Milan Hodza and Federation in Central and Eastern Europe

Milan Hodza and Federation in Central and Eastern Europe.

MICHAL MÛDRY-SEBÎK

When, at the start of this century, Milan Hodza entered public life, rela- tions among the nationalities in Austria-Hungary were at the peak of tension. The old Emperor Francis Joseph was neither wise nor able enough to create harmony in the conglomeration of nationalities in his empire. Let us just recall what nationalities lived in the monarchy: Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Serbians, Croatians, Slovenes, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Italians, Germans, and Magyars. The ruling element in Austria-proper were the Germans, and in Hungary the Magyars - although in comparison with the non-German and non- Magyar nationalities they were minorities. The Magyars were ob- sessed with the idea of magyarizing the whole non-Magyar majority. They applied such pressures, particularly on the Slovaks, that only the victory of the Allies in World War I rescued them from extinction.1 Milan Hodza, true to the traditions of his forefathers, could not stand idly by.8 As soon as he entered the University of Budapest in 1896, he started to fight to change these conditions. Even as a young student, he understood that the situation could be improved only by introducing universal suffrage, that is, by giving voting rights to the common people, particularly the peasants - by awakening the non-Magyar nationalities from their lethargy, and leading them to close cooperation. Being a

1 "There can be little doubt that the defeat of the Entente in the Great War and the consequent frustration of Czech aspirations would have meant the virtual destruction of Slovak nationality in the course of another generation. It is the knowledge of this fact - that the goal of assimilation was actually in sight - which explains the peculiar bitterness with which the Magyar nationalists regard the post-war situation in Slovakia. The victim was rescued only just in time." (R. W. Seton-Watson: Slovakia Then and Now, page 25. Orbis, Prague, 1931.) 2 Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia during the years 1935-1938, was born on February 1, 1878, in Sucany. His father, Andrej Hodza, a Lutheran pastor in Sucany, was also a writer. His uncle, Michal Miloslav Hodza, together with Ludovit Stur and Jozef Miloslav Hurban, was the founder of the literary Slovak language and organizer of a new political and cultural program for Slovaks. 1548 Michal Mudry-Sebik gifted journalist, he focused his articles in the Slovenske listy (Slovak Gazette) in Slovensty dennik (Slovak Daily), and particularly in Slo- vensky tyzdennik (Slovak Weekly) on the aforementioned goals. That is also why, in 1897, he founded at Budapest University a club of non- Magyar students of which he became the chairman. After World War I, it was often pointed out that this club, which was composed of Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbians, was, in a way, the forerunner of the Little Entente.3 At any rate, the student club of non- Magyar nationalities, which was prepared to cooperate with the liberal Magyar and German elements, was to Hodza a sort of nucleus of his later grand design for a Central European federation, a concept to which he devoted much effort during his public career. In modern history, the Central European problem first became press- ing after Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz in 1805. The problem arose again in 1848-49, when Europe was swept by the revolution which flared up in Paris. At the Kromeriz (Kremsier) Diet of 1849, a program was submitted to the Emperor according to which the structure of the empire was to be based on its autonomous nations. But this attempt at federation failed. Another plan was made in the years from 1905 to 1914 in contract to the official Austro-Hungarian policy. The reorgani- zation of the Empire was, to a major extent, planned by the political leaders of Austria-Hungary's national minorities, with the cooperation of the heir-apparent to the throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The young Slovak journalist and politician, Milan Hodza, then a member of the Budapest Parliament (1905-1910), was also engaged in this plan, the aim of which was a constructive solution of the Austro-Hungarian problem. The reform was essentially similar to the proposals of the Kromeriz Diet. The transformation of old Austria-Hungary into a federation could have meant the first step toward building a Central Euro- pean community of nations in a peaceful and evolutionary way. This effort, however, failed when Francis Ferdinand was assasinated in Sara- jevo on June 28, 1914. The fatal shot fired by Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist fanatic, triggered World War I. The Central European question was radically solved by World War I. Under the Paris peace treaties, a number of new states were formed on the territory of the former Habsburg monarchy. Some critics of the

3 The Little Entente, a mutual defense arrangement among Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, based upon the treaty of August 14, 1920, was con- cluded at Belgrade between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, joined by Rumania in treaties with Czechoslovakia on April 23, and with Yugoslavia on June 7, 1921. Milan Hodza and Federation in Central and Eastern Europe 1549 Paris peace treaties take issue with the dismemberment of old Austria- Hungary. But Milan Hodza was convinced that the principles of national freedom and independence of small nations, on the basis of which the Paris peace treaties had built a new order in Central Europe, were the only possible solution and among the most valuable concepts of modern political history. However, the Allied Powers failed to con- solidate the results of their victory in World War I. They did not im- press on the small nations of Central Europe the need to develop cooperation amongst themselves, eventually leading to a federation. This would have made them equal partners in dealing with their big neighbors and a strong factor for security and peace in Europe. Hodza was convinced that the mere existence of such a federation might have meant a great deal. Nazism would hardly have dared to resort to an act of aggression against European collective security. Milan Hodza never wanted to rely exclusively on the security guar- antees of the great powers. As an advocate of cooperative effort, he knew the value of the principle of self-help, particularly in practical politics. And if any nation needed self-help - at home as well as in rela- tions with neighbors - it was the nations of Central Europe. United in a federation, they would certainly have been able to resist any pressure - from the West or from the East. He saw the best security guarantee in close cooperation among the Central European partners, in united Cen- tral European defense. In this, he often differed from Dr. Benes, who preferred to play the role of an intermediary between the great powers. Hodza started from the principle that the national sovereignty of small Central European nations should not mean their isolation, but, rather, a common basis for international contacts and cooperation. He demanded that, in the Central European "micro-statism," states with similar interests or qualities draw closer together in order to form regional components of civilization. He rejected any idea of hegemony in this area, and demanded cooperation with neighbors and with every- one on the basis of equality. In March 1931, a new customs union was formed between Germany and Austria, and, at the same time, Germany offered Romania a preferential customs agreement. For Central Europe, this was a remark- able economic and political act. Milan Hodza saw it as the first serious attempt to bring about a new international situation in Europe, contrary in both substance and principle to the peace treaties. In lectures and magazine articles, he outlined his concept of Central European cooperation, and simultaneously expressed a quiet but earnest critique of 1550 Michal Mûdry-Sebik Czechoslovakia's foreign policy of that time. He then laid down these principles: ten million Czechs and Slovaks alone cannot preserve their unconditional sovereignty for long in the vicinity of a great nation. For a thousand years, the immense civilizing and cultural influences of Ger- many affected the whole way of life of Czechs and Slovaks. Therefore, in the thirteenth year of its independence, Czechoslovakia should seriously think about how, under these circumstances, she could gain not only formal diplomatic, but also political, economic, and military, guar- antees of her independence. Hodza considered the existing program of the Little Entente inadequate, because it only offered negative protec- tion against Hungarian revisionism. The Little Entente, he thought, should be given a positive program which would lead to the organization of all homogenous or, at least, related forces in Central Europe. All those who where concerned with respecting peace treaties belonged together. "The Little Entente must not be just a diplomatic mechanism; it must have an economic raison d'être and must deal with the question of how to settle its relationship with Poland. It is not true that the Czechs and Slovaks are so far apart from the Poles. If we do not manage to bring together the 96 million people of Central Europe, future genera- tions will blame us if, because of internal political trivialities, we fail to rise to the occasion and strengthen the basis of our existence for the future."4 Milan Hodza was one of the prominent European federalists. His plan for a federation of nations in Central and Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia and between the Baltic and the Black Seas, was, no doubt, a major and valuable contribution to international cooperation. Hodza considered a Central European federation an indispensable precondition for the final goal: an all-European federation. As an ex- pert on the central European mosaic of nationalities, he believed that it would be easier to lead them to all-European cooperation after they had become united. Hodza regarded federation as a guarantee not only of the Central European nations' political and economic independence and freedom, but of democracy itself. Between the two World Wars, all Central European democracies, except Czechoslovakia, underwent a crisis. This caused many people to wonder whether it was even possible to build democracy in Central Europe and base it on a solid social class. There

4 Interview with Milan Hodza in the newspaper, Montagblatt, Prague, March 22, 1931; an article by Milan Hodza in the newspaper, Nârodni listy, Prague, April 19, 1931. Milan Hodza and Federation in Central and Eastern Europe 1551 were fears that Central Europe without adequate preconditions for democracy might some day become a carrier of the virus of dictatorship of the right or the left. Some people talked about "Danubian errors," which were allegedly rooted in the fact that democracy in this area had neglected to educate and to instill a sense of responsibility towards the state in those social classes which had gained economic prosperity under it. The truth is that after World War I, democracy in Central Europe was installed abruptly, regardless of the fact that the Central European nations were unprepared for it. In comparison with the development of American or British democracy, twenty years between two wars was too short a time for them to develop fully. In particular, it was often asked whether Central Europe possessed a social class which could mean the same thing for democracy there as the middle class did in the United States and Britain. It is known in the West that the middle class was relatively strong in only three Central European countries: Czechoslovakia, Austria, and, to some extent, Poland. In other Central European states, this class was certainly in need of substantial help. What kind of help? and from where? Hodza saw it in the peasants, who, in the period between the two World Wars, formed an absolute majority of the population in Central Europe. Here, the question was sometimes raised as to whether the peasant in this area was politically mature enough to be one of the basic supports of democracy; whether, in general, he was not a reactionary rather than a progressive element that would hamper rather than further democracy. There are historians who see progress only in the struggles of the bourgeoisie and the industrial proletariat, as well as in the constitutional battles of the aristocracy against absolutist monarchs, who call the peasant a reactionary because, in some cases, he has remained on the sidelines in the battle for freedom if it did not directly concern him, or because, if he did participate, it was primarily to protect his own interests. But this view is unjust. The Central-European peasant - even if he sometimes remained aloof from struggle for freedom - cannot be> identified with the French peasants of the Vendée, who hampered the Great Revolution. The peasant of Central Europe fought against social and political oppression. In the feudal lord, he saw not only a social oppresssor, but also a political and national foe. It is true and at the same time tragic that for a long time the peasant was unable to govern himself and that he, therefore, followed alien leaders and lost many of 1552 Michal Mudry-Sebik his battles.3 The village is not revolutionary the way the city is revolutionary. Its battalions are widely scattered, while the urban masses are concentrated in one place. And even when the village rebelled, it had no constructive plan; it wanted only to get rid of the oppressor who had driven it to desperation. However, even the unsuccessful peasant revolts had not been without value, since in them the peasant fought in principle against social oppression and for social justice. Every inch of soil even temporarily wrested from the feudal lord meant a step forward in man- kind's march toward progress. And what about recent history? The peasant in former Austria-Hungary became the pillar of the struggle for the universal right to vote. In Slovakia, moreover, he was the only reliable platform for those who fought against Magyarization, against the surrender of national consciousness. The Slovak intelligentsia saw in him the only salvation for the nation. And it was not disappointed: it was from the ranks of the peasantry that most of the fighters for freedom and independence were recruited, both in World War I and in the Slovak National Uprising against Fascist domination in August 1944. And one more question may be raised. Was not the small peasant too poor to be able to replenish the depleted ranks of the urban class in Central Europe? No doubt he was. And that is precisely why Hodza spent so much effort on the peasant's getting as much land as possible (such as the land reform), on his being given the best possible education (such as the Houses of Peasant Culture and agricultural economic institutions, formed by Hodza), on his getting as much public assistance as possible to help himself; in short, on aiding him to become a free and economically independent citizen. The peasants organized in free co- operatives and, in close cooperation with the middle classes and with the labor movement, they were — according to Hodza's plan - to become the pillar of Central European democracy.6 At the beginning of World War II, some exile governments started to study seriously the idea of a Central European federation.7 The Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks in London started promising negotiations, and,

5 Gy6rgy Dozsa at Temesvar (1514), the moujiks under Pugachev on the Volga and the Urals (1774), the German peasants wars of the 16th Century, the French jacqueries at the battle of Mello (1358), and the English their Levellers (1647, resp. 1659-60). • Milan Hodza, "Strengthening the Middle Class by Rural Democracy," in Federation in Central Europe, pp. 195-200. 7 Dr. Hodza summarized his ideas and proposals for cooperation among Central and East-European nations in his book, Federation in Central Europe, published by Jarrolds in London, 1942. In addition to theories, the book also contains the general constitutional principles on which the future federation should be founded. Milan Hodza and Federation in Central and Eastern Europe 1553 in 1941-1942, laid the basis for a confederation. In this endeavor, Hodza played a significant role. But when the Soviet Union entered the war, the situation began to change rapidly. The Soviet government had other plans for the nations of Central Europe. Any idea of federation was unwelcome, because that would have stood in the way of its own imperialist aims. Furthermore, the Czechoslovak government, or, more precisely, Dr. Edvard Benes, was in a hurry to go to Moscow and conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post-War Col- laboration as soon as possible. This he did on December 14, 1943. It was a serious blow to any further Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation, and also for Hodza's concept of a federation.8 The United States generously declared that this Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty did not contravene general security, and praised the good inten- tions of both parties. Still, it was clear that the treaty had helped create "spheres of interest." Hodza immediately grasped the catastrophic consequences of this policy and endeavored to save what could be saved in that situation. At that time, he was in exile in the United States. And although treacherous illness was already gradually undermining his health, Hodza used his last strength and, in a small hotel room on New York's Central Park West, he drafted a memorandum for the U.S. State Department which will remain a document of his political acumen and wisdom.9 He warned the Allies against the danger to the post-war world order inherent in the partition of Europe into spheres of interest. He wanted to balance the evil consequences of such a policy with, at least, a system of mutual responsibility of all the three great powers, and with free elections in Central and Eastern Europe under the supervision of all the Allies. Only such free elections could guarantee a free evolution in the area. Hodza was convinced that a great majority of the countries would, in free elections, express their desire to maintain an alliance with the United States and Britain, as well as their will to live together as good neighbors with the Soviet Union, without having to accept from the Soviets their social and economic system. In his memorandum, Hodza wrote that the freedom of Central and Eastern European nations and the exclusion of spheres of interest are

8 "The London Poles, having learned of our plans, were, in a large majority, very strongly opposed to them. They saw in them an end to their former plans for the building of a Central European federation under Poland's leadership which was to have been a barrier against both Germany and the Soviet Union." (Dr. Edvard Benes, Memoirs, p. 363.) 9 See Bulletin of the International Peasant Union, January-February, 1954, pp. 14-18. 1554 Michal Mudry-Sebik basic preconditions for the settlement of age-old problems in this area. He states that the goal is first of all, federation, and then representative governments, firmly oriented toward the United States, Great Britain, and Russia; no spheres of interest, but participation in an international organization of all Allies. On such a basis, he also proposed cooperation of the Big Three - the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. Hodza was convinced that even the Soviets would one day recognize that a new consolidated world, and Europe in it, cannot be built without consistent cooperation with the American and British democracies. He, therefore, proposed that, instead of spheres of interest, the principle of international cooperation on the basis of equality among national sovereign- ties be firmly defended — equality from which common decisions and common responsibility result. Milan Hodza emphasizes in his memorandum that the Soviet Union can be a partner of the United States and Great Britain on the European continent only within the framework of such a political structure and cooperation. He comes to the conclusion, expressed in these words: "All means and institutions which the future democratic organization of Europe will have available should be put into service against the danger represented for democracy by Stalin." Hodza defended and advocated the idea of federation in Central and Eastern Europe almost to his last breath. Only in this idea did he see a permanent solution of Central European problems. At the end of his life, he said: "I know that many of our neighbors have minimized the idea of a federation. You will see the day when all of them will flock to it for refuge." And the idea is alive even now, as the whole world watches with interest the dramatic evolution in the states of Central and Eastern Europe. This evolution has apparently started toward gradual detach- ment from exclusive dependence on Soviet Russia, towards greater independence and, internally, towards gradual liberalization. It is clear that, once this evolution reaches its peak, when this area of Europe has freed itself from exclusive Soviet influence, it will be categorically neces- sary to put it on a basis from which its nations may act permanently as equal partners with both East and West. This basis is a federation.