Senator Mitch Mcconnell, Et Al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) V
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA __________________________________________ ) Senator Mitch McConnell, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) v. ) ) Federal Election Commission, et al., ) ) Defendants, ) and ) Civil Action No.: ) 02-CV-582 (CKK, KLH, RJL) Senator John McCain, Senator Russell Feingold, ) ALL CONSOLIDATED CASES Representative Christopher Shays, Representative ) Martin Meehan, Senator Olympia Snowe, Senator ) James Jeffords, ) ) Intervening Defendants. ) DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS’ EXCERPTS OF BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS (Redacted Version for Public Distribution) ROGER M. WITTEN (D.C. Bar #163261) SETH P. WAXMAN (D.C. Bar #257337) RANDOLPH D. MOSS (D.C. Bar #417749) WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING 2445 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037-1420 (202) 663-6000 Counsel for Defendant-Intervenors Counsel for Defendant -Intervenors: Senator Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. John McCain, Senator Russell Feingold, E. Joshua Rosenkranz Representative Christopher Shays, Prof. Burt Neuborne Representative Martin Meehan, Senator Elizabeth Daniel Olympia Snowe, and Senator James Jeffords Laleh Ispahani Adam H. Morse Lynn Bregman BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE Eric J. Mogilnicki NYU School of Law Edward DuMont 161 Avenue of the Americas, 12th Floor Michael D. Leffel New York, NY 10013 Anja L. Manuel Stacy E. Beck Paul M. Dodyk A. Krisan Patterson Christopher J. Paolella Jennifer L. Mueller Peter Ligh WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE 2445 M Street, N.W. Worldwide Plaza Washington, D.C. 20037-1420 825 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10019 Bradley S. Phillips Michael R. Doyen Fred Wertheimer Stuart N. Senator Lexa Edsall Deborah N. Pearlstein DEMOCRACY 21 Randall G. Sommer 1825 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 400 Shont E. Miller Washington, DC 20006 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor Trevor Potter Los Angeles, CA 90071 Glen Shor THE CAMPAIGN AND MEDIA LEGAL CENTER David J. Harth 1101 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Charles G. Curtis, Jr. Suite 330 Monica P. Medina Washington, DC 20036 Michelle M. Umberger Sarah E. Reindl Alan B. Morrison HELLER EHRMAN WHITE & MCAULIFFE LLP PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP One East Main Street, Suite 201 1600 20th Street, N.W. Madison, WI 53703 Washington, DC 2000 REDACTED VERSION FOR PUBLIC RELEASE TABLE OF CONTENTS I. BCRA’s Soft Money Provisions Are Constitutional. ............................................................. 5 A. Background............................................................................................................. 5 B. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. ................................................................ 12 C. The Constitutional Framework. ............................................................................ 14 D. The Record Provides Overwhelming Support for Congress’s Judgment that Soft Money Has Been Used To Evade the Law and, in Actuality and Appearance, Corrupts the Political Process.......................................................... 19 E. The Measures Congress Adopted To Constrain the Solicitation and Receipt of Soft Money Contributions by Federal Officials and National Parties Are Constitutional..................................................................................... 44 F. The Measures Congress Adopted To Constrain the Use of Soft Money by State and Local Parties For Activities that Affect Federal Elections Are Constitutional........................................................................................................ 51 G. BCRA Will Not Prevent National and State Parties from Amassing the Resources Necessary for Effective Advocacy. ..................................................... 61 II. BCRA’s Electioneering Communications Provisions Are Constitutional. .......................... 66 A. The Problem Congress Addressed: The Legislative History and Record Evidence Regarding Sham “Issue” Ads Run By Corporations, Unions, And Other Interest Groups.................................................................................... 69 B. The Measures Congress Adopted to Solve the Problem: A Summary of BCRA’s Electioneering Communications Provisions. ......................................... 94 C. BCRA’s Electioneering Communications Provisions Are Constitutional. .......... 96 III. BCRA’s Coordination Provisions Are Constitutional. ....................................................... 120 A. Plaintiffs’ Section 214 Challenges Are Nonjusticiable and Fail on the Merits. ................................................................................................................. 121 B. The Section 213 “Either/Or” Provision Is Entirely Consistent With the Supreme Court’s Treatment of “Independent” and “Coordinated” Expenditures by Political Parties in Colorado I and Colorado II....................... 131 IV. BCRA’s “Millionaire’s Provisions” Are Constitutional..................................................... 136 A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Challenge the Millionaire’s Provisions................... 137 B. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims Lack Merit...................................................... 138 C. Congress’s Approval of Higher Contribution Limits for Candidates Who Face Wealthy, Self-Funded Opponents Does Not Render the Basic Contribution Limits Unconstitutional................................................................. 142 i REDACTED VERSION FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS’ INTRODUCTION “Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000). That warning underscores what the Supreme Court has long recognized: campaign finance practices can pose a serious threat to our democracy, and Congress has sufficient constitutional authority, consistent with the First Amendment, to protect the federal political process from the corrosive influence of those practices when they do.1 In enacting the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”), Congress broke no new legislative or constitutional ground. Laws barring corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for federal election activity and limiting individual contributions have commanded a national consensus for decades.2 In recent years, however, corporations, unions, wealthy individuals, and the political parties have discovered and exploited ways to evade these longstanding laws on a scale that threatens to render them irrelevant. BCRA’s core provisions close the loopholes that have permitted this wholesale evasion. They do nothing more and nothing less. Notably: 1 See, e.g., Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957) (deference to legislative attempts to “avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (“Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’“) (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (“NCPAC”); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 437 (2001) (“Colorado II”). 2 See Thomas E. Mann, Report of Thomas E. Mann at 2-11 [DEV 1-Tab 1, hereinafter Mann Expert Report] provides a brief history of campaign finance legislation. REDACTED VERSION FOR PUBLIC RELEASE • Since 1907, Congress has banned the use of corporate treasury funds for contributions to federal candidates and their parties;3 since 1947, Congress has similarly banned expenditures of corporate treasury funds in connection with federal elections.4 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld laws that bar the use of these funds in connection with candidate elections.5 Title I of BCRA closes the “soft money” loophole that has permitted the injection of hundreds of millions of dollars of corporate contributions into the coffers of political parties for use in federal elections; Title II closes the sham “issue ad” loophole that reintroduced immense corporate expenditures directly into federal elections. • Since the 1940s, Congress has prohibited the use of union dues in connection with federal elections.6 As with corporate treasury funds, Titles I and II of BCRA close the soft money and sham issue ad loopholes that unions have used to reintroduce into federal elections massive contributions and expenditures from union dues. • Since 1974, Congress has capped contributions by individuals to candidates and parties,7 and the Supreme Court has upheld those contribution limits.8 Title I of BCRA closes the soft money loophole that reintroduced unlimited individual contributions into federal 3 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (“Tillman Act”). 4 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 159 (“Taft-Hartley Act”). 5 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 661; FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982). 6 Taft-Hartley Act; Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 209; United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 578-79 (detailing congressional intent behind the proscription on electoral activity funded from the “huge war chests being