Online Appendix to Cultivating the Appearance of Neutrality: Autocratic Propaganda in Africa and Asia

December 6, 2016

1 Introduction

This online appendix contains supporting information and robustness checks that, due to space constraints, we were unable to include in the main text. The appendix features three parts. Sections 2 through 5 validate our measure of propaganda and demonstrate that the results in the main text are robust to different constructions. Section 2 offers a more expansive validation of our measure of propaganda than Table 2 in the main text. We show temporal trends in positive coverage of the executive and the political opposition in Rwanda’s state-run New Times before and after the 2010 presidential election. For additional detail, we reproduce a series of articles from the newspaper. Section 3 provides more information about our valence dictionaries. In particular, we show that the most common words across state-run newspapers are stable across election seasons and non-election seasons. This is important, for it establishes that the results in the main text are not artefacts of a few positive words that are especially common during election seasons. Section 4 reconstructs our measure of positive coverage using exclusively names, rather than general identifiers such as “president,” “head of state,” and “State House,” which arecommon but may increase during elections because of general political coverage. We show that the results in the main text are substantively unchanged with this alternative construction. Section 5 explores how our measure of propaganda comports with the use of frames, which autocrats may employ strategically to present the regime in a more favorable light. To do so, we draw from Namibia’s New Era. Sections 6 through 9 consider alternative explanations for the results in the main text. Section 6 presents the results of a multi-label topic model that assigns labels to all newspaper articles in our corpus. This enables us to assess how the topics covered by newspapers evolve throughout the year. In particular, we find no evidence that autocrats employ their propaganda apparatuses to issue threats of violence during election seasons. Rather, as expected, coverage of economic

1 performance increases immediately prior to election day. Section 7 probes the tone of economic coverage immediately prior to election day. Again, as expected, we find that autocratic propaganda apparatuses describe country i’s economic performance more positively during election seasons. Section 8 attempts to rule out the possibility that the results in the main text are driven by genuine “good news”: that autocrats do not simply release positive, factually correct news reports in the 15 days before election day. To do so, we control for news coverage from a range of global newspapers of record. Section 9 reestimates the results in the main text with a series of local polynomial regressions, adapted from a regression discontinuity framework. The final four sections provide additional information about our measure of positive coverage, our corpus of state-run and state-affiliated newspapers, and other measures included in themain text. Section 10 includes a brief description of each of the 24 newspapers in our sample, the media environment in which they operate, and how we obtained them. Section 11 lists all executive and opposition identifiers, by country, that we use to create our measures of positive coverage. Section 12 provides descriptive statistics for the other variables used in the statistical analysis. Section 13 presents additional information about the Google search habits of African citizens, referenced in Section 1 of the main text.

2 Validating Our Measure of Propaganda: An Example from Rwanda

2.1 Temporal Trends

To illustrate our measure of propaganda, we focus particular attention on Rwanda, where The New Times serves as President Paul Kagame’s chief propaganda organ. Between April and July 1994, Rwanda’s ethnic Hutus massacred approximately 800,000 Tutsis, goaded by the state-run Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines.1 After some semblance of stability was restored, the National Assembly elected Paul Kagame, a Tutsi and the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), president under the transitional constitution. Notwithstanding his popularity among some Western donors, Kagame quietly assembled among the continent’s worst human rights records. Among other violations, he routinely silences the political opposition by assassinating exiles. In 2014 Kagame addressed the murder of one, Patrick Karegeya:

Whoever betrays the country will pay the price. I assure you. Letting down a country, wishing harm on people, you end up suffering the negative consequences. Any person still alive who may be plotting against Rwanda, whoever they are, will pay the price.2

Rwanda’s most recent presidential election occurred on August 9, 2010, when Kagame was reelected in a poll that was widely considered fraudulent. Figure 1 depicts how The New Times

1Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) estimates that the radio station was responsible for 10% of violence. 2Human Rights Watch (2014).

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Mar Apr May● Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb

Figure 1: The New Times’ coverage of Paul Kagame and the RPF between March 2010 and February 2011 is shown in blue circles. Coverage of the political opposition is shown in red triangles. The presidential election, which occurred on August 9, 2010, is given by the dashed vertical line. The solid lines give the moving average of Positive Coverageit for executive and opposition figures. When daily points cluster around 0, references to Kagame (or the political opposition) in The New Times on day t were neutral. When daily points are positive (negative), so too was coverage.

covered Kagame, as well as the Rwandan opposition, during the year surrounding the election.3

For each calendar day along the x-axis, the y-axis records our measure of Positive Coverageit :

Executive and Positive Coverageit : Opposition. These record the number of positive words, less negative words, among the 20 surrounding each class of identifier on day t. The solid lines give

3The newspaper claims to be privately owned but Human Rights Watch deems it state owned and Kagame himself called it servile (Economist 2010). Indeed, many observers suspect The New Times is owned by Kagame himself.

3 moving averages. When daily points cluster around 0, references to Kagame (or the political opposition) in The New Times on day t were neutral; when daily points are positive (negative), so too was coverage. Figure 1 reveals a propaganda strategy that is strikingly consistent with the results in the main text. Save for the fortnight surrounding the election, The New Times’ coverage of Kagame was generally neutral: sometimes positive, sometimes negative. Indeed, the valence – though clearly not the frequency – of Kagame’s coverage was quite similar to the 40 opposition parties and leaders that we identified. During the fortnight surrounding the election, however, all this changed. Although The New Times continued its neutral coverage of the political opposition, it endorsed Kagame without reservation, increasing its positive valence by a factor of 20. In the election’s aftermath, after the government declared victory and prepared for Kagame’s inauguration, The New Times again registered its approval.

2.2 Example Documents

To illustrate our measures of Positive Coverageit : Executive in more detail, we reproduce several articles from Paul Kagame’s The New Times. The article in Table 1 appeared in The New Times on August 6, 2010, just three days prior to the August 9, 2010, presidential elections. We bold the executive – for Rwanda, either “Kagame” or “RPF,” his political party – and then italicize the 10 words on either side. Positive words are rendered in blue, while negative words are rendered in red. This article contains 16 positive words surrounding “Kagame” and “RPF” and 0 negative words surrounding “Kagame” and “RPF,” and so registers a net positive coverage of 16. By the standards of our corpus, this article is extremely flattering. Indeed, few other articles, in any country, reach this degree of flattery. The article articulates a clear argument in favor of Kagame’s reelection and emphasizes the extent to which important constituencies support him. The statistical results in the main text suggest that autocrats employ their propaganda apparatuses outside election seasons to cultivate the appearance of neutrality. The article in Table 2 was published in The New Times on February 19, 2010, some six months before the presidential election. Again, we italicize the 10 words on other side of “Kagame” and “RPF,” while rendering positive words blue and negative words red. This article clearly illustrates the dramatic difference in autocratic propaganda during election seasons and all other days in the calendar year. The article in Table 2 presents a more balanced view of Kagame’s successes and failures. It admits Rwanda’s relatively poor economic conditions. It gives voice to citizen frustrations. It presents genuine news. With only one positive word – referencing Kagame’s support of the East African Business Council – its support of Kagame is tepid. The results in the main text suggest that autocratic propaganda apparatuses frequently employ positive descriptors for the political opposition, even during election seasons. The New Times suggests one reason why. Like several of his counterparts elsewhere in Africa, Kagame routinely

4 Table 1: Coverage of the Autocrat during Election Seasons

The New Times (Kigali) August 6, 2010 Friday Varsity Students Rally Behind Kagame Dan Ngabonziza

Enthusiastic students of Umutara Polytechnic University on Wednesday took to the streets, urging area residents to give the RPF candidate, Paul Kagame, another 7-year mandate.

Clad in RPF branded T-shirts and placards with words reading: “Tora Kagame” (Vote for Kagame), the students marched from the University grounds towards Nyagatare town main round-about, chanting praise for Kagame and highlighting his past achievements.

“Tuzamutora, Tuzamutora. Tuzatora Kagame ijana ku ijana” (We shall vote for him, we shall vote for Kagame 100%), they chanted amid blaring music.

Mukagasana, one of the students, praised Kagame for his education policies and support.

“He facilitated the establishment of this University that has helped many Rwandans to pursue their educational goals. We shall vote for him to continue providing a solid foundation for the countryś future development,” she said.

On Thursday morning, the students rallied as early as 6.00 am, join over 150,000 other party supporters heading for Rukomo Sector play grounds, where the RPF candidate, Kagame, addressed a huge rally in the afternoon.

“We know how remote and underdeveloped Nyagatare District was. It was not a place one would think of the district has become a centre for milk production in the country and very soon food production will top,” he said.

Karengera, who rose from being a simple to a modern cattle farmer, also says Kagame deserves another term because of his past achievements.

5 Table 2: Coverage of the Autocrat outside Election Season

The New Times (Kigali) February 19, 2010 Friday Kagame Receives EA Business Council John Gahamanyi

The East African Business Council (EABC) wants full involvement of the business community in all policy formulation and decisions that have an effect on business.

They said this shortly after meeting with President Paul Kagame at Urugwiro Village.

The EABC, which is an apex body made up of private sector associations from all five member states, says that total inclusion of the business community in policy formulation and implementation would improve investor confidence.

The body says that frequent policy changes by regional governments, without due consultation with the relevant stakeholders negatively impacts on existing investments and also deters new investors.

“We have issues of the persistent non-tariff barriers that don’t seem to be reducing, infrastructure projects that need to be addressed, and the relevancy of EABC in generating policy and in being consulted when certain policies are being discussed,” the Chairman of the EABC, Faustin Kananura Mbundu, said yesterday.

Rwanda’s Minister for East African Affairs, Monique Mukaruriza, said that President Kagame promised his support to the EABC.

“He recognized the key role the EABC will play in the growth of the economies of the EAC states,” she said.

Mukaruriza added that Rwanda has a participatory approach when it comes to formulating policies.

The EABC call comes at a time the World Bank Doing Business Report says that transport costs as a share of exports, for a country like Rwanda, is estimated at 48 percent, something that raises the cost of production.

In relation to power, the price of electricity/production in East Africa is said to be 5-10 times higher than the region’s competitors like Egypt and South Africa.

“EABC has low quality power supply system, with a high dependency on large scale hydroelectricity plants leading to power rationing as a result of dry spells and erratic rainfalls,” Mbundu said.

The EABC gave President Kagame a brief that contains issues affecting the private sector in the EAC. The same memorandum will be given to other EAC Heads of State before the EAC Heads of State summit scheduled for March.

“The memorandum we have given to the President is the same we gave to the Chairman of the EAC Heads of State Summit, Jakaya Kikweta,” Mbundu said.

6 Table 3: Coverage of the Opposition during Election Season

The New Times (Kigali) July 31, 2010 Friday Ntawukuriryayo Rallies Gakenke, Burera Residents Bonny Mukombozi

The Social Democratic Party (PSD) presidential candidate, Dr. Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo, yesterday said that once he wins the upcoming elections, his government will ensure all parties are included in administration from the grassroots to the national level.

Speaking at a rally at Nemba Stadium, Gakenke District, Ntawukuriryayo said that the kind of democracy that gives freedom to opposition parties will be maintained.

“I will ensure that the inter-party committee operates from all levels, from national level to sector and cell levels,” Ntawukuriryayo said.

The supporters thronged the stadium, carrying placards and singing party songs. As soon as the candidate arrived, they broke into chants, dance and music.

If voted into power, he said, he will ensure improved standards of living among Rwandans; “the party will also focus on improving social and economic development.”

“To achieve this, we will first deal with family planning in every household.”

Dr. Ntawukuriryayo promised to transform the agricultural sector by ensuring that the quality of production is improved and small scale industries are established to enrich the rural communities.

“Literacy levels will at least reduce to 10% during my term in office,” he added.

He challenged residents to ensure proper sanitation and hygiene in homes in order to reduce diseases which have been rampant in the area.

Earlier, he had campaigned in Burera District, where he reiterated his promise to double teachers’ salaries in the first two years of his term and the setting up of a nursery school in every villageinthe country.

7 commissions prominent political elites to “campaign” against him, the better to create the appearance of democratic competition. In the Republic of Congo, ruled by Denis Sassou Nguesso for all but five years since 1979, these candidates are called the “moderate opposition.” In Rwanda, the most prominent of these “moderate opposition” candidates during the August 2010 election was Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo, president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD). He served in Kagame’s cabinet between 2002 and 2008, when he was elected Vice President of the National Assembly with Kagame’s blessing. For his efforts during the August 2010 presidential election, he was made President of the Senate in 2011. These moderate opposition campaigns provide an ideal, unthreatening forum for autocratic propaganda apparatuses to cultivate the appearance of neutrality and, as a result, acquire credibility capital. During the 2010 election campaign, Ntawukuriryayo was careful to burnish Rwanda’s status as an economically vibrant democracy, effectively bolstering Kagame’s central platform. Accordingly, The New Times adopted a strikingly moderate tone when covering Ntawukuriryayo: a tone very similar the one employed for Kagame outside election seasons. The article in Table 3, published on July 31, 2010, makes this clear. References to “Ntawukuriryayo” and his “PSD” appear in bold, the 10 surrounding words on either side in italics, positive words in blue, and negative words in red. The article’s net positive coverage is 9. It describes Ntawukuriryayo’s efforts to “rally” the local population, his “supporters” that “thronged the stadium,” and his apparently popular campaign “promises.” In short, by appearing to cover Kagame’s “rivals” with equanimity, The New Times’ support for Kagame seems all the more objective.

3 Dictionary Validation: Word Distribution Stability Across Elec- tion Seasons and Non-Election Seasons

To construct our measures of Positive Coverageit : Executive and Positive Coverageit : Opposition, we employed the Harvard General Inquirer language dictionary. Readers familiar with the Harvard General Inquirer may be concerned that some of the words that the dictionary classifies as positive may be more likely during election seasons, and for reasons that have nothing to do with strategic propaganda. Table 4 illustrates this. The first two columns give the ten most common words –both positive and negative – during election seasons in Rwanda; the third and fourth columns give the ten most common words outside election seasons in Rwanda. We report the “stemmed” versions of these words, which we employ to capture variation in tense and plural forms. The first two columns, in particular, suggest that particularly common words during election seasons may indeed appear simply as a function of normal political reporting, rather than strategic propaganda. The term “candid,” for instance, is the stemmed form of candidate and the baseline form of candid, and is registered as positive tone in the Harvard General Inquirer. However, the word “candidate” is extremely common during election seasons, and likely should not be associated

8 with positive coverage. Likewise, the term “polit” is the stemmed form of polite, politician, and politics, and is also registered as positive tone in the Harvard General Inquirer. Again, the words “politics” and “politician” are common during election seasons, and should not be associated with positive coverage. To ensure that words such as these do not drive the results in the main text, we reviewed the Harvard General Inquirer to identify any words that could plausibly increase during election seasons as a function of normal political coverage rather than strategic propaganda. We identified 12 such words, which appear in Table 5, and omitted them from our final English and French linguistic dictionaries that were used to generate the results in the main text. After revising the linguistic dictionaries accordingly, we reproduced Table 4; this reproduction appears as Table 6. Now, the most common words during election seasons are strikingly similar to the most common words outside election seasons. Since the set of common words is relatively stable across the calendar year, it is extremely unlikely that a handful of election season words are driving the spike in positive coverage that we observe during election seasons.

Table 4: Most Common Dictionary Terms in Rwanda: Before Exclusions Election Season Non-Election Season Positive Negative Positive Negative will against will need candid make use against support need make make good help like help accord get help get educ servic accord servic secur point well even well even good challeng communiti turn support point polit arrest come home

Table 5: Words Excluded from Stemmed Dictionaries capital polit (stemmed form of polite, politesse) race candid (stemmed form of candidate) run home (stemmed form of homely) prime common (stemmed form of commoner) minister depend (stemmed form of dependent) econom (stemmed form of economize) author (stemmed form of authoritative)

9 Table 6: Most Common Dictionary Terms in Rwanda: After Exclusions Election Season Non-Election Season Positive Negative Positive Negative will against will need support need use against good help like help accord get help get come servic accord servic secur turn good challeng use point come point well arrest support differ improv show well club train commit call show

4 Excluding Terms of Office

Newspapers frequently refer to executives not by their proper names, but by their office. For instance, Rwanda’s The New Times commonly refers to Paul Kagame as “the president” or “the head of state.” In anglophone Africa, newspapers often refer to the executive as “the State House,” much as American newspapers refer to the American president as “the White House.” To accommodate this, our measure of propaganda treats references to “the president” just as it does references to Paul Kagame, Robert Mugabe, and other autocrats. Readers may be concerned that our statistical results in the main text are driven by these general identifiers, and that these general identifiers indicate coverage of the election rather than deliberate coverage of the executive. If so, our statistical results underscore not strategic propaganda, but simply common political coverage. To ensure this is not the case, we construct a measure of propaganda that excludes all non-proper nouns. That is, in Rwanda, we measure the tone surrounding references to named entities – in particular, Paul Kagame and his chief political opponents – rather than “president,” “head of state,” “State House,” or “opposition.” The results appear in Tables 7 through 10. The results are substantively identical to those in the main text. Note, however, that the magnitude of the effects is somewhat smaller, since the number of references that weuseto construct our measures of Positive Coverageit : Executive and Positive Coverageit : Opposition is much less.

10 Table 7: Election Seasons and Pro-Regime Coverage in Autocracies: Baseline and Full Models with Named Entities

Pro-Regime Coverage in Autocracies Pro-Regime Coverage in Autocracies Articles with References Total Articles Articles with References Total Articles Reference Per Article Published Reference Per Article Published Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Day Level Variables Election Season 11.575∗∗ -0.020 27.652∗∗ 16.182∗∗ -0.017 19.247∗∗ (0.973) (0.062) (1.042) (1.066) (0.105) (1.086) Election Day 7.233† -0.190 40.412∗∗ 0.414 -0.412 14.247∗∗ (3.814) (0.244) (4.087) (3.801) (0.375) (3.874) Post-Election Season 5.339∗∗ -0.038 16.926∗∗ 1.294 -0.026 2.015† (0.973) (0.062) (1.043) (1.020) (0.101) (1.040) Protestt−1 -0.758 -0.007 -0.700 (0.628) (0.062) (0.640) ∗ Repressiont−1 -1.585 -0.103 -3.794

11 (1.668) (0.164) (1.700) Civil War Event: Statet−1

Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate 0.318∗∗ -0.005 0.237∗ (0.103) (0.010) (0.105) ln Per Capita GDP -12.012∗∗ 0.258 -7.466∗ (3.252) (0.321) (3.314) Oil Supply 0.010∗∗ 0.0002 0.006∗ (0.003) (0.0003) (0.003) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 16,483 16,483 16,483 6,641 6,641 6,641 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season 11.575 -0.020 27.652 16.182 -0.017 19.247 (9.67, 13.48) (-0.14, 0.10) (25.61, 29.70) (14.09, 18.27) (-0.22, 0.19) (17.12 21.38) Table 8: Election Seasons and Opposition Coverage in Autocracies: Baseline and Full Models with Named Entities

Pro-Regime Coverage in Autocracies Pro-Regime Coverage in Autocracies Articles with References Total Articles Articles with References Total Articles Reference Per Article Published Reference Per Article Published Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Day Level Variables Election Season 4.633∗∗ 0.018 40.351∗∗ 2.794∗∗ 0.013 15.505∗∗ (0.252) (0.032) (1.346) (0.364) (0.053) (1.704) Election Day 0.796 -0.014 49.241∗∗ -0.340 -0.037 24.341∗∗ (0.988) (0.125) (5.277) (1.298) (0.188) (6.079) Post-Election Season 1.119∗∗ -0.056† 22.610∗∗ -0.059 -0.086† 4.524∗∗ (0.252) (0.032) (1.346) (0.348) (0.050) (1.631) ∗∗ † Protestt−1 -0.564 -0.028 -1.753 (0.213) (0.031) (0.997) Repressiont−1 -0.290 -0.065 0.867

12 (0.631) (0.091) (2.956) Civil War Event: Statet−1

Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate 0.029 0.005 -0.195 (0.035) (0.005) (0.164) ln Per Capita GDP -2.275∗ -0.225 -14.543∗∗ (1.110) (0.160) (5.198) Oil Supply 0.002∗ 0.0002† 0.011∗∗ (0.001) (0.0001) (0.004) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 16,483 16,483 16,483 6,641 6,641 6,641 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season 4.633 0.018 40.351 2.794 0.013 15.505 (4.14, 5.13) (-0.04, 0.08) (37.71, 42.99) (2.08, 3.51) (-0.09, 0.12) (12.17, 18.84) Table 9: Election Seasons and Pro-Regime Coverage in Democracies: Baseline and Full Models with Named Entities

Pro-Regime Coverage in Democracies Pro-Regime Coverage in Democracies Articles with References Total Articles Articles with References Total Articles Reference Per Article Published Reference Per Article Published Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Day Level Variables Election Season -0.314 -0.087† 2.978∗∗ -0.875∗∗ -0.151∗∗ 3.913∗∗ (0.231) (0.052) (0.571) (0.305) (0.056) (0.983) Election Day -0.973 -0.202 -1.381 -0.550 -0.139 -2.308 (1.094) (0.248) (2.708) (2.359) (0.433) (7.589) Post-Election Season 0.902∗∗ -0.013 2.791∗∗ 1.010∗∗ -0.023 2.675∗∗ (0.228) (0.052) (0.563) (0.310) (0.057) (0.997) Protestt−1 0.107 0.041 0.489 (0.142) (0.026) (0.456) Repressiont−1 -0.002 0.393 -0.901

13 (1.673) (0.307) (5.383) ∗∗ Civil War Event: Statet−1 0.287 0.474 -1.268 (0.844) (0.155) (2.715) Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate -0.197∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.688∗∗ (0.079) (0.014) (0.253) ln Per Capita GDP 48.966∗∗ 7.191∗∗ 23.464 (5.010) (0.921) (16.120) Oil Supply 1.086∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.285 (0.239) (0.044) (0.769) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 6,351 6,351 6,351 2,223 2,223 2,223 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season -0.314 -0.087 2.978 -0.875 -0.151 3.913 (-0.77, 0.14) (-0.19, 0.02) (1.86, 4.10) (-1.47, -0.28) (-0.26, -0.04) (1.99, 5.84) Table 10: Election Seasons and Opposition Coverage in Democracies: Baseline and Full Models with Named Entities

Opposition Coverage in Democracies Opposition Coverage in Democracies Articles with References Total Articles Articles with References Total Articles Reference Per Article Published Reference Per Article Published Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Day Level Variables Election Season 1.868∗∗ -0.009 7.940∗∗ 3.465∗∗ 0.023 12.991∗∗ (0.644) (0.045) (1.208) (0.732) (0.055) (1.784) Election Day 0.084 0.220 0.359 -0.466 0.040 -1.026 (3.055) (0.214) (5.729) (7.985) (0.599) (19.455) Post-Election Season 0.571 0.020 8.068∗∗ 3.103∗∗ 0.097† 7.816∗∗ (0.636) (0.045) (1.192) (0.740) (0.056) (1.804) Protestt−1 -0.534 -0.040 0.026 (0.342) (0.026) (0.834) Repressiont−1 -0.973 0.669 -4.126

14 (5.649) (0.424) (13.763) Civil War Event: Statet−1 0.222 0.063 -1.185 (2.030) (0.152) (4.947) Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate 0.957∗∗ 0.117∗∗ -0.097 (0.189) (0.014) (0.460) ln Per Capita GDP -99.660∗∗ -8.494∗∗ -119.569∗∗ (12.019) (0.902) (29.284) Oil Supply -1.223∗ 0.020 -6.234∗∗ (0.573) (0.043) (1.396) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 6,351 6,351 6,351 2,223 2,223 2,223 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season 1.868 -0.009 7.940 3.465 0.023 12.991 (0.61, 3.13) (-0.10, 0.08) (5.57, 10.31) (2.03, 4.90) (-0.08, 0.13) (9.49, 16.49) 5 On Propaganda and Framing: An Example from Namibia

Our explanatory variable of interest, Positive Coverage: Executiveit, measures the net volume of fulsome coverage of the executive and his ruling party. Of course, autocrats may employ other strategies to change citizen beliefs. Autocrats may admit a failing but offer a justification: that the current situation is better than the previous situation and/or that the government plans to fix the problem in the future. Alternatively, propaganda apparatuses may portray the autocrat favorably through comparison. Many of the countries in our sample frame their neighbors in a negative light so as to make their domestic situation appear more positive. For example, Singapore’s Straits Times tells readers that Malaysia’s fiscal problems remain hard to solve; that it is difficult tostarta business in Beijing; that Thailand has fewer doctors per capita than Singapore; and that Indonesia is bedeviled with corruption, terrorism, and militant labor unrest. We believe these frames merit future research in their own right. Indeed, we can imagine a range of interesting questions. When do autocratic propaganda apparatuses employ frames? Why do they employ some frames rather than others? For two reasons, however, we view frames as outside the scope of this paper. First, in our dataset, comparison frames appear to be relatively uncommon. In Section 6 below, we show that foreign coverage constitutes at most 10% of the total newspaper articles published in our sample. Much of this foreign coverage focuses not on the economic or political failings of neighbors, but on regional trade, development aid, and major international events. The second reason that we view frames as outside the scope of this paper is because our measures of Positive Coverageit:Executive and Positive Coverageit:Opposition implicitly accommodate them. The reason is that justification frames generally include positive words about why the current situation has improved or how the government proposes to solve problems in the future. As a result, they register as positive coverage of the autocrat. In this sense, our measures of Positive

Coverageit implicitly measure the intensity of these justification frames. The example below, from Namibia, makes this clear. Namibia held a general election on November 28, 2014. It was won by Prime Minister Hage Geingob of the ruling South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) party. The article in Table 11, published seven weeks before the election by New Era, Namibia’s state-run newspaper, shows how our measure of Positive Coverage: Executiveit records justifications for current policy failures as positive coverage. Geingob acknowledges economic problems and that some citizens have deserted SWAPO. “The problems are there,” he says, including “poverty,” “homelessness,” and “tribalism.” Nonetheless, Geingob claims credit for Namibia’s track record of development – “we delivered a long time ago” – and promises that current problems “would be fixed as part of the national development programme.” As for Rwanda above, we bold the executive – for Namibia, either “Geingob” or “Swapo” – and then italicize the 10 words on either side. Positive words are rendered in blue, while negative words

15 are rendered in red. The article contains 15 positive words surrounding “Geingob” and “Swapo” compared to 7 negative words surrounding “Geingob” and “Swapo,” and so registers a net positive coverage of 8. While the economic problems admitted by the regime decrease the level of positive tone, the superlatives attached to Geingob’s justifications more than compensate. Therefore, this justification registers as positive coverage of the regime.

Table 11: Justificatory Frame

New Era (Windhoek) October 6, 2014 There Are Problems and We Will Fix Them – Geingob

Prime Minister Dr Hage Geingob says Swapo has delivered and that the party will not indulge in merely promising what it is going to do should the party win the presidential election scheduled for November 28.

”We are saying that we delivered a long time ago and there is freedom – freedom of speech, press, expression. We promised to be our own liberators after independence and we have achieved that,” said Geingob at a rally in Eenhana over the weekend. Geingob, addressing hundreds of Swapo supporters, said those who do not recognize the efforts made by the party are liars and dishonest. ”We cannot deny that there are no problems, the problems are there,” said Geingob, adding they would be fixed as part of the national development programme.

Geingob said Swapo would declare a war against the still ongoing problems of poverty and homelessness during the phase of economic emancipation. ”Those who do not have a house, children taught under trees, people sleeping with hunger, that is the war we declare in the second phase,” said Geingob. He said Swapo would continue to empower business personalities by providing a conducive environment to enable those who have the ability to work and feed themselves to help themselves and assist in the fight for economic emancipation and developing the country. ”We use yourtax money to build schools, clinics and for infrastructural development,” said Geingob. He condemned tribalism and was content with the number of people who had come to the rally saying: ”You didn’t say the guy is Damara, you came out in numbers.” Geingob also invited those who had left the party or were ”misled”, to rejoin the party, adding that they will be welcomed back. The Chairperson of National Leaders assigned to Ohangwena Region and the Minister of Works and Transport Erkki Nghimtina assured Geingob that Ohangwena is a Swapo stronghold. According to Nghimtina, who reflected on the past elections in Ohangwena, 90 percent of the population are Swapo supporters.

6 Alternative Explanation: Article Topics, Threats of Violence, and Performance Legitimacy

The results in the main text make clear that autocratic propaganda apparatuses across Africa and Asia cover the regime with striking equanimity throughout the calendar year, the better to cultivate the appearance of neutrality. At the reference level and at the article level, they maintain that relative equanimity during election seasons as well. Yet because the number of articles that reference the autocrat increases sharply during election seasons, so too do the aggregate number of references and the aggregate level of pro-regime coverage. Our theory makes sense of this. To

16 persuade citizens of useful fictions, autocrats must establish a reputation for neutrality.

6.1 Delivering Threats of Violence

These results may also be consistent with an alternative mechanism. Autocrats may employ relatively unbiased reporting outside of election seasons to induce their citizens to read state-run newspapers during election seasons. Then, as election day approaches, autocrats may use their propaganda apparatuses to issue threats of violence: about what would happen if voters refused to support the autocrat or protested in the streets. Our case knowledge suggests that this occurs. The Republic of Congo suffered a series of civil wars between 1993 and 2003. The most intense roundof fighting occurred between June and October 1997, when Denis Sassou Nguesso deposed PascalLis- souba, the only democratically elected president in Congo’s history. The war killed roughly 1% of the country’s citizens and displaced at least 30%.4 Since 1997 Sassou Nguesso has organized three presidential elections, all fraudulent. In the weeks prior to the elections, his propaganda newspaper, Les Dépêches de Brazzaville, frequently reminds readers that Sassou Nguesso is the “apostle of peace,” the “guarantor” of the country’s “cherished” stability. Congolese citizens widely interpret these allusions as threats: about the violence Sassou Nguesso is willing to employ to retain power. By providing generally neutral news coverage outside of election seasons, autocrats may seek to ensure that their electoral threats are delivered.

6.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics

To ensure that this alternative explanation is not driving the results in the main text, we employ two empirical strategies. First, we developed a list of topics that state-run newspapers generally cover. The list includes economic performance, public goods provision, democracy and elections, law and order, nationalism and colonialism, sports, religion, foreign affairs, culture, local issues, obituaries, ethnicity, gossip and life advice, and other salient topics by country.5 If autocrats employ relatively neutral reporting outside election seasons to deliver threats of repression during election seasons, then we should observe coverage of law and order topics spike immediately prior to election day. We employ topic models to label newspaper articles accordingly. To do so, we randomly sampled 300 articles from each state-run newspaper. These articles comprise each newspaper’s training set; we refer to the remaining articles in the corpus as the test set. We then employed a team of research assistants to label each article in the training set with as many topics as applicable. Next, we ran a multi-label topic model on each state-run newspaper, which assigned as many topics as

4For more, see Yengo (2006) and Clark (2007). 5Note that the “Public Goods Provision” and the “Economic Performance” labels are quite similar. The key distinction for our coding decisions is agency. For an article to be labeled “Public Goods Provision,” the government itself must be implicated in service provision. The “Economic Performance” label, by contrast, reflects the country’s general economic growth and performance in a range of sectors: poverty reduction, foreign trade and investment, agricultural productivity, and small business growth.

17 1.0

Other 0.9 0.8 0.7 Sports 0.6 0.5 Democracy and Human Rights 0.4

Law and Order 0.3 Share of ArticlesTopic by Published

0.2 Economic Performance 0.1 Public Goods Provision 0.0 26−26 23−2220 −1817 14−14 11−108 −65 2−2 −22 −66 −1010 −1414 −1818 −2222 −2626

Weeks Until/Since Election Day

Figure 2: The life cycle of propaganda topic, for autocracies. For each of the 56 elections in the dataset, we identified the six months prior to election day and the six months after election day. Next, for each of the 52 weeks within this 12 month period, we averaged the share of newspaper articles about a given topic, across all countries in the dataset. The x-axis records weeks until and since election day – with election day itself given as 0 – and the y-axis gives the share of total coverage represented by a given topic.

appropriate to each test set article.6 This multi-label modeling approach is critical, for newspaper articles routinely discuss a range of topics: public goods provision and economic performance are common pairs, as are local issues and crime. After implementing the topic model, we produced a day-level dataset that records how often topic h appears in country i’s state-run newspaper on day t. To visualize the life cycle of propaganda topics, we adapted Figure 1 in the main text by calculating the share of articles about topic h, for each of 26 weeks before and after election day,

6We used the multilabel package in Python’s sklearn module to do so. The multi-label classifier employs a linear SVC OvR model to assign as many topics as appropriate to test set articles.

18 1.0 Other 0.9 0.8

Sports 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4

Democracy and Human Rights 0.3 Share of ArticlesTopic by Published Law and Order 0.2

Economic Performance 0.1

Public Goods Provision 0.0 26−26 23−2220 −1817 14−14 11−108 −65 2−2 −22 −66 −1010 −1414 −1818 −2222 −2626

Weeks Until/Since Election Day

Figure 3: The life cycle of propaganda topic, for democracies. For each of the 56 elections in the dataset, we identified the six months prior to election day and the six months after election day. Next, for each of the 52 weeks within this 12 month period, we averaged the share of newspaper articles about a given topic, across all countries in the dataset. The x-axis records weeks until and since election day – with election day itself given as 0 – and the y-axis gives the share of total coverage represented by a given topic.

across both autocracies and democracies. The results for autocracies appear in Figure 2; the results for democracies appear in Figure 3. These descriptive statistics suggest several observations. First, although state-run newspapers in autocracies cover law and order issues considerably more than their democratic counterparts, coverage appears to decline as election day approaches. It does so, indeed, in favor of electoral coverage itself. In short, we find no evidence that autocratic propaganda apparatuses systematically issue threats during election seasons. Second, coverage of economic performance and public goods provision – topics that indicate a focus on performance legitimacy – generally receive about 20% of all coverage in autocratic propaganda apparatuses – compared with perhaps 10% for law and order issues – and that this share increases during election

19 seasons. Third, although coverage of the “political horse race” increases sharply during election seasons, political coverage still lags relative to democracies, where some 60% of all coverage during election seasons focuses on politics. This is intuitive: autocratic propaganda apparatuses serve strategic purposes, and so cover the regime’s economic performance relatively more than electoral campaigns from across the political spectrum. Finally, state-affiliated newspapers in democracies cover sports news far more often than their autocratic counterparts. This may be because state- affiliated newspapers in democracies are more often treated as businesses, which must be profitable. Sports coverage may simply attracts readers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this profitability constraint is less binding in autocracies.

6.3 Results

To probe how newspaper coverage changes during election seasons, we estimate a series of models of the form

yhit = α + β (Election Seasonit) + γi + γs + ϵ (1) where yhit gives the number of articles about topic h in country i on day t. We estimate equation

(1) for the five primary topics h that appear in Figures 2 and 3. Since the outcome variables yhit are positive counts, we employ negative binomial models. Accordingly, positive coefficient estimates represent an increase in the predicted number of articles about topic h on day t in country i. For comparison, we select the six most common topics, and then estimate a model for each. By comparing results across regime type, we can understand how state-run newspapers across regime type set coverage differently. The results appear in Table 12; the top panel gives results for autocracies, while the bottom panel gives results for democracies. The results are consistent with the theory in the main text and the descriptive statistics in Figures 2 and 3. Again, we find no evidence that autocrats systematically draw on legacies of violence to threaten their populations during election seasons. As expected, they are far more likely to address themes of democracy and participation, from Model 2, as well as economic performance related words, from Model 3. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that discussion of public goods related terms actually declines during election seasons.

20 Table 12: Election Seasons and Propaganda: Coverage Topic

Coverage Topics in Autocracies Law and Democracy Economic Public Goods Sports Nationalism Order Performance Provision Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Day Level Variables Election Season -0.091 1.315∗∗ 0.104∗ -0.290∗∗ -0.009 -0.742 (0.059) (0.050) (0.047) (0.064) (0.035) (0.645) Election Day -0.465† 2.093∗∗ 0.186 -0.278 -0.028 -17.435 (0.265) (0.196) (0.180) (0.260) (0.140) (7,872.218) Post-Election Season -0.213∗∗ 1.154∗∗ -0.314∗∗ -0.079 -0.279∗∗ -0.722 (0.062) (0.052) (0.055) (0.060) (0.038) (0.646) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 32,721 32,721 32,721 32,721 32,721 32,721 † ∗ ∗∗ 21 Significance levels: : 10% : 5% : 1%

Coverage Topics in Democracies Law and Democracy Economic Public Goods Sports Nationalism Order Performance Provision Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Day Level Variables Election Season -0.074 1.102∗∗ 0.306∗∗ -0.008 -0.139∗∗ 0.194 (0.146) (0.049) (0.111) (0.099) (0.054) (0.695) Election Day 0.722 0.810∗∗ -0.220 -18.527 -0.672† -16.161 (0.464) (0.291) (0.640) (3,102.317) (0.404) (8,352.059) Post-Election Season 0.183 0.925∗∗ -0.179 -0.117 -0.153∗∗ 0.150 (0.124) (0.050) (0.126) (0.103) (0.053) (0.689) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 14,493 14,493 14,493 14,493 14,493 14,493 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% 7 Evidence of Performance Legitimacy: Tone of Economic Cover- age

The results in Table 12 suggest that coverage of economic performance increases somewhat during election seasons, though not public goods provision. To understand whether performance legitimacy propaganda increases during election seasons, however, it may be more appropriate to focus on how autocratic propaganda apparatuses cover the regime’s economic performance, rather than simply its volume. Accordingly, to determine whether the tone of economic coverage changes during election seasons, we employ the same concordance method that we used to create our measures of Positive Coverageit,

Positive Coverage Standardizedit, and Referencesit, described in Section 3.2. Now, rather than treat the names of prominent politicians in country i as identifiers, we employ a list of terms related to economic performance and public goods. These appear in Table 13. We focus on the sorts of major public works projects that governments often regards as their signature programs, and that clearly signal appeals to performance legitimacy: roads, hospitals, schools, ports, and electrifica- tion, among others. Then, we used the Harvard General Inquirer linguistic dictionary to measure the tone – either positive or negative – of the surrounding 20 words. The resulting variable,

Positive Coverage: Economyit records the number of positive words surrounding each economic identifier, less critical words, on day t in country i.

Table 13: Economic and Public Goods Identifiers

English French Economic Public Goods Economic Public Goods economy education économie éducation development school développement formation growth electricity croissance école trade water échange électricité exports infrastructure exportations eau imports road importations infrastructure agriculture airport agriculture route investment seaport investissement aéroport finance ICT finance port natural resources hospital ressources naturelles communication employment clinic emploi hôpital unemployment medical chômage clinique poverty medicine pauvreté médical business health entreprise médicament manufacturing fabrication santé commerce

22 To probe this more systematically, we estimate a series of models of the form

| yit Regime Type, Political Classit = α + β1 (Election Seasonit)

+κXit + γi + ϵ (2)

The results appear in Tables 14 through 17; Tables 14 and 15 focus on autocracies, while Tables 16 and 17 focus on democracies. We find substantial evidence that autocrats employ performance legitimacy propaganda atfar higher rates during election seasons. From Models 1 and 4 in Table 12, the tone of public goods coverage increases dramatically. Importantly, this is not because references to public goods related words increase, as Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 make clear. Rather, from Models 2 and 5, references themselves to public goods related terms are considerably more positive. It is unclear whether state-affiliated newspapers in democracies exhibit this pattern. Models 1 and 2 inTable 14 suggest no similar increase during election seasons, while Models 4 and 5 – which employ only a third of the number of observations as Models 1 and 2 – suggest they might.

23 Table 14: Election Seasons and Public Goods Coverage: Autocracies

Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate 0.408 0.005 0.616 (0.471) (0.006) (0.502) ln Per Capita GDP 44.840∗∗ -0.629∗∗ 59.744∗∗ (14.946) (0.198) (15.925) Oil Supply -0.028∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.042∗∗ (0.012) (0.0002) (0.013) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 15,153 14,726 15,153 6,641 6,548 6,641 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season 10.818 0.108 5.033 10.540 0.221 -0.994 (4.39, 17.25) (0.03, 0.18) (-1.80, 11.87) (2.48, 18.60) (0.11, 0.33) (-9.58, 7.59) Table 15: Election Seasons and Economic Performance Coverage: Autocracies

Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate 1.603∗ 0.008 1.563∗∗ (0.645) (0.006) (0.551) ln Per Capita GDP 97.814∗∗ -0.485∗ 106.927∗∗ (20.466) (0.200) (17.457) Oil Supply -0.064∗∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.074∗∗ (0.017) (0.0002) (0.014) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 15,153 14,522 15,153 6,641 6,484 6,641 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season 6.730 0.033 17.837 4.818 0.087 1.079 (-1.37, 14.83) (-0.04, 0.11) (10.44, 25.24) (-6.22, 15.85) (-0.02, 0.20) (-8.33, 10.49) Table 16: Election Seasons and Public Goods Coverage: Democracies

Baseline Models Full Models Positive Coverage Standardized References Positive Coverage Standardized References Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Day Level Variables Election Season 3.647 0.059 -17.809∗∗ 20.728∗∗ 0.138∗∗ -1.306 (3.201) (0.046) (5.145) (4.924) (0.052) (6.835) Election Day -12.114 0.050 -36.569 -25.181 -0.309 -89.425† (15.182) (0.216) (24.402) (38.029) (0.405) (52.782) Post-Election Season -11.777∗∗ -0.012 -20.747∗∗ -2.524 0.026 -9.537 (3.159) (0.046) (5.077) (4.994) (0.054) (6.931) ∗ † † Protestt−1 -4.905 -0.046 -6.105 (2.286) (0.024) (3.172) † Repressiont−1 17.129 0.023 61.791 (26.977) (0.287) (37.442) 26 Civil War Event: Statet−1 3.895 0.058 -10.869 (13.607) (0.145) (18.886) Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate -7.973∗∗ -0.020 -19.720∗∗ (1.269) (0.014) (1.761) ln Per Capita GDP 472.833∗∗ -2.138∗ 1,362.975∗∗ (80.780) (0.862) (112.116) Oil Supply -3.743 -0.132∗∗ 7.885 (3.852) (0.041) (5.346) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 6,351 6,171 6,351 2,223 2,208 2,223 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season 3.647 0.059 -17.809 20.728 0.138 -1.306 (-2.63, 9.92) (-0.03, 0.15) (-27.89, -7.72) (11.08, 30.38) (0.04, 0.24) (-14.70, 12.09) Table 17: Election Seasons and Economic Performance Coverage: Democracies

Baseline Models Full Models Positive Coverage Standardized References Positive Coverage Standardized References Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Day Level Variables Election Season -15.307∗∗ -0.006 -16.706∗∗ -4.649 -0.018 -6.870 (5.081) (0.052) (4.873) (7.844) (0.054) (7.139) Election Day -29.499 0.093 -35.344 -54.041 -68.860 (24.098) (0.311) (23.112) (60.581) (55.134) Post-Election Season -14.313∗∗ 0.004 -18.100∗∗ -5.957 0.002 -12.693† (5.014) (0.051) (4.808) (7.955) (0.055) (7.240) ∗ ∗∗ Protestt−1 -7.201 -0.004 -8.761 (3.641) (0.025) (3.313) Repressiont−1 24.337 0.109 22.106 (42.974) (0.294) (39.110) 27 Civil War Event: Statet−1 2.397 0.117 -9.405 (21.676) (0.148) (19.727) Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate -7.449∗∗ -0.009 -8.207∗∗ (2.021) (0.014) (1.839) ln Per Capita GDP 1,021.556∗∗ 1.201 1,031.112∗∗ (128.682) (0.881) (117.112) Oil Supply 11.267† -0.049 16.235∗∗ (6.136) (0.042) (5.584) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 6,351 6,180 6,351 2,223 2,213 2,223 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season -15.307 -0.006 -16.706 -4.649 -0.018 -6.870 (-25.27, -5.35) (-0.11, 0.10) (-26.26, -7.16) (-20.02, 10.73) (-0.12, 0.09) (-20.86, 7.12) 8 Alternative Explanation: The Timing of Elections and “Good News”

The results in the main text are consistent with another alternative mechanism as well. Many executives – autocratic and democratic alike – are able to determine election dates. If autocrats can schedule elections when good news is more likely, then more positive coverage during election seasons may reflect reality rather than bias. Similarly, autocrats may schedule the releaseof favorable economic indicators to coincide with elections. In both cases, more positive coverage during election seasons may reflect genuine good news, rather than biased, pro-regime coverage. To ensure that this possibility is not driving the results above, we created a day-level measure of genuinely positive news coverage about country’s i executive, as well as its opposition, drawn from newspapers around the world. We create this Good Newsit variable much as we did

Positive Coverageit. For each country i, we manually downloaded from Lexis Nexis every article that references country i from the world’s news organizations of record. We identified 28 such news sources, which appear in Table 18. Then, for each article in the corpus, we identified every mention of country i’s executive or his ruling political party, as well as country i’s opposition; as above, we refer to these proper nouns as identifiers. Next, we extracted the 20 words surrounding each identifier. Using standard semantic dictionaries, we measured how fulsome or critical arethese20 words. The resulting Good Newsit variable, we believe, is as close to an objective measure of daily “good news” as currently exists. By controlling for daily good news, we can be more confident that the estimated effect of Election Seasonit does not simply reflect the potentially higher rate of actual good news during election seasons.

Table 18: Corpus of Global Newspapers of Record

Al Jazeera English AllAfrica.com BBC Monitoring International New York Times Newsweek Oil and Gas Journal Oil Daily Petroleum Economist The Standard (UK) The Telegraph (UK) The Mirror (UK) The Christian Science Monitor The Courier Mail (Australia) The Daily Mail (UK) The Evening Standard (UK) The Globe and Mail (Canada) The Washington Post The Toronto Star IRIN UN News Service USA Today Wall Street Journal Agence France Presse Associated Press CNN News Bites – Africa PR Newswire Africa United Press International

To assess the plausibility of our good news measure, we estimate a pair of bivariate regressions. Model 1 in Table 19 confirms that, for state-run newspapers in autocracies, positive coverage of the executive is strongly correlated with positive coverage in the world’s newspapers of record. This is unsurprising. When there are legitimately positive developments in the world’s autocracies,

28 autocratic propaganda apparatuses cover them accordingly. By contrast, Model 1 in Table 20 shows that there is no correlation between positive coverage of opposition leaders in autocratic propaganda apparatuses and the world’s newspapers of record. Table 19 reestimates the statistical models from the main text for pro-regime coverage in autocracies; Table 20 does so for opposition coverage in autocracies. They are virtually identical to the results in the main text. In short, our results are not driven by autocrats’ ability to strategically schedule elections when good news is more likely, or to release good news when politically advantageous. We note, however, that insofar as autocrats might time elections to coincide with genuine good news – or might time the release of good news to coincide with elections – the results in the main text suggest that autocrats refrain from providing similarly positive coverage outside of election seasons. This behavior, therefore, would be consistent with our theory in the main text. Autocrats cultivate reputations for neutrality outside election seasons so that they can manipulate citizens’ beliefs during election seasons and other politically sensitive moments.

29 Table 19: Election Seasons and Pro-Regime Coverage: Baseline and Full Models with Good News Variable

Positive Coverage Positive Coverage Standardized References Positive Coverage Standardized References Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Day Level Variables Election Season 20.875∗∗ -0.075 28.786∗∗ 21.283∗∗ -0.131 32.892∗∗ (1.898) (0.070) (1.787) (2.584) (0.092) (2.328) Election Day 19.506∗∗ -0.218 30.147∗∗ 5.259 -0.442 27.672∗∗ (7.201) (0.264) (6.779) (8.934) (0.319) (8.047) Post-Election Season 10.226∗∗ -0.116† 14.903∗∗ 1.822 -0.148† 4.479∗ (1.900) (0.070) (1.789) (2.435) (0.087) (2.193) Good News 0.146∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.001† 0.027 (0.014) (0.014) (0.001) (0.013) (0.020) (0.001) (0.018) ∗ ∗∗ Protestt−1 -3.128 0.006 -4.146 (1.572) (0.056) (1.416) ∗ Repressiont−1 -1.389 0.112 -8.006 30 (3.983) (0.142) (3.588) Civil War Event: Statet−1

Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate 0.085 0.002 0.314 (0.308) (0.011) (0.277) ln Per Capita GDP -5.370 -0.638∗ -2.691 (8.696) (0.311) (7.833) Oil Supply 0.461 -0.019 0.944† (0.560) (0.020) (0.504) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 10,868 10,868 10,868 10,868 5,650 5,650 5,650 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season 0.146 20.875 -0.075 28.786 21.283 -0.131 32.892 (0.12, 0.17) (17.16, 24.60) (-0.21, 0.06) (25.28, 32.29) (16.22, 26.35) (-0.31, 0.05) (28.33, 37.45) Table 20: Election Seasons and Opposition Coverage: Baseline and Full Models with Good News Variable

Positive Coverage Positive Coverage Standardized References Positive Coverage Standardized References Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Day Level Variables Election Season 3.314∗∗ -0.005 17.045∗∗ 6.134∗∗ 0.034 16.351∗∗ (0.404) (0.057) (1.296) (0.577) (0.079) (1.885) Election Day 1.131 0.117 24.349∗∗ 2.931 0.169 24.005∗∗ (1.532) (0.218) (4.917) (1.997) (0.274) (6.520) Post-Election Season 0.384 -0.135∗ 13.241∗∗ 0.181 -0.102 4.179∗ (0.404) (0.058) (1.298) (0.544) (0.075) (1.776) Good News 0.003 0.002 0.001∗ 0.009 -0.009∗ -0.00003 -0.025† (0.003) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.014) ∗ † Protestt−1 -0.748 -0.031 -2.121 (0.348) (0.048) (1.138) Repressiont−1 -0.361 -0.092 0.944 31 (0.991) (0.136) (3.235) Civil War Event: Statet−1

Country Level Variables Internet Penetration Rate 0.052 -0.001 -0.384† (0.069) (0.009) (0.224) ln Per Capita GDP -4.473∗ -0.072 -12.203† (1.943) (0.266) (6.343) Oil Supply 0.016 0.017 -0.051 (0.125) (0.017) (0.408) Country Level Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed N 10,868 10,868 10,868 10,868 5,650 5,650 5,650 Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

Marginal effect of Election Seasonit = 1 (with 95% confidence intervals) Election Season 0.003 3.314 -0.005 17.045 6.134 0.034 16.351 (0.00, 0.01) (2.52, 4.11) (-0.12, 0.11) (14.50, 19.59) (5.00, 7.27) (-0.12, 0.19) (12.66, 20.05) 9 Regression Discontinuity Framework

Readers may observe that our use of election seasons bears some resemblance to a regression discontinuity (RD) research design. There are, of course, significant differences. RD frameworks require some forcing variable, which “forces” units on either side of a cutpoint into treatment and control groups. In our case, there is no such forcing variable, since election seasons are neither temporally well defined nor exogenously determined. Still, as a robustness check, we can adapt the RD framework by treating election day itself as a natural cutpoint. Then, we can fit loess smoothers to various outcomes of interest on either side of election day: both in the days before voting begins and after voting concludes. Next, we can compare whether election day marks a discontinuity in these fitted smoothers, for autocracies and democracies alike.

Figures 4 through 6 present the results graphically. Figure 4 focuses on Positive Coverageit for the regime and the opposition in both autocracies and democracies. The x-axes record the number of days either before or after election day, while the y-axes measure the predicted level of aggregate positive coverage on a given day t. The shaded gray area gives 95% confidence intervals. As expected, we find a large discontinuity at election day for pro-regime coverage in autocracies.

As the election approaches, predicted levels of Positive Coverageit rise dramatically: indeed, by some 250%. In no other case do we find a discontinuous break.

Figure 5 reports a similar series of graphics for Referencesit. Again, the results are similar to those in the main text. Autocratic propaganda apparatuses references both the executive and the opposition considerably more as election day approaches, though the magnitude of the effect is far larger for the executive. State-affiliated newspapers in democracies exhibit much weaker trends.

Figure 6 reports the same graphics for Positive Coverage Standardizedit. As in the main text, though positive coverage of the autocrat and the number of references to the autocrat increase during election seasons in autocracies, the per reference tone does not change. In short, all results are substantively identical.

32 Autocracies: Executive Democracies: Executive 50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

Positive Coverage Positive 10 Coverage Positive 10

0 0 −200 0 200 −200 0 200 Days Until/Since Election Days Until/Since Election

Autocracies: Opposition Democracies: Opposition 50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

Positive Coverage Positive 10 Coverage Positive 10

0 0 −200 0 200 −200 0 200 Days Until/Since Election Days Until/Since Election

Figure 4: Fitted loess smoothers for Positive Coverageit as a function of days until or since the election. We treat election day itself as a cutpoint. The gray areas give 95% confidence intervals.

33 Autocracies: Executive Democracies: Executive

60 60

40 40

20 20 Number of References Number of References

0 0 −200 0 200 −200 0 200 Days Until/Since Election Days Until/Since Election

Autocracies: Opposition Democracies: Opposition

60 60

40 40

20 20 Number of References Number of References

0 0 −200 0 200 −200 0 200 Days Until/Since Election Days Until/Since Election

Figure 5: Fitted loess smoothers for Referencesit as a function of days until or since the election. We treat election day itself as a cutpoint. The gray areas give 95% confidence intervals.

34 Autocracies: Executive Democracies: Executive 2.0 2.0

1.5 1.5

1.0 1.0

0.5 0.5

Positive Coverage Standardized Coverage Positive 0.0 Standardized Coverage Positive 0.0 −200 0 200 −200 0 200 Days Until/Since Election Days Until/Since Election

Autocracies: Opposition Democracies: Opposition 2.0 2.0

1.5 1.5

1.0 1.0

0.5 0.5

Positive Coverage Standardized Coverage Positive 0.0 Standardized Coverage Positive 0.0 −200 0 200 −200 0 200 Days Until/Since Election Days Until/Since Election

Figure 6: Fitted loess smoothers for Positive Coverage Standardizedit as a function of days until or since the election. We treat election day itself as a cutpoint. The gray areas give 95% confidence intervals.

35 10 Newspaper Summaries

This section presents background information about each of the 24 newspapers in our sample.

Burkina Faso: Sidwaya was the official state-run newspaper under the Blaise Compaoré regime. It is published by Éditions Sideway, a state owned enterprise. It circulates widely in Ougadagou and competes primarily with L’Observateur Paalga, an independent newspaper that was founded in 1974 and, by some accounts, is the most widely read newspaper in the country. Sidwaya also publishes an edition in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, that targets the Burkinabé diaspora.7 We obtained Sidwaya from Lexis Nexis.

Cameroon: The Cameroon Tribune is the state-owned newspaper for the Paul Biya regime. Reflect- ing Cameroon’s linguistic divide, it is published in both English and French. We employ the French version because there are more French speakers than English speakers in Cameroon. Nonetheless, our results are robust to using the English version. It was founded in 1974 and has a daily print run of roughly 30,000 copies. Since 2001 it has been printed in color. It maintains an extensive online presence, from which we obtained our country corpus. The paper is based in Yaoundé, the capital, but circulates widely in Douala, the economic capital, and major secondary cities.8

Cote d’Ivoire: Fraternité Matin is the state-owned newspaper in Cote d’Ivoire. It was founded in 1964 by the country’s first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Laurent Gbagbo, who held power between 2000 and 2011, toyed with privatizing Fraternité Matin around 2004, but ultimately decided not to. With a daily print run of roughly 25,000, Fraternité Matin dominates the Ivoirian print journalist landscape and circulates widely in Abidjan. Under Gbagbo, Fraternité Matin acquired a reputation for frequently criticizing the government. As often occurs, Alassane Ouattara appointed a new director upon taking power in 2011.9 We obtained our corpus from Fraternité Matin’s online archives.

Djibouti: La Nation was founded in 1977 and is the state-owned newspaper under the Islaim Omar Guelleh regime. It is Djibouti’s only widely circulated daily newspaper, although opposition political parties are permitted to circulate a journal or newspaper.10 La Nation is published in Djibouti town, where it circulates widely. La Nation maintains a professional online website, from which we obtained our country corpus.11

7For more, see http://www.agenceecofin.com/presse-ecrite/0607-30376-burkina-faso-le-journal-d-etat- sidwaya-arrive-en-cote-d-ivoire-avec-une-application-mobile-et-2-sites-web, http://news.abidjan.net/ h/558961.html, and http://www.burkina-faso.ca/liste-des-journaux-et-medias-de-la-presse-ecrite-au- burkina-faso/. 8For more, see http://crtv.cm/fr/latest-news/top-news-24/cameroon-tribune-new-look-goes-fully- operational--17331.htm. 9For more, see https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fraternit_Matin#cite_note-ci-1. 10See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/djibouti. 11See http://www.lanationdj.com/.

36 Eritrea: Hadas Shabait is a state-run news news agency operated by Isaias Afeworki’s Ministry of Information.12 It is Eritrea’s only Tigrinya language newspaper, and appears to be the country’s only legally circulated news organ as well. It is published in Asmara. Hadas Shabait maintains an online website, which publishes English translations of its Tigrinya content.13 Note that Hadas Shabait is the only newspaper that we include in our corpus in which news articles are translated from the population’s primary language; our results are not sensitive to omitting the Hadas Shabait corpus.

Gambia: The Daily Observer is the state-owned newspaper under the Yahya Jammeh regime. It was founded in 1992 by Kenneth Best, a Liberian, who was critical of the democratic government led by Dawda Jawara. After Jammeh seized power in 1994, Best was incarcerated and then deported to Liberia. In 1999 he was forced to sell The Daily Observer to one of Jammeh’s closest allies, rendering it effectively state-controlled.14 Given the opacity of financial arrangements, it may be partly owned by Jammeh himself. It remains Gambia’s only daily newspaper and is circulated widely in Banjul, the capital. Although there are several other prominent newspapers in Gambia, all are effectively censored by the regime. The Daily Observer maintains a relatively high quality online archive, from which we obtained our country corpus.

Ghana: Ghanaian Times is a government-owned daily newspaper published in Accra. It was founded in 1957 by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president, as The Guinea Press Limited. It served as a printing press for his Convention People’s Party, and, after he was deposed in a military coup in 1966, it was taken over by the new government. In 1971 it was rebranded as the New Times Corporation. The Ghanaian Times now boasts a daily circulation of 80,000 copies.15 Ghana’s print newspaper industry is extremely vibrant, and so the Ghanaian Times confronts significant competition for readers.16

Guinea: Guinea’s media environment is “not free,” according to Freedom House. Defaming government officials and reporting falsehoods are criminal offenses. Most media outlets areowned by the state. We draw from Aminata, an online newspaper. We chose this over the print-based Horoya, also government-owned, because Horoya has a very small distribution and prints only a few hundred to a few thousand copies per day. Aminata is published in French, which is the official language of Guinea and is used in government and business.

Libya: JANA, short for the Jamahiriya News Agency, was the official state news agency under

12See http://www.shabait.com/eritrea-haddas. 13See http://www.shabait.com. 14See The Historical Dictionary of Gambia, page 60. See also http://www.panapress.com/Gambia-- Senior-journalist-of-state-owned-newspaper-sacked--12-630420382-42-lang2-index.html and Delayed Democracy: How Press Freedom Collapsed in Gambia, p33. 15See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghanaian_Times. 16See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_newspapers_in_Ghana.

37 Muammar Gaddafi. When Gaddafi’s government fell in 2011, it was rebranded as the Libyan News Agency, or LANA, though it remains state-run. As a government press agency, JANA/LANA produces content for the state-owned daily newspapers. JANA/LANA posts this content on a well maintained online archive, all in Arabic, and publishes English translations alongside. JANA/LANA releases those English translations to Lexis Nexis as well.17

Madagascar: La Vérité was founded in May 2008 by a group of longtime Malagasy journalists, with financing from Mamy Ravatomanga, a prominent Malagasy businessman.18 Ravatomanga has been described as an “unwavering supporter [of] and unofficial advisor” to former president Andry Rajoelina, who was in power between 2009 and 2014. Under Rajoelina, Ravatomanga emerged as among Madagascar’s most successful businessman. He regularly appeared in public with Rajoelina, and it was widely understood that La Vérité served as the government’s mouthpiece.19 In 2013, when Rajoelina chose not to compete in the 2014 elections, Ravatomanga prevailed on Rajoelina to select Hajo Andrianainarivelo, then Deputy Prime Minister, as his successor.20 Andrianainarivelo won, and Ravatomanga remained a close advisor until 2016.21 One of several prominent newspapers in Madagascar, La Vérité circulates widely in Antananarivo, the capitals, but faces stiff competition for readers.22

Malawi: The Nation was founded in July 1993 by Aleke Banda, a prominent ally of Hastings Kumuzu Banda, who was deposed in 1994. The Nation became a daily newspaper in 1994, and it sought primarily to argue against multiparty democracy and in favor of ongoing rule by the Malawi Congress Party. When Bakili Muluzi was elected president in 1994, he appointed Aleke Banda to his cabinet, where he remained until Bingu wa Mutharika’s election in 2004. At that point, The Nation became an opposition newspaper, and for years Bingu wa Mutharika refused to permit state owned agencies to advertise in its pages.23 Under Joyce Banda, Binga wa Mutharika’s successor, The Nation remained an opposition newspaper. This changed, however, in 2013, when Aleke Banda’s son, Thoko, warmly endorsed Joyce Banda’s opponent, Peter Mutharika, for president.24 Since then, The Nation has been reliably pro-government. Malawi’s media landscape is vibrant, and The Nation competes with The Daily Times, owned by Blantyre Newspapers Limited, and Nyasa

17For more, see http://www.lana-news.ly/ara and http://www.lana-news.ly/eng. See the BBC’s summary of the fluid Libyan media landscape at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13754900. 18https://www.madonline.com/la-verite-un-nouveau-journal-est-ne/. 19Even the US State Department took note; see the 2012 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204349.pdf. 20See http://www.midi-madagasikara.mg/a-la-une/2016/01/18/andry-rajoelina-cest-mamy-ravatomanga-qui- ma-presente-hery-rajaonarimampianina/. 21http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160527-madagascar-perquisition-president-transition-mamy-ravatomanga. 22https://www.africaintelligence.com/insiders/ION/MADAGASCAR/2013/02/04/mamy-ravatomanga-businessman -and-eminence-grise/107942896-BE1. 23http://www.icfj.org/blogs/presidential-celebration-malawi-does-little-help-struggling-newspaper. 24http://www.nyasatimes.com/alekes-son-thoko-banda-endorses-mutharika-chilima-ticket/.

38 Times.25

Mali: L’Essor was founded in 1949 by the Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US-RDA), a political party demanding independence from France. After the military coup in 1968, L’Essor became the government’s official daily newspaper, a status it has retained since. Afterthe transition to democracy in 1991, L’Essor was transferred to a new government owned printing and distribution house, managed by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Published in Bamako, the capital, L’Essor is among the few newspaper that circulates widely in secondary cities and some rural areas. With some 15 daily newspapers, Mali’s press landscape is intensely competitive. Indeed, the government appears to foster this competition by subsidizing all newspapers, without regard for editorial line. A range of press organizations has praised L’Essor for its journalistic integrity.26

Morocco: Agence Marocaine de Presse, also known as the Maghreb Arab Press,27 is one of two official government organs; the other, Al-Anbaa, is an Arabic daily newspaper. Founded in 1959, the Agence Marocaine de Presse was nationalized in 1973 and has remained under government control since. The government dominates the media landscape, and maintains two semi-official daily newspapers as government organs: Assahra Al Maghribia and Le Matin. The Agence Marocaine de Presse provides content to the government’s various news outlets, which circulate widely throughout the country, and especially in the primary cities of Rabat, Casablanca, Fez, and Marrakech. It employs some 300 journalists and maintains 23 national offices and 21 international offices.28 Self- cenorship remains widespread, though in recent years the number of independent daily newspapers has grown dramatically.29

Namibia: New Era was founded in 1991, as Namibia claimed independence from South Africa. Owned by the government, it has appeared daily since 2004. One of five daily newspapers, it circulates widely in Windhoek, as well as Namibia’s secondary cities. Although New Era is subject to considerable political pressure, Freedom House reports that “independent newspapers usually operate without official interference.”30 New Era maintains an extensive online archive, reflecting the rapidly rising internet penetration rates across Namibia’s urban areas.

25For more, see https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-africa-2008- malawi.pdf and http://www.pressreference.com/Ky-Ma/Malawi.html. 26For more, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%27Essor, http://archive.ec/PiUka, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-africa-2008-mali.pdf, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-africa-2009-mali.pdf, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-africa-2012-mali.pdf. 27http://www.agenceecofin.com/medias/1105-28852-l-agence-de-presse-marocaine-map-ferme-son-bureau- en-algerie-a-cause-des-entraves-au-travail and http://www.map.ma/en/Home. 28http://lavieeco.com/news/societe/maghreb-arabe-presse-50-ans-et-800-depeches-chaque-jour-16263.html. 29https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_of_Morocco. 30https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/namibia.

39 Rwanda: The New Times was founded in 1995, just after the 1994 genocide and subsequent fighting ended. Although The New Times claims to be privately owned, in 2009 Human Rights Watch uncovered evidence that it was effectively state-owned, with the paper’s ownership shares held by either Paul Kagame himself or a close ally.31 Published daily in Kigali, The New Times dominates Rwanda’s media landscape, and is the only newspaper to circulate throughout Rwandan territory. Kigali invests considerable effort in obscuring The New Times’ ownership. In 2010 he claimed that The New Times was too praiseworthy of him, and publicly asked Aga Khan to establish a competitor.32 The New Times maintains an extensive online archive.

Senegal: Le Soleil was founded in 1933 as Paris-Dakar, a weekly newspaper that served French employees of the colonial government. In 1936 it became the first daily newspaper in Sub-Saharan Africa. When Senegal claimed independence from France in 1960, the newspaper rebranded itself as Dakar-Matin, and in 1970 it became Le Soleil. Since then, Le Soleil has served as the government’s chief mouthpiece. Senegal’s media landscape is among the African continent’s most vibrant. As a result, Le Soleil competes for readers with a range of independent daily newspapers. Still, it circulates widely in Dakar and Senegal’s secondary cities. Le Soleil maintains an extensive online archive.

Swaziland: The Swazi Observer was founded in 1981 and is owned by Tibiyo TakaNgwane, a company fully held by the royal family of Swaziland. The Swazi Observer is published daily in Mbabane, the capital, and circulates widely throughout the country. It competes with the Times of Swaziland, the ownership of which remains unclear. Indeed, the royal family dominates the media landscape, and The Swazi Observer is routinely accused by foreign news sources of pro-monarchy bias.33 The Swazi Observer maintains an extensive online archive.

Tunisia: La Presse was founded in 1934 by Henri Smadja, a French Tunisian doctor and lawyer. Tunisia claimed independence from France in 1956, and in 1967 the state nationalized La Presse and deported Smadja. Published daily in Tunis, La Presse quickly became the chief propaganda outlet for Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime. During the Arab Spring protests in 2010 and 2011, as Ben Ali’s regime collapsed, La Presse’s journalists mounted an internal coup against the newspaper’s handpicked directors. One journalist said: “It is essential that this takes place here as it is taking place elsewhere. We had let down our readers for many years, we had failed in our duty as journalists. How many important stories have been buried? How much truth has been replaced by lies? Look what happened to the story of Mohamed Bouazizi.”34 In 2012, a year after Ben Ali’s fall, La Presse’s journalists held an election among themselves to select the newspaper’s new editors in

31See https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/18/response-new-times-article-rwandan-genocide. 32http://www.economist.com/node/16750119. 33See http://allafrica.com/stories/201606160922.html. 34See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/tunisian-media-throw-off-censors-shackles- after-decades-of-fear-and-collaboration-2189241.html.

40 chief and editorial board. Since then, the newspaper has been widely praised for its journalistic integrity. As it did during Ben Ali’s reign, La Presse dominates Tunisia’s media landscape, with a daily circulation reaching some 83,000 copies. La Presse has maintained an extensive online archive since the early 2000s.35

Uganda: New Vision was founded in 1955 as the Uganda Argus, a publication of the British colonial government. It was inherited by Uganda’s post-independence government. In 1971, when Idi Amin claimed power, the newspaper was renamed Voice of Uganda. When Amin was deposed in 1979, the newspaper was again rebranded, this time to Uganda Times. When Yoweri Museveni seized power in 1986, the newspaper became New Vision. Published daily in Kampala, New Vision is one of Uganda’s two daily newspapers, and circulates relatively widely throughout the country. It is majority owned by the government, but the balance of its shares – roughly 47% – are traded on the Uganda Securities Exchange.36 Although the government claims to respect press freedom, New Vision is clearly subject to government pressure, and a series of editors in chief have resigned in recent years in protest.37 New Vision maintains an extensive online archive.

Zambia: The Times of Zambia was founded during Zambia’s colonial era as the Copperbelt Times. In the 1960s and 1970s, under South African ownership, The Times of Zambia acquired a reputation for government criticism. In response, Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party seized the newspaper in 1975. When the Movement for Multiparty Democracy came to power in 1991 following the democratic transition, Frederick Chiluba transferred ownership of The Times of Zambia to the government. Since then, it has served as the state’s official mouthpiece, although its editorial line is generally regarded as reasonably independent. Published daily, The Times of Zambia circulates widely in Lusaka, as well as Zambia’s secondary cities. Zambia’s media landscape is vibrant, and so The Times of Zambia confronts substantial competition for readers.38 The Times of Zambia maintains a significant online archive.

Zimbabwe: The Herald was founded in 1891 by William Ernest Fairbridge, a British South African. Originally dubbed the Mashonaland Herald and Zambesian Times, in 1892 it became The Rhodesia Herald. When Zimbabwe claimed independence in 1981, the government purchased The Herald with a $20m grant from Nigeria, and established the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust. Since Mugabe ascended to power, The Herald has been widely criticized for its heavily pro-regime slant. The Herald confronts little domestic competition, since Mugabe’s regime has severely restricted press freedom in Zimbabwe. Published daily in Harare, The Herald circulates throughout the country.39

35https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Presse_de_Tunisie. See also Media in Egypt and Tunisia: From Control to Transition? and http://carnegieendowment.org/files/tunisian_media.pdf. 36https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Vision. 37http://allafrica.com/stories/200610270188.html. 38https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Times_of_Zambia. 39https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Herald_(Zimbabwe) and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_of_ Zimbabwe.

41 China: The People’s Daily is the leading state-owned newspaper in China. It was founded in 1946. It has a daily circulation of 3 to 4 million. It is directly controlled by Party leadership, a tradition dating to the 1940s when it was managed by Mao Zedong’s secretary, Hu Qiaomu. The newspaper prints government viewpoints that, particularly when presented in editorial format, are viewed as authoritative by domestic and foreign observers. It maintains an extensive online presence, from which we obtained our country corpus. The newspaper is based in Beijing. It circulates throughout China and to a lesser extent, worldwide.40 Though the Party maintains several print-based propaganda outlets, including the Global Times (which tends to be more nationalist), PLA Daily (which targets a military audience), Communist Youth Daily (which targets a younger audience), and Xinhua (a news agency that develops content for all of the above), the People’s Daily is widely accepted as the most authoritative.

Malaysia: Malaysia has a diverse and multi-lingual media environment. This reflects the Malaysian population, which is 50% Malay, 23% Chinese, 11% Indian, and 11% indigenous. The state has increased its control over the media in recent years. Most newspapers are owned by the government or by one of the parties in the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition.41 Newspapers must renew their permit to publish annually. The two main English-language newspapers are the Star and the New Straits Times. The Star is majority owned by the Chinese Malaysian Association, which is a member of the ruling coalition.42 The New Straits Times is owned by the Media Prima Group, which in turn is owned by Malaysia’s largest political party, the United Malays National Organisation.43 We drew from the Star because it is Malaysia’s most popular English-language newspaper, with a daily circulation of 250,000.44 The New Straits Times maintains extensive online archives.

Singapore: The Straits Times is Singapore’s most widely circulated English language newspaper. It was founded by expatriates in 1845 and is now owned by Singapore Press Holdings. Singapore’s Newspaper and Printing Presses Act of 1974 provides for government supervision of newspapers. Typically, government appointed monitors supervise newsrooms, and previous Singapore Press Holdings chairpersons have been civil servants. The former executive president, Tjong Yik Min, was the head of Singapore’s Internal Security Department between 1986 and 1993. These relation- ships, as well as Singapore’s Sedition Act and harsh defamation laws, lead Freedom House to rank Singapore’s media environment as “not free.”45 We accessed the Straits Times through Lexis Nexis.

40https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Daily 41See this guide to Malaysian media: http://www.pressreference.com/Ky-Ma/Malaysia.html 42http://medialaw2013.law.hku.hk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Malaysia.pdf 43https://info.publicintelligence.net/OSC-MalaysiaMediaGuide2009.pdf 44https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Star_(Malaysia) 45https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/singapore

42 11 Executive and Opposition Identifiers

This section presents, for each country in our sample, all identifiers that we used to create our

Positive Coverage: Executiveit and Positive Coverage: Oppositionit variables. Note that Table 1 presents a series of identifiers that we employed across countries, by language.

Table 21: General Entities Level Term English Executive president Executive head of state Executive excellency Opposition opposition leader Opposition opposition politicians Opposition opposition politician Opposition opposition parties French Executive président de la république Executive chef de l’etat Executive votre excellence Executive son excellence Executive majorité présidentielle Opposition opposition Opposition leaders de l’opposition Opposition chef de l’opposition Opposition membres de l’opposition Opposition partis de l’opposition Chinese Executive 总统 Executive 主席 Opposition 零⼋宪章 Opposition 持不同政见者

Table 22: Burkina Faso

Level Term 1 executive Blaise Compaoré 2 executive Blaise Compaore 3 executive Michel Kafando 20 opposition Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo 21 opposition ODP/MT 22 opposition Bénéwendé Stanislas Sankara 23 opposition Sankarist Democratic Front 24 opposition Front Démocratique Sankariste 25 opposition FDS

43 26 opposition Sankarist Pan-African Convention 27 opposition Convention Panafricaine Sankariste 28 opposition CPS 29 opposition Fidèle Meng-Néré Kientéga 30 opposition Inoussa Kaboré 31 opposition Convergence for Social Democracy 32 opposition Djéjouma Sanon 33 opposition Convergence pour la Démocratie Sociale 34 opposition CDS 35 opposition Union of Progressive Forces 36 opposition Philippe Ouédraogo 37 opposition Convergence of Hope 38 opposition Convergence de l’Espoir 39 opposition Norbert Tiendrébéogo 40 opposition Hermann Yaméogo 41 opposition National Union for the Defence of Democracy 42 opposition UNDD 43 opposition Group of Patriotic Democrats 44 opposition Groupe des Démocrates Patriotes 45 opposition GDP 46 opposition Issa Tiendrebéogo 47 opposition Movement for Democracy and Rebirth 48 opposition Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Renaissance 49 opposition MDR 50 opposition National Convention of Progressive Democrats 51 opposition Convention Nationale des Démocrates Progressistes 52 opposition CNDP 53 opposition National Republican Party-Right Path 54 opposition Party of Independent Forces for Development 55 opposition Patriotic Front for Change 56 opposition Front Patriotique pour le Changement 57 opposition FPC 58 opposition Union of Democrats and Independent Progressives 59 opposition Union des Démocrates et Progressistes Indépendants 60 opposition Union of Forces for Renewal 61 opposition Laurent Bado 62 opposition Ram Ouédraogo

44 63 opposition Union for Rebirth 64 opposition Sankarist Movement 65 opposition Union pour la Renaissance / Mouvement Sankariste 66 opposition UNIR/MS 67 opposition Benewende Stanislas Sankara 68 opposition Benewende Sankara 69 opposition Union for Renewal 70 opposition Party for Democracy and Progress 71 opposition Socialist Party 72 opposition Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès 73 opposition Parti Socialiste 74 opposition PDP 75 opposition PS 76 opposition Ali Lankoandé 77 opposition Social Forces Front 78 opposition Front des Forces Sociales 79 opposition FFS 80 opposition Soumane Touré 81 opposition African Independence Party 82 opposition Parti Africain de lâIndépendance 83 opposition PAI 84 opposition Touré 85 opposition Gilbert Bouda 86 opposition Burkinabé Party for Refoundation 87 opposition Pargui Emile Paré 88 opposition Socialist Alliance 89 opposition Toubé Clément Dakio 90 opposition Union for Democracy and Development 91 opposition Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Développement 92 opposition UDD 93 opposition Nayabtigungu Congo Kaboré 94 opposition Movement for Tolerance and Progress 95 opposition Mouvement pour la Tolérance et le Progrès 96 opposition MTP 97 opposition Convention for Democracy and Federation 98 opposition Convention pour la Démocratie et la Fédération 99 opposition CDF

45 100 opposition National Rebirth Party 101 opposition Parti de la Renaissance Nationale 102 opposition PAREN 103 opposition Parti pour la Concorde et le Progrès 104 opposition PCP 105 opposition Party for Democracy and Socialism 106 opposition Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme 107 opposition PDS 108 opposition Rally of Democrats for the Faso 109 opposition Rassemblement des Démocrates pour le Faso 110 opposition RDF 111 opposition Rally of the Ecologists of Burkina 112 opposition Rassemblement des Ãcologistes du Burkina 113 opposition RDEB 114 opposition Union for the Republic 115 opposition Union pour la République 116 opposition UPR 117 opposition Union of Patriots for Development 118 opposition Union des Patriotes pour le Développement 119 opposition UPD 120 opposition Alliance for Democracy and Progress 121 opposition Alliance pour la Démocratie et le Progrès 122 opposition ADP 123 opposition Party of National Reconciliation 124 opposition Parti de Réconciliation Nationale 125 opposition PRN 126 opposition Alliance for Progress and Freedom 127 opposition Alliance pour le Progrès et la Liberté 128 opposition APL 129 opposition Alliance for Rebirth, Democracy and Integration 130 opposition Alliance pour la Renaissance, la Démocratie et lâIntégration 131 opposition ARDI 132 opposition Alliance for the Defense of Democracy and Progress 133 opposition Alliance pour la Défense de la Démocratie et le Progrès 134 opposition ADDP 135 opposition Alliance of Progressive Forces 136 opposition Alliance des Forces Progressistes

46 137 opposition AFP 138 opposition Burkinabé Liberal Party 139 opposition Parti Libéral Burkinabè 140 opposition PLB 141 opposition Burkinabé Party for Refoundation 142 opposition Parti Burkinabè pour la Refondation 143 opposition PBR 144 opposition Citizens’ League of Builders 145 opposition Ligue Citoyenne des Batisseurs 146 opposition LCB 147 opposition Convention for Democracy and Freedom 148 opposition Convention pour la Démocratie et la Liberté 149 opposition CDL 150 opposition Democratic and Popular Rally 151 opposition Rassemblement Démocratique et Populaire 152 opposition RDP 153 opposition Democratic Awakening of the Masses 154 opposition Réveil Démocratique des Masses 155 opposition RDM 156 opposition Democratic Organization for the Defense of Nature 157 opposition Organisation Démocratique pour la Défense de la Nature 158 opposition ODDN 159 opposition Democratic Union of Faso 160 opposition Union Démocratique du Faso 161 opposition UDF 162 opposition Ecologist Party for the Development of Burkina 163 opposition Parti Ecologiste pour le Développement du Burkina 164 opposition PEDB 165 opposition Front for Integration and Social Development 166 opposition Front pour lâIntégration et le Développement Social 167 opposition F/IDS 168 opposition Group of Republican Democrats 169 opposition Groupe des Démocrates Républicain 170 opposition GDR 171 opposition Liberal Party of Burkina 172 opposition Parti Libéral du Burkina 173 opposition PLB

47 174 opposition Movement of Progressive Democrats 175 opposition Mouvement des Démocrates Progressistes 176 opposition MDP 177 opposition Movement of the Union of the Democratic Peasants for Progress 178 opposition Mouvement de lâUnion des Paysans Démocrates pour le Pro- grès 179 opposition M./UPDP 180 opposition National Convention for Renewal / New Era 181 opposition Convention Nationale pour le Renouveau / Ãre Nouvelle 182 opposition C.N.R./E.N. 183 opposition National Democratic Party 184 opposition Parti Démocratique National 185 opposition PDN 186 opposition National League for Democracy, the Coalized Movements for Democratic Alternance in Burkina Faso 187 opposition Ligue Nationale pour la Démocratie, les Mouvements Coalisés pour lâAlternance Démocratique au Burkina Faso 188 opposition LINAD/MOCLAD/BF 189 opposition National Patriots’ Party 190 opposition Parti National des Patriotes 191 opposition PNP 192 opposition National Salvation Front 193 opposition Front National du Salut 194 opposition FNS 195 opposition National Union for Democracy and Progress 196 opposition Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès 197 opposition UNDP 198 opposition National Union for Independence and Solidarity 199 opposition Union Nationale pour lâIndépendance et la Solidarité 200 opposition UNIS 201 opposition New Alliance Party 202 opposition PNA 203 opposition New Political Rally 204 opposition Rassemblement Politique Nouveau 205 opposition RPN 206 opposition New Social Democracy 207 opposition Nouvelle Démocratie Sociale

48 208 opposition NDS 209 opposition Organisation for Democracy and Labour 210 opposition Organisation pour la Démocratie et le Travail 211 opposition ODT 212 opposition Pan-African Movement of Faso 213 opposition Mouvement Panafricain du Faso 214 opposition MPF 215 opposition Party for National Unity and Development 216 opposition Parti pour l’Unité Nationale et le Développement 217 opposition PUND 218 opposition Party for Progress and Social Development 219 opposition Parti pour le Progrès et le Développement Social 220 opposition PPDS 221 opposition Party of Progress and for National Renewal 222 opposition Parti du Progrès pour le Renouveau National 223 opposition PPRN 224 opposition Party of the Independent Forces for Development 225 opposition Parti des Forces Indépendantes pour le Développement 226 opposition PFID 227 opposition Patriotic Movement for Renewal 228 opposition Mouvement Patriotique pour le Renouveau 229 opposition MPR 230 opposition Patriotic Movement of the Popular Front and the African Inte- gration 231 opposition Mouvement Patriotique du Front Populaire et de lâIntégration Africaine 232 opposition MPFP/IA 233 opposition Patriotic Movement of Young Democrats 234 opposition Mouvement Patriotique des Jeunes Démocrates 235 opposition MPJD 236 opposition Patriotic Rally of Faso 237 opposition Rassemblement Patriotique du Faso 238 opposition RPF 239 opposition People’s Council for Action 240 opposition Conseil du Peuple pour lâAction 241 opposition COPAC 242 opposition People’s Movement for Socialism / Federal Party

49 243 opposition Mouvement du Peuple pour le Socialisme / Parti Fédéral 244 opposition MPS/PF 245 opposition Peasants’ and Workers’ Alliance of Burkina 246 opposition Alliance des Paysans et Ouvriers du Burkina 247 opposition APOB 248 opposition Progress Party for National Renewal 249 opposition Parti du Progrès pour le Renouveau National 250 opposition PPRN 251 opposition Rally for Popular Prosperity 252 opposition Rassemblement pour la Prospérité Populaire 253 opposition GWASIFI 254 opposition RPP/GWASIGI 255 opposition Rally for the Development of Burkina 256 opposition Rassemblement pour le Développement du Burkina 257 opposition RDB 258 opposition Rally of Independent Forces / Parti des Jeunes du Burkina 259 opposition Rassemblement des Forces Indépendantes / Parti des Jeunes du Burkina 260 opposition RFI/PJD 261 opposition Rally of Republicans 262 opposition Rassemblement des Républicains 263 opposition RDR 264 opposition Refusal Front 265 opposition Front de Refus 266 opposition Republican Democratic Front 267 opposition Front Démocratique Républicain 268 opposition FDR 269 opposition Republican National Party / Just Way 270 opposition Parti National Républicain / Juste Voie 271 opposition PNR/JV 272 opposition Republican Party for Integration 273 opposition Parti Républicain pour l’Intégration 274 opposition PARI 275 opposition Social Union of Burkina 276 opposition Union Sociale du Burkina 277 opposition USB 278 opposition Socialist Peasants Party

50 279 opposition Parti Socialiste Paysan 280 opposition PSP 281 opposition Greens of Burkina 282 opposition Les Verts du Burkina 283 opposition Unified Socialist Party 284 opposition Parti Socialiste Unifié 285 opposition PSU 286 opposition Union of Democratic and Progressive Forces 287 opposition Union des Forces Démocratiques et Progressistes 288 opposition UFDP 289 opposition Union of Democratic Forces 290 opposition Union des Forces Démocratiques 291 opposition UFD 292 opposition Union of Democratic Peasants / Labour Party 293 opposition Union des Paysans Démocrates / Parti du Travail 294 opposition UPD/PT 295 opposition Union of Independent Democrats and Progressives 296 opposition Union des Démocrates et Progressistes Indépendants 297 opposition UDPI 298 opposition Union of Independent Democrats 299 opposition Union des Démocrates Indépendants 300 opposition UDI 301 opposition Union of Liberals for Democracy 302 opposition Union des Libéraux pour la Démocratie 303 opposition Union of Progressive Forces 304 opposition Union des Forces Progressistes 305 opposition UFP 306 opposition Union of Republicans 307 opposition Union des Républicains 308 opposition UDR 309 opposition Union of the Renewal Forces 310 opposition Union des Forces pour le Renouveau 311 opposition UFR 312 opposition Voltaic Revolutionary Communist Party 313 opposition Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire Voltaïque 314 opposition PCRV 315 opposition African Convention for Democracy

51 316 opposition Convention Africaine pour la Démocratie 317 opposition CAD 318 opposition Change 2005 319 opposition Alternance 2005 320 opposition Collective of Democratic Mass Organizations and Political Par- ties 321 opposition Collectif des Organisations Démocratiques de Masse et de Partis Politiques 322 opposition CODMPP 323 opposition Convention of Democratic Forces 324 opposition Convention des Forces Démocratiques 325 opposition CFD 326 opposition Coordination of Extra-parliamentary Parties 327 opposition Coordination des Partis Extra Parlementaires 328 opposition COPEP 329 opposition February 14th Group 330 opposition Group of 14 February 331 opposition Groupe du 14 Février 332 opposition G14 333 opposition United Burkinabè Opposition 334 opposition Opposition Burkinabè Unie 335 opposition OBU 336 opposition Burkinabé General Confederation of Labor 337 opposition Burkinabé Movement for Human Rights 338 opposition National Confederation of Burkinabé Workers 339 opposition National Organization of Free Unions 340 opposition Zephirin Diabre 341 opposition Party for Development and Change 342 opposition PDC 343 opposition Saran Sereme 344 opposition Youth Alliance for the Defense of the Independence of the Re- public 345 opposition Adam Kanazoe 346 opposition Union for Progress and Change 347 opposition UPC

52 Table 23: Cameroon

Level Term 1 executive Paul Biya 17 opposition Respect Unity for All African Integration 18 opposition Rufasca, Ambazonians, Southern Cameroonians 19 opposition Rufasca 20 opposition Social Democratic Front 21 opposition Front Social-Démocratique 22 opposition SDF 23 opposition FSD 24 opposition Ni John Fru Ndi 25 opposition Elizabeth Tamanjong 26 opposition Joseph Mbah Ndam 27 opposition Democratic Union of Cameroon 28 opposition Union Démocratique du Cameroun 29 opposition Cameroon Democratic Union 30 opposition Cameroonian Democratic Union 31 opposition DCU 32 opposition UDC 33 opposition CDU 34 opposition Adamou Ndam Njoya 35 opposition Union of the Peoples of Cameroon 36 opposition Union des Populations du Cameroun 37 opposition UPC 38 opposition Samuel Mack Kit 39 opposition Cameroonian Party of Democrats 40 opposition Parti des Démocrates Camerounais 41 opposition CPD 42 opposition PDC 43 opposition Jean-Jacques Ekindi 44 opposition Progressive Movement 45 opposition Mouvement Progressiste 46 opposition MP 47 opposition Alliance for Democracy and Development 48 opposition Alliance pour la Démocratie et le Développement 49 opposition ADD 50 opposition Marcel Yondo

53 51 opposition Garga Haman Adji 52 opposition Movement for the Defense of the Republic 53 opposition Mouvement pour la Défense de la République 54 opposition MDR 55 opposition Dakole Daissala 56 opposition Cameroon Reformation Party 57 opposition CRP 58 opposition Edith Kah Walla 59 opposition Alliance of Progressive Forces 60 opposition Paul Pufong

Table 24: China

Level Term 1 executive 胡锦涛 2 executive 共产党 6 opposition 陈光诚 7 opposition 艾未未 8 opposition 刘晓波 9 opposition ⾼智晟 10 opposition 冉云飞 11 opposition 谭作⼈ 12 opposition 赵连海 13 opposition 郭泉 14 opposition 新民党 15 opposition 胡佳 16 opposition 曾⾦燕 17 opposition 黃琦 18 opposition 赵紫阳 19 opposition 程建萍 20 opposition ⾼瑜 21 opposition ⾼⾏健

Table 25: Cote D’Ivoire

Level Term 1 executive Laurent Gbagbo

54 6 opposition Rally of the Republicans 7 opposition Rassemblement des Républicains 8 opposition RDR 9 opposition Alassane Ouattara 10 opposition Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire 11 opposition Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire 12 opposition Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire â African Democratic Rally 13 opposition Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire â Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 14 opposition PDCI-RDA 15 opposition PDCI 16 opposition Henri Konan Bédié 17 opposition Emile Constant Bombet 18 opposition Rally of Houphouetistes for Democracy and Peace 19 opposition Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire 20 opposition UDPCI 21 opposition Movement of the Force of the Future 22 opposition Mouvement des Forces de l’Avenir 23 opposition MFA 24 opposition Innocent Anaky 25 opposition Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire 26 opposition UDPCI 27 opposition Toikeuse Mabri 28 opposition Albert Mabri 29 opposition Union for Côte d’Ivoire 30 opposition Konan Gnamien 31 opposition Ivorian Party of Workers 32 opposition Parti ivoirien des travailleurs 33 opposition PIT 34 opposition Francis Wodié 35 opposition Socialist Union of the People 36 opposition Henri Tohou 37 opposition Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire 38 opposition MPCI 39 opposition Congress of Republican Women 40 opposition Aya Virgine Toure 41 opposition Siméon Konan

55 42 opposition Jacqueline Lohoues 43 opposition Pascal Tagoua 44 opposition Adama Dolo 45 opposition N’Douba Enoh Aka 46 opposition Félix Akoto Yao 47 opposition Union of Democrats of Côte d’Ivoire 48 opposition Union des Démocrates de Côte d’Ivoire 49 opposition UDCI

Table 26: Djibouti

Level Term 1 executive Ismail Omar Guelleh 2 executive Ismaïl Omar Guelleh 26 opposition Union for a Democratic Change 27 opposition Union pour lâAlternance Démocratique 28 opposition UAD 29 opposition Parti National Démocratique 30 opposition PND 31 opposition Aden Robleh Awaleh 32 opposition Republican Alliance for Democracy 33 opposition Alliance Républicaine pour la Démocratie 34 opposition ARD 35 opposition Ahmed Dini Ahmed 36 opposition Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development 37 opposition Mouvement pour le Renouveau Démocratique et le Développe- ment 38 opposition MRDD 39 opposition Party for Democratic Renewal 40 opposition PRD 41 opposition Abdillani Hamariteha 42 opposition Mohamed Djame Elabe 43 opposition Djibouti Party for Development 44 opposition Parti Djiboutien pour le Développement 45 opposition PDD 46 opposition Mohamed Daoud Chehem 47 opposition Djibouti Union for Democracy and Justice 48 opposition Union Djiboutienne pour la Démocratie et la Justice

56 49 opposition UDDJ 50 opposition Union Pour Le Salut National 51 opposition USN 52 opposition Ahmed Youssouf 53 opposition Daher Ahmed Farah 54 opposition Centre Démocrate Unifié Djiboutien 55 opposition CDU 56 opposition Abdourahman Boreh

Table 27: Eritrea

Level Term 1 executive Isaias Afewerki 4 opposition Eritrean Liberation Front 5 opposition ELF 6 opposition Hussein Khalifa 7 opposition Abdullah Muhammad 8 opposition Eritrean National Alliance 9 opposition Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council 10 opposition RLF-RC 11 opposition Ahmed Nasser 12 opposition Eritrean Liberation Front-United Organization 13 opposition ELF-UO 14 opposition Mohammed Said Nawd 15 opposition Eritrean People’s Democratic Front 16 opposition EPDF 17 opposition Tewelde Ghebreselassie 18 opposition Eritrean Solidarity Movement for National Salvation 19 opposition ESMNS 20 opposition Tesfu Atsbeha 21 opposition Democratic Movement for Libaration of Eritrean Kunama 22 opposition DMLEK 23 opposition Kernelewos 24 opposition People’s Democratic Front for the Liberation of Eritrea 25 opposition SAGEM 26 opposition Eritrean Youth Solidarity for Change 27 opposition EYSC 28 opposition Yonas Hagos

57 29 opposition Eritrean People’s Democratic Party 30 opposition EPP 31 opposition Weldeyesus Ammar 32 opposition Eritrean Popular Movement 33 opposition Adhanom Ghbermariam 34 opposition Eritrean National Council for Democratic Change 35 opposition Yusuf Berhanu 36 opposition Eritrean National Salvation Front 37 opposition Abdell Mahmmud 38 opposition Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunama 39 opposition Kornelios Osman 40 opposition Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation 41 opposition Ibrahim Harun

Table 28: Gambia

Level Term 1 executive Yahya Jammeh 2 executive Yayha AJJ Jammeh 7 opposition United Democratic Party 8 opposition UDP 9 opposition Ousman Rambo Jatta 10 opposition National Alliance for Democracy and Development 11 opposition NADD 12 opposition Halifa Sallah 13 opposition National Democratic Action Movement 14 opposition NDAM 15 opposition Waa Juwara 16 opposition National Reconciliation Party 17 opposition Hamat Bah 18 opposition People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Social- ism 19 opposition PDOIS 20 opposition Sidia Jatta 21 opposition People’s Progressive Party 22 opposition PPP 23 opposition Ousainou Darboe 24 opposition Yaya Jallow

58 25 opposition Ebraima Manneh 26 opposition Amadou Taal 27 opposition Mariam Denton 28 opposition Momodou N Shyngle Nyassi 29 opposition Gambia Party for Democracy and Progress 30 opposition GPDP 31 opposition Henry Gomez 32 opposition Gambia Moral Congress 33 opposition GMC 34 opposition Mai Fatty

Table 29: Ghana

Level Term 1 executive John Dramani Mahama 6 opposition Nana Akuffo Addo 7 opposition Nana Akufo-Addo 8 opposition New Patriotic Party 9 opposition NPP 10 opposition Jake Obetsebi Lamptey 11 opposition Edward Mahama 12 opposition Grand Coalition 13 opposition People’s National Convention 14 opposition PNC 15 opposition Hassan Ayariga 16 opposition George Aggudey 17 opposition Convention People’s Party 18 opposition CPP 19 opposition Paa Kwesi Nduom 20 opposition Great Consolidated Popular Party 21 opposition GCPP 22 opposition Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere 23 opposition EGLE 24 opposition Henry Herbert Lartey 25 opposition Progressive People’s Party 26 opposition PPP 27 opposition Papa Kwesi Nduom 28 opposition Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo

59 29 opposition Michael Abu Sakara Foster 30 opposition United Front Party 31 opposition Akwasi Addai Odike 32 opposition Jacob Osei Yeboah

Table 30: Guinea

Level Term 1 executive Lansana Conté 2 executive Moussa Dadis Camara 14 opposition Cellou Dalein Diallo 15 opposition Alpha Condé 16 opposition Rally of the Guinean People 17 opposition Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen 18 opposition RPG 19 opposition Union for Progress and Renewal 20 opposition Union pour le Progrès et le Renouveau 21 opposition UPR 22 opposition Ousmane Bah 23 opposition Union for Progress of Guinea 24 opposition Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée 25 opposition UPG 26 opposition Jean-Marie Doré 27 opposition Democratic Party of Guinea-African Democratic Rally 28 opposition Parti Démocratique de Guinée-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 29 opposition PDG-RDA 30 opposition El Hadj Ismael Mohamed Gassim Gushein 31 opposition National Alliance for Progress 32 opposition Alliance Nationale pour le Progrès 33 opposition ANP 34 opposition Party of the Union for Development 35 opposition Parti de lâUnion pour le Développement 36 opposition PUD 37 opposition Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea 38 opposition Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée 39 opposition UFDG 40 opposition Cellou Dalein Diallo

60 41 opposition Mamadou Ba 42 opposition Republican Front for Democratic Change 43 opposition Union of Republican Forces 44 opposition Union des Forces Républicaines 45 opposition UFR

Table 31: Libya

Level Term 1 executive Gaddafi 24 opposition National Transitional Council 25 opposition NTC 26 opposition Abdul Hafiz Ghoga 27 opposition Mustafa Abdul Jalil 28 opposition National Forces Alliance 29 opposition Mahmoud Jibril 30 opposition Abdul Rahman Al Shater 31 opposition Salaheddin El Bishari 32 opposition Justice and Construction Party 33 opposition Justice and Development Party 34 opposition JCP 35 opposition Mohamed Sowan 36 opposition Mohamed Gaair 37 opposition Nouri Abusahmain a Amazigh 38 opposition Ahmed Maiteeq 39 opposition National Front Party 40 opposition NFP 41 opposition Mohamed el-Magariaf 42 opposition Mohamed Magariaf 43 opposition Mohamed Yousef el-Magariaf 44 opposition Mohamed Ali Darrat 45 opposition Mohamed Ali Abdallah 46 opposition National Front for the Salvation of Libya 47 opposition NFSL 48 opposition Ibrahim Abdulaziz Sahad 49 opposition Fawzi al-Tarabulsi 50 opposition Suleiman Abdalla 51 opposition Mohamed Saad

61 52 opposition Mohamed Ali Binwasil 53 opposition Mustafa A.G. Abushagur 54 opposition Ali Zeidan 55 opposition Wadi al-Hiya Alliance 56 opposition Union for Homeland 57 opposition Abdurrahman Sewehli 58 opposition National Centrist Party 59 opposition NCP 60 opposition Ali Tarrhouni 61 opposition Libyan National Democratic Party 62 opposition LNDP 63 opposition The Message 64 opposition The Foundation 65 opposition National Party for Development and Welfare 66 opposition NPDW 67 opposition Nation & Prosperity 68 opposition Authenticity & Renewal 69 opposition Authenticity & Progress 70 opposition Moderate Umma Assembly 71 opposition Libik Watani 72 opposition National Gathering of Wadi al-Shati 73 opposition Moderate Youth Party 74 opposition Libyan List for Freedom & Development 75 opposition National Coalition of Parties 76 opposition Libya the Hope 77 opposition Wisdom Party 78 opposition Democratic Party 79 opposition DPL 80 opposition Homeland Party 81 opposition Libyan National Party 82 opposition Alwattan Party 83 opposition Ali al-Sallabi 84 opposition Abdelhakim Belhadj 85 opposition Mahmoud Hamza 86 opposition Mansour Saif Al-Nasar 87 opposition National Gathering for Freedom, Justice and Development 88 opposition Party of Reform and Development

62 89 opposition PRD 90 opposition Khaled al-Werchefani 91 opposition Libyan Constitutional Union 92 opposition Libyan Amazigh Congress 93 opposition Alhaq and Democracy Party of Benghazi 94 opposition Libyan National Congress Party 95 opposition New Libya Party 96 opposition National Unity of Libya Party 97 opposition Freedom and Development Party of Libya 98 opposition The Patriotic Reform Party 99 opposition National Solidarity Party 100 opposition The Libyan National Party 101 opposition Umma Party 102 opposition Justice and Democracy Party of Libya 103 opposition Libya Future Party 104 opposition Libyan Center Party 105 opposition National Democratic Assembly for Justice and Progress 106 opposition Libya Development Party 107 opposition Libyan Universal Party 108 opposition National Democratic Alliance 109 opposition New National Congress Party 110 opposition Tawasul Party 111 opposition Libyan National Democratic Party for Justice and Development 112 opposition Libya Our Home and Tribe Party 113 opposition Libyan Liberation Party 114 opposition Libya for All Party 115 opposition Unity Movement 116 opposition Democratic Youth Party 117 opposition National Democratic Assembly 118 opposition Wefaq Party 119 opposition Libyan National Democratic Assemblage 120 opposition Ansar Al Horria 121 opposition Libyan Unionist Party

Table 32: Madagascar

Level Term

63 1 executive Marc Ravalomanana 2 executive Andry Rajoelina 5 opposition Hery Rajaonarimampianina 6 opposition Marc Ravalomanana 7 opposition Kolo Roger 8 opposition Hery Vaovao ho an’i Madagasikara 9 opposition Jean Ravelonarivo 10 opposition Tiako i Madagasikara 11 opposition TIM 12 opposition Jean Lahiniriko 13 opposition Roland Ratsiraka 14 opposition Herizo Razafimahaleo 15 opposition LEADER FANILO 16 opposition Norbert Ratsirahonana 17 opposition Ny Asa Vita no Ifampitsarana 18 opposition AVI 19 opposition Ny Hasina Andriamanjato 20 opposition Elia Ravelomanantsoa 21 opposition Our Madagascar 22 opposition Pety Rakotoniaina 23 opposition Jules Randrianjoary 24 opposition Daniel Rajakoba 25 opposition FIHAVANANTSIKA 26 opposition Movement for the Progress of Madagascar 27 opposition Mpitolona ho an’ny Fandrosoan’i Madagasikara 28 opposition Manandafy Rakotonirina 29 opposition MFM 30 opposition Philippe Tsiranana 31 opposition Ferdinand Razakarimanana 32 opposition Salman Khan 33 opposition Fanjava Velogno 34 opposition Antoko Miombona Ezaka 35 opposition AME 36 opposition Economic Liberalism and Democratic Action for National Re- covery 37 opposition Libéralisme Economique et Action Démocratique pour la Recon- struction Nationale

64 38 opposition Brun-Ly 39 opposition Fampandrosoana Mirindra 40 opposition Isandra Mivoatsa 41 opposition Liaraike 42 opposition Mayors’ Association 43 opposition Association de Maires 44 opposition National Wisa Association 45 opposition Association Nationale Wisa 46 opposition ANAWI 47 opposition Vohibato Tapa-kevitsa 48 opposition Solofonantenaina Razoarimihaja 49 opposition Yvan Randriasandratriniony 50 opposition Ivohasina Razafimahefa 51 opposition Manassé Esoavelomandroso 52 opposition Elia Ravelomanantsoa 53 opposition Daniel Rajakoba 54 opposition AVANA 55 opposition Jean-Louis Robinson 56 opposition Green Party 57 opposition Parti Vert 58 opposition Sarah Georget RABEHARISOA 59 opposition National Unity, Freedom, and Development 60 opposition FFF 61 opposition Andriamparany Benjamin RADAVIDSON 62 opposition New Force for Madagascar 63 opposition FIDIO 64 opposition Parti Hiaraka Isika 65 opposition PHI 66 opposition Albert Camille VITAL 67 opposition Pillar of Madagascar 68 opposition AIM 69 opposition Andry RAKOTOVAO 70 opposition Ravlomanana Movement 71 opposition MR 72 opposition Sambo Fiaran’i Noe 73 opposition SFN 74 opposition Union Party

65 75 opposition Tambatra 76 opposition Pety RAKOTONIAINA 77 opposition Vondrona Politika Miara dia Malagasy Miara Miainga 78 opposition VPM-MMM 79 opposition Milavonjy ANDRIASY

Table 33: Malawi

Level Term 1 executive Bingu wa Mutharika 5 opposition Lazarus Chakwera 6 opposition Malawi Congress Party 7 opposition MCP 8 opposition John Tembo 9 opposition Joyce Banda 10 opposition People’s Party 11 opposition Atupele Muluzi 12 opposition United Democratic Front 13 opposition UDF 14 opposition Bakili Muluzi 15 opposition Kamuzu Chibambo 16 opposition People’s Transformation Party 17 opposition Mgwirizana Coalition 18 opposition Mark Katsonga 19 opposition Progressive Party Movement 20 opposition John Chisi 21 opposition Uzmodi Party 22 opposition George Nnesa 23 opposition Tisinthe Alliance 24 opposition James Nyondo 25 opposition National Salvation Front 26 opposition Hellen Singh 27 opposition United Independent Party 28 opposition Friday Jumbe 29 opposition Labour Party 30 opposition Davis Katsonga 31 opposition Chipani cha Pfuko 32 opposition CCP

66 33 opposition Malawi Democratic Party 34 opposition MDP 35 opposition Kamlepo Kalua 36 opposition Malawi Forum for Unity and Development 37 opposition MFUD 38 opposition Movement for Genuine Democratic Change 39 opposition MGDC 40 opposition National Unity Party 41 opposition NUP 42 opposition People’s Progressive Movement 43 opposition PPM 44 opposition Aleke Banda 45 opposition Republican Party 46 opposition RP 47 opposition Gwanda Chakuamba 48 opposition Sam Mpasu 49 opposition Nicholas Dausi 50 opposition John Chikakwiya 51 opposition Yusuf Mwawa 52 opposition Lucius Banda

Table 34: Malaysia

Level Term 1 executive Najib Razak 60 opposition Pakatan Rakyat 61 opposition People’s Pact 62 opposition People’s Alliance 63 opposition PR 64 opposition People’s Justice Party 65 opposition PKR 66 opposition Democratic Action Party 67 opposition DAP 68 opposition Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party 69 opposition PAS 70 opposition Sarawak National Party 71 opposition SNAP 72 opposition Wan Azizah Wan Ismail

67 73 opposition Lim Kit Siang 74 opposition Lim Guan Eng 75 opposition Tan Kok Wai 76 opposition Abdul Hadi Awang 77 opposition Edmund Stanley Jugol

Table 35: Mali

Level Term 1 executive Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta 2 executive Ibrahim Boubacar Kéita 3 executive Ibrahim Boubacar Keita 12 opposition Amadou Toumani Touré 13 opposition Soumaïla Cissé 14 opposition Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali 15 opposition Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali-Parti Pan-Africain pour la Liberté, la Solidarité et la Justice 16 opposition Alliance for Democracy in Mali 17 opposition Alliance for Democracy in Mali-Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity and Justice 18 opposition ADEMA 19 opposition ADEMA-PASJ 20 opposition Dioncounda Traore 21 opposition Dioncounda Traoré 22 opposition Tiébilé Dramé 23 opposition Party for National Rebirth 24 opposition Le Parti pour la renaissance nationale 25 opposition PARENA 26 opposition Tiébilé Dramé 27 opposition Tiebile Drame 28 opposition African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence 29 opposition SADI 30 opposition Oumar Mariko 31 opposition Solidarité Africaine pour la Démocratie et l’Indépendance 32 opposition Youssouf Dembélé 33 opposition Mamadou Blaise Sangaré 34 opposition Social Democratic Convention 35 opposition Convention sociale démocrate

68 36 opposition CSD 37 opposition CDS-Mogotiguiya 38 opposition Alliance for the Solidarity of Mali-Convergence of Patriotic Forces 39 opposition ASMA-CFP 40 opposition Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga 41 opposition Soumeylou Boubéye Maiga 42 opposition Convergences 2007 43 opposition Sidibé Aminata Diallo 44 opposition Rally for Sustainable Education and Development 45 opposition Rassemblement pour l’éducation au développement durable 46 opposition REDD 47 opposition Madiassa Maguiraga 48 opposition Union for the Republic and Democracy 49 opposition Union pour la République et la Démocratie 50 opposition URD 51 opposition Soumalia Cissé 52 opposition Younoussi Touré 53 opposition Patriotic Movement for Renewal 54 opposition MPR 55 opposition Mouvement Patriotique pour le Renouveau 56 opposition Choguel Kokalla Maïga 57 opposition Choguel Kokalla 58 opposition National Congress for Democratic Initiative 59 opposition CNID 60 opposition Congrès national d’initiative démocratique 61 opposition Mountaga Tall 62 opposition N’Diaye Bah 63 opposition Union for Democracy and Development 64 opposition UDD 65 opposition Union pour la démocratie et le développement 66 opposition Mamadou Bamou Toure 67 opposition Tieman Hubert Coulibaby 68 opposition Movement for the Independence, Renaissance, and Integration of Africa 69 opposition MIRIA

69 70 opposition Mouvement pour l’indépendance, la renaissance et l’intégration africaine 71 opposition Party for Solidarity and Progress 72 opposition PSP 73 opposition Parti de la solidarité et du progrès 74 opposition Alternation Bloc for Renewal, Integration, and African Cooper- ation 75 opposition BARICA 76 opposition Bloc des alternances pour le renouveau, lâintégration et la coopération africaine 77 opposition Bloc for Democracy and African Integration 78 opposition BPDIA 79 opposition Bloc pour la démocratie et l’intégration africaine 80 opposition BDIA 81 opposition Citizens’ Party for Revival 82 opposition Parti citoyen pour le renouveau 83 opposition PCR 84 opposition National Rally for Democracy 85 opposition Rassemblement national pour la démocratie 86 opposition RND 87 opposition Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally 88 opposition Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 89 opposition US-RDA 90 opposition Malian Union for the African Democratic Rally 91 opposition Union Malienne du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 92 opposition UM-RDA 93 opposition Bocar Moussa Diarra 94 opposition Front for Democracy and the Republic 95 opposition Front pour la démocratie et la république 96 opposition FDR 97 opposition COPP 98 opposition DPM 99 opposition Faso 100 opposition MPDD 101 opposition PARI 102 opposition PER 103 opposition PRDDM

70 104 opposition RDR 105 opposition RDT 106 opposition Amadou Ali Niangadou 107 opposition RJP 108 opposition ADJ 109 opposition Alternative Forces for Renewal and Emergence 110 opposition Forces Alternatives pour le Renouveau et l’Emergence 111 opposition FARE 112 opposition Soumana Mory Coulibaly 113 opposition Modibo Sidibé 114 opposition Convergence for the Development of Mali 115 opposition Convergence pour le développement du Mali 116 opposition CODEM 117 opposition Alassane Abba 118 opposition Housseini Guindo 119 opposition Marie Sylla 120 opposition Saran Sinaté 121 opposition Souleymane Guindo 122 opposition Party for Economic Development and Solidarity 123 opposition Parti pour le Développement Economique et la Solidarité 124 opposition PDES 125 opposition Hamed Diané Séméga 126 opposition Jamille Bittar 127 opposition Alliance for Solidarity in Mali 128 opposition Alliance pour la Solidarité au Mali 129 opposition ASMA 130 opposition Democratic Alliance for Peace 131 opposition Alliance Démocratique pour la Paix 132 opposition ADP-MALIBA 133 opposition Aliou Boubacar Diallo 134 opposition Change Party 135 opposition Yéléma Party 136 opposition Moussa Mara 137 opposition Party for the Restoration of Malian Values 138 opposition Parti pour la Restauration des Valeurs Mali 139 opposition PRVM 140 opposition Union of Patriots for Renewal

71 141 opposition Mamadou Sidibe 142 opposition Rally for Labour Democracy 143 opposition Rassemblement pour la Démocratie du Travail 144 opposition RDT 145 opposition Convergence for Alternation and Change 146 opposition Convergence pour l’Alternance et changement 147 opposition CPAT 148 opposition Alliance for Democratic Change 149 opposition Movement for a Common Destiny 150 opposition MODEC 151 opposition Koniba Sidibe 152 opposition Party for Democracy and Progress 153 opposition PDP 154 opposition Mady Konate

Table 36: Morocco

Level Term 1 executive Mohamed VI 35 opposition Justice and Development Party 36 opposition Parti de la justice et du développement 37 opposition PJD 38 opposition Saadeddine Othmani 39 opposition Abdelilah Benkirane 40 opposition Istiqlal Party 41 opposition Abbas El Fassi 42 opposition Independence Party 43 opposition Parti de l’Istiqlal 44 opposition National Rally of Independents 45 opposition Rassemblement National des Indépendants 46 opposition RNI 47 opposition Salaheddine Mezouar 48 opposition Moncef Belkhayat 49 opposition Amina Benkhadra 50 opposition Yassir Znagui 51 opposition Aziz Akhannouch 52 opposition Socialist Union of Popular Forces 53 opposition Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires

72 54 opposition USFP 55 opposition Abderrahmane Youssoufi 56 opposition Koutla 57 opposition Popular Movement 58 opposition Mouvement populaire 59 opposition MP 60 opposition Mohand Laenser 61 opposition National Popular Movement 62 opposition Mouvement National Populaire 63 opposition MNP 64 opposition Democratic Union 65 opposition Union démocratique 66 opposition UD 67 opposition Party of Progress and Socialism 68 opposition Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme 69 opposition PPS 70 opposition Labour Party 71 opposition Parti Travailliste 72 opposition PT 73 opposition Abdelkrim Benatik 74 opposition Omar Seghrouchni 75 opposition Mohamed el Ouchari 76 opposition Democratic and Social Movement 77 opposition Mouvement Démocratique et Social 78 opposition MDS 79 opposition Party of Renewal and Equity 80 opposition Parti de Renouveau et de l’Ãquité 81 opposition PRE 82 opposition Democratic Oath Party 83 opposition SD 84 opposition Front of Democratic Forces 85 opposition Front des Forces Démocratiques 86 opposition FFD 87 opposition Green Left Party 88 opposition Action Party 89 opposition Parti de l’Action 90 opposition PA

73 91 opposition Mohammed El Idrissi 92 opposition Union and Democracy Party 93 opposition PUD 94 opposition Party of Liberty and Social Justice 95 opposition Parti de la Liberté et de la Justice Sociale 96 opposition PLJS 97 opposition Socialist Party 98 opposition Parti Socialiste 99 opposition PS 100 opposition Moroccan Union for Democracy 101 opposition Union Marocaine pour la Démocratie 102 opposition UMD 103 opposition Citizens’ Forces 104 opposition Forces Citoyennes 105 opposition Abderrahim Lahyuyi 106 opposition PFC 107 opposition Party of Renaissance and Virtue 108 opposition Parti de la Renaissance et de la Vertu 109 opposition Mohamed Khalidi 110 opposition National Congress Party 111 opposition Parti du Congrès National Ittihadi 112 opposition PCNI 113 opposition Abdelmayid Bazubaa 114 opposition Moroccan Liberal Party 115 opposition Parti Marocain Libéral 116 opposition PML 117 opposition Mohammed Ziane 118 opposition Social Centre Party 119 opposition Parti du Centre Social 120 opposition PCS 121 opposition Reform and Development Party 122 opposition Parti de la Réforme et du Développement 123 opposition PRD 124 opposition Abderrahman El Kuhen 125 opposition Party of Hope 126 opposition Parti de l’Espoir 127 opposition PE

74 128 opposition Democratic Society Party 129 opposition PSD 130 opposition Democratic Independence Party 131 opposition Democratic Party for Independence 132 opposition Parti Démocratique et de l’Indépendance 133 opposition PDI 134 opposition Democratic Socialist Vanguard Party 135 opposition Parti de l’avant-garde démocratique socialiste 136 opposition PADS 137 opposition Unified Socialist Party 138 opposition Parti Socialiste Unifié 139 opposition PSU 140 opposition Nabila Mounib

Table 37: Namibia

Level Term 1 executive Hifikepunye Pohamba 29 opposition Rally for Democracy and Progress 30 opposition RDP 31 opposition Hidipo Hamutenya 32 opposition Jesaya Nyamu 33 opposition Steve Bezuidenhoudt 34 opposition Jesaya Nyamu 35 opposition Agnes Limbo 36 opposition Anton von Wietersheim 37 opposition Kandy Nehova 38 opposition Peter Naholo 39 opposition Heiko Lucks 40 opposition Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 41 opposition Demokratische Turnhallenallianz 42 opposition DTA 43 opposition McHenry Venaani 44 opposition Vincent Kanyetu 45 opposition Katuutire Kaura 46 opposition National Unity Democratic Organisation 47 opposition National Unity Democratic Organization 48 opposition NUDO

75 49 opposition Kuaima Riruako 50 opposition Asser Mbai 51 opposition Meundju Jahanika 52 opposition United Democratic Front 53 opposition UDF 54 opposition Dudu Murorua 55 opposition Justus Çgaroëb 56 opposition Gustaphine Tjombe 57 opposition Michael Goreseb 58 opposition Simson Tjongarero 59 opposition All People’s Party 60 opposition APP 61 opposition Ignatius Shixwameni 62 opposition Stephanus Swartbooi 63 opposition Reinhold Madala Nauyoma 64 opposition Mukuve Marcellus Mudumbi 65 opposition Herbert Shixwameni 66 opposition Lena Nakatana 67 opposition Republican Party 68 opposition RP 69 opposition Henk Mudge 70 opposition Clara Gowases 71 opposition Congress of Democrats 72 opposition CoD 73 opposition Ben Ulenga 74 opposition SWANU 75 opposition South West Africa National Union 76 opposition Usutuaije Maamberua 77 opposition Usutuije Maamberua 78 opposition Democratic Party of Namibia 79 opposition Salomon Dawid Isaacs 80 opposition David Isaacs 81 opposition Namibian Democratic Movement for Change 82 opposition Nam DMC 83 opposition NDMC 84 opposition Frans Goagoseb 85 opposition Joseph Kauandenge

76 86 opposition Communist Party of Namibia 87 opposition CPN 88 opposition Attie Beukes 89 opposition Harry Boesak 90 opposition Monitor Action Group 91 opposition Kosie Pretorius 92 opposition Jurie Viljoen 93 opposition Gernot Wilfrid Schaaf 94 opposition Eric Peters 95 opposition National Democratic Party 96 opposition NDP 97 opposition WRP 98 opposition United People’s Movement 99 opposition UPM 100 opposition Jan van Wyk

Table 38: Rwanda

Level Term 1 executive Kagame 4 opposition Christian Democratic Party 5 opposition Islamic Democratic Party 6 opposition Rwandese Socialist Party 7 opposition Prosperity and Solidarity Party 8 opposition Party for Progress and Concord 9 opposition Democratic Union of the Rwandese People 10 opposition Social Democratic Party 11 opposition Liberal Party 12 opposition Harelimana JMV 13 opposition Coalition of Democratic Forces 14 opposition Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 15 opposition Democratic Green Party of Rwanda 16 opposition PDC 17 opposition PDI 18 opposition PSR 19 opposition PSP 20 opposition PPC 21 opposition UDPR

77 22 opposition PSD 23 opposition PL 24 opposition HAR 25 opposition CDF 26 opposition FDLR 27 opposition GREEN 28 opposition Faustin Twagiramungu 29 opposition Jean-Nepomuscene Nayinzira 30 opposition Agnes Mukabaranga 31 opposition Alivera Mukabaramba 32 opposition Chrstian Marara 33 opposition Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo 34 opposition Prosper Higiro 35 opposition Protais Mitali 36 opposition Victoire Ingabire 37 opposition André Kagwa Rwisereka 38 opposition André Rwisereka

Table 39: Senegal

Level Term 1 executive Abdoulaye Wade 19 opposition Alliance for the Republic 20 opposition Macky Sall 21 opposition Rewmi Party 22 opposition Idrissa Seck 23 opposition Socialist Party of Senegal 24 opposition Parti Socialiste du Sénégal 25 opposition PS 26 opposition Ousmane Tanor Dieng 27 opposition Alliance of the Forces of Progress 28 opposition Alliance des forces de progrès 29 opposition AFP 30 opposition Moustapha Niasse 31 opposition Alternance 2007 32 opposition Robert Sagna 33 opposition Coalition Up to Rebuild Senegal 34 opposition Takku Defaraat

78 35 opposition Party of Independence and Labour 36 opposition Parti de l’Indépendance et du Travail 37 opposition PIT 38 opposition Amath Dansokho 39 opposition Alliance for Progress and Justice/Jëf-Jël 40 opposition Alliance pour le Progrès et la Justice/Jëf-Jël 41 opposition APJ/JJ 42 opposition Talla Sylla 43 opposition Front for Socialism and Democracy/Benno Jubël 44 opposition Front pour le socialisme et la démocratie 45 opposition FSD 46 opposition Cheikh Bamba Dièye 47 opposition Tekki Taaru 48 opposition Mamadou Lamine Diallo 49 opposition Sellal 50 opposition Mama Adama Guèye 51 opposition Union for Progress and Renewal 52 opposition Doudou Ndoye 53 opposition Alioune Mbaye 54 opposition Movement for the Liberation of the Senegalese People 55 opposition Louis Jacques Senghor 56 opposition Modou Dia 57 opposition Coalition Call of Duty 58 opposition Waar Wi 59 opposition Rally for the People 60 opposition Rassemblement pour le peuple 61 opposition Convergence for Renewal and Citizenship 62 opposition Convergence pour le renouveau et la citoyenneté 63 opposition Authentic Socialist Party 64 opposition Parti socialiste authentique 65 opposition PSA 66 opposition Souty Touré 67 opposition National Patriotic Union 68 opposition Union nationale patriotique 69 opposition Reform Movement for Social Development 70 opposition Mouvement de la réforme pour le développement social 71 opposition MRDS

79 72 opposition Rally of the Ecologists of Senegal 73 opposition Rassemblement des écologistes du Sénégal â Les Verts 74 opposition Social Democratic Party 75 opposition Jant Bi 76 opposition Parti social-démocrate 77 opposition PSD 78 opposition Senegalese Patriotic Rally 79 opposition Rassemblement patriotique sénégalais 80 opposition Jammi Rewmi 81 opposition Benno Siggil 82 opposition Benno Bok Yakaar 83 opposition BBY 84 opposition United to Boost Senegal 85 opposition BSS

Table 40: Singapore

Level Term 1 executive Tony Tan Keng Yam 9 opposition Workers’ Party of Singapore 10 opposition WP 11 opposition Low Thia Khiang 12 opposition Sylvia Lim 13 opposition Chen Show Mao 14 opposition Muhamad Faisal Manap 15 opposition Pritam Singh 16 opposition Png Eng Huat 17 opposition Lee Li Lian 18 opposition Gerald Giam 19 opposition Yee Jenn Jong 20 opposition Singapore Democratic Party 21 opposition SDP 22 opposition Francis Seow 23 opposition J.B. Jeyaretnam 24 opposition Chee Soon Juan 25 opposition Chiam See Tong 26 opposition Chee Siok Chin 27 opposition Tan Jee Say

80 28 opposition Michelle Lee Juen 29 opposition Ang Yonh Guan 30 opposition Vincent Wijeysingha 31 opposition James Gomez 32 opposition John Tan 33 opposition Jarrod Luo 34 opposition Sadasivam Veriyah 35 opposition Mohd Isa 36 opposition Teo Soh Lung 37 opposition Gerald Sng 38 opposition Alec Toc 39 opposition Democratic Progressive Party 40 opposition DPP 41 opposition Mohamad Hamim bin Aliyas 42 opposition Benjamin Pwee 43 opposition National Solidarity Party 44 opposition NSP 45 opposition Goh Meng Seng 46 opposition Reform Party 47 opposition Kenneth Jeyaretnam 48 opposition Singapore Democratic Alliance 49 opposition SDA 50 opposition Desmond Lim

Table 41: Swaziland

Level Term 1 executive Mswati III 7 opposition People’s United Democratic Movement 8 opposition PUDEMO 9 opposition Mario Masuku 10 opposition Ulibambe Lingashoni 11 opposition Don’t Let the Sun Set 12 opposition Sipho Jele 13 opposition Bonginkosi Dlamini 14 opposition Gabriel Mkhumane 15 opposition Umbane Peopleâs Liberation Army 16 opposition Musa Dlamini

81 17 opposition Jack Govender 18 opposition Alex LaNgwenya 19 opposition Swaziland Youth Congress 20 opposition SWAYOCO 21 opposition Sikhumbuzo Phakathi 22 opposition Amos Mbedzi 23 opposition Maxwell Dlamini 24 opposition Mlungisi Makhanya 25 opposition Thulani Maseko 26 opposition Swazi Democratic Party 27 opposition SWADEPA 28 opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress 29 opposition NNLC 30 opposition Bheki Dlamin 31 opposition Zakhele Mabuza 32 opposition Communist Party 33 opposition Kenneth Kunene

Table 42: Tunisia

82 56 opposition Afek Tounes 57 opposition Tunisian Aspiration 58 opposition Emna Mnif 59 opposition Mustapha Mezghani 60 opposition Sami Zaoui 61 opposition Hela Hababou 62 opposition Yassine Brahim 63 opposition National Salvation Front 64 opposition Popular Front 65 opposition Front populaire 66 opposition al-Jabha 67 opposition Chokri Belaid 68 opposition Mohamed Brahmi 69 opposition Moncef Marzouki 70 opposition Hamadi Jebali 71 opposition El Amen Party 72 opposition Ba’ath Movement of Tunisia 73 opposition Mouvement Baath de Tunisie 74 opposition PBT 75 opposition Congress for the Republic 76 opposition Congrès pour la République 77 opposition CPR 78 opposition Cultural Unionist Nation Party 79 opposition Current of Love 80 opposition Courant de l’amour 81 opposition Hechmi Hamdi 82 opposition Democratic Alliance Party 83 opposition Alliance démocratique 84 opposition Mohamed Hamdi 85 opposition Democratic Current 86 opposition Ettayar Addimoqrati 87 opposition Attayar 88 opposition Mohamed Abbou 89 opposition Democratic Patriots’ Movement 90 opposition Mouvement des patriotes démocrates 91 opposition Ziad Lakhdhar 92 opposition Mongi Rahoui

83 93 opposition Democratic Social Nation Party 94 opposition Destourian Movement 95 opposition Mouvement destourien 96 opposition Abderrahim Zouari 97 opposition Ennahda Movement 98 opposition Mouvement Ennahda 99 opposition Renaissance Party 100 opposition Ennahda 101 opposition Rachid Ghanoushi 102 opposition Al-Ghannushi 103 opposition Equity and Equality Party 104 opposition Free Patriotic Union 105 opposition Union patriotique libre 106 opposition UPL 107 opposition Slim Riahi 108 opposition Future Tunisia Party 109 opposition Mouvement Tunisie de l’Avenir 110 opposition Party of Liberation 111 opposition Hizb ut-Tahrir 112 opposition Homeland Party 113 opposition Parti de la patrie 114 opposition Al-Watan 115 opposition Mohamed Jegham 116 opposition Ahmed Friaa 117 opposition Al Ilkaa Party 118 opposition National Destourian Initiative 119 opposition Initiative nationale destourienne 120 opposition Al Moubadara 121 opposition Kamel Morjane 122 opposition Justice and Development Party 123 opposition Maghrebi Republican Party 124 opposition Parti républicain maghrébin 125 opposition PRM 126 opposition Mohamed Bouabdelli 127 opposition Maghrebi Liberal Party 128 opposition Parti libéral maghrébin 129 opposition Movement of the Republic

84 130 opposition New Destour Party 131 opposition Nidaa Tounes 132 opposition Appel de la Tunisie 133 opposition Call of Tunisia 134 opposition Call for Tunisia 135 opposition Tunisia’s Call 136 opposition Beji Caid Essebsi 137 opposition Patriotic and Democratic Labour Party 138 opposition Parti du travail patriotique et démocratique 139 opposition Tunisian Pirate Party 140 opposition Pirate Party 141 opposition Parti pirate tunisien 142 opposition Slim Amamou 143 opposition Parti Democrate Liberal 144 opposition Patriotic Construction Party 145 opposition Popular Unity Movement 146 opposition Mouvement d’unité populaire 147 opposition MUP 148 opposition Ahmed Ben Salah 149 opposition Progressive People’s Party 150 opposition Reform and Development Party 151 opposition Reform Front Party 152 opposition Third Alternative 153 opposition Tunisian Movement for Freedom and Dignity 154 opposition Tunisian National Front 155 opposition Voice of the People of Tunisia 156 opposition La voix du peuple tunisien 157 opposition Larbi Nasra 158 opposition Wafa Movement 159 opposition Mouvement Wafa 160 opposition Independent Democratic Congress 161 opposition Abderraouf Ayadi 162 opposition Workers’ Party 163 opposition Parti des travailleurs 164 opposition PCOT 165 opposition Parti communiste des ouvriers de Tunisie

85 Table 43: Tunisia

Level Term 1 executive Zine el Abidine Ben Ali 40 opposition Social Democratic Path 41 opposition Democratic and Social Path 42 opposition Voie démocratique et sociale 43 opposition VDS 44 opposition Al-Massar 45 opposition Union for Tunisia 46 opposition Union pour la Tunisie 47 opposition UPT 48 opposition Democratic Modernist Pole 49 opposition Pôle démocratique moderniste 50 opposition PDM 51 opposition Socialist Left Party 52 opposition Republican Party 53 opposition Parti républicain 54 opposition PR 55 opposition Maya Jibril 56 opposition Afek Tounes 57 opposition Tunisian Aspiration 58 opposition Emna Mnif 59 opposition Mustapha Mezghani 60 opposition Sami Zaoui 61 opposition Hela Hababou 62 opposition Yassine Brahim 63 opposition National Salvation Front 64 opposition Popular Front 65 opposition Front populaire 66 opposition al-Jabha 67 opposition Chokri Belaid 68 opposition Mohamed Brahmi 69 opposition Moncef Marzouki 70 opposition Hamadi Jebali 71 opposition El Amen Party 72 opposition Ba’ath Movement of Tunisia 73 opposition Mouvement Baath de Tunisie

86 74 opposition PBT 75 opposition Congress for the Republic 76 opposition Congrès pour la République 77 opposition CPR 78 opposition Cultural Unionist Nation Party 79 opposition Current of Love 80 opposition Courant de l’amour 81 opposition Hechmi Hamdi 82 opposition Democratic Alliance Party 83 opposition Alliance démocratique 84 opposition Mohamed Hamdi 85 opposition Democratic Current 86 opposition Ettayar Addimoqrati 87 opposition Attayar 88 opposition Mohamed Abbou 89 opposition Democratic Patriots’ Movement 90 opposition Mouvement des patriotes démocrates 91 opposition Ziad Lakhdhar 92 opposition Mongi Rahoui 93 opposition Democratic Social Nation Party 94 opposition Destourian Movement 95 opposition Mouvement destourien 96 opposition Abderrahim Zouari 97 opposition Ennahda Movement 98 opposition Mouvement Ennahda 99 opposition Renaissance Party 100 opposition Ennahda 101 opposition Rachid Ghanoushi 102 opposition Al-Ghannushi 103 opposition Equity and Equality Party 104 opposition Free Patriotic Union 105 opposition Union patriotique libre 106 opposition UPL 107 opposition Slim Riahi 108 opposition Future Tunisia Party 109 opposition Mouvement Tunisie de l’Avenir 110 opposition Party of Liberation

87 111 opposition Hizb ut-Tahrir 112 opposition Homeland Party 113 opposition Parti de la patrie 114 opposition Al-Watan 115 opposition Mohamed Jegham 116 opposition Ahmed Friaa 117 opposition Al Ilkaa Party 118 opposition National Destourian Initiative 119 opposition Initiative nationale destourienne 120 opposition Al Moubadara 121 opposition Kamel Morjane 122 opposition Justice and Development Party 123 opposition Maghrebi Republican Party 124 opposition Parti républicain maghrébin 125 opposition PRM 126 opposition Mohamed Bouabdelli 127 opposition Maghrebi Liberal Party 128 opposition Parti libéral maghrébin 129 opposition Movement of the Republic 130 opposition New Destour Party 131 opposition Nidaa Tounes 132 opposition Appel de la Tunisie 133 opposition Call of Tunisia 134 opposition Call for Tunisia 135 opposition Tunisia’s Call 136 opposition Beji Caid Essebsi 137 opposition Patriotic and Democratic Labour Party 138 opposition Parti du travail patriotique et démocratique 139 opposition Tunisian Pirate Party 140 opposition Pirate Party 141 opposition Parti pirate tunisien 142 opposition Slim Amamou 143 opposition Parti Democrate Liberal 144 opposition Patriotic Construction Party 145 opposition Popular Unity Movement 146 opposition Mouvement d’unité populaire 147 opposition MUP

88 148 opposition Ahmed Ben Salah 149 opposition Progressive People’s Party 150 opposition Reform and Development Party 151 opposition Reform Front Party 152 opposition Third Alternative 153 opposition Tunisian Movement for Freedom and Dignity 154 opposition Tunisian National Front 155 opposition Voice of the People of Tunisia 156 opposition La voix du peuple tunisien 157 opposition Larbi Nasra 158 opposition Wafa Movement 159 opposition Mouvement Wafa 160 opposition Independent Democratic Congress 161 opposition Abderraouf Ayadi 162 opposition Workers’ Party 163 opposition Parti des travailleurs 164 opposition PCOT 165 opposition Parti communiste des ouvriers de Tunisie

Table 44: Zambia

Level Term 1 executive Michael Sata 5 opposition Rupiah Banda 6 opposition Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 7 opposition MMD 8 opposition Nevers Mumba 9 opposition United Party for National Development 10 opposition UPND 11 opposition Hakainde Hichilema 12 opposition Alliance for Democracy and Development 13 opposition ADD 14 opposition Charles Milupi 15 opposition National Restoration Party 16 opposition NAREP 17 opposition Elias Chipimo Jnr 18 opposition Elias Chipimo 19 opposition United National Independence Party

89 20 opposition UNIP 21 opposition Tilyenji Kaunda 22 opposition Forum for Democracy and Development 23 opposition FDD 24 opposition Edith Nawakwi 25 opposition United Democratic Alliance 26 opposition UDA 27 opposition National Movement for Progress 28 opposition NMP 29 opposition Nâgandu Peter Magande 30 opposition Ngandu Peter Magande 31 opposition Heritage Party 32 opposition Godfrey Miyanda 33 opposition Zambians for Empowerment and Development 34 opposition ZED 35 opposition Fredrick Mutesa 36 opposition United Liberal Party 37 opposition Sakwiba Sikota

Table 45: Zimbabwe

Level Term 1 executive Robert Mugabe 8 opposition Movement for Democratic Change 9 opposition MDC 10 opposition Morgan Tsvangirai 11 opposition Arthur Mutambara 12 opposition Welshman Ncube 13 opposition Thokozani Khuphe 14 opposition Gibson Sibanda 15 opposition Silas Mangono 16 opposition Shaky Matake 17 opposition Douglas Mwonzora 18 opposition Tendai Biti 19 opposition Lovemore Moyo 20 opposition Nelson Chamisa 21 opposition Elias Mudzuri 22 opposition Eddie Cross

90 23 opposition Roy Bennett 24 opposition Thamsanqa Mahlangu 25 opposition Felix Magalela Mafa Sibanda 26 opposition David Anthony Chimhini 27 opposition Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn 28 opposition MKD 29 opposition Simba Makoni 30 opposition Kudzai Mbudzi 31 opposition Ibbo Mandaza 32 opposition Mavambo 33 opposition ZAPU 34 opposition United Movement for Democracy 35 opposition UMDC 36 opposition African National Party 37 opposition ANP 38 opposition Peace Action is Freedom for All 39 opposition PAFA 40 opposition United People’s Party 41 opposition UPP 42 opposition Zimbabwe People’s Democratic Party 43 opposition ZPDP 44 opposition Democratic Party 45 opposition DP 46 opposition Zanu Ndonga 47 opposition Langton Towungana 48 opposition Dumiso Dabengwa 49 opposition Kisinoti Mukwazhe 50 opposition Kisnot Mukwazhe 51 opposition Kuratidza Sandati 52 opposition Andrew Dhizari 53 opposition Leonard Mahora 54 opposition Joshua Nkomo 55 opposition Wilson Kumbila 56 opposition Viomak 57 opposition Moreprecision Muzadzi

91 12 Summary Statistics

Tables 46 and 47 present descriptive statistics for all variables used in the main text.

Table 46: Variable Definitions

Variable Range Mean Description Day Level Variables Positive Coverage: Executiveit [−58, 372] 19.13 Net positive coverage of the executive of country i on day t. Positive Coverage: Oppositionit [−46, 320] 1.99 Net positive coverage of the opposition of country i on day t. Positive Coverage standardized: Executiveit [−4, 7] 0.68 Net positive coverage of the executive of country i on day t, standardized by the number of references. Positive Coverage standardized: Oppositionit [−4, 7] 0.18 Net positive coverage of the opposition of country i on day t, standardized by the number of references. References: Executiveit [0, 406] 23.46 Number of references to the executive of country i on day t. References: Oppositionit [0, 614] 8.97 Number of references to the opposition of country i on day t. Articlesit [0, 201] 16.91 Number of articles published in country i on day t. Articles that Reference the Executiveit [0, 67] 4.02 Number of articles published that reference the executive of country i on day t. Election Seasonit {0, 1} 0.01 Assumes value 1 if day t in country i occurs within 15 days before an executive or legislative election. Election Dayit {0, 1} 0.0009 Assumes value 1 if day t in country i occurs on the day of an executive or legislative election. Post-Election Seasonit {0, 1} 0.01 Assumes value 1 if day t in country i occurs within 15 days after an executive or legislative election.

92 Table 47: Variable Definitions

Variable Range Mean Description Day Level Variables Protestit−1 {0, 1} 0.05 Assumes value 1 if a protest event occurred on day t in country i. Repressionit−1 {0, 1} 0.005 Assumes value 1 if a repression event occurred on day t in country i. Civil War Event: Stateit−1 [0, 4] 0.003 Number of civil war events initiated by the state occurred on day t in country i. Civil War Event: Non-Stateit−1 {0, 3} 0.01 Number of civil war events initiated by a non-state actor occurred on day t in country i. Autocracyit {0, 1} 0.69 Assumes value 1 if country i is coded by Svolik (2012) as an autocracy on day t. Country Level Variables Internetis [0.41, 80.9] 16.55 Measures the percent of country i’s population that enjoys internet access in year s, as reported by the World Bank. Per Capita GDPis [651, 78960] 8104 Measures country i’s per capita GDP in year s, as reported by the World Bank. Oil Supplyis [−0.08, 1874] 81.30 Measures country i’s oil production in year s, as reported by the US Energy Information Administration, expressed in thousands of barrels produced per day.

13 Googling Democracy

Figure 7 underscores the extent to which citizens across Africa google search terms related to democracy. For the words “democracy,” “human rights,” and “constitution” in eight leading languages,46 Figure 7 displays the relative frequency of Google word searches across countries. We use the Google Search Volume Index (SVI), which gives the number of searches by word relative to the total number of searches within the country. People everywhere search for breaking news. But in Africa, citizens also google democratic norms and their governments’ failure to abide them.

46The languages are English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, Chinese, Japanese and Thai.

93 Google Search Volume Index 0−19 20−39 40−59

60−79 80−99 100−119 120−140

Figure 7: For the words “democracy,” “human rights,” and “constitution” in eight leading languages (English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, Chinese, Japanese and Thai), the relative frequency of Google searches by country. The Google Search Volume Index (SVI) gives the number of searches by word relative to the total number of searches within the country. See https://www.google.com/trends/ for more on the Google SVI.

94 References

Clark, John F. 2007. “The Decline of the African Military Coup.” Journal of Democracy 18(3):141– 155.

Economist. 2010. “President Paul Kagame Under Scrutiny.” http://www.economist.com/node/16750119.

Human Rights Watch. 2014. “Rwanda: Repression Across Borders - Attacks and Threats Against Rwandan Opponents and Critics Abroad.” New York: Available online.

Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University.

Yanagizawa-Drott, David. 2014. “Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(4):1947–1994.

Yengo, Patrice. 2006. La Guerre Civile du Congo-Brazzaville 1993-2002: Chacun Aura Sa Part. Paris: Karthala.