On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology Author(s): Randall Collins Reviewed work(s): Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 5 (Mar., 1981), pp. 984-1014 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778745 . Accessed: 07/03/2013 09:30

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology'

Randall Collins Universityof Virginia

Detailed microsociologicalstudies of everydaylife activityraise the challengeof makingmacrosociological concepts fully empirical by translatingthem into aggregates of micro-events.Micro-evidence and theoreticalcritiques indicate that human cognitive capacity is limited. Hence actors facingcomplex contingencies rely largelyupon tacit assumptionsand routine.The routinesof physicalproperty and or- ganizationalauthority are upheldby actors'tacit monitoring of social coalitions.Individuals continuously negotiate such coalitions in chains of interactionrituals in whichconversations create symbols of group membership.Every encounteris a marketplacein whichindividuals tacitlymatch conversational and emotionalresources acquired from previousencounters. Individuals are motivatedto movetoward those ritualencounters in whichtheir microresources pay thegreatest emo- tionalreturns until they reach personal equilibrium points at which theiremotional returns stabilize or decline.Large-scale changes in social structureare producedby aggregatechanges in the threetypes of microresources:increases in generalizedculture due to new com- municationsmedia or specializedculture-producing activities; new "technologies"of emotionalproduction; and new particularizedcul- tures (individualreputations) due to dramatic,usually conflictual, events.A methodof macrosamplingthe distribution of microresources is proposed.

Microsociologyis the detailedanalysis of what people do, say, and think in the actual flowof momentaryexperience. Macrosociology is the analy- sis of large-scaleand long-termsocial processes,often treated as self-sub- sistententities such as "state," "organization,""class," "economy,""cul- ture,"and "society."In recentyears there has been an upsurgeof "radi- cal" microsociology,that is to say, empiricallydetailed and/or phenom- enologicallysophisticated microsociology. Radical microsociology(Garfin- kel 1967; Cicourel1973), as the detailedstudy of everydaylife, emerged partlyfrom the influx of phenomenologyinto empirical sociology and part- ly fromthe applicationof new researchtechniques-audio and video re- cordings-whichhave made it possible to study real-lifeinteraction in second-by-seconddetail. This has led to the close analysisof conversation (Sacks, Schegloff,and Jefferson1974), of nonverbalinteractions (Goffman 1971,pp. 3-61), and of the constructionand use of organizationalrecords

1 I am indebted to Aaron Cicourel,Paul DiMaggio, Arlie Hochschild,Charles Perrow, and Norbert Wiley for commentson earlier versionsof this paper. (? 1981 by The Universityof Chicago. 0002-9602/81/8605-0002$01.50 984 AJS Volume86 Number5

This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology

(Cicourel1968; Clegg 1975) and henceto a viewof howlarger social pat- ternsare constructedout of micromaterials. This radical microsociology,under such labels as "ethnomethodology," "cognitivesociology," "social phenomenology,"and others,cuts in a num- ber of differentdirections. The directionthat I wouldargue is mostprom- isingfor the advance of sociologyas an empiricalscience is not the phe- nomenologicalanalysis of conceptsbut the emphasisupon ultradetailed empiricalresearch. This detailedmicro-analysis offers several contributions to the fieldof sociologyin general.One is to give a strongimpetus toward translatingall macrophenomenainto combinations of micro-events. A micro- translationstrategy reveals the empiricalrealities of social structuresas patternsof repetitivemicro-interaction. Microtranslation thus gives us a pictureof thecomplex levels of abstractioninvolved in causal explanations. Anothercontribution of radicalmicrosociology is its discoverythat actual everyday-lifemicrobehavior does not followrationalist models of cognition and decisionmaking. Instead, social interactiondepends upon tacitunder- standingsand agreementsnot to attemptto explicatewhat is taken for granted.This impliesthat explanations in termsof norms,rules, and role takingshould be abandonedand thatany modelof social exchangemust be considerablymodified. These are largedepartures from accepted sociologi- cal traditions.But these traditionshave not been verysuccessful in ad- vancingexplanatory principles. I would contendthat thisis because they have an incorrectmodel of the actor.What we need,instead, is a micro- mechanismthat can explain the repetitiveactions that make up social structuresuch that interactionsand theiraccompanying cognitions rest upon noncognitivebases. Such a mechanism,I will attemptto show,is providedby interaction ritualchains. Such chainsof micro-encountersgenerate the central features of social organization-authority,property, and group membership-by creatingand recreating"mythical" cultural symbols and emotionalener- gies.The resultof microtranslatingall socialstructure into such interaction ritualchains shouldbe to make microsociologyan importanttool in ex- plainingboth the inertia and the dynamicsof macrostructure.

THE TIME-SPACE TABLE It is usefulto visualizethe empiricalbasis of microand macrocategories by a time-spacetable (see table 1). On one dimensionare laid out the amountsof timeconsidered by thesociologist, ranging from a fewseconds throughminutes, hours, days, weeks,months, and up to years and cen- turies.On the otheraxis are the numbersof people in physicalspace one mightfocus on: beginningwith one personin a local bodilyspace, through small groups,large groups,and aggregates,and up to an overviewof all

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology the people across a large territory.I have filledin the cells of the table withthe kindsof analysesthat sociologists make of thatparticular slice of timeand space. It is clear thatthe distinction between micro and macrois one of degree and admitsof at least two dimensions.All levels of analysisin this table are moremicro than those below and to theright of them,and all levelsare moremacro than those above and to theleft. Micro and macroare relative termsin both timeand space, and the distinctionitself may be regarded as a pair of continuousvariables. Moreover, one can see thatmicroanalysis in sociologyhas recentlyshifted its level: symbolicinteractionism, for ex- ample,has traditionallybeen concernedwith situations (although some- times with more long-termprocesses-e.g., Becker 1963; Bucher and Strauss 1961; Dalton 1959) located generallyon the minutes-to-hours level.Radical microsociologiessuch as ethnomethodologicalanalysis of con- versationor micro-ethologicalstudies of eye movementshave shiftedthe focus to the secondslevel (e.g., Schegloff1967); and phenomenological sociology,in its extremeformulations, verges upon Platonismor mysticism because of its focuson the instantaneous"now" at the leftedge of the table. The strictmeaning of "empirical"refers to theupper left-hand corner of the table.You, the reader,sitting at yourdesk or in yourcar, or standing by yourmailbox, etc., are in thatmicrosituation (or possiblyalso slightly furtherdown the left-handcolumn), and it is impossiblefor anyone ever to be in any empiricalsituation other than thissort. All macro-evidence, then,is aggregatedfrom such micro-experiences.Moreover, although one can say thatall the verticalcells in the farleft-hand column are empirical in the (slightlydifferent) sense that they all existin the physicalworld of the present,the cells horizontallyto the rightmust be regardedas ana- lysts'constructs. In the fewseconds it takes to read thispassage, you the readerare constructingthe realityof all thosemacrocategories insofar as you thinkof them.This is not to say thatthey do not also have someem- piricalreferent, but it is a morecomplex and inferentialone than direct micro-experience. Everyone'slife, experientially, is a sequenceof microsituations,and the sumof all sequencesof individualexperience in theworld would constitute all the possiblesociological data. Thus the recentintroduction of audio- and videotapesby radicalmicrosociologists is a movetoward these primary data.

MICROTRANSLATION AS A STRATEGY There are severaladvantages in translatingall sociologicalconcepts into aggregatesof microphenomena.The firstpoint is epistemological.Strictly

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology speaking,there is no such thingas a "state," an "economy,"a "culture," a "social class." There are only collectionsof individualpeople actingin particularkinds of microsituations-collectionswhich are characterized thusby a kindof shorthand.This can easilybe seen if one examinesem- piricallyhow researchersgo about studyingmacrosubjects. Researchers themselvesnever leave theirown microsituations;what theydo is compile summariesby a seriesof codingand translatingprocedures until a textis producedwhich is takenas representinga macroreality, standing above all themicrosituations that produced it (Garfinkel1967; Cicourel1975). This is truewhether the researcher is relyingon conversationwith informants or on closed-itemquestionnaires, or even on directpersonal observation. In each case thereare a seriesof tacitsummaries between the actual lifeex- periencesand theway in whichthey are finallyreported. The same is true to an evenlarger degree when historical materials are used; suchmaterials are usuallyconstructed from previous written accounts, which even in their originalform contain numerous glosses upon the actual flowof minute-by- minuteexperience. It is strategicallyimpossible for sociologyto do withoutthis kind of macrosummary. It would take too much time to recountall the micro- eventsthat make up any large-scalesocial pattern,and a totalrecounting in any case wouldbe tediousand unrewarding.Nevertheless, we need not reconcileourselves to the completeloss of informationof the trulyempiri- cal level,satisfying ourselves with remote abstractions. For if macrophe- nomenaare madeup of aggregationsand repetitionsof manysimilar micro- events,we can samplethese essential microcomponents and use themas the empiricalbasis of all othersociological constructions. The significanceof the firstpoint, then, is: Sociologicalconcepts can be made fullyempirical only by groundingthem in a sample of the typical micro-eventsthat make themup. The implicationis thatthe ultimateem- piricalvalidation of sociologicalstatements depends upon theirmicrotrans- lation.By thisstandard, virtually all sociologicalevidence as yetpresented is tentativeonly. This of coursedoes not meanthat it maynot be a useful approximation,although this is not always the case. Success at some de- greeof microtranslation,I would suggest, is the testof whetherthe macro statementis a goodapproximation or a niisleadingreification.2

2 To cite a recentexample: the controversyover the reputationaland decision-making models of communitypower is a debate over the meritsof a more macro and a more micro model. The decision-makingmodel focuses on particular micro-eventsand claims greater empirical realism. Its advocates criticize the reputational model for taking the hypostatizationsand illusions of commonsensediscourse as if they were reliable picturesof social realities.Advocates of the reputationalmethod, on the other hand, criticizethe decision-makingmodel for missingthe larger pattern,and especially that part of it which is hidden by focusingonly on actual decisions,ignoring decisions that are never raised, includinginstitutional arrangements which are never challenged

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A secondimplication is that the activeagents in any sociologicalexpla- nationmust be microsituational.Social patterns,institutions, and organi- zations are only abstractionsfrom the behaviorof individualsand sum- mariesof the distributionof differentmicrobehaviors in timeand space. These abstractionsand summariesdo notdo anything;if theyseem to indi- cate a continuousreality it is because the individualsthat make themup repeat theirmicrobehaviors many times,and if the "structures"change it is because the individualswho enact themchange their microbehaviors. This is not to say thata causal explanationis totallymicrosituational. In anotherpaper (Collins,in press), I have attemptedto show that the microtranslationof a largebody of causal principlesleaves, in additionto a numberof puremicroprinciples, a residue of severaltypes of macrorefer- ences. Individualswithin microsituations make macroreferencesto other situations,as well as to abstractor reifiedsocial entities;the effectsof microsituationsupon individuals are oftencumulative, resulting from repe- titionof micro-experiences;outside analysts cannot establish microprinci- ples withoutcomparing across microsituations.There are also threepure macrovariables:the dispersion of individualsin physicalspace; theamount of timethat social processestake (includingtemporal patterns of intermit- tentand repeatedbehaviors); and thenumbers of individualsinvolved. In otherwords, there are some irreduciblemacrofactors, but thereis only a limitedset of them.All varietiesof macro structuresor eventscan be translatedinto thesekinds of aggregationsof micro-events. If causalityinvolves stating the conditions under which particular social processeshappen, it is apparentthat both the independentand dependent variables,"the conditions"and "the social processeswhich happen," are compositeterms. Both, at a minimum,refer to an analyst'sselection of repetitivemicro-events. Both independentand dependentvariables may be furthercomposites in the sense of includinga spatial-temporalarrange- mentof a numberof differentmicro-actors. In addition,more macro sam- ples-"control variables"-must be comparedby the analystto establish any givencausal statement. In any empiricalinstance, then, to accountfully for the behaviorob- servedinvolves the analyst in comparisonswith a wide rangeof nonpresent situationsand withstatements linking behavior in one situationwith be-

but are implicitlydefended by being taken for granted (Backrach and Baratz 1962). The macro theoryhere promisesa greaterrange of explanatorypower but is empirically weaker. Yet it is salvageable by translatingit into an aggregate of micro terms. A move in this directionhas been accomplishedby Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz (1977), who show a key link between the crude macrosummaryof actions involved in reputationalpower and the actual exercise of that power by demonstratingthat there are networksof reputed influentialswho actually discuss political mattersin- formallyamong themselvesand thus tend to arrive at a generalline of behavior which presumablyincludes taken-for-grantedroutines as well as explicitdecisions.

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology haviorin othersituations. For example,an individual'ssituational behavior is conditionalupon theoverall distribution of behaviorsin othertimes and places that can be referredto metaphoricallyas an organizational"net- work."But to showsuch a pattern(and I believewe have showna number of such patterns,cryptically summarized under such statementsas "social class backgroundaffects attitudes about x" [e.g., Collins 1975, pp. 73- 75]) is not yet to show its dynamics;it is only to referto an observed correlationbetween behavior in certainkinds of repeatedsituations and behaviorin othersituations. We still need to producethe mechanismby whichconditions-certain arrangements of microsituations-motivatehu- man actorsto behavein certainways. This mechanismshould explain both whythey behave as theydo in specificsituations and why theymaintain certaindispersions of microbehaviorsamong themselves, across timeand space, therebymaking up the macropatternsof social structure.Such a mechanism,moreover, should be able to produce,by differentstates of its variables,both repetitivebehaviors-static or regularlyreproduced social structure-andstructural changes. The secondimplication, then, comes down to this: the dynamicsas well as the inertiain any causal explanationof social structuremust be micro- situational;all macroconditionshave theireffects by impinging upon actors' situationalmotivations. Macro-aggregates of microsituationscan provide thecontext and makeup theresults of suchprocesses, but theactual energy mustbe microsituational. It remainsto producesuch a micromechanism.Here, the substantivere- searchof radicalmicrosociology provides further leads.

THE MICROCRITIQUE OF RATIONALISTIC COGNITIVE AND EXCHANGE MODELS Much of the classic ethnomethodologicalresearch was orientedtoward showingthat the basic everydaylife stanceis to take it forgranted that meaningfulactivities are goingon. Garfinkel's(1967) breachingexperi- mentsindicate that to questionor violatethe usuallytacit aspectsof be- havior upsets people. They assume thereare aspects of life which they shouldnot have to explain.There is also a deeperreason for this reaction: it is in factimpossible to explicateall thetacitly understood grounds of any social convention,and the effortto do so quicklyshows people the pros- pectsof an infiniteregress of discussion.Cicourel (1973) has shownsome of thebases of the"indexicality" of social communications.Many elements of communicationinvolve nonverbal modes which cannot be completely translatedinto words, and the activityof talkingitself (as opposedto the contentof talk) has a structurethat resultsin verbalizationsbut is not itselfverbalizable. These resultsimply that meaningfulcognitions do not

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology ultimatelyguide social behavior;rather, cognitive meaning is usuallygiven to eventsretrospectively, when some difficultyhas arisenwhich is to be remediedby offeringan "account" (Scott and Lyman 1968). This perspectiveundercuts a numberof conventionalexplanations of so- cial behavior.Values and normsbecome dubious constructions.Ethno- methodologicalresearch indicates that people are rarelyable to verbalize many social rules guidingtheir behavior. This is especiallytrue at the deeperlevels of tacitunderstanding, such as thecircumstances under which particularkinds of surfacerules are appropriate(Cicourel 1973). Norma- tiveconcepts are observedmainly in retrospectiveaccounts or as analysts' constructs;there is no first-handevidence that theyguide actors'sponta- neousbehavior (see Deutscher1973; Cancian 1975). Nor is it possiblefor individualsto operatecognitively simply by matchingexternal situations to mentallyformulated rules.3 Similarconsiderations cast doubton the adequacyof assumingthat be- havioris guidedby the definitionof the situationor by role taking.These conceptsimply that behavior is determinedcognitively by well-definedver- bal ideas. But if the mostcommon stance is to assumenormalcy as much as possible,even in theabsence of discerniblemeaning, and if meaningsare mainlyimputed retrospectively as part of some otherconversational situ- ation, then immediatesituations do not have to be explicitlydefined in orderfor people to act in them.Moreover, if thereis an irreduciblytacit elementin cognitionand communication,situations and rolesnever can be fullydefined. What guides interaction,then, must be foundon another level. These difficultiesarise again in the case of exchangetheories. For the micro-evidencedoes notshow that the usual cognitivestance is one in which actorscalculate possible returns; on the contrary,most people most of the timeoperate on the basis of an assumednormalcy which is not subjectto consciousreflection. Comprehensive samplings of conversationsin work settings,for example,show that the prevailingtone of mostinteractions is to take organizationalroutine for granted; bargaining relations are con- finedlargely to externalcontacts, as betweenbusiness heads and clients (Clegg 1975). More fundamentally,the ethnomethodologicalfindings im- ply that,even whereexchanges do take place, theymust occur againsta backgroundof tacitunderstandings which are notchallenged or evenraised

3 Of course,one may rescue the norms or rules as nonverbalizableor unconsciouspat- ternswhich people manifestin theirbehavior. But such "norms" are simplyobserver's constructs.It is a common, but erroneous,sleight-of-hand then to assume that the actors also know and orienttheir behavior to these "rules." The reason that normative sociologies have made so little progressin the past half centuryis that they assume that a descriptionof behavior is an explanationof it, whereas in fact the explanatory mechanismis still to be found. It is because of the potential for this kind of abuse that I believe that the terminologyof norms ought to be dropped fromsociological theory. 991

This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology to consciousness.Durkheim ([1893] 1947) made a similarpoint in criti- cizingsocial contracttheories: any contract,he pointedout, involvesone in furtherobligations not bargainedfor, such as an implicitobligation to upholdthe contract. Analogousdifficulties have arisenwithin exchange theory itself (Heath 1976). There are certainkinds of calculationswhich actors cannot make on a purelyrational basis. They cannotchoose rationally among amounts of twoor morealternative goods if thereis no commonmetric; and thisis frequentlythe case in everydaylife, as in dealingwith such goods as status, comfort,or affection,which have no simplemonetary equivalent. The prob- lem is evenmore acute whenone mustcalculate the expectedvalue of dif- ferentcourses of action,which involves multiplying the probabilityof at- taininga good timesits relativedesirability; here thereare two incom- mensurablescales to be combined.Yet anotherdifficulty is thatthe prob- abilitiesof attainingone's ends are impossibleto calculatefor a particular situationin the absenceof knowledgeof the objectivedistribution of out- comes.There are furtherlimitations on the applicabilityof an exchange model: manyexchanges, such as thoseamong members of organizational positions,or amongpersons who have establisheda bond of repeatedgift exchanges,leave no roomfor bargaining, having excluded alternative part- ners aftera once-and-for-allagreement. The applicabilityof a model of exchange,then, seems very restricted. The findingsof empiricalmicrosociology and the self-critiquesof ex- changetheories are equivalentand pointto thesame underlying conditions. If cognitionis limitedto a fewrelatively uncomplex operations, then people cannotfollow a chain of thoughtvery many steps, either forward to its consequencesor back to its premises.Most coursesof actionmust be taken forgranted. In March and Simon's (1958) neorationalistreformulation, the only feasiblestrategy for an actor monitoringa numberof complex actions (as in managingan organization)is to "satisfice"in mostareas, thatis, to ignoremost chains of actions,as longas theymeet a certainrou- tine level of satisfaction,and concentrateinstead on the mostunpredict- able and irregulararea. This is essentiallythe same procedurethat ethno- methodologistsfind in people'sconversational practices. People do notques- tionthe truthfulnessor pursuethe fullmeaning of mostutterances unless severemisunderstandings or conflictsoccur, and thenthey "troubleshoot" by offeringretrospective accounts. Williamson(1975) has drawnsome of the consequencesfor economic theory.Like the ethnomethodologists,he proposes that human rationality is limitedand hencethat any complexor potentiallyconflictual negotiations can becomeexceedingly long and costly-conceivablyeven interminable- unlessthere is some tacitor nonnegotiablebasis foragreement. Hence, in manycircumstances open marketsfor labor and forgoods give way to or-

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ganizations,that is, to repeatedexchanges at conditionsnegotiated on a once-onlybasis. These are economicallymore efficient than continually re- negotiatingrelations among workers,or among suppliersand manufac- turers,when there are tasksof any degreeof complexityto be carriedout. This argumentis tantamountto claimingthat the structuralconsequence of the cognitivefeatures documented by microsociologistsis to replace open-marketexchanges with taken-for-grantedroutines in organizational networks. Nevertheless,substituting organizations for markets does not eliminate the problemof showingthe microfoundationsof social structure.Granted that limitedrationality makes people relyon routinerather than on bar- gainingin manyareas of life,the questionstill remains:Why does any particularform of organizationalroutine exist, and to what extentwill it be stable?Any organization involves authority, the power of certainpeople to give and enforceorders which others carry out. The basis of authority is a chainof communications.The ultimatesanction of a lower-levelman- ager over a workeris to communicateto othersin the managementhier- archyto withholdthe worker's pay; thesanction in a militaryorganization is to communicateorders to applycoercion against any disobedientsoldier. The civiliancase is foundedon the militaryone; controlchains based on pay or otheraccess to propertyare ultimatelybacked up by the coercive powerof the state. Thus the microbehaviorsthat make up any organiza- tionalroutine must involve some sense of the chainsof commandthat can bringsanctions to bear forviolating the routine. Carryingout a routine,then, cannot be a matterof completeoblivious- ness to possiblecontingencies. Moreover, there is a good deal of evidence fromobservational studies of organizationsthat strugglesto exerciseor evade controlgo on amongworkers and managers,customers and sales- persons;that managersnegotiate coalitions among themselves; that staff and line officialsstruggle over influence; that promotions and careerlines are subjectto considerablemaneuver (Roy 1952; Lombard1955; Dalton 1959; Glaser 1968). Given the natureof power,this is not surprising. Sanctionstend to be remoteand take timeto apply,and the verycondi- tionsof limitedcognitive capacities in situationscalling for complex coordi- nationor involvinguncertainty leave roomin the routinefor negotiation. Routinemay be cognitivelydesirable, but it is not always forthcoming. When breakdownsoccur, prior routinecannot prevent individual actors fromnegotiating which further routines are to be established. Even whensanctions are applied,the negotiablenature of poweritself again becomesapparent. The ultimatebasis of propertyand of privateau- thorityis politicalauthority, backed up by the powerof the military.Po- litical and militaryauthority, however, are based upon a self-reinforcing processof producingloyalty or disloyalty.A politicalleader, even of dicta-

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology torialpower, relies upon othersto carryout orders; this includesusing subordinatesto enforcediscipline over other subordinates. Hence a leader is powerfulto the extentthat he or she is widelybelieved to be powerful, mostessentially among those within the organizationalchain of command (see Schelling1963, pp. 58-118). For less dictatorialleaders and forin- formalnegotiations at lowerlevels within organizations, power is evenmore obviouslydependent upon the accumulatedconfidence of others(Banfield 1961). Organizationalauthority, then, is based on sharedorientations among the membersof a group,directed toward the extentof sharedorientation itself.Organizational members monitor what each is feelingtoward the otherand especiallytoward those in authority.The ultimatebasis of rou- tineis anotherlevel of implicitnegotiation. Here we cometo thecrux of theissue. Both neorationalistself-criticisms and microsociologicalevidence agree that complex contingencies cannot be calculatedrationally, and hence that actorsmust rely largely on tacit as- sumptionsand organizationalroutine. But the actual structuresof the so- cial world,especially as centeredon the networksupholding property and authority,involve continuous monitoring by individualsof each other's grouployalties. Since the social worldcan involvequite a fewlines of au- thorityand setsof coalitions,the task of monitoring them can be extremely complex.How is thispossible, given people's inherentlylimited cognitive capacities? The solutionmust be that negotiationsare carriedout implicitly,on a differentlevel than the use of consciouslymanipulated verbal symbols. I proposethat the mechanismis emotionalrather than cognitive. Individ- uals monitorothers' attitudes toward social coalitions,and hence toward thedegree of supportfor routines, by feelingthe amount of confidenceand enthusiasmthere is towardcertain leaders and activities,or the amountof fearof beingattacked by a strongcoalition, or the amountof contempt for a weak one. These emotionalenergies are transmittedby contagion amongmembers of a group,in flowswhich operate very much like the set of negotiationswhich produce prices within a market.In thissense, I will attemptto show that the strengthsof a marketmodel forlinking micro- interactionsinto macrostructures can be salvagedwithout incorporating the weaknessesof traditionalexchange theories.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AS MICROREPETITION IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD Froma microviewpoint,what is the"social structure"?In microtranslation, it refersto people'srepeated behavior in particularplaces, using particular physicalobjects, and communicatingby usingmany of the same symbolic expressionsrepeatedly with certain other people. The mosteasily identifi-

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology able partof thisrepetition, moreover, is physical:the most enduring repeti- tionsare thosearound particular places and objects.Most of therepetitive structureof economicorganization takes place in particularfactories, office buildings,trucks, etc. The mostrepetitive behaviors that make up thefam- ily structureare the facts that certainpeople inhabitthe same dwelling places day afterday, thatthe same menand womensleep in thesame beds and touchthe same bodies, that the same childrenare kissed,spanked, and fed. The "state" existsby virtueof therebeing courtrooms where judges repeatedlysit, headquartersfrom which police leave to ride in the same squad cars, barrackswhere troops are repeatedlyhoused, and assembly halls wherecongresses of politiciansrepeatedly gather. Of course,there is also symboliccommunication which goes on among thesepeople, and this bears some relationto the "structuredness"of so- ciety.But whatI am contendingis thatthe repetitivenessis not to be ex- plainedprimarily by the contentof thissymbolic communication. The so- cial structureis not a set of meaningsthat people carryin theirheads. I believethat this is borneout by the findingsof the empiricalmicrosoci- ologyof cognition.The structureis in the repeatedactions of communi- cating,not in the contentsof what is said; thosecontents are frequently ambiguousor erroneous,not always mutuallyunderstood or fullyexpli- cated. People do not always (or even usually) have a veryaccurate idea of the politicalstate to whichthey defer, the organizationin whichthey work,or the familyor circleof friendswith whom they associate. But if the structurednessof societyis physical,not cognitive,these disabilities do notprevent us fromcarrying out a greatdeal of orderlyrepetition. No one needs to have a cognitivemap of the wholesocial structure,or even of any organization;all one needs is to negotiatea fairlylimited routine in a fewphysical places and withthe particular people usually encountered there. The limitationsupon humancognition documented by theethnomethod- ologistsshow why social ordermust necessarily be physicaland local forall participants.Although this may seem paradoxical in viewof thephilosoph- ical and antimaterialistthemes associated with thisintellectual tradition, it is consonantwith the main examplesof "indexical"statements which ethnomethodologistshave cited (Garfinkel1967): such termsas "you," "me," "here,"'and "this" are irremediablybound to the specificcontext, because people's activitiesalways occur at a particularphysical location and at a particulartime. The inexpressiblecontext upon whicheverybody depends,and upon which all tacit understandingsrest, is the physical world,including everyone's own body, as seen froma particularplace withinit.4

4 A phenomenologistwould object that individual persons and particular situations cannot be seen simplyas physicalmoments in time and space, because theyare always

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Again,it is plain thatthis physical social worldis not static.People do comeand go; homesare formedand dissolved;workers move to new fac- toriesand offices;politicians are replaced; new friendsmeet while others cease to see one another.Nor are thepatterns historically constant; indeed, muchof what we mean by "structuralchange" in historyis shiftingpat- ternsof physicalorganization: separation of workplacesand armaments places fromhomes, shifting numbers and shiftingrates of turnoverof peo- ple in politicalplaces, and so on. My pointhere is simplythat the micro- realityof any "social structure"is some patternof repetitiveassociations amongpeople in relationto particularphysical objects and places,and that thismust be so becausehuman cognitive capacities do not allow people to organizein any otherway. These cognitivecapacities do notprevent individuals from systematically misperceivingthe natureof theirsocial orderby makingclaims about it on a symbolicplane. How thisis done willbe suggestedbelow. The questionnow arises: Why is it thatpeople repeatedlyinhabit the same buildings,use the same tools,talk to the same people? Part of the answerhas alreadybeen given: routineoccurs because the worldis too complexfor us to have to renegotiateall of it (or even verymuch of it) all thetime. Most of thetime it is easierto staywhere one is familiar.But thisis onlythe beginningof an answer.We still need to knowwhy those particularpeople occupy thoseparticular places. And since theydo not stay thereforever, we need to knowwhy theymove when theydo and wherethey will go. Moreover,the mechanismthat explains when they will move (and by the same token,when theywill stay) should also be the mechanismthat explains just whatthey will do, bothin actionand in com- munication,with the people they repeatedly encounter in theirusual places. From a macroviewpoint,one way to gloss these microrepetitionsis to referto themas propertyor authority.This bringsin the notionof pos- siblesanctions against violating a particularpattern of repetitivebehavior. The personwho goes into someoneelse's factoryor takes someoneelse's car stands the riskof being arrestedand jailed; the personwho fails to carryout a boss's ordersrisks being fired.Nevertheless, from the view-

definedby a cognitivestructure which transcends the immediatesituation. In other words,we do not knowwho theindividual is or whatthe situation is withoutusing some situation-transcendingconcept. Here again (as in n. 2 above) I believewe encountera confusionof the theorist-observer'sviewpoint and the actor'sviewpoint. It is the outsidetheorist who wantsto characterizethe individualas a "citizen"or a "husband,"or thesituation as a "home"or a "workplace."What I am contending is thatmost of the timeactors do not thinkabout suchconcepts at all; theysimply are physicallyin certainplaces, carrying out certainactions, including the actionof talkingto otherpeople. It is only whenthis physical and emotionalroutine is dis- ruptedthat people rise to the level imputedto themby phenomenologicaltheorists and beginto offermacroconceptual "accounts" of themselvesand theirsettings.

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology pointof strictmicrotranslation, we mustask: To what extentdo people actuallythink of thesecontingencies from moment to momentin theirlives as theyact eitherto respectproperty and authorityor to violate them? The realityof sanctionsupholding property and authoritycannot be doubted,as micro-eventsthat sometimes occur; but theydo notoccur very oftenin relationto the sheernumber of micro-eventsthat actuallytake place. Moreover,the generalmodel of humancognition suggested above is thatpeople do not calculatecontingencies or referto explicitrules most of the time; theyact tacitly,and only consciouslythink of theseformalities whenan issue arises.Not thatpeople cannotformulate rules or calculate contingencies,but thereis no consciousrule about whenpeople must bring up therules and no consciouscalculation of whenone shouldcalculate and whennot (see Cicourel1973). Whatwe have instead,I suggest,is a patternin whichpeople act toward physicalobjects and towardeach otherin ways thatmostly constitute rou- tines.They do not ordinarilythink of theseroutines as upholdingproperty and authority,although an analyticallyminded outside observer could de- scribethem as fittingthat pattern. People followroutines because they feel naturalor appropriate.Moreover, routines may be quite variablewith re- spectto whatan observermay describeas propertyand authority;people can rigidlyavoid steppingon someoneelse's frontlawn or theymay take theoffice stationery home, in bothcases withoutconsciously thinking about it; theymay nervouslyjump to a boss's requestor sloughit offbehind the boss's back, again withoutconsciously invoking any generalformulations of rulesor roles.This variationmay, of course,also extendto instances where people do become property-conscious,rules-conscious, authority- conscious;what I am arguingis thatwe need an explanationof whythis symbolicconsciousness occurs when it does. That explanationis again in the realmof feeling:people invokeconscious social conceptsat particular timesbecause the emotional dynamics of theirlives motivates them to do so. The underlyingemotional dynamics, I propose,centers on feelingsof membershipin coalitions.Briefly put: property(access to and exclusions fromparticular physical places and things)is based upon a senseof what kindsof personsdo and do not belongwhere. This is based in turnupon a sense of what groupsare powerfulenough to punishviolators of their claims.Authority is similarlyorganized: it restsupon a sense of which people are connectedto whichgroups, to coalitionsof what extensiveness and of whatcapacity to enforcethe demands of theirmembers upon others. Both of these are variables: thereis no inherent,objective entity called "property"or "authority,"only the varying senses that people feelat par- ticularplaces and timesof how strongthese enforcing coalitions are. There may also be membershipgroups that make fewor no claims to property or authority-purely"informal" or "horizontal"groups, like friendsand

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology acquaintances,whose solidarity is an end in itselfas faras its membersare concerned. The mostgeneral explanation of humansocial behaviorencompasses all of thesevariations. It shouldspecify: What makessomeone a memberof a coalition?What determinesthe extensivenessof a coalitionand the in- tensityof bondswithin it? How do people judge the powerof coalitions? The answersto these questions,I am suggesting,determine the way in whichgroups of friendsand otherstatus groups are formed,the degreeto whichauthority and propertyroutines are upheld,and who will dominate otherswithin these patterns. The basic mechanismis a processof emo- tional groupidentification that may be describedas a set of interaction ritualchains.

A THEORY OF INTERACTION RITUAL CHAINS From a microtranslationviewpoint, all processesof formingand judging coalitionmemberships must take place in interactionsituations. The main activityin such situationsis conversation.But no one situationstands alone.Every individual goes throughmany situations: indeed, a lifetimeis, strictlyspeaking, a chainof interactionsituations. (One mightalso call it a chainof conversations.)The peopleone talksto have also talkedto other people in the past and will talk to othersin the future.Hence an appro- priateimage of the social worldis a bundleof individualchains of inter- actional experience,crisscrossing each otherin space as they flowalong in time.The dynamicsof coalitionmembership are producedby the emo- tionalsense individuals have at any one time,due to the toneof the situ- ationthey are currentlyin (or last remember,or shortlyanticipate), which in turnis influencedby theprevious chains of situationsof all participants. The manifestcontent of an interactionis usuallynot theemotions it in- volves.Any conversation, to theextent that it is takenseriously by its par- ticipants,focuses their attention on the realityof its contents,the things that are talkedabout (Goffman1967, pp. 113-16). This may includea focuson practicalwork that is beingdone. What is significantabout any conversationfrom the pointof viewof social membership,however, is not the contentbut the extentto whichthe participants can actuallymaintain a commonactivity of focusingon thatcontent. The contentis a vehiclefor establishingmembership. From this viewpoint,any conversationmay be lookedupon as a ritual.It invokesa commonreality, which from a ritual viewpointmay be calleda "myth":in thiscase, whether the conversational mythis trueor not is irrelevant.The myth,or content,is a Durkheimian sacredobject. It signifiesmembership in a commongroup for thosewho trulyrespect it. The personwho can becomesuccessfully engrossed in a conversationalreality becomes accepted as a memberof thegroup of those

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology who believe in that conversationalentity. In termsof the Durkheimian modelof religiousritual (Durkheim [1912] 1954; see also Goffman1967), a conversationis a cult in whichall believersshare a moralsolidarity. In fact,it createsthe referencepoint of moralsolidarity: those who believe are thegood; defenseof thebelief and henceof thegroup is righteousness; evil is disbeliefin, and even moreso attack upon, the cognitivesymbols thathold the grouptogether. The cognitivesymbols, however banal, par- ticularized,or esotericthe conversationalcontent may be, are important to thegroup and defendedby it because theyare the vehicleby meansof whichthe group is able to unifyitself. Not all conversations,however, are equallysuccessful rituals. Some bind individualstogether more permanently and tightlythan others; some con- versationsdo not come offat all. Amongthose conversations that do suc- ceed in evokinga commonreality, some producea feelingof egalitarian membershipamong the conversationalists,while others produce feelings of rankdifferences, including feelings of authorityand subordination.These typesof variabilityare, in fact,essential for producing and reproducing stratifiedsocial order.Conversational interaction ritual, then, is a mech- anismproducing varying amounts of solidarity,varying degrees of personal identificationwith coalitions of varyingdegrees of impressiveness. What,then, makes a conversationalritual succeed or not,and whatkinds of coalitionsdoes it invoke?I suggestthe followingingredients. (1) Par- ticipantsin a successfulconversational ritual must be able to invoke a commoncognitive reality. Hence theymust have similarconversational or culturalresources.5 A successfulconversation may also be inegalitarian,in thatone persondoes mostof thecultural reality invoking, the others acting as an audience; in thiscase we have a domination-and-subordination-pro- ducingritual. (2) Participantsmust also be able to sustaina commonemo- tionaltone. At a minimum,they must all wantto produceat least momen- tary solidarity.Again, the emotionalparticipation may be stratified,di- vidingthe group into emotional leaders and followers. These twoingredients-cultural resources and emotionalenergies-come fromindividuals' chains of previousinteractional experience and serveto reproduceor changethe pattern of interpersonalrelations. Among the most importantof thepatterns reproduced or changedare feelingsabout persons' relationshipsto physicalproperty and to the coercivecoalitions of author- ity.How individualsare tied to thesecoalitions is the crucialdeterminant of whichare dominantor subordinate. Conversationalresources.-Particular styles and topicsof conversation implymemberships in differentgroups. At any time,the previouschain of

5 Bourdieu (1977; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) proposes a similar concept,"cultural capital," although this refersmore specificallyto the culture legitimatedby the dom- inant class in a society.

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology interactionrituals which have been successfullynegotiated has made cer- tain conversationalcontents into symbols of solidarity.The rangeof these contentshas been discussedelsewhere (Collins 1975,pp. 114-31). For ex- ample,shop talk invokesmembership in occupationalgroups, political and otherideological talk invokes contending political coalitions, entertainment talkinvokes groups with various tastes, general discussion invokes different intellectualand nonintellectualstrata, while gossip and personaltalk invoke specificand sometimesquite intimatememberships. Again, it is not impor- tant whetherwhat is said is trueor not, but whetherit can be said and acceptedas a commonreality for that moment-that is what makesit an emblemof group membership. Conversationaltopics have twodifferent implications for reproducing the social structure.Some conversationaltopics are generalized:they refer to eventsand entitieson some level of abstractionfrom the immediateand local situation.Talk about techniques,politics, religion, and entertainment is of this sort.The social effect,I would suggest,is to reproducea sense of whatmay be called status-groupmem~bership: common participation in a horizontallyorganized cultural community which shares theseoutlooks and a beliefin theirimportance. Ethnic groups, classes to the extentthat theyare culturalcommunities, and manymore specialized cultural groups are of thistype. Successful conversation on suchtopics brings about a gen- eralizedsense of commonmembership, although it invokesno specificor personalties to particularorganizations, authority, or property. Otherconversational topics are particularized:they refer to specificper- sons,places, and things.Such talk can includepractical instructions (ask- ing someoneto do somethingfor someoneat a specifictime and place), as well as politicalplanning about specificstrategies (as in organizational politics)and gossipand personalnarration. Some of thisparticularized talk servesto produceand reproduceinformal relations among people (friend- ships). But particularizedtalk, paradoxically enough, is also crucialin re- producingproperty and authority,and henceorganizations.6 For, as I have arguedabove, property and authoritystructures exist as physicalroutines whosemicroreality consists of peopletaking for granted particular people's rightsto be in particularbuildings, giving orders to particularpeople, and so on. In thissense, property and authorityare reenactedwhenever people referto someone'shouse, someone's office, someone's car, as well as when- ever someonegives an orderto do a particularthing, and the listenerac-

6 This is contraryto the emphasisin Bernstein's(1971-75) theoryof linguisticcodes, in which restricted(particularized) codes are seen as the communicationmode of the lower classes, while the middle and upper classes use primarilyan elaborated (gen- eralized) code. Bernstein'stheory focuses only on class cultures and misses the role that particularizedtalk plays in enactingspecific organizations. The higherclasses do engage in more generalizedtalk than the lower classes, but they also engage in par- ticularizedtalk that is, in fact, crucial for enactingthe organizationsthey control.

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology knowledgesthe reality,at least forthat moment, of thatorder. Again, it is worthpointing out thatorders are notalways carried out, but it is thesitu- ation in whichthe communicativeritual occurs that is crucialfor main- tainingthe structure as a real socialpattern, not the consequences for prac- ticalaction.7 Of course,as indicated,even the degree of ritualcompliance is a variable, and we mustinquire into the conditionswhich make people respectand enact organizationalcommunications less or moreenthusiastically or even rebelagainst them. This bringsus to thesecond ingredient of rituals,emo- tionalenergies. Emotionalenergies.8-Emotions affect ritual membership in severalways. There mustbe at least a minimaldegree of commonmood amonginter- actantsif a conversationalritual is to succeedin invokinga sharedreality. The strongerthe commonemotional tone, the morereal the invokedtopic will seem to be and the greaterthe solidarityin the group (see Collins 1975,pp. 94-95, 153-54). Emotionalpropensities are thusa prerequisite fora successfulinteraction. But the interactionalso servesas a machine forintensifying emotion and forgenerating new emotionaltones and soli- darities.Thus emotionalenergies are importantresults of interactionsat any pointin the ritualchain. Emotional solidarity, I wouldsuggest, is the payoffthat favorable conversational resources can producefor an individual. If successfulinteractional rituals (IRs) producefeelings of solidarity, stratificationboth within and amongcoalitions is a furtheroutcome of emo- tionalflows along IR chains.As noted,conversational rituals can be either egalitarianor asymmetrical.Both types have stratifyingimplications. Egali- tarianrituals are stratifyingin thatinsiders are acceptedand outsidersre- jected; herestratification exists in the formof a coalitionagainst excluded individuals,or possiblythe domination of one coalitionover another. Asym- metricalconversations, in whichone individualsets the energytones (and invokesthe culturalreality) while the othersare an audience,are inter- nallystratified. The mostbasic emotionalingredient in interactions,I wouldsuggest, is a minimaltone of positive sentiment toward the other. The solidaritysenti- mentsrange from a minimaldisplay of nonhostilityto warmmutual liking and enthusiasticcommon activity. Where do such emotionscome from? They originatein previousexperiences in IR chains.An individualwho is successfullyaccepted into an interactionacquires an incrementof positive

7 This, I believe,is the significanceof Goffman's(1959) concept of frontstagebehavior in organizations.Enunciation of rules, then,is a special type of frontstageenactment; its significanceis not that the organizational rules directlycause behavior but that rules are conversationaltopics that are sometimesinvoked as crucial tests of feelings of memberstoward authoritycoalitions in organizations. 8 Some alternative theoriesof emotion are given in Kemper (1978), Schott (1979), and Hochschild (1979).

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology emotionalenergy. This energyis manifestedas what we commonlycall confidence,warmth, and enthusiasm.Acquiring this in one situation,an individualhas moreemotional resources for successfully negotiating soli- darityin the nextinteraction. Such chains,both positive and negative,ex- tendthroughout every person's lifetime.9 Let us considerthe variations possible within this basic model,The main conditionswhich produce emotional energy are these: a) Increasedemotional confidence is producedby everyexperience of successfullynegotiating a membershipritual. Decreased emotionalconfi- denceresults from rejection or lack of success. b) The morepowerful the groupwithin which one successfullynegoti- ates ritual solidarity,the greaterthe emotionalconfidence one receives fromit. The powerof a grouphere means the amount of physicalproperty it successfullyclaims access to, the sheernumber of its adherents,and the amountof physicalforce (numbers of fighters,instruments of violence)it has access to. c) The moreintense the emotional arousal within an IR, themore emo- tionalenergy an individualreceives from participating in it. A groupsitu- ationwith a highdegree of enthusiasmthus generates large emotional in- crementsfor individuals. High degreesof emotionalarousal are createdes- peciallyby IRs thatinclude an elementof conflictagainst outsiders: either an actual fight,a ritualpunishment of offenders,or, on a lowerlevel of intensity,symbolic denunciation of enemies(including conversational grip- ing). d) Taking a dominantposition within an IR increasesone's emotional energies.Taking a subordinateposition reduces one's emotionalenergies; themore extreme the subordination, the greater the energy reduction.

INTERACTIONS AS MARKETPLACES FOR CULTURAL AND EMOTIONAL RESOURCES Whywill a particularperson, in any giveninteractional situation, achieve or failto achieveritual membership? And why will particular persons domi- nate or be subordinatedin an IR? The answerslie in a combinationof the emotionaland culturalresources of all the participantsin any encounter. These in turnresult from the IR chainsthat each individualhas previously experienced.Each encounteris like a marketplacein whichthese resources are implicitlycompared and conversationalrituals of variousdegrees of solidarityand stratificationare negotiated.Each individual's"market" po-

9 This does not implyan infiniteregress in the past; it pointsto the importantfact thathuman children are borninto an emotionalinteraction and thatsuccessive emo- tionalstates build upon theinitial one.

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology sitiondepends upon the emotionaland culturalresources acquired from previousinteractions. The several kinds of emotionaland culturalresources interact. Since emotionalenergies result from success or failurein previousIRs, having high or low culturalresources also contributesto high or low emotional energies.To a lesserextent there is an effectin the oppositedirection: the moreemotional energy (confidence, social warmth)one has, the moreone is able to gain newcultural resources by successfullyentering into new con- versations,whereas a personwith low emotional confidence may be "tongue- tied,"unable to use evenwhat cultural resources he or she has. Bothcultural and emotionalresources change over time. But theychange in differentrhythms. Generally speaking, I would suggestthat emotional energiesare muchmore volatile than cultural resources and thatthey can changein bothpositive and negativedirections. If one encountersa series of situationsin whichone is highlyaccepted or even dominating,or in whichthe emotionsare veryintense, one's emotionalenergy can build up veryrapidly. The rhythmsof mass politicaland religiousmovements are based upon just such dynamics.On the otherhand, if one goes through a seriesof ritualrejections or subordinations,one's energiescan dropfairly rapidly. Culturalresources, however, are fairlystable, and theychange largely in a positivedirection. But herewe mustpay attentionto the distinction betweengeneralized and particularizedcultural resources. Generalized re- sourcesusually grow over timeand at a slow rate.Individuals may forget some of the generalizedinformation they possess, but since it is oftenre- producedas commonconversational topics in theirusual encounterswith otherpeople, loss of generalizedcultural capital is probablyconfined to thoseoccasions in whichsomeone leaves a habitualmilieu of conversational partnersfor a longtime. And evenso, thereis a considerablelag; thepower of memorymakes generalized cultural resources a stabilizingforce in social relations. Particularizedcultural resources, on theother hand, are potentiallymore discontinuous.Particularized conversational actions (givinga specificor- der, askingpractical advice, negotiating a strategyregarding a particular issue in organizationalpolitics, joking with friends,etc.) are evanescent. The bondsthey enact are permanentonly to the extentthat thoseactions are frequentlyreproduced. Particularized cultural resources are especially importantas the microbasisof property,authority, and organization,as wellas of closepersonal ties. The relationshipof peopleto particularphys- ical objectsthat constitute property is enactedover and overagain in ordi- naryand taken-for-grantedencounters, in IRs whichhave a particularized content.The same is true of the microreproductionof authorityand of organizations.

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Particularizedconversational resources differ from generalized conversa- tionalresources, and fromemotional resources as well,in thatthey not only are acquiredin one's ownconversations but also circulateindependently of oneself.When other people talk particularisticallyabout some individual, theyare constitutingher or his reputation.One's reputation,then, is a par- ticularizedconversational resource that circulates in otherpeople's conver- sations.For the microtranslationof macrostructures,the mostimportant kindof reputationsthat circulate are simplythe parts of talkwhich identify someoneby a particulartitle ("the chairman,""his wife") or organiza- tionalmembership ("he is with G.E."), or whichtacitly give someonea reputationfor certainproperty and authority("I went into his office," "She sentout a memodirecting them to . . . "). Particularizedconversa- tion,both as enactedand as circulatedsecondarily as reputationsof other people,is whatprincipally constitutes the social structureof propertyand authority. Comparedwith generalized conversation, particularized conversation is potentiallyquite volatile,although much of the timeit simplyreproduces itselfand hence reproducessocial routines.Most of the time,the same peopleare placed intoorganizational and property-maintainingroutines by both the particularizedconversational rituals in whichthey take part and thosein whichthey are conversationalsubjects. But this flowof particu- laristiccultural resources can shiftquite abruptly,especially on the repu- tationalside. On a small and local scale, thishappens frequently: a new personenters a job, a familiarone leaves a place-the old roundof par- ticularizedconversational enactments and reputationssuddenly stops and a newparticular social realityis promulgated.Most of the timethese par- ticularizeditems of conversationreinforce the bedrockof physicalroutine, whichhuman cognitive capacities require us to relyupon to such a great extent.But by the same token,the particularstructure of organizational behavior,including very large organizational aggregates such as the state, is potentiallyvery volatile: it is notupheld by generalizedrules or general- ized cultureof any kind, but by short-term,particularized interaction rituals,and thesecan abruptlytake on a new content.This microbasisof propertyand authorityimplies that theseroutines alternate between long periodsof relativelystable microreproductionand dramaticepisodes of upheavalor revolution. If we ask, then,what causes the variationsin thispattern-when will particularindividuals move in or out, and whenwill the wholepattern of propertyand authoritybe stableor shift-we finda market-likedynamic. Particularindividuals enact the propertyand authoritystructure because theirprevious IR chainsgive themcertain emotional energies and cultural resources,including the resourceof the reputationfor belonging in certain authorityrituals and particularphysical places. The relativevalue of these

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology resourcesmay shiftfrom encounter to encounter,as the combinationsof individualsvary. If one beginsto encounterpersons whose emotional and cultural(including reputational) resources are greateror less than what one is used to, one's own capacityto generateritual membership and con- versationaldominance will shiftup or down.Hence one's emotionalener- gies will undergoan increaseor decrease.If theseenergy shifts reach the pointat whichone is motivatedand able to shiftphysical and ritualpo- sitionin the patternof propertyand organizationalauthority, one's repu- tationand otherparticularized conversational resources will abruptlyshift. Generalizedcultural resources, finally, may build up acrossa longseries of interactions,but thisoccurs relatively slowly. AlthoughIR situationsare market-like,it is worthstressing that the mechanismby whichindividuals are motivatedby theirmarket positions is not one of rationalcalculation. As notedabove, a fundamentaldifficulty in rationalistsocial exchangemodels is thatthere is no way forindividuals to comparedisparate goods having no commonmetric, nor is it possibleto multiplythese values by the differentmetric of a scale of probabilitiesof attainingvarious goods. But if individualsare motivatedby theiremo- tionalenergies as theseshift from situation to situation,the sheeramount of emotionalenergy is thecommon denominator deciding the attractiveness of variousalternatives, as well as a predictorof whetheran individualwill actuallyattain any of them.Individuals thus do nothave to calculateprob- abilitiesin orderto feelvarying degrees of confidencein differentoutcomes. Disparate goods do not have to be directlycompared, only the emotional toneof situationsin whichthey are available.'0Nor do actorshave to cal- culate the value of theirvarious cultural resources (generalized and par- ticularized)in each situation.These resourceshave an automaticeffect upon the conversationalinteraction, and the outcomesare automatically transformedinto increments or decrementsof emotionalenergy. The fundamentalmechanism, then, is not a consciousone. Rather,con- sciousness,in the formof culturalresources, is a seriesof inputsinto each situationwhich affects one's senseof availablegroup memberships of vary- ing degreesof attractiveness.It is possible,of course,for individuals some- timesto reflectconsciously upon theirsocial choices,perhaps even to be- comeaware of theirown culturaland emotionalresources vis-'a-vis those of theirfellows. But choicesconsciously made, I wouldcontend, would be the

10 There may be occasions, of course, in which individuals find themselvesamong disparate sources of attractionor repulsionwhich are evenly balanced. In those cases, the IR chain theory predicts that their behavior will in fact be immobilized-they will remain in whatever physical routine they are in at that time, until the flow of IR energycombinations with other actors motivates them to leave that routine.

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology same as choicesmade without reflection.1" One's senseof "choice"or "will" restsupon the accretion of energies-one'sdegree of self-confidence-which is theproduct of a largerdynamic. Anotherlong-standing difficulty of social exchangetheories is solvedby theIR chainmodel: Why do peoplerepay a gift?Self-interest is not a suf- ficientexplanation, as an exchangeis rewardingonly to the extentthat individualsalready know therewill be reciprocity.Hence theoristshave feltit necessaryto fall back upon such claimsas "what is customarybe- comesobligatory" (Blau 1964) or to invokean alleged"norm of reciproc- ity" (Gouldner1960; see also Heath 1976). Both formulationsbeg the explanatoryquestion: in both cases, the customarinessof the behavioris just whatremains to be explained,and to call thiscustomariness a "norm" is merelyto describeit. The IR chainmodel proposes that feelings of soli- daritywithin a social coalitionare fundamental.If two individualsfeel a commonmembership, they will feel a desireto reciprocategifts, because the giftand its reciprocationare emblemsof continuingtheir common membership.This modelhas theadvantage of makinggift giving and reci- procationinto a variableinstead of a constant:individuals will reciprocate to the extentthat the emotionaldynamics of a particularcoalition mem- bershipis attractiveto them.Similarly, they will feel like giving gifts or not becauseof the same rangeof circumstances.Hence the variablesdescribed above shouldaccount for the degreeto whichreciprocity is actuallyprac- ticed. The aggregateof IRs, then,may be describedas market-like.What hap- pensin each encounteris affectedby whathas happenedin therecent series of encountersin each participant'sIR chain,and what happenedin those encountersin turnwas affectedby the recentexperiences of theirpartici- pants,and so on. This largeraggregate of encountersproduces what may be describedas a seriesof culturaland emotional"prices" at whichindi- vidualscan negotiateIRs of differentdegrees of solidarityand domination withone another.I say a seriesof pricesbecause only certain combinations of individualscan successfullycreate a ritual,and differentcombinations willsettle upon deals at differentprices. Thereare severaldifferent markets of thiskind operating simultaneously. At one level, thereis a relativelyslow-moving market for organizational

11 Hochschild (1979) shows that people do sometimesreflect upon theiremotions and try to make themselvesfeel in particularways that are appropriate to the situation. The fact that they do not automaticallyfeel the "right" way is explainable,I would argue, by the market attractionor repulsionof various alternativesituations in their IR chains. What Hochschild is describing,then, may be situationsin which individuals are torn between two differentforms of resourcesor are gettingvery mixed payoffs from their immediate interactions.Such situations may arise when an individual's market position is shiftingaway from a previous equilibriumpoint and a new equi- libriumhas not been established (see discussionbelow).

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Microfoundationsof Macrosociology ritualrepetitions ("positions") and forother property enactments. There is a greatdeal of repetitionin themicrorituals that make up the reproduc- tion of such structures;yet individualsdo tryto move in or out of po- sitions.Their motivations to stayput or to move,and thechances of being acceptedwhen they attempt these actions, are determinedby theaggregate of IR chains with whichtheir lives physicallyintersect. Informal shifts withinorganizational relations are similarlydetermined-shifts in which bosses gain or lose influence,informal allies win or lose, workersshow greateror less enthusiasmand compliance.At anotherlevel, thereare marketsfor personal friendships, for horizontal coalitions among different organizationalexecutives, etc., which are not tied to the directenactment of propertyand authorityrelations between the participants.These mar- ketsare capable of movingmuch more quickly and continuouslythan those in whichorganizational "structures" are enacted,because informal conver- sationalpartners do nothave to changethe more complex and particularity- embeddedties of property and organizationalposition. Both typesof markets,however, operate by a similarmechanism. In the "organizationalposition market," individuals will be motivatedto pressfor moredomination within the organizationalroutine or to leave thatroutine to finda betterone to the extentthat their aggregate of experiencesin IR chainsis emotionallypositive. Similarly, in marketsfor horizontal alliances (whetherpersonal or business/political),individuals who experiencerela- tive surplusof emotionalenergy over thosein theirusual encounterswill be motivatedeither to seek moredomination or to moveto a differentset of encounters.But such individualswill eventually tend to reachthe limit- ing situationsto whichtheir resources will take them:situations in which theirpartners are equal or higherin resources,hence stabilizingor re- versingtheir emotional surplus. From a veryabstract viewpoint, one can imaginean equilibriumpoint in such marketsat which all individualshave settledon the particular peopleto interactwith ritually, so thatall emotionaland culturalresources are staticallyreproduced. Such an equilibriumpoint may be a useful concept,but only if we see it as merelyone tendencyof aggregateinter- actionalmarkets which is modifiedby a numberof otherprocesses. The situationis constantlybeing destabilized,whenever any individualsany- whereexperience new increments (or decrements)of culturalresources and emotionalenergies. A particularboss who is losing emotionalenergies (throughill health,let us say, or a shiftin familyinteractions) will bring about smallincrements in energiesamong the workershe or she routinely dominates,which in turnmay increasetheir influence in otherencounters. Such effectswill cause at least local destabilizationof the micro-interac- tionalequilibrium. The equilibriumpoint is a patterntoward which inter- actionswill tendagain and again,subject to thesedisturbances.

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Many of thesedisturbances will be local and temporary;their outcomes do not changethe patternof macroorganization.Others, however, may be large-scaleand pervasivein theirconsequences. In the followingsection, I considerwhat kindsof aggregatemicroprocesses can cause eithergross reproductionor grosschange in macrostructures.

MACROSTRUCTURAL EFFECTS The precedingmodel suggests that large-scale social changesare based on micromechanismsof one or moreof thefollowing kinds: large-scale changes in the amountor distributionof (a) generalizedcultural resources, (b) particularizedcultural resources, or (c) emotionalenergies. a) The generalizedcultural resources across a largepopulation can shift because of the introductionof new technologiesof communicationor be- cause moreindividuals specialize in the productionand disseminationof generalizedculture. Writing implements, mass media,and educationaland religiousorganizations of varyingsize have introducednew culturalre- sources,or increasedtheir distribution, in societiesat varioustimes in his- tory.One can pictureat leasttwo kinds of resultantstructural effects. First, the distributionof the expandedculture may be concentratedin particular populations;hence these will be able to raise theirlevel of successin IRs at theexpense of others,forming new organizational ties and therebyeven- tuallydeveloping emotional and reputationaladvantages. A secondkind of effectoccurs when the wholepopulation uniformly receives an increasein generalizedcultural resources; the sheer degree of mobilization,of effortsto negotiatenew IR connections,should increase throughout the society.Al- thoughno one gains relativeto others,the overallprocess should increase the amountof organizationbuilding generally in that society.It can be suggestedthat earlyphases of thisprocess contribute to economicbooms and to the growthof politicaland/or religious movements; later phases, however,if generalizedcultural currency continuously expands, may in- volve a devaluationof the culturalcurrency, with ensuing contraction of politicaland economicactivity (Collins 1979). b) Particularizedcultural resources define individuals relative to particu- lar physicalproperties and authoritycoalitions. What can changethe whole structureof theseresources? The volatileaspect of particularizedculture, I wouldsuggest, is especiallyimportant for the reputationsof the individ- uals who rituallyenact the most powerfulcoalitions. Most reputational talk,as indicated,is local and repetitive.But rapidupheavals in personal reputationscharacterize important shifts in politicaland religiouspower. Personsbecome powerful (or "charismatic")when a dramaticevent, usu- ally involvingsuccess in a conflict,makes large numbers of peoplefocus on them.The widespreadand rapid circulationof theirnew reputationgives

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themthe self-reinforcingpower of commandingthe largest,and therefore dominant,coalition in that society.Conversely, powerful persons usually fall because of dramaticevents-scandals or defeatsin conflicts-which suddenlycirculate their negative reputation. The movementof such particularizedcultural resources has severalim- plicationsfor the dynamicsof social change.Such changesare discontinu- ous and alternatewith periodsof routine.They depend upon dramatic eventsthat are highlyvisible to manypeople. The mostdramatic events, I would contend,are conflicts,and especiallyviolent ones. It is for this reasonthat wars are so importantin mobilizingrevolutions and otherrapid social changes(see Skocpol 1979). Politicsitself is a masterdeterminant of the propertysystem, and so manyother routine aspects of social life, because politicsconsists of continuouslyorganized coalitions mobilized to engagein conflicts.These coalitionsgain theirpower frombroadcasting the dramaticsof theirconflicts in ways favorableto themselves,thereby creatingparticularized reputations for various individuals as powerful,vil- lainous,or impotent.Politics, as the struggleover reputation,rests upon controlof the meansof reputationmanagement. c) Emotionalenergies form the mostcrucial mechanism in all of these processes.Shifts in both generalizedand particularizedcultural resources have effectsupon people's actionsin microsituationsbecause they affect theiremotional energies. The reputationshift of a politicalleader, for ex- ample,is trulyeffective only when the rumorscarry an emotionalimpact, a contagionof feelingsthroughout the society about which is nowthe domi- nantcoalition. Hence the marketattractiveness of thatcoalition increases, all the moreso to the extentthat it spreads fear of its threatto those people who remainoutside it. Conflict,war, and politicscan be regarded as quintessentiallyemotion-producing situations. The strongerthe conflict, themore emotional energy flows through the networks of micro-interaction constitutingthe macrostructure.Periods of rapidlychanging reputational resourcesbecome particularly important for the organization of social net- worksto the extentthat such networksare vehiclesfor strong emotional contagion. Thereare also conditionsthat change the entire level of emotional energy in a society.Parallel to theintroduction of newcommunications technology and generalized-culture-producingspecialists, one can thinkof thehistori- cal introductionof new emotion-producing"technologies," including shifts in the numberof emotion-producingspecialists. From this viewpoint, changesin materialconditions are mostimportant because they change the numberof people who can assemblefor ritualpurposes or because they change people's capacities for impressionmanagement or dramatization (Collins 1975, pp. 161-216, 364-80). Such technologiesof dramatization have rangedfrom the massivearchitecture and lavishreligious and politi-

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AmericanJournal of Sociology cal ceremonyof thepharaohs through the various styles of politicaldisplay of today.Similarly, the historyof religionscan be seen as a seriesof in- ventionsof new social devicesfor generating emotions, ranging from the shaman'smagic ritual, to congregationalworship, to individualmeditation and prayer.In thisperspective, shifts among tribal, patrimonial-feudal, and bureaucraticforms of organizationare shiftsamong diverse sources of emo- tional impressionmanagement. The various combinationsof these emo- tionaltechnologies available at any giventime, and theirdegree of concen- trationor dispersionamong the populace, are crucialfactors in thestruggle forpower in any particularhistorical society. An overall picture of the statics and dynamicsof macrostructures emerges,at least in generaloutline. There are relativelyslow processesof macrochange,fueled by new emotional"technologies" or by stepped-up productionof eithergeneralized cultural currency or emotionalenergies. There are also episodicshifts in particularizedcultural resources-espe- ciallythe reputationsof personswho rituallyenact the mostpowerful po- litical,military, and religiouscoalitions-which occur at timesof dramatic conflict.The slow processes,which may spreadeither to certainprivileged groupsor moreuniformly throughout the society, bring about longperiods of organizationbuilding and personalmobilization which alter both the structureof the societyand its degreeof fluidityand conflict.The rapid, episodicprocesses bring about revolutionaryshifts in whichdramatic con- flictsfocusing attention on a newdominant coalition can bringabout mas- sive changesin thepatterns of propertyand organizationand in the par- ticulardistribution of personsin them.

CONCLUSION The precedingmodel has been presentedin veryabstract form. It does not attemptto describethe detailedvariants of ritualinteraction or the com- plexitiesof conversationalnegotiations and emotionalenergies. Integrating thesevariants into the general model should greatly increase its explanatory power.On the macro level, as well, thereare many ramificationsto be workedout in translatingall macropatternsinto micro-interactional "mar- kets" of generalizedand particularizedcultural resources and emotional energies. Even at thisdegree of imprecision,I hope thatthe modelconveys some of the advantagesof integratingmicro and macrodescriptions into a com- monexplanatory framework. It suggests,for example, that "entities" that have been locatedin individuals,such as "personality"or "attitudes,"are insteadsituational ways of actingin conversationalencounters, and that "personalities"and "attitudes"are stable onlyto the extentthat individ- uals undergothe same kindsof repeatedinteractions. Charismatic person-

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alities,by thisaccount, are simplyindividuals who have becomethe focal pointof an emotion-producingritual that links together a largecoalition; theircharisma waxes and wanes accordingto the degreeto whichthe ag- gregateconditions for the dramatic predomination of thatcoalition are met. On a smallerscale, one mayhypothesize that upwardly mobile individuals are thosewhose culturalresources lead themthrough a sequenceof IR experiencesthat build up theiremotional energies, hence their confidence and drive; whenthey reach IR matchupsthat no longergive a favorable emotionalbalance, this advantage disappears, and theycease to risefurther. To mentionone morearea of application,the growth of a productiveecon- omyas wellas its cyclesof boomand depressionshould be to an important degreedetermined by shiftsin emotionalenergies throughout the working populationin general,or possiblyamong entrepreneurs in particular. Such explanationsof specificphenomena need to be elaboratedfrom both the microand the macrosides. I would also suggestthat the connection betweenthe two levelscan be made empiricalby a new formof research. Generalizedand particularizedconversational resources exist simplyas thingspeople say in conversations;emotional energies exist in therhythms and toneswith which people say them.Accordingly, one maytake a macro- sample of the distributionof microresourcesby samplingconversations acrossa largenumber of differentsocial groupsand takingrepeated sam- ples overtime. Such a methodmoves away fromthe predominant emphasis of contemporaryconversational research, which performs detailed analyses of singleconversations in isolation.The proposedmethod resembles sample surveys,but instead of tappingattitudes of self-reportsby interviewer questions,it wouldsample natural conversations by audio or video record- ings.Technical devices may makeit possibleto characterizethe emotional energiesof conversationaltone and rhythmfrom tape recordingsor by ex- pressivepostures in video recordings.Generalized and particularizedcon- versationalresources may be characterizedby thesame data, by classifying verbalcontents. With these kinds of data, it shouldbe possibleto showthe actual operationof IR chains,their effects upon individuals' situational be- havior,and theiraggregate effects upon social stabilityand social change.

SUMMARY The followingprinciples have been suggestedto constructan explanatory theoryof macrostructuresas aggregatesof microsituations: 1. Sociologicalconcepts can be made fullyempirical only by translating theminto a sampleof the typicalmicro-events that make themup. 2. The dynamicsas well as the inertiain any causal explanationof so- cial structuremust be microsituational;all macroconditionshave their effectsby impingingupon actors'situational motivations.

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3. Humancognitive capacity is limited,hence actors facing complex con- tingenciesof social coordinationrely largely upon tacit assumptionsand routine. 4. Anyindividual's routine is organizedaround particular physical places and objects,including the physicalbodies of otherpersons. The sum of thesephysical routines, at any moment,makes up themicroreality of prop- erty. 5. Authorityis a typeof routinein whichparticular individuals domi- nate micro-interactionswith other individuals. 6. Whatparticular routines are to be adheredto is subjectto self-inter- ested maneuverand conflict.Both adherenceto routinesand changesin themare determinedby individuals'tacit monitoring of thepower of social coalitions. 7. Conversationsare ritualscreating beliefs in commonrealities that be- come symbolsof groupsolidarity. Individual chains of conversationalex- periencesover time (IR chains) thus re-createboth social coalitionsand people'scognitive beliefs about social structure. 8. Conversationaltopics imply group membership. Generalized conver- sational resources(impersonal topics) reproducehorizontal status-group ties.Particularized conversation enacts individuals' property and organiza- tionalpositions and furtherreinforces this concrete social structureby cir- culatingbeliefs about it, including the reputations of particularindividuals. 9. An encounteris a "marketplace"in whichindividuals tacitly match conversationaland emotionalresources acquired from previous encounters. Individualsare motivatedto enactor rejectconversational rituals with par- ticularpersons to the extentthat they experience favorable or unfavorable emotionalenergies from that interaction, as comparedwith other IRs they rememberin theirrecent experiences. 10. Individuals'acceptance or rejectionin an IR respectivelyraises or lowerstheir emotional energies (social confidence).Similar effects are pro- duced by experiencingdomination or subordinationwithin an IR. These emotionalresults are weightedby theintensity of emotionalarousal in each IR and by the powerof the membershipcoalition it invokes(its control overproperty and force). 11. Severaldifferent ritual markets operate simultaneously: a slow-mov- ingmarket of personsshifting in and out of particularproperty and organi- zationalpositions, more rapidly changing markets for informal solidarity withinorganizations and among individualsoutside organizationalrela- tions,and verylong-term markets for the growthand declineof organiza- tionsas a whole. 12. In each market,individuals sense theirpersonal opportunities via theirdegree of emotionalenergy. They move towardmore advantageous ritualexchanges until they reach personal equilibrium points at whichtheir

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culturaland emotionalresources are matchedby equal or greaterresources of theirpartners. 13. Social structureis constantlychanging on the microlevel,but it tendsto an aggregatestability if individualfluctuations of emotionaland culturalresources are local and temporary. 14. Large-scalechanges of social structureoccur through changes in any of the threetypes of microresources:(a) Increasesin generalizedcultural resources,produced by newcommunications media or increasedactivity of religiousand educationalspecialists, increase the size of groupcoalitions that can be formedand hence the scope of organizationalstructure. (b) Particularizedcultural resources change, for a whole society,when dra- matic (usually conflictual)events focus many people's attentionon par- ticularindividuals, thereby creating rapid shiftsin theirreputations and shiftingthe organizational center of power coalitions. (c) New "ritualtech- nologies,"including shifts in the materialsof impressionmanagement and in the typicaldensity and focusof encounters,change the qualityof emo- tionsthroughout a society.Such shiftsbring about changesin the nature of social movementsand in the dynamicsof politicaland economicaction. 15. Conversationalresources and emotionalenergies may be directly measuredby samplingconversation through time and acrosspopulations; the culturalresources are foundin conversationaltopics and the energy levelsin the toneand rhythmof talk.

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