Milan Hodza and Federation in Central and Eastern Europe
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Milan Hodza and Federation in Central and Eastern Europe. MICHAL MÛDRY-SEBÎK When, at the start of this century, Milan Hodza entered public life, rela- tions among the nationalities in Austria-Hungary were at the peak of tension. The old Emperor Francis Joseph was neither wise nor able enough to create harmony in the conglomeration of nationalities in his empire. Let us just recall what nationalities lived in the monarchy: Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Serbians, Croatians, Slovenes, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Italians, Germans, and Magyars. The ruling element in Austria-proper were the Germans, and in Hungary the Magyars - although in comparison with the non-German and non- Magyar nationalities they were minorities. The Magyars were ob- sessed with the idea of magyarizing the whole non-Magyar majority. They applied such pressures, particularly on the Slovaks, that only the victory of the Allies in World War I rescued them from extinction.1 Milan Hodza, true to the traditions of his forefathers, could not stand idly by.8 As soon as he entered the University of Budapest in 1896, he started to fight to change these conditions. Even as a young student, he understood that the situation could be improved only by introducing universal suffrage, that is, by giving voting rights to the common people, particularly the peasants - by awakening the non-Magyar nationalities from their lethargy, and leading them to close cooperation. Being a 1 "There can be little doubt that the defeat of the Entente in the Great War and the consequent frustration of Czech aspirations would have meant the virtual destruction of Slovak nationality in the course of another generation. It is the knowledge of this fact - that the goal of assimilation was actually in sight - which explains the peculiar bitterness with which the Magyar nationalists regard the post-war situation in Slovakia. The victim was rescued only just in time." (R. W. Seton-Watson: Slovakia Then and Now, page 25. Orbis, Prague, 1931.) 2 Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia during the years 1935-1938, was born on February 1, 1878, in Sucany. His father, Andrej Hodza, a Lutheran pastor in Sucany, was also a writer. His uncle, Michal Miloslav Hodza, together with Ludovit Stur and Jozef Miloslav Hurban, was the founder of the literary Slovak language and organizer of a new political and cultural program for Slovaks. 1548 Michal Mudry-Sebik gifted journalist, he focused his articles in the Slovenske listy (Slovak Gazette) in Slovensty dennik (Slovak Daily), and particularly in Slo- vensky tyzdennik (Slovak Weekly) on the aforementioned goals. That is also why, in 1897, he founded at Budapest University a club of non- Magyar students of which he became the chairman. After World War I, it was often pointed out that this club, which was composed of Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbians, was, in a way, the forerunner of the Little Entente.3 At any rate, the student club of non- Magyar nationalities, which was prepared to cooperate with the liberal Magyar and German elements, was to Hodza a sort of nucleus of his later grand design for a Central European federation, a concept to which he devoted much effort during his public career. In modern history, the Central European problem first became press- ing after Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz in 1805. The problem arose again in 1848-49, when Europe was swept by the revolution which flared up in Paris. At the Kromeriz (Kremsier) Diet of 1849, a program was submitted to the Emperor according to which the structure of the empire was to be based on its autonomous nations. But this attempt at federation failed. Another plan was made in the years from 1905 to 1914 in contract to the official Austro-Hungarian policy. The reorgani- zation of the Empire was, to a major extent, planned by the political leaders of Austria-Hungary's national minorities, with the cooperation of the heir-apparent to the throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The young Slovak journalist and politician, Milan Hodza, then a member of the Budapest Parliament (1905-1910), was also engaged in this plan, the aim of which was a constructive solution of the Austro-Hungarian problem. The reform was essentially similar to the proposals of the Kromeriz Diet. The transformation of old Austria-Hungary into a fed- eration could have meant the first step toward building a Central Euro- pean community of nations in a peaceful and evolutionary way. This effort, however, failed when Francis Ferdinand was assasinated in Sara- jevo on June 28, 1914. The fatal shot fired by Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist fanatic, triggered World War I. The Central European question was radically solved by World War I. Under the Paris peace treaties, a number of new states were formed on the territory of the former Habsburg monarchy. Some critics of the 3 The Little Entente, a mutual defense arrangement among Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, based upon the treaty of August 14, 1920, was con- cluded at Belgrade between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, joined by Rumania in treaties with Czechoslovakia on April 23, and with Yugoslavia on June 7, 1921. Milan Hodza and Federation in Central and Eastern Europe 1549 Paris peace treaties take issue with the dismemberment of old Austria- Hungary. But Milan Hodza was convinced that the principles of nation- al freedom and independence of small nations, on the basis of which the Paris peace treaties had built a new order in Central Europe, were the only possible solution and among the most valuable concepts of modern political history. However, the Allied Powers failed to con- solidate the results of their victory in World War I. They did not im- press on the small nations of Central Europe the need to develop co- operation amongst themselves, eventually leading to a federation. This would have made them equal partners in dealing with their big neigh- bors and a strong factor for security and peace in Europe. Hodza was convinced that the mere existence of such a federation might have meant a great deal. Nazism would hardly have dared to resort to an act of aggression against European collective security. Milan Hodza never wanted to rely exclusively on the security guar- antees of the great powers. As an advocate of cooperative effort, he knew the value of the principle of self-help, particularly in practical politics. And if any nation needed self-help - at home as well as in rela- tions with neighbors - it was the nations of Central Europe. United in a federation, they would certainly have been able to resist any pressure - from the West or from the East. He saw the best security guarantee in close cooperation among the Central European partners, in united Cen- tral European defense. In this, he often differed from Dr. Benes, who preferred to play the role of an intermediary between the great powers. Hodza started from the principle that the national sovereignty of small Central European nations should not mean their isolation, but, rather, a common basis for international contacts and cooperation. He demanded that, in the Central European "micro-statism," states with similar interests or qualities draw closer together in order to form regional components of civilization. He rejected any idea of hegemony in this area, and demanded cooperation with neighbors and with every- one on the basis of equality. In March 1931, a new customs union was formed between Germany and Austria, and, at the same time, Germany offered Romania a preferential customs agreement. For Central Europe, this was a remark- able economic and political act. Milan Hodza saw it as the first serious attempt to bring about a new international situation in Europe, contrary in both substance and principle to the peace treaties. In lectures and magazine articles, he outlined his concept of Central European coopera- tion, and simultaneously expressed a quiet but earnest critique of 1550 Michal Mûdry-Sebik Czechoslovakia's foreign policy of that time. He then laid down these principles: ten million Czechs and Slovaks alone cannot preserve their unconditional sovereignty for long in the vicinity of a great nation. For a thousand years, the immense civilizing and cultural influences of Ger- many affected the whole way of life of Czechs and Slovaks. Therefore, in the thirteenth year of its independence, Czechoslovakia should seri- ously think about how, under these circumstances, she could gain not only formal diplomatic, but also political, economic, and military, guar- antees of her independence. Hodza considered the existing program of the Little Entente inadequate, because it only offered negative protec- tion against Hungarian revisionism. The Little Entente, he thought, should be given a positive program which would lead to the organization of all homogenous or, at least, related forces in Central Europe. All those who where concerned with respecting peace treaties belonged together. "The Little Entente must not be just a diplomatic mechanism; it must have an economic raison d'être and must deal with the question of how to settle its relationship with Poland. It is not true that the Czechs and Slovaks are so far apart from the Poles. If we do not manage to bring together the 96 million people of Central Europe, future genera- tions will blame us if, because of internal political trivialities, we fail to rise to the occasion and strengthen the basis of our existence for the future."4 Milan Hodza was one of the prominent European federalists. His plan for a federation of nations in Central and Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia and between the Baltic and the Black Seas, was, no doubt, a major and valuable contribution to international coopera- tion. Hodza considered a Central European federation an indispensable precondition for the final goal: an all-European federation.