Online Appendix to Cultivating the Appearance of Neutrality: Autocratic Propaganda in Africa and Asia
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Online Appendix to Cultivating the Appearance of Neutrality: Autocratic Propaganda in Africa and Asia December 6, 2016 1 Introduction This online appendix contains supporting information and robustness checks that, due to space constraints, we were unable to include in the main text. The appendix features three parts. Sections 2 through 5 validate our measure of propaganda and demonstrate that the results in the main text are robust to different constructions. Section 2 offers a more expansive validation of our measure of propaganda than Table 2 in the main text. We show temporal trends in positive coverage of the executive and the political opposition in Rwanda’s state-run New Times before and after the 2010 presidential election. For additional detail, we reproduce a series of articles from the newspaper. Section 3 provides more information about our valence dictionaries. In particular, we show that the most common words across state-run newspapers are stable across election seasons and non-election seasons. This is important, for it establishes that the results in the main text are not artefacts of a few positive words that are especially common during election seasons. Section 4 reconstructs our measure of positive coverage using exclusively names, rather than general identifiers such as “president,” “head of state,” and “State House,” which arecommon but may increase during elections because of general political coverage. We show that the results in the main text are substantively unchanged with this alternative construction. Section 5 explores how our measure of propaganda comports with the use of frames, which autocrats may employ strategically to present the regime in a more favorable light. To do so, we draw from Namibia’s New Era. Sections 6 through 9 consider alternative explanations for the results in the main text. Section 6 presents the results of a multi-label topic model that assigns labels to all newspaper articles in our corpus. This enables us to assess how the topics covered by newspapers evolve throughout the year. In particular, we find no evidence that autocrats employ their propaganda apparatuses to issue threats of violence during election seasons. Rather, as expected, coverage of economic 1 performance increases immediately prior to election day. Section 7 probes the tone of economic coverage immediately prior to election day. Again, as expected, we find that autocratic propaganda apparatuses describe country i’s economic performance more positively during election seasons. Section 8 attempts to rule out the possibility that the results in the main text are driven by genuine “good news”: that autocrats do not simply release positive, factually correct news reports in the 15 days before election day. To do so, we control for news coverage from a range of global newspapers of record. Section 9 reestimates the results in the main text with a series of local polynomial regressions, adapted from a regression discontinuity framework. The final four sections provide additional information about our measure of positive coverage, our corpus of state-run and state-affiliated newspapers, and other measures included in themain text. Section 10 includes a brief description of each of the 24 newspapers in our sample, the media environment in which they operate, and how we obtained them. Section 11 lists all executive and opposition identifiers, by country, that we use to create our measures of positive coverage. Section 12 provides descriptive statistics for the other variables used in the statistical analysis. Section 13 presents additional information about the Google search habits of African citizens, referenced in Section 1 of the main text. 2 Validating Our Measure of Propaganda: An Example from Rwanda 2.1 Temporal Trends To illustrate our measure of propaganda, we focus particular attention on Rwanda, where The New Times serves as President Paul Kagame’s chief propaganda organ. Between April and July 1994, Rwanda’s ethnic Hutus massacred approximately 800,000 Tutsis, goaded by the state-run Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines.1 After some semblance of stability was restored, the National Assembly elected Paul Kagame, a Tutsi and the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), president under the transitional constitution. Notwithstanding his popularity among some Western donors, Kagame quietly assembled among the continent’s worst human rights records. Among other violations, he routinely silences the political opposition by assassinating exiles. In 2014 Kagame addressed the murder of one, Patrick Karegeya: Whoever betrays the country will pay the price. I assure you. Letting down a country, wishing harm on people, you end up suffering the negative consequences. Any person still alive who may be plotting against Rwanda, whoever they are, will pay the price.2 Rwanda’s most recent presidential election occurred on August 9, 2010, when Kagame was reelected in a poll that was widely considered fraudulent. Figure 1 depicts how The New Times 1Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) estimates that the radio station was responsible for 10% of violence. 2Human Rights Watch (2014). 2 75 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● 50 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● 25 ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ●●● ● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ●● ●● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ●● ●● ● ●●● ● ● ●● ●● ● ● ● ● ●● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●●●●●● ●●●●●●●●● ●●● ● ●●●●●● ●●●●●● ●● ●●●●●● ●●●● ● ●● ●● ● ● ●● ●●●●● ●● ● ●●● ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●● ●●●● ●●●●●●●●●●●●●● ●●●●●●●● ●● ● 0 ●● ● ● ●● ●● ● ●● ● ● ●●● ● ●●●● ● ●●●●●● ● ●●● ● ● ●● ●● ● ●●● ● ●● ●●● ●● ● ●●●● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ●●●●● ●●● ●● ●● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●● ●●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ●●● −25 ● ● ● ●● ● Mar Apr May● Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Figure 1: The New Times’ coverage of Paul Kagame and the RPF between March 2010 and February 2011 is shown in blue circles. Coverage of the political opposition is shown in red triangles. The presidential election, which occurred on August 9, 2010, is given by the dashed vertical line. The solid lines give the moving average of Positive Coverageit for executive and opposition figures. When daily points cluster around 0, references to Kagame (or the political opposition) in The New Times on day t were neutral. When daily points are positive (negative), so too was coverage. covered Kagame, as well as the Rwandan opposition, during the year surrounding the election.3 For each calendar day along the x-axis, the y-axis records our measure of Positive Coverageit : Executive and Positive Coverageit : Opposition. These record the number of positive words, less negative words, among the 20 surrounding each class of identifier on day t. The solid lines give 3The newspaper claims to be privately owned but Human Rights Watch deems it state owned and Kagame himself called it servile (Economist 2010). Indeed, many observers suspect The New Times is owned by Kagame himself. 3 moving averages. When daily points cluster around 0, references to Kagame (or the political opposition) in The New Times on day t were neutral; when daily points are positive (negative), so too was coverage. Figure 1 reveals a propaganda strategy that is strikingly consistent with the results in the main text. Save for the fortnight surrounding the election, The New Times’ coverage of Kagame was generally neutral: sometimes positive, sometimes negative. Indeed, the valence – though clearly not the frequency – of Kagame’s coverage was quite similar to the 40 opposition parties and leaders that we identified. During the fortnight surrounding the election, however, all this changed. Although The New Times continued its neutral coverage of the political opposition, it endorsed Kagame without reservation, increasing its positive valence by a factor of 20. In the election’s aftermath, after the government declared victory and prepared for Kagame’s inauguration, The New Times again registered its approval. 2.2 Example Documents To illustrate our measures of Positive Coverageit : Executive in more detail, we reproduce several articles from Paul Kagame’s The New Times. The article in Table 1 appeared in The New Times on August 6, 2010, just three days prior to the August 9, 2010, presidential elections. We bold the executive – for Rwanda, either “Kagame” or “RPF,” his political party – and then italicize the 10 words on either side. Positive words are rendered in blue, while negative words are rendered in red. This article contains 16 positive words surrounding “Kagame” and “RPF” and 0 negative words surrounding “Kagame” and “RPF,” and so registers a net positive coverage of 16. By the standards of our corpus, this article is extremely flattering. Indeed, few other articles, in any country, reach this degree of flattery. The article articulates a clear argument in favor of Kagame’s reelection and emphasizes the extent to which important constituencies support him. The statistical results in the main text suggest that autocrats