The Maintenance of the Radiological Categorization Depends U P A
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.DUE DATE ACTION me7 2002 SPNRD:RGB:024 t3M Approval of Ke-Categorization of Building 881 as a Radiological Pacitity Alan M. Parker President and Chief Executive O€ficer Kaiser-fill Company, L.L.C. Referelm: Letter, Snyder Ea Bostic, 02-W-01052,dtd August 22., 2002, Subject: Transmittal af the Facility Safety Analysis, Building 88 1 and Related Facilities, Revision 0; Request fa Approval on the ReCategoxizaticw to Radiological, DPS-013-02 The Department of Energy-Rocky Rats Field office {DOE-RWO) approves the re-categ&mtion of Building 881 and related facilities fiom Hazard Cmtegory 3 nuclear Fzcilities to radiohgka! facilities as transmitted in the re€erence. The transmitted documentation indicates that Ihe current radiologkd materid inventories are less than half of the lower threshold limit for Hazard Category 3 designation. The ducumentation also indicates that the hveutories ofother nun-raifiokogkd inventorks are bdQW thresholds ul- concern. Also, the DOE-RFFO agrees that the transmitted documentatkm satkfies the Building 88 I authorization basis annual update requirement. The DOE-KEF0 understands &at the facitity ca&ts to RwQ Flats Environmeattal Tehology Site(Site) level imylementaticm af the Site Safiety Management Fro-. It is also understood that the maintenance of the radiological categorization depends upa prohibition on the receipt of any radioactive waste by the facilities in the Building 883 complex, other than the return of waste generated as part of dismantlement, decontamination, md &d~tionactivities in the BuiIding 88 1 complex. The DOE-RFFO also approves the removd of ail Building 88 Z complex equbmxtt from the Reportable Equipnunt List associated with the Occurrence Reporting Process Pmdm, I-D97-ADM-Lfi.O1,Should you hauc any questions, please contact Ron Bostic at extension 2109. Manager neviewS#1forAdd- ms.CMltrOl WP M.Frei EM-30, HQ N. Larson, EM-33, HQ ' S. Stirdler, EH-2, HQ Ref. Ltr. # D. Owen, DNFSB, RWO ga Res /c)S= R. Goldsmith, AMSP, RFFO J. Sbhneider, AMP, REF0 R. Bostic, NRD, RWQ E. Westhroak, FAD, RFFC) 5 qgo ' 5 D. Synder, K-H J. G&, K-€1 DATE: z RERY TU ATTN OF. SP:NRD: RGE3:OZ-U I558 SWECT Approval uf Site SafHy Analysis Reprt Appendix J Page Change PGC-WF-U3.a336-3NC TU Alan M.Parker President and Chief Executive Officer Kaiser-Wiil Company, UC Reference: Streamlined Page Change, dtd October 4,2002. PW-KFP43.C#)36-J”, Clarify Waste Management Cell Siting Criteria The Departmeat of Energy, Rocky Flats Fieid Office, approses lZie re€e~ncedSite Safety Analysis Report Appendix f Page Change. The page change deais with specification uf additiond Waste Management Ceil (WMC) siting criteria to preclude vrnanalyM storage c~nfigurationsand clarifies that WMC descriptions do not supedeWMC siting criteria. The specific siting criterion that was added prwiudes the interaction uf WMC waste containers with other staged&ured waste containers, particularly in tlhosecaseswhereWMGsarelocate:dincloseproximity tonuciesrfacilities. The subject page. change dms not result in an increase in risk and may actually reduce the likeliihoud ctf unamlyxd accidents with the. potmtial fur higher consequmces than accidents currently evaluated in nuclear facility authorimtiun basis docu~ntsand Appendix J. The subject page change is appraved without technical direction. If YQU have any quesciurrs, please cantact Ron Jhstic at extension 2109. Artachnrent cc w/Att: M. Frei, EM-30, HQ N. Larson, EM-33, I-IQ S. Stadler, EH-2, EIQ D. Owen, DNF:SB, wo R.Goldsmith, AMSP, RFFQ K. Sostic. “2, RFFO E. Westbrook, FAD, RFFO J. Gei~,K-E3 DUE-RFFO Basis far Approval: The safety analysis presented in Appendix J generally did not consider I~T~Yinteractions between WMCs and other nuclear facilities. One exception dealt with the seismic cullapse ofa nuclear facility wall anto waste containers stored in a WC. However, there was no consideration given to accidents that would impact both WCwaste containers and other stag&stord waste containers. For example, there was ne evaluation of WhlC waste contai~~.~~in du5e pruxdty to a nuclear facility dack where an maiyzed fire can impact waste containers in the %MC and at the dmk. The DOE-W'FQ ~~ifiedin the app~~alof AppadiX 3 that it W~Sthe ~~~sibilityofthe contractor to evaluate situatkm where accidents coultd involve both WMC waste containers ftnd other waste containers in those cases where Mrh.pCs were located in close proximity to 8 nuclear facility. During the conduct of $hisrequired evaluation fox a Building 707 WMC Xcrcatcd in close proximity to the hat: the WMC de on in Appendix J did not preclude a p lity dock waste containers. The emernt that precludes that interaction and clarifies that the supercede any requirements associated with the speciRed WCsiting criteria, Since the Page change actually further prohibits unanslyzed cunfigwations,there is no risk increase associated with the proposed change. The Page Change actually reduces risk by reducing the likelihood of accidents with the potential to exceed currently analyzed cunscquences. The added siting criterion precludes the placement of WMC waste containers in configuration.^ where accidents could impact the W4C waste containers and other stagedlstored waste wnlt.winers. Reinteraction between t-he WMC waste containers and other waste containers coultd Elf: precluded by spacing or by &e imposition of vafiaus types ofba-rkrs. The actual spacing requirements or b;tnriers to be inipased to preclude interactions axe nut spcifred in the Page Change since they would vary depending on the actual csnfiguraticzn trfifig to be avoided. As such, it is the responsibility of the ~on&xtctarto ensure &at xapriate spacing or barriers are in piace to meet the siting criterion slssociated with WMC and other waste contaiirar interactions. As stated above, there is no risk increase associated with this proposed Page Change and the change actvd1y reinfor.ces the assumptions nude in the safety analyses and ci&Ees the implenientation requirements. The Page Change is approved, ~~E-~~UDirecti~ There is no DOE-RFFO technical direction associated with this Page Change. DUE DATE ,OCT 21 ACTION Approval of Documented Safety Analysis for 903 Drum Storage Arecr (IHSS 112) Remediation Project Denny Fenera, Vice President Project Manager for Remediation, Industrial D&D, and Site Services Kaiser-Hill Company, LLC Reference: Letter, Snyder to Bostic, 02-RF-01991 ,dtd 09/11/02, subject: Transmittal of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for 903 Drum Storage Area (MSS 112) Remediation Project - DPS-026-02 The reference transmitted the final version of the 903 Pad Project Docmmented Safety Agalysis @SA) to the Department of Energy (DOE)Rocky Flats Field Ofice for approval. The attached Safety Evaluation keport (SER) provides the basis for approval, directed changes, implementation issues, and annual update issues. The SER shall be issued with the controlled copy distribution of the 903 Pad Project DSA. The 903 Pad Project DlSA is approved with the DOE direction contained in the SER. II sw0NSohl.A IxI h Should you have any qucstions, please contact me at extension 2025 or my point of contact on I I' this matter, Ron Bostic, at extension 2109. 1-1- Eugene C. Schmitt Manager . Attachment cc w/Att: Reviewed for Addressee M. Frei, EM-30, HQ Cones. Conlrd RFP N. Larson, EM-33, HQ D. Owen, DNFSB,RFFO J. Schneider, AMP,RFFO R. Goldsmith, AMSP, RFFO J. Legare, AMES, RFFO Ref. Ltr. # 62 ACOt99 1 R. Bostic, NRD, RFFO A. Geis, K-H Revision No: 0 Dait:: October 2002 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT For Documented Safety Analysis for 903 Drum Storage Area (IHSS 112) Remediation Project REVISION 0, September 2002 Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site Kaiser Hill Company, L.L.C. PREPARED BY: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ROCKY FLATS FIELD OFFICE c.>-,.??= Prepared by: Ronald Rostic, Direcror, Nuclear Regulatory Division Approved by: Le- Eugene?. Schmirt, Manager, Rocky Flats Field Office r---Reviewed tor Classification/UCNI. By: T~ITVForme. Safetv Analvsr U/NU Safcty Evaluation Report 903 Pad Documented Safety Analysis . Revision 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................................... i 1.0 LNTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... i 2.0 SUMMARY CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 2 3.0 REVIEW PROCESS...................................................................................................................................... 5 4.0 DESCRIPTION OF FACLITY AND OPERATION .................................................................................. 6 5.0 APPROVAL BASES ..................................................................................................................................... 8 5.1 Adequacy of Base Information ............................................................................................................... 8 5.2 Adequacy of Hazard and Accident Aiialyses ....................................................................................... 10 5.3 Adequacy of Safety Structures, Systems, and Compoiicnts ................................................................ 21 5.4 Adequacy of Derivation and Development of Technical Safety Requirements ................................. 22 5.5 Adequacy of Programmatic Controls ..................................................................................................