METAPHYSICS THROUGH METAPHORS: TOWARDS AN

UNDERSTANDING OF TIME IN PSYCHOLOGY WITH WILLIAM JAMES'S

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY

DANIEL A. NOEL

A thesis subrnitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Graduate Programme in Psychoiogy York University North York, Ontario

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by Daniel Allen Noel

a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Permission has been granted to the LIBRARY OF YORK UNIVERSITY to lend or seIl copies of this thesis, to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film, and to UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS to publish an abstract of this thesis. The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or othenvise reproduced without the author's written permission. Abstract

This thesis focuses on William James's (1 842- 19 10) conceptualization of Time in his seminal work, The Principles of Psycholow (1890). On the surface, James's explicit statements concerning Time advance the temporal assumptions that were conventional for science. According to the conventional scientific idea, Time was exclusiveIy quantitative, homogeneous, linear. and reductive; in other words, it was objecrive. An examination of James's metaphors, however, reveals another idea of Time that was implicit in his presentation of concepts such as the stream of consciousness, the fringe of felt relations, and the saddleback of the specious present. Historical evidence and recent discussions on the use of metaphor in science support the suggestion that metaphors function in James's work as iiterary bridges between philosophy and natural science.

Through metaphors, James at once provides the philosophical underpinnings of his ideas, but without undermining his proposa1 that psychology should be treated as a natural science, The idea of Time that emerges out of his metaphors is one that is more inclusive, one that advocates the more subjective characteristics inhering in the experience of Time: such as its qualitative, heterogeneous, and irreducible characteristics.

In effect, James accomrnodates the scientific approach to psychology by supplementing the scientific conceptualization of Time with one that is more inclusive, and thus more authenticating, of the psychological view of reality. Acknowledgements

1 would like to acknowledge the aid of York University's Research Costs Fund and Harvard University's Houghton Library Archives in providing me access to much of the historical material conceming William James. Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE: A PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES ...... 1 OVERVIEW...... 1 TEMPORALASSUMPTlONS WlTHIN PSYCHOLOGY...... , ...... 4 The 'prevalertce' and 'iniplicimess' of temporal assum~tions...... 4 The problemic of ~svcho1o~~'sremuoral assumprions...... , ...... 6 CONCEPTUALIZWGTIME ...... 9 SCIENCE.TIME, AND PSYCHOLOGY ...... 14 Slife 'sdescription ofNewtoninn tirne...... 23 A probleniatic solution-Oaeratinr~al anah*sis...... 26 Criticisms ofpsvcholonv 's Newotiiarz assumptions ofTime ...... 31 TLMEAND WILLIAM JAMES:THE m.AND METAPHORS ...... 33

CHAPTER 2: RELEVANT SOURCES OF WILLIAM JAMES'S PRINCIPLES OF PSY CHOLOGY ...... 46 EARLYLIE ...... 46 STUDIES AND EXPLORATION...... 51 THEPRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY( 1 890) ...... 63 SUMMARY...... 66

CHAPTER 3: METAPHYSICS THROUGH METAPHORS ...... 70 THEIMPLlClT METAPHYSICSIN JAMES'SNATURAL SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY...... 71 The novelnr ofJames's scientific approach to ~svcholonv...... 72 The assumptions ofthe natural science ofpsvcholoay ...... 74 JAMES'SSTYLE AND METHOD ...... 79 James's stvle ...... 79 James's metaphors: literary bridges between philosophy and science ...... 81 RUDIMENTSOF METAPHORKAL ANALYSE ...... 89 Metaphor in Literafure...... 89 The coristructivist account ...... 92 The role ofnletaphors in science ...... , ...... 96 A histonographical note ...... 98 METAPHYSICSTHROUGH METAPHORS ...... 101 Heraclitus and temporal a~oria...... 102 The strcamlchain/train/current/physiologysystem of metaphors ,...... 103 Zeno 'sparadox ofremnorai contirtuin1...... 110 Kant's critique ...... 113 James's rebuttal: The stream/saddleback/flight/fnnge/flowsystem of metaphors ...... 115 DISCUSSION...... 130 REFERENCES ...... 131 Chapter One: The Issues Presented

Overview

In this, and following chapters, 1will explicate William James's (1 842- 19 10) contributions to the temporal assumptions' that have developed within psychology.

This analysis focuses on some important vehicles of James's influence in psychology; namely the metaphors in his fundamental text, The Principles of Psycholony (1 890), and the central concept of this work, the "stream of consciousness." Additionally, 1 will discuss concepts reIated to the temporal aspects of James's discussions of hurnan experience (e.g., the specious present), and incorporate suppIementary material from

James that fell both before and after the publication of The Principles of Psycho10,ay

(hereafter referred to as the PP). Nonetheless, it is within the PP that more than a decade of James's thought and work culrninate, from which his later thought derives, and upon which 1 will concentrate this study. In the PP, James expertly ernploys metaphor to craft a compelling account of human experience. 1 will explain how

James's disavowal of an explicit metaphysics necessitated means other than logic to account for mentai life-a key instrument being his metaphorical style. Accordingly,

James's metaphors and what they reveal of his implicit metaphysical assumptions of

Time are a central concern of this thesis.' Through an account of his metaphors, 1 wilI demonstrate how James's implicit rnetaphysical assumptions of Time, coupled with his metaphorical style, contributed to the nascence and propagation of the implicit assurnptions of Time in later psychology~aneffect that I explain below). The second chapter covers the historical context of James's E. This historical context is especiaIly important for an account of his strategic use of metaphorical description and explanation. The historical background of James's work will buttress later reflections concerning the idea of Time irnplicit in his metaphors. In due course, the plausibility of my arguments concerning James's metaphors and assumptions of

Time will prove consistent and coherent with the historical context within which he wrote the m.Several important pieces of information emerge out of this historical account: information conceming possible sources of James's metaphors, information on some potential sources of his assumptions of Time, information about the intended audience for the PP, and incumbent upon this information, what he may have assumed for the construction of his metaphors.

The third and final chapter contains the discussion of Time in James's K.

Beyond what few explicit statements he provides on this topic, I examine the

'implicit' metaphysic of Time that 1 locate within his metaphors. To facilitate this examination, 1 discuss recent scholarship on the topic of metaphor and explicate the most appropriate position on this topic; namely the constructivist approach. From this approach, 1explain the appropriateness of metaphorical analysis for exarnining

James's E. Again, it is through standards of consistency and coherence that the constructivist position achieves its appropriateness for an examination of the assumptions of Time implicit in James's metaphors. I concentrate my attention upon the metaphors which accompany those topics that are inherently dynamic or temporal: topics such as consciousness, the self, memory, and time perception. Associated with these concepts are the principal metaphors of the Stream of consciousness, the flight of the transitive parts and perching of the substantive parts of the Stream, the fringe of felt relations, the saddleback of the specious present-and more subtly-the clock of operationaiized time, the underlying mechanical mode1 of

James's "science," as well as physiological metaphors of a "scientific psychology." 1 examine these metaphors as a constellation of inter-related ideas which both express meaning, and generate possibilities for meaning. 1suggest how the "meanings" of his metaphors may have influenced the subsequent development (or lack of development) of psychology's assumptions regarding Time. Contrasted with his effect on other disciplines, I explain that the effect of James's PP on later psychology indicates psychologyfs general unreflective stance towards philosophicd considerations in general, and towards its own assumptions in particular. With this thesis, 1initiate some of these reflections as 1consider some fundamental questions that psychologists have trivialized or externalized.

1devote the remainder of this first chapter to a broad sketch of the temporal assumptions in psychology: demonstrating the presence, implicitness, and problems of such assumptions. These discussions will advance a later argument: though these assurnptions were implicit in James's psychology, it is perhaps through this

'irnplicitness' that his assumptions were perpetuated by later psychology. 1will then specify those temporal issues related to these assumptions which were possibly

'consequential' in the writing of the E. 1further explain the relevance and capacity of an examination of James's metaphors for an explication of these implicit

assumptions of Time.

Temporal Assurnptions within Psychology

The 'prevaience' and 'implicitness' of temporal assumptions

Time is a prevalent feature of psycho~ogicaldiscourse. Tirne often appears as an

independent or dependent variable in psychological experirnents-occasionally, even,

as both the independent and dependent variable. An exarnple is the familiar case

where a psychologist varies the time interval of stimulus presentation (the

independent variable), and measures performance in terms of reaction time4 (the

dependent variable). In addition, there are occasions where Time is the culprit in

cases of questionable validity or reliability5; taking the form of methodological issues

such as history and maturation. And for specific areas such as clinical psychology,

Time is sometimes regarded as both a stressor, and the other, sometimes better,

"healer."

Considering the ubiquity of Time in daily human activity, it is appropriate that

psychologists make such a broad and heavy use of Time. Indeed, there seems to be

no limit to the way in which humans use Time. Time can be something invested or

wasted, measured or counted, experienced or fought. We use Time to locate, structure, schedule, and synchronize our activities: for example, Time allows us to arrange a meeting "at a certain time." As an important, even fundamental, aspect of hurnan activity, it is indispensable in a number of capacities to psychological research. This does not, however, explain why psychology has so seldomly

considered Time.

The prevailing sentiment responsible for psychology's neglect of Time may be

illustrated by the prosaic refrain, "Time just is." Essentially, this statement suggests

that Time is present, or part of reality, and understood in a like manner by dl. Time,

however, is highly problematic (as I will demonstrate below). The occasional

usefulness of this assumption notwithstanding, the presumption of Tirne's sanctity

arrests any further discussion of it. But a psychologist who assumes that "Time just

is," is one who has failed to recognize several hazardous assumptions at the heart of

psychologicd discourse. 1 will argue that the extent to which psychologists cm agree

that Time is a fundamental feature, fundamental for how as humans we structure and

understand our lives, to this degree it should be considered a central topic for

psychology.

Considerations of the temporal assumptions are particularly wanting in

psychology. Whether due to an economy of thought or philosophical naiveté, most

psychologists adopt a methodological solipsism when it comes to considering issues

of metaphysics (by relegating such issues to other disciplines such as philosophy). 1s

Time a question of philosophy or is it, as a fundamental dimension of psychologicd research, an issue for psychology? 1would say both. It is a topic that has been discussed in the dornain of philosophy, but what philosophers have to say on the metaphysic should be a primary concern for psychologists. Moreover, it will become apparent through later discussions that psychologists should have their own account, tailored for each particular psychslogical context in which this concept is applied.

Unfortunately, most psychologists would not regard rnetaphysical questions such as the nature of Tirne to be within the domain of psychology.

Although it is difficult to prove the absence of temporal considerations in so large a field as psychology, a survey of any introductory textbook will show that the rnetaphysical status of Time is not addressed6. The widespread use of "tirne" in psychology contrasts with the absence of any discussion concerning the nature of that concept, or even a citation of such a discussion. 1 cm only appeal to the reader's own experience with this, since "tirne" is used in so many studies that the actual figures for these questions are nearly incalculable; but it should be obvious that Time is an irnplicit assurnption of rnost psychologists7. Implicit assumptions, especially those concerning a fundamental ubiquitous feature of psychology such as Time, are precarious grounds for inquiry and research-especiaIly when Time is problematic.

But before 1discuss these assumptions, 1will first explicate the problernics of Time that remains unexamined when psychology's assumptions of Time are implicit.

The problemic of psvchologv's temporal assumptions

For what is time? Who can readily and briefly explain this? Who can even in thought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? But what in discourse do we mention more familiarly and knowingly, than time? And, we understand, when we speak of it; we understand also, when we hear it spoken of by another. What, then. is time? If no asks me, 1 know: if 1 wish to explain it to one that asketh, 1 know not: yet I Say boldly that 1 know, that if nothing passed away, time past were not; and if nothing were, time present were not. Those two times then, past and to come, how are they, seeing the past now is not, and that to come is not yet? (St. Augustine, Confessions, translated by E. B. Pusey; as cited in Gale, 1968, p. 40) Leaving aside for the moment the historical development of psychology's indiscriminate use of Time, this indiscriminacy may be explained through the overwhelming problemic associated with Time. Time is an intractable topic for it is both deceivingly basic and too problematic to allow easy explanation. This "basic" quality, which inheres in its ubiquity and the apparently searnless capacity of humans to understand Time, conceals a difficult and complex array of problems associated with this concept. Being basic, psychologists fail to see Time as problematic; being problematic, psychologists feel that Time is beyond their scope.

The complexity and perplexity incumbent upon considerations of Time is evident in St. Augustine's statement above, in which he alludes to the specific problem of the indefinitiveness of the word "time," and by extension, the indefinitiveness of the concept, Time. Because the concept encompasses such a multitude of features in life, it is virtudly impossible to derive a definition that would include every instance of its use, every instance of its future use.' Consequently, the ever-expanding nature of language precludes the possibility of every sense of the word ever being covered by one definition. When to this problernic are added issues such as Time's inostensabilityg and the almost inescapable circularity in many of the proposed working definitionslO,it becomes apparent why psychology has been reluctant to consider Time.

Those for whom Time was a fundamental and necessary topic include early philosophers such as ~lato'',Aristotle", and St. Augustine; later philosophers such as

Kant (1781/1965), Heidegger (l962), and Whitehead (1960); and physicists such as Newton (1726A969) and Einstein (1905). Though each of these persons has

recognized that Time is a crucial topic, each has in some way encountered the enigmatic nature of Tirne. Along these lines, McGrath and Kelly (1986) summarized the philosophical discourse on the problernic of Time. In their attempt to surnrnarize the philosophicai discourse on the problemic of Tirne, McGrath and Kelly (1986, p.

28) derived four general temporal problems, wjth two clusters of specific issues pertaining to each of the four general problems (for a total of eight clusters of specific issues). The fïrst problem concems Time's structure, which subsumes two issues

(see Figure 1): (a) is Time holistic or atomistic?; (b) is Time homogeneous or heterogeneous (composed of different parts)? The second problem engages two questions related to the flow of Time (see Figure 2): (c) is Time bi-directional or unidirectional?; (d) is Time uniform or phasic in its passage? The third problem takes issue with the reality of Time (see Figure 3): (e) is Time objective or subjective?; (f) is Time an abstract or concrete entity? The fourth, and last problem, deals with the validity of Time (see Figure 4): (g) is Time singular or pluralistic (many different

Times); (h) is Time independent of space (though perhaps confounded only in measurernent), or is it inherently confounded with space and other phenomena?

McGrath and Kelly (1986) further organized each issue (issues one through eight) with each designating an axis in a two dimensional figure for each general problem

(see Figures 1-4). Conceptualizing Time

Given the categories that McGrath and Kelly have outlined, it follows that this

problemic distinguishes between a large nurnber of concepts of Time (256 to be

precise). The problemic of Time has implications for psychology where it is an impljcit assumption: Allowing it to remain as an implicit assumption of Time not only leaves unexamined a host of problems, but fails to acknowledge al1 the many, alternative, and possibly better concepts of Time. A full discussion of this problemic lies outside the scope of this thesis'), but it introduces and serves as a useful framework for some of the issues that are relevant to it.

In order to provide a working understanding, it is perhaps useful to note that

Time is a concept that accounts for change (Honderich, 1995, p. 875-876). This is hardly delirniting, because change is itself a broad concept. NevertheIess, Time is a concept which might generally be applied to changes of location (motion), changes of order (succession), even the change inherent in existence itself (temporal becoming).

Beyond this generic sense, if indeed this is properly "generic," the concept has been burdened with various meanings, definitions, concepts, and theories that different peoples, across history and cultures, have attributed to it. Even so, scholars have made sorne common characterizations, the most cornrnon of v~hichis essentially a dualism between an internaVsubjective tirne and an extemallobjective time (see

Jackson & Michon, 1992; McTaggart, 1968; Michon, 19%; Szamosi, 1992).

Although there are some problems with this subject/object dualism14, it is a useful starting point. By internal/subiective time, 1 refer to the concept of time that originates from the experience of Time. 1 characterize this as internaihubjective because this experience is both interna1 to the subject and contingent upon his or her experience as a reference to Time. Within the temporal structure of a person's Me, the specific cultural and sociohistorical context within which they exist, internal/subjective time may be distinguished as that system of temporality which is "an intrinsic property of consciousness, [whereby this] Stream of consciousness is aIways ordered temporally,

[and] every individual is conscious of an inner flow of time, which in tum is founded on the physiological rhythms of the organism though it is not identical with these"

(Berger & Luckrnan, 1966, p.26).

From this internal/subjective tirne, humans gain access to the changing features of temporal becoming-pastness, presentness, and futurity-features which inhere only in reference to this subject and their experience (McTaggart, 1968). And thus, according to McGrath and Kelly's frarnework, this 'time' is epochal since it is divisible into the three tenses and dzfferentiable both in tenns of tense and the relational emotive qualties that become intenningled with the subjective experience of Time. The subjective experience of Time becomes confounded with these contextual qualities of emotion and relation, endowing it with significance, and with concrete consequences such as aging (and eventually death). This epochal quality of internal/subjective tirne further accounts for the phasic quality of Time; in other words, humans experience Time at varying rates; and since, as hurnans, we are unable to reverse ~irne'~,we experience Time as unidirecrional. Moreover, given that different subjects may have different experiences of Time, there are multiple times.

Thus in terrns of McGrath and KeIlyYsclassification scheme, internallsubjective time has the following characteristics: it has a divisible and differentiable structure; it has a unidirectional and phasic flow; it is both concrete and relational in terrns of reality; and it is multiple and inherently confounded in terms of validity.

h contrast, external/obiective time is postulated to have an existence apart frorn, independeni of, and extemal to the subject. Within Western societyi6,this is seen as an existence analogous to that of an "object." Just as an object is bounded in space, observable motion or change is bounded within an interval of time. with both time and space being assumed to be independent (although this point is somewhat questionable, still it is 'assumed'). This interval-be it accounted through the movement of the Sun, stars, or hands of a clock-sequences events in terrns of before and after (McTaggart, 1968). This ordering of events is assumed to be observable

(e.g., by tracking the motion of the hands of a dock), thus bequeathing an observability to Time. Moreover, as an observable bounded interval, Time is quantifiable; and taken together with al1 the previous characteristics, amenable to physical theory and mathematical description.

Given that the concept of Time comonly endorsed by the early physical sciences is incipiently that of Newton, several scholars (McGrath and Kelly ,1986;

Slife, 1993; Valle, 1989; and Szamosi, 1992) attribute this external/objective time to the Newtonian temporal paradigm. Similar to the intemaVsubjective and external/objective distinctions, Newton (1 726/1969, p. 12-15) distinguishes between absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar time17:

Abfolute, true and mathematical time, in itfelf, and from its own nature, flows equally, without relation to anything external; and by another name is called Duration. Relative, apparent, and vulgar tirne, is fome fenfible and external rneasure of duration by motion, whether accurate or unequable, which is cornmonly ufed inftead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year. . . .

Newton's bequeaths priority, or truth, upon the time that is absolute, mathematical. and independent of the observer. As humans, we rnay observe this time, but since our observations may vary or be inaccurate we must correct these observations through a mathematical cornparison to the true, constant, and continuous tirne. Newton's idea of Time roughly corresponds to the concept widely held by the natural sciences (at least prior to what McGrath and Kelly, 1986, have called "new physics").

Essentially, the principal concept of Time endorsed by the early physical sciences, external/objective time, was an assumption with several notable characteristics: It was atomistic and hornogeneous in structure; bi-directional and uniforrn in its passage

(Le., linear). It was abstract and absoiute in terrns of reality. And it was both singular and independent in terms of its validity. This time concept, however, has been problematic for the physical sciences and has given rise to several criticisms.

Szarnosi (1992) relates how developments such as the theories of relativity, quantum mechanics, and thermodynamics have called into question many of the previous temporal assumptions held by the physical sciences18-assumptions to do with what he characterizes as metric time (due to the prevailing interests of measurernent and quantification in physics). Einstein's special and general theories of relativity, which postulate that Time will flow at a different rate relative to the speed and mass of the observer, challenge prior assumptions of Time's uniforrn flow, its unconfounded nature, and its independence from space or motion. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle challenges the existence of arbitrarily small time intervals; which, dong with quantum rnechanics, further contests the continuity and the homogeneity of Time. Lastly, thermodynarnics disputes the assumption of bi- directionality; explaining the unidirectionality as a result of a universal increase in entropy (Coveney & Highfield, 1990, p. 32-35).

In addition to the challenges that have come from within the physical sciences, further objections have emerged frorn postmodernist conceptions of the philosophy of science. Post-modernisrn challenges the subject-object dualism implicit in the contrast between intemaVsubjective and external/objective time (see Berger &

Luckrnan, 1966, p, 26-27). Many difficulties with subject-object dualisms rest with the tendency of empirical science to define objects (such as Time) independently of the "observer"; and because of its observability, it tends to further bestow upon the

"objective" a singular claim to reality. This tendency is reflected in the negative connotations that often accompany science's use of the word "subjective." Reflecting the underlying sentiment that reality is monistic, and that anything which exists in multiplicity is not real, subjective often connotes "relative" or "irnaginary." A sirnilar priority given to 'objectivity' results from the dualism of internal/subjective and external/objective time. Since the former is internd to the subject, it becornes private

(unobservable) and one of many such 'times.' Thus, science regards internal/subjective time as illusory, or at best, a shadowy inzpoverislzed estimate of the

real, external/objective time. For instance, when one discusses the rate of

internal/subjective time, the standard of such a rate is nearly always

external/objective time. Tmly impoverished, however, is a science that emphasizes a

'singular' external/objective time-failing as it does to consider the many alternative,

and perhaps more useful conceptualizations of Tirne. Such is the case for

psyc hology .

Science. Time, and psvcho10,oy

Psychology's temporal assumptions figure largely in its agenda of the past

century; namely, to validate itself as a science and demonstrate the appropriateness of

the scientific method for examining psychological phenomena. This was an agenda

within which James's PP, and to which his contributions to psychoiogy's temporal

assumptions, play a central role19. But before 1return to the discussion of James, 1

will first broadly describe something of the historical context surrounding the

temporal contributions of James's E.Specifically, 1 will discuss the historical

context of psychology's temporal assumptions in terms of its agenda of becoming,

and being regarded as, a science.

Foremost arnong the challenges set before psychology's nascence as a science, and constitutive of its later agenda, is Kant's (1781/1965) daim that psychological inquiry has only one fonn of intuition, Time, for the phenornena properly suited to psychology (those phenomena being the "inner objects"). In contrast, argued Kant, the physical sciences have, in addition to Time, the intuition of space for the

description of its objects. Taking Newtonian mechanics as the prototype of science,

Kant maintained that an empirical science requires both of these intuitions in order

that its objects might be observed and thus described mathemati~all~~~.Kant

compared the objects of the outer sense (objects for the physical sciences) with the

objects of the inner sense (objects for psychology), and concluded that a science of

the latter, and thus the science of psychology, is not possible. Because the passage

containing this criticism has implications further on in this discussion, 1 quote it at

length:

Although both are appearances, the appearance to outer sense has something fixed or abiding which supplies a substratum as the basis of its transitory determinations and therefore a synthetic concept, namely, that of space and of an appearance in space; whereas time, which is the sole form of our inner intuition, has nothing abiding, and therefore yields knowledge only of the change of determinations, not of any object that can be thereby determined. For in what we entitle 'soul', everything is in continua1 flux and there is nothing abiding except (if we must so express ourselves) the 'Il, which is simple solely because its representation has no content, and therefore no manifold, and for this reason seems to represent, or (to use a more correct term) denote, a simple object. In order that it should be possible, by pure reason, to obtain knowledge of the nature of a thinking being in general, this '1' would have to be an intuition which, in being presupposed in al1 thought (prior to al1 experience), might as intuition yield a priori synthetic propositions. This '1' is, however, as little an intuition as it is a concept of any object; it is the mere forrn of consciousness, which can accompany the two kinds of representation and which is in a position to elevate them to the rank of knowIedge only in so far as something else is given in intuition which provides material for a representation of an object. Thus the whole of rational psychology, as a science surpassing al1 powers of humari reason, proves abortive, and nothing is left for us but to study our sou1 under the guidance of experience, and to confine ourselves to those questions which do not go beyond the limits wirhin which a content can be provided for them by possible inner experience. (Kant, 178 l/l965, p. 353)

As Kant explains it, though the objects for psychology (those of the inner sense) have the forrn of Time, this forrn is not observable in the same manner as external objects.

Experience necessarily occurs in Time, but Kant argues, "Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived frorn any experience" (Kant, 178 111965, p. 74). Being intemal to a person, one can not observe the inner objects of another; nor cm one observe one's own inner objects: by Kant's account, these inner objects occur as the succession (Tirne) that give these objects their fom (178111965, p. 75). It would be just as impossible to ask a one-eyed man to pluck-out, dissect, and the 'observe' the very eye needed for this observation.

Kant's critique was a very real and present concern for James. As he points out,

These dechrations on Kant's part of the utter barrenness of the consciousness of the pure Self. and of the consequent impossibility of any deductive or 'rational' psychology, are what carned for him the title of the 'ail-destroyer.' (James, 1890, p. 362)

Kant's was just one of many positions that James addressed in his PP, but it has a great deal to do with the topic of this thesis, Time.

We are thus left with just the experience of Time. an experience that is no more quantifiable that it is observable. Quantification requires a "something" to be observed. It follows from rnany of the same reasons Kant provided above, that there can be no quantities of Time in Kant's estimation of psychological objects; the intuition of Time does not provide quantifiable content. Moreover, provided that quantification is not possible, measurement is just as unlikely. Measurement requires a standard to which the time of one experience could be compared with another.

Because different times were "not simultaneous but successive" (Kant, 178111965, p.

75), no such standards, or comparisons with such a standard, were possible in psychology. The only temporal differentiations that Kant attributes to psychology are qualititative differentiations of time. We can have an experience of one thought as before or after another thought; or in reference to the self, we can experience thoughts in ternis of pst, present, or future; but none of these experiences admits quantification or measurement. Along with Kant, who "believed, and considered fie had proved. that an empirical inquiry is as scientific as the amount of mathematics it contains" (Watson & Evans, 1991, p. 240), psychology believed it could be a science only so far as it could quantify and apply mathematics to its objects (see Boring,

1936; Stevens, 1935; Tolman, 1936).

Kant derived his scientific criterion of quantification from Newtonian physics.

Kant was impressed by the power of the Newtonian paradigm. Newton's central work, Principia Mathematica (1726/1969), was, and remains, without its equal in its importance to science: "No other work known to the history of science has simultaneously permitted so large an increase in both the scope and precision of research" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 30). And by Kant's estimation, the Newtonian paradigm exemplified the potential of science for inquiries into the nature of the physical universe.

Though Newton's work contains a wealth of valuable insights for the process of science, it was Newton's application of mathematics with the intuitions of space and time that validated "science" for Kant (and subsequently served as a mode1 for psychology). Recall Newton's distinction between "Duration" (true, absolute, and mathematical time) and apparent, relative, and vuigar time. Though Newton accepted that Duration is never directly observed, Newton argued that it could be observed

indirectly through a mathematical correction of vulgar time:

Relative, apparent, and vulgar time, is fome fenfible and external measure of duration by motion, whether accurate or unequable, which is commonly ufed inftead of uue time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year. . . .Abfolme time, in aftronomy, is diftinguifed from relative by the equation or correction of vulgar time. For the natural days are tmly unequal, though they are commonly confidered as equal, and ufed for a measure of time. Aftronomers correct this inequality, that they may meafure the celeftial motions by a more accurate time. It may be, that there is no equable motion, whereby time may be accurately meafured. Al1 motions may be accelerated and retarded; but the flowing of abfolute tirne is liable to no change. The durntion or perfeverance of the exiftence of things remains the fame, whether motions are fwift, or flow, or none at all: therefore this duration is properly diftinguifhed from its fenfible meafures; and from them it is collected by means of aftronomical equation. The neceffity of which equation. for determining the times of a phenornenon, is evinced, as well by the experimenter of a pendulurn clock, as by the eclipfes of the fatellites of Jupiter. (1726/1969, p. 14-15)

For Kant, Newton's physics illustrated the inextricable relations between science, Time, quantification, and mathernatics-and hence the validity of scientific knowledge. Kant considered mathematical judgements, and the principles of mathematics, as a priori synthetic judgements; as synthetic a priori judgernents they were derived from intuitions of space and tirne. It will be recalled that the objects for science are externd and are thus mathematically describable 'through' both time and space: "Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge frorn which bodies of a priori synthetic knowledge cm be derived. (Pure mathematics is a brilliant example of such knowledge, especidly as regards space and its relations.)" (Kant,

178 1 /l965, p. 80). The second intuition, space, makes it possible for science to observe content in these extemal objects because having spatial dimensionality, science could observe an object abiding through time. Though Kant had argued that empirical observation, by itself, did not give us a tme representation of the noumenal world, Newton's process of describing these observations in terms of time and space, further quantifying, and then applying rnathematics to these observations, endowed his physics with the status of a priori synthetic knowledge that required no further proof" (Kant, 178 l/l965, p. 54). This position of Newtonian physics was an enviable one. And considered along with its success, the Newtonian paradigm has been the very model of science not only for Kant, but also for psychology.

SpecificalIy, Newton's process of quantifying Time has proved to be an influential model for how psychology could become a science. It is debatable as to what extent this agenda has been met, but certainly the trappings of science are present in contemporary psychology. Mainstream psychologies, such as cognitive psychology and behaviorism, for example, have developed several characteristics that are tacitly associated with Newton's temporal assumptions-assumptions which psychology has seemingIy adopted (Leahey, 1995; Siife, 1993; Szamosi, 1992; Valle,

1989). These "scientific characteristics" of the Newtonian paradigrn include psychology's abiding interests in quantification, mathematics, and technology.

Thus, a substantial part of psychology's agenda of becoming a science was to quantify and apply mathematics to its objects, even though Kant thought that this was beyond psychoIogy since its objects were without spatial extension. It followed that psychology could not observe, quantify, nor apply mathematics to its objects because psychology had only the highly problematic intuition of Time. Seemingly, however, the Newtonian paradigm provided the key to a science of psychology. The key was the time concept derived from Newtonian physics, which when adapted for

psychological led to the notion of sn operationalized fimez2.

Kant's critique of a scientific psychology is especially relevant to the interests of

this thesis because much of early psychology emerged out of Gerrnany and the

prevailing philosophical tradition of Kant. Accordingly. the influence of Kant and his critique are immediately apparent in the early psychological works of German scholars, such as Herbart and Fechner, whose work may be regarded as deliberate attempts to mathematize psychological phenomena, and, as such, were responses to

Kant's critique. Both were aware of the German philosophical tradition," as was reflected in their psychological work-in Herbart's atternpts to describe competing ideas in apperception in mathematical ter~ns,'~and in Fechner's mathematical description of the "just noticeable differen~e'"~.

As 1 see it, though Fechner and Herbart's work made some strides towards mathematizing, and thus scientizing psychology in that sense, the approach toward this goal accelerated as psychologists, such as Wundt, embraced the paradigm of what they, dong with Kant, regarded as the prototype of science, Newtonian physics.

Specifically, the Newtonian paradigm provided these Continental psychologists with the means to not only mathematize, but spatialize Tirne-these means being the array of temporal assurnptions that constitute what 1 describe as Newtonian time.

Also aware of Kant's critique, Wundt set forth to establish that he could mathematically describe the physiological aspects of psychological phenomena'6

(Benjafield, 1996, p. 69-74; Watson & Evans, 1991, p. 277-296). Toward this end, he adopted several methods developed within the physical sciences that quantified and mathematically corrected the rneasure of Time. In particular, one experimental method common in Wundt's research, Donders's subtractive procedure'', illustrates

Wundt's adoption of the Newtonian assumptions of Time.

Pertinent to this argument, Donders's subtractive procedure developed out of astronomical observation and the need for astronomer's to correct the errors involved in the observation of Time (Watson & Evans, 199 1, p. 254). Due to individual variation in what was termed reaction time, astronomers needed a method to correct for this individual variation in order to establish the 'true time' of an observation.

Through the invention of technology such as the chronograph and the chronoscope, each individual's reaction time was established and could thus be used to correct their astronomicai observation^'^.

From these developrnents within astronomy, Donders derived his subtractive procedure. Donders extended the reaction tirne studies to investigate mental operations. Essentially, Donders posited that if he could establish reaction times for a particular mental operation, then gradually increased the complexity of the task while concurrently measuring the increase in reaction time, subtracting this new reaction time from the previous would indicate quantitatively the increase in mental operations associated with each task. This procedure held several implications for Wundt (and, see note 32, the cognitive revolution, which, in tenns of psychology's temporal assumptions, was not at al1 a revolution since these were maintained throughout). Thus, it seems the temporal assumptions of Newton infiltrated the physiological psychology of Wundt. Donders's subtractive procedure figured largely in Wundt's ambitions for a "chronometry of the mind, since by the additive and subtractive procedures, it appeared entirely feasible to work out the times necessary" for processes of "volition, perception, apperception, cognition, association, and judgement" (Watson & Evans, 1991, p. 285). This was not the intemal/subjective time that Kant had attributed to psychology, but rather the externaVobjective time of

Newton and astronomy. Newton's conceptualization of time seemingly provided

Wundt with the means necessary to measure and thus mathematize psychological processes.

Newton had demonstrated how the measurement of constant and continuous motion-Le., measurement provided by a clock--could indeed spatially represent a quantity of Time. Given that Newton conceptualized Duration (or Time) as mathematical (as well as absolute and independent), the mea&rement of Time was fully compatible with this conception. Time as represented by a clock, by its motion being both observable (by virtue of its being spatia1ized)-and technoIogy perrnitting+onstant, precise, infinitely divisible, and continuous, the motion of a clock represents the 'objective and equable flow' of mathematical time. Once measured, any divergence, be it inconstancy or discontinuity, could be corrected mathematically. Once quantified, time could operate in mathematical models (of the physical universe in the case of Newtonian physics). In fact, measured time so closely captured the qualities of mathematical tirne that with the increased sophistication of these measures, clock (measured) time has become synonymous with Newton's Duration (Crosby, 1997, p. 69-84). This situation is reflected in

Western civilization, where through the widespread use of clocks and calendars,

Newton's mathematical time of astronomy has become the public's'9-and psychology's-understanding of Time (McGrath & Kelly, 1986, p. 36).

Slife's description of Newtonian time

Several aspects of psychologicd research reflect the presence of Newton's assumptions of Time. These aspects are not only shared with, but derived from what has been called Newtonian time30. As explained above, Newtonian time equates the mathematical nature of Time with its measure; a situation which is reflected in psychology's, and indeed al1 of science's, abiding interest in mathematics and technology. This mathematics/measure identity is further apparent in aspects shared by both psychologicd research and its concept of Time: properties such as objectivity, reductivity, continuity, linearity, and universality (Slife, 1993~').

The first property, objectiviy, has two components, observability and independence. The spatial representation of the measure of Newtonian time endows it with observability. The formal logic of its mathematical conception endows

Newtonian tirne with independence from any objects to which one compares it. Be it a behavior or a internal psychological process, measuring these in tems of

Newtonian time invest these observations with objectivity. Even a person's thoughts, which are not directly observable, given the math and measure of Time, these thoughts may become at least indirectly observable-and thus objective.32 Further, the mathematical nature of Newtonian time endows psychological

research with a dimension that is indefinitely divisible-hence reducrive.

Psychological objects persisting for any length of tirne are at least conceivably

measurable. The measure of these objects is limited only by the state and

sophistication of current technology. Accordingly, psychological research has

advanced as a result of more precise timing devices that have an even closer

approximation to mathematical time. In retum, it has been able to reduce its

observations to objects which persist for ever smaller periods of tirne.

It follows that, as timing technology improved, psychology further appropriated

another characteristic of Newtonian time, continuity. Timing technoIogy continues to

approach the "unbroken flow" of mathematical time. With improved precision and

power of such technology, one is able to 'search the gaps' so to speak. Psychology

finds less discontinuity as increasingly sophisticated technology allows psychology to

find the sequences of change that were previously hidden in the seconds to find

change in the rnicroseconds.

The fourth property of Newtonian time, linearity, also manifests in psychology from this math/measure identity. Again, increased sophistication of timing

technology has brought psychology to a point where the rate of time is reliably constant (another characteristic of mathematical time). Timing technology provides temporal standards such as seconds, minutes, etc. which proceed at a linear rate.

Accordingly, one now finds that psychological processes are mathernatically standardized according to temporal standards such as seconds, minutes, etc. Moreover, the mere possibility of (efficient) causal sequences in psychology is attendant upon this linearity property of Time (Anscombe, 1974). In order for psychology to assert causal sequences, it rnust proceed from the assumption that the rate of tirne will proceed in the present, through to the future, as it had in the past.

This assumption is particularly clear in cerain circles ofdevelopmental and clinical psychology where there is a high regard for the determinacy of the past. Given that the above temporal properties are nniversal, once a psychological phenomena is reduced to a regular pattern of antecedent and consequent, the psychologist is then able to predict from this causal sequence.

From the above, it is apparent that psychology has enjoyed some success in its agenda as a result of its adoption of Newtonian time. Through experimental designs that feature Newtonian time, psychological phenomena such as intelligence and personality are purported to be objective and observable. Based on these experiments, and the quantitative methods present in statistics, contemporary psychology has created time standards (such as standards of intelligence behavior and personality). Psychological phenomena are measured in terrns of time and mathematical models emerge from psychological objects thus measured. And with these standards and models, through the development of technology such as batteries and therapies, contemporary psychology claims the ability to manipulate, predict, and control human behavior. Al1 the above constitute psychology's initiatives for becoming a 'science', Functioning so well for psychology, it is ironic, though perhaps not surprising in light of its functionality, that the time concept of Newton has been maintained in psychology while it has become questionable for physics (what some consider as the very mode1 of science). As indicated, a reconceptualization of Time was a pivotai development in the new physics. In the wake of this new wave of physical theory, philosophers of science were left with the realization that the entire foundation of science, the Newtonian paradigm, had contained the basis of its own ruination- metaphysical assumptions which did not inhere in (physical) reality. When these assumptions proved to be false, physicists were left to question how many more assumptions and, by extension, fields of study were similarly vulnerable. How was science to protect itself from similar 'rnistakes' in the future?

A problematic solution-Operational analvsis

Some philosophers of science began to see metaphysicd assumptions as a weakness in scientific theory and considered how science rnight eliminate these assumptions. One such proposal, operational analysis, was especially suited to psychology's interests in quantification. Proposed by Bridgman (1938), operational analysis was a method of reference whereby, instead of refemng to an assumed metaphysical concept (prior to the fall of Newtonian physics), science would now replace this concept with the operations used to observe the physical consequences that were of actual scientific interest.

Operational analysis was particularly alluring to psychology. As Green (1992) explains, operational analysis became manifest in the work of several important psychologists through the 1930s, particularly in behaviorism, and continues today as

characteristic of the psychological approach to research. Green cites several

examples of its early adoption by psychologists by such persons as E. G. Boring, B.

F. Skinner, S. S. Stevens, Edward Tolman, and Clark L. Hull (1992, p. 297-302).

Psychology's advocacy of operational analysis is thus documented in several notes

and articles by sorne of the more influentid psychologists of the tirne (see Stevens,

1935a, 1935b; Boring, 1936; Skinner, 1945; Tolman, 1936). S till today,

psychological research features operational analysis, particularly in the mainstream approaches of behaviorism and cognitive psychology. Operationd analysis manifests in behaviorisrn's emphasis on behavioral correlates. Behavior is often supposed to correlate with inostensive psychological phenomena. Additionally, operational analysis is a comrnon feature within cognitive psychology with so many studies applying batteries to define phenomena such as intelligence or personality, .

The concern shared by these psychologists was that same, and by now, tacit criticism that Kant had forwarded, to which operational analysis seemed to be the ideal solution. Through operational analysis, psychology was able to maintain that quantitative veneer of science. By referring to intelligent behavior or the results of an

"intelligence test, " psychology could thus define terms such as intelligence in a

(pseudo) ostensive manner that further lent itself to quantitative methods. And by using either the behavioral correlates or psychological tests to define the phenomena in question, these phenomena become spatially extended, and thus objective and quantifiable. Thus, similar to a "paradigm" (Kuhn, 1962), operational analysis provides a means (through its theory and rules of reference) to promote 'science' in psychological research.

Operational analysis has other, perhaps unnoticed, implications. Operational analysis worked equally well with the inostensive phenomena that were more central concerns for psychology-phenomena such as intelligence and personaiity-as it did with the rnetaphysical assumptions of Time. Thus for psychology, referring to Time would not be a reference to an inostensive philosophical assumption, but a reference to a directly observable operation or measure such as a clock (merely consider how often time is used and defined as its measure in terms of hours, seconds, or minutes).

However, replacing the rnetaphysical concept of Time with a measure such as the clock does Iittle to remove the assumptive underpinnings of such an operational definition; rather, it further conceals those same Newtonian temporal assumptions that had prompted Bridgeman's proposa1 of operational analysis.

Again. the clock was constructed to match the temporal properties of the

Newtonian paradigm (by having supposedly constant, equable, and objective motion).

Realizing this, it is apparent that the clock is a thoroughgoing embodiment of the

Newtonian paradigm's assumptions of time. This is part of the reason why the physical sciences have not adopted operational analysis as a philosophy of science, for as Kuhn (1962, p. 59) explains: "consciously or not, the decision to employ a particular piecr of apparatus and to use it in a particular way carries an assumption that only certain sorts of circumstances will aise." Consequently, operational anaylysis does not eliminate any metaphysical assurnptions of Time, it only rnakes them more insidious. And so with the advent of new physics, rather than taking the

demise of Newtonian pbysics and the subsequent reflections upon the nature of

science as a cue to examine its temporal assumptions, psychology's general stance

toward the quantification of Time has only become further cemented and concealed

as it adopts operationalism.

In terms of its assumptions of Time (not to mention the sophistication of its

scientific activity), psychology has yet to reach the sarne point as the physical

sciences, but the Newtonian paradigm that psychology has adopted has seemingly

transformed the "time" attributed to psychology by Kant into that of the altogether

more 'scientific' time of physics. Although, this is a transformation that has ailowed

several advances in psychological research, there are several issues with which this approach has failed to contend (which 1 shall discuss at more length below).

Accordingly, and again similar to a paradigm, these assumptions of Time have an inevitable end.

Even though it has been argued that psychology does not have a paradigm (e.g.,

Roth, 1995), psychology's assumptions concerning time serve many of the same functions that would be served by such a paradigm. Briefly, like a Kuhnian paradigm

(1962, p. 37)' Newtonian time has displaced many problems, problems that were previously standard, from the normal science of psychology (i.e., Kant's criticism) by identifying these problems as metaphysical, the concern of another discipline, or just too problematic to be worth the effort. The clock illustrates, as both an instrument and a metaphor, the paradigm process in psychology: In the wake of indifference toward issues of Time, through its widespread use, the clock has come to be a fixture that enjoys a normative privilege zs the embodiment of the societal understanding of

Time. Accordingly, Newtonian time has become nearly intuitive-though it is an a posteriori intuition, not a priori intuition as Kant would maintain-in the way it orders, organizes, and in terprets everyday social experience for psychology . Because

Newtonian tirne has become not only tacit in, but also exclusively held by psychology, this time concept insulates the cornmunity of psychologists from those problems that can not be formulated in terms of this Time.

It is this focussing function of paradigms (and Newtonian time) that contributes largely to another characteristic of them-they provide a nurturing environment for scientific advance by creating a consensus within the field on both a restricted number of traditional problems, and a number of restricted practices (see Kuhn's discussion, 1962, p. 10-37). From this, a community of scientists is able to maintain and concentrate its efforts, efforts which have provided the physical sciences with steady advance. Moreover, though somewhat ironically, these are advances that eventually lead to theoretical change through the discovery of anomalous findings that cannot be subsumed under, resolved by, or ignored by the paradigrn in question.

Inevitably, theoretical changes lead to the paradigm change that has been observed in the physical sciences. One cannot help but wonder if it is inevitable that, subsequent to psychology becorning ever more sophisticated in terms of its technology, discourse, and concepts, psychology will have to reconsider its assumptions of Time. Criticisms of psychology's Newtonian assumptions of Time

A few psychoIogists (Bowers, 199 1 ; McGrath, 1986; Slife, 1993; Valle, 1989;

and Szarnosi, 1992) have noticed temporal anomalies which somewhat challenge the

exclusivity of psychology's Newtonian assumptions of Time. Specifically, and

despite what some might regard as disciplinary legerdemain to conceal this anomaly,

a few scholars have attempted to reacquaint psychology with internaVsubjective time.

Alhough internaVsubjective time is an inextricable aspect of how we understand

Time, it has been sorely disregarded in the psychology of this century. Realizing this

anomaly within psychology has led Valle (1989, p. 427) to take exception to a host of inter-related aspects relating to psychology's Newtonian time:

. . . an unstated linear temporality is implied in any attempt to determine a cause- effect (or stimulus-response) relationship. One predicts that the effect will follow directly in time the presence of the cause. . . . psychology patterns itself after the 'old physics,' after the Newtonian world-view which the new physics has shown to be narrow and restrictive. Treating behavior as the only objective ("object-like") aspect of people has led psychologists to a profound reductionism. In the name of experiment, the search continues for the cause behind ever effect, and the cause in one instance becomes the effect in the next. The dizzying process goes on until every postulated variable that can possibly be operationalized has been examined in great detail.

Valle's concerns with the singulari~of a concept of Newtonian tirne is congenial with Slife's concerns. Both Valle and Slife depict Newtonian time as linear, reductive, and objective; and both find it problematic. For what often occurs is that externaUobjective time is applied to the exclusion of the subjective nature of

Time. But in a scientific psychology, a singular externaVobjective time not only leads to the precarious position experienced by the early physical sciences33, it further neglects the "time" of what is perhaps the principal domain of psychology, the time of the internalhbjective d~rnain'~(reminiscent of Kant's sentiments).

In summary, 1 have discussed how one can make a subjective psychological phenomenon object-like through operationalizing it according to clock time, by representing a previously inostensive thing in terrns of an interval of constant spatial movement. Operationalizing Time in tenns of a clock achieves several ends.

Because time intervais are regarded as standard (for example one minute here and now'is equivalent one minute on the opposite side of the planet decades ago), once described in these terrns, a psychological phenomenon becomes independent of any particular context or moment of history. That phenomenon, once described in such terrns, is abstractable, transportable; it becomes scientific 'knowledge'. Time operationalized as such puts psychology on a slippery dope leading to the grossly materialistic view of the physical sciences.'"

Instead of the process of operationalism of Time contributing a deeper understanding of what it is to be human, it has begun to act reflexively upon the person to the point where humms are now described, compared, indeed work to become as machines (eg., as a computer). Unsurprisingly, this process of objectifying the psychological strips away rneaning. This is evident in how we regard psychological research; research that appears most 'scientific' seerns the least

'psychological', and that which appears most 'psychological' seems the least

'scientific'. Thus, though psychology has begun to accornplish its airns of becoming scientific, a creeping kind of apathetic nihilism is imminent as it realizes the incipient bankruptcy of meaning and values that results from its 'exclusive' adoption of

Newtonian time.

Tirne is a difficult topic, fraught with numerous cornplex issues. Accordingly,

with the assumptions that accompany its indiscriminate application in psychology, al1

the problematic features that may have contributed to Time's implicitness make it a

questionable component of psychological study. And being a fundamental

component of psychology, this is a precarious position for psychology. It is

hazardous to maintain an implicit assumption of Time; an irnplicit assumption such as

Tirne leaves unexarnined a host of alternative, and perhaps better, concepts.

Moreover, Time is problematic, and not something of which psychology can safely

rernain ignorant. Consequently, though it is beyond the ambitions of this thesis to

deal with each and every issue associated with this topic, 1 postulate that an

examination of Time within James's PP is an important first step towards addressing

this o~ersi~ht.~~

Time and William James: the PP, and metaphors

It hardly needs to be mentioned that William James is a central figure in the

history of psychology and that The Principles of Psycholo~vis the main vehicle of

James's influence, or that consciousness is the cornerstone to James's psychology37.

Accordingly, there is a wealth of Jarnesian scholarship, replete with considerations of

William James's theory of consciousness within the m38.However, James's temporal assurnptions have received scant consideration; with its specific focus on the metaphors of the PP, this thesis will address this oversight.

An intriguing irony inheres in the disparate influence James has had on considerations of Time. James holds a pivotal position in a comrnunity of scholars for whom considerations of Time (or the lack of) have served as a catalyst to a number of important theoretical results. f will account for James's contributions to

Time scholarship in more detail in the chapters that follow, but for now I will mention only a few lines of his influence. One lineage exists where James lies dong the intellectual path, through his well-documented influence on figures such as John

~ewe~'~,Ernst ~ach~', and Henri E3ergson41, to the revision of temporal assumptions within Einstein's special theory of relativity. Additionally, James had an influence on

Edmund ~usserl", and through Husserl to Martin ~eide~~er's~~account (1 962) of the temporality that is inherent in Being-there (Dasein). Compare these endeavours to those within psychology: What was James's influence in the discipline where he ought to have had the widest influence and best understanding?

James's work has been described as a transition leading away from the philosophy of the mind, to a science of the mind (Watson & Evans, 1991, p. 365).

However, we can see that in the contemporary scientific approach to the study of the rnind there is supposedly no need for metaphysics. Psychology regards metaphysics as philosophy, and outside its "province." Did James provide the mode1 for this approach to later psychology? Contrary to his effect in other domains, it seerns that later psychologists may have interpreted James as having advocated an unreflective stance towards Tirne. His influence outside of psychology suggests the opposite:

James's thought provoked considerations of Time on behalf of scholars outside of

psychology.

How could James have gamered such disparate results, leading both to and

away from considerations of Time? Jarnesian scholarship has often concentrated on

the logical grounds of James's ideas (see Natsoulas, 1995, and Bluestone, 1963).

James, however, deliberately avoided a metaphysical account in the PP, which would

have afforded a logical basis for his discussions (see James, 1890, p. vi, quoted

below). Instead of emphasizing a logical account, James wrote in a naturalistic and

rnetaphorical prose. I argue that the key to James's disparate influence abides with

the particular scientific worldview of both James and later psychologists (which rnay

not have been a concern for those outside psychology), his subsequent disavowal of

metaphysics, and his adoption of a metaphorical style.

James's rnetaphorical style does not lend itself to a logical analysis, A metaphor is inherently paradoxical (Romanyshyn, 1989), and provided it is a powerfuI metaphor, rich with possible interpretations. Due to a metaphor's rich meaning and plurality of implications, different interpretations may result with each new interpreter and the particular structures of meaning with which each person engages the metaphor. It follows that writing, such as James's, which is heavily metaphorical is extremely vulnerable to an unsympathetic reading. Logical analyses which regard paradox and contradiction as destructive to theory have failed to appreciate much of what is particularly engaging and powerful about James's unique explanations of psychological phenomena. Hardly consistent with his repute and

appeal within the history of psychology, schoIarship which focuses on the logic of the

-PP often criticizes its imprecision, relativism, or inconsistency (see Bluestone, 1963; and Natsoulas, 1993).~An account of the metaphorical implications of James's writings, instead of his metaphysics through a logical analysis, may provide a better more sympathetic understanding of what Time meant to him and his c~llea~ues~~.

In conclusion, 1 shall make explicit my task for the remaining chapters. On the basis of some preliminary discussion, 1will demonstrate that a great deal of reflexivity exists between metaphor and consciousness on the one hand, and Time on the other; they are related both conceptually and functionaIIy, and what one understands of of one will arnplify what one understands of the others. I will discuss metaphor as a stylistic device which has a conceptual basis in consciousness, and 1 will discuss both metaphor and consciousness according to their relationships with

Time. 1 will develop a rough rationale, loosely derived from contemporary discussions of metaphor, for evaluating James's metaphors as explicit representations of an implicit assumption of Time. A metaphorical analysis of Time in the PP will provide consistency between this study's aims and methods and James's aims and methods, and further preserve the richness and meaningfulness of James's unique style. In short, this study will explicate the complex relationships that exist between

James's exegetical method, metaphor, the central topic of his psychology, consciousness,and the assumptive status of a fundamental dimension within psychology, Time. ' 1 am particularly sensitive to the necessity of maintaining consistency with my lerms. Accordingly, though they are sometirnes interchangeable, 1 try to use the words "temporal,""temporality," "Time," and "tinic" as precisely as the complex relations among them allow. Anything that rnay be associated with change, transitivity, and thus Time, 1might modify with the adjective "temporal"; the word "temporality," refers as a noun to these temporal features. By "Time," 1 am referring to the general topic of this theis; using the word "time" as a particular case in this discussion. However, these words appear so frequently in this text that seeing these words so often may become onerous. Accordingly, 1 have adopted pronouns wherever possible to alleviate some of the onerousness of this reading. * The metaphors of Time's arrow and Tirne's cycle proved to be a useful dichotomy for Gould's (1987) examination of geological time. Through this metaphorical analysis, Gould was able to organize and unlock the meaning of three critical texts in the history of geology. This thesis paral1eIs Ernst Mach's (1893/I 960) historical examination of Newton's assumptions of Time. This was a crucial stage in the development of Einstein's special theory of relativity, whereby Einstein was drawn to an examination of the temporal assumptions in physics through Mach's text ( 1893; see Machamer, 1976, for more details). ' An interesting example that we will encounter below is one of the early studies that established cognitive psychology, Cooper and Shepard (1979). See note 29. See Kelly & McGrath (1988)' who wrote on the presence of Time in empirical studies as it applies to threats to validity and reliability through effects such as maturation. My own brief survey of inuoductory psychology textbooks (Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, & Bem, 1990; Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, Bern, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1996; Bernstein, Clark, Roy, Skrull, & Wickens, 1994; Hilgard, Atkinson, & Atkinson, 1979; Lefton, 1994; Munn, 1946; Myers, 1995; Plotnik, 1996; Searnon & Kenrick, 1994) revealed a complete omission of any discussion of the metaphysical assumptions in psychology, not to mention Time. This survey found no index listings for "metaphysic(s)," "assumptions,"or "time" apart from such phrases as "timing" or "time with children." In addition, a quick glance at the introductory chapters of these textbooks further support my daim that the metaphysical question of Time is not an issue for psychology-in as much as introductory textbooks reflect the mainstream sentiment. Additionally, there is sound rationale for this cornparison between textbooks considering that James's PP was also intended as a textbook. ' Although there are a few exceptions to this previous statement, notably Wallis (1966), the continuing disregard of temporal problems, which I outline below, attest to the irnplicitness of psychology's assumptions of Time. Moreover, exceptions which occur in the form of recent psychologists who have recently called attention to these irnplicit assumptions (Slife, 1993; Bowers, 1991; and McGrath, 1986) support my argument that this is indeed an important area to consider. Other notable exceptions include Piaget (1946) and Janet (1928). As I shall explain later, however, these exceptions have al1 been absorbed by mainstream psychology without major revisions to the Newtonian paradigm therein. Each of these exceptions have either ignored or disarmed the threat of these exceptions: by being regarded as outside the dornain of the mainstream (as non-EngIish in the case of Piaget and Janet); or when unavoidable, have accepted each into the disciphne in a rnodified form whereby it becomes coherent with the prevailing Newtonian paradigrn. For example, Piaget's stage theory of development somewhat opposes the continuity aspect of mainstream psychology's temporal assumptions. Piaget proposed that development is often punctuated by periods of discontinuous change; which implied further that personality was holistic and organismic rather than reductive or mechanistic. However, the threat of Piaget's stage theory of development theory has been neutralized by its translation into the prevailing paradigm structure; which, with sufficiently powerful (quantitative) research designs, the psychologist could reveal or explain the qualitative, discontinuous, and irreducible change of Piaget's theory of stages as merely brisk quantitative, continuous, and reducible change. Elusive as it is to an exhaustive definition, we can nonetheless approach an understanding of Time recursively. In other words, we can distinguish temporal problems from the temporal problemic through recursive definition: a temporal problern is any issue that make Time questionable and thus subject to discourse; a temporal problemic is the array of problems that have emerged from such discussions. What is it that we refer to when we speak of Time? What is it that we are measuring by our instruments (Le., a clock)? What can we observe of its "material" existence of timc? Time's inostensability exemplifies recent postmodern and constructivist criticisms of the assumptions behind positivisrn. Specifically, these criticisms argue that in order to sustain the existence of "Time" one must appeai to its socially constructed nature since it has no material substance in a purely physical sense. 'O For example, defîning Time in terrns of motion and change, which are themselves defined by Time, does little to clarify what Time is. l1 See in particular Plato's Timaerts: Time is a crucial aspect of the atemporality of Forms. " Although it is a circular definition, Aristotle provides an especjally clear account of Tjme (as cited in Gale, 1968) l3 See McGrath and Kelly (1986) for the full discussion. Further discussions of temporal problems can be found in Gale (1968), Slife (1993). Bowers (1991), Denbigh (1981), or Grunbaum (1973). 14 For example, one of the difficulties that 1 am here glossing over the epistemological and ontological distinctions that accompany the subject/object dualism. l5 One obvious objection to this is that a human's mernory allows them to, in a manner of speaking. reverse Time-and "in a manner of speaking," this is correct. Memory does allow us to re-experience a Time of the past, but this is an "experience" in the presenr. l6 ExternaYobjective time varies greatly across history and cultures. 1 focus on Western society since this is the context within which psychology originates and operates. l7 1 have retained the original's use of the letter "f' in place of the letter "s". '' McGrath and Kelly (1986, p. 30-32) also elaborate on the contrast between what they have called the time concept of classical and new physics. l9 His psychology, which has been described as a 'science of the mind', is a transition between the 'philosophy of mind' of nineteenth century and the 'science of behavior' of twentieth century sychology (Watson & Evans, 1991, p. 365). 'O 'O See ahFancher (1990, p. 107-108). Watson and Evans (1991, p. 240). and Benjafield (1996, p. 38- 40), for further discussion of Kant's critique of a scientific psychology. 21 Although this is what Newton tried to achieve, 1 am not trying to assert that Kant thought of Time as noumenal. Kant allowed that the world held "things in themselves"; Time, however. was an intuition inhering in the sensible. Thus Time was an aspect of the phenomenal (not the noumenal) world, through which the phenomenal was at al1 possible (1781/1965, p. 74-77) 22 The prevailing concept of Time within psychology shares al1 but one feature with the concept of Time advocated by Newton and the classical physical sciences (McGrath & Kelly, 1986; Slife, 1993; Szamosi, 1992; Valle, 1989). Accordingly, mainsueam psychology's concept of Time has the following characteristics: Time is atornistic, homogeneous, uniform in its passage (i.e., linear), abstract, absolute, singular, and independent. The only characteristic that sets psychology's concept of Time apart from Newton's is the bidirectionality of Time that Newton posits (Le., for psychology, Time is unidirectional). 23 Herbart was in fact a successor to Kant, holding his position in the philosophical department at the university of K-nigsberg (Benjafield, 1996, p. 49). 24 As described in Benjafield (1996, p. 50), Herbart's mathematical description of two competing thoughts (A and B; 1 being the amount of inhibition) in apperception was the following: --B" (A+B) - - ' AI " Fechner derived the "just noticeable differencc" from Weber, -= K , whereby delta "1" was the I change in the stimulus magnitude, "1" was thc standard stimulus magnitude, and "K" was a constant. This equation captured the relationship between the change in stimulus magnitude required to make a perceptible difference on the part of the subject (Benjafield, 1996, p. 54). These were just two examples of the work characteristic of the early stages of a scientific psychology. 26 David Rennie (persona1 communication, August 26, 1998) has pointed out that Wundt's psychological experiments were primarily concerned with basic physiological bases of psychological phenomena, and was perhaps less vulnerable to Kant's criticisms. See also Danziger (1990, p. 45-48) for details of Wundt's particular approach to psychological experiment. For further discussion of Dondcr's subtractive method, see Jaager (186511 970). '' Astronomy further provided psycholo,oy with some of the more fundamental aspects of statistics; statistics also refiecting the Kantian concern with mathematics and Newton's method of correction of observation through mathematics. For example, the normal distribution, which forms the basis of inference through statistics, though it was introduced into psychology by Galton, it was first developed by Laplace and DeMoivre in their efforts to correct errors in astronomical observation. Cowles [1997 #3 121 provides several instances where statistics used in psychology were originally derived in the interests of furthering the studies of astronomy and physics. l9 McGrath and Kelly (1986, p. 36-37) note: "The salience of clocks and caIendars in Our images of time makes it clear that Our culture's dominant conception of time is heavily influenced by classical (essentially Newtonian) physical science and mathematics. Calendars rely largely on properties of the astronomical world: years, months, and days are loosely coupled to major planetary events. Clocks rely largely on a mathematical view of time. with abstract, uniform, arbitrary divisions of the basic calendar unit, the day. We tend to use abstract, homogeneous, substantively 'empty,' arbitrary time units at a micro level (hours, minutes, seconds, microseconds, etc.) and at the very macro level (decades, centuries, and beyond). 30 Several scholars have identified psychology's assumptions of Time as essentially Newtonian in origin: scholars such as Slife (1993), McGrath (1986), VaIle (1989), Szamosi (1992), and Leahey (1995). 31 Though not identical, 1 have derived much of the following discussion of the characteristics of Newtonian tirne from Slife (1 993). 32 For example, the mental rotation studies of Cooper and Shepard (1979) illustrate how time intervals indicate mental operations. They suggested that the length of time it takes to make a decision conceming the identity of a letter of the alphabet indicated the extent of mental rotation required of an 'inner object'. 33 Again, an example lies within the physical sciences. Recent advances within the physical sciences have demonstrated that the observer is inextricably involved and influential in that which s/he observes; in effect making the observer also something to be observed (a subject). On the macro level of the theories of relativity, different observers in different frames of reference (velocity, mass, etc.) will perceive Time differently. On the sensitive micro level of quantum mechanics, the very act of observation has a potential impact upon the thing observed. Indeed, the connotative aspects of the internal/subjective concept of Time would have little to lose and much to gain if 1referred to it as "psychological time." This is not, however, a term that would be adopted by psychology, since this would serve as an acknowledgement of the 'subjectivity' that is an unavoidable facet of psychological research. '' A premonition of whvt the Newtonian paradigm bestows upon 'scientific' psychological research is present in the machina ex nrundi rnetaphor that elucidates science's deterministic goals. It is perhaps no coincidence that the nlnchina ex ntundi metaphor which captures the 'scientific' vision of the universe, takes its exarnple from the clock. Kepler expresses this scientific ambition (as cited in (Crosby, 1997): "My aim is to show that the heavenly machine is not a kind of divine, Iive bcing. but a kind of clockwork (and he who believes that a clock has a soul, attributes the maker's glory to the work), insofar as nearly al1 the manifold motions are caused by a most simple, magnetic, and material force, just as al1 motions of the clock are caused by a simple weight." Concealed, though nonetheless present, within this metaphor of the clock lies an unsettling hint of what operationalisrn and the Newtonian paradigm brings to psychology. If it is not already apparent, my own assumptions of Time are necessarily pIuralistic-otherwise 1 could not reasonably consider the alternatives; and intersubjective, where the plurality of times function systemically where each characteristic of Time may occur on a wide scale, but in a local context only one may be appropriate or pragmatic. So, although 1 have taken a polemical stance with regard to externauobjective time, 1 have done so only because this concepi has been overrepresented in psychology (it may in fact be wholely appropriate to certain inquiries in more physical domains, thoogb it might not be for a the 'mental' domain of psychology). Consequently, and though it may be regarded as non-commital, my own position with regard to time is a pragmatic one; evaluating each specific Time concept according to its value and coherence with each specific context to which it is a plied. do not anticipate any objections to these claims since they are fairly well-documented. I will merely substantiate them by citing secondary literature. The influence of James's PP and description of the stream of consciousness is noted in a number of textbooks on the history of psychology (see Benjafield, 1996, p. 83-92; Watson & Evans, 1991, p. 365-378; and Fancher, 1990, p. 239-274). 38 Not surprisingly, many aspects of this thesis have received some share of attention. The unique contribution to this scholarship follows my emphasis on Time, James's contributions to its development within psychology, and the unique array of concepts that 1 examine (time, metaphor, and human experience). 39 James's influence on Dewey is well documented in the literature of the history of psychology. Less known, however, is Einstein's familiarity with Dewey. This familiarity of Einstein with Dewey is reflected in a review by the former of Dewey's work. Several of Dewey's ideas have been expressed via the stream metaphor that James popularized so it is at least possible that there is a connection between James and Einstein through Dewey. 40 In support of Mach's familiarity with James, 1 cite Mach's dedication of his Popular Scientific Lectures (1895) to James and series of six letters from Mach to James that acknowledge his receipt of al1 of James's major works (see the letters fiom Mach to James concerning the m,Oct.17, 1890; Varieties of Relinious Experience, , Dec. 16, 1902; Pragmatism and A Pluralistic Universe, , June 28, 1907. 4 1 The strongest link between James and the realm of physics is through Henri Bergson. Their mutually beneficial relationship is well documented in the literature-many James biographies have documented this relationship (e.g., Allen, 1967). Bergson is a central figure in the debates with Einstein over the relativity of time after the publication of Einstein's theory of relativity. However, the period of this relationship fell after the publication of the E;any influence that Bergson had on James probably failed to garner attention in psychological circles, though James's influence on physics through Bergson has been widely mentioned. 42 Though significant, given that Husserl often notes James's proto-phenomenological approach as a precursor and influence on his thought, in terms of considering Time, this relationship is complicated. Both James and Husserl were both influenced by Brentano. Brentano's work, Philosophical investigations on svace, time. and the continuum (1988), could hardly have failed to pass Husserl's notice as he wrote his "Reminiscences of Franz Brentano," in McAlister, ed., The philosophv of Brentano, pp. 47-55. Thus a cross-fertiiization of these temporal musing may have occurred between Brentano, James, and Husserl. 43 Though the relationship is a cornplicated one. çee note 39, much of what Heidegger has to Say of Time echoes the work of James. For example, note Heidegger's (1 962, p. 474) description of the ordinary understanding of time: "Time is understood as a succession, as a 'fiowing stream' of "nows", as the 'course of tirne'." 44 Logical analyses ignore James's explicit warning against such an approach. For as James warns, "The reader will in vain seek for any closed system in the book. It is mainly a mass of descriptive details, running out into queries which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope successfully to deal with" (1 890, p. vii). 45 The most obvious example of the implicii assumptions of time in James's writing lies in his metaphor of the stream of consciousness. The metaphor of the stream of consciousness is in part derived from Heraclitus's metaphor of the stream. By extrapolating the ground of the stream metaphor-that there may be unity amidst change-to the domain of consciousness, James embues consciousness with aspects of continuity, unity, and change. These seemingly paradoxical aspects of consciousness are further shared by, and recursively related to, how he conceives of Time. SimiIar connections exist between other Jarnesian metaphors and his concept of Time. ( Undifferentiated)

Tirnc as Time as 1 SUCCESION 1 DURATION

ATOMISTIC HOLISTIC 4 + (Divisible) ( Indivisihlc i

Time as Time as 1 TRANSPOSABLE

1 DIFFERENTIATED 1

Figure 1. The structure of Time (adapted from McGrath 6r Kelly, 1986, p. 30) (Uni form passagc 1

Tinlc flow as Time flow as 1 BI DIRECTIONAL 1 UNIDIRECTIONAL

~iassica~ Ncu Physics P 1 ( 1 1 REVERSIBLE IRREVERSIBLE +

Timc flow as Time flow as / RECURRENT 1 DEVELOPMENTAL

(Phasic in passagc i

Fig~ire2. The flow of Tinle (adapted from McGrath & Kelly. 1986, p. 30) ABSTRACT

RELATIVITY TIME 1 (Observer constraincd i 1

Einsteinian RELA.I'IONAL ABSOLUTE (Inhcrcs in Undeuendent of 4 reiaiiom I 1 Transactional 1 1 aniong objects 1

1 NEUMONAL or 1 EXPERIENTlAL TIME REAL TIME (Observer determined )

(Real effects)

Figure 3. The reality of Time (adapted from McGrath & Kelly. 1986, p. 3 1 j 1 ABSTRACT 1

Tirne as part of SINGULAR UNIFIED SPACE- INDEPENDENT TIME DIMENSION CONTINUUM 1

classical Einsicinian HlGW 1 1 DISCRIMINANT 4 HOLISTIC (Indivisible) Transactional -Eastern 1 1 --EEl 1 1 Tirnc n-ieasurcible as MULTIPLE blcasures of Time as CONSTRUCTS

LOW CONVERGENT VALIIIITY

Figure 4. The validity of Time (adapted from McGrath S: Kelly. 1986, p. 3 1 ) Chapter 2: Relevant Sources of William James's Principles of Psychologv

In this chapter 1 will rnake a brief account of the intellectual and personal

associations' that had an impact upon the assumptions of Time in James's

psychology. Specifically, I will discuss how James became involved in writing the

The Principles of Psycholoov (PJ). Proceedjng from this investigation, I will provide

information concerning the intended audience for the PP, and explore some of the potential sources of both James's rnetaphorical style and concept(s) of Time.

Earl y Li fe

Several features of Ralph Barton Perry's account ( 1935)' of William James's

( 1842- 19 10) upbringing will prove il luminating for later discussions. To begin with,

William James received a remarkrible education. In addition to the forma1 curricula and schooling, life in James's farnily irself contributed to hi; early intellectual development, especially his father and brother, Henry James Sr. and Jr. James's later intellectual development continued to benefit from his family influence as it widened to include the social circles of both his father and brother. This family influence never completely disappeared, even as he entered into adulthood and his own initiatives in cultivating such social connections became prominent in his development3.

James's parents, along with the wider farnily setting, provided a nurturing environment for developing minds. As a reputed. though obscure religious scholar who wrote and lectured on Swedenborgian religious philosophy, Henry James Sr. was certainly a capable educator. Meanwhile, James's mother was the family's touchstone of emotional support. And his siblings, who included a brother who would become a famous novelist, Henry James Jr., provided constant stimulation where it might be othenvise lacking due to travel and unfamiliar surroundings.

James's education was liberal.' His father had a handsorne inheritance that provided him considerable liberty when it came to exercising his discretion and takins an active interest in his children's education. Though this interest was constant, the father's discretion was rarely stable. however. He initiated several abortive attempts, crossing the Atlantic Ocean se\.cral times, to and from America, to find the best tutors and schools-only to discover each new situation unsuitable

(which was often a result of his own change in opinion). Regardless of this mercurial guidance, the James children were provided with first rank instruction in nearly every subject imaginable, ranging from theology to science, painting to rnathematics, and in several languages, incliiding French and German.

Perry's (1935, p. 23) account of the father's educational initiatives describe them as stimulating and expansive rather than heavy-handed or restrictive. His own religious thinking and works contained an aversion to orthodox approaches and religious dogma; instead the elder James promoted a personal inquiry into one's faith.

Accordingly, mâny of the family's moves to find better tutors or the like were informed by the children's interests (though the eldest son's, William's, interests were rnost often served). Henry James Sr. was ever wary of his children making too early a decision on what course their life was to take. Instead, he provided each of his children with as wide a curriculum as possible, carefully advising each to consider the educational experiences that would give them the most options when it came to their finally choosing a career or life path.

Henry James Jr., is an interesting historical figure in his own right. Though he felt somewhat eclipsed by his brother's star during his own lifetime, Henry Jr. stands prominently among the best American novelists. His voluminous writings incIude such notable works as The Portrait of a Lady, The Bostonians. The Traoic Muse, and many more besides. Their correspondence over the course of their lives indicate a strong relationship, one that provided a fertile exchangc of their somewhat different perspectives. From William, Henry benefited from his cilder brother's

'psychological' approachs; and from Henry, William benefited from the younger's literary approach. Several instances of Iiterary evocation exist within the FT, which illustrate how the brothers shared an interest in literary expression.

Congenial to this thesis, Richards (1991, p. 209) exriniined James's use of literary evocation. One example he uses is a portion of James's explanation of how we never have the same experience twice-in which the literary turn is evident:

"What was bright and exciting becomes weary, flat, and unprofitable. The bird's sont is tedious, the breeze is mournful, the sky is sad" (James, 1890,I: p. 232). To this day, though some of the content of the PP has become sornewhat outdated (such as certain reports of experimental findings), its literary appeal rernains. Modeis of literary achievement were, in fact, abundant during the childhood of

the James children. The social circle of the James contained many prominent editors

and the some of their more distinguished writers. The brothers' acquaintances with

persons such as James T. Fields, (editor of the Atlantic Monthlv), A. P. Peabody

(editor of the North American Review), and E. L. Godkin (editor of the Nation)

certainly fricilitated their careers when it came to publishing their own writing.

Moreover, the James house was forever visited by writers such as Lowell, Norton,

Gurney. Henry Adams, Hawthorne, Longfellow, Holmes, Emerson. Whittier, Bayard

Taylor. Mrs. Stowe, Harriet Martineau, and a host of others (Perry. 1935, p. 64).

Consequently, the James children were exposed early and of'ten to the world of

literary pursuits, its language, and its inner workings.

Indeed. Ralph Waldo Emerson and Thomas Carlyle were close persona1 friends

of Henry James Sr.; each was a frequent visitor to the James household (Perry, 1935,

p. 10-2 1 ). Both William and Henry profited by this association; which can be seen to

have inspirecf Henry to undertake a career in writing, and to have informed William as to how to ground his thinking in the perspective and struggIes of the individual.

The paralleIs between the thought and writing of William James and Emerson are further suggested in a passage by james6:

Froni one year to another we see things in new light. What was unreal has grown rcal. and what was exciting is insipid. The friends we used to care ihc world for are shrunken [O shadow; the wonlen once so divine, the stars, the woods, and the waters, how nciw so duIl and cornmon: the young girls that brought an aura of infinity. at prcxni hardly distinguishable existences; the pictures so empty, and a5 for book. whai rivrs there to find so mysteriously significant in Goethe, or in John Mill so full ol'\\sighi? Instead of all this. niorc zestful than ever, is the work, the work: and fullcr and dccpcr ihc import of' common duiics and of common goods. (James. I XS)O. 1: p. 333-234).

And in an extract from Emerson's essay on 'Experience,' which gives a

similar message:

Life is a train of moods like a string of beads, and as we pass through thern thcy provc to many-colorcd lenses, which paint ihe worId in their own hue. and cach shows only what lies in its focus. . . Gladly we wouId anchor, but the anchorrigc 1s quicksand . . . Once 1 iook delisht in Montaigne that 1 thought 1 should nor nccd ai14 other book; befori: thai. in Shakespeare; then in Plutarch; then in Plotinus; at onc rime in Bacon. atierwards in Goethe . . . but now 1 turn the pages of either (sic)of' [hem languidly. whilst 1 stiIl clench their senius. (Emerson, 1883, p. 53-59).

Though there are distinct differences between the philosophies behind the two

passages7, the style is informed from the same subjective perspective. Furthci-more.

this subjective perspective was consistent with another feature of James's Iiwr

style-the psycholo_oist's distinctive use of metaphor. Although these feat~ires.the

subjective perspective and the metaphorical style, can not be attributed to Enicrson

alone- James's entire social world, especidly noting his father's and brother's

influence, fostered this 'literary' approach. Emerson anticipated James's use of

metaphor in scientific writing when the former said that "science is nothing but the

finding of an analogy" (Emerson, 1837/1983, p. 55; noted in Leary, 1990. p. 19).

The persons present in James's early life al1 contributed to how James

approached and wrote his psychology. Though he was, in his later work. interested in tmth, the standards of tmth were always persona1 ones. Where Iogic or reason conflicted with one's persona1 experience. it was the latter to wfiich he gave pi-iority.

And considering thut metaphor is a literary device that is often grounded in pci-mnal experience, it is perhaps small coincidence that he would favour metaphor as an

instrument to express the truth as it pertains to the individual.

In terms of the particulars of James's experiences in early life, they provided him

with an impressive repertoire of abilities. From his extensive travels, he developed a

cosmopolitan spirit and exercise in his many languages: which, with his habit of being of voracious reader and an excellent conversationalist. would later give James access to both a wide range of scholarship, and even the schoIars themselves.

Studies and Exploration

When it came to choosing the activity that would occupy him for the rest of his life, and subsequently the studies he wished to pursue, James had many options before hirn. Indeed, he had so many options that this decision became a personal trial. Accompanying his broad capabilities, and perhaps more troublesomely, his broad interests, James fel t a strong social responsibility that made hirn extremely anxious to find an occupation that wouId both satisfy his interests and relieve his social conscience. His anxiety was further aggravated by an intense persona1 struggle with issues of determinism and utilitarianism. Thus, the period between when he embarked on his search for a vocation at age 18 and finally settling into a series of teaching positions at Harvard at age 30, was not just a time of exploring his career options, but a time of self-exploration.

Perry (1935) describes James's long and tangled trek to finding a career. His first career choice was to become a püinter. It was not long, however, before he decided that his knack for drawing was insufficient to carry him to greatness; thus his work, though enjoyable for its own salie, was neither justified in terms of its utility to

society, nor was it his callings. James decided that 'science'. rather than art, was his

domain. He came closer to his goal as he began the study of chemistry at the

Lawrence Scientific School; however, the "tediousness" of the long-term inquiry

required by chemists was not in line with his impetuous nature. Still wishing to continue jn the physical sciences, he went from chemjstry into physiological studies in 1863-4, and then into medicine in 1864. But before he finally bot his medical degree in 1869, he explored the possibilities of biology and natural history. During this period, he fell under the supervisicii~of Jeffries Wyman and Louis Agassiz

(another acquaintance Henry James Sr. i. These two persons introduced James to the then current debates concerning Darwin's theory of evolution.

James accompanied Agassiz on ri biological expedition in 1865. Although a staunch critic of Darwin's theory of evolution, Agassiz exposed James to many of the arguments both for and against evolutionism, especially Darwin's mechanism for evolution, natural selection. Nonetheless. through Agassiz's criticisms James developed a familiarity wjth the evolu t ionary theory of Darwin, eventually finding the latter's views the more agreeable, to which the following letter from WiIliam to his brother Henry (March 9, 1868) attests:

Dear Harry,-Here is the "Darwin" for Charles Norton. which 1 spoke of in my letter of thrce days ago. 1 slung it yesterdriy and breathe at last frec. Nothing new to tell you save that 1 have finished thc Od~ssc~~..and been once to see the collection of casts in the Museum herc. It is uselcss 10 dcny that the Greeks had a ceriain cleverness. Houp la la!-1 have ~OIICand hought Renan's Quesrioris conteniporaines. . .. Renan is-Renan. but abounds in felicitous says and suggestive nyet-us. . . . The more 1 think of Darwin's ideas the more weishty do ihcy appear to me, ihouph of course rny opinion is wimh vcry little-still. I Delici-e that that scoundrel Agassiz is unworthy eithcr intelleciually or morally for him to wipc his shoi-s on. and I find a certain pleasurc in yicldin; IO the feeling. . . . Adieu! Adieu! Adieu! (as given in Perry, 1935, p. 102)

Agassiz stands in contrast to his colleague, Jeffries Wyman. To James, Wyman

exemplified scientific integrity. It was characteristic of Wyman to be more open-

minded and have a "more patient suspension of judgment until such time as the

evidence should prove decisive" (Perry, 1935. p. 67). A similar estimation was given

by James himself when in later years he vocafly represented radical empiricism. It

was perhaps Wyman's influence that allowed James to avoid sorne of the biases of

Agassiz's account of evolution, and accept what later biologists have supported. For

as Leary (1990, p. 47) notes, "Long before selectinnism was accepted by the majority of biological evolution, James (1880) had xccptcd it and was drawing out its implications for the theory of social evolution". Again, however, he did not proceed with his studies of natural history; after having had a distressing time in Agassiz's field expedition James thought better of such a c~reer.~

Though James did not follow any of the paths he began during his university studies, many of these aborted pursuits piayed at Ieast some part in his later thinking and writing. Perry (1935, p. 68) summarizes the influence of Wyman and Agassiz:

When James began to teach, he drew most heavily upon what he had learncd from Wyman. The first philosophical problem to which he devoted himself systematically was the problem of evolution, and here also it was the samc teacher who had first shown hirn the way. This, together with the idcal of scientific purity, was his debt to Wynian. To Agassiz he owed the strong siimulatic~nof his scientific interest. He felt. as did all who came under Agassiz's hypnotic spell, that 'natural history must indecd be a godlike pursuit, if such a man as this can so adore il.' Above al1 he learncd from Agassiz to believe that ahstract knowlcdge is second best, transcended in immedinte acquaintance. When 1 discuss the PP below, certain vestiges of Jameh's early exposure to evolutionary theories will become apparent in his thtiory of consciousness.

Furthermore, his short stint at painting contributed to a certain felicity in description which distinguished his writing (this 1will also treat more fully when 1 discuss the visual imagery present in James's metaphors).

James did not go on to practice medicine, feeling jnstead that such an occupation was distasteful given what he had Iearned of such "chicanery" as medicine was during his time. James did learn something of physiology, however, that wouid make his medical training profitable. And though he founcl that he was not suited to sustained work in a physiology lab, due both to his impetuous nature and certain back troubles (Perry, 1935, p. 66), he developed a great deal ot' interest in the outcornes of such work in physiology-particularly as it pertained to the emerging field of physiological psychology. During an interruption in his studies, James writes to his

Fdther and reveds the seed of his later interest in psychology (persona1 communication, Dec. 26, 1867)

I don't think I've told you as yet anything about rny futurc plans. . . . 1 ihink now of going to Heidelberg. There are two professors there, Hel~nholtzand Wundt. who arc strong on the physiology of the senses, and 1 hope 1 shall be well enough to do some work in their laboraiory . . . . My ultimate prospects arc prctty hazy. If 1 only had been well and could have got out here a year or two earlicr rr) onc of these physiological laboratories, the way of lifc would have bcen singulnrly sirnplified for me. At present my health is so uncertain that 1 cannoi look forward to teaching physiology. As a central point of study 1 imagine thai the border of physiology and psychology. overlapping both, would be as fruitful as an?. and 1 am now workinp on to it.

Several years would pas, however, before James finiilly realized this new in terest. In the period that followed his graduation from medical studies in 1869 until his eventuiil procurement of a teaching position at Harvard in 1972, James underwent a persona1 crisis. His efforts up to that point had proven fruitless, if only in terrns of failing to supply him with a career path. Feeling bereft of direction, James was left floundering ris to what his future held for him. It seemed even more dismal because his physicd ailments were particularly acute. And to make matters worse, during this period of relative physical inactivity James became absorbed in trying to find a

'philosophy io live by'.

Specit'ically. James was searching for the rule(s) by which he should decide his actions. Rcding J. S. Mill, and other utilitarian thinkers, James was left with question5 conccrniiig which occupation would best serve utilitarian ends. How would . suc11 uti l i tarian ends be determined? These personal explorations became most troubling ~vhenhe considered that his ability to choose was, however, dependent on the possibility of making such decisions.

In thc 1a1e 1 81h century. science as a method of inquiry was on the rise. And from the scientific. or more precisely, from the positivistic perspective as it came to read in

James's period, personal decisions (or freedom) were considered an illusion since human actions are predetermined, with everything having an identifiable cause (or causes as it may be). Positivism placed inordinate vatue on the rnettiods of science and was being quickly accepted by scientists. It was fully consistent with what was being regasdecl as science. It wris even consistent with novel theories such as

Darwin's theory of evolution, by "describing how human thought had in fact evolved and prescribing norms for how our thinking, including thinking about human thought

itself, should proceed" (Honderich, 1995, p. 705). Thus, if he took the scientific

approach, it seemed to James that he would then be shackled with the debilitating and

dismal condition of his lack of freedom. James read copiously and diversely and

meditated at length to resolve this issue, only to have his feelings of anxiety deepen . .

. until he discovered the wri ting of Charles Renouvier. For as James wrote in his

diary on April 30, 1870.

1 think that yestcrduy was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier's second Essais and sec no rcason why his definition of free will-"the sustaining oi'n thousht becnirsi? 1 c-lioose ro whcn 1 mipht hnvc other thoughtsW-need be the definition of an illusion. At any ratc. 1 wilI assume for the present-until ncxi yenr-that it is no illusion. My first act of frec will shall be to believe in free \vil]. (as quoted in Perry. 19.15. p. 12 1 )

According to many Jriniesian schoIars (e.g., Myers, 1986, p. 46-47) this

'concession' marked the beginning of a new direction in James's life. The

implications of Renouvier's writings exploded into a renovation of James's perwnal

philosophy. Providing the basis of James's later plurality, pragmatism, radical empiricism, and fallibil ism"', it also marks the possible beginning of James's considerations of Time and his particular method of grounding phiIosophical inquiry in persona1 life,

Reading Renouvier hltd provided James with the clue he needed to find hi3 wrij. through his personal crisis. But as one reads further into Renouvier's philosophy one discovers that a significant aspect of it is an argument against infinity. To explin. the notion of infinity aciheres to the idea of a block universe. If Time were sutic. there being but one block of unchanging predetermined events-as the notion of' infinity suggests-this would negate thc possibility of freedom. Renouvier's arguments against infinity were thus a precondition of his arguments for freedoni."

Consequently, Time, among other topics, became important in James's thought, as evidenced in correspondence between James and Renouvier. which began in 1872.

For example, in a letter to Renouvier. James wrote,

My dear Monsieur Renouvier,-Your note and the ccmclusion of rny article in the "Critique" came together this inorning. . . . 1 have read your discussion with Lotze in the "Revue Philosophiqc" and agrw with Hodgson tliai you carry off there the honors of the battle. Qitnttt crltji)rid de Irr rpesriot~.howcver, 1 am still in doubt and wait for the light of furthci- rcllcxion to scttlc my opinion. The rnatter in my mind complicates itself with the qucstion of a universal cgo. If time and space are not in se, do we not need an enveloping qy to makc continuous the times and spaces, not necessarily coincidcnt. of thc pirt~alcps? On this qucstion, as I told you, 1 will not fail to write again whcn 1 nc'\\ 11ght.which 1 trust mny decide me in your favor. (Decernber, 27, 1880)"

Time was certainly a topic in his correspondencc with other scholars, particularly

Hodgson. The evidence for including Hodgson and his book, Time and space: a metaphvsical essay ( 1865), as sources for James's concept of Time in the PP is twofold. First, James cites Hodgson's Time and Space several times throughout the

-PP. Second, Hodgson is perhaps next only to Renouvier in terrns of the influence he had on James (see Perry, 1935; Myers, 1986). Convincing evidence lies within the correspondence between the two scholars: Not only does it indisputably show their association, but it also demonstrates that Time figured prominently in James's thought. The prominence of Time in James's thought is apparent in rnany of his discussions of infinity (e.g., a letter from James to Shadworth Hodgson, Dec. 18.

188 1); but is widely apparent in the following excerpt of a letter from Hodgson to

James (July 15, 188 1): " If'ihe whole formal furniturc oi'consciouwc~s.Tinic and Space thcrnselves inctuded. consisis of concepts, then M. Renouvier is right. and there is no such thinp as Ir!fiiig. Because conceiving is lin~itation.Existence is rhen a concept. and only liniitcd tizitlgs exisf. . . . You with M. Rcnouvicr would make man's conceiving powcrs the measure of actual existcncc; nothing can be real unless he can lirnil it by their thinking. . . [but based on his argunicnts] 1 say that there is an acrrrrrl Universe, infinite in Time and Space. When, transccnding Matter & Motion, 1 try to picture what exist prior to them and beyond rhem.

And further evidence exists in another letter Hodgson addresses to James (Oct. 17,

1882), wherein he claims that Renouvier makes the sarne rnistake as Kant by

assurning "a spiritual agent working in indispensable forrns of thought [i.e., Time and

Space]."

Apparently, Hodgson did not abide with Kant's ideas of Time. Instead, Hodgson

ideas of Time fell in line with those of Lockc. Mill, and Hume, a11 of whom were

infl~icncedby Newton (see chapter one). Ii \vils thus that Hodgson described Time:

Time. Time has one dimension-lcngth. II 1s infinitely divisible in thought; it is infinitcly extensible in thought. It admits no riiinimum in division, and of no maximum in extension. For thcse rcasons ii contains every thing. nothing long enough to outrun it. It is one in naturc. foi. a11 its Park are still timc. It is incompressible for no single part crin hc annihilatcd. (Hodgson, 1865, p. 122)

I will return to Hodgson's influence on Jarncs in the final chapter.

Another persona1 association that may have influenced James's concept(s) of

Time was that with Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce was a life-long friend of James, and whose philosophy had a marked influence on James (e.g., James's pragmatism).

James and Peirce first met during their university studies at the Lawrence Scientific

School (Peirce's father was actually part of the same Saturday club as James's father).

Over the many yecvs leading up to James's writing of the p,Peirce was a constant (as constant as James's travelling aIIowed) cornpanion and fellow in discussions on

philosophy. As Peirce recalls,

It was in the earliest seventies that a hot of us younp men in Old Cambridge, calItng ourscives, half-ironically, half-defiantly, "The Metaphysical Club."-for agnosticism was [lien riding its high horse, and was frown~ngsuperbly upon al1 metaphysics,- used to mect, sometimes in my srudy, sometimes in that of William James . . . . Wright, James, and I were men of science. rather scrutitiizing the doctrines of the metaphysicians on their scientific side than rcgarding them as very momcntous spiritually. The type of our thought was decidcdlq British. 1, atone of our nurnher. had corne upon the threshing-floor of philosophy ihrough the doorway of Kant, and even my ideris were acquiring the English accent. (as citcd in Pcrry. 1935, p. 130)

Peirce's reminiscence suggests that three schools of thought were possible influences on the concept(s) of Time in William Jiirnes's p.The first school included those whose scholarship has a decidedly Kantian flavour: scholars such as

Renouvier, Bain, Hodgson, and Peirce. A second school may be distinguished, the

British empirical school: The British empiricist school seems to be represented by only one of the sources that 1will mention. that being Spencer. The last, which 1 regard as derivative of both the Kantian and British traditions, but with its own unique implications is the scientific school-a schod. which in a general sense. fits none and al1 of the above sources. Coming from each of their original schools, either the Kantian or British, the sources listed above are caught in the transition that was happening at the time, the transition from the philosophy of the mind to the science of the rnind. Both the Kantian and British schools were represented in the new approach, and so each of the sources shared some of the temporal assumptions that lay in the foundation of science. James. and sometirnes Peirce, represented the scientific school in terms of his ideas of Tirne (though with soine reservation, as we

shall discover in the next chapter).

Nonetheless, certain notes written by Peirce perhaps reveal something of his

discussions with James on the topic of Time. Most of what Peirce had to say on Time

echoed Kant's thoughts on the topic in asserting that Time was necessary for thought.

Peirce. however, stressed the continuity of Time; this aspecr being, he argued.

necessary for the mere possibility of logical thought (see Peirce. 1982; or p. 67-73.

cited below). We will find that Peirce shared with James an emphasis on the . continuity of Time, albeit along the lines of Kant.

In 1872. several things occurred that indicate an improvcrnent in James's condition. For one, his health had returned. Furthermore, his spirits were high, partly because of a promising new 'philosophy to live by', and pürtly because of (though sonlewhat due to the aforementioned) his acceptance of a teaching position in physiology at Harvard University. GainfuI employment secms to have provided him with a concrete indication of his "utility." And perhaps mort. significantly, teaching physiology took him away from the metaphysical issues that had been somewhat responsible for his depression in 1870. This is indicated in a diary entry for April 10,

Ycsterday 1 told Eliot [the president of Harvard University] 1 ~~iulJxcept the anritornical instruction for next year, if well enough to perform 11. and would probably stick to ihar department. 1 came to this decision rnainly from ihe feeling that philosophical activity as a bitsiness is not normal for mosi nwn. and not for mc. To be responsible for a complcte conception of ihings is beyond niy strength. To rnake the forni of al1 possible thought the prevailing ntarrer of' oiic's thought breeds hypochondria. Of course my deepest interest will as ever tic u iih ihc most gencral problems. But as my strongcst moral and intellectual craving 1s f'or stable reality to lean upon, and as a profcsscd philosopher pledges himself publicly ncvcr io hai~ donc wiih doubt on these subjecis. but every day to be ready to criricise afrcsh and cal1 in question the grounds of his faith of thc day before, 1 fear rhe constnni scnse of insiahility gcnerated by ihis attitude would be more than the voluntary friiih 1 can kccp _coing is suffiçient to neutralize. . . . (as cited in Perry. 1935, p. 136)

James would, however, move to other departments over the course of his

teaching career. In the next couple of years, he began incorporating psychological

content into his courses on physiology and tumed increasingly towards psychological topics, until. in 1875, he offered a graduate course titled "The Relations between

Physiology and Psychology" (Perry. 1935, p. 142). If not the first. it was one of the first of its kind offered in America. James's facility in German and French had given him nccess to the experimental results of Mach, Fechner, and Wundt. James used these results to riiigment his lectures. Moreover, as indicated. his penchant for travei, as well as his habits of correspondence gave James access to many of the leading scholars of his day.

In 1876. James had begun teaching an undergraduate course on psychology frorn

Spencer's PrincipIes of Psychology (documented in a persona1 correspondence that

James addressed to Thomas Ward. Dec. 30, 1876). Spencer's book. however, had little to do with the emerging experimental studies in psychology (it beinp instead more properly described as a work in philosophy). Nonetheless, James proceeded or drew from Spencer's Principles as a source in some cases, and as a foi1 in others, for his own textbook.

The moist obvious indication of James's indebtedness to Spencer's work is the book title that James gave to his psychology, drawn as it were from Spencer's. James's PP also covers n-iuny of the same subjects covered by Spencer. The

organization of each is strikingly similar and, with a few exceptions, even shares the

same chapter titles. In the cietails. however, there are wide differences, especially on

the topic of Time.

James's and Spencer's Lvorks differed according to the rnethods that each

employed-a djfference that niay very well have followed from their differing

opinions concerning psychology's designation as either a philosophy or a science.

Consistent with philosophiciil methods, the strength of Spencer's arguments was

drawn primarily froni the Iricidity and validity in the logic underlying his theories. In contrast, though James dicl in most cases link his ideas to both the mental philosophy that preceded and the science of the rnind that he was introducing, he had additional instruments to support his arguments, including the experimentd findings that hiid resulted from the relative1 y new science of psychology. But the most important instrument in James's psychology was perhaps his use of metaphor.

Another textbook that James used extensively was Bain's Mental science: .4 compendium of ~svchologv.and the history of philosophv designed as a textbook for high-schools and colleoes ( 1882). Because psychology resources were limited. James drew heavily from the philosophical works that preceded any notions of making psychology a science. Bain's Mental Science, though its title says otherwise, was CH[ from such a cloth. Though Bain drew severaI experimental examples from science. few of these, however, could pi-operly be called "psychological" studies- psychological experimentiil i-cserirch being rare. Nor would his approach be 'recognized' as science today: the reason for which lies in his concept of Time. His

approach to psychology remained grounded in Kantian philosophy.

In conclusion, there are many possible influences on James's idea of Time, but

the most relevant sources include Spencer's The principles of psvchology (1888) and

Bain's Mental science; A compendium of psvcholo~y.and the historv of philosophy

designed as a textbook for hi.gh-schools and colIe.~es(1 882), both of which included

discussions of Time. Additional works that James cites in the FT, and may have also

informed James's concept(s) of Timc. are Renouvier's Essais de critique générale

( 19 12). Hodgson's Time and space: a rnetaphvsical essay ( 1865); likewise, James's

correspondence with Peirce and Hodgxon will provide further evidence of James's

idea of Time.

The Principles of Ps~cholo.~~( 1890)

James proceeded to teach psychology in the years following his first forays into the connection between physiology and psychology. Psychology, however, became so increasingly popular to students. and to the pubIic in general, that a textbook seemed to be in order. Consequentl y. when Henry Holt, a publisher, began to search for someone to write a textbook for psychology, James's reputation brought him to the publisher's attention. James signed the contract to write the Princi~lesof

Psvcholoav in 1878, but it would be 12 years before he had finished the two-volume work that would usher in the new scientific psychology into Arnerica. During that time, James derived much of the rnaterial for his PP from his lectures and several articles submitted to the popular press (Osowski, 1989, p. 139). There are several ches to indicate that James's intended audience for the PP was the newcomer to psychology. Drawing from those original lectures upon which the

-PP is based, or those prospective students who James foresaw would later read the -PP, James's audience consisted mainly of students. As James words it in the first sentences of the Preface to the B:"The treatise which follows has in the main grown up in connection with the author's class-room instruction in Psychology. . .". and then goes on to provide a list of chapters that wouId especially suit the beginners who are

"most in need of assistance" (James, 1890, p. v). This would have also been in line with his publisher's interests. Rounding out James's audience would be the intelligent lay persons for which some of the chapters oi-iginally appeared as

article^'^, serving to introduce the 'amateur' to ps yc hological research.

Considering James's audience allows some measure of explaining the gpe of metaphors that he employed. One would suppose that if James's audience were reIatively uninitiated in the vagaries of psychology. psychology being a discipline with which even the well-versed scholar may not haivehad much familiarity, metaphors grounded in experience would be useful for introducing hitherto unfamilia- notions of a psychological nature. In this fashion, James could avoid losing his reader as he discussed the finer points of the current psychological research; research that might have been otherwise impossible to discuss without years of scientific training.

For as James explains it, metaphors provide concrete illustrations:

Philosophy and psychology are such different studics ihar most of may be said to read ir~the works of philosophers rather than to rcad theni. We like, as it werc, physically to rub Our minds againsi the abstract pruhlcms in their page; we enjoy the glimpses we gct of their solution: but we grasp nothing hut [hc concrete illustrations by the way and the explanalions of detaiIs the author may givc us. Accordingly, the more fertile a philosopher is in these, the more popular he will hccomc. (James. 1876/1920. p. 26)

Of course there is always the explanation that using metaphor stimulated his thought,

or even lent his writing a certain grace that is normally lacking in scientific works.

NevertheIess, James's use of metaphor 'made sense' (in both a literal and

figurative fashion). Not only was rnetaphor useful for introducing wbat might

otherwise be arcane details of psychological thought, it could do so in a manner that

macle psychology seem r-elevczrzt and rneaningfLIl. Because James's main metaphors

were grounded in common experiences, they irnrnediately appealed to the reader's

own senses or experiences of the world-al1 of which had the added benefit of

pi-oviding his arguments and descriptions of psychological phcnomena with an

aesthetic appeal.

Was James's use of metaphor deliberate? It would be difficult to establish indisputably; but a number of statements that James forwards suggest that, in addition to the reasons for metaphor listed above, James held metaphorical thought in high esteern. First, metaphor, with its being open to interpretation. was consistent with his radical empiricism. James believed that Our perceptions of reality. like reality itself, "had an infinity of aspects" and that the scientist could only collect "al1 the instances he can find which have any analogy to that phenornenon, and, by simultaneously filling his mind with them dl, he frequently succeeds in detaching from the collection the peculiarity which he was unable to formulate in one alone" (James. 187811983). And especially relevant to this thesis, James thought that metaphysical knowledge of such things as Time, "dl our attempted definitions of the

Whole of things. are made by conceiving it as analogous in constitution to some one of its parts which we treat as a type-phenomenon" (James, 1905, p. xi). Thus, James own statements. along with those of his literary influences (e.g., Henry James Jr. and

Ralph Waldo Emerson). suggest that James's use of metaphor, if not deliberate, was at least coherent with his overall approach to scholarship.15

Summary

It was the purpose of this section to discuss the workslthinkers may have been sources for how James presents his concept(s) of Time in the PP, to discuss the sources of his rnetaphorical style as well as the intended audience for these metaphors, and lastly, to discuss those persons who may have brought him into contact with considerations of Time (leaving it to the next chapter to explain these influences as each coincides with my discussion of Time in this classic text). As a textbook of psychoIogy, the PP covered a multitude of areas and work. Yet it is perhaps James's extensive associations that make the PP not so much the work of a

'great man'. though a great man he was, but rather the embodiment of the thoughts of ail those with whom James had commerce. His style, which could be sunlmarized as grounded in common experience and expressed through rnetaphor, shows the influence of a literary family and literary social affiliations.

Fortuitously, James's style was entirely suitable to his audience. This audience required a style. consisting as it did of the students or intelligent laypersons, that drew from common experience. lt was his style that allowed him to not just explain something as complex as consciousness or Time, or represent the work and thoughts of his colleagues clearl~,.but aIso to make it al1 seem natural and meaningful. Ali told, the PP represents the thoughts of the religious thinker, the litterateur, the philosopher, and the scientist-al1 of which combine to engage the reading audience with one unique perspect i1.e. that of a psycholopist. In this thesis I concenirate on William Jrinics becartse his work figures larglely in the history of psychulogy. And so, though Janics is a "grcat man," 1 do no1 intcnd this thesis as a "great man history," but rather as an installrnent in tlic history of an idea. Janics. with his protean interests and polyglot abilities, traveled and corresporidcd widcly wiih niost of the period's larger intellectual figures. As a result, the numerous associations that James enjoyed. both intellectually and personally. the scope of the scholarship that his PP covercd. and the influence of his work, function as foci which connect a wider community of scholars and scholarship of that period to the development of psychology's temporal assumptions. Accordingly, the following discussions of James and his PP, especially when we turn to discussing his mctriphors. will serve to direct this thesis towards the wider yrrents and watersheds of Time in psychology. - Ralph Barton Perry's (1935) biograph!. (if William Jamcs provides the bulk of the material that 1 prescnt in this chapter. From thjs biog~i~l'l~yI have selccted only that information that 1 consider relevant to later discussions concerning Tiiiic in the e. hnaddition to Perry's biography, 1 hriw supplemented this information with first-hand examination of thc primary documents provided by ihc Houghton Library Archives at Harvard University. paying partic,ular attention to the cxtensivc corrcxp~~ndcncebetween Jamcs and many of the leading intellectual figures of the period bctwccii 1860- 1995. Sec Fancher (1990, p. 239-274) for a briel'. but cngaging description of James's early childhood. 5 ln perhaps Henry James's best known \vurk. The Portrait of a Ladv, the author demonstrated ri sophisticated psychological approach io characier dcvelopnient. one thai surpassed the efforts of his contcmporaries. William Jamcs's influcncc ia apparent in Iatcr commcntaries such as the followin_r on The Portrait: "Without propoundins thc qucsiion of the freedom of the will, without discussing determinism, James adheres to the siniplc fiicts of his story and Icavcs the reflection upon it moral values to the reader. . . .What James is sriyirig in this book, and hc rcpcated it with greater subtlety in his Iast works, is that, given the hard knocka of life. the civilized bcins can coine to terms with it only through mental fortitude-and through undcrstanding. To understand is to feel, and to know. and to bc able to face one's problems. The inncr lilk of' Isabel is unfoldcd for us with great analytical and psychological power, and it is through Iicr lucid mind that Janics finally knits al1 the elements of her drama" (Hornstein, 1973, p. 43.1). See Richards (1991, p. 210) whercin hc dcscribes James's use of metaphor. Perry (1935, p. 39) explains thesc dif1i.rcnc.c~: "William Jamcs could not sympathize with . . . his father's contemporaries who argued frecly fiuni analogy, took figures of speech IiteralIy, and producecl a blend of poetq and science which wah ncithcr the one nor thc other. He had contracted at an early age the scientist's standard of parsinmny. which forbids one's spending more in the way of belief than one's income in the forrn of fact." ' Nor was a career in painting agrceablc to Henry James Sr. Thc elder James believed that it was ncxt to impossible to express the spirit of truih in a merely aesthctic medium such as painting. See Fancher (1990, p. 244-245). 'O An early example of James's later exposition of his pragmatism and fallibilism is present in his 1876 essay on Bain and Renouvier (p. 32). \\.hcrc hc discusses the 'pragmatic' consequences of having a fallibilistic, but pragmatic philosophy. which contained both detcrminism for scientific purposes, and indeterminism to avoid the nihilism of thc scientific approach: "The 'assumption' of a fixed law in natural science is thus, according to this iiurhority, an intellectual posrrtlare. just as the assumption of an uttirnate law of indetermination mirhi hc a moral postdate in treating of certain hurnan deliberations." " Sec Renouvier (1912) for the details of'his philosophy. " This letter may be obtained from thc Houzhion Library Archives at Harvard University. '"cc the James collection in the Houghtcm Library Archives at Harvard University. '" Two of the chapters in the PP that arc cciitrnl io this csan~inaiionlirst nppeared in philosophical journals where formally trained psychologisis would be rare among its readers: James's chapter on thc stream of thought made its original apperirance in thc January issuc of 'hlind' in 1883; and the chapter on thc pcrçcption of time originaliy appeared in ihc October issue of the 'Journal of Speculative Philosophy' ( 1886, vol. xx, p. 374). 15 Gentner and Grudin (1985, p. 185) also dcmonsirni~.thit James's usc of metaphor was distinctive of him throughout his career. Chapter 3: Metaphysics through metaphors

In its ostensible outlook it is a treatise like any other, but what distinguishes it is the author's gift for evoking vividly the very life of the mind. This is a work of the imagination; and the subject as he conceived of it, which is the flux of immediate experience in men in general, requires imagination to read it at all. It is a literary subject, like autobiography or psychological fiction, and can be treated only poetically; and in this sense Shakespeare is a better psychologist than Locke or Kant. Yet this gift of imagination is not merely literary; it is not useless in divining the truths of science, and it is invaluable in throwing off prejudice and scientific shams. The fresh imagination of William James led him to break through many a false convenrion. He saw that experience, as we endure it, is not a mosaic of distinct sensations, nor the expression of separate hostile faculties, such as reason and the passions, or sense and the categories; it is rather a flow of mental discourse, like a dream, in which al1 divisions and units are vague and shifting, and the whole is continually merging together and drifting apart. It fades gradually in the rear, like the wake of a ship, and bites into the future, like the bow cutting the water. For the candid psychologist, carried bodily on this voyage of discovery, the past is but a questionable report, and the future wholly indeterminate; everything is sirnply what it is experienced as being. (Santayana, 1920, p. 67-69)

In James's book, The Principles of Psycholo~y(1890, henceforth referred to as -PP), topics such as consciousness, the self, and time perception have demonstrable temporal aspects. An anaiysis of James's metaphors will show that these topics are inter-related in terms of their temporal qualities. EssentiaIIy, James's metaphors functioned by engaging his readers' own mental experiences, encouraging thern to enlist their own experiences in the process of developing an individually tailored interpretation of exceedingly complex topcis. More irnportantly, and in addition to their exegetical functions or their aesthetic appeai, metaphors constituted the conceptual structure of his thought. In light of their temporal features, 1 wiil discuss metaphors such as the Stream of consciousness, the fiight of the transitive parts and perching of the substantive parts of the Stream, the fringe of felt relations, the saddleback of the specious present; 1will also touch upon less conspicuous, though no less important metaphors such as the dock of operationalized tirne' the underlying mechanical mode1 of natural science, and physiological rnetaphors of James's scientific psychology. He used these metaphors not only to express the manifest content the "mass of descriptive details" but also to suggest the latent philosophical underpinnings of such details. One such philosophical underpinning is James's concept(s) of Time.

Similar to its role in James's psychology, Tirne plays an important, but implicit, role in current psychology (see chapter one). Below, 1 will indicate how this examination of Time contributes to an understanding not only of its role in James's psychology, but also of its role in psychology as a whole. 1 will achieve this end by examining his metaphors in terms of how they could both express meaning and generate possibilities for rneaning in the subsequent development (or lack thereof) of psychology's assumptions of Time. In short, the task set for this thesis is to supplement what few expiicit statements James rnakes concerning Time with a historicdly informed analysis of James's metaphors. Through this analysis, I will enter irnaginatively into James's understanding and sound his metaphors for what they can reveal of James's implicit assumptions of Time.

The Irnplicit Metaphvsics in James's Natural Science of Psvcholo,ov

A distinguishing feature of the PP is that it stands as one of the first treatises to make the transition from considering psychology as science rather than philosophy.

Another prorninent feature is James's liberal use of metaphor. On the surface. these two features might appear at odds with one another: some students of the philosophy of science would argue that metaphor is adverse to scientific writing, instead prescribing literal and logical writing. 1 will explain, however, that metaphor functioned pragmaticallyl in James's presentation of psychology as a science. In the -PP, metaphors functioned as literary bridges between metaphysics and science, at once addressing the philosophical issues that threatened psychology's claims to being a natural science while circumventing the resistance of science to metaphysical issues such as the nature of Time.

The novelty of James's scientific approach to psychologq!

The novelty of James's scientific ambition for psychology lay not in its historical priority, though he was among those who "pioneered" the scientific tack (see

Fancher, 1990); rather, the novelty lay in James's unique style of writing, the priority he conferred upon subjective experience, and the nurnerous implications that his unique approach drew from the exciting physiological research that had recently emerged out of Gerrnan laboratories. Nevertheless, it is important to establish

James's contributions to psychology's transition from philosophy to science because it will figure prominently in the following discussion of Tirne in the m.

Several lines of evidence attest to James's place among those who brought the natural scientific approach to psychology. Perry (1935, p. 18 1) provides evidence of his early, yet tentative, plans to treat psychology as a science rather than a philosophy:

It seems to me that perhaps the tirne has corne for psychology to begin to be a science-some measurements have already been made in the region lying between the physical changes in the nerves and the appearance of consciousness-at (in the shape of sense perceptions), and more may corne of it. . . . (letter frorn James to Thomas W. Ward, in the autumn of 1867)

Somewhat later, though still in the early days of scientific psychology, he makes this

transition public in the first lines of the FT, in what has become a farnous definition of psychology (1 890, p. 1: 1):

PSYCHOLOGYis the Science of Mental Life, both of its phenornena and their condiiions.

James recognized the novelty of this definition and expended considerable effort in establishing first and foremost that psychology was a natural science. To this end, he further distinguished psychology from philosophy by contrasting the 'scientific' approach with both the "orthodox 'spiritualistic' theory of scholasticism" and the

"'associationist' schoo1s"-the latter being represented by Herbart, Hume, the Mills, and Bain (James, 1880, p. 1). Unlike the spiritualistic and associationist schools, the scientific approach was alone capable of fully subsuming in its study the implications of brain-physiology ( 1890, p. 5). James argued that the spiritualists and the associationists merely explained certain manifestations of the Sou1 or the relations between "discrete 'ideas"' respectively (p. 1). Nei ther of these schools, however,

. . . explain the effects of fever, exhaustion, hypnotism, old age, and the like. And in general, the pure associationist's account of our mental life is almost as bewildering as that of the pure spiritualist. This multitude of ideas, existing absolutely, yet clinging together, and weaving an endless carpet of themselves, Iike dominoes in ceaseless change, or the bits of glass in a ka1eidoscope.-whence do they get their fantastic laws of clinging, and why do they cling in just the shapes they do? . . . The fact that the brain is the one immediate bodily condition of the mental operations is indeed so universally admitted nowadays that I need spend no more time in illustrating it, but will simply postdate it and pass on. The whole remainder of the book will be more or less of a proof that the postulate was correct. (James, 1890, p. 4) In effect, James achieved the new trend of treating psychology as a 'natural

science' with his attention to physiological research. Several of the early chapters of

the PP, deal exclusively with brain physiology, the brain's functions, and the

conditions of its activity. And in the remainder of the book, he continually

incorporates the implications of physioIogica1 work for various other psychological issues. James somewhat supports his use of physiological research by describing the correlations between mental phenornena with neural (dys) function. Though he does not explicate the precise connection between the rnind and brain, admitting in a later chapter the "difficulty of stating the connection between mind and brain" (James,

1890, p. 1: 176), he explains that such a difficulty is a common feature of natural science.

The assumptions of the natural science of psvcholony

James restricted the discussions in the PP from those that he felt were more properly philosophy: " in this strictly positivistic point of view consists the only feature of it [the PP] for which 1 [James] feel tempted to daim origindity" (1890, p. 1: vi.). Proceeding from this position, the 'mindhody' connection was but one of several assumptions that James made to justify his treatment of psychology as a natural science. He argued that the interaction between the mindhody could not be criticized "in the same breath" by those who would sustain that there are mechanical causes in physiology; for this view also took as its assumption such material causes2

"as if Hume, Kant, and Lotze had never been boni" (James, 1890, p. 1: 136). Thus, by both accounts the claim to being a science necessitated certain assumptions about

In contrat to physiology, psychology was more vulnerable to doubts regarding

its scientific qualities. Thus, to establish his scientific approach for psychology,

James was restricted frorn explicit discussions of metaphysics, specificaIIy the nature

of Time. A problem emerges, however, because many of these rnetaphysical issues,

such as the mincilbody connection and the nature of Time, were at the heart of his

argument for a scientific psychology. James's metaphorical style provided a solution

to this problem. For example, rather than explaining the mind/body connection

explicitly, James's use of the results of physiological research often took the forrn of

finding analogies between mental and neural processes. It should be noted that his

use of physiological analogies was coherent with his assumptions of the nature of the mindhody connection, and the correlative aspects of such connections. James shared this view with spencer4:

At a certain stage in the development of every science a degree of vagueness is what best consists with fertility. On the whole, few rccent formulas have done more real service of a rough sort in psychology than the Spencerian one that the essence of mental life and of bodily life are one, namely, 'the adjustment of inner to outer relations.' Such a formula is vagueness incarnate; but because it takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react; because, in short, it takes mind in the midst of al1 its concrete relations, it is imrnensely more fertile than the old-fashioned 'rational psychology,' which treated the sou1 as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and properties. 1 shall therefore feel free to make any sallies into zoology or into pure nerve-physiology which may seem instructive for our purposes, but otherwise shall leave those sciences to the physiologists. (James, 1890, p. 1: 6)

Accordingly, James found that he could speak of what occurred mentally on the one hand, and physically on the other, by explaining how they occurred in parallel; thus. he could suggest a connection-albeit with leaving the exact nature of this connection unspecified. Consequently, on the basis of analogy he was able to rnake as much use of the physiological research as necessary to better understand mental experience and further bestow the 'scientific' aspects of physiology upon psychology.

The assumptions that James draws rnight be qualified by mentioning that the metaphysical foundation of Newton's physics had yet to fa11 into question. Because the metaphysical foundations of the natural sciences were still intact, James would have felt few reservations about making such assumptions (though he would, in fact, take part in criticisms to these metaphysics in his later work. He regarded his assumptions as standard practice within science. Moreover, it would have been exceedingly difficult to build a new science and its metaphysical foundation concurrently. To attempt both science and metaphysics, he believed, would end up with failing at both, rather than just one (see below). For example, further examination of the rnindhrain relationhould run counter to' his intentions of presenting psychology as a science-a dornain where metaphysics had been restricted-and surrender psychology to philosophy:

One must be irnpartially naifor impartially critical. If the latter, the reconstniction must be thorough-going or 'metaphysical,' and will probably preserve the common- sense view that ideas are forces, in some uanslated form. But Psychology is a mere natural science, accepting certain terms uncritically as her data, and stopping short of metaphysical reconstruction. Like physics, she must be naive; and if she finds that in her very peculiar field of study ideas seem to be causes, she had better continue to talk of them as such. She gains absolutely nothing by a breach with comrnon-sense in this matter, and she loses, to say the least, al1 naturalness of speech. If feelings are causes, of course their effects must be furtherances and checkings of intemal cerebraI motions, of which in themselves WC are entirely without knowledge. . . . (James, 1890, p. 137) The above quote suggests two additional reasons for James's apparent neglect of

philosophical inquiries. First, metaphysical inquiries dernand a great deal of mental

cornmitment. An extended metaphysical account would have severely taxed James's

mental resources6 at the expense of his drawing out psychology as a science. Second,

he might have felt that his metaphysics was not sufficiently mature for a "thorough-

going" account: "Metaphysics fragmentary, irresponsible, and half-awake, and

unconscious that she is metaphysical, spoils two good things when she injects herself into a natural science" (1890, p. vi). Accordingly, James's psychology proceeded from those assumptions that he thought necessary to scierztijïc inquiry.

Nonetheless, James was extremely cautious with his philosophical assumptions.

In fact, he frequently alerts the reader to dangers of such assumptions:

"The fundamental conceptions of psychology are practically very clear to us. but theoretically they are very confused, and one easily makes the obscurest assumptions in this science without realizing, until challenged, what interna1 difficulties they involve. When these assumptions have once established themselves (as thcy have a way of doing in our very descriptions of the phenomenal facts) it is almost impossible to get rid of them afterwards or to make any one see that they are not essential features of the subject" (1 890, p. 145)

Mindful of the difficulties of that accompany unrealized assumptions, James went to great pains to state his own assumptions that followed his adoption of a scientific approach to psychology. Cogent to this essay, he frequently includes his assumption of Time, among others, as an accepted convention in a natural science. For exarnple,

James (1890, p. v.) states in the Preface to the ff,

1 have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as ils data (1) thoccghts and feelings, and (2) a pltysical world in time and space with which they coexist and which (3) they know. Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them (as of other elernents) is called metaphysics and falls outside ihe province of this book.

Time rnight seem incidental to his list of assumptions, but it nonetheless figures

largely in his psychology. Directly following the heading "PSYCHOLOGY IS A

NATURAL SCIENCE,'' James continues to explain how Time is inextricable from

psychology inquiry:

That is, the mind which the psychologist studies is the mind of distinct individuals inhabiting definite portions of a real space and of a real time. With any other sort of mind. absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, of Mind no[ subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. (1890, p. 183)

And yet again, mentioning psychology's position as a natural science, and in relation to the assumption of the mindhody connection discussed above, he both points to the importance of Time, but inexplicably arrests any further considerations of it:

Psychology, as a natural science, confines itself to the present life, in which every mind appears yoked to a body through which its manifestations appear. In the present world, then, rninds precede, succeed, and coexist with each other in the common receptacle of time, and of their collective relations [O the latter norhing more can be said. (James, 1890, p. 199)

Regardless, he was sensitive to the possible problems that could result frorn some of his philosophical assumptions: "Men must keep thinking; and the data assurned by psychology, just like those assumed by physics and the other natural sciences, must some time be overhauled" (James, 1890, p. vi).

James realized that the transition of psychology as philosophy to psychology as science was sornething that had to be addressed on a philosophical plane (a central concern was of course Kant's critique, which denied the possibility of psychology ever being a science). A tension emerges however: psychology had originated out of the philosophical tradition and many of James's ideas were informed by that tradition,

but in order to proceed with his scientific approach to psychology he could overtly

state only his assurnptions, and had to leave their explication implicit7. This tension

dissolves, however, as one begins to perceive the implicit metaphysics in the

metaphors of the E.

James's stvle and method

James's overriding purpose was to present psychology as a science; extensive

discussions of philosophical problems would have defeated this purpose. Subsequent

then to James's adoption of a scientific approach to psychology, he seemingly

dispensed with philosophicaf considerations, specifically that of the metaphysic of

Time. But James's disavowal of metaphysics was merely on a surface level; on another level, the rnetaphorical level, he had a sophisticated philosophical framework.

An examination of James's metaphors will reconcile James's use of metaphor with the traditional linguistic prescriptions of logic for science. Furtherrnore, I will show how these metaphors are not only consistent with his ideas of science, but dso how they function pragmatically for James in his attempt to resolve psychology's philosophical legacy with its scientific aspirations-the key to which was the metaphorical transformation of the time of psychology into the time of science.

James's style

As we have seen (see chapter two), James's literary style was a natural consequence of an upbringing that was heavily populated by literary types. His use of metaphor developed early in his career, and it was characteristic of him for the rest of his life (see (see Gentner & Gmdin, 1985). In addition to the living influence of

persons such as Emerson, Carlyle, and Henry James Jr., James was a voracious reader: he was exposed to the work of hundreds of persons who used metaphors, and who may have provided him with a model for his own style. Ruddick (198 l), for example, provides an excellent account of James's sources for his strearn of consciousness metaphor. She attributes Carlyle and Emerson with the original model for James's ideas of the 'world in flux': "It dominates, for example, the writings of

Carlyle, whose universe consists of a cosmic 'Chaos-flood' traversed by the 'bridges' and 'webs' of art, science, and language" (p. 336); or Emerson, "who pictures the mysterious universe as a great, swallowing ocean which would certainly 'drown' us if not for the 'ship' of science that bears us safely across it" (p. 336). As viewed by

James's psychological perspective, however, the world in flux is described as it is perceived, as an interna1 Stream.

As much as Carlyle and Emerson, two persons with whom James had a great deal of commerce, influenced his thought, James intended his metaphors for purposes other than literature. James's intentions and use of metaphor in his PP realize sentiments expressed by Hodgson:

. . . The facts of metaphysic, like those of every purely objective science, are fact of consciousness, and their obscurity and the difficulty of observing them make their interpretation, or their analysis doubtful. . . . In this unfixed part of metaphysic the appeai to consciousness rnust still be permitted; there the proofs must not only be examined but performed by everyone for himself, with a view to the establishment of a sufficient consensus of judgements; and the aim of the metaphysical writer in this part of this inferential task must bc, not to give convincing inferential proofs of his positions, but to state and describe the phenomena so as to lead and assist the reader in finding the proofs for himself. . . (Hodgson, 1865, p. 3-5) This is the very sarne approach that James takes in the E. It was an approach that

called for the use of rnetaphor rather than inferential proofs or logic.

Logic would have been unfaithful to James's view of the worId. It would

misrepresented the world as sornething static. Instead, James believed it was in flux.

His use of metaphor served his interests perfectly; reasoning from logic wodd not

have served James's intention of presenting a common-sense understanding of

psychological phenornena, nor would it have preserved his preference for

"naturalness of speech."8 Through metaphor, James could espouse his ideas of

consciousness and rnetaphysics in a way that made them self-evident to the reader.

And perhaps even more importantly, James's metaphorical style provided his

descriptions with the "vagueness that best consists with fertility," and allowed him to proceed in 'literal' metaphysical naiveté while metaphorically revealing the many intricacies of psychology.

James's metaphors: literary bridges between philosophy and science

At first glance, a rnetaphorical style might seem to be just as contrary to science as an explicit rnetaphysics would have been. Science, at least the conventional science of today, advocates literal objective language and the logic that such language affords. Imputing the logical positivist perspective of science upon James and subrnitting his work to a logical analysis, however, would not only be anachronistically false (logical positivism was not founded until the 1920s)' but it would further rnisconstrue the value of metaphor in science. Traditionally, or in the domain of literary theory, the word "metaphor" has been

used as the general tem designating what has also been called figurative language, a

family of comparison or similarity-based turns of phrase, which. in addition to the specific form of metaphor, also includes sirnile, synecdoche, metonymy, and personification (Abrarns, 1988, p. 64-68). In its specific literary definition, a metaphor occurs when "a word or expression which in literal usage denotes one kind of thing or action is applied to a distinctly different kind of thing or action, without asserting a comparison" (Abrams, 1988, p. 65). To illustrate with the terrns of literary theory, metaphorical expressions, such as "David is a giant" or "an ocean of time," use the secondaty subject (in these cases, "giant" or "ocean") as a vehicle to highlight similar or shared features or relations (the focus) in the principal subject ("David" or

"time").

Typically, logical positivists are critical of the use of metaphors in science, assigning metaphor dong with metaphysics as part of a nonsensical realm of discourse (Smith, 1990, p. 240). Instead of the imprecision and ambiguity that logical positivists attribute to metaphor, literai language is prescribed as the proper form of scientific discourse. Certain logicai positivists even go so far as to claim that "reality could be preciseIy described through the medium of language in a manner that was clear, unambiguous, and, in principle, testable-reality could, and should, be literally describable" (Ortony, 1993b, p. 1).

However, the logical positivist position has been weakened as a result of its failure to show how scientific discourse can operate without metaphorg. This failure is in part due to the inextricable part metaphor plays in language. Consequently,

logical positivists, in their attempt to rid scientific discourse of metaphor have yet to

provide a system that is not just a different type of metaphor.

The metaphorical basis of even the discourse of logical positivists has often been concealed within symbolic systems. However, few distinctions can be made between symbol and metaphor. Symbolic systems, whether as discourse, logic, or mathematics, are symbolic of sornething-an intentionality that is inherently metaphorical. Symbolic accounts remain based on human knowledge and language in a manner that is representational, with our experience of the world ntediated in terms of pre-existing meaning structures. It rnatters little if these representational meaning structures themselves consist of metaphors or symbols; they are both used to mediate experience by a similar mapping across the conceptual domains of experience and social knowledge. Even description or definition in terms of quantity is still metaphorically putting one thing "in terms" of something else. Granted these new terms might be more or less useful, but they are nonetheless metaphor-like.

Indeed, the logical positivist position might have been more convincing if they would have been able to avoid the use of metaphors in their own writings. Instead, they have demonstrated the opposite by their hypocritical use of metaphor (Smith, 1990, p.

240):

In the formal realm of logic, there was metaphorical taIk of logical atonts, molecular propositions, a pictrtre rheot-y of nteaning, and a logical structure (Aufbau) of the world. In the context of scientific theory, the purely forma1 component of a theory was sometimes characterized as a postulate set (to use a geometrical metaphor), sometimes as a niacltirw for grinding out theorems (to use a mechanical metaphor), and even as a nornological rzer (to use a piscatonal metaphor). In the frequently used architectural mode, theories were said to be erected or consrrucred on an empirical foundation. And what about this empirical foundation? Sometimes it was referred to as the plane of etnpir-icalfacrs, sometimes as the soil of observariotl, and sometimes sirnply as the giveri. And what was the relation between the formal and ernpirical realms? The formal çomponent of theory, which was said tofloat or hover over the plane of facts, needed to be tien to the observable realm by rneans of what were variousIy described as links, anchorings, chains of reduction sentences, bridge principles, rootlets desceriding into the soil, and even pilings driver1 inro the swanzp of fallible observatiotz starements. These connecting links were then said to permit an upward seepage of nzeanitig from the observation base to the theoretical concepts.

Furthemore, the failed attempts by logical positivists to correct even their own

language of the nonsensical expressions of metaphor and metaphysics illustrates how

unavoidable metaphors are in conceptualization. Many of their attempts resulted in

operationalism and instrumentalism (again, two metaphors).

Recall the discussion of operationalism in the first chapter. The sme argument

applies: definitions in terrns of the operations or instruments invoIved just conceal

and intens& the hazards of the metaphors and metaphysical assumptions involved.

h effect, what happens by operationalism or instrumentalism is that something is

taken metaphorically to the 'nth' degree: in terrns of quantity, in terrns of the

instrument/operation, and in terms of what this instmment/operation embodies.

Critics of logical positivism, such as Danziger (1990) and Kuhn (1962), explain that

even the technology used (the operations or instruments) are metaphorical

manifestations of social practices. For exarnple, I discussed how the use of time

measured by a clock actually ernbodies the very metaphysical assumptions that the

logical positivists thought they were removing, Newtonian time. This remains hidden because eventually the plurality of symbolism covers by many orders of intentionality what is at bottom an assurnption (or assumptions). That assumption is essentially stripped of the flags that could caution or alen the scholar to something "assumed," or

in other words, something unfounded. By their implicitness, these assumptions are

propagated unwittingly without the benefit of a critical eye.

The logical positivist position on metaphor is clearly inconsistent with James's

scientific approach to psychology. Logical positivism prescribes the use of logic; this

would have misrepresented the "unfinished seeming front'' with which he tried to

endow his psychology, considering, as he did, that such a front was "the best mark of

health that a science can show" (1 890, p. vii). Furthermore, and in the same interests

of science, logical positivism would have restricted James from his use of metaphor; but metaphors, on the other contrary, were fully compatible with his view of science.

The metaphors that James deliberately uses (the conspicuous ones, not the subtle unnoticed ones) fully confess the provisional nature of (metaphorical) knowledge claims. His metaphors did not once and for al1 dictate 'a' meaning; rather several meanings were at once possible. And where this metaphor remained visible, rather than concealed, then new and perhaps more useful meanings were yet possible to discover. In effect, James's metaphors "rernind us that another language rnight have located different joints, cut up the world in a different way" (Kuhn, 1993, p. 537).

This meaning-generating attribute of metaphors is in part responsible for what made them indispensable tools in James's approach to psychology.

James saw metaphors as not only consistent with his idea of Science, but consistent with his metaphysics. Metaphors afford different ways of viewing the world. They invite the interpreter into one of several views of reality, to apply the structural relations of the secondary object to find similar relations in the primary

subject. to perhaps view aspects of the primary subject with new significance, and to

consider undiscovered implications. By adopting certain prevailing metaphors of

philosophy-specifically, those metaphors that sympathetically communicated his

metaphysical ideas of Time-and transplanting these into his scientific presentation

of psychology, James was able to implicitly inform. and thus not undermine, his

science with his philosophy.

'Again, this was modeled for James in severai of the sources he uses for his E.

For example, the analogical references to consciousness, physiology, and Time in

Hodgson's book, Time and Space (1865, p. 2 17):

If the material element is due partly to the constitution of the brain irrespective of other objects, it is according to analogy to suppose that the forma1 element is so too: and that objects appear in consciousness, in the conscious iife of the empirical ego, as extended, not only because they have extension themselves, but partly because the nervous matter has extension; that they appear as having duration partly because the nervous matter, as well as the objects, has duration. It is more according to analogy to suppose the cognitions of time and space coeval with the conscious life, because the nervous matter in which it arises occupies time and space, than to suppose the conscious life, so far as it relates to the form of its perceptions, existing first as tabula rasa or sheet of white paper, which is first modified and written on from without; for the nervous matter in which it arises is not such a tabula rasa but has both form and duration.

Although it is a weak argument against a crucial aspect of Kant's critique, of there

being only the form of Time for consciousness, James may have found Hodgson's

argument informative. It demonstrated how a physiological analogy could endow consciousness with spatial dimensions, and subsequently, how physiological research could support James's bid that psychology should be regarded as a natural science. Similarly, Spencer draws an analogy between Time and space. Specifically, he shows through analogy how one can measure what Kant thought resistant to quantification-namely, Time. Spencer argues that in our perception of either Time or space, the dimensions of one can be translated into the other. He demonstrates this by an appeal to the history of Our measurement of these dimensions:

Beyond the facts that a second of tirne is a function of the length of the pendulum, and that our hours are measured by spaces on the dial, there is the fact ihrit a dqree, which was originally a day's journey of the Sun along the elliptic, has become the name of an angular space. (Spencer, 1888, p. 207) He goes so far as to cal1 it a result of progress that we have come to express Time in terrns of Space, measurement being, as it were, an indication of scientific progress.

James drew heavily upon Spencer's Principles of Psvcholorzy (1 888) in his own m, so again it is likely that James encountered this case of analogical reasoning.

Evidence falling after the publication of the PP even suggests that James deliberately adopted his style of writing on the basis of his understanding of Time.

On the basis of his understanding of Time, James defends the imprecision of his

Ianguage-for which his use of metaphor was largely responsible-in a series of lettersI0 to Charles ~eirce".

Cambridge, March 10, 1909 Dear Charles,- Before whom have 1 cast that pearl of an Appendix? 1imagined it to be in the purest spirit of your synechistic tychism'2; and I think still that my only mistake was in sending it IO you without the whole text that introduced and justified it. Of course you are right in the Iogical world, where every term is changeless eternity, but the real world is incongruent, as 1 always thought you held (it being indeterminate, except partly), and the logical terms only mark static positions in a flux which nowhere is static. . . . Affectionately yours. . . . Wm. James

Milford, March 14. 1909 My dear William,- 1 must have been in a hazy condition of mind when 1wrote to you, if 1 did not rnake it clear, as 1 intcnded to do, that you had skilfully stated my position so far as the univcrse of existence goes. But I wish you would consider-as vitally important, and quite indispensable condition of making yourself clear-that you must have some invariable or exactly certain yardstick. . . . 'Twas that acute but shallow fellow. Chauncey Wright, whom 1 only availed myself of as a whetstone of wits, but whom you looked upon far too much, who probably entrapped you his notion that in some part of the universe one and one perhaps do not make two. . . . My dear William, thcre is something about your mode of expressing yourself that makes plain folk like me unable to comprehend what you mean; and 1 think that this is what it is. You want to make the universe of the possible (because it indubitably is a real universe) as inexact as 1 hold the existential universe to be. But that can'r be, because the possible is Our only standard of expression. . . . C.S. P.

Cambridge, March 2 1, 1909 Dear Charles,- 1don't dcserve as elaborate and instructive a letter as you have written, nor do 1 fully deserve al1 your censure, even though 1 was conceived and born in philosophic sin, for 1 expressly do believe with you that in the universe of possibles, of rnerely mental truth, as Locke calls it, relations are exact. Time that equabiliterfluit is a conceptual entity, against which your time felt as tedious and mine felt as flashing by, can be artificially plotted out and equated, to the great convenience of human practice; and al1 their exact relations form a splendid artificial scheme of tabulation, on which to catch whatever elements of the existential flux can be made to stick there. My tychism, like yours, relates onIy to the flux. But wait till you see rny forthcoming book!. . . Wm. James

The above series of letters provides several clues to James's understanding of

Time and his use of metaphors. His metaphors worked to justify a science of psychology by merging the time that Kant attributed to psychology into the time favoured by science. We can see that his understanding of the world in flux is the very same world that James was initiated into by the metaphors of Emerson and

Carlyle; and it is the very same world that prevails throughout the E. Metaphors were perfectly coherent with this world because they were by their nature meaningful but not imposing, ambiguous but not absurd.I3 What better way could James have communicated his ideas of that "equabiliter fluit," Time, than with the central

metaphor of his E,the stream of consciousness? Cogently, Shotter (1993, p. 106)

explains, "Nowhere is the power of linguistic analogy in the creation of imaginary

entities more apparent than in the creation. among the stuff and substances of Our

universe, of the formless stuff we cal1 'tirne'."

1 will first explain the "power" of metaphors in the next section before 1proceed

to find James's understanding of Time in his metaphors.

Rudiments of Metaphorical Analvsis

Several domains of scholarship have attempted to explain metaphor. Metaphor is commonly regarded as a concept belonging to literary theory, and the scholarship of this domain will have obvious connections to James's FT, being as it is very much

'literary' in it style. But in the PP, he was also promoting psychology as science.

Consequentiy, I will cover the scholarship that has discussed the role of metaphor in both literature and science. Together, they will also prove informative for what will end up being a 'constructivist' account of rnetaphor in science, specifically psychology.

Metaphor in Literature. Literary theory norrnally focuses on "strong metaphors," a term supplied by Max Black (1993, p. 26). Strong metaphors play an indisputably major role in literature. They lend certain elegance to the writing of poets and novelists. This elegance is achieved through the ability of metaphor to cornrnunicate a wide body of relations or implications in a compact, elliptical, or condensed manner-but in a manner that literal language is unable to achieve. The value of

rnetaphors in literature, however, lies not only in their efficiency.

A strong metaphor, BIack explains, is one that has both emphasis and resonance

(Black, 1993, p. 26). A metaphor is e~nplraticif it is indispensable to the writing: in

other words, if the same effect intended by the use of the metaphor cm not be

captured by literal language. Ernphasis relates to the second quality of strong

rnetaphors, resonance, whereby if a metaphor can not be captured by literal language,

then what the metaphor has supplied is an unstated, or unstateable, set of implications

that the reader must interpret. The extent to which a metaphor warrants further

consideration, this, Black defines as resonance.

Strong metaphors engage the reader's understanding in interpreting the meaning

of their referent, rather than providing the meaning in a manifest, surface, or in a

word, literal fashion. By enlisting the reader in interpretation, often the reader's own experiences are used to provide the 'meaning' of the metaphor. Working to reveal the meaning of the rnetaphor, the interpreter must provide the very evidence required to sustain the 'personal tmth' of the metaphor-that evidence being those same experiences the reader used to disclose the meaning of the metaphor. If no experiences are to be found, then the metaphor, and by extension, the 'tnith' of the metaphor, fails.

This is not precisely "truth" in terrns of the contingent truths required by conventional science. The purpose of a metaphor is not to achieve an objective or universal tmth. Rather, what is sought is a personal truth, one that not only reveals the meaning of the writer, but provides additional 'rneaning to the reader's own

experiences".'. Thus, when J. S. ~i11"described the ability of poetry and fiction to

depict truth, it is surely due to literature's employrnent of metaphor:

Poetry, when it is really such, is tmth; and fiction also, if it is good for anything, is truth: but they different truths. The truth of poetry is to paint the human sou1 truly: the truth of fiction is to give a true picture of life. The two kinds of knowledge are different, and come by different ways, corne mostly to different persons. Great poets are often proverbially ignorant of life. What they know has come by observation of thernselves: they have iound within them one hiphly delicate and sensitive specimen of humnn nature, on which the laws of emotion are written in large characters, such as can be read off without much study. Other knowledge of mankind, such as cornes to men of the world by outward experience, is not indispensabIe to them as poets: but, to the novelist, such knowledge is al1 in all; he has to describe outward things, not the inward man; actions and events, not feelings; and it will not do for him to be numbered among those, who, as Madame Roland said of Brissot, know man, but not men. (Mill, I833ll993, p. 996)

From literature, or more specificâlly, frorn metaphor, what the reader arrives at is not an ideal, static, universal Truth, but a truth that incorporates the perspectives of both the writer (the "verbal rneaning"), and the reader (the "~i~nificance")'~.The verbal meaning somewhat constrains the reader in hisher interpretation, but it does not determine it. This understanding of metaphorical interpretation further implies that the significance of a metaphor, and thus the resulting understanding, will Vary across readers. Al1 readers bring with them a unique set of experiences to their interpretation of a metaphor, and as a result of each new person, a new understanding.

And though there is not 'one' understanding there is still a true understanding-only on a personal basisI7. Hereafter, 1 will use 'truth' as distinct from 'meaning', using the former to refer to the objective static truth one appeds to in contexts such as logic, using the latter to refer to the variable personal 'truth' one derives from metaphors. CIaiming the importance of metaphor in poetry or literature in general is hardly a

contentious issue. In science, however, metaphor is a different beast altogether, with

both its role and importance being controversial issues. The soundest approach with

which 1 can approach James's use of rnetaphor is the constructivist position.

The constructivist account. Constmctivist accounts of metaphor are somewhat consonant with the literary explanation of metaphor (see Black, 1993; Boyd, 1993;

Danziger, 1990; Kuhn, 1993; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Ortony, 1993a).

~irni1a.rto the literary explanations, constructivist accounts recognize that metaphors are not simply elliptical literal statements. Emanating from several domains such as philosophy of science, linguistics, and history and theory of psychology, constructivist accounts also share the idea that each person's unique set of life circumstances piays a significant part in their interpretation of a metaphor. It adds however, to the literary account in two ways: 1) it emphasizes the sociohistorical conditions in the rnetaphor interpretation process, and 2) it draws attention to the reflexivity of the interpretation process because language, even Our understanding of reality, constructivists claim, develops in a metaphorical manner.

Interestingly, the constructivist account of metaphor is itself a metaphor. The

'bconstruction" metaphor used by this position captures both the act of the individual's

'construction' of the meaning of a metaphor, as well as the 'constructed' nature of the social knowledge present in language. The tools for an individual's construction of meaning consists largely of the person's unique grasp of a language's set of rules and usages-a language, furthemore, which is shared with the writedspeaker (henceforth called the interlocutor). Essentially, the interlocutor utilizes "conventional rneans to

produce a nonstandard effect, while using only the standard syntactic and semantic

resources of his speech community" (Black, 1993, p. 23).

Corresponding to the verbal meaning versus significance distinction made by

literary theorists, readersflisteners (henceforth called interpreters) build their

understanding on the basis of not onIy a shared language, but also a partially assumed

shared social knowledge. A shared social knowledge provides the minimum

requirements of communication: those requirements being membership and access to

the communal meaning structures in which both the interlocutor and interpreter are

grounded (Danziger, 1990, p. 332). Even granting a shared language, without this

shared social knowledge one would be at a loss to understand certain metaphors. For

example, how would a person of the medieval era understand the information

processing metaphors of cognitive science? This is perhaps hedging the argument, so

take another example, the metaphorical expression "life is but a play, and we but

actors in it."

Language affords people the ability to proceed from wbat each of the terms

denotes, to fîrst understand the literal meanings of "life," "play," and "actors." Then, in order to understand the metaphorical aspects of the expression, the person has to understand that an ontological equivalence is being made, and that this equivalence is metaphorical rather than literal. Life is not literally equivalent to a play, but it shares certain aspects with theatre productions. What a person has experienced of life shares a set of relations with their understanding of plays and actors, and what a person knows of each will inform them as to what the metaphor means. Clearly not

everyone will come to the same conclusions, even though theatre is a fairly stable

feature of many societies. People's understanding of a metaphor will hinge on the

particular conditions of the sociohistorical position they inhabit: their language, their

social relations, and their historical context. This sociohistorical position will

influence how they have experienced life. It will influence not only what they

understand of plays and actors (e.g., whether it is Shakespearean or theatre of the

absurd), but dso which relations they select to understand the metaphor.

Consequently, there are no 'objective truths' when it cornes to metaphorical

interpretation. People who have experienced restrictive social circumstances might

construct the metaphor to mean that they have been given roles to play in their lives,

that their lives have been scripted as tragedies; other people might construct the

metaphor as cornedies, that their lives are to provide entertainment for others, or that

anything they do in life is just an exciting illusion. Though it may lead to mors in

some circumstances, nevertheless, experience affords people equal privilege to their

interpretation.

In addition to its rhetorical or aesthetic functions, the constructivist account

attributes a still grander role to metaphor. It attributes a conceptual basis to metaphor.

According to this account, metaphor is not simply a matter of expression, but a matter of thought (Danziger, 1990, p. 33 1-334). Metaphors occur as a result of "general mappings across conceptual domains" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 203). Consequently, to understand metaphor interpretation and creation, one must consider the conceptual

basis of metaphor.

Essentially, the constructive process of metaphor creation and interpretation is recursive. Metaphors work to express our ideas because Our ideas are inherently metaphorical; or more precisely, " . . . the original presentation of this cornplex reality is rnetaphorical" (Romanyshyn, 1989, p. 61.'' And though we use language to understand metaphors, language, constructivists claim, develops through a metaphorical process:

The first mute language is the immediate responsive-representation in gesture of a moment or place of common reference, where the gesture functions rneraphorica!ly, not to refer to something already known about, but to indicate an 'is,' to esrablish a 'something' with common significance. (Shotter, 1993, p. 55)

After we have developed language through rnetaphorical processes, they continue to expand our understanding. Through sharing this understanding via metaphors, members of a society share with others their access to an ever-growing source of societal knowledge. Over time, the societal knowledge present in language develops and grows as humans participate in metaphor creation and interpretation. In short, reality is further metaphorically mediated as the social knowledge, primarily in the form of language, articulates persona1 experience. Or, as Eckartsberg observes, through metaphor creation and interpretation "there is an ongoing production and sedimentation of meaning which one experiences as a dynarnic and cumulative enrichment of the world, personally, and collectively through institutiondized knowledge and production" (1989, p. 47). From this process, "reality which is neither i!r us nor in the world but between the world and us in a relation of experierzce

becomes a fact in the world of which we have an experietzce" (Romanyshyn. 1989. p.

13).

The role of metaphors in science. It follows from the above explanation that

metaphors possess several qualities that make them uniquely suited to, and

inextricably a part of scientific theory. In science's enterprise of explorhg and

understanding reality, metaphors function to accommodate laquage-and thought-

to an exceedingly complex world, a world wherein the causal structures are rarely

ever found to be of billiard-bal1 simplicity. Frorn the chaotic staging area of the

world, science arduously attempts to select or discover (some might even Say

construct) these causal relationships. In this enterprise, metaphors have proved

invaluable for what Boyd (1993, p.483) refers to as its capacity for socially

coordinating epistemic access to the causal structures of the world.

Indispensable for creative conceptud thought in science, metaphors have a unique capacity for hamessing the development of social knowledge that occurs and becomes embedded in language. Through metaphor a scientist can apply existing meaning structures in their native language to develop or permit "access" into new meaning structures. This capacity will become clear as 1 discuss two ways in which metaphors contribute to the general scientific enterprise: specifically, 1) in constituting theory (Boyd, 1993, p. 486), and 2) in transrnitting theory (Kuhn, 1993, p. 539). There are several criteria for theory constitutive metaphors. First, a metaphor is

constitutive of a theory if it is indispensable; in other words, if by no other means

(i.e., literal language) other than the metaphor could the theorist provide the same

effect (implications). The second criterion is related to the first: namely, that the

. rnetaphor provides a set of implications which continue to contribute to the theory's

elaboration and developrnent. The metaphor ntay or may not be cumpicuolrs, but the

second criterion is often reflected, irnplicitly or not, in not only the continued use of

the metaphor by the scholar responsible for it, but the further use and elaboration of

this metaphor by a community of scholars.

The continued utility of theory constitutive metaphors distinguishes it from the

strong metaphors found in literature. Although theory constitutive metaphors have a

great deal in cornrnon with the qualities of emphasis and resonance of strong

metaphors, what distinguishes the former from the latter is what Boyd (1993, p. 486)

refers to the "inductive open-endedness" of theory constitutive metaphors. It is this

quality that makes theory constitutive metaphors particularly unique and useful for

science. While some of the implications of a theory-constitutive metaphor must be

immediately apparent to the interpreter, there also remains an indefinite number of

implications for the scientist and the research cornmunity to discover. Thus, while

few literary metaphors can be extended past the original work in which they appear,

"theory-constitutive scientific metaphors, on the other hand, become, when they are

successfu1, the property of the entire scientific comrnunity, and variations on them are explored by hundreds of scientific authors without their interactive qualtity being lost" (Boyd, 1993, p. 487).

Because theory constitutive metaphors are inductively open they further contribute to theory transmission. By metaphorical qualities that should now be farniliar to the reader, metaphors can capture, in their compact fashion, a large set of theoretical implications. They function heuristically, serving as theoretical shorthand for what would have ot herwise demanded a lengt hy explication. Moreover, because the vehicle of the metaphor is often widely accessible, metaphors are understood where a literal explication would not. And by using the interpreter's own understanding of the secondary subject to draw out a metaphor's implications, they further work to persuade the interpreter of the accuracy of the theory. Consequently, metaphors become a standard or flag which draws new adherents to this or that particular theory.

Together, the theory transmission and constitutive functions of metaphor in science serve a pragrnatic function. In this function, the success of a metaphor is reflected in how well it brings new members into a scientific community. This of course depends on the appropriateness of metaphor, how well it constitutes the theory, and the extent to which the social knowledge, or the ground of the metaphor is shared by prospective members of that community.

A historio~ra~hicalnote. When scholars engage inn historical work they encounter several difficulties. Foremost is the issue of how to provide an appropriate reading of that work. By the very nature of historical work, the scholar is often set at a distance from the epistèmé in which that work is embedded, the societal knowledge upon which an appropriate reading must be buil t. This is most apparent when the scholar does not share the language, the historical period in which the work is set, or both. In these cases the scholar is al1 too aware of the possibiIity of rnisinterpretation.

But even when the work is set in a scholar's native language, and the period and society which bounds the work in question is close to their own (Le., the sociohistoricd context of James's PP), a scholar is still in jeopardy of rnisinterpretation. If the above discussion of metaphor says anything about interpreting texts, it should be clear that when "we study any kind of text, including research reports, the only objects we encounter are symbolic objects, and it as such we have to treat them" (Danziger, 1990, p. 337)-a caveat that is especially applicable in this thesis's goal of examining James's metaphors.

Previous scholarship concerning Time in James's PP has treated his metaphors in a Iargely perfunctory manner (Bluestone, 1963; Capek, 1950; Myers, 1986;

Natsoulas, 1993). This scholarship has adhered almost exclusively to James's explicit statements on Time, discussed James's logic, and has only superficially considered his metaphors when an obvious connection to Time exists. 1 fïnd this problematic because metaphorical styles such as James's are extremely vulnerabIe to unsympathetic readings. Unsympathetic readings fail to realize that James did not intend to provide a comprehensive or definitive meaning via his metaphors.lg

With the exception of Capek's modest consideration of James's metaphors

(1950)' the almost inevitable result of this scholarship has been an critical reading of James's PP which has contended with its many, though 1 will argue, apparent

'inconsistencies' and 'contradictions'. Bluestone's reading (1963, p. 212) is typical

of this scholarship. Bluestone, dong with the others, believes that many of the

distinctions James makes "cm be maintained only by developing a cornprehensive

epistemology and adopting a 'purified' vocabulary." To this largely logical

positivistic approach 1attribute the wjdespread misunderstanding of James's work.

Specifically, these misunderstandings suffer frorn the same failure of logical positivists ro understand how a single metaphor can operate to fom connections, even homologies, between two domains (see Bluestone, 1963, p. 2 13). It is not surprising that logical positivists would look for, but fail to find "any precise meaning in his [James's] statements" (p. 219). Thus, any arcount of James's work which takes a logical positivist approach, such as Bluestone's, is left with the conclusions that

James is "repeatedly involved in contradictions" (p. 220) and that there is "no single consistent view of consciousness and temporality" (p. 243) in James's work." 1do not share these conclusions, for once we submit James's PP to a rnetaphorical analysis many of these inconsistencies and contradictions dissolve.

Noting the above difficulties, this will be an admittedly subjective reading. To claim an objective static 'tmth' of James's metaphors would clearly violate the above account of metaphor. My account-what 1emphasize, and what 1 find-will be affected by its focus on the temporal aspects of James's metaphors. There are some constraints though; the following examination will be a historically inforrned account that is aware not only of its biases and shortcomings, but its sympathies and strengths that result of its metaphorical focus. Given a shared language, through metaphor I will be able to use the societal knowledge present in language to discover the meaning of James's expressions and his understanding of the world. Accordingly, this reading will be able to maintain consistency with the historical context and coherence with the aims of James's FT, and on this basis it can be evaluated to the extent it is consistent and coherent with another person's reading. In other words, 1 will provide 'meaning' rather than 'truth'.

Metaphvsics through metaphors

Metaphorical analysis admits us into James's "underlying assumptions and preoccupations" (Danziger, 1990, p. 332) as he wrote the m.These underlying temporal assumptions and preoccupations emerge from the systernatic relations among his metaphors. In his metaphorical description of mental experience, Time lies at the heart of two systems of overlapping figures of thought-each of these systems features the strearn metaphor. Suitably, the relations arnong his metaphors may be organized according to two temporal analogies: the analogy of the

Heraclitus's Stream and the analogy of Zeno's paradox of continuity. These analogies illustrate not only James's preoccupations with Time and its aporetic structure, but also how his metaphors function pragmatically to constitute and transmit his ideas of

Tirne. In the following exarnination, 1 will delve into the thoughts James was attempting to express, engage with the conjoined experiential and social knowledge that inforrned his metaphors, and enter imaginatively into his understanding of Time. Heraclitus and temporal aporia

James was not the first person to use the stream metaphor, nor was he even the

first person to apply the stream metaphor to consciousness-priority for this, as far as

1can tell, lies with Shadworth Hodgson. In his book Time and S~ace:a meta~hvsical

essav (1865, p. 74), Hodgson posited that the purpose of metaphysics is to "trace as it

were the strearn of consciousness and of existence to its source or sources." Hodgson

did not cultivate the metaphor, but cogent to this essay, he traced the strearn to its

source in Time, specifically, the temporality present in, and shared between, the

feeling of consciousness and the world." Overtly, James adopted this metaphor to

account for consciousness; tacitly, however, the metaphor also accounted for a fundamental aspect of consciousness, Time.

The temporal basis of James' stream metaphor is irnrnediately apparent in what is probably its first well-known formulation, Heraclitus's solution-through-analogy of

Tirne's aporetic structure. The temporal aporia2' occurs as follows: A necessary condition for Time is change. But what changes? In order for there to be some

'thing' to change, it must at some point exist; thus it must have at some point peïsisted through change. But if an aspect of a thing is its place in history, its Time, and change is an aspect of Time, then the thing must have changed. Alone, or in part, the above components of the temporal aporia are valid, but together they seem incompatible. The aporia, however, can be resolved through the strearn metaphor.

Through the strearn metaphor, Heraclitus (circa 540-480 BC) demonstrated how unity and identity can exist amidst change. Aliowing for differences in translation, Heraclitus has been cited as saying that as "People step into the same rivers, and different waters flow on to them" (Honderich, 1995, p. 35~).~~This anaiogy illustrates temporal becoming: even though the material substance of a thing changes, in this case water, identity is still possible because the river's identity, it sameness, inheres in the temporal continuity of its flow. hdeed, change is a necessary condition for a river; stop the flow of the water and you no longer have a river.

The stream/chainltrainlcurrent/physioionvsvstem of rnetaphors. In a manner comparable to the Heraclitian solution of temporal aporia, James constructed the first system of metaphors to counter the Hume's argument against the unity of the self.

James used the metaphors of this system to support his claim for the temporal becoming present in consciousness, and through temporal becoming, his claim that the idea of personal identity is tenable. But the heart of James's argument is his metaphorical description of experienced tirne. Personal identity is a process; the sensible continuity conveyed by one's experience of Time constitutes the foundation of the process that is persona1 identity.

James's captured Hume's description of thought in the forrn of the chain and train metaphors. Hume argued that al1 we are conscious of is a succession of different sensations, and that the self is just a "bundle" of sensations succeeding one another."

He allowed that according to certain regularities in the successive sensations, such as association through similarity, one rnight arrive at the questionable ideas of causation or the sense of self; but Hume was skeptical of the assertion that these associations. however strong, actually inhere in the event structure of the world. For though the

sensations a person experiences seem connected causally or as part of one's self,

counterfactually speaking, the connections might be no more than a train or chain of

discrete ideas, associated with one another merely in terrns of contiguity or similarity.

It followed, for Hume, that the idea of a unified self was questionable.

Opposing Hume's philosophy, James argues that the associationist approach-an approach which led inevitabl y to Hume's skepticism-makes several fundamental errors. One error is that associationistic approaches to psychology have begun with sensations as the elements of consciousness:

Most books start with sensations, as the simplest mental facts. and proceed synthetically, constructing each higher stage frorn those below it. But tliis is abandoning the empirical method of investigation. No one ever had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness from our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we cal1 simple sensations are results of discriminative attention, pushed ofien to a very high degree. (James, 1890, 1: p. 224)

Because Hume begins with elementary sensations, James finds his account incomplete. Hume's account is insufficient for explaining causation. Hume is at a loss in explaining how a succession of ideas becomes an idea of succession; and he is at a loss in explaining the widely held belief in a unified self. But these problems

Hume might never have had to encounter: "Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the nzind perceive some real corlnection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case"". Indeed, he might have discovered the real connection had he not begun from sensations and then tried to build them into what we perceive. Contrary to the associationist approach, and fitting to his metaphorical style,

James's general rule is that perceptual experience-immediate and whole-"has

absolute authority. . . Where conception denies the appearance and perception affirrns

it, perception must prevail. In short there is no contradiction possible Save where

reason and sense both make a deliverance about the appearance taken as such.

Conclusions about the cause of sensations cannot contradict sensation^".'^ And from

the irnmediate experience of perception, James argues that we do not observe

anything to support the Hurnian skepticism of self.

Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitIy as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In taiking of if hereafrer, let ris cal1 it the streani of thoicght, of conscioustzess, or of subjective life. (James, 1890, p. 1: 239)

Thus, by pitting the Stream metaphor against the metaphors of a train and a chain,

James was actually arguing against the associationistic approach.

There are subtle, but important differences that distinguish these metaphors. The

chainltrain metaphors manage to account for how one impression might 'seem' linked

to another, but they do not explain how we arrive at an idea resulting from their

cornparison. Any relation between the two impressions necessarily involves an

awareness of change, an idea of their succe~sion~~.In order for this to occur we must be able to hold both impressions in the rnind 'at a stroke'. But, as James argues,

Hume never catches himself "at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception: . . . [and he supposes] in the rest of mankind that they are notlzing but a bi4ndle or collection of difSerent perceptions" (James, 1890, p. 35 1). Consequently, the essential connections between perceptions are lost to Hume's

approac h.

In comparison, the stream system of metaphors is entirely representative of lived

experience. To begin with, the root metaphor of a stream has several characteristics

that James employs in his descriptions of consciousness. Like Heraclitus's stream

wherein djfferent waters flow, experience attests to the different thoughts that flow

through consciousness (James, 1890, p. 233). But contrasted with the chainhrain

metaphors, these changing thoughts are not built from discrete sensations; rather, they

are from the outset sensibly continuous and whole. James argues that it would be

absurd to posit that one could immediately experience being conscious of not being conscious (though we might later learn of it through inferential means). And so. again like Heraclitus's stream, this continuity contributes to the stream's identity, in this case of a unified self. Indeed, it is the continuity in the changing thoughts through time that constitutes identity (see James, 1890, p. 353). This process, by presentist terms, is calied temporal becorning-a process that the chaidtrain metaphors and, by extension, the associationistic approach cannot explain.

Temporal becorning is the basis of the strearn metaphor and it emerges from the

Heraclitian characteristics of consciousness. In order for a thing to 'become' temporaily, that "thing" must persist over the duration of its becoming. There are several ways a thing may change and yet persist. One way is to change additively, like a snowball, adding more snow to the existing ba11.'~ In the case of consciousness, change is also somewhat additive in terms of the memories that result from experience. In a global fashion. by being added to the existing set, these memories change the overall mental store. But perhaps the most important way in which consciousness changes and yet persists is through the experience of time. As thoughts rnerge together in succession, the "lingerings of old objects, these incomings of new, are the genns of rnemory and expectation, the retrospective and prospective sense of time. They give that continujty to conscjousness without which it could not be called a stream" (James, 1890, p. 606). The 'thing' that persists in consciousness in temporal becoming, then, is the continuous process of changing thoughts.

James extends the stream metaphor with a stream-current/electric-current homology; frorn which, he is further able to support his Heraclitian description of consciousness with physioiogical analogies (see Osowski, 1989, p. 134). Just as a stream has a current, so does the stream of thought. One's experience of the flow of thought follows certain trends, with one thought suggesting another. Though it operates by something bordering on rhetorical sIeight of hand, James likens the current of the strearn to the electrochemical currents in the brain and uses these two meanings interchangeably:

There are probably no exceptions to the diffusion of every impression through the nerve-centres. The effécr of the wave through the centres may, however, often be to interfere with proccsses, and !O dirninish tensions already existing there; and the outward consequences of such inhibitions may be the arrest of discharges from inhibited regions and the checking of bodily activities already in process of occurrence. When this happens it probably is iike the draining or siphoning of certain channels by currents flowing through others. When, in walking, we suddenly stand still because a sound, sight, smell, or thought catches our attention, something like this occurs. (James, 1890, p. II: 373)'9

We have seen that the free discharge of cells into each other through associative paths is a likely reason why the maximum intensity of function is not reached when the ceils are excited by their neighbors in the cortex. . . . The idea is that the leakage forward along these paths is too rapid for the inner tension in any centre to accumulate IO the maximal explosion point. unless the exciting currents are greater than those which the various portions of the cortex supply io each other. (James, I 890, p. II: 123)

The current works as fluid rnetaphor that creates a suggestive paraIlel between the mind and the brain. With this homology, James suggests that the flow of thought not

.only coincides with the electrochemical workings of the brain, but it emerges from

The analogy between one's experience and the brain is more direct when James discusses the Heraclitian aspects of the stream of consciousness. Brain analogies support the changes experienced in thought and the Heraclitian claim that "no state once gone cm recur and be identicai with what it was before" (James, 1890, p. 1:

230). Even when we try to hold in consciousness a simple enduring thought, a core feature of the thought might continue, but never does a thought occur that has its exact duplicate in another part of the stream. For example, the second time we experience the sight of a relatively stable object, it is a 're-experience' that is devoid of the novelty of the original experience. Othenvise, we wouId not know it was a "re- experience." And where experience testifies to the ever-changing thoughts, so does the physiological basis of these thoughts. The thought rnight persist, but "like the crest of a wave" (James, 1890, p. 1: 235) the flow of brain activity is actually reproducing the essential aspects of a prior thought, but the reproduction is due to the physiological changes. Furthennore, as James notes, "Every sensation corresponds to sorne cerebral action. For an identical sensation to recur it would have to occur the second time in an unrnodijied brain" (1890, p. 1: 232).

The continuity of the strem of consciousness also has its analogue in brain processes. Throughout one's life, the brain's processes are never once mested.

There are simultaneous currents of brain activity, which, in terms of timing, interpenetrate one another, but are continuous in a global sense. For example, activities in the anterior lobes rnight be accornpanied by activities in temporal lobes, and if not the temporal lobes, then the parietal, with none of this activity ending without activity in sorne other area having begun. And yet again, the coupling of change and continuity of processes-only with brain processes this time-account for the temporal becoming of lived experience.

Two arguments support the claim that temporal becoming occurs in brain processes. First, at least some amount of cerebral matter, structurally and functionally, retains its forrn changes occur in the rest of the brain rnatters little that this same cerebral matter changes itself dong with futures changes:

. . . this amount of duration is pictured fairly steadily in each passing instant of consciousness by virtue of some fairly constant feature in the brain-process to which the consciousness is tied" (James, 1890, p. 1: 630).

Second, over the duration of these other changes, there are structures, even processes (in that the 'timing of certain processes remain the same), that persist. Once more, these cerebral events reflect what occurs in consciousness:

Or, to state it in neural terms, rhere is ar every nlotnerlt a cunrularion of brain- processes overlapping each other, of which the fainter ones are the dying phases of processes ivhich but shortly previous were active in a rmrinial degree. The AMOUNT OF THE OVERLAPPING determines the feeling of the DURATION OCCUPIED. WHAT EVENTS shall appear ru occupy the duration deperids or1 just WHAT PROCESSES the overlapping processes are. (James, 1890, p. 1: 635)

James is quick to point out, though, that the ultimate causes of the overfapping brain processes are the objects thought of by consciousness. Similar to the intentionality posited by Brentano, for one to be conscious, it is to be conscious of something. Largely, thoughts in the stream of consciousness are of objects independent of the person. But when thought 'of', the objects are not objects 'in themselves,' but rather become thought-objects among others within the 'for-itselfY3': brain processes temporally order a multitude of the objects independent of the self into thoughts for the self. The order and overlap of the multitude of thoughts in the stream of consciousness provide the basis of duration. Duration articuIates these thoughts into the continuum that James characterizes as a stream. James calls this

"duration" in rnind and brain the specious present. And in James's description of the specious present is his clearest account of Time, to which 1 will proceed below.

Zeno's paradox of temporal continuity.

Similar to the first system, Time also plays a crucial role in the aims of the second system of metaphors as it too counters a temporal problem, Zeno's paradox of contin~it~.~'In particular, James not only elaborates on the temporal becoming introduced by the first system, thereby adding to his arguments against Hume's critique of the self, but further explains how the sensible continuity of the stream of consciousness avoids the logical paradox of mathematical continuity. He achieves this resolution to Zeno's paradox with his metaphors: the flow of the Stream of consciousness, the fringe and flight of the transitive parts of consciousness, and the saddleback of the specious present.

Aptly, Zeno's paradox is often illustrated through one of many analogies; an account of the most common analogy, however, will suffice in demonstration of the paradox undedying al1 of them. The analogy goes as follows: Achilles challenges a tortoise to a race, and in his pride, Achilles gives the tortoise a healthy head start. In spite of his overwhelming speed, starting off a fair distance behind the tortoise,

Achilles quickly finds that he is unable to catch up to the tortoise. Achilles races forth, cutting the time separating himself from the tortoise, some hours ahead of

Achilles, in half. Finding this, he redoubles his efforts and cuts the time in half again.

However, continuing to cut the time separating himself from the tortoise he never catches up to the tortoise because there are an infinite amount of divisions possible between any two points of continuous time. Achilles can half and hdf again the time separating himself and the tortoise ad infinitum and never make up the time separating the two.

At the heart of Zeno's analogy is the paradox that ernerges from a particular idea of continuity; also, this paradox, it would seem, argues the impossibility of temporal change, if change is assumed to be based, as it is with mathematical time and temporal becoming, upon continuity. According to the mathematical definition of continuity, something is continuous if every part of it has itself parts of the sarne kind.

Mathematical tirne. for exarnple, is continuous because any part of that time is divisible in the very same manner as a part of the original: one interval of time can be

divided just as an interval within the first interval can be divided. It follows that one

might divide a mathematically continuous interval of time ad infinitum. When it is

applied to temporal change, the mathematical definition of continuity makes change

, an illusion: there is no appreciable difference between any two points dong the time

continuum in other than a static distinction of one point from ar~other.~~

Another definition of continuity, however, accompanies temporal becorning; but

in contrast to the mathematical definition, this definition vdidates the possibility of

temporal change. According to the definition of continuity belonging to temporal

becoming, continuity results from the interpenetration of time intervals, each one

finite in itself, though continuous with one an~ther.~~This is the definition of

continuity to which James appeals in his account of consciousness through the

metaphors of the Stream, saddleback, flight, fringe, and flow.

James used rnetaphor to describe the temporal features of consciousness; and

with metaphor, he created parallels between his ideas of consciousness and his ideas

of Time. Specifically, James creates consonance between consciousness and Time by

attributing to both the same qualities of fringe, flight, and flow. Though the qualities

of Time that ernerge out of his metaphors seem incidental to his description of

consciousness, how James conceives of Time plays an exceedingly important role in

his psychology. 1 explained above how the temporal qualities of James's metaphors

operated in his arguments against Hume's position on the self. Important as that was,

James's metaphorical presentation of Time plays an even grander role countering the position of another philosopher, Kant, Also provoked by Hume, Kant's conceptualization of Time followed from his purpose of presenting the conditions necessary for human reason. But similar to how the conclusions reached by Hume's position were unacceptable to Kant, thus provoking Kant to build his philosophy, the conclusions reached by Kant's position were unacceptabIe to James. Ultimately,

James's metaphorical presentation of Time functioned tacitly ;;is a rebuttal to Kant's critique of a scientific psychology.35 In light of its role of opposition to Kant's critique, 1 will flesh out the nature and underlying purpose of James's conceptualization of Time.

Kant's critique. To revisit the discussion given in Chapter 1, several aspects of

Kant's idea of Time contribute to his position that a science of rational psychology, the study of objects of the inner sense, "proves abortive" (Kant, 176911965, p. 353).

First, Kant maintained that Tirne was the sole fom of the intuition applicabIe to psychology, in other words, consciousness. Given that we are aware of the "change of determinations" in the objects succeeding before the inner sense, Tirne, Kant argued, was an a priori condition for this succession. The succession of inner objects must exist in and through Time, and from their temporal existence emerges the feeling of temporal change.

The second aspect of Kant's idea of Time was that it was a transcendental quality of consciousness. Not only was Time inextricably involved in 'subjective' experience, being as it were a condition necessary and prior to experience, but it was also 'objective' (in presentist terms) because it was ontologically independent of experience. In other words, subjective experience is dependent upon Time, but Time does not depend on experience.

From the experience of the objects of the outer world specifically (compared with those of inner world), Kant further deduced that it was necessary to conceive of

Time as an infinite continuum in the manner of the mathematical conception 1 described above. Only by conceiving of Time as an infinite continuum could he remain consistent with his arguments of the synthetic a priori nature of mathematics; the knowledge of mathematics derives from experience, but given that experiences are 'bot simultaneous but successive," the idea of mathematical continuity must originate as an aspect of Time (Kant, l769/l 965, p. 75).

By Kant's reasoning, however, mathematics was not applicable to rational psychology. Though the objects for psychology (those of the inner sense) have the forrn of Time, this form is neither observable nor quantifiable in the manner of one's experience of external objects. Experience necessarily occurs in Time, but he argues that "Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience"

(Kant, 1769/1965, p. 74). Being interna1 to a person, one can not observe the quantity of Time constituting the inner objects of another person; nor can one observe this quantity in one's own inner objects. The objects of the inner sense succeed one another in perpetual flux, with nothing abiding Save the Pure ~~o~~(or the self as it is currently known); an empirically empty concept, it is transcendentai in the sarne fashion as Time: not derived from experience, not observable, and not quantifiable.

One's experience of the succession of inner objects does not admit knowiedge of the static sort that would permit quantification because there is no 'thing' persisting

through the change: the succession "yields knowledge only of the change of detenninations, not of any object that can be thereby determined" (Kant, 1769/1965, p. 75). Considering that Kant "believed, and considered he had proved, that an empirical inquiry is as scientific as the amount of mathematics it contains" (Watson

& Evans, 1991, p. 240), psychology could not be a science since it could not quantify and apply mathematics to its objects.

Guided by his aims of providing the conditions necessary to account for human reasoning, Kant arrives at several unfortunate conclusions--conclusions, however, that can be attributed to his concept of Time. Specifically, his conceptualization of

Time summons many of the same difficulties that 1 discussed under the headings of

Zeno's paradox and temporal aporia. By depicting Time as an objective 'infinite necessary continuum,' his concept succumbs to the paradoxical conditions illustrated by Zeno's aphorism. Furthemore, reflecting the problem of temporal aporia, Kant has taken the position that nothing persists through change; this results in Kant's conclusion that the self is empty, without content. But the most unfortunate conclusion reached by Kant, at least for James's purposes, was the implausibility of a science of rational psychology. The solution for the last conclusion, just as it was for the previous temporal difficulties, was James's conceptualization of Time.

James's rebuttal: The stream/saddlebacWflight/frin~e/flowsystem of metaphors.

James's metaphorical presentation of Time is strikingly well suited to oppose Kant's criticisrn of a scientific psychology. According to James's metaphors, from the fringe/flight/flow of consciousness we derive the feeling of what are regarded as

temporal qualities of fringe/flight/flow. The conceptualization of Time that emerges

from James's metaphors shows how he developed "the line of philosophic progress. .

. not so much through Kant as round him"37 on behalf of his daim that a science of

psychology is possible.

Metapborically, James descrjbed the transitive and substantive parts of the

strearn in terms of the flight and perching of a bird (p. 1: 243). The transitive parts

constituted the flight (change) of thought which brings it to relative States of rest in

the perching of the substantive parts. 1 Say "relative" because the substantive parts

themselves consisted of change, like the rainbow-only they continue to present a

quality that one observes as virtually the same as it was before. Hume rnissed the

transitive parts in his account because in trying to catch the transitive parts of the

strearn they are unavoidably destroyed. In connection with Zeno's paradox. trying to

arrest one's thoughts on the transitive parts is "like seizing a spinning top to catch its

motion, . . . as unfair as Zeno's treatment of the advocates of motion, when, asking

them to point out in what place an arrow is when it moves" (James, 1890, p. 1: 244).

Sirnilar to the transitive parts that James described in his argument of the

continuity of consciousness, the quality of a fringe also occurs in James's description

of the specious present. Taken as a whole, as it is by experience, the specious present is a duration which rnight encompass each, or even dl, of the three tenses: mernories might direct attention to anticipate the future, anticipations of the future might affect present considerations, and present considerations might throw new light upon one's past. Yet there is no break in the continuity of consciousness because the felt

temporal relations overlap as transitive parts, with one part coming into existence

before another, and not perishing until the second part has begun. Thus, dong with a

core duration, the "specious present has, in addition, a vaguely vanishing backward

and forward fringe . . ." (italics added, James, 1890, p. 1: 6 13). Accordingly, James - describes the specious present as a "saddleback, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and frorn which we look in two directions into time" (James,

Also in connection to the transitive parts of the stream of consciousness, James attributes the quality of flight to Time. The transitive parts of the stream consist largely of temporal relations, and fil1 what appeared. for Hume, to be gaps between the substantive parts of the stream. Metaphorically, the temporal relations transport consciousness dong what James's previously described as perching at substantive parts of the strearn:

The traditional psychology talks like one who should Say a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotful, barrelsful, and orher moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots al1 actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, the value, of the image is al1 in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it, . . . (James, 1890, p. 1: 255)

A person's sense of "time's flight"38 is derived from the continuity in the content of the strearn (James, 1890, p. 619). Furtherrnore, given that the continuity of the stream results from the overlap in thought-objects-thoughts which originate in relatively stable extemal objects independent of the self-James could argue that consciousness, and, by extension, Time originated from 'real' content.

A person's feeling of the varied Pace in what might be called objective content of consciousness is reflected in our experience of the varied rate of time's 'flow'. In other words, from the 'flow' of consciousness we derive the feeling of time's 'flow'.

Depending on the volume and the amount of overlap in the thought-objects fiowing through consciousness, the perceived rate of the stream's flow varies: more volume and overlap results in a greater perceived rate of change, less volume and overlap results in a lesser perceived rate of change. As the beats of each thought-object become more or less discernible from one another, one's sense of "time" speeds or slows accordingly. Our awareness of the rate of change in thought-objects "is thus the condition on which our perception of time'sfiow depends" (italics added, James,

1890, p. 1: 620). The felt continuity of the Stream arises from the overlap in thoughts, and these thoughts reflect a similar overlap in brain processes. The amount of the overlap in thoughts, James argues, "determines the feeling of duration occupied"

(1890, p. 1: 635). Due to this duration, the sensible continuity of the strearn of consciousness is not a mathematical continuity (and thus subject to Zeno's paradox).

Rather, the continuity of consciousness is based upon the interpenetration of finite experiences-experiences which themselves have duration.

James's argument on behalf of felt continuity is twofold. First, the only experience that one has of continuity is based on an indefinite rather than an infinite sense of continuity. An infinitely dense continuum is an inference or an abstract elaboration; but in this case, it is an inference based on one's experience of temporal

becoming. James's colleague, Peirce (1873/1982, p. 74), presented a clear expression

of this argument:

. . . there is no such thing as an instantaneous consciousness; but al1 consciousness relates to a process. And no thought, however simple, is at any instant present to the mind in its entirety, but it is something which we live through or experiences as wc do the events of a day. And as the experiences of a day are made up of thc expcriences of shorter spaces of time so any thought whatever is made up of more special rhoughts which in their turn are themselves made up by others and so on indefinitely. Jt may indeed very likely be that there is some minimum space of tirne within which in some sense only an indivisible thought can exist and as we know nothing of such a fact at present we may content ourselves with the simpler conception of an indefinite continuity in consciousness.

It follows that even if there were a gap in consciousness it wouid be indeteminare, and if "the consciousness is not aware of them, it cannot feel them as intenuptions"

(James, 1890, p. 237). James allows that there are several occasions that we may infer- the gap in consciousness (due to sleep, injury, anesthesia, etc.), but never do we experience it. There may even exist "time-gaps" in the continuity of brain processes underlying thought, but these, he argues, fall below the threshold of consciousness; they are infinitesimal in the pragmatic sense whereby they are somewhere lost to observation, and therefore, do not impact upon the feeling of contin~it~.~~

Thus, counter to Hume's report of discrete sensations, James asserted that the flow of thoughts through the stream of conscious is neither static. nor sensibly discontinuous. Though these thoughts might appear static to Hume, they are reaHy the result of a process. And as the result of a process, what appears to be a static thought is rather like the rainbow on a waterfall, a "quality unchanged by the events that stream through it" (James, 1890, p. 1: 630). James referred to relativeiy constant thought in consciousness as a "substantive" part of the stream. James's argues that

Hume's account of the self unduly emphasized these substantive parts (p. 1: 244). al1 to the neglect of the transitive parts. Compared to the substantive parts, the transitive parts consisted of the fringe of felt relations that underlied and connected the substantive parts of the stream.

Furthemore, contrasted with the "declarations on Kant's part of the utter barrenness of the consciousness of the pure Self, and of the consequent impossibility of any deductive or 'rational' psychology"(Jarnes, 1890, p. 362), James's metaphors show how consciousness, because its thought-objects are "sensibly continuous," constitutes the process that provides one with consciousness of the self. One's self

'abides' through the process of temporal becoming. Consequently, the continuity of the "change in determinations" is the self. Nor was the self empty of content.

Compared to mathematical continuity, which is undemiined by Zeno's paradox, the sensible continuity of the stream of consciousness does not run along an infinitely dense punctual continuum. Experience cannot be based upon a continuum thus conceived. According to the mathematical conception, a point in a continuum does not differ from an interval, except that it is the ideal lirnit (see Peirce, 1982, p. 103), and experience felt at such a point would be just as ideal. In other words, it would not be something 'experienced'. If our experience of the present were a mathematical presen t,

Our consciousness would be like a glow-worm spark, illuminating the point it immediately covered, but leaving al1 beyond in total darkness. . . . [But] Our feelings are not thus contracted, and Our consciousness never shrinks to the dimensions of a glow-worm spark. The kriowledge ofsonie orlter part of the streani, pasr orfirture, nenr or remote. is alrvnys ntixcd in with oitr krio\r.ledge of the present rlting. (James, 1890, p. 1: 606)

Though Kant concedes the existence and awareness of change in the objects of the

inner sense-"the change in determinations" reflects the very intuition of Time to

which Kant refers to as the forrn of consciousness-he fails to provide an explain for

the duration necessary for this awareness. James explains that awareness of change cannot arise through a mere succession of ideas. Rather, one's awareness of change in thought-objects occurs only through the succession of ideas within a Zarger duration or interval, or the specious pe~ent.~'Thus, as opposed to Kant's position, which posits mathematical continuity and "empty" Time, thefrnite continuity of

'objective' contents constitute "filled" Time. The substratum of the 'self,' as a result, is cornposed of the 'real' contents and their temporal relations.

hsiead of the "knife edge" of the mathematical present, James posited the

"saddleback" of the specious present. James derived the concept of the specious present from E. R. Clay (see James, 1890, p. 1: 609), but he developed it for his own purposes. Of the thee tenses of Time-past, present, and future-the present is often taken to be the most real, the most irnrnediate. Properly speaking, however, none of these tenses are 'real' : the past is already gone, the future neither is nor might it be, and the present, as already noted, is an ideal limit separating the two (see also

McTaggart, 1968). This and several other difficulties have made the notion of Time an exceedingly difficult issue (see chapter one). Nonetheless, James found a useful rapprochement, and perhaps more importantly, a phenomenally faithful rendering of Time in the concept of the specious present. In the words that James quoted from

The relation of experience to time has not been profoundly studied. Its objects are given as being of the present, but the part of time referred to by the datum is a very different thing from the conterminous of the past and future which philosophy denotes by the name Present. The present to which the datum refers is realIy a part of the past-a recent past-dclusively given as being a time that intervenes between the past and the future. Let it bc named the specious present, and let the past, that is given as being the past, be known as the obvious past. All the notes of a bar of a Song seem to the listener to be contained in the present. Al1 the changes of place of a meteor seem to the beholder to be contained in the present. At the instant of the termination of such series, no part of the time measured by them seems to be a past. Time, the, considered relatively to human apprehension, consisls of four parts, viz., the obvious past, the specious present, the real present, and the future. Omitting the ' specious present, it consists of three . . . nonentities-the past, which does not exist, the future, which does not exist, and their conterminous, the present; the faculty from which it proceeds lies to us in the fiction of the specious present. (Clay, as cited in James, 1890, p. 609)

Though James adopted the term "specious present" for the immediâte sensible moment, he did not, however, portray the specious present as a "fiction."

Rather, the specious present was for James the 'real duration'" within which the stream of thought occurs. As mentioned above, the stream of consciousness is composed of overlapping thought-objects. Although these are but objects thought of-not objects in-themselves-there was an abiding basis of the Stream independent of itseIf, a basis in "redity." Through processes of evolution, the nervous system has developed into a reality-filter for consciousness: "Out of the infinite chaos of movements, of which physics teaches us that the outer world consists, each sense- organ picks out those which fa11 within certain limits of velocity" (James, 1890, p.

284). Due to activity in the nervous system, this sea of extemal objects stream as a temporally ordered multitude of thought-objects in the forrn of consciousness (see James, 1890, p. II: 629). These thought-objects coincide along with the neural

activity responsible for them, one thought-object existing and persisting while another

begins. The result is that consciousness is felt to have both continuity and duration:

continuity from the interpenetration of finite thought-objects, and duration from the

overlap in the thought-objects.

Thus, consciousness is sensibly continuous in the manner of temporal becoming whereby the continuity of consciousness provides an unending interval within which comparisons, relations, and inferences between the thought-objects can occur.

Because of the alLencompassing duration of the stream of consciousness, we are able to extract the idea of two separate thought-objects occurring in relations of before and after. This relation of before and after, James argues, is a fundamental aspect of Our idea of Time: for example, in relation to one thought-object, a second object occurs in the future, and in relation the second, the first thought-object occurs in the past. This is not to say that the stream is irnrnediately experienced as discrete, rather it is felt as whole and unified, but "attention looking back rnay easily decompose the experience, and distinguish its beginning from its end" (James, 1890, p. 1: 610).

Somewhat reminiscent of the writing of ~ocke~',James described Tirne as a synthetic datum that is based on the temporal features of the stream of consciousness.

As Locke explains it, the idea of Time emerges naturally from the measurement of the duration of tho~~hts.~~In a sirnilar fashion, James demonstrates how we rnetaphoricûlly elaborate from duration in the stream of thought, the conceived times of philosophy, physics and rnathematics: "the urigirtal paragon and protoype of al1 cotrceived times is rile speciorrs preserzt, the short duration of which we are

imrnediarely and incessarttly serisible" (James, 1890, p. 1: 63 1).

The first spaces, times, things, qualities, experienced by the child probably appear, like the first heartburn, in this absohte way, as simple beings, neither in or out of thought. But later, by having other thoughts than this present one, and making repeated judgements of sameness among their objects, he corroborates in himself the notion of realities past and distant as well as present, which realities no one single thought wither possesses or engenders, but which al1 may contemplate and know. (James, 1890, p. 1: 272)

Essentially, James's conceptualization of Tirne opposes Kant's staternent that

"Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience"

(1769/1965, p. 74). While Kant's position is that Time is a prior condition for

consciousness, James argues that the idea of Time is subsequent to consciousness.

The following passage is key to James's purposes and particular views on Tirne:

Kant's notion of an i~~rriitiorzof objective time as an infinite continuum has nothing to support it. The cause of the intuition which we really have cannot be the dltratiori of our brain-processes or our mental changes. That duration is rather the object of the intuition which, being realized at every moment of such duration, must be due to a permanently present cause. This cause-probabiy the simultaneous presence of brain-processes of different phase-fluctuates; and hence a certain range of variation in the amount of the intuition, and in its subdivisibility, accrues. (James, 1890, p. 642)

James's conceptualization of Time has greater scope than that of ~ant.~Where

Kant is at a loss for an explanation for how one arrives at the idea of Time, assuming

it as an a priori condition of consciousness, James, on the other hand, is able to

provide an explanation for the idea of Time consistent with one's experience of it.45

For example, James cm account for the elasticity of one's sense of Time; the felt rate of Time is contingent upon the amount of overlap in the thought-objects of the

Stream. Indeed, James explains how one can elaborate from the temporal features of the stream of consciousness any conceived times-including the tirne concept of

Kant. From the felt continuity of consciousness, we derive the ideal mathematical conception of Time's con tinuity. From the indefinite divisibility and extension of consciousness we derive the ideaI mathematical conceptions of infinitesimal and infinite Time.

From the experience of periodic and continuous processes extemal to one's self, in the motions of the planets, stars. and the sun, we conceive of Time as external and objective. Even the measurement of Time, James argues (metaphorically), originates from the sensible temporal qudities of the stream.

Using metaphor, "human rneaning and encounter connects person and world, subject and object, and establishes a relationship in beîween" (Eckartsberg, 1989p.

46). It couples persona1 lived experience with societal knowledge, allowing us to discover or develop Our own understanding of what would otherwise be too cornplex, transient, or abstract to be understood literally. A metaphor can be regarded "to be essentially a higher level version of the process by which ostension enters into the establishment of reference for natural-kind tenns" (Kuhn, 1993, p. 537). As such, they are a powerful tool in the repertoire of a scholar. With metaphors, even the most abstract aspects of the world and ourselves can be transposed into what we already understand. One of the most powerful metaphors is that of Time.

Indeed, the most remarkable illustration of the metaphorical nature of Time is how the measure of Time, or clock time, emerges from the specious present. Though its origins have been lost to the general public, at its heart, measured time was conceived so as to be syrnbolic of the temporal qualities native to the strearn of consciousness. The measure of Time, its divisibility, derives from the ever-present rhythms of thought-objects. Perpetually arnidst the felt continuity of the strearn of consciousness exist the perceived rhythms of bodily processes such as respiration, the heart's pulse and the inhale/exh& of breathing. If one traces the development of chronological instruments that have measured Time, one finds that among the first of these was the pendulums used to symbolize polyphonic music (see Crosby, 1997).

Time was measured not only to CO-ordinatea multitude of voices in Song, but dso to

'tirne' the breaths of the singers. Today, the measurement of Time has evohed into the technoIogy of the clock-technology which, sirnilar to that used for polyphonic music, also serves the function of CO-ordinatation;only this CO-ordinationoccurs on a wider societal scale, functioning in the synchronization of the activities of mernbers of society (see Kelly, 1988). Though it has, Iike many metaphors, evolved beyond its original basis, even in the technology of the analog clock its experiential basis is apparent. Compare the continuity of one hand of the clock with the felt continuity of consciousness and the duration of the other hands of the clock with the beats of the heart (or the inhalation/exhalation of the breath).

In chapter one, 1 discussed how the notion of clock time has become so prevalent in society that it is now widely regarded as synonyrnous with Time itself. 1 also discussed how clock time meshes with the qualities attributed to it by scientists and philosophers alike. Ln a sense, it has become the public notion of Time (at least for the public of contemporary Western society); and in that sense, Time is an idea" that can be regarded as historically prior to one's experience. It is an idea held by

previous rnembers of society. But the prevalence of the notion of clock time is not a

result of its being "objective" or independent of consciousness, as it is cornrnonly

held, but a resuIt of its consonance with consciousness and the temporal qualities

inherent therein.

Tirne is a metaphor that captures a wide set of instances, events, and processes.

Two instances in the farnily of things that we learn to refer to as Time rnight actually

bear little resemblance to one another, but one common aspect runs through each

member of the Time family. In the manner of a metaphor, it is experientially

grounded in consciousness. In order for a person to understand something as Time, it

must have at some point been understood as something already experienced. In such

a way, one finds that Time is both empirical (drawn from experience) and metaphorical. Once established as a metaphor, the competing views of Time outlined in chapter one resolve into a set of equally valid perspectives. This does not imply relativity, but flexibility; certain conceptualizations provide advantages that others cannot.

James chose to emphasize certain aspects of Time in line with his purpose of justifying the scientific approach to psychology. It should come as little surprise to find that James frequently applied the same aspects of Time that were then conventional of science. It was useful for James's purposes that he emphasize the quantitative, objective, and continuous aspects of Time. He described experirnents that enlisted measured Time in 'scientific' studies of higher mental processes. Drawing from the work of Ebbinghaus, Fechner, and Wundt, James cites studies of

higher mental processes such as those of memory which used gross measures of hours

and days to track forgetting, and finer rneasures of seconds to study attention (see

James, 1890, p. 1: 427-433). Likewise, James used clock time to account for the measure the span of consciousness, or the specious present to be more precise.

Although the duration of the specious present varied according to environmental conditions and the resulting overlap in thought-objects, James was able to gather from the e'xisting body of research that the normal span of the specious present, and hence consciousness, measured roughly 12 seconds (James, 1890, p. 1: 61 3).

It should be noted, however, that by no means did the measurement of Time compromise the experiential basis of the understanding of Time.

We assume for certain purposes on 'objective' time, that aequabilirerfluir, but we don't livingly believe in or realize any such equally flowing time. (James, as quoted in Myers, 1986, p. 156)

The idea of Time still originated in the temporal aspects of the Stream:

The units of duration, on the other hand, which the time-sense is able to take in at a single stroke, are groups of a few seconds, and within thesc units very few subdivisions-perhaps forty at most, as we sliall presently see-can be clearly discerned. The durations we have practically most to deal with-minutes, hours, and days-have to be syrnbolically conceived, and constructed by mental addition . . . (James, 1890, p. 1: 61 1)

Thus James 'used' Time in a sirniIar capacity as ascribed to it by Kant; its source, however differed in a way that had large consequences. It was because Time had an experiential basis, that James had good reason to apply the time of science to psychology. Time was a metaphor for temporally endowed experiences. The application of the metaphor of "objective time" perrnitted James access to the common causal structures underlying both the mental and material worlds (see Boyd, 1993).

Their rime- and space-relations, however, are impressed from without-for two outer things at least the evolutionary psychologist rnust believc to resernble our thoughts of them, these are the time and space in which the objects lie. The time- and space-relations benvcen rhirtgs do sramp copies ofrhemselves wirhin. . . . The degree of cohesion of our hner relations, is, in this part of our thinking, proportionate, in Mr. Spencer's phrase, to the degree of cohesion of the outer relations; the causes and the objects of our thought are one; . . . (James, 1890, p. II: 629)

For example, what one learns to discem as the temporal aspects of the stream of consciousness are contingent upon the physical processes of the brain; this leads to the synthetic idea of the specious present. Because, according to James, al1 conceived times originate in the specious present, it was equally valid to apply dock time to the study of inner perception as it was to outer perception, or to apply clock time to the study of psychology as it was to physics. The idea of Time, particularly clock time, is built upon the connection of the inner and outer worlds: To deny the appropriateness of dock tirne for one would be to deny the appropriateness of the other.

In effect, James's metaphorical description of psychology implicitly rendered

James's idea of Time. It was particularly significant in the systems of metaphors that featured the stream of consciousness metaphor. Though James idea of Time functioned tacitly, it was nonetheless central to the solution of several issues that he contested, not the least of which was the issue that it was admissible to study psychology as a science. James's notion of Time, however, was not only metaphorically presented, but was presented as a rnetaphor drawn from the temporal aspects of experience. Consequently, Time was, as rnuch for physics as it was for

psychology, understood in terms of the temporal aspects of experience; thus, psychology could apply the sarne measures of Time and submit psychological

phenornena to the scientific method.

Discussion

Wi thin the speci fic domai n of North American psychology, where his work ought to have been best understood, James's work did not yield any following that could be properly described as a school. Contrasted with other psychologists of similar, or even lesser importance. of the many psychologists who have professed a debt to James's thought none is a strict adherent to his views. One might Say that

James's diffuse influence was actually consistent with his underlying attitude which opposed any dogrnatic or programmatic solutions, instead, opting for locaily pragmatic and uniquely tailored solutions. But a clearer notion of his influence can be seen in terms of his metaphorical presentation of psychology.

In generd, the pattern of James's influence is coherent with his use of metaphor.

The effect of a metaphor, its meaning, is variable and contingent upon the sociohistorical 'horizon' of the reader. The prior knowledge base from which the reader must engage a metaphor bounds and governs the meaning that slhe will draw from it. Because James's PP relied heavily upon metaphor, the pattern of his influence was correspondingly variable according to the contexts in which they were received. Specifically, James's idea of Time, as it is found in the FT, led to largely disparate results. It was understood differently, and had a different effect according to historical, societal, linguistic, and disciplinary contexts. Widely regarded as a huge influence in Arnerican thought, James's thought in the PP crossed disciplinary as well as linguistic boundaries. Not only did it influence psychology, but literature (fiction), philosophy, and physics as well; furthemore, it influenced English speaking

Americans dong with the English of Europe, likewise (in translation) the French,

German, and ltalian. I will not attempt to draw out James's influence in dl of these contexts, but will choose arnong thern those which will act as a counterpoint to

James's influence on the idea of Time in North American psychology.

Perhaps the most cornpelling foi1 to James's influence upon psychology is that of his influence upon Henri Bergson, who figured largely in debates with Einstein over the concept of Time. Bergson, in keeping with the French academy in general, was receptive to James's idea of Time. Sirnilar to James, Bergson argued that Time was inherently based on real duration (or durée réele, see Capek, 1950). Contrary to

Einstein who argued the relativity of objective time, Bergson thought that Tirne and its relativity followed from the temporal qualities of subjective experience. Although their correspondence documents that their relationship did not begin until well after the publication of the a46Bergson mentions in their correspondence the inspiration

James provoked in him on the subject of ~ime.~'James's effect on Bergson's thinking is due to several factors. First, Bergson was sensitive to James's metaphors because of his own philosophical interests, leaning as he did towards inquires into rnetaphysics. Second, French academia had also supplied Bergson with prior instances of psychological inquiries into the subjective aspects of Time. Both James and Bergson mention Janet's work on the development of the idea of Time (1 928).48

In any case, we can at least speculate that the context of French academia was

particuiarly arnenabie to receive James's notion of Time in PP because it had

provided many of its scholars with the prior knowledge necessary to uncover the

temporal qualities of James's metaphors.

In contrast to the context of French psychology, James's idea of Time was not

received well by North American psychology. There are several reasons for this:

Shortly after the publication the PP, North American psychology saw the emergence

of positivisrn as the dominant approach within the discipline; French psychology saw

the emergence of existentiaiism. This led to several differences between the contexts

of Bergson and James. Where French psychologists were receptive to philosophical

issues, American psychologists were not. Where French psychologists considered

subjective experience, Arnerican psychologists considered how they could make

psychology more objective. Where French acadernics considered issues of Time,

Americans did not. But perhaps most importantly, the positivist directives of

American psychology annulled anything beyond what could be translated into literal tenns in James's work; thus, because they were metaphorically presented, the full implications of James's ideas of Time were lost to American psychology.

After the publication of the PP, James eventually turned to issues that could be regarded as more philosophical. The issue of Tirne played a large and explicit role in his discussions. In its characteristic manner, however, psychology habeen largely ignorant of his 'philosophical' writing." Nonetheless, that he did not explicitly enter into discussions of metaphysics until after his move away from psychoIogy fails to

explain why psychology did not see fit to consider the full impkations of his notions

of Time. His idea of Time was certainly present in his PJ-they were just implicitly

presented through metaphor. Perhaps the explanation lies with the dominant view of

science in psychology, positivism (see chapter one).

With the rise of positivism in psychology, three features of James's idea of Time made it alrnost a foregone conclusion that it would not receive due consideration.

First, it was a metaphysical issue; thus it was regarded as an issue for philosophy rather than a science such as psychology. Second, it was metaphorically presented, and metaphors were not appropriate to science. Third, fully allowing James's idea of

Time would have opposed the interests of positivism in "objectivity"; the full implications of his idea Time connoted an intemal/subjective approach to psychology. But because James used metaphors to present it, the positivists would have felt justified in their disrnissal of the metaphysical implication of his ideas of

Time.

Later psychology has emphasized the 'scientific' aspects of James's idea of

Time. Essentially, the only aspects of Time that were properly scientific, and thus suitable for later psychology, were its measurable attributes. The measurement of

Time was consistent with the underlying machine mztuphor of the scientific enterpriseS0(see chapter one). It was assumed to be objective, reductive, linear, continuous, and universd. In other words, it was the time concept used by Newtonian physics, the quintessential science. It was not, however, faithful to

James's idea of Time.

James did not argue against the usefulness of measuring Time, but he did object

to there being but one time. James advocated plurality, and this included a plurality

of times that rnetaphorically accounted for the tempord aspects of the many worlds in

which human activity occurs (see James, 1890, p. 11: 292-293). There was a time for

the world of sense, for the world of science, for the world of ideal relations, and most

importantly, for the worlds that psychology most often studies, the various worlds of

individuals: "of particular finite streams of thought, coexisting and succeeding in

time" (James, 1890, p. 1: 367). Accordingly, as a metaphor, Time has several

meanings. It affords different ways of looking at one's world. And it provides a

connection between experience and the causal structures of the world (see Boyd,

1993).

In conclusion, after more than a century since its publication, James's PP

continues to reward readers with new insights. 1have argued that James's metaphors

are responsible for his long-lasting and widespread appeal. 1 have attempted to demonstrate through an analysis of his metaphors that James could suggest as much to current psychology, as he did when the PP was first published. At the very least, my reading of James seems to suggest that psychology might renew its interest in both how Time is at heart based on metaphor, and how it is primordially based on experience. Psychology still has much to discover, much to understand. 1 cannot help but think that a return to considering the basis of Time, subjective experience, will prove useful for the development of new metaphors and new implications for the application of Time. For topics that continue to pose problems for current psychology, such as consciousness and the mind/body connection, which happen to be the very same topics that occupied James, surely, 1can see no more promising a direction than considerations of rnetaphor and Tirne. ' By applying the word 'pragmatic' to rnetaphor 1 do not intend it to bc taken in strict linguistic terms, but rather in the Jarnesian sense. Metaphors, 1 wiIl show, work to both constitute and iransmit theories. The success of metaphor, then, is contingent upon how well they constitute a theory and the extent to which it is adopted by an acadernic community. The concept of material cause is inescapably temporal, where in order for one event to cause another it is normally assumed that the first event has to follow the second in rime (see Anscombe, 1974). Interestingly, these assumptions Ied to certain assumption of Time: "Our first conclusion, then, is that a certain arnount of brain-physiology must be pre-supposed or included in Psychology" (James, 1890. p. 5). Additionally, Hodgson's influence surfaces in James's argume.nts on behalf of evidence originating frorn physiology; however, 1 will discuss this influence below when we encounter James's use of ~hysiologicalanalogies. The mindhrain connection rernains today one of the most troubling and difficult questions for philosophical psychologists and the philosophers of mind. An interesting collection of articles examining the issues involved in such problems can be found in Hofstadter (1981). James had experienced the demand of metaphysical inquiries firsthand. On April 10, 1873, James wrote to his brother that he had chosen to remain in the position of teaching physiology because to do otherwise rnight give him leisure to faIl back into metaphysical musings, musing which had previously proven somewhat damaging to his health (see p. 56). Dispensing with metaphysical inquiries into the nature of Time is a feature of the PP that is strangely at odds with James's own leanings toward philosophical inquiries. At one point before James wrote the PP philosophy actually provided James with the remedy to a personal dilemma he had with the determinism of science (see chapter two). And after the PP James turned almost exclusively to philosophical issues, popularizing topics such as prapmatist and pluralistic philosophies-' issues, furthermore, which found their beginning in the E. Interestingly, though none too simply, Carlyle explains how metaphor is inherent in language: "Examine language; what, if you except some primitive elements of natural sound, what is it al1 but metaphors, recognized as such or no longer recognized; still fluid and florid or now solid-grown and colourless? If these sarne primitive garments are the osseous fixtures in the Flesh-Garment Language then are metaphors it muscle and living integuments" (as cited in Brown, 1927, p. 41). See Hoffman, Cochran, and Nead's article "Cognitive metaphors" for their critique of logical ositivisms account of metaphor (1990, p. 2 12-2 17). 'O 'O 1 have drawn the following series of lerters from Perry's biography of James (1935, p. 292-293). Il It is somewhat ironic that the "great innovator of the symbol metaphor was Charles Sanders Peirce. His views provided the foundation metaphors-icons, indexes, and symbols. These were what he proposed in place of the physicalistic sensations that dominated the thinking of his time. In essence, he identified language rather than physics as the rnost appropriate source for metaphors of cognition" (Bruner & Feldman, 1990, p. 236-237) '2 Synechisrn: "the doctrine that we are to expect the universe to display continuities rather that discontinuities"; Tychism: "the thesis that there is absolute chance, that the universe is not wholly governed by determinist laws." (Honderich, 1995, p. 651) 13 Simone de Beauvoir (194811994, p. 129-130) explains the difference between absurdity and ambiguity: "The notion of ambiguity must not be confused with that of absurdity. To declare that existence is absurd is to deny that it can ever be given a meaning; to Say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is never fixed, that it must be constantly won. . . . Thus, to Say that action has to be lived in its truth, that is, in the consciousness of the antinomies which it involves, does not mean that one has to renounce it. . . . Art and science do not establish themselves despite failure, but through it; which does not prevent there being truths and errors, masterpieces and lerncns, depending on whether the discovery or the painting has or has not known how to win the adherence of human consciousness; this amounts to saying that failure, always ineluctable, is in certain cases spared and in others not. :' In much the same fashion Keats exclaims in his "Ode on a Grecian Urn" (1 820, line 49): "'Beauty is truth, truth beauty. . .'." I5 James noted that J. S. Mill was a significant influence in the writing of the PP (see James, 1890, p. 1: vii). l6 1 have derived my use of verbal meaning and significance from Abrams account of interpretation and hermeneutics (1988, p. 87). l7 All that 1 have said so far on metaphor can be illustrated and explained so much more eloquently by just two lines (and one metaphor) of William Wordsworth's poem, "Ode: Intimations of Immortality," lines 202-203: "To me the meanest flower that blows can givel Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears." '' Romanyshyn illustrates this last point by asking us to consider what Johannes Kepler and Tycho Brahe might have seen as they watched a "sunrise" together. We might speculate that they saw two cornpletely different events. From Kepler's perspective, he saw himself standing on a world which revolved around the Sun; from Brahe's perspective, he saw himself as standing on a world around which the sun revolved. Considered in this way, a "sunrise" becomes a metphorical event. The specific details of the "sunrise" did not change; the sun's change in position relative to the earth proceeded at the same rate for both observers. But a different meaning for each accompanied the event. l9 For example, the vulnerability of James's metaphoncal style is evident in unsympathetic readings such as Myers ( 1986, p. 144- 160). The general form of Myers's discussions follow a similar course in that he provides a reading of James's various ideas only as a lead up to their eventual critique-a critique which is based on just one of many readings, and an unsympathetic reading in the case of Myers-that can follow from James's metaphors 'O Bluestone shares these conclusions with A. O. Lovejoy (see Bluestone, 1963, p. 244-245) and Natsoulas (1993). " As Hodgson States, "Time is involved in every moment and in every object of consciousness; and this is a fact which is incapable of proof by inference, because the inference itself supposes its truth. It is however immediately certain to everyone; some time is occupied by every instant of consciousness however short" (1 865, p. 75). 2' Honderich (1995, p. 41) provides a clear example of aporia that parallels the one 1 outline: "(1) Physical change occurs. (2) Something persists unaffected throughout physical change. (3) Matter does not persist unaffected through change. (4) Matter (in its various guises) is al1 there is." 23 Or as Green (1997) has it translated, "as they step into the same river, different and still different waters flow. . ." See Hume's "A ireatise of human nature." 25 See book 1 of Hume's "A treatise of human nature." 26 Cited from James's notes obtained from the Houghton Library Archives, "Spencer's chapter on The assumptions of metaphysicians" (no date). 27 James frequently notes that a succession of ideas is not an idea of successi0.n. 28 The snowbaIl example of temporal becoming is Bergson's. 29 The source for this argument of James's current homology is Osowski (1989, p. 133-135). 30 James frequently makes the point that the "bald fact is that when the brain acrs, a rhoughr occurs" (1890, p. 345). 31~purposely make a cornparison with Kant's wording because later 1 will explore how James conception of the Stream of consciousness is implicitly directed as an explanation of the subject/object relation between the rnind and the world relation (see James, 1890, p. 1: 362, and 1: 642). Along these lines, 1 should note that Brentano wrote on Time's role in relating the outer and inner worlds of the person in his book, Philoso~hicalinvestigations on sriace. tirne and the continuum (1988). Brentano's notion of intentionality was articulated on the temporal connection between the chaotic continuum outside the person (see James, 1890, p. 284), similar to Emerson's and Carlyle's chaotic ocean, and the ternporally ordered continuum inside the person (Le., James's Stream of consciousness). 37. Although James's discussion of Zeno's paradox in the PP seems incidcntal to his arguments, it was actually the central problem in his assertion of the continuity of consciousness. As 1 demonstrated in the previous chapter, James's PP was largely derived from his lectures. And evidence for my claims for the importance of this paradox lies in one of James's course descriptions, whereby he rnakes direct mention of Zeno's paradox as the central issue which he was to deal with in the course (see Myers, 1986, p. 157). 33 It is perhaps interesting to note that Newton's acceleration solution works on the basis of mathematical continuity in order to find the staîic acceleration of an objcct at a point in its motion. Moreover, there is a strong parallel between Newton's 'problern' and Zeno's paradox of the arrow: that in order to find the static acce!eration of an object such as an anow in flight, Newton had to (rnetaphorically) stop the object's motion-which had the adverse effect of nullifying the acceleration. Newton's solution? He created the calculus, which, in a "pragmatic" fashion, took the acceleration as time approached nil, though it never reaches it. 34 Peirce, with whom James had a great deal of intellectual interchange, describes a similar condition in his discussions of Time: "Nothing is therefore present to the mind in an instant, but only during a time. . . . In the first place, then, it is to be observed that under this conception, two ideas may be both present to the mind during a longer interval, while they are separately present in shorter intervals which make up the longer interval. During this longer interval they arc present to the mind as different. And this longer interval embraces still shorter intervals than those hitherto considered, during which there are ideas which agree in the respects which are defined by each of the two ideas, which are seen to be different" (Peirce, 1982, p. 70) Although 1 have not found any direct link, there is a strong possibility that James was somehow involved in the deveIopment Peirce's ideas. 35 See chapter one, p. 14-15, for the discussion of Kant's critique and concept of Time. 36 In many place throughout the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant develops the distinction between the Pure Ego and the empirical Ego. Without going into details, the Pure Ego is essentially analogous to the concept of the Soul; the empirical Ego is essentially a looking-glass self that develops a posteriori fiom Our relationship with the world. The empirical Ego is not properly situated "within" the person, however, so Kant does not count it among the objects for rational psychoiogy. James (1890, p. I:291- 40 1) discusses this distinction in his chapter "The consciousness of self '; James adds, however that the empirical Ego can be further analyzed into the material Self and the social self, and that there is also the spiritual Self in addition to the Pure Ego. 37 In James words, as cited in Perry (1935, p. 162): "'the line of philosophic progress' lay 'not so much tlzrough Kant as round him,' and that 'the truth can be built much better by simpIy extending Locke's and Hume's lines."' 38 By examining the "tirne flies" metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 41-43) were able to explain how the apparent contradictions in how we conceive of Time are actually coherent with one another. They explain that we conceive the movement of two things when we talk about "tirne flies": the movement of Time, and the movement of a person through Time. Coherent with the notion of attributing the 'front' to that which faces the direction of motion, we both face Frontwards as we approach Time, and Time faces fiontwards as it approaches us. As a result, seemingly contradictory statements such as "We are looking ahead to the following weeks" (p. 42) are actually rnetaphorically coherent and naturafly understood. The reader can hardly mistake the parallels between the metaphoncal implications of "time flies" and James's own statements to the same effect in his discussion of the frontward and backward looking parts of the saddleback of the specious present. 39 In the same way, James believes infinity is only understood as indefinite: "Pragmatically, infinity means that more may corne; infinitesimal means that something's lost, has sunk below the pragmatic threshold" (James, as cited in Myers, 1986, p. 157). 40 As James writes (1890, p. II: 622). " . . . a movernent is a change, a process; so we see that in the time-world and the space-world alike the first known things are not elements, but cornbinations, not separate units, but wholes already forrned. The condition of being of the wholes may be the elernents: but the condition of our knowing the elements is Our having already felt the wholes as who1es." 41 LRealduration' (dur-e r-ele) is the term used by Bergson to describe the fundarnental experiences u on which we base our concept of Time, in whatever way it is conceived. 4 'Sec Bluestone (1963. p. 13). 43 Locke writes (1690/1977, Bk. II, Chp. XIV, 17-21): "Having thus got the idea of duration, the next rhing natural for the mind to do, is to get some measure of this cornrnon duration, whereby it might judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct order wherein several things exist; . . . Al1 that we can do for a measure of time ist to take such as have continual successive appearances at seemingly equidistant periods; of which seerning equality we have no other measure, but such as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other probable reasons, to persuade us of their equality." 44 James writes on scope and the truth of a systern: "The conceived system, to pass for true, must at least include the reality of the sensible objects in it, by explaining them as effects on us, if nothing more. The systern which includes the rnost of them, and definitely explains or pretends to explain the rnost of them, will, ceteris paribus, prevail" (James, 1890, p. II: 312). 45 In fact, James writes that we do not have the capacity to experience Tirne as Kant posits it: We have no organ or faculty to appreciate the simply givencxder. ~herealworld as it is given at this moment is the sum total of al1 its beings and events now. But can we think of such a sum? Can we realize for an instant what a cross-section of al1 existence at a definite point of time would be? While 1 talk and the flies buzz, a sea gull catches a fish at the mouth of the Amazon, a tree falls in the Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes in Germany, a horse dies in Tartary, and twins are born in France. What does that mean? Does the conternporaneity of these events with each other and with a million more as disjointed as they form a rational bond between them, and unite them into anything that means for us a world? Yet just such a collateral contemporaneity of these events, and nothing else, is the real order of the world. It is an order with which we have nothing to do but get away from it as fast as possible. As 1 said, we break it: we break it into histories, and we break it into arts, and we break it into sciences; and then we begin to feel at home. We make ten thousand separate serial orders of it. On any one of these, we rnay react as if the rest did not exist. We discover among its parts relations that were never given to sense at all, -mathematical relations, tangents, squares, and roots and Iogarithmic functions,-and out of an infinite number of these we cal1 certain ones essential and lawgiving. and ignore the rest, Essential these relations are, but only for ourpurpose, the other relations being just as real and present as they; and our purpose is to conceive simply and to foresee. Are not simple conception and prevision subjective ends pure and simple? They are the ends of what we cal1 science; . . ." (James, 1890, p. II: 635). 46 See in particular the letter frorn James to Bergson, December 14, 1902, wherein he mentions reading Bergson for the first time four years earlier. 47 See the letter from Bergson to James, January 6, 1903, where he writes, "C'est vous dire qu'aucune approbation ne pouvait m'etre plus pr Ncieuse que celle que vous vouly bien donner aux conclusions de mon livre 'Matiere et M-moire."' 1rnight also note that James's and Bergson's works share a common influence, Spencer. As Bergson explains, May 9, 1908: "1 cannot but attribute great importance to the change which took place in my way of thinking during the two years which followed my leaving the Ecole Normale, from 1881 to 1883. 1 had remained up to that time wholly imbued with mechanistic theories, to which 1 had been led at an early date by the reading of Herbert Spencer, a philosopher to whom 1 had undertaken, after leaving the Ecole Normale, to examine some of the fundamental scientific notions. It was the analysis of the notion of time, as that enters into mechanics and physics, which overturned al1 my ideas. 1 saw, to my great astonishrnent, that scientific time does not endure, that it would involve no change in our scientific knowledge if the totality of the real were unfolded al1 at once, instantaneously, and the positive science consists essentially in the elimination of duration. This was the point of departure of a series of reflections which brought me, by gradua1 steps, to reject almost al1 of what 1 had hitherto accepted and to change my point of view completely. . ." Spencer's writing on Time provoked similar reactions in both, their accounts of subjective experience distinct only in their emphasis: James emphasized consciousness, while Bergson emphasized Time. 48 Indeed, the fertility of French academia for inquiries into the nature of Time can be further seen in later work of Swiss psychologists such as Piaget (1 969). 49 James also experienced a loss of credibility as he began inquiring into paranormal activity and parapsychology. Though he was skeptical, James's work was suspected to be mysticism, or worse, ghilosophical. One of the most powerful and successful representatives of theory-constitutive metaphors is ais0 one of the most insidious-the mechanical metaphor. Theory constitutive metaphors, like the machine metaphor, often form the "root" of scientific models. Manifesting in technology-driven metaphors such as hydraulics, the clock, and the computer, the metaphor of the machine has driven scientific theory for as long as there has been science. With this metaphor scientists have leamed to anticipate and search for the machine-like qualities in the universe. The mechanical metaphor has shaped scientific theory to search exhaustively for efficient mechanical causes, to find the motive power in phenomena. It has brought order to the unnily universe and explained the push/pull forces behind planetary motion. It has also revealed the inner workings of the organic machine, with the combustion of digestion and the pump of the heart for example. It has even fashioned Time in the form of a machine (a clock). And the mechanical metaphor continues to drive the scientific search for the causal computer-like structures of the mind; though this last effort has been somewhat problematic. 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