Proposed Sugar Industry Restructuring and Land Conflict in Fiji

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PROPOSED SUGAR INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING AND LAND CONFLICT IN FIJI

Old wine in a new bottle? Proposed sugar industry restructuring and land conflict in Fiji

Padma Lal with Mahendra Reddy

The proposed restructure of Fiji’s sugar industry has the Padma Lal is a reader in potential to change fundamentally the incentives facing Environmental Management and stakeholders and their interaction. How well the stated Development, Asia Pacific School objective of ‘unity in purpose’ is achieved will depend on of Economics and Government, The Australian National University. whether the causes of the current land conflict are addressed and whether the established decision-making Mahendra Reddy is a senior process can help build trust, transparency and lecturer at the Centre for accountability. Ultimately, the success of the proposed Development Studies, School of industry restructure may depend on the commitment of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific. Fijian landowners and the Fijian administration to review the way returns are shared among stakeholders.

The Fijian sugar industry is facing major among the stakeholders. Each stakeholder challenges, including declining productivity, group—the mill workers’ unions, transport deteriorating transport and processing workers’ union, sugarcane growers’ unions infrastructure, declining sugarcane quality, and associations and the landowners—is and declining sugar recovery rate (Sugar ‘scrambling to secure “their fair share” of a Commission of Fiji 1997). The roots of many crumbling and shrinking pie’ (Sugar Industry of these problems can be found in past and Proposal 1999). The current structure includes current industry structure (Box 1). a payment system which has little or no These elements include an institutional commercial basis and which does not provide arrangement based on a prescriptive Master incentives to reward those who work towards Award and land leasing system which improving productivity and quality. encouraged an adversarial relationship According to the industry’s own assessment,

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it is too bureaucratic and legalistic (see back at least to the early days of European Moynagh 1981; Lal 1992, 1997). settlement in the 1800s. The origins of the To address this apparent lack of unity of present conflict, however, can be found in purpose among key stakeholders, the sugar the indigenous land ownership and industry has developed a proposal to provide management system introduced in Fiji key interest groups with a more effective stake during the colonial era, in subsequent in the operation of the industry. Essentially, legislation, and in misperceptions and the new structure is expected to provide misinformation about leases, lease rents and incentives for stakeholders, in particular the the profitability of sugarcane farming. landowners, the growers and the millers, to The present land ownership and cooperate in developing the industry rather management system is a creation of the British than compete over shrinking resources. colonial government under Sir Arthur Gordon (1875–80). To prevent alienation of Origins of current land conflicts Fijian land, the government legislated that custom-held land could not be bought or sold, Conflict over land is nothing new to Fiji. even among Fijians themselves (France 1969). Tensions and disagreements over land go Although land was owned by individuals,

Box 1 Key elements of Fiji’s sugar industry structure

• A single processing firm, the Fiji Sugar Corporation, operates four mills on the two main islands, Vanua Levu and Viti Levu. • Rain-fed sugar sugarcane is grown mainly on small farms. • Land is leased on terms and conditions stipulated in the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant’s Act (ALTA). • Most sugarcane is grown on land leased from indigenous Fijians who own 92 per cent of land that is inalienable. • Leases are negotiated with the Native Land Trust Board acting as custodians on behalf of the traditional owners. • Leases are issued by the Native Land Trust Board, often without landowner consent. • The sugarcane payment system is based on sugarcane yield, not on the quality of sugarcane supplied to the mills. • A prescriptive Master Award under the Sugar Industry Act 1984 which stipulates key industry activities including — planting and cultivation of sugarcane by registered growers — harvesting and delivery mode of sugarcane to the Fiji Sugar Corporation — sale and purchase of sugarcane under quota to the Fiji Sugar Corporation — establishment and incorporation of the sugarcane harvesting process — the manufacture, storage, marketing, delivery and sale of sugar and by-products — the sharing of the sugar price between the processor and growers and the manner and timing of sugarcane payments — the manner in which industry-related disputes can be settled by the Sugar Industry Tribunal.

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families, clans or other higher levels of in 1940 the government created the monopoly communal aggregation, ownership was Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) under the highly flexible and dynamic and land often Native Land Trust Act (NLTA). The Act gave changed hands (Ward 1995). In an effort to the NLTB sole control over custom-held land, simplify the colony’s management, the and this facilitated dealings between the then colonial government created over time a highly major agriculturists—the Colonial Sugar rigid ownership system that entrenched non- Refinery (CSR) and Indian Fijian growers— alienation and vested ownership primarily and the indigenous owners. However, the in the mataqali.1 Even today, this system sits NLTB is not obliged to consult with uneasily with the Fijians and is partly landowners about renewal or issuance of responsible for the discontent among Fijian leases, a practice which continues to landowners about the use and management contribute to the conflict over land. of their land (Rakai et al. 1995; Ravuvu 1983; The NLTB issues and renews leases, Nayacakalou 1971). collects rents, takes 25 per cent of the rent Following European settlement, income for administration and pays heads demands for productive land for expansion of the land-owning units 22.5 per cent of of various primary industries required the the gross rent collected (Kamikamica and settlers to deal with individual landowners Davey 1988).2 The rest is divided among the in areas remote from the main areas of members of the land-owning units, who may settlement. A land tenure system was created number from a few hundred to more than whereby land could be leased for a 25-year 1,000. The returns to individual landowners period. However, European farmers had thus vary considerably. three main complaints: the 25-year leases The powers of the NLTB were retained were too short to justify major investments; under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant the 1880 Ordinance did not allow Act (ALTA) introduced in 1976 to rationalise landowners to pay compensation to the the leasing of Crown, Native and Freehold tenant when the land reverted to them; and land for agricultural purposes. Two main the leasing process was daunting, involving features of ALTA have been central to the personal approaches to the mataqali heads, conflict: the stipulated rental amount and the applications to district heads and councils, length of lease. The rental amount was fixed and payment of ‘bribes’ (France 1969). In under ALTA at 6 per cent of the unimproved 1916, a Native Land Ordinance was passed capital value (UCV), with a mandatory which required all land to be leased by the reassessment of the UCV every five years by a government for a period of 25 years with the committee of valuers appointed by the possibility of an extension for another 10 government. Second, all leases granted under years. Under this Ordinance, Fijian ALTA since 1 September 1977 were to be for a landowners were required to pay minimum of 30 years. The holders of leases compensation to the lessee for improvements granted before this date (the great majority of in the case of non-renewal of the lease—a which were for a term of ten years under condition which Fijian landowners were ALTA’s predecessor the Agricultural unhappy about. Landlord and Tenant Ordinance) were To bring a semblance of stability to the entitled to a single extension of 20 years under leasing of land and to minimise the ALTA. As a result a majority of the leases began transaction costs of dealing with individual to expire from 1997, with landowners mataqalis, as well as simplifying the process, generally unwilling to renew them.

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Non-renewal of leases Reasons for non renewal The reasons for non-renewal given by the Despite extensive dialogue between the then landowners are several. Some are valid while major political parties representing the two others are based on misinformation or ethnic communities, the Soqosoqo no Vakavulewa incomplete data. Four reasons commonly ni Taukei (SVT) for the Fijians and the National cited include Federation Party (NFP) representing the • landowners’ desire to recover some of IndoFijians, not much progress was made. An their land for use by the mataqali members ALTA Task Force was established, involving • a desire on the part of the landowners to key representatives from the SVT and NFP, the participate in commercial agriculture NLTB and the Sugar Cane Growers Council, • inequitable sharing of the ‘subsidy’ with the primary objective of resolving the land received by Fiji under the various issue. The deadlock over ALTA could not be preferential market access arrangements overcome, partly because of the extent of the • past rents were too low and the necessity disagreement between the two groups resulting to charge a ‘market rent’ (higher rent) for from misunderstandings and incomplete their land. information available to those involved. The first two reasons are related, with Indian Fijians, who are the main lessees, landowners wanting to regain control of their and the Fiji sugar industry that depends on land for subsistence or commercial uses. sugarcane farming on largely custom land, want the Government to retain ALTA.3 Land needed for own use However, the NLTB in its response noted Giving the NLTB sole responsibility over [a]ny attempt by Government to matters related to native land effectively took implement this proposition will all control out of the hands of the demonstrate Government’s insensitivity landowners. This has been a major source of towards the realities of the landowners discontent among the landowners for two and tenants particularly within the main, but related, reasons (Rakai et al. 1995). sugarcane belt, (and) the effects this will First, often the best pieces of their land are have on the sugar industry and Fiji’s leased out under ALTA. Second, it is economy. We say this because, many understandable that as indigenousFijian more tenants will be subjected to eviction aspirations change they, too, may wish to from the sugarcane belt as is the current engage in commercial agriculture. practice (NLTB 1999). However, the requirements of each land- Of the total 11,293 sugarcane leases owning unit need to be carefully examined. formally recorded by NLTB, a total of 3,323 Even where land is needed for their own use, leases expired between 1997 and 2001. By it is unclear whether 100 per cent of the leased the end of 2006 another 2,131 are expected land needs to be repossessed, as apparently to expire. The proportion of leases expiring indicated by many land-owning units. An by 2006 will be greater (almost 88 per cent) assessment of ‘need’ can be made in terms of once the Crown Schedule A and B lands the proportion of land currently not leased have been transferred to indigenous Fijians, to total land owned by, or the size of, the land- following a recent government decision owning unit. It is possible that some land- (Reddy and Lal 2002). So far over 70 per owning units, such as the Naduta and cent of the expired leases have not been Savanaura (Nakama) land-owning unit in reissued to existing tenants. the Wailevu, leased 100 per cent of their

Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 18 Number 1 May 2003 © Asia Pacific Press PROPOSED SUGAR INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING AND LAND CONFLICT IN FIJI

arable land (Lal and Rita 2003). In some In some cases, previously productive cases, although the majority of the land may sugarcane fields now leased to members of have been leased, the need for land to revert land-owning units have been allowed to back to the land-owning units may not be as revert to bush. The extent of this is not known. acute as has been implied, because the rural population is declining, with many more Inequitable sharing of subsidies Fijians residing in urban areas. Another major reason given for not renewing A desire to enter sugarcane farming is leases is the Fijian landowners’ concern that also often given as the reason for the they have not received any direct benefit from landowners not wanting to renew the leases. the subsidy received from the European This is understandable, as the sugar Union. This sentiment is summarised by the industry is the source of the largest then Interim Prime Minister, Laidenia Qarase. commodity export income for Fiji. During The tenants have benefited greatly the period 1997–99, 74 per cent of the from their leased native land. For expired leases were either issued to example, in the period of the Lome members of mataqali, or put in reserve; that Convention between the European is, only 26 per cent of the expired leases were Union and the African, Caribbean and renewed. This may reflect a desire on the Pacific countries, from 1975 to 1999, part of indigenousFijians to take up total earnings of Fiji from its sugar sugarcane farming. These statistics, however, need to be considered cautiously exports to the European Union under because the number of leases issued to the Convention’s Sugar Protocol were members of the land-owning units may estimated at F$3.5 billion. About half reflect to some extent the effect of the of this comprised premium from the government’s policy to grant F$10,000 to high EU sugar prices compared to every Fijian who took up sugarcane farming. world free market sugar prices. In the The grant amount is greater than the total sugar industry in Fiji, this F$3.5 billion rent that some landowners could expect to is shared 30 per cent to the millers, Fiji receive in their lifetime, as the following Sugar Corporation, and 70 per cent to quote from the head of the NLTB, Maika the farmers, more than 75 per cent of Qarikau,4 indicates whom are tenants of Fijian-owned land. But not a bit of that windfall …imagine if all your land is leased by F$3.5 billion is shared directly [with] other people who are receiving some the Fijian landowners (Qarase 2000). F$10,000 gross income and you get only, say, about F$250 as your gross income It is true that the Fijian landowners have from that lease. And you have to share not directly received a share of the European that with the NLTB which deducts 30 Union subsidy. It is, however, likely that they per cent and then 5 per cent goes to the would not have been able to obtain the Turanga-ni-Taukei, 10 per cent goes to current level of rent had the industry not Turaqa-ni-Yavusa, 15 per cent to the received the higher prices for sugar. The rent Turaga-ni-Mataqali, you are left with is a function of the present value of the peanuts (Fiji Times, 9 August 1997:7). expected net returns from the use of the land There have been reports of Fijians (Barlowe 1972). ALTA restricts the rental registering an interest in sugarcane farming amount that can be levied to 6 per cent of the (Fiji Post, 23 November 2000), only to receive unimproved capital value (UCV). The UCV the grant and not to enter sugarcane farming. is supposed to reflect the potential

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agricultural productivity of the land and the Less than one per cent of land is categorised ‘purpose for which the land is issued and as Class I land, producing 85 tonnes per not the actual use of the land or any other hectare or more. Under ALTA, lessees would purpose for which the land could be used’ have paid rent of F$480 per hectare for such (ALTA S21(3)). The UCV has been revised land. Over 90 per cent of land under upwards three times since the first valuation sugarcane is poor to marginal (Classes III in 1977, with the most recent revision in 1997 and IV), producing less than 50 tonnes per (Table 1). Although the rent has remained at hectare. For such land, a rental amount of 6 per cent of UCV, the rental amount paid F$45–150 per hectare is paid. The weighted has increased in both nominal and real terms average annual rent is estimated at F$92 per (Lal et al. 2001a). hectare (Lal et al. 2001a). Without the high sugar prices, the Second, rent per member is low because ‘market value’ and the UCV, of sugarcane members of a land-owning unit receive only land would have been much lower than what about 48 per cent of the rent (on average, F$44 it is currently and the landowners would per hectare) collected and this amount is have received even much lower rental divided among all adults over the age of 18. amounts. Government revenue has also been The amount of rent received by individual increased by the preferential sugar prices members, however, varies considerably, through the taxes collected, in particular the depending on the size of the land-owning unit, 3 per cent export tax.5 the productivity class of their land, the proportion of total area of land leased out and Low rent the percentage deducted for the different chiefs Members of some landowning units are (Lal et al. 2002). Income per member varies correct in saying that the rental amount widely, and can range from F$2 to F$3,879.6 received is small. Nationally, on average about 3.4 per cent of the gross value of Is the rent low by international standards? sugarcane has been paid in rent. The rent The answer to this question depends on may be thought of as low in two senses. First, which land is considered and which market the amount received is low because of the is used for comparison. On average the biophysical characteristics of land in Fiji. current UCV-based rent is equivalent to 10.6

Table 1 Nominal unimproved capital value per hectare for sugarcane growing areas in Fiji, 1977–97 (F$)

Land classification 1977 1987 1992 1997 First class 500–900 2,700–4,500 6,500 8,000 Second class 200–500 1,650–2,700 4,500 5,000 Third class 85–200 1,100–1,650 2,000 2,500 Marginal class 50–100 300–1,250 750 900

Note: Although land in different regions has different UCV estimates and usually a range of estimates was reported in the local gazette, since 1992 the lower bound of UCV estimates rather than a range has been reported. Source: Lal, P.N., Lim-Applegate, H. and Reddy, M., 2001a. ‘Land tenure dilemma in Fiji—can Fijian landowners and Indo-Fijian tenants have their cake and eat it too?’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 16(2):106–19.

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per cent of the gross value of product for Class account. In some cases, farmers are even I land and 2.9 per cent for marginal land (Lal making a loss (assuming the average cost et al. 2001a). These estimates do not include data provided by the Fiji Sugar Corporation goodwill payments, New Lease is applicable to the Wainikoro sector). These Consideration (NLC) fees, or premiums averages are below the national per capita charged by the NLTB and/or the GDP, which was recorded at F$3,889 for 2000. landowners.7 Total rent received (UCV-based On the other hand, for growers on Class I rent plus the annualised goodwill payment) land, their household income from is estimated as equivalent to an annual 14 sugarcane averages about F$7,000 per per cent of gross value of product (GVP) for annum (Lal et al. 2001a). Class I land; where GVP is equal to price As a comparison, a 1997 UNDP study times the average yield. The total rental on poverty in Fiji suggests that rural people equivalent is estimated at 10 per cent for earning less than F$100 a week are marginal land. considered to be below the poverty line These rents are within the range of rental (Government of Fiji and UNDP 1999). By that amounts charged in other countries. Since criterion some 90 per cent of the sugarcane joining the European Union, the rent paid in growers would be considered to be in the United Kingdom has been 10–15 per cent poverty. However, sugarcane growing is not of GVP (Ravenscroft et al. 1999). In always the only source of household income, Queensland the rent charged is 10 per cent particularly not around the urban areas. of GVP. Although there is no universally Nationally, the average income disparity agreed ‘fair’ rent for agricultural land, the between the two major ethnic groups is small, annual rent paid in Fiji plus annualised according to UNDP (1999) and income goodwill payments is consistent with these inequality is greater within each ethnic group payments in other countries. than between groups. While overall, Fijian households have Is there money to be made from the lowest incomes and ‘others’ have sugarcane farming? the highest, the lower-income Indo- One of the sources of tension is the perception Fijian households are worse off than that sugarcane growers are making a lot of lower-income Fijian households. Low- money (Qarase 2000). Is there a lot of money income ‘others’ in rural areas are the to be made in sugarcane farming? worst off of all. There are more Indo- The average net return (as compared Fijian households in the very poorest with gross income) per household from section of society, numbering just over sugarcane farming is F$842 per hectare or half of all-poor households. They have about F$3,500 in total. This estimate is based an average income 14 per cent lower on census data on sugarcane harvested and than Fijian households. In the highest transported to the Fiji Sugar Corporation, the bracket, the average income of Indo- sugarcane prices received by growers, and Fijian households is 42 per cent higher average cost data provided by Fiji Sugar than high-income Fijian households. Corporation (personal communication Fijians predominate in the middle 2001). But for 92 per cent of growers, those income groups. Fijians in urban areas who produce 50 tonnes per hectare or less, are relatively the best off. Poverty is in all the household net income is F$2,000; while communities, not just particular ethnic in sectors such as Wainikoro, net income is groups or sections of the society (Govern- negative if family labour is taken into ment of Fiji and UNDP 1999:Ch 5).

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Renewal of leases between leases granted under the two pieces of legislation). ‘Market rent’ in the NLTA is The general belief in the Fijian community is defined as ‘the annual rent that might that the root cause of low rents is the terms reasonably be expected to be let in the open and conditions of leases issued under the market by a willing lessor to a willing lessee’. ALTA. It is because of such perceptions that However, the term ‘market rent’ has often the NLTB and the Qarase government have been used to imply higher rents (that is, nominally rejected ALTA. In rejecting it, the higher than what is currently received or has NLTB reiterated that the existing Native Land been received in the past). This is evident Trust Act (NLTA) apply and rental rates are from the demand for—in some cases determined by NLTB based on market exorbitant—goodwill payments for short- conditions. The specific recommendations of term leases. Goodwill payments have ranged the NLTB are listed in Appendix 1. from F$2,000 to F$22,000 per lease, a figure According to the NLTB, leasing under which seems to have no bearing on the NLTA would give landowners greater productivity of those lands or the size of the flexibility to charge a more ‘market-based’ leased area (Lal et al. 2001a). Thus, one could rent (see Table 2 for institutional differences argue that the reason why NLTA is preferred

Table 2 Differences in institutional arrangements under ALTA and NLTA

Terms and conditions ALTA Proposed under NLTA Lease tenure Minimum 30 years Rolling 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30 years (de facto maximum) Basis of rent fixation 6 per cent unimproved Market rent and a percentage of capital value (UCV) production Renewability Non-renewable beyond 30 Renewable subject to NLTB’s year maximum/minimum consent. Recently proposed to be renewable with additional goodwill payment to NLTB as well as to the landowners. At expiry—compensation Value of improvements Compensation to be paid for by payable by landowners if the government approved by NLTB Choice of land utilisation Tenant Stipulated in ALTA Subletting/sharecropping Illegal, although common Possible, but with NLTB’s permission Settlement of disputes By the Agricultural Tribunal By an Independent Arbitration; a Land Court has recently been proposed.

Source: Lal, P.N., Lim-Applegate, H. and Reddy, M. 2001a. ‘Land tenure dilemma in Fiji—can Fijian landowners and Indo-Fijian tenants have their cake and eat it too?’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 16(2):106–19.

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to ALTA is that there is greater scope to extract reverted to landowners for their own use or rents that are higher than ‘market rent’ under the leases were issued to indigenous Fijian ALTA, that is, monopoly rent. tenants (Table 3). Even if land were issued under NLTA Prospects for future lease renewals are and higher rents were charged, the issue of uncertain. Nor is it known how many ex- the ‘low rent’ received by members of certain tenants have entered into informal vakavanua land-owning units cannot be resolved, given arrangements on land returned to the the communal land-ownership system, the landowners or placed in reserve. Terms and proportion of rent deducted by the NLTB, and conditions for vakavanua leases are directly the amounts claimed by different chiefs. Even negotiated with the landowners and the rent if the amount of rent were to be doubled or is paid directly to them, thus bypassing the increased ten-fold, the share received per NLTB. The extent of vakavanua leasing is not member would still be very small because known since the NLTB does not keep records the rental income would be divided among of this activity (personal communication, all individuals over the age of 18 registered March 2002). Records of the Fiji Sugar in the land-owning unit. Corporation prior to 1997 suggest that on To the growers and the Fiji Sugar average between 1993 and 1996, 5 per cent Corporation, NLTA is not acceptable because of all sugarcane land was under vakavanua of the key conditions, many uncertainties and lease. Today the proportion could be more limited protection. In their submission, the significant if earlier experience is any industry suggested that for the industry to indication. In 1988 about 72 per cent of survive and prosper, lessees need longer term tobacco-growing land was recorded to be leases with reasonable rentals; require under the vakavanua system (Eaton 1988). reasonable advance notice periods before the In the sugarcane belt area there are thus expiry of their tenancy; require protection by three different types of leases and four legislation against unreasonable rental different forms of agreement (Table 4) issued increases and other charges; and require fair by the NLTB, as well as vakavanua. compensation for improvements upon expiry of a lease (Sugar Commission of Fiji 1999). Perceptions and reality In many instances, the NLTB was This discussion highlights the differences willing to offer residential leases but not between fact, perceptions and fiction. It is leases over farming land. This offer was possible that much of the conflict over land rejected by some growers in the hope of has arisen because of the differences in receiving the F$28,000 cash grant then on perceptions between the two ethnic offer by the Chaudhary Government. While communities, not to mention political the offer produced considerable kudos for differences. To reduce the scope of the the People’s Coalition Government, not seemingly escalating conflict over land many people actually received the money experienced elsewhere in the world, it has because the assessment of applications itself been suggested that sharing of information, became highly politicised. convergence of understanding, and During the period 1997 to 2001, a total identification and development of of 3,323 leases expired, of which only 883 collaborative solutions are essential. It is were reissued to sitting tenants as sugarcane important to create an ‘awareness of land.8 Residential leases on smaller pieces interdependence’ among stakeholders as of land accounted for a further 174 leases well as a ‘unity of purpose…if conflict is to granted to sitting tenants. The remainder be overcome’ (Buckles and Rusnak 2000:5).

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Table 3 Number of expired leases reissued to sitting tenants for sugarcane and residential uses

Expiry year Expired sugarcane leases New sugarcane leases issued New residential leases issued 1997 72 67 (36) 23 (8) 1998 157 152 (45) 61 (7) 1999 1,073 861 (350) 297 (83) 2000 1,708 780 (311) 132 (26) 2001 313 155 (141) 15 (50) Total 3,323 2,015 (883) 297 (174)

Note: Figures in parentheses are for leases issued to sitting tenants. Source: NLTB data supplied to the sugar industry, 15 March 2002.

Industry restructure company. The suggestion is to grandfather the current stakeholders, growers, The key intention behind the proposed landowners and mill workers, and to provide industry restructure is to provide a unifying them with free shares in the company. The mechanism among the stakeholder groups— ‘ownership’ is to be shared among the key the growers, landowners and the mill stakeholder groups, with the growers to workers—to encourage the desired ‘unity of receive 65–75 per cent, the landowners 5–10 purpose’. This, it is hoped, will ensure that per cent, mill employees 5–10 per cent, and decisions made by them will be based on the rest to the government, whose shares commercial considerations and for the would be phased out in the long run and common good, not just in their respective distributed among the other stakeholders. interests. The goals driving the proposal The argument put forward by the include industry at the meeting in Seqaqa sector (7 • long-term business sustainability based February 2002), is that a stakeholder-based on world’s best practice company would ensure that the shareholders will have the common goal of • market-based commercial relationships maximising returns on their respective among all stakeholders and suppliers of shares, thus increasing the profitability of the inputs and services industry. Each stakeholder will, they argue, • maximising returns to shareholders. also try to increase the cost effectiveness of To encourage unity of purpose, the their own activities or services along the company currently operating the four mills— production chain. Lautoka, Labasa, Penang and Raviravi—is Under this proposal stakeholders, to be split into four separate companies particularly the landowners and growers, established around each sugar mill. The are expected to have financial incentives to government is to buy out existing company ensure the sugar industry prospers, and not shareholders and to transfer all assets to the just be concerned about receiving a ‘fair’ new companies free of charge. Each return on their inputs. Experience elsewhere stakeholder group around each mill suggests that this is not likely to happen if catchment area will have a share in the the fundamental causes of the current

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conflict over land—arising from perceptions genuine partners in the venture, of unfair distribution of benefits from the pursuing a common goal sugar industry—are not addressed as the • a common goal of maximising not only new institutional structure is negotiated. company profits but also the welfare of each stakeholder group (Parkinson 1997; Hutton 1997). Stakeholder capitalism Industry restructure and creation of A stakeholder-based company is built on mutual trust the philosophy of stakeholding, which is The central challenge in Fiji is thus to design about creating a change in culture, and a new industry structure which provides ‘changing the way people think’ (Darling sufficient property rights (decision rights) for 1997:16) about each other, about their each stakeholder group such that they have respective interests and their joint interests. appropriate incentives to work towards a It is built on a culture of ‘constructive common good without losing out on ownership’. The stakeholder approach efficiency. Trust and long-term relationships includes a commitment to cannot be legislated, nor can they be built • a partnership between stakeholders who when there are differences in perceptions and have obligations as well as rights beliefs, as is currently the case between • a framework of reciprocal rights, which landowners and sugarcane growers and generates expectations that each side will between the two ethnic groups (Williamson seek to advance the interests of the other 1997). At the core of landowners’ concerns • building long-term, cooperative re- is the feeling that tenants have become rich lationships based on mutual trust at their expense. Although the facts suggest • a view that stakeholders are not mere otherwise, nonetheless the perception of sources of factors of production but are unfairness exists and it must be addressed.

Table 4 Proportion of ALTA and non-ALTA leasesa issued under different agreement types (excluding vakavanua leases)

Agricultural non-ALTA leases ALTA Reserve Total (per cent) Registered lease 26 2,671 41 24 Tenancy at will 73 26 45 1 Instrument of tenancy 23 4,006 18 36 Agreement for lease 47 38 1,230 12 Memorandum of lease 33 2,825 186 27 Unspecified 1 2 2 0.04 Total number of leases 203 9,568 1,522 11,293b Percentage of total leases 2 85 13 100 a Expired and current leases in the NLTB database of March 2002. In some cases, people with expired leases would have obtained residential leases which are not included above. b This figure is the total number of leases. Source: Native Land Trust Board data (personal communication, 13 March 2002).

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To overcome such perceptions, at least Allocation of rights can influence what two main issues need to be resolved as far as the different stakeholder groups ‘feel’ about the landowners and growers are concerned: each other and the company. Equal the initial distribution of shares among ownership in a company by the key stakeholders, and the negotiation of the land stakeholder groups could give a sense of lease and ‘market’ rent system. Furthermore, equal partnership (between groups) and a decision-making system needs to be put in could be critical if the current perception of place which will create a forum that can help inequity is to be overcome. This would mean build trust rather than conflict. that of the total number of shares created for each mill area company, each stakeholder Distribution of shares between group—growers, mill workers and landowners and growers landowners—would be assigned an equal Distribution of new entitlements without any proportion of shares, not highly unequal costs to the stakeholders is an equity not an shares as currently proposed. economic issue. There are many different Each member of a stakeholder group ways new ‘ownership’ rights can be could then be assigned an equal share in their distributed: for example, they can be stakeholder group share. It is noted, that auctioned, grandfathered, issued on a ‘first- through grandfathering of groups, equity at come, first-served’ basis, or allocated by the group level may be achieved, but not lottery. Different mechanisms have different necessarily equity between members within distributional implications and imply groups of different sizes. potentially different levels of transactions Published theoretical literature on costs (Cullen 1985). An auctioning system is practical experiences with stakeholder- appropriate if efficiency is the main issue as it based companies are limited. Experience ensures that those best able to use the rights with employee share schemes and employee will hold them. Auctioning, however, could share ownership plans in the United result in inequitable distribution of shares, Kingdom suggests that the success of particularly to Indian Fijian growers, who are stakeholder-based companies depends on more likely to be able to afford to bid for the members’ ‘sense of ownership’ (Pendleton shares. ‘First-come, first-served’ and 1997:176). Economic success would allocation by lottery may be used in situations ultimately depend on the efficiency gains this where the new right is to a one-off event and sense of ownership generates, and by the the demand is not large relative to supply; if extent to which stakeholders feel they have the demand is high then the transaction cost an effective say in decision making. This could be significant, particularly when would suggest that each stakeholder group growers and the land owners are should have equal representation on the geographically dispersed. Where prior rights decision-making board of the company. or some entitlements already exist, While this issue of board representation has grandfathering would be perceived as not yet been tackled by the Fiji sugar industry, equitable. Since equity is the main issue in the it is important that any new institutional Fiji sugar industry, grandfathering of existing arrangement in Fiji adequately addresses it. stakeholder groups would thus appear most As equity among the groups is one of the acceptable and cost effective; grandfathering key issues in the industry, the overall stake may, however, not be acceptable to those who in the company would, however, need to are not in the industry and thus would not remain the same for each stakeholder group, gain from the new rights. at least in the short to medium term. This

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would mean that the company profits would ideally be divided among growers according be initially divided three ways in equal to their share of total sugar produced in their proportion and group shares would remain mill area. Thus, the higher the individual constant. In the long run it is possible that sugar output from their sugarcane, the larger landowners may increase their proportion the share of grower dividend. This can occur of shares as they purchase largely Indian if the industry adopts a system of sugarcane Fijian shares and become directly involved quality payment and records the amount of in sugarcane farming. sugar, as compared with the quantity of Within each stakeholder group, the group sugarcane, produced by each grower.9 If the dividend would be divided among its industry retains sugarcane payment on members according to an agreed formula. A weight rather than quality of sugarcane system for sharing dividends among members delivered, a second-best option would be to would still need to be negotiated even if the divide the dividend according to quantity of industry decides to divide the shares using sugarcane delivered. the formula under the proposed restructure. Furthermore, for efficiency reasons, Ideally for the landowners, the dividend grower entitlements need to be divisible and would be divided among the land-owning units transferable, allowing membership of the according to their proportion of land of different grower-group to change. To achieve this, an quality leased in the mill area. To determine the institutional arrangement would need to be proportion of land of different qualities, the put in place which would allow for the industry could use the land quality database transfer of individual entitlements as currently being developed. Alternatively, the growers sell their supply contracts and exit dividend could be divided in proportion to the the industry. Similar transferability of land- rent received for their land, but only if a more owning unit entitlements is also critical, if market-oriented rental system is put in place. land-owning units are to be allowed Such a system would provide an appropriate flexibility in their decisions about the leasing incentive to the land-owning units, assuming of land for sugarcane farming. they were consulted by the NLTB, to increase In the case of the mill workers, where no their holdings of good quality land. such unit of input can be readily determined, Individual dividends within a land- or costs effectively monitored, the dividend owning unit will vary with time as changes could be shared equally. When a mill worker occur in the membership of the group due to leaves the industry, essentially his/ her share births, deaths and the number of individuals in the industry ceases, though the group reaching 18. Such changes are recorded in the share remains intact. Vola ni Kawa Bula maintained by the Fijian In conclusion, the proposed stakeholder- Affairs Board. With increases in the based company arrangement could help indigenous Fijian population, it is likely that create a sense of fairness among the returns to individual landowners will decline stakeholder groups as well as provide over time, unless there is a more rapid increase appropriate incentives, increasing industry in the profitability of the industry. Given recent efficiency, provided related institutional industry performance, and the expected loss issues are also addressed. in preferential access, the latter is highly unlikely to occur in the short to medium term, Negotiation of land leases and rents with or without industry restructure. If a stable, long-term relationship is to be Similarly, to provide the appropriate developed between landowners and growers incentive to the growers, the dividend would within each mill catchment area, a market-

based, land leasing system is required. The rental amount that reflects expected net industry recognises the need for this. In their returns—including restricting the monopoly restructure proposal, the industry asks the position of the NLTB. landowners to ‘support [and introduce] To move closer to a market condition commercially based contractual arrangements where landowners and tenants can which reflect the land tenure and investment negotiate a market rent, one option is for requirements of the industry’ (Sugar land leases to be negotiated separately for Commission of Fiji 1999:7). A commercially each mill area, allowing for the greatest based system would closely reflect market degree of flexibility in the types of lease supply and demand of land. available. Different models have been Under competitive market conditions, suggested, including the Sugar Cane land rent reflects the net returns expected Growers’ Council representing the growers from its best use, as well as risks and negotiating with the NLTB, representing the uncertainties. Therefore, the more productive land-owning units; and the stakeholder- the land, the more valuable the crop, the based company taking a head lease and lower the costs, and the lower the issuing a supply contract to growers. uncertainties, the higher the expected net The rental formulae negotiated in each returns. The higher the expected area will depend on whether landowners (mathematically)10 net returns, the greater and growers are risk averse, risk neutral or should be the land price and thus the greater risk takers. In an uncertain environment, risk- the annual rental value. The rental value of averse tenants would be prepared to forgo land thus should reflect what the tenants are income for more secure average returns. Risk- willing to pay (Barlowe 1972; Pagiola 1999). averse landowners may feel better off under However, in Fiji, a market price for a fixed lease since they will not be exposed custom-owned land cannot be observed to risks (see Lal et al. 2001a). because land cannot be bought or sold. For commercially-based rent options Second, a competitive market for land leases which are more responsive to market is also not possible because native land is forces—instead of fixing rent, land rent leased by the custodian for Fijian land, the should closely reflect the expected returns NLTB. Land-owning units are not free to net of all costs, including returns to negotiate leases of their land. In the past the management. This would mean that not only NLTB has also not consulted the land- information about gross value of output owning units before issuing leases on their should be known but also the costs of land (see Lal et al. 2001a). The NLTB is thus production, harvest and transport (if a monopolist, able to restrict the supply of transport costs are to be borne by the land and extract monopoly rents. growers). While the value of output, rail As a second-best option, some institu- transport and harvest costs can be estimated tional mechanism, other than the current with certainty because census data on these UCV-based system, needs to be developed factors are collected by the Fiji Sugar that allows land rent to change with Corporation, reliable production cost changing market conditions of the crops estimates are currently not available. grown. Given the level of discontentment In the short run, a second-best option over the UCV-based rental amounts, and the could include the landowners receiving a demand by the NLTB and the landowners fixed percentage of the gross value of product for a market rent, a rental system is needed (GVP). This figure would need to be which can simulate market conditions and negotiated between the landowners and the

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growers. Current average land rents, taking ongoing additional payments (Lal and into account goodwill payments, are Reddy 2003). equivalent to 16–20 per cent of the GVP, when To avoid this kind of ‘sovereign’ risk, and internationally land rent is in the vicinity of to minimise transaction costs of negotiation, 10–14 per cent of GVP (Lal et al. 2001a). the industry has also suggested that each Alternatively, sharecropping may be another mill area company could negotiate with the option. However, as noted by Heady (1971) NLTB representatives of the mill area land- and Reid (1976), for sharecropping to be owning units, and enter into a single land- efficient there needs to be an equal lease contract directly with the NLTB. This distribution of rewards and costs as well as will not necessarily resolve the issue of risks. They also note that for efficiency it does arriving at market rent unless of course the not matter what the share ratio between land owners are directly consulted by the growers and landowners is—what matters NLTB, or are directly part of the negotiating is that the returns and costs are shared in the team. The rental amount would still need to same proportion. Transaction cost of reflect the marginal value of land in the negotiation and monitoring of tenant activity sugarcane production. in sharecropping should also be low. The advantage of this approach is that Sharecropping has not been considered land lease negotiations can be carried out as as a serious option, partly perhaps because a commercial transaction and land is seen of its bad reputation of exploitation by as a factor of production of the final landowners and growers. To avoid commodity, sugar, and not as the political exploitation of the landowners or the growers football that it has been in the past. By (Otsuka et al. 1992) and a loss in efficiency allowing individual mill areas to negotiate (see Shaban 1987; Binswanger et al. 1993), their own separate leases, and the the government could institute a system landowners being present during the clearly defining the parameters within which negotiations, both parties, the landowners sharecropping arrangements can be and the company, will be in a better position negotiated thus protecting both tenants and to take into account the local supply and landowners. demand of land as well opportunity cost of Similar risk issues are also a concern in sugarcane growing land. Furthermore, since the current land leasing system whereby the landowners would be stakeholders in the NLTB, and not the land-owning units, enter company, they will take into account in their into leasing agreements. Many economists, negotiations their share of the expected such as Kasper (2001), have argued for the returns from company profit, as well as their decorporatisation of the NLTB, allowing opportunity cost of not leasing land for leasing to occur through a competitive market sugarcane farming. situation. However, a recent economic survey The company would then be in a position of the growers suggests that this will not to enter into supply contracts with the growers work, at least in the short-to-medium term. on terms and conditions that would promote Growers indicated their preference for efficiency in the production sector, including leasing land through the NLTB, because of land rent reflecting the value of marginal their fear of land-owning unit members product. To determine rent, a detailed changing their minds. Growers are also production cost and production economic concerned that if they deal directly with model will be required, or the rental amount landowners, there will be demands by could be based on a percentage of the gross different members of land-owning units for value of product as mentioned previously.

Alternatively, the Sugar Cane Grower’s McGavin 2001), Indonesia (Fisher 1995), Costa Council could negotiate on behalf of Rica (Weitzner and Borras 2000) and Honduras growers with the NLTB, together with the (Chenier, Sherwood and Robertson 2000) participation of their respective local area suggests that developing a dialogue between representatives. Once again the transaction stakeholders is essential if collaboration and costs could be minimised. However, the peaceful resource use and management are to Sugar Cane Grower’s Council will not only be achieved. Only through a process that face similar problems to the company encourages stakeholder groups to come negotiating with the NLTB, the council together, critically assess the underlying model has an additional difficulty. Since the sources of concerns and share information can majority of the growers are Indofijians and a common understanding and an awareness the landowners are Fijians, there is a danger of interdependence be achieved. that ethnic politics may once again dom- Therefore, key stakeholders need to be inate land debate. This possibility can, provided with a detailed analysis of the key however, be minimised over time if trust and issues, perceptions and/or misconceptions a stable long-term relationship can be from the point of view of the landowners and encouraged through the new stakeholder- growers at the local level. Analysis could be based company structure. provided and synthesised at the appropriate Regardless of which negotiation model unit of aggregation—growers, land-owning is adopted, efficiency in the sugarcane units, or mill catchment area—and presented production is unlikely to be realised unless to the stakeholders in a user-friendly form. growers are able to negotiate separate leases Specific computer tools and techniques, such for their home sites. A separate lease for the as computer models, decision-support home site can encourage growers with better systems and Geographical Information alternative sources of livelihood to sell their Systems (GIS) are available now which can supply contracts and exit the industry help provide detailed objective and without putting their homes at risk. This integrated analysis of data available from the provides a less political environment for NLTB, the Fiji Sugar Corporation and the negotiation with the emotional factor of Ministry of Agriculture, Sugar and Land losing the home sites removed. Resettlement. The challenge is to use these, Recently, the NLTB has started to identify validate and harmonise the different data residential sites within an agricultural lease sets and integrate them in a manner that and charging separate rents for them. Once allows them to be used by all the key the fear of growers losing their house site is stakeholders to collectively make informed removed, the Sugar Cane Grower’s Council decisions (see Lal et al. 2002). and the NLTB can negotiate agricultural A decision-support system (Lal et al. lease rentals considering key factors related 2001b) is currently being developed as part to sugarcane farming. of an interdisciplinary project supported by An arrangement that encourages sharing the Australian Centre for International of information can also increase trans- Agricultural Research linking the different parency and help build trust between the databases and analytical modules. landowners and the growers. Through an objective assessment of alternatives, and a commitment to the Building trust stakeholding philosophy, stakeholders Experience in many developing countries, within each mill catchment can arrive at a such as Papua New Guinea (Jones and solution in their collective interests, and

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within the legislative guidelines protecting welfare of those who, like us, wish to the interests of growers and landowners. The live peacefully and increase the wealth negotiation process will require some of the Colony. We are doing our part compromise, while recognising that here and so are they. We want to live; stakeholder-based industry is about ‘equality they do the same. You should realise of opportunity’ and ‘not equality of income’ that money causes a close inter- (Kelly, Kelly and Gamble 1997:243). relationship of interests. If other communities are poor, we too remain poor. If they prosper, we also prosper. Conclusion But if we obstruct other people without reason from using our lands, following While conflict over land in Fiji is not new, it laggards there will be no prosperity has escalated in recent years in part because (Lal 1992:101). of the differences in perceptions, wants and The success of the stakeholder company needs of the two ethnic communities, will depend on whether there is a commitment indigenous Fijians and Indian Fijians, fueled on the part of the Fijian landowners and the by the use of incomplete information and Fijian administration to review the way rental misinformation, as well as political income and future returns from the expediency. If the conflict is to be reduced, stakeholder-based company are shared the proposed industry structure aimed at among the members of the land-owning unit, creating a ‘unity of purpose’ is a necessary the respective chiefs, and the NLTB. first step. A long-term relationship between Ultimately, however, the long-term the stakeholders based on mutual trust must success of the stakeholder companies will be established. depend on the viability of sugarcane farming Trust cannot be legislated. It can develop in a competitive world sugar market, and on only when there is effective communication, whether Fiji is able to introduce a lease rental a shared understanding of the problems system that is considered to be fair and from the point of view of all stakeholders, equitable and market based. Ideally, what is an understanding of their different interests required is a system where farmers can freely and a sense of who is affected by, and who negotiate leasing arrangements with the can influence, the use of the resource. An landowners. However, in the absence of a equitable and collaborative decision-making competitive land lease market, the challenge process involving relevant stakeholders, is to design an institutional system in which with the help of objective analysis using the the land rent reflects the marginal value of best information available could assist product in sugarcane farming and that enormously. minimises the prospect of monopoly rent For stakeholding to work towards being extracted by the NLTB. achieving a sense of ‘unity of purpose’, a change in culture is required. Stakeholders need to understand that with stakeholding Acknowledgments comes both rights and obligations and that it is a two-way relationship of interdependence The authors wish to thank Ron Duncan for between the growers and the landowners. As his comments and the Australian Centre for Ratu Sukuna aptly noted in 1936, International Agricultural Research for [we] cannot in these days adopt an supporting the ongoing three-year research attitude that will conflict with the project on which this paper is based.

Appendix 1 NLTB recommendations to government

• Government, political party leaders and all other stakeholders should explicitly and publicly acknowledge that native land (including Crown Schedule A and B lands) is the exclusive property of the Fijian landowners and accordingly the NLTB in consultation with the landowners alone should have the right to determine when, how or if their land is to be leased. • Government, political party leaders and all other stakeholders should explicitly and publicly acknowledge the debt owed by both the Nation and the tenant communities to the landowners for their sacrifice in having surrendered the use of their land under ALTO and ALTA at less than commercial rates of returns and further publicly acknowledge the right of the landowners to receive a fair and commercially determined rate of return on lands they will allow for leasing. • Government should expeditiously put in place amendments to the current provisions of ALTA to allow new agricultural leases over native land to be outside the ambit of ALTA. At the same time, NLTB should publicly announce its assurance to the tenant community that those, whose leased land will not be required by the landowner for their use will be offered rolling leases under NLTA. Government and political party leaders should explicitly and publicly acknowledge that Fijians have traditional and customary ownership rights. • NLTB should publicly announce that together with Government and in consultation with the Fijian landowners native land will be made available for resettlement. Government and political party leaders should explicitly and publicly announces its full support, both in terms of resources and finance, to NLTB to enable it to make available land for resettlement both in rural, urban and peri-urban areas. • Government and political party leaders should explicitly and publicly acknowledge that Fijians have traditional and customary ownership rights over land below high water mark referred as their qoliqoli and that the Fijians should be rest assured that Bills shall be introduced conferring such rights to the Fijian owners. • Government and political party leaders should explicitly and publicly acknowledge that native land previously acquired by Government for public purpose and are currently used for purpose other than for public purposes be immediately returned to the original owners.

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Notes 7 Goodwill payments, although illegal under ALTA, have always been paid by tenants. In the past these usually were equivalent to 1 In Fiji’s pre-colonial period, resources were about one year’s rent. In 1999–2000, the owned by different units of Fijian society, goodwill (or New Land Consideration fees, vanua, yavusa, mataqali or itokatokas. Vanua, the as goodwill has recently been referred to) largest unit, consisted of ‘agnatic descendents charged by NLTB ranged between F$2,000 of common ancestors or ancestral gods living and F$22,000 per lease (Lal et al. 2001a). A in the same area. Each vanua would have one similar amount has also been paid to the or more yavusa, the members agnatically landowners for giving their ‘consent’. related. A yavusa comprised several mataqalis 8 These figures differ from those reported in whose members were in turn related to the Lal et al. (2001a), although both were derived descendent of their yavusa’s founder. One or from NLTB. According to the Manager, more extended families, itokatoka, form a Information Technology, NLTB, the differ- mataqali ‘(Ward 1995:200). The British colonial ence is due to different cut-off dates used to government that formalised land ownership determine when the leases expired. in Fiji recognised communal ownership at 9 Proposed sugarcane quality payment, as in the mataqali level (France 1969). the case of the Australian system, would 2 Kamikamica and Davey note that figures reward growers and millers for their quoted by Eaton (1988:24) and Nayacakalou respective efficiency gains over and above (1971:216) were wrongly reported to be 25 some benchmark, and penalise them per cent going to the NLTB, 30 per cent to the according to their efficiency losses. Despite chiefs and 45 per cent to the mataqali members. the growers and the miller agreeing in 2002 3 ALTA is entrenched in the 1997 Constitution, to implement such a system from the and thus any changes to it would require a following crushing season, according to Mr two thirds majority in parliament. Gerald Barrack this has been deferred for at 4 The percentages are incorrect, see Note 2. least another year (Fiji Times, 19 February 5 In the November 2002 Budget, the sugar 2003). While the growers are still in support export tax was increased to 10 per cent from of the introduction of the sugarcane quality January 2003 (Qarase 2002). payment system (Sugar Cane Growers’ 6 These estimates are based on matching the Council 2003); it appears that the miller has boundaries of land-owning units and changed its position on this. 10 mataqalis with the areas covered by Expected net returns are determined by sugarcane leases, actual land rent paid by multiplying the probability and the net return. lessees, and the number of over-18 years old members of each land-owning unit. The amount of rent payable to each land-owning References unit was assessed using actual rent paid by the lessees and determining the proportion Barlowe, R., 1972. Land Resource Economics: of that rent that should accrue to each land- the economics of real property, Prentice owning unit based on the proportion of the Hall, Sydney. lease which belongs to the particular land- Buckles, D. and Rusnak, G., 2000. owning unit from the Native Land Registry ‘Introduction: conflict and collaboration at the NLTB. Per member rent was estimated in natural resource management’, in D. using the total rent received by a land- Buckles (ed.), Cultivating Peace: conflict owning unit, after the NLTB and the chiefs’ and collaboration in natural resource share was deducted (see Note 2) and divided by the number of adults over 18 years management, International Development registered in the Vola ni Kawa Bula maintained Research Centre, Ottawa:1–12. by the Ministry Fijian Affairs (see Lal et al. Chenier, J., Sherwood S. and Robertson, T., 2002 for details). 2000. ‘Copna, Honduras: collaboration

for identity, equity and sustainability’, in Kasper, W., 2001. ‘How to learn racial D. Buckles (ed.), Cultivating Peace: conflict harmony? Fiji would benefit from rules and collaboration in natural resource of a new game’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, management, International Development 16(1):136–41. Research Centre, Ottawa:221–36. Kelly, G., Kelly, D. and Gamble, A., 1997. Cullen, R., 1985. ‘Rationing recreation use ‘Conclusion: stakeholder capitalism’, in of public land’, Journal of Environmental G. Kelly, D. Kelly and A. Gamble (eds), Management, 21:213–24. Stakeholder Capitalism, Macmillan Press, Darling, A., 1997. ‘A political perspective’, London and Political Economy in G. Kelly, D. Kelly and A. Gamble Research Centre, Sheffield:238–55. (eds), Stakeholder Capitalism, Macmillan Lal, B.V., 1992. Broken Waves: a history of the Press and Political Economy Research Fiji Islands in the twentieth century, Centre, London and Sheffield:10–19. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. Eaton, C., 1988. ‘Vakavanua land tenure and ——, 1997. A Vision for Change: A.D. Patel tobacco farming’, in J. Overton (ed.), Rural and the politics of Fiji, National Centre for Fiji, Institute of Pacific Studies, University Development Studies, The Australian of the South Pacific, Suva:19–30. National University, Canberra. Fisher, R., 1995. Collaborative Management of Lal, P.N., Lim-Applegate, H. and Reddy, M., Forest for Conservation and Development, 2001a. ‘Land tenure dilemma in Fiji— World Conservation Union–Worldwide can Fijian landowners and Indo-Fijian Wildlife Fund, Gland. tenants have their cake and eat it too?’, France, P., 1969. Charter of the Land: custom Pacific Economic Bulletin, 16(2):106–19. and colonisation in Fiji, Oxford Lal, P.N., Lim-Applegate, H., and University Press, Melbourne. Scoccimarro, M., 2001b. ‘INRM or Heady, E.O., 1971. ‘Optimal sizes of farms adaptive decision-making process (ADM under varying tenure forms, including process)—a case of focus, attitudes and renting, ownership, state and collective approach’, Conservation Ecology, 5(2):11. structures’, American Journal of Lal, P.N., Rita, R. and Tuivanuavou, S., 2002. Agricultural Economics, 53(1):17–25. Can information from different sets of data Hutton, W., 1997. ‘An overview of reduce land conflict, Paper presented at stakeholding’, in G. Kelly, D. Kelly and the FAO/RIC/USP Land Symposium, 10– A. Gamble (eds), Stakeholder Capitalism, 12 April. Available online at http:// Macmillan Press, London and Political www.usp.ac.fj/landmgmt/symposium/ Economy Research Centre, Sheffield:3–9. landtenurepapers. Jones, L.T. and McGavin, P.A., 2001. Land Lal, P.N. and Reddy, M. 2003. Survey data Mobilisation in Papua New Guinea, Asia collected as part of a project funded by Pacific Press, The Australian National The Australian Centre for International University, Canberra. Agricultural Research, Canberra (unpublished). Kamikamica, J. and Davey, T., 1988. ‘Trust on trial—the development of the Lal, P.N. and Rita, R. 2003. Data made customary: land trust concept in Fiji’, in available by the NTLB, Ratuva, personal Y. Ghai (ed.), Land, Government and communication (unpublished). Politics in the Pacific Island States, Institute Moynagh, M., 1981. Brown or White? A of Pacific Studies, University of the history of the Fiji sugar industry, 1873– South Pacific, Suva:284–303. 1973, National Centre for Development

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