World economic situation in Japan as follows: "Against War. In this context, any Russian leader would a background of prolonged recession, from have to be brave indeed to offer majorwhich no exit is in sight, there is rooted territorial concessions to Japan. amongst the public a sense of pessimism which borders on the feeling of a country that has Japan's economic leverage? capitulated after a long and exhausting war." Prime Minister Abe's evident hope is that Putin (2014: 78). Observations of Japan's slow-motion can be induced to go against public opinion and population collapse only add to such negative to use his enormous political capital to force perceptions. As such, unlike China in the 2000s through a territorial deal. In formulating this to which Russia was willing to cede a small 2 strategy, however, the Japanese side has amount of territory ,Japan is not regarded as misjudged, not only the intensity of Russian the sort of dynamic economy to which it would popular opposition, but also the extent of be worth making painful concessions in Japanese leverage. As noted, the principal exchange for closer economic ties.

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Added to this impression that Japan is that at a parliamentary level economically past its best, there is a strong people have started to believe that belief in Russia that economic leverage within economic development of our the bilateral relationship is not all one way. relations is a step towards That is, while Russia may want more of Japan's resolution of the territorial high-tech investment, Japan also has a desire to problem and not the reverse." import more energy resources from Russia. (quoted in Sargin 2014). This is considered particularly pressing since Japan needs to protect its energy security by On 26 January 2016, Foreign Minister Lavrov diversifying its oil and gas imports away from confirmed that this was also his understanding excessive dependence on the Middle East at a of the situation, stating: time when its nuclear power remains largely crippled (Brown 2013). Giving voice to this opinion, Valerii Golubev, Gazprom's deputy "Some Japanese politicians say that chairman, has stated: "No, I don't think Japan if the peace treaty is concluded has an alternative [to Russian gas]. They don't and the territorial issue resolved, have their own energy resources, so they will Japanese business will become need to buy. [. . .] For them, it is the shortest hugely involved in the Russian route. Therefore, in any case for them our gas economy but it will play it safe if it will be the most advantageous" RIA( Novosti doesn't happen. We don't feel that 2014). Increased economic exchange is Japanese business is trying to play therefore viewed as mutually beneficial, and it safe. … For the most part, not as some coveted gift to be bestowed on business is not waiting for any Russia by Japan in exchange for political political stamp but is actively concessions. working" (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). Another factor that seriously reduces Japanese economic leverage is the widespread understanding amongst Russian officials and Based on observations like these, there is the business executives that the territorial dispute not unreasonable belief in Russia that, if the has already become almost completelyauthorities succeed in creating a more decoupled from economic relations. In other attractive environment for all investors, words, attracting increased JapaneseJapanese investment will also substantially investment is not dependent on makingincrease, even if there is no progress progress on the territorial issue. This precise whatsoever on the territorial dispute. Efforts in point is made by Viktor Ozerov, representative this direction are already underway, including of Khabarovsk in the Federation Council. the goal to reach 20th place in the World Bank's ease of doing business rankings by 2018 (Kremlin 2012), as well as the creation of the "Beginning in 1994, I have been to Vladivostok Free Port and several Territories of Japan many times. At the time of Priority Development in the Russian Far East my first trips, as soon as the (Markelov 2015). Japanese asked, 'Are you going to give up the islands?' and I said, Last of all, any Japanese financial inducements 'No', the negotiations immediately have to be weighed against the economic losses ended. However, during my last associated with surrendering sovereignty over visit, a Japanese legislator told me the islands. This is an issue emphasised by

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Svetlana Goryacheva, a Duma deputy, who New Russian airport on Etorofu declares: "Of course, I would never give up the Southern Kurils! … these islands are especially rich in fish and mineral resources. That is, the Japanese have something to gain and we have Russian security considerations something to lose. There are really valuable natural resources there!" (quoted in Sargin The final set of reasons that ensure that Abe 2014). Added to the forfeiture of these natural will not succeed in his plan to resolve the assets, by transferring the territory to Japan territorial dispute in 2016 relate to Russia's the Russian government would be abandoning national security considerations. Firstly in this a number of its own recent investments. The regard, the Russian military will oppose any islands were seriously neglected during the transfer of sovereignty over the islands because 1990s, resulting in much hardship for their of its desire to retain tight control over the Sea resident population. Since the mid-2000s, of Okhotsk. This is because of the Sea's however, the Russian federal and regional potential strategic value as a "last line of authorities have directed significant financial defense" (Haines 2014: 596). Specifically, in resources to the islands, including programmes the event of a major conflict, Russia would have of R30bn for 2007-15 and R20bn for 2016-25 the option of mining the narrow straits that (Interfax 2014). These funds have beenprovide access to the and using directed towards building and renewing basic the area as a sanctuary for its ballistic missile infrastructure on the disputed islands,submarines. This contingency plan gives Russia including roads, power plants, and water added confidence about the security of its treatment facilities. Most eye-catchingly, a new nuclear deterrent. Giving up Etorofu and airport was opened on Etorofu in 2014 and a Kunashiri would undermine this strategy as two new hospital was unveiled on Shikotan in 2015. of the most convenient channels for accessing With a touch of hyperbole, one Russianthe Sea are adjacent to the islands. It might be newspaper proclaimed that "the islands are thought that such strategic planning for a being transformed from a godforsaken frontier nuclear confrontation was a relic of the Cold to a downright paradisiacal corner of Russia" War. In fact, however, in recent times Moscow (Argumenty Nedeli 2014). Now that this has come to place increasing emphasis on its "paradise" is on its way to completion, the nuclear arsenal in recognition of the fact that, Russian government will surely be all the more unlike the Soviet Union, Russia's conventional reluctant to give it up. forces are no match for those of the United States and its allies.

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hostility has intensified in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis. In particular, Japan's decision to follow the United States in introducing sanctions has encouraged the view in Russia that Tokyo simply functions as Washington's puppet when it comes to major international issues and that it cannot be trusted to act in an autonomous fashion. This view underpins the comments made by Foreign Minister Lavrov during his 26 January press conference when he expressed Russia's desire to "see a more independent Japan". He also made the criticism that "When a country takes the same position as the United States, it doesn't contribute much to the political process or adjust the balance in the drafting of decisions." (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). Given these current attitudes, the prospect of a territorial transfer becomes even more distant since it would be The Sea of Okhotsk, Russia's "last line of regarded by many Russians as being, at least defense" partly, a political concession to the United States. Whether justified or not, there is also In addition to functioning as a side-door to the the underlying fear that, if it regained the Sea of Okhotsk, the disputed islands are islands, Japan would permit the US to use the considered strategically important to Russia territory to deploy military, surveillance, or because of their location at the extreme end of missile-defence capabilities in proximity to the Northern Sea Route. The RussianRussia's eastern borders. government is eager to promote the commercial use of this alternative trade route Lastly in terms of security, in recent times an between Europe and Asia. At the same time, increasingly salient feature of Russian foreign however, the authorities are worried about the policy has been the Kremlin's portrayal of itself security implications of the Arctic waterways in in the role of defender of all Russian speakers proximity to Russia's northern coastlineand "compatriots" (sootechestvenniki), even if becoming increasingly accessible as a result of these individuals are not Russian citizens and climate change. It is to a considerable extent in are resident outside the borders of the Russian response to these security concerns that Russia Federation. This concept has been present has recently sought to accelerate itswithin Russian foreign policy thinking for some programme of developing a total of 392 military years, but it became particularly prominent installations on Etorofu and Kunashiri. As following the Ukraine crisis when Moscow announced in January by Defence Minister appealed to this idea in justifying the Shoigu, all of this military infrastructure is now annexation of Crimea. As such, having fully expected to be complete by the end of 2016 embraced this role of protector of all Russians (Sankei Shinbun 2016). internationally, it is all but inconceivable that Putin would now agree to a territorial deal that There is therefore well-established opposition would be seen by many in his country as the on security grounds to the transfer of the abandonment of nearly 17,000 Russians to be islands to Japan. While long-standing, this ruled by a foreign power.

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Conclusion Fundamentally, the Russian authorities feel little compulsion to sign a peace treaty with In short, however strong his determination, Japan. Such a document would be welcome as a how well-planned his negotiating strategy, and way of ending the awkward legal situation that how friendly his personal relations with Putin, exists between the two countries, yet the Prime Minister Abe will be unable to secure Russian side sees no particular urgency to any deal in 2016 that entails Japan regaining finalise such a treaty and is certainly not the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri, even if inclined to make concessions to achieve it. The this were only in terms of a recognition of reason is because, while there may not be a residual sovereignty. The only territory that peace treaty, this does not mean that the could possibly be recovered is Shikotan and countries are in a state of war. Instead, the Habomai, in accordance with the 1956 Joint Joint Declaration of 1956 formally established Declaration. As I have previously argued in this "peace, friendship and good-neighbourly journal (Brown 2015c), there is growing relations" (Joint Declaration by the USSR and opposition within Russia to even thisJapan 1956). As such, Russian officials concession. Nonetheless, as signalled by frequently emphasise their broad satisfaction Lavrov's reference to this agreement on 26 with the status quo. Most recently, this point January (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reiterated by Foreign Minister Lavrov who, 2016), the Putin administration (at least for the on 26 January, told the press that "essentially time being) seems willing to honour this we maintain peace and cooperation. In other commitment. This is therefore most likely what words, we don't feel the effects of the absence Putin had in mind when raising the possibility of the peace treaty" (Russian Ministry of of a "hikiwake" solution3. Foreign Affairs 2016).

The prospect of recovering only these two The Russian side is therefore in no hurry to islands, which account for 7% of the total reach a resolution to the peace treaty and disputed landmass, will be unacceptable to related territorial issue. This tendency is most on the Japanese side. Arguing against further strengthened by the perception that such a resolution, there will be those who time is on Russia's side. Firstly, it will not be counsel that, even if a more favourable deal is long before the last of the Japanese former impossible at present, Japan should remain residents of the islands passes away. This will patient and wait until its negotiating position deprive Japan of some of its most ardent further strengthens. This argument has been campaigners for the islands' return and will made previously by Kimura Hiroshi, who also break Japan's most direct connection to its believes that "the international situation and former territory. Furthermore, as the years the Russian domestic situation are moving in a pass, we begin to approach the date of 2035 direction favourable to Japan and therefore when the islands shift to having been ruled Japan should wait until the right opportunity, directly for longer by Moscow than they ever which will come in 2017 or later" (Kawauchi were by Japan. Lastly, and perhaps most 2014). Such optimism is based on positive importantly, the demographic situation is not assessments of Japan's economic and security favorable to Japan. The Russian population of position vis-à-vis Russia, but it is alsothe islands has recently been growing at a rate encouraged by the assumption that a peace of 2-3% a year (Argumenty Nedeli 2014), and treaty is something "which Russia badly needs" the Russian government has introduced plans (Kimura 2009: 29). Once again, this assessment to attract further residents (Japan Times 2015). derives from a serious misunderstanding of the At the same time, Japan's population will Russian position. continue to decline. Specifically, by 2055 it is

20 14 | 4 | 1 APJ | JF projected that Japan's population will have January 26. plummeted to 91.93 million from 128.06 million Argumenty Nedeli (2014) Na Kurilakh in 2010 (National Institute of Population and uzhe nikto ne khochet v Yaponiyu [On the Social Security Research 2012: 13). With this Kurils already no-one wants the islands population decline affecting remote areas most to go to Japan], 43(435), November 13. strongly, this suggests that, even if the islands Asahi Shimbun (2015) Japan pursues top- were somehow returned, Japan would be level talks with Russia despite U.S. unable to repopulate them. concern, May 23. Barber, L. and Harding, R. (2016). In conclusion, with the passage of time, Japan's Japan's Abe calls for Putin to be brought chances of regaining any territory become ever in from the cold,Financial Times, less and Russia's position will become January 17. increasingly inflexible. This trend is reflected in Brown, J.D.J. (2013) The 2011 Great East Deputy Foreign Minister Morgulov's statement Japan Earthquake and Russian-Japanese of September 2015, in which he said, "We are Relations, Post-Soviet Affairs, 29(3): not engaging in any form of dialogue with 197-236 (June). Japan on the 'Kuril problem'. This question was Brown, J.D.J. (2014). Hajime! The causes solved 70 years ago" Interfax( 2015). A and prospects of the new start in similarly hardline stance was also shown by Russian-Japanese relations, Asia Policy, Lavrov when he stated, "We do not consider the 18: 81-110 (July). peace treaty to be synonymous with resolving Brown, J.D.J. (2015a). Ukraine and the the territorial issue" (Russian Ministry of Russia-China Axis, The Diplomat, April 2, Foreign Affairs 2016). This being so, if Abe is http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/ukraine- really committed to resolving the territorial and-the-russia-china-axis/ dispute with Russia before the end of his time Brown, J.D.J. (2015b). Towards an anti- in office, he will need to consider settling for Japanese territorial front? Russia and the considerably less than a 50-50 territorial split Senkaku/ Diaoyu dispute,Europe-Asia or three islands. If not, Japan's prospects of Studies, 67(6): 893-915 (August). regaining any territory whatsoever are likely to Brown, J.D.J. (2015c). Not Even Two? soon vanish altogether. New developments in the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, The Recommended citation: James Brown, "Abe's Asia-Pacific Journal, 13(38-3) 2016 Plan to Break the Deadlock in the (September). Territorial Dispute with Russia",The Asia- Brown, J.D.J. (2016) Japan, Russia and Pacific Journal, Vol. 14, Issue 4, No. 1, their Territorial Dispute: The Northern February 15, 2016. Delusion (Oxon: Routledge). Works cited Bukh, A. (2015) Shimane Prefecture, Tokyo and the territorial dispute over Abe, S. (2006)Utsukushii kuni he Dokdo/Takeshima: regional and national [Towards a Beautiful Country] (Tokyo: identities in Japan, The Pacific Review, Bungei Shunju). 28(1): 47-70. Agafonov, K. (2016) Sindzo Abe mog by Burrett, T. (forthcoming) Abe road: stat' sosrednikom mezhdu Rossiei i Comparing Japanese Prime Minister Zapadom, schitaet eks-prem'er Yaponii Shinzo Abe's leadership of his first and [Abe Shinzō could become a mediator second governments,Parliamentary between Russia and the West says Affairs. former prime minister of Japan], TASS, Clover, C. (2013). Russia and Japan

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[Statements for the Press and Replies to Mizoguchi, K. and Dudden, A. (2007). Journalists' Questions about the Results Abe's Violent Denial: Japan's Prime of Russian-Japanese Negotiations], April Minister and the 'Comfort Women', The 29, Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 5(3): http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/18000 1-4. Kremlin (2014) 75-letie pobedy na Mizoguchi, S. (2014) Nisso kokkō seijō-ka Khalkhin-Gole [75th anniversary of the kōshō ni taisuru Beikoku no seisaku no victory at Khakhin Gol, September 3, henka to renzoku-sei [Changes and kremlin.ru/news/46553 continuities in US policy towards the Kremlin (2016). Telefonnyi razgovor s Japan-Soviet normalisation talks], Prem'er-ministrom Yaponii Sindzo Abe Kokusai Seiji, 176: 111-125. [Telephone conversation with Prime MOFA (1993). Statement by the Chief Minister of Japan Abe Shinzō], January Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono 22, on the result of the study on the issue of http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5 "comfort women", August 4, 1193. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fun Lenin, A. (2015). G7 otneslas' s d/state9308.html ponimaniem k zhelaniyu Yaponii MOFA (2011). Northern Territories prodolzhat' dialog s RF [G7 reacts with Issue. March 1, understanding to Japan's desire to http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/rus continue dialogue with Russia], sia/territory/overview.html Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June 9. MOFA (2013). Japan is Back, February Lenin, A. (2016) MID RF: Sergei Lavrov 22, posetit Yaponiyu v seredine aprelya http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/ [Russian MFA: Sergei Lavrov will visit us_20130222en.html Japan in mid-April], February 15. MOFA (2015). Announcement by Foreign Mainichi Shinbun (2009). '3.5 jima' Ministers of Japan and the Republic of henkan [The return of '3.5 islands'], April Korea at the Joint Press Occasion, 18. December 28, Makarov, Y. (2014) Prem'er-ministr http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_ Yaponii khotel by uskorit' peregovory o 000364.html territorial'noi problemy RF [The Japanese Momoi, Y. (2016) Putin's 'draw' not so Prime Minister would like to accelerate even, Nikkei Asian Review, January 15. negotiations about the territorial Mori, Y. (2013) Nihon seiji no ura no ura problem with Russia],ITAR-TASS , [Deep behind the scenes of Japanese January 19. politics], (Tokyo: Kōdansha). Markelov, R. (2015) Zakon o TORakh Myasnikov, V. (2014) Na Shumshu za vstupil v silu [Law on Territories of yaponskimi tankami [On Shumshu Priority Development enters into force], beyond Japanese tanks],Nezavisimaya Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 30. Gazeta, September 12. Minekonomrazvitiya (2013) Naka, K. (2012). Budushchii prem'yer Zvaimovygodnoe sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Yaponii Abe nameren ukreplyat' Yaponii [Mutually beneficial cooperation otnosheniya s Rossiei [Future Premier of between Russia and Japan," December Japan Abe Intends to Strengthen 26, Relations with Russia],RIA Novosti, http://economy.gov.ru/minec/press/news/ December 16. doc20131226_3 Naka, K. (201 4). Yaponskii prem'er

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James Brown is Associate Professor in Political Science at Temple University, Japan Campus. His main areas of expertise are Russian-Japanese relations and international energy politics. His research has previously been published in the following academic journals: International Politics, Politics, Asia Policy, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism, Europe-Asia Studies, and The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. His recently completed book, Japan, Russia and their Territorial Dispute: The Northern Delusion, is to be published by Routledge on 11 March 2016.

Notes

1 For convenience, the Japanese names for the islands will be used in this article. In Russian, the islands are known as , Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomai. Also for simplicity, the Habomai islets will be referred to as a single island. 2 In 2004 Russia agreed to settle its border dispute with China by relinquishing sovereignty over one and a half islands at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. In contrast to the territorial dispute with Japan, the amount of land involved was small and almost entirely unpopulated (Weitz 2008). 3 There is an alternative interpretation of Putin intentions, which is even more depressing from a Japanese perspective. According to this view, Putin is not even willing to consider recognising Japanese sovereignty over Shikotan and Habomai. Instead, by exploiting the wording of the 1956 Joint Declaration, Russia would offer to "transfer" the two smaller islands to Japan for that country's use. Sovereignty, however, would remain with Russia (Momoi 2016).

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