SWAZILAND Swaziland Is an Absolute Monarchy, and King Mswati III Has
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Tax Administration and Representative Authority in the Chiefdoms of Sierra Leone1
Tax Administration and Representative Authority in the Chiefdoms of Sierra Leone1 Richard Fanthorpe September 2004 Department of Anthropology University of Sussex 1 This report is an output of DFID/SSR research project R8095. It must not be cited or reproduced in any format without the author’s permission Contents Introduction and Methodology…………………………………………………..1 Section 1: The Development of Chiefdom Administration……………………..7 Tax Administration………………………………………………………………...7 Representative Authority………………………………………………………….15 Section 2: Survey Data……………………………………………………………23 Chiefdom Staff Working Conditions………………………………………………23 Local Tax Administration: The Current Situation………………………………..32 Calculating Chiefdom Councillorships……………………………………………45 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………50 2 Abstract This report analyses survey data, collected by the author between March and June 2003, from five chiefdoms in Sierra Leone. The aim of the survey was to investigate the capacity of chiefdom administrations to assess and collect local tax and the relationships between taxation, political representation, and citizenship at the chiefdom level. The first section of the report explores the legal and technical development of financial administration and representative authority in the chiefdoms, with particular attention to the policy assumptions that underlay it. The second section analyses the survey data, which were collected before the new decentralised local government structures were put in place. They indicate that chiefdom financial administration is barely functional and suffers greatly from poor staff working conditions and lack of transparency and accountability among district level administrations. The rural public have little confidence in the local tax system and are unlikely to cooperate with it any further until tangible benefits from local tax revenue begin to flow in their direction. However, tax assessment (if not payment) also has a political purpose and evidence was found of manipulation of tax assessment rolls in order to yield extra chiefdom councillors. -
Types of Government
TYPES OF GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INDIVIDUALS THAT EXERCISE POLITICAL AUTHORITY ON BEHALF OF A GROUP OF PEOPLE CITIZEN A LEGAL MEMBER OF A COUNTRY CONSTITUTION A WRITTEN PLAN OF GOVERNMENT TYPES OF GOVERNMENT Limited Unlimited In a limited government even the people !Power in the hands of one person" who make the laws have to obey them." !In unlimited governments all the power !Usually limited by constitution (plan of belongs to the ruler." government)" !There are no rules or laws that the ruler !Examples:" must obey." ! Direct Democracy" !Examples:" ! Representative Democracy" ! Totalitarianism" ! Constitutional Monarchy" ! Monarchy" ! Dictatorship" DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS DEMOCRACY: RULE BY THE PEOPLE lGovernment! is elected by the people POWER TO THE PEOPLE lEveryone! over a certain age is able to vote and has a say in who is elected to lead lElections! are held to determine who is in charge DIRECT DEMOCRACY “ALL VOTERS IN A COMMUNITY MEET IN ONE PLACE TO MAKE LAWS AND DECIDE WHAT ACTIONS NEED TO TAKE PLACE” !Pros: ! Every citizen has equal power in matters of government. Every citizen is involved in the decision making. ! Since all citizens are involved in decision making, there is a broad base of support and loyalty. ! Individual liberties are protected. !Cons: ! Only works when a small number of people are involved. Ability to gather all citizens in one place is necessary. ! Decision making involving all citizens is time-consuming. All citizens give in-put, debate, etc... !Examples: ! Town Hall ! Ancient Greece in Athens REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (REPUBLIC) PEOPLE ELECT REPRESENTATIVES TO CARRY ON THE WORK OF GOVERNMENT !Pros: ! Citizens are too busy to learn about and vote on all laws, electing representatives that become experts in law making helps the process. -
Resource Scarcity Drives Lethal Aggression Among Prehistoric Hunter-Gatherers in Central California
Resource scarcity drives lethal aggression among prehistoric hunter-gatherers in central California Mark W. Allena,1, Robert Lawrence Bettingerb, Brian F. Coddingc, Terry L. Jonesd, and Al W. Schwitallae aDepartment of Geography and Anthropology, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, CA 91768; bDepartment of Anthropology, University of California, Davis, CA 95616; cDepartment of Anthropology, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112; dDepartment of Social Sciences, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA 93401; and eMillennia Archaeological Consulting, Sacramento, CA 95817 Edited by Robert L. Kelly, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, and accepted by Editorial Board Member Richard G. Klein September 6, 2016 (received for review May 19, 2016) The origin of human violence and warfare is controversial, and some risk of immediate mortality and long-term reprisals, individuals scholars contend that intergroup conflict was rare until the emer- should only take up violence when the benefits (e.g., material goods, gence of sedentary foraging and complex sociopolitical organization, status, and long-term alliances) outweigh those costs (18–22). The whereas others assert that violence was common and of considerable benefits are more likely to outweigh the costs when and where en- antiquity among small-scale societies. Here we consider two alterna- vironmental productivity is low, resources are scarce, and individuals tive explanations for the evolution of human violence: (i) individuals have relatively more to lose from theft (23). If individual evaluation resort to violence when benefits outweigh potential costs, which is of the costs and benefits of lethal aggression determines the incidence likely in resource poor environments, or (ii) participation in violence of violence, and if these evaluations vary ecologically, then (P1) we increases when there is coercion from leaders in complex societies predict that rates of lethal aggression should covary negatively with leading to group level benefits. -
The Executive Survey General Information and Guidelines
The Executive Survey General Information and Guidelines Dear Country Expert, In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). • The Head of State (HOS) is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country; his or her function could be purely ceremonial. • The Head of Government (HOG) is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government; the HOG may also be HOS, in which case the executive survey only pertains to the HOS. • The executive survey applies to the person who effectively holds these positions in practice. • The HOS/HOG pair will always include the effective ruler of the country, even if for a period this is the commander of foreign occupying forces. • The HOS and/or HOG must rule over a significant part of the country’s territory. • The HOS and/or HOG must be a resident of the country — governments in exile are not listed. • By implication, if you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony or an annexed territory, the HOS and/or HOG will be a person located in the territory in question, not in the capital of the colonizing/annexing country. • Only HOSs and/or HOGs who stay in power for 100 consecutive days or more will be included in the surveys. • A country may go without a HOG but there will be no period listed with only a HOG and no HOS. • If a HOG also becomes HOS (interim or full), s/he is moved to the HOS list and removed from the HOG list for the duration of their tenure. -
P. Van Der Grijp the Making of a Modern Chiefdom State; the Case of Tonga
P. van der Grijp The making of a modern chiefdom state; The case of Tonga In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Politics, tradition and change in the Pacific 149 (1993), no: 4, Leiden, 661-672 This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 07:40:40PM via free access PAUL VAN DER GRIJP* THE MAKING OF A MODERN CHIEFDOM STATE: THE CASE OF TONGA Tonga has never been colonized by a foreign political system of government. However, never having been officially colonized does not mean it has been completely independent. In the nineteenth century, Tonga developed from a situation in which several groups of chiefs dominated the islands, to a centralized state power with a king: a modern chiefdom state. Tonga is a modern state with all the usual requirements: a government with a parliament, civil service, legislation, judges, police, army, school system, health care, post office, etc. At the same time, however, it has several characteristics of a chiefdom, although in an adapted form. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Tonga was involved in a civil war. There were political intrigues, political murders, and field battles in which hundreds and sometimes thousands of people participated. During this civil war, one of the competing chiefs, with the aid of European firearms and the moral support of European missionaries, was able to centralize political power in the Tongan archipelago. Following the western, or, to be more precise, British example, this chief, whose name was Taufa'ahau, was made King of Tonga in 1845. -
Thabani Thwala 0007581D Master of Arts (History
The Politics of Placing Princes in Historical and Contemporary Swaziland Thabani Thwala 0007581d Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (History) of the University of Witwatersrand Supervisor: Professor Bonner Johannesburg 2013 1 Chapter 1: Introduction This research report is an exercise which seeks to understand centre-regional disputes, which are now nearly two centuries old, between the Swazi royal house, and the subordinate chiefdoms of the Magagula, Tfwala, Mabuza, all located in central Swaziland, and the Fakudze of Macetjeni in the Lubombo region. It seeks to investigate what has become an increasingly critical and controversial issue in Swazi society and Swazi politics: the relationship between princes and chiefs. It will also highlight the central importance of history, or at least historical assertion, in the assumption of political power in earlier and contemporary Swaziland. These issues have attracted some attention from scholars but not nearly as much as they deserve. Centre-regional relations between kings and subordinate chiefs are on the whole neglected in Swazi historiography. This thesis seeks to correct this anomaly by exploring local, regional, and national dynamics which strained the relationship between centre and region, and to show how the former has grappled with the problem of recalcitrant chiefs in a bid to retain its power position through suppression of the latter who have constantly sought to reclaim lost autonomy. The present history of Swaziland is one that glorifies the Dlamini dynasty and projects a one-sided picture of historical events in Swaziland. For instance, it is contended that Swaziland is a homogenous, democratic and peaceful country. -
Complex Chiefdom: Precursor of the State Or Its Analogue?
Complex Chiefdom: Precursor of the State or Its Analogue? Leonid Grinin Volgograd Centre for Social Research ABSTRACT It is often noted in the academic literature that chiefdoms frequently prove to be troublesome for scholars because of the disagreement as to whether to categorize this or that polity as a complex chiefdom or as an early state. This is no wonder, because complex chiefdoms, early states, as well as different other types of sociopolitical systems (large confederations, large self-governed civil and temple commu- nities etc.) turn out to be at the same evolutionary level. In the pre- sent article it is argued that such complex societies can be consid- ered as early state analogues. The most part of the article is devoted to the analysis of the most developed chiefdoms – the Hawaiian ones. It is argued that before the arrival of Cook there was no state in Hawaii. It should be classified as an early state analogue, i.e. a society of the same level of development as early states but lacking some state characteristics. It proceeds from the fact that the entire Hawaiian political and social organization was based on the strict rules and ideology of kinship, and the ruling groups represented en- dogamous castes and quasi-castes. The transition to statehood oc- curred only in the reign of Kamehameha I in the early 19th century. A scrupulous comparison between the Hawaiian chiefdoms and Ha- waiian state is presented in the article. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS This article is tightly connected with Grinin and Korotayev's article (in the present volume). -
List of Delegations to the Seventieth Session of the General Assembly
UNITED NATIONS ST /SG/SER.C/L.624 _____________________________________________________________________________ Secretariat Distr.: Limited 18 December 2015 PROTOCOL AND LIAISON SERVICE LIST OF DELEGATIONS TO THE SEVENTIETH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY I. MEMBER STATES Page Page Afghanistan......................................................................... 5 Chile ................................................................................. 47 Albania ............................................................................... 6 China ................................................................................ 49 Algeria ................................................................................ 7 Colombia .......................................................................... 50 Andorra ............................................................................... 8 Comoros ........................................................................... 51 Angola ................................................................................ 9 Congo ............................................................................... 52 Antigua and Barbuda ........................................................ 11 Costa Rica ........................................................................ 53 Argentina .......................................................................... 12 Côte d’Ivoire .................................................................... 54 Armenia ........................................................................... -
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Dipartimento di International Relations Cattedra Mediterranean Studies The Resilience of Arab Monarchies during the Uprisings of 2011 and 2012: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan RELATORE: Professoressa Francesca Corrao CANDIDATO Uberto Marchesi Matricola 626222 CORRELATORE: Professor Marco Mayer ANNO ACCADEMICO 2015 – 2016 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY 4 INTRODUCTION 6 CHAPTER 1: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 10 The Birth and Evolution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 12 Ottoman Rule 13 Conflicting Ideologies: Arab Nationalism and Zionism 14 The First World War: The Role of Diplomacy 17 Transjordan 21 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 25 The Coronation 26 Legitimacy of the regime 27 The Arab Awakenings in the Middle East and North Africa 32 The Boom of Young People 38 Economic and Social Marginalization 39 The Absence of Political Freedom 40 Regress of National Integration Factors 41 The growing role of Foreign and Regional Forces 42 A Comparative Overview 44 2011 – 2012 Jordanian’s Protests 46 Conclusionary Remarks 55 2 CHAPTER 2: LEGITIMACY 56 Monarchies Today 57 Legitimacy of Arab Monarchies 58 The Hashemite King 67 Abdullah II Bin al-Hussein 70 Conclusionary Remarks 78 CHAPTER 3: STABILITY 80 The eye of the cyclone 81 The Effects of the Arab Awakenings in the Stability of the Country 84 Domestic Level 88 Intermestic Level 91 Refugees and Jordan 91 The Threat of Da’esh 93 International Level 97 Neighbors 98 The Pull of the Gulf Cooperation Council 100 Washington, Amman… and Rabat 103 Conclusionary Remarks 108 CONCLUSION 113 Areas for Improvement and Further Studies 114 ANNEX I: GENERAL TIMELINE 117 ANNEX II: LIST OF CURRENT MONARCHIES 123 REFERENCES 127 3 SUMMARY On January 2013, the Kingdom of Jordan had its first elections according to the new electoral law implemented at the end of the rush of protests that shook Jordan and the Middle East during the two previous years. -
Executive Database 10 September 2020 Nb
EXECUTIVE DATABASE 10 SEPTEMBER 2020 NB: THIS DATABASE IS BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SA MISSIONS POLITICAL DESKS FOREIGN MISSIONS COUNTRY HEAD OF STATE DATE OF HEAD OF GOVERNMENT DATE OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN CAPITAL CITY INAUGURATION (PRIME MINISTER) APPOINTMENT AFFAIRS African Union HE Mr Matamela Cyril 12/02/2020 HE Mr Moussa Faki 14/03/2017 Addis Ababa (AU) Ramaphosa Mahamat Chairperson Chairperson of the African Union Commission0 Islamic Republic HE Mr Ashraf Ghani 29/09/2014 Chief Executive 29/09/2014 HE Haroon Kabul of Afghanistan Chakhansuri (acting) President Mr Abdullah Abdullah Minister of Foreign Affairs 23/01/2020 Republic of HE Mr Ilir Rexhep Metaj 24/07/2017 HE Mr Edi Rama 15/09/2013 HE Mr Edi Rama Tirana Albania President Prime Minister Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs 21/01/2019 Gent Cakaj Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (with full responsibility as a Minister) 22/01/2019 Democratic HE Mr Abdelmadjid Tebboune 19/12/2019 HE Mr Abdelaziz Djerad 28/12/2019 HE Ms Sabri Boukadoum Algiers People’s President Prime Minister presiding Minister of Foreign Affairs Republic of over the Council of and International Algeria Ministers Cooperation Head of Government 02/04/2019 Principality of HE Bishop Joan Enric VIVES I 16/05/2019 HE Mr Xavier Espot 17/07/2017 HE Mrs Maria Ubach Font Andorra La Andorra SICILIA Zamora Vella Minister of Foreign Affairs (Co-Prince of Andorra) Prime Minister (Letters to each HE Mr Emmanuel Macron Co-Prince) (Co-Prince of Andorra) Republic of HE Mr João Manuel 26/09/2017 HOS is -
4133 POSITION NAME TERM DOB AFFIL AFGHANISTAN President (2Nd) Karzai, Hamid 19-06-02 07-12-04 24-12-57 Indep. Chairman, Authorit
4133 POSITION NAME TERM DOB AFFIL AFGHANISTAN President (2nd) Karzai, Hamid 19-06-02 07-12-04 24-12-57 Indep. Chairman, Authority Interim Karzai, Hamid 22-12-01/19-06-02 24-12-57 Indep. President (1st) Rabbani, Burhanuddin 13-11-01/22-12-01 1940 Jamiat First Vice President Masood, Ahmad Zia 07-12-04 01-05-56 Second Vice President Khalili, Abdul Karim 07-12-04 1946 HW ALBANIA President Topi, Bamir Myrteza 24-07-07 24-04-57 PDS President Moisu, Alfred (GEN) 24-07-02/24-07-07 01-12-99 PSS President Mejdani, Rexhep 24-07-97/24-07-02 17-08-44 PSS Prime Minister (11th) Berisha, Sali Prof. Dr. 11-09-05 15-10-44 PD Prime Minister (10th) Nano, Fatos 31-07-02/11-09-05 16-09-52 PSS Deputy Prime Minister Pollo, Genc 30-07-08 1963 PDRe Deputy Prime Minister Rusmajli, Ilir 11-09-05/14-11-07- 1965 PD Deputy Prime Minister Dokle, Namik 29-12-03/11-09-05 10-03-46 PSS Deputy Prime Minister Meksi, Ermelinda Ms. Prof. Dr. 18-07-03/11-09-05 1957 PSS Deputy Prime Minister Oketa, Gazmend 03-07/03-08 14-12-68 PD ALGERIA President Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 29-05-99 19-04-04 02-03-37 FLN President Zéroual, Liamine 31-01-94/27-04-99 03-07-41 none Prime Minister Ouyahia, Ahmed 23-06-08 02-07-52 RND Prime Minister Belkhadem, Abdelaziz 24-05-06/23-06-08 08-11-45 FLN Prime Minister Ouyahia, Ahmed 05-05-03/24-05-06- 02-07-52 RND ANDORRA Head of State/President of France Sarkozy, Nicolas 16-05-07 28-01-55 UMP Head of State/Bishop of Urgel Vives I Sicilia, Joan Enric 12-05-03 24-07-49 none Chief of Government Pintat Santolària. -
Traditional Authority and State Legitimacy: Evidence from Namibia
Working Paper No. 183 Traditional authority and state legitimacy: Evidence from Namibia by Vladimir Chlouba | July 2019 1 Working Paper No. 183 Traditional authority and state legitimacy: Evidence from Namibia by Vladimir Chlouba | July 2019 Vladimir Chlouba is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Ohio State University. Email: [email protected] Abstract Do African traditional leaders weaken state legitimacy at the local level? Past scholarship raises the possibility that unelected chiefs might undermine trust in national-level institutions. Relying on an original map of areas governed by chiefs and survey data from Namibia, this study examines whether respondents governed by traditional leaders are less likely to trust state institutions. I find that compared to individuals not living under traditional authority, chiefdom residents are more likely to trust government institutions. To partially alleviate the concern that chiefdom residence is endogenous to trust in national-level institutions, I use a genetic matching strategy to compare relatively similar individuals. I further find that the association between chiefdom residence and trust in state institutions is considerably weaker and less statistically significant for individuals who do not share ethnicity with their chief. This evidence suggests that traditional leaders’ ability to complement state institutions at the local level is compromised by ethnic diversity. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Ruth Carlitz, Alec Clott, Jeff Conroy-Krutz, Jared Edgerton, Jon Green, Jianzi He, Jon Kingzette, Reed Kurtz, Shaohan Lin, Jan Pierskalla, Amanda Robinson, Grant Sharratt, Inés Valdez, participants of the Midwest Workshop in Empirical Political Science in October 2018 in St. Louis, and participants of the Livelihoods, Community and Voting in Africa panel at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting in April 2019 in Chicago for helpful suggestions and comments on earlier versions of this paper.