Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

pdf version of the entry Temporal Consciousness http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/consciousness-temporal/ from the Fall 2010 Edition of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen John Perry Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor Editorial Board http://plato.stanford.edu/board.html Library of Congress Catalog Data ISSN: 1095-5054 Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Copyright c 2010 by the publisher The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 Temporal Consciousness Copyright c 2010 by the author Barry Dainton All rights reserved. Copyright policy: https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/info/copyright/ Temporal Consciousness First published Fri Aug 6, 2010 In ordinary conscious experience, consciousness of time seems to be ubiquitous. For example, we seem to be directly aware of change, movement, and succession across brief temporal intervals. How is this possible? Many different models of temporal consciousness have been proposed. Some philosophers have argued that consciousness is confined to a momentary interval and that we are not in fact directly aware of change. Others have argued that although consciousness itself is momentary, we are nevertheless conscious of change. Still others have argued that consciousness is itself extended in time. In this entry, the motivations and merits of these and other positions will be expounded and assessed. 1. Three Models of Temporal Consciousness 1.1 Time and Consciousness 1.2 Terminology, Problems and Principles 2. A Brief History 2.1 Augustine 2.2 Locke, Berkeley and Hume 2.3 Thomas Reid: common sense champion of PT-antirealism 2.4 Kant and Brentano: the emergence of Retentional models 2.5 Meinong and Stern: the emergence of the Extensional alternative 2.6 James and the Specious Present 2.7 Bergson, Husserl, Russell and Broad 3. Further Issues and Distinctions: Simultaneity, Immediacy and Continuity 4. Cinematic Models 4.1 Cinematic Realism 1 Temporal Consciousness 4.2 Cinematic Antirealism 4.3 Reid on the Proper Provinces of Sense and Memory 4.4 Further Diagnoses: Crick and Koch, Le Poidevin 4.5 A More Radical Anti-Realism: Dennett 5. Extensional Models 5.1 The Extensional Specious Present 5.2 The Discrete Block Model 5.3 Broad's Partial Extensionalism 5.4 The Overlap Model 5.5 Problems and Prospects 6. Retentional Models 6.1 Retentional Models: Motivations 6.2 The Retentional Specious Present: challenges and variations 6.3 The Retentional Stream of Consciousness 6.4 Assessments 7. Metaphysics of Temporal Consciousness 7.1 Time of Consciousness vs Consciousness of Time 7.2 Temporal Consciousness and the Metaphysics of Time 7.3 Memory, Experience and Determinacy Bibliography Other Internet Resources Related Entries 1. Three Models of Temporal Consciousness 1.1 Time and Consciousness Time and consciousness are interwoven on several levels. From the vantage point of ordinary life and common sense, consciousness plainly seems to exists in time. When we hear the clock strike twelve, our auditory experience of it so doing also occurs at twelve (or at most a few moments later). Watching a 120 minute action movie results in a two hour 2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Barry Dainton moments later). Watching a 120 minute action movie results in a two hour stream of auditory and visual experiences (along with accompanying thoughts and feelings), and this stream runs concurrently with the playing of the movie. Quite generally, our conscious states, irrespective of their kind or character, seem to occur in the same temporal framework as the events in the wider world – even if their precise timing is not easy to ascertain. But this is by no means the whole story. Our consciousness may be located within time, but there are also ways in which time or temporality might be regarded as manifest within consciousness. Our episodic (or autobiographical) memories supply us with access to our own pasts; thanks to such memories our earlier states of consciousness are not altogether lost to us: they can be recreated (or relived), albeit imperfectly, in our present consciousness. And of course there are past-oriented emotions, such as remorse or regret or shame: through these the past can influence our present feelings, often in powerful ways. While there is no future-directed counterpart of memory, we can anticipate future happenings (more or less accurately, more or less eagerly), and experience future-directed emotions: fear, dread, hope – and these too can exert a powerful influence of our present states of consciousness. The story is still by no means complete, for temporality is manifest in consciousness in a further and more intimate way. In our ordinary experience, over brief intervals, we seem to be directly aware of temporally extended phenomena such as change, persistence and succession. When we see a friend waving goodbye, do we infer that their arm is moving, on the basis of having observed a motionless arm occupying a sequence of adjacent spatial location? We do make such inferences of this kind: if I see that my neighbour's dustbin is in the middle of the road rather than its usual position on the pavement, I (rightly) infer that it has been moved. But the case in question is not at all like this: what we see is simply an arm in motion. (Is it for nothing that cinema is often called ‘the moving image’?) The same applies in other sensory modalities. When listening to a melody, we hear each note giving Fall 2010 Edition 3 Temporal Consciousness sensory modalities. When listening to a melody, we hear each note giving way to its successor; when we hear a sustained violin tone, we hear the tone continuing on, from moment to moment. If temporally extended occurrences such as these can feature in our immediate experience, it is natural to conclude that our awareness must be capable of embracing a temporal interval. While this may seem obvious, it can also seem problematic. We can remember the past and anticipate the future, but we are only directly aware of what is present – or so it is natural to say and suppose. But the present, strictly speaking, is momentary. So if our awareness is confined to the present, our awareness must itself lack temporal depth. Hence we are led swiftly to the conclusion that our direct awareness cannot possibly encompass phenomena possessing temporal extension. We are thus confronted with a conundrum: it seems our awareness must extend over time, but it seems it can't. In grappling with this ‘paradox of temporal awareness’ as it is sometimes called, different philosophers have proposed quite different accounts (or models) of the structure of temporal consciousness. Simplifying somewhat, the most commonly favoured options fall into three main categories: Cinematic Model: our immediate awareness lacks any (or any significant) temporal extension, and the same applies to the contents of which we are directly aware – they are akin to static, motion-free ‘snapshots’ or ‘stills’. Our streams of consciousness are composed of continuous successions of these momentary states of consciousness. In this respect they are analogous to movies, which (as displayed) consist of rapid sequences of still images. Retentional Model: our experiencing of change and succession occurs within episodes of consciousness which themselves lack 4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Barry Dainton occurs within episodes of consciousness which themselves lack temporal extension, but whose contents present (or represent) temporally extended intervals and phenomena. These episodes thus have a complex structure, comprising momentary phases of immediate experience, along with representations (or retentions) of the recent past. Our streams of consciousness are composed of successions of these momentary states. Extensional Model: our episodes of experiencing are themselves temporally extended, and are thus able to incorporate change and persistence in a quite straightforward way. Our streams of consciousness are composed of successions of these extended ‘chunks’ of experience. These labels are not standard – in this field there is little by way of terminological uniformity – but they are as apt as any. All three models are depicted in Figure 1 below. In each of the diagrams the horizontal line represents ordinary clock-time. Although the Retentional and Cinematic models both trade in momentary (or very brief) states of consciousness – in the diagrams such states are represented by thin vertical lines – these states are construed very differently. In the Cinematic case the momentary contents seem momentary, and are static (they contain no discernible motion or change); in the Retentional case the contents appear to possess a brief temporal depth, containing as they do experienced change and succession – hence the backward pointing arrows, intended to signify the way in which the recent past is supposedly ‘retained’ in present consciousness. Fall 2010 Edition 5 Temporal Consciousness Figure 1. The Three Main Conceptions of Temporal Consciousness. In his influential writings on these matters William James argued that to make sense of our temporal experience we need to distinguish the strict (or mathematical) present from the from the experiential (or specious) present: whereas the first is indeed durationless, the second possesses a brief duration, sufficient to accommodate the change and persistence we find in our immediate experience. The Retentional and Extensional approaches can each be seen as implementing James' proposal, albeit in very different ways. Ascertaining where the truth lies among the differing accounts of the temporal contents of our immediate experience is interesting and intriguing in itself.

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