Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation July 2020 Forthcoming in Ergo Emanuel Viebahn (Humboldt University of Berlin,
[email protected])* Alex Wiegmann (Ruhr University Bochum,
[email protected])* Neele Engelmann (Georg August University Göttingen,
[email protected]) Pascale Willemsen (University of Zurich,
[email protected]) * Joint first authors. Order of authors reflects contribution. Abstract In several recent papers and a monograph, Andreas Stokke argues that questions can be misleading, but that they cannot be lies. The aim of this paper is to show that ordinary speakers disagree. We show that ordinary speakers judge certain kinds of insincere questions to be lies, namely questions carrying a believed-false presupposition the speaker intends to convey. These judgements are robust and remain so when the participants are given the possibility of classifying the utterances as misleading or as deceiving. The judgements contrast with judgements participants give about cases of misleading or deceptive behaviour, and they pattern with judgements participants make about declarative lies. Finally, the possibility of lying with non-declaratives is not confined to questions: ordinary speakers also judge utterances of imperative, exclamative and optative sentences carrying believed-false presuppositions to be lies. 1. Introduction Questions are used to elicit information. But questions are also used to convey information. For example, if Harry wants to tell Rosa that John owns a Mercedes, he might use the following question: (1) Did you know that John owns a Mercedes? In uttering (1), Harry presupposes that John owns a Mercedes, and he intends to convey the content of this presupposition to Rosa.