CEVRO Institute

European Transnational Armed Forces

Development, Analyses and Discussion of an Approach as Supplement to National Armies

Robert Schoder

PPE: Philosophy, Politics, Economics

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Radka Havlová

Master’s Thesis

Prague, 2020 Abstract

The European security infrastructure build up by NATO and the Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP) of the European Union is faced with internal divides and a lack in decisive action.

This stands in front of an increasingly difficult perspective for European security policy and

Europe’s strategic situation. The instability emerging from wide parts of Africa and the Middle

East threat also Europe as this instability can translate into zones of retreat for terrorists and be the starting point for irregular migration; the increasingly aggressive actions of Russia in front of Europe and pursues together with China a policy to weaken the unity within EU and

NATO; and the actual divides between substantial members of the European Union and the

USA and a potential shift concerning the efforts the USA are spending in Europe need to find substantial answers. In this time the High Representative of the European Union calls for the establishment of “´hard power´ dimension” for the European Foreign and Security Policy.

The thesis shows an opportunity how such a hard power dimension could look like. It develops and discusses the potential of the build-up of European transnational armed forces recruited out of the vast majority of European states and funded by ten per cent of European military spending to help face those challenges. It gives answers on how it can be established, which legal and institutional matters have to be reconsidered, how it can be funded, and how challenges for such an approach can be faced.

1

1 The font picture is a self-creation out of a stylized NATO-Star generated from the logo of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in combination with a circle of EU 12 stars. The colours are the colours of the European Council as the stars are the ones of the Logo of the European Council. This combines symbols of two different entities which European transnational armed forces could be linked to. Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations...... 6

Introduction...... 8 Research Question and Argument...... 9 Thesis Structure...... 12 State of Research and Methodology...... 14

What is European Security and Foreign Policy? Specifications of Key Terms...... 16

1 Security Architecture of Europe...... 20

1.1 The European Union and CFSP...... 21 1.1.1 Developments of CFSP Since 1990...... 23 1.1.2 CFSP Institutions...... 26

1.2 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization...... 30 1.2.1 Developments Since 1990 for NATO...... 30 1.2.2 NATO Institutions...... 33

1.3 European States in the European Security Architecture...... 34

1.4 Analyses and Derivations of the Chapter-Findings...... 37

2 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces...... 40

2.1 Advantages of ETAF Given by its Characteristics...... 40 2.1.1 Alliance Strengthening and Deterrence...... 40 2.1.2 ETAF as Framework Nation and Strategic Enabler...... 42 2.1.3 Political Unification – Armed Forces as Contributor to European Identity...... 44

2.2 Counterarguments to European Army Approaches Compared to ETAF...... 45 2.2.1 Five Hurdles for the European Army Approaches...... 46 2.2.2 The Advantages of the ETAF Approach Compared to EU Army Approaches...... 49

2.3 Classification of the ETAF Approach Compared to the European Army Approaches...... 50

3 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF...... 51

3.1 ETAF's Linkage to NATO...... 52

3.2 ETAF Embedded in the CFDP...... 53 3.2.1 Options for an Embedment of ETAF Without Changes of the EU Treaties...... 54 3.2.2 Opportunities for Embedment Connected to EU Treaty Changes...... 55

3.3 Realising ETAF Outside the EU...... 59

4 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy...... 62

4.1 Instability in Africa and the Middle East as Threat for European Security...... 62

4.2 Russia as Security Challenge...... 64 4.2.1 Driving Forces For Aggressive Actions From a Russian Perspective...... 64 4.2.2 Challenges and Threats Posed by Russia...... 66

4.3 Transatlantic Divide as Security Challenge...... 67 4.3.1 Causes For Transatlantic Divide: Geopolitical Trends...... 68 4.3.2 Causes For Transatlantic Divide: Political, Strategic and Military Disappointments...... 69

5 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe...... 71

5.1 Proposal ETAF´s Spectrum of Capabilities...... 71 5.1.1 Air Capabilities...... 72 5.1.2 Ground Forces...... 74 5.1.3 Navy...... 77 5.1.4 ETAF as Capability Pool...... 78

5.2 Building and Transition Process of ETAF...... 78

5.3 Budget...... 80 5.3.1 Base Budget Built by GDP Linked Efforts ...... 81 5.3.2 Proposal for a Financial Gap-Closing Mechanism...... 82 5.3.3 ETAF as “Great Pool”...... 83 5.3.4 Links of Budget Matters to Several Aspects of the Research Question...... 83

6 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions...... 85

6.1 How Common Ground Can Be Developed...... 85

6.2 Strategic and Tactical Divergences as Challenge...... 86

6.3 Different Alliance Memberships and Military Neutrality...... 87

6.4 Military Culture and Political Status of the Soldier...... 90 6.4.1 Military Culture as Challenge and Task for ETAF...... 90 6.4.2 Political, Legal and Social Status of Soldiers...... 92

6.5 Geography as Challenge for ETAF...... 93 6.5.1 Distance as Disadvantage and Options for Anticipation...... 93 6.5.2 Three Concepts of Stationing ETAF – Development of a Military District Model...... 94

6.6 Different Economic Backgrounds of Soldiers as Challenge for Recruitment and Payment...... 98

6.7 Competition over Recruits...... 99

Conclusion...... 101

Publication Bibliography Sources and Literature...... 105 List of Abbreviations

A2/AD Anti Access/Area Denial

ACO Allied Command Operations

ATGM Anti tank guided missile

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

CARD Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

CEDC Central European Defence Cooperation

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

DSACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

ECtHR European Court on Human Rights

EDA European Defence Agency

EEAS European External Action Service

EIS European Interceptor Site

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

ESS European Security Strategy

ETAF European Transnational Armed Forces2

EU European Union

EUMC European Union Military Committee

EUMS European Union Military Staff

2 The abbreviation ETAF will be used in the following pages in all grammatical ways and meanings possible. In singular and plural and as political project or as description of its characteristics. The words European and transnational are chosen to describe its characteristics as consisting of soldiers from several European states also within the level of the the smallest unit; the words armed forces are chosen to outline that the approach is not just focused on ground forces. EUCO European Council

HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

NAMN Non-aligned or military neutral states

NAT North Atlantic Treaty

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process

NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation

NRF NATO Response Force

PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation

PSC Political and Security Committee

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

STOVL Short take-off and vertical landing

TEU Treaty on the European Union

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

US United States

USA United States of America

VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

WEU Western European Union (WEU) Introduction

Introduction

The members of the European Union represent within the European Market the second- largest combined economic power. This translates not into a comparable status concerning foreign policy or being an international security provider (Krotz & Wright, 2018 p. 871,p.

886). As Hans-Lothar Domröse a German General and during this time chief of the army puts it, The EU is in the international Arena a giant economically and a dwarf politically (Domröse,

2011, P.367).

The Lisbon Treaty of 2007 was established also as a step to bring coherence to Europe´s foreign policy and to cumulate the political power existing within its members. But thirteen years after its implementation Europe still has not found its geopolitical role or a substantial level of unity which would give Europe the ability to address its security issues substantially

(Krotz & Wright, 2018 p. 871, p. 886). The last two decades showed many unanimities between the US and within the EU countries, while challenges for European security grew.

Russia's use of military power to change borders, the Arab uprisings and the following chaos in Libya and Syria, irregular migration, nuclear non-proliferation and cyber threats are some of them. To face the challenges and to become a recognized global actor many politicians, officials and intellectuals repeatedly mentioned a European army as a solution. While these proclamations remained in the approximate on the state level it became part of the scientific and military debate. The detailed analyses of potential approaches to dissolving national armies and to merge them into one or a less far going to put all European armies under one command found that these are unrealistic due to many legal, political and practical problems

Albani & Brantner, 2011, p. 285).

8 Introduction

Therefore, the debate around the topic European Army became increasingly silent. However, in the scientific debate, an approach kept a destiny of being often mentioned but not developed in detail: the establishment of European transnational armed forces in addition to the national armed forces. Also concerning media coverage and proposal by politicians this approach remains in a shadowy existence. This thesis has the approach to bring light to this option and the many reasons which make it worth recognising.3

Research Question and Argument

While the impacts of joined European international security policy remain minor the challenges for European security emerge. To keep the actual status quo of slow and small- scale developments with a low rate of synergies at least on the EU level will not give Europe the ability to become a recognisable force in foreign policy and especially international security policy. The forces which divide and paralyse European security policy and the security challenges are growing faster than the accomplishments of CSDP which have more symbolic than practical value.4

This brings European security and status at risk, as Russia behaves increasingly aggressive and unpredictable, while the destabilization of large parts of Europe's neighbourhood bears in themselves to become areas of instability. These are developments which harm the security of

European countries and citizens. Also, the unity of Europe is in danger as Russia and China act

3 The only longer discussion of such an approach found due to the research was made by Olivier Dupius, a former member of the European Parliament, which then was a source for other scientific works (Dupius, 2017; Dupius, 2019). 4 As Johanna Mohring puts it in War on the Rocks: “Judging from past experience, there is the danger that current European defense cooperation efforts do not so much contribute to the creation or the reinforcement of autonomous European military capacities as to the production of symbolic political capital: proof of reactivity and sign of European unity for some, skillful staging of activity to cover up for the lack of credible investment to others.” Mohring, J (2020, January 28) The Three Elephants of European Security. War on the Rocks. Retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-three-elephants-of-european-security/

9 Introduction in the interest to divide the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO). Already lack of decisive action would bear the danger of becoming the plaything of

Europe for the global superpowers China and the US and the regional power Russia. Divides within Europe would make such a development even more severe.

With those perspectives approaches for substantially changing the European defence architecture and security policy become a current interest. Such a substantial step could be achieved by establishing European transnational armed forces. Therefore the research question of the thesis is:

“Has the approach for establishing European Transnational Armed Forces (ETAF) the potential to be a useful tool for joint European Foreign and Defence policy?”

The terms of the research question are derived from the purpose of armed forces on the national level. For example, the purpose of the German Bundeswehr is defined as tool for

Germany's foreign (Krause, U. (2013). Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik.

Springer) and security policy (Weißbuch 2016 Zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der

Bundeswehr, 2016, P.6, P. 9, P. 15). The term useful is taken, as it is of scientific interest, whether such an approach would raise the effectiveness of European foreign and security policy and whether it would add or reduce its problems and complexity. It is a useful tool if it adds effectiveness, reduces complexity and problems or at least does not add complexity in a disproportionate way.

The research question of the thesis is of high interest for politics and political science as it establishes a potential answer for crucial issues of European defence policy. The approach developed in this thesis gives European security a new perspective in a time where the status quo is not promising and the other potential answers European Army and NATO are given up

10 Introduction or at risk of losing substance. With the answers to the research question, the reader gets furthermore substantial insights to the severe security issues and their routes, the inner workings of transnational military units, into the legal and contractual bases of NATO and

CSDP and an overview of their institutions and their interactions which are also interesting for other topics. It is further becoming increasingly of interest as many contributions of the study also count for approaches by German Social Democrats and Radoslav Sikorski, former Polish foreign minister and member of the European Parliament for a transnational EU Brigade

(Vogel & Schulz, 2020, Parltrack, 2019).5

For the research two assumptions are made to give it a frame which gives a broad but also sharp frame. First is that the forces would be funded with at least 10 per cent of the defence expenditures of most of the actual EU and NATO members or between 0.2 and 0.3 per cent of

EU GDP. This assumption is made to give the analyses a broader scope than a research based on the proposals for the establishment of an EU brigade (Vogel, Schulz, 2020). It would open up opportunities of creating a force consisting of 50.000-100.000 soldiers. The second assumption is that ETAF is mainly tasked and build for conventional warfare. Aspects like nuclear deterrence and cybersecurity are left aside as they are subjects by themselves or unlikely aspects European transnational armed forces (ETAF) would be tasked with. Cyber defence remains mostly a domestic domain and also other entities could be tasked with these subjects then armed forces.6 The discussion about nuclear weapons is politically complicated

5 Ct. “Radosław SIKORSKI Motion for a resolution Paragraph 33 a (new) 33 a. Considers it necessary to reform the EU battlegroup concept so as to create an EU military unit based on volunteers coming from the Member States or associate countries, which would be at the disposal of the European Council and financed from the EU defence budget, complementing national military forces and compatible with NATO, in the frame of the mandate stemming from the relevant Treaty provisions.” He repeated that approach at the Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz 2020. 6 A good overview on cyber security can be found at The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces by Vincent Boulanin's study Cyber Capabilities.With a focus of the military use of cyber security Mathias Schulz gave a good analyzes in his study Cyber in War: Assessing the Strategic, Tactical, and Operational Utility of Military Cyber Operations for NATO CCDCOE Publications.

11 Introduction and also many other armed forces fulfil their tasks without the direct ownership over nuclear weapons. Therefore the research question can also be answered without special recognition of these two aspects.

Thesis Structure

The research question gives way for three main directions dealt with in this thesis. How is it accessible to the European defence architecture, can it and how can it contribute to face actual security challenges and is it practically possible? Therefore Chapter 1 Security Architecture of

Europe provides an introduction to the main actors NATO, European Union and member states and how they interact and which problems they are facing. This chapter has also descriptive elements, which contribute to the development of the thesis and give it a useful frame.

It is followed by Chapter 2 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces which analyses advantages of ETAF by being transnational, developing its deterring effect, recognising political-economic approaches and its ability to keep the transatlantic bonds strong by investing in ETAF linked to NATO. It analyses also the advantages the ETAF approach has compared to other approaches discussed under the titles “EU Army” or “European Army”.

Chapter 3 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF will discuss and develop options on how to embed the ETAF approach into the European security architecture based on the findings of the prior Chapters. An institutional embedment gets special attention as to be useful the ETAF approach has best go in line, sustain, and improve the actual defence architecture and at least not replace them without establishing an equal or even better supplement.

Chapter 4 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy analyses and explains key threats Europe faces in 2020 and which are likely to be also important in the future. This

12 Introduction contributes to Chapter 5 European Transnational Armed Forces which develops an approach for a capability built that could be of use to address them. Chapter 5 also contains an analysis on how the practical build-up could be realised concerning the training and equipment of the first units and the transition to a state where ETAF trains and equips its troops mostly in its own responsibility. It contains a subchapter that puts attention to the development of an approach how to fund ETAF. To estimate whether it is useful this first image on how a practical built up can look like, how this could help to face Europe's security challenges and how it can be funded contributes substantially on several ways to answer the research question. It shows how it can be useful and in a financial and practical way, that it is actually possible to do so, also by using actual and historic examples. Chapter 6 Challenges for ETAF analyses several challenges the ETAF approach would be faced with due to its characteristics and the security architecture of Europe and how they can be solved. Differences in strategic and tactical approaches, military culture, different alliance memberships among the potential ETAF states, legal aspects, potential competition over recruits, will find attention. Also geographic distances and their impact on soldiers and the recruitment of them will be discussed and anticipated as the likely competition for recruits between ETAF and national armies. The solutions developed in this chapter based on actual and historic examples serve the research question, as they also show, how the ETAF approach is actually possible and practicable. In this Introduction also the key terms “European”, “security” and “foreign policy” will be described and discussed, to show in which frame they are used for the rest of the thesis. The thesis is closed by a Conclusion which sums up the key results of the research, discusses which potential that the ETAF approach has and gives hints for further research.

13 Introduction

State of Research and Methodology

The thesis follows an analytical exploratory approach by putting attention on ETAF built up in addition to national armies, a topic which has not been focused by broader and repudiated scientific work so far. The study is developed mainly out of two bases, first the recognition of the legal and geopolitical status quo and second using historic and actual examples of transnational armed forces. These bases make reasonable adaptations concerning a legal and political embedment and a practical built up of ETAF possible and the development of thoughts on their practicability and possible challenges. The findings of the thesis are based on primary and secondary sources. The key secondary sources are: For aspects concerning actual security challenges, technological developments, and the institutional and practical aspects of the security architecture of Europe The Handbook of European Defence Policies and

Armed Forces edited by Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss is a key source.

Besides this actual research papers like Mutual Reinforcement CSDP and NATO in the Face of

Rising Challenges and 10 YEARS OF CSDP Four in-depth analyses requested by the Sub-

Committee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament (EP) contributed substantially to the development of this thesis while they stay in line with the state of the art of the scientific debate. For legal and institutional aspects concerning the European Union, the Research Handbook on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy edited by Steven

Blockmans and Panos Koutrakos and published in the book series Research Handbooks in

European Law has been a key source. A variety of aspects which are necessary to be recognised for a practical build-up of transnational armed forces are given within the book Eine einsatzfähige Armee für Europa. Die Zukunft der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und

Verteidigungspolitik nach Lissabon [trans. An operable Army for Europe. The Future of the joint

14 Introduction

Security and Defence Policy after Lisbon]. Here repudiated scholars, high ranked political and military individuals give their views and insights on the importance of the transatlantic relationship, legal issues, social aspects, and military culture.

As the topic is developing and has implications to the future, many sources are derived also from digital sources. Also, many of the primary sources are derived from the internet, as for example legal documents are open for public access. Among other sources white papers (like

Weißbuch 2016 Zur Sicherheitspolitik und Zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr, White Paper on the

Future of Europe, European Security Strategy (ESS), European Union Global Strategy (EUGS)) primary legal documents (like Lisbon Treaty, NATO founding document), reports (like NATO's

The Secretary General's Annual Report), and studies from NATO, EU and national governments, repudiated think tanks and scholars, key political speeches and important news articles from repudiated newspapers find recognition. Many aspects are further influenced by the lectures and discussions within prominent think-tanks and universities like CSIS, IISS and US Army

War College.

The impacts of the Corona crisis are difficult to be forecasted also on the subjects concerning this thesis. Most of the sources were written before the Corona crisis. Crisis in general can lead to innovation but also to military budget cuts. They also can lead to shifts in the geopolitical environment, which can influence again decision-making processes concerning military projects. The potential impacts of the corona crisis, therefore, will not be fully recognised within the thesis. At the date of submission, it is at least stated that the findings are still actual and that the Covid-19-pandemic so far has not overwritten the foundations and or even the details of the thesis.7 7 The only exception is chapter 5.3 Budget which is developed mainly linked to GDP numbers of the last 3 years. At the moment these economic numbers are in question for an indefinite time but will suit again, when an economic recovery is accomplished. Until then the estimated ETAF budget has do be estimated with a smaller scale or reach

15 Introduction

What is European Security and Foreign Policy? Specifications of Key Terms

For further research, two words need some specification, “European” and “security”.

The definition of Europe is a widely contested field. Europe could be among others defined politically, culturally, and geographically. Under these considerations, Europe could end at the borders of the EU, as they could end in Georgia or the Ural Mountains.

In this thesis for practical reasons, the term Europe counts mainly for all member states of the

European Union and all NATO states on the European continent. This group of states share many cultural, historic, and political similarities, face similar threats and are bound in mainly the same alliances and economic systems. Those aspects develop a high rate of correlation with the potential to outshine variations and divides. United they would have the potential to accumulate their economic and political power to face their security threats and to become a major player concerning international politics (Domröse 2011, P. 367). Therefore, it is interesting to examine their potential to engage united concerning the ETAF approach also because only cooperation of at least a large proportion of those states would give it the financial substance it needs to have a substantial impact. Therefore, it is interesting to examine their potential to engage united concerning the ETAF approach also because only cooperation of at least a large proportion of those states would give it the financial substance it needs to have a substantial impact. Even if also non-EU-NATO-states will find recognition, the thesis has a stronger focus on the 27 actual EU member states, as the EU provides legal and political structures in which the ETAF approach could be embedded.8

To exclude culturally and geographically European countries which are not members of EU or

its budget target by founding from stimulus packages or other financing. 8 Subchapter 6.3 Different Alliance Memberships and Military Neutrality will take a special focus on the special cases of states which are NATO Members but not EU countries, like the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) which is important in military and economic aspects and states which are EU Members but have a stance for military neutrality like Finland.

16 Introduction

NATO is done as their membership would not add much for the ETAF approach and would often be connected with the domestic problems, like in the case of Kosovo; with international problems, like in the case of Ukraine; or because of their stances for non-aligned status or military neutrality, like in the case of San Marino or Switzerland. To limit the scope of the definition also geographically on continental Europe has the advantage to define European security and foreign policy apart from the contradicting interests that for example Turkey follows and actions it implements (Brzozowski, 2019). The term “European” refers therefore to the states defined here in a positive and negative way and their assumed and described or actual accumulated interests.

The definitions of the term “security” are perhaps even wider and more contested then the term “Europe”. As the thesis follows as much as possible an empirical approach to develop an approach to solve actual problems of European foreign and security policy and to define opportunities for becoming more effective it follows a theory open course. This means that the findings of the thesis should add knowledge besides which theoretical glasses it is read by.

Besides this, it is assumed that theories concerning international relations suit more or less depending on the time and objective of a study. In 2020 and due to its objective, the study goes mostly in line with realist approaches or the Copenhagen School. It is assumed that the ability to act with the use of military means is important for a state or an entity consisting of states like the European Union to secure its territorial integrity, to implement its broader security interests and to be recognised in general in the field of foreign policy. To establish security and to secure the interest of a stately actor or a coalition of states means saving its citizens from threats coming from outside its borders, assure its territorial integrity, preventing outside actors to divide an alliance or establishing unrest within a society, ensure that its trade and

17 Introduction economic interests are not contested by violent actors.

This can be accomplished by many means of which military matters are one of. This thesis focuses on the perspective of how the establishment of European transnational armed forces can be used to be a useful tool of European foreign and security policy. Therefore, diplomatic actions, sanctions or means of soft power play a secondary role.

To concentrate on the aspect of military means is especially interesting in times in which the liberal order loses ground. Continuous breaks of international law, whether in Syria, Ukraine and Georgia show that hard power matters. This is also recognised by many political strategy papers like the Weißbuch 2016 Zur Sicherheitspolitik und Zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr. There it is stated that there is a renaissance of classic power politics and also the European Union underwent at least in its strategic documents on foreign and security policy a shift away from value-based soft power measures to pragmatic recognition of its security interests and broader interests by the means of hard power (Bendiek, 2017 P. 14). Also, Josep Borell the actual High Representative of the European Union (HR) stated in June 2020, “Virtuous ´soft power´ is no longer enough in today's world. We need to complement it with a ´hard power´ dimension” (Borelli, 2020). The thesis provides an approach how this “hard power” dimension can be shaped and integrated in political structures. It is not said that military means are the only or in all aspects the best means of foreign policy. It is just stated that they are necessary to act in many areas of security policy or to ensure the interests of a state or an actor like the

EU in international politics. This limitation is chosen to focus the research on its objective

ETAF and because the actual developments described.

Besides security interests, foreign policy follows also other interests. This thesis is focusing on the research question for being a usable tool for joint European foreign policy mainly on the

18 Introduction aspects of ensuring security interests. Secondary the improvement of achieving goals in international politics by status given by international recognition as a capable military power is also assumed. All other interests an actor in international politics could achieve with a foreign policy that uses military means receive no further attention to limit the scope of the research and security interests are already a valuable objective.

19 Security Architecture of Europe

1 Security Architecture of Europe

To understand the actual security architecture and to take it into account it is necessary to answer the research question as a built up of ETAF must work with and within it and best to improve it. With “security architecture of Europe” is referred to important entities like alliances and tendencies which drive and impact European actors and the European actors themselves which contribute to the European Security infrastructure. An understanding of the

CFSP and NATO its main actors and institutions is important, as they provide a likely framework for ETAF. The following chapters will be built on the bases developed here and show where integrations and adaptations of the actual status quo are possible and necessary and how the ETAF approach can be connected to or create improvements in this security architecture. Therefore, this chapter is organized in three sections. 2.1 deals with the

European Union and its CFSP, 2.2 with NATO and 2.3 recognises key actors and developments on the national level. The chapter gives overviews over the development of NATO and the

CFSP in the last 30 years and their entities and actors with a focus on aspects that contribute to the research question.

More detailed descriptions of those developments and its actors are found within the scientific works of highly repudiated scholars in the books The Handbook of European Defence

Policies & Armed Forces and Strategic Autonomy and the Defence of Europe. For a broader and detailed overview over all institutions that contribute to the CFSP and on which legal bases the Research Handbook on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy is an equally promising reading.

20 Security Architecture of Europe

1.1 The European Union and CFSP

The European Union and its member states are one actor on European security policy with a differentiated legal and institutional body. In the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 the actions and entities connected to the EU's foreign policy got their name and in most cases also their tasks and responsibilities as they are today. Important aspects of the treaty base of the CFSP are

Article 2(4) TFEU9 and Article 24(2) TEU10 while its goals are specified in Article 21 TEU.11

These articles convey for the EU's foreign policy an high approach. The member states should

9 The Union shall have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. (Article 2(4) TFEU) 10 Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever- increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions. (Article 24(2) TEU) 11 1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations. 2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. 3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies. The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect. (Article 21 TEU)

21 Security Architecture of Europe act jointly within the European Union and the Union itself is described as an independent and discussion-making actor. It is even stated that the member states should work accordantly to this policy by the EU and should not work against it.

This was not achieved or followed mainly due to two reasons. First the decisions concerning the CFSP are made by the European Council, consistent of the member states of the European

Union. They decide concerning aspects of CFSP unanimously. This gives not just each state the ability to veto against all measures not suiting its interests. It also gives each member state bargaining power concerning CFSP decisions to achieve other interests. Beside this it is discussed whether contradicting actions of a state against CFSP decisions would fall under EU jurisdiction, but such decisions are still not taken (Wessel, 2015, P.16). Those both aspects condemn the CFSP to remain mostly on the level of the smallest common denominator and even if agreements are made, they could still be side-lined by the member states. The support of France for the fraction military lead by General Haftar, the opponent to the side the EU is supporting in the Libyan Civil War is an example for this.

The CFSP contains a variety of institutions, positions and entities which interact in an even bigger variety of interdependencies of giving advice, chairing councils and controlling processes. Many functions are also given to two or more entities, like the external representation, a duty shared by the HR, the president of the European Council, the president of the European Parliament and the President of the Commission. Therefore the “EU external representation remains a puzzle for all but the closest observers.” (Hillion & Wessel, 2018, P.

63).

22 Security Architecture of Europe

1.1.1 Developments of CFSP Since 1990

When in 1990 the Cold War ended, in Europe was a highly armed continent as the former

Warsaw Pact members and the NATO members had prepared for a large scale conventional war against each other. While the Warsaw Pact diminished there had been question marks for the purpose of European defence architecture and an incentive to decrease military spending as the main opponent disappeared. On both sides of the former iron curtain states introduced the “peace dividend” by reducing their defence spendings and also the size and capabilities of their armed forces (Meijer & Wyss, 2018, P. 8; Roberts, 2018, P. 564; Uttley, 2018 P. 682). Still in NATO the Western European Union (WEU)12 declared 1992 the Petersberg Tasks which later became part of the EU Treaties. Capabilities should be developed and used for humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions and for military crisis management including peacemaking.13 The Yugoslav Wars showed that these efforts had not led to effective results. It also showed that neither European and NATO gave the base for sufficient strategic action to secure peace by preventing conflicts to emerge even on the European continent

(Hyde-Prince, 2018, P.395). In the WEU rose up the call for own military capabilities for crisis- management and stabilization operations (Hyde-Prince, 2018, P. 396).This calls found its transition in the Cologne EU Summit in June and the Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999. It had been made clear that future European military capabilities would not set as rival to NATO and that the both alliances should stand in cooperation. The Western European Union set up

12 The WEU was a Western European defensive alliance. With the development of CFSP in 1998 its structures got integrated in this new institutional frame and it it lost its tasks. The WEU formally seized to exist in 2011. 13 (Article 43 TEU)”The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”

23 Security Architecture of Europe the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which had been renamed to Common

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007.

The year 1999 saw also the EU Helsinki summit, which set up the structures and functions of future military involvement on European and NATO level. Small scale operations should commanded directly by the EU, medium sized by one member state who acts as lead nation which provides a headquarter and legal frame from which allied contribution are coordinated while larger scale operations should use NATO structures (Hyde-Prince, 2018, P. 397). The also proclaimed goal for an European Rapid Reaction Force consistent of up to, “60,000 troops deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year“ was never established an given up

(Fahron-Hussey, P. 45.).

The Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 between NATO and EU specified the already established cooperation. The NATO headquarter system got opened for EU military missions as long as there is no NATO mission in the same state. Thirty four monitoring and stability missions had been led by the EU in the last three decades, but the most of them directly during the first ten years after the Helsinki summit. The use of the EU as coordinating structure decreased since then and also the scale of those missions (Mejer & Wyss, 2018, P. 400). Those missions and actions did not prevent however that the security situation around Europe worsened.

Strategy Papers

Another big development in the second millennium was the development of strategic papers concerning neighbour policy, EU-foreign policy and security policy. After the Iraq War, which showed a partial divide between EU-Member interests and US-interests as most important

NATO member, EU set up the European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS developed the guideline CFSP should be based and focused on. Its key aspects had been achieving European

24 Security Architecture of Europe security by winning its neighbours as partners to transform them through binding them in EU structures and spreading EU-values by soft power. (Bendiek, 2017, P. 7). The limits of this approach had been shown by the Arab spring, which destabilized North Africa and the Middle

East and the aggressions of Russia in Georgia and Ukraine(Bendiek, 2018, P.64, P.65).

In 2016 the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) succeeded the (ESS) and recognised these developments. It includes a stronger turn on stability to detriment of value-based transformation (Bendiek, 2017 P. 14). Another important shift within the CFSP was the stance for European “strategic autonomy”. Europe should develop force to maintain missions on its own initiative outside of the NATO-framework. The joint and reciprocal stability missions in

Mali where NATO is not involved and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in which most EU states coordinate multilateral armament and capability projects are examples of this approach. Defends budgets are slightly growing since 2014, there is now a profound base of cooperation and experiences between European armed forces and an institutional and administrative body is developed. Nevertheless, “strategic autonomy remains a distant ideal.”

(Meijer & Wyss, 2018, P. 1). The defence efforts are not closing the capability gaps, NATO remains crucial for defence and the divide of interests between EU-Member states in the

Council is not closed. Also, a substantial synchronisation in armament efforts is not achieved comparable to the one within the US (Meijer & Wyss, 2018, P. 1, P.2).

There is also criticism, that an unrealistic approach of strategic autonomy is discussed, while the most important actor for mutual and territorial defence remains the USA within NATO. UK and states bordering Russia are criticising this stance cause of fears it could danger the transatlantic relationship (Major, 2019, P. 17, P. 18). Nevertheless, the UK which undermined approaches to give CFSP more substance left the EU, which opened up the window to make

25 Security Architecture of Europe steps into the direction expressed in the global strategy. PESCO and the approach to establish an EU headquarter system are examples of this. There are signals that practical strategic autonomy has not to be a danger for the NATO-alliance. Already the Berlin Plus Agreement of

2002 stated that Europe should become more responsible for its security. The Joint

Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation of 2018 then included that efforts made by the CFSP are welcomed and could even go in line of NATO members NATO contributions. So, it would be good times to develop strategic autonomy for Europe with and inside NATO.

1.1.2 CFSP Institutions

The European Council

The European Council is the the main institutions of the CFSP and CSDP. Its voting participants are the Heads of Governments of the EU Member states. Also, Members of the council are the

President of the European Commission,14 the High Representative and its own President of the

Council, but have no voting right. Its role is to “provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof”

(Art 15 TEU). This also concerning the CFSP. It meets annually all three months but can also

14 European Commission: The European Commission is a supranational EU entity and builds the executive in the EU framework. The Commission is set up by deputies for each member state, which get approved by the EU parliament. Even if the Commission as institution is representing the EU in foreign affairs, it is legally not involved in the CFSP policy based on the EU treaties (Marquardt, 2018, P. 27). That does not mean that some of its tasks are connected to what is seen as Foreign policy, such as trade policy, development cooperation, humanitarian affairs or the EU neighbourhood policy. Nevertheless it has some influence which it intends to do increase. The one way of influence is by the political statements and approaches that are connected to the GDSP. For example Juncker influenced the debate by his White Paper on the Future of Europe when he made a stance for a deeper connection concerning security policy. Their influence on CFSP and their competences is provided by the funding of several of its institutions out of EU budget and the establishment of new ones like the EDF. The European Commission is an active agent the member states seek to keep under control (Heldt, 2017, P. 481). To give ETAF under the responsibility of the Commission is therefore unlikely from an EUCO perspective.

26 Security Architecture of Europe meet for extraordinary meetings, like in the Ukrainian crisis. Decisions are made concerning aspects of CFSP by consensus (Marquardt, 2018, P. 23). Within the Council the HR has initiative functions as he can propose actions as military or security operations, or sanctions.

The council decides over these proposals made by the HR or other members within the

Council. The Council is also tasked with the development and ratifying of international agreements for the EU (Article 218 TFEU) and over EU-sanctions.

Concerning CFSP the council appoints its own President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and President of the European Commission. The

Council is one of the several entities representing the EU. These three represent the European

Union in foreign affairs. Beside the HR the council also appoints a directly CFSP connected position: the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, an institution build up by the general staffs of the member states which gives advice to the High Representative and the

Political and Security Committee (PSC).

Its decisions concerning CFSP are on the same level as legal acts while it is not bound by the

CJEU of the European Union or the ECtHR (Hillion & Wessel, 2018, P. 76). If there would be no political and strategic divide within the council members, it would be a powerful tool in

European foreign and defence policy.

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) appointed by the European Council and elected by the European parliament is representing the EU in

Foreign Affairs, in a role analogous to a foreign minister. He has together with the member states the right to initiate decisions in the European council (Art 30 TEU). The HR contributes to the development of CFSP by proposals and by implementing the decisions of the Council

27 Security Architecture of Europe

(Art 18(2), 27 TEU). To do so it is supported by and is head of the EEAS, PSC, European Union

Military Staff, European Defence Agency (EDA) and advised by European Union Military

Committee, the Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and he is head of the

EU Council of Foreign Affairs (the council of all EU foreign ministers).

With these competences the HR is central for the implementation of the decisions of the

Council and for the CFSP in general. While in the EU the policy areas of foreign policy remain spread on many actors and institutions, the HR acts as a bridge between all fields of EU foreign policy. He is also vice president of the Commission, which underlines its role. Its role in commission and council are gives the HR the attribute to be the so-called ´double-hat´

(Marquardt, 2018, P. 25, P. 25). The far reaching formulation that the HR conducts to the CFSP and CSDP and the chief of a variety of institutions gives him on the first view many opportunities of independently influence those policies. This gives space for agency problem and agency drift worries the member states. They use their ability to set rules concerning the administration and competence of EU entities and measures like understaffing to keep the HR and other entities in check (Hillion & Wessel, 2018, P. 52, P. 53, P. 63).

European External Action Service (EEAS)

EEAS is an institution built up by EU and member states officials. It was set up 2010 by the

European Councils (EEAS Decision) based on (Article 27(3) TEU). It is under the authority of the HR. Its main tasks are to support the HR in his work for the CFSP and his position as

President of the FAC as VP of the Commission. Beside this it is also an administrative body for the European Commission and assists “the President of the EUCO, the president of the

European Commission and the Commission in the exercise of their functions in the area of external relations (Article 2.2 of the EEAS Decision). Another role of the EEAS is to program

28 Security Architecture of Europe the external assistance instruments (Article 9 of the EEAS decision). Together with the EDA it builds the Secretariat of PESCO. For ETAF the EEAS could play a role to define the strategic guidelines.

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC)

The European Union Military Committee is set up by the Chiefs of Defence of the EU Member states. For EU-NATO members in most cases they serve also in the NATO Military Committee.

It advises the HR and the PSC in military matters. With the subordinate Military Staff of the

European Union (EUMS) it implements EU military operations. The EUMC can play a key role in establishing guidelines for the capability build up, tactical approach and military culture of

ETAF.

European Defence Agency (EDA)

The European Defence Agency (EDA) has the task to build up synergies among the EU member states concerning armament and capability building. It is headed by the HR and reports to the EUCO. It established the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) which analyses the capabilities of the CFSP members and the progresses made concerning mutual goals and the Capability Development Plan, which has an advising function for European

Decision makers concerning defence and especially armament policy. It is part of the implementation processes of PESCO. The expertise sustained in the EDA could be of use in establishing the guidelines of a potential capability built up of ETAF.

29 Security Architecture of Europe

1.2 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is mainly a military but also a political alliance built up in the Cold War to defend Western Europe against military aggressions and political influence by the USSR and its satellite states in the Warsaw pact. The core of this alliance is Article 5 15 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT), its founding document of 1949. It declares that an armed attack on one of its member states is considered and answered as attack on all member states.

It consists out of several institutions that build up a military hierarchy and political exchange structures, that organize military exercises among the member states and with partners, that analyse and propose military standardisations and joint investments in armaments.

1.2.1 Developments Since 1990 for NATO

In the last three decades NATO saw two strategic shifts: first leaving the approach for large scale conflict with the Soviet Union and territorial defence to out of area missions or non-

Article 5 missions. The new main task was to establish stability missions within the neighbourhood of Europe or outside even outside. After the terrorist attacks on 911 this non-

Article 5 missions became the main focus NATO planned for.16 The time between 1990 and

2014 saw beside this shift in focus also decreased defence spending (European Parliament,

15 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (Article 5, NAT) 16 “we have approved a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO's Strategic Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come.” This quote from the NATO Prague Summit Declaration gives an insight to this shift of focus.

30 Security Architecture of Europe

2018), new diplomatic fora like the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the NATO Russia council; the Eastern Enlargement to former Warsaw Pact members like Poland, Czech Republic,

Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states and partnership programs to other parts of the former Soviet Union like Georgia.

This changed when the traditional task of territorial defence became more prominent after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the support for separatists in the Donbass region.

Manifestations of this shift are an increase in NATO exercises, the proclamation of the 2 per cent target for military spending and the built up of the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence. A permanent stationing of multinational units of a strength of 1000 soldiers in the three Baltic states and Poland. The composition of this troops consists of rotating releases of units by

NATO members. Beside this the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) got approved in

2014 at the NATO summit in Wales. Its goal is to keep a force with a strength of between 5000 up to 10000 soldiers in a level of high state of readiness to react fast on crisis. They should be deployable between in at least three days. These aspects are relevant as it will be examined in

Chapter 4 how these obligations can be implemented within the ETAF approach.

While the bigger political obstacles resulted during and after the US presidential elections

2016 in which Donald Trump questioned the alliance in general and connected the pledge of mutual defence on the investments of the NATO partners.17 Quotes from the European side also questioned the alliance, as Merkel said 2017 that “The times in which we could completely depend on others are on the way out.”18 or Macrons approach to establish a

17 Ct. (2020). Donald Trump questions US role in Nato. In, Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/2695854c-efaf-11e5-a609-e9f2438ee05b 18 Ct. (2017). Merkel: Europe 'can no longer rely on allies' after Trump and Brexit. In CNBC. Retrieved fromhttps://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40078183

31 Security Architecture of Europe

European Army with the US as potential competitor19 or attest “brain death” to NATO

(Erlanger, 2019). The actual policy from the US side on the contrary was an increased investment in NATO (Major, 2019, P.16) and engagement in Europe. Its relaying on the 2 per cent target also resulted in increased investments in the defence sector what could be seen in the NATO Annual Reports. Another development important for the security policy in Europe and also the NATO alliance is the increased attention the US is putting on the Pacific Arena to oppose Chinas rise in that region (Brustlein, 2019, P.14). This will likely reduce the efforts the

US can afford to spend in the European arena which in any case faces European decision makers to invest more in European security. Beside the political divides and the trends described NATO remains a crucial aspect for the European security architecture. It puts together a set of countries which consists together over the world´s highest economic and military power (Heinrich, 2020).

The ETAF approach could be designed to strengthen the bounds between Europe and the US by linking it to NATO. At the same time it would give Europe a level of strategic autonomy by establishing forces that could sustain joint missions outside the NATO framework. This must not conflict but merely follow in line with NATO approaches to give more responsibility for the security of Europe to European actors.

19 Ct. (2018). Macron calls for ‘true European army’ to defend against Russia, US, China. In Euraktiv. Retrieved from https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/macron-calls-for-european-army-to- defend-against-russia-us-china/

32 Security Architecture of Europe

1.2.2 NATO Institutions

The North Atlantic Council

The North Atlantic Councils consists of Representatives of its member states. Its responsibilities are to decide over the political guidelines of the alliance. This consists of other aspects to decide over invitation and admission of new members, the strategic approach in front of security challenges and goals that should be achieved jointly. Beside this it chooses the

Secretary General of NATO which is the civil chief of NATO. He acts as spokesperson of the alliances and has responsibilities over the work of the several administrative institutions.

Among those is the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Committee, which advice the NAC and analyse the capabilities and achievements within the framework of NATO.

The Military Committee

The NATO Military Committee is composed by the Chiefs of Defence of the alliance members or their high ranked military representatives. They give input to the Defence Planning

Committee and the Nuclear Planning Committee and are advising the NAC in military matters.

By doing so they contribute to the strategic planning of the alliance. It is supported in this work by the International Military Staff.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe consists of the Allied Command

Transformation (ACT) and the Allied Command Operations (ACO) both strategic of the NATO.

The ACT develops plans to realise the capability decisions made by the NAC and plans NATO.

The ACO is the command structure of all NATO missions. Chief of SHAPE is the Supreme Allied

33 Security Architecture of Europe

Commander Europe (SACEUR). This position is always seated by a US military with a rank of a four star general. His deputy the Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR) is head of ACO and always British or German four star general. Head of ACT is since 2009 always a

French four star general.

1.3 European States in the European Security Architecture

The European states remain important actors in the field of international politics and especially the area of defence policy. They have in aspects diverging interests and follow different strategic paths, in scope and direction. There are several mini-lateral and multilateral alliances developed outside the framework of CSDP. Among the most important are the bilateral relationships that especially the Eastern European states are establishing to the US to further reassure its goodwill in addition to their NATO membership. Even if the bounds to the most important NATO member the US have strengthened this questions indirectly also NATO as the alliance is at risk to lose importance by those measures when the fundamental decisions are no longer made within its institutions (Major, 2019, P. 17). This stances for stronger relationships are also a shift away from the CFSP. This subchapter will put a focus on the most important actors and developments concerning European state actors and their mini-lateral-and bi-lateral cooperation. For a more detailed view on the several defence policies and military capabilities of most European states the Handbook of European Defence

Policies and Armed Forces, published in 2018, is a rich source. With a focus on the positions on

European security policy Strategic Autonomy and the Defence of Europe: On the Road to a

34 Security Architecture of Europe

European Army?, published in 2017, examines for all EU member states their defence policies and capabilities.

The strong alliance between France and Germany is often referred to as the motor of Europe.

They are responsible for large portions of the EU's population, GDP and build up between 40 and 50 per cent of the of defence spending within the EU (Mathis, 2018). In 2019 it was prominently reassured and deepened with the Aachen Treaty even if the proclamations within it still must show their impact in the future. Actual fruits of this alliance are the French

German Brigade and joint projects of armament like the Main Ground Combat System a successor for the actual main battle tanks in Europe and the Alternative Future Combat Air

System a successor for the Euro Fighter. Nevertheless they are often divided into questions about strategic approaches concerning the EU as a whole and CFSP, especially concerning relationships to the US, on the delivery of weapon systems outside the EU and have different tactical and strategic traditions.

In the case of Germany worth to mention are, besides its strong relationship to France, it's cooperation with smaller countries especially with the Netherlands concerning armoured and amphibious capabilities. Beside this well established and deep cooperation, the increased synchronisation with Poland concerning tanks did not make so much progress so far due to restructuring measures within the Polish army (Müller, 2018).

The Lancaster House Treaties of 2010 are a strong military cooperation between France and the United Kingdom. It stretches the fields of Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship, establishment of joint forces, capability management by building up synergies and development projects. Fruits of this alliance are the joint development of the UAV Telemos and the build-up of the Combined

35 Security Architecture of Europe

Joint Expeditionary Force (Mills, 2018).

All of those partnerships are signals for centrifugal forces away from the CSDP and also partially between the European major contributors, as Germany is not part of the Lancaster

House Treaty which has a completely different and further character then the so far accomplished steps between Germany and France. Beside their bilateral agreements, each of those three most important European states for the European security architecture follows its individual strategic approach to CFSP and NATO. While France takes stances for a wide range of European strategic autonomy – under French dominance (Lippert & Ondarza & Perthes,

2019, P. 12), the UK signalled already before leaving the EU that it sees NATO as the most important aspect of European security architecture. Both having the will to stay important actors internationally and this also outside the multilateral frameworks. These two tendencies combined in an ambition of national power stay in front of a Germany that did not found a role as a substantial contributor and designer for the security architecture of Europe (Möhring,

2020). Some explain this as a result of Germany's history but this argument is not valid as

Germany showed in its first decades much more ambition concerning military involvements and also in the last two decades there had been voices to become a factor recognising its economic and military potential. But this voices merely became silent which is more a result of domestic politics and a tendency of leading German politicians and parts of the administrative body to avoid strategic thinking.

Another aspect worth to mention is that CSDP is not just limited in scope but that in some instances European states follow conflicting approaches. As the EU member states are not legally limited in their sovereignty concerning foreign policy and the same is true for NATO it also appears that contradicting actions are taken. Most prominently was the participation in

36 Security Architecture of Europe the Iraq War of 2008 or the interactions within the Libyan Civil War, where especially Italy and

France are involved on different sides (Lacher, 2019).

1.4 Analyses and Derivations of the Chapter-Findings

This chapter explained the functionality and development of CFSP and NATO and the role of significant member states. Both alliances face internal divides and weaknesses. In the NATO the political divide and the reciprocal questioning of the credibility concerning mutual defence between the member states are the most prominent. In CFSP it is a general lack of cohesion and ambition while tendencies emerge that go away from the supranational level for more regional and multilateral approaches (Bendiek, 2018, P. 24).

The most prominent difference between NATO and CFSP is that the first is a military institution which later became also reluctant to pronounce political goals, while the CFSP emerged out of a political entity which increasingly becomes more invested in foreign and security policy. As their members widely overlap and the same counts for accumulated threat perceptions also their strategic approaches underwent similar developments and shaping.

After the end of the Cold War, they became mostly focused on out of area missions on the detriment of territorial defence until 2014. Then it shifted to approaches that give both fields more equal attention. But while there are many similarities in the approaches, and they cooperate both institutions are developing and acting widely separated in many fields. The armament and capability planning processes are just connected informally (Brustlein, 2019,

P.30) and a joint operational planning or a clear division of labour is not achieved (Fahron-

37 Security Architecture of Europe

Hussey, 2019 P. 4 ff).

But while the memberships of NATO and CFSP widely overlap it has also to be stated that some NATO members are not European countries at least by the definition of this thesis.

Therefore the accumulated interests within NATO are not congruent to the ones of Europe and even more severe, the veto power of NATO member states counts also for non-European states which are in its character a limitation to a joint European foreign policy. Further, as NATO is more a military alliance then a political alliance and foreign policy are the competence of politics the establishment of ETAF referring to the research question is assumed to be established within the framework of the European Union or a new framework established by

European states. But the similarities in the approaches and recognizing the importance of both institutions for the European defence architecture a link of ETAF to both NATO and CFSP is assumed to be beneficial in line with the research question. Such a link can also contribute to the harmonization of those institutions, their approaches, and their processes.

Concerning the implementation of operations both organizations established frameworks for joint operations; it has to be recognised that in general the most and especially the most cost and risk intensive missions had been deployed by coalitions of the willing/ ad hoc coalitions or by state actors on their behalves. For example, the Invasion of Iraq 2003, Opération Serval

2013, International military intervention against ISIL 2014 and even the military intervention in Libya 2011 started as mission by a coalition if the willing. This is recognising that state actors who are facing high efforts and risks by implementing larger-scale missions prefer to rely on themselves or keep the number of decision-making actors small. It is also recognising the fact that an agreement on a joint mission and their goals is easier to be found in a smaller than a larger number of decision-making actors, especially if all the actors like within NATO

38 Security Architecture of Europe and CFSP can veto an approach.

The ETAF approach could improve joint military action in the way that the deployment of

ETAF would not set any member state under a relatively high risk of losing soldiers and to suffer a relative high financial burden if the budget is funded equally. Therefore, joint

European foreign policy would have a tool easier to decide for use. With ETAF for many missions the search for an implementing force would not be depending on the efforts of a small portion of its member states as ETAF would be able to implement missions on its own or as framework force. As Chapter 3 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF will show there are further options how the ETAF approach can be connected to eased decision making processes if the use of ETAF would be given to a supranational entity or if the decision making process of

ETAF would not require an unanimous vote. Such eased decision making processes could be realised easier with the ETAF approach, as it would put member states at risk to lose the decision making power of its own national armed forces.

39 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces

2 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces

The establishment of ETAF as force established by the contributions of European states consists of its characteristics of advantages compared to national armies and the wider discussed approaches for a European Army. This chapter analyses four of them, alliance strengthening and deterrence, reduce of the political bargain and potential institutional efficiency and political unification.

Besides the ability to fill up of capability gaps realized in ETAF European transnational armed forces can have special advantages for European security infrastructure and its political and and military alliances. They are the deepening of alliances and deterrence, the reduction of political negotiation costs and the probability that this could increase unified acting, besides a likely increase in cultural unity. This analysis is followed by a discussion referring to the wider examined approaches under the headline “European Army”.

2.1 Advantages of ETAF Given by its Characteristics

2.1.1 Alliance Strengthening and Deterrence

The establishment of ETAF as force established by the contributions of European states consists of its characteristics of advantages compared to national armies and the wider discussed approaches for a European Army. This chapter analyses four of them, alliance strengthening and deterrence, reduce of the political bargain and potential institutional efficiency and political unification.

Besides the ability to fill up of capability gaps realized in ETAF European transnational armed

40 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces forces can have special advantages for European security infrastructure and all military or political alliances are not just as strong as the sum as their parts. The strength of alliances and the benefits especially of deterring alliances are highly connected to the credibility of those alliances. This can be explained economically or empirically. The economic explanation bases on the assumption that the benefits offered by an alliance as deterrence through accumulated power full fill the criteria of public goods (Hartley P. 50f, P.73) and also the problems of free- riding (Hartley, P. 77). While a member has a natural interest of profit of the deterrence and alliance provides by the formal accumulation of conventional and nuclear capabilities provided by the sum of its members as it decreases its individual risk, in the case of war members could have the incentive not to follow their obligations as this would increase the risk of losses from military conflict. But if the reliability of an alliance is questioned also its accumulated power. An aggressor can therefor assume that an attack would not that risky. An empirical example could be that as France in 1938 did not stand reliable on their assurance to help Czechoslovakia in case of invasion of its territory Hitler counted with that in the case of an invasion of Poland this assurance would also not count (Hofer, 1960).

To prevent such tendencies alliances can increase the liability on their obligations by several measures, one of them stationing troupes out of the alliances to the territory of threatened members (Leeds, 2003, P. 808). A historic example for this measure had been the so-called

Berlin-Brigades as “tripwire” in West Berlin. If West Berlin would be attacked by the Warsaw

Pact members, they would automatically collide with the troupes stationed by the USA and the

UK which would make it much more likely also for the aggressor that the alliance into practice than without having them involved. An actual example is the NATO joint battalions on the eastern border of NATO which full fill a similar role as the Berlin Brigades: too weak to be a

41 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces substantial military factor they limit the chances for limited conflict as an attack to this multinational battalions or already to harm them by incidence would make an entry of the sending countries much more likely.

A set up of European transnational armed forces and its deployments in threatened territories would full fill this aspect in a fundamental way. They would be consistent of soldiers out of all

ETAF states, whether the states of the soldier's descendants are small or big, close or in distance. This would make it much more likely that for example, Mediterranean states would join to help the Baltic states substantially in case of a Russian attack. This is doubted by many that this would occur in the state of the art of the alliance systems. Not just Lithuania would be attacked, but also Spain, through the Spanish soldiers within ETAF. ETAF would bring these benefits within a more substantial way compared to the NATO Battle groups which only consist of a fraction of NATO members. Also, its political and military alliances. They are the deepening of alliances and deterrence, the reduction of political negotiation costs and the probability that this could increase unified acting, besides a likely increase in cultural unity.

This analysis is followed by a discussion referring to the wider examined approaches under the headline “European Army”.

2.1.2 ETAF as Framework Nation and Strategic Enabler

As showed in Chapter 2 within the security architecture of Europe most deployments of large scale are implemented by ad hoc coalitions and actions by individual states. This is not due to a lack of treaty basis within CFSP but for the fact that the acting within CFSP adds no substantial practical benefits besides the Athena mechanism while it increases political efforts

42 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces for state actors capable to implement a mission. Or from the opposite, CFSP is not the initiator of such missions as it is dependent on capable state actors which have not a natural incentive to connect the risks of a large scale mission with the equal say of the other members within the European Council.

As the ETAF approach would be built on a budget equal to the budget of one of potential framework nations like Italy, France and Germany the search for a force to implement a mission within the framework of CFSP would become easier for the members of the European

Council or any other deciding entity for joint European security policy. With an economic perspective (Olson, 2002) there would be even an incentive for a preferable use of ETAF instead of national armies. As the financial efforts are spread but obligatory the use of ETAF on the interest of a member state is a relative gain. Not to use it would mean the loss of the obligatory regular payments without achieving something. Even if the costs for the implantation of a mission would increase the obligatory payments the interest can be achieved fully with a successful operation for the several states while the increase in financial effort is divided among them. This is likely to lead to a tendency that ETAF members would lobby to use ETAF for missions which are in their interests.

Besides the aspect of ETAF as sole actor implementing a mission or as a lead nation where just minor support is given by other actors (Kirsch, 2011, P.477f) ETAF could also take the tasks given by the EU Framework Nation Concept. ETAF would, therefore, provide logistics and staff for missions implemented by or together with member states. This would especially open up the opportunity for coalitions of smaller states to act substantially within the framework of

ETAF. Another aspect how the ETAF approach would be likely to increase the scope of missions within the framework of CFSP is if it provides enabling capabilities like

43 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces reconnaissance, logistics and tanker plains, logistics in general, special forces, pioneers which coalitions of states or sole actors need to rely on. This would make ETAF an attractive partner as most countries do not have that at hand and ETAF could be with the right decision-making process a more reliable partner then the pooling and sharing projects which are established so far. These are burdened with one of the multinational traps: the fear that a mission must be aborted or a capability can no longer be sustained because a partner withdraws from the mission (Mölling, 2012, P. 3). This became severe when Germany withdraw their AWACS planes from the multinational NATO Boeing E-3 Sentry Component in 2011 because the

German parliament did not was in line with missions in Libya and Afghanistan (Krause, 2015,

P. 6).

2.1.3 Political Unification – Armed Forces as Contributor to European

Identity

As a side effect, ETAF is also likely to increase European political and mental unity. The joint military service and war experience had been founding stones of many countries (Crotty,

2020). Besides the solidarity born in united military operations the training and regular service is likely to have a unifying role as people of all-around Europe would serve in mixed units. They naturally would get to know and exchange each other and regions outside their home countries. These effects are seen and wanted by the ERASMUS program or the European social service. Further likely contributions to European identity by ETAF can be gained by derivation from the results of Kristine Mitchell's Rethinking the ‘Erasmus Effect’ on European

Identity Mitchell, 2014). Especially interesting is that ETAF as “Erasmus in uniform” is likely to

44 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces appeal to a set of people which differs from previous exchange programs. The aspect of contributing to an entity is an important aspect for security policy, as this identity contributes further to European unity, an aspect which is threatened by Russian and Chinese measures to play European countries and nations against each other.

2.2 Counterarguments to European Army Approaches Compared

to ETAF

With a look at those advantages, the question may arise why not to accomplish this under the approaches discussed under the headline European Army. These approaches can be summed up in two main categories which will be framed for the sake of distinction here “merge approach” and “integration approaches”: the “merge approach” means to merge all European armed forces into one with one budget. Compared to these options the ETAF approach is limited concerning its size and budget and consequences. The political leadership would fall under an EU entity (Albani & Brantner, 2011, p. 94 ff). The “integration approaches” keep the national armies as organizational entities but intend to put them more under EU institutions charge while mostly using common armament and other measures of harmonization. This could be achieved by keeping within the national armed forces units for the disposal for an EU entity (Albani & Brantner, 2011, p. 100 ff) or changes concerning the general competence of

EU entities which would give the national armies in general to the disposal of an EU entity

(Dupuis, 2017).

The scientific debate discarded these approaches widely (Krause, 2015 P. 37; Krause 2019; P.

5, Fröhlich, P. 166, Toucas, 2016, Albani & Brantner, 2011, P. 104, Brok & Ahumada, 2011 P.

45 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces

285 f), while even the publications of the European Parliament meanwhile talk about the“EU army myth” (European Parliament, 2019). Others see it as a possibility for the far future. It remains a frequently, in the last time fewer, proclaimed goal, which had no real political impact so far and serves more as a pro-European statement by political actors than a consistent and serious plan for the future. This is said in front of the possible gains: reduced expenditure by getting rid of double structures and double capacities and in the fields of armament and technology by scale effects. It also could contain the gains explained above: strengthening alliances, ease up decision-making processes and political-/ cultural unification factor of European military for a European identity. Nevertheless, the approaches for an “EU army” or “European Army” are connected to high hurdles of which five repeatedly discussed will be analysed here. Afterwards the advantages of the ETAF approach will be explained in comparison to the hurdles for the “European Army approaches.

2.2.1 Five Hurdles for the European Army Approaches20

1. Aspects of Sovereignty and Identity

To sustain national armed forces is a key characteristic of a sovereign state. Besides a few examples, this did not lose its actuality (Röder, 2019; Gareis, 2011, p. 457). It is also a tool for foreign policy on which states want continuously rely on. With the merge approach, this would disappear, with the integration approach this would be widely reduced. Beside this armies contribute to the identity of a state which would disappear through the merge approach.

Especially the merge approach is likely to see severe opposition as already by the approach for

20 Chosen are aspects the scientific literature is referring to in a repetitive manner.

46 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces the Pleven Plan there was opposition from the military side to give up its military culture and its military traditions. (Seiller, 2018, P. 40).

2. Political and Legal Problems

It would be related to high legal and political difficulties. The main one is that many states bind the disposal over the national armed forces to a national say and or anchor the sustainment of national armed forces within the constitution. The European Army approaches collide with those legal bases. For example, the German Federal Constitutional Court made clear that the proclaimed ideas of a European Army which would merge all national armed forces into one or which would put the authority of would make a change of the German

Constitution necessary connected to a plebiscite. The necessary constitutional changes are combined with high political costs and reluctances (Brok & Contreras, 2011, P. 283 ff). Further the institutional processes concerning the use of armed forces diverge substantially. While in some states these decisions lay completely by the executive in others the parliament must be included into those decisions, in the German case the decision is based on the votes of the parliament. To find here a needed common ground seems particularly difficult (Vogel &

Schulz, 2020, P. 2; Brok & Contreras, 2011, P. 286).

Besides this, to transmit the responsibility for the national armed forces in such a far going manner or European armed forces in general to an EU entity makes changes of the EU treaties nearly inevitable which are faced with even more political costs and reluctances (Kirsch, 2011, p. 481 ff).

47 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces

3. Differences Between European Armed Forces

The tactical and strategic approaches, the rank structure, payment systems and military culture are differing widely between the different actual national armed forces. The “merge approach” would include the problem over the decisions which aspects are allowed to remain and which not. In the “integration approaches” these difficulties would be there too in a less severe manner.

The deepened cooperation of units from different armies which is intended with the

“integration approaches” showed problems for example in the French-German Brigade as soldiers mostly remained among their nationals and differences from legislation to strategic approach is a continuing force of divides (Klein, 1993, p. 3; Krause, 2019, p. 18; Kirsch 2011,

201, p. 481 ff).

4. Nuclear Weapons

With the “European Army approaches” in particular with the “merge approaches” the question about the control over nuclear weapons could emerge as they are military means.

That the only European nations with direct ownership over nuclear weapons France and Great

Britain would give their nuclear potential to an EU institution or another multilateral institution seems not likely. On the other hand, to leave this question out would create opposite problems as the nuclear strategy would then in a high degree be separated from the conventional strategy (Groß & Weigel, 2009, p. 2).

5. Lack of Legitimisation

There is also a reluctance to the approaches for an EU army and the combined transition of sovereignty as the concerning aspects need especially democratic legitimisation (Fröhlich,

48 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces

2014 p.36). Especially the “merge approaches” is uneasy to go in line with this legitimacy aspect as there is no European demos and also the legitimisation of the EU entities is under ongoing debate (Bendiek, 2017, p. 5, p.36; Brok & Contreras, 2011, P. 285).

2.2.2 The Advantages of the ETAF Approach Compared to EU Army

Approaches

The sovereignty, identity, political and legal problems nuclear would or could be widely sidelined by ETAF. Concerning the different characteristics of the armies the ETAF approach has less potential for conflicts, as the national states could keep their owns. The task would mainly lay within the establishment of an initial common ground. To form and establish legal structures, tactical and strategic approaches, a rank structure, payment systems and a military culture for ETAF is remains a complex task but has less problems as no side loses by forming something new without giving up old structures. The subchapter 5.2 Building Up Process of

ETAF and Chapter 6 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions show how such a task can be achieved.

Besides losing traditions and the own ways to act with the “merge approaches” also the problems of the“integration approaches” with the potential of internal conflicts and divides among different soldiers would be bypassed in ETAF, as all soldiers would be under one legislation, with the same equipment, tactics and military culture in the same army.

49 Arguments for European Transnational Armed Forces

2.3 Classification of the ETAF Approach Compared to the European Army Approaches

The problems for the approaches under the label “European Army” are big hurdles which could be bypassed by the ETAF approach while keeping central gains of such ideas concerning stabilizing alliances, building up a force which would make sustained joined European deployments more likely and having a unifying role for Europe in aspects of political and mental unity. One aspect the ETAF approach provides no advantages over the “European

Army” in which all European armies are merged to one is, that it bears no big advantages concerning cost-effectiveness and saving potential by reducing European forces as a whole.

The only financial benefits could be gained if the armament would be done in joined armament projects with member states to benefit from benefits of scale and if parts of ETAF would be included in pooling and sharing measures. For those, it would be predestined as

ETAF would be linked to all its members. The aspects examined in 3.1 counts also for the approaches for an EU Brigade,21 even if the effects would be smaller if its connected to a smaller budget and manpower. Besides this the advantages of European transnational armed forces examined here also count for the “European Army” approaches and the built up of ETAF could potentially also serve as avant-garde into the direction of the “merge approaches”.

21 Ct. Introduction.

50 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF

3 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF

As to be a useful tool for European foreign and security policy ETAF depend to be embedded within joint European decision-making processes concerning those matters. The chapter, therefore, analyses options on how to embed ETAF institutionally. Besides this general assumption, the institutional framework also influences the usefulness of ETAF as the use of it depends on those political processes. Therefore, each option will not just be analysed through a legal lens but also concerning their impact on political-economic aspects. The third aspect of the options will be analysed by is their legitimacy. While legitimacy is defined in different ways to go in line with the research question the theorem of Throughput-Legitimation is chosen. For the analyses, legitimacy is specified by the assumption that a political entity or process is as more comprehensible and as more bound to direct free secret and equal elections it is more it is legitimate. This is first chosen as legitimacy and therefore legitimacy is chosen as it is key for the identification of ETAF soldiers with their service and the acceptance for the ETAF project in general (Gareis, 2011, p. 461). Beside this legitimacy is also directly connected to foreign and security policy. The former US General and security adviser

McMaster describes the lack of understanding and identification with security policy by society as “maybe the biggest threat for national security” (Center for Strategic & International

Studies, 2016). The patterns described by him count also on Europe as it lacks opens up opportunities of influence by foreign actors like Russia and China to spread divides within

Europe and concerning the NATO alliance beside it undermines the political will for financial efforts in security policy and with this also ETAF as an approach.

51 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF

3.1 ETAF's Linkage to NATO

It is of core interest for a European security policy to keep the NATO alliance strong. This has also to be recognised by ETAF. But as NATO is due to its decision-making processes rarely implementing large scale operations within its framework and as not all of its members are

European states it is not the main framework for ETAF as a usable tool for European foreign and security policy. But due to its importance options should be recognised how ETAF can go inline, harmonize, and contribute to NATO. Such a link can be a hurdle to win Non-aligned or military neutral states (NAMN) like Ireland for the ETAF approach but those are for several options of the realisation of the ETAF approach connected to hurdles.

ETAF would sustain one of the largest military forces on the European continent. To connect it with NATO would be in reciprocal interest. This gives way for several options for optimisation but also discussion. Formal membership of ETAF would open up a full involvement of the planning and decision-making processes through the participation of ETAF entities within the

Military Committee and North Atlantic Council and subordinate institutions. This would ease the way for approaches that should generally be followed like that the ETAF capability planning and build-up processes should go in line with the ones of NATO and best contribute to the harmonization of NDPP and EDA. Also, the question of how capabilities of ETAF can be included in the capability providing mechanisms of NATO and how those are counted as contributions of burden-sharing for NATO-ETAF states. For an ETAF membership, it seems the

NATO treaty would have to be changed as they refer to states (North Atlantic Treaty Art. 10).

This should not be that a hurdle as the accepting of membership is decided anomalously as treaty changes. The other criteria are likely to be fulfilled.

52 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF

3.2 ETAF Embedded in the CFDP

The European Union with the CFSP established many institutions connected to defence and has a legal framework that could embed ETAF. Aspects that favour a linkage of ETAF to the EU are that such an embedding would serve institutional coherence and goes in line with the goals of CFSP.

According with the approach written in the EU treaties,

“The Union shall have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on

European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including

the progressive framing of a common defence policy” (TFEU, Art 2(4)), such a transnational approach seems precedented to be realised within the EU.

The deciding entity for the ETAF approach is together with all aspects of CFSP the European

Council. It can take ´decisions´ concerning CFSP based on Article 25 TEU which constitute legal acts on the build up of institutions, the relationships between institutions and EU missions. In this case the Council would have to decide to establish ETAF and how its institutional embedment is designed. To act within the CFSP gives the opportunity for a fast built up without hurdles which could be provided by any other EU institutional legal framework as it has not to recognise other EU institutions and also the legislation by courts is really limited by Article 40 TFEU (Cremona, 2018, p. 15 f). If the establishment of ETAF would not be made by an CFSP decision on the other hand many EU departments like DG EMPL, DG

JUST or DG REGIO beside other entities are likely to claim their competences which is likely to slow down processes. Beside this to act within the framework of CFSP would also give member states the opportunity to act outside the legislation of the EUcHR and the CJT as mentioned in chapter two. This would provide them with a set of different options to act and

53 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF makes ETAF therefore able for special uses.

The question whether the establishment of ETAF goes with or without changing the EU

Treaties is an important one as those it will be shown the treaties would give some limitations for an effective joint European foreign and security policy but are also connected to high political hurdles. Therefore, those the first section will analyse options for establishing ETAF without changes on the EU treaties and a second some options with a treaty change.

3.2.1 Options for an Embedment of ETAF Without Changes of the EU

Treaties

Without treaty changes the deciding entity concerning matters of CFSP and therefore ETAF would remain to the Council which has to find an entity that would full fill the responsibility of a defence minister. This could be supported by and interact with a European Council on defence policies similar to the EU councils to other topics but without participation in the legal processes of the EU just enabled to decide over ETAF matters.

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

With the role intended of the treaties as conducting entity for the CFSP, the HR would be the obvious choice to give the responsibility for ETAF. The HR also heads several institutions connected to security policy and to choose the HR, therefore, would serve institutional cohesion.

This could increase given the responsibility for one of the largest armed forces to the HR. This

54 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF contradicts the approach for legitimacy. Further Legitimacy questions could arise from choosing the HR are its complicated admission procedure and its title “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” that consists out of 63 letters. A problem of the HR is that the EU Treaties give him broad competences in theory but the EUCO has incentives to prevent entity drift. The measures to contradict it make the role for the HR already hard to comprehend.

Defence Deputy

To prevent agency drift the Council could also decide to give the responsibility for ETAF to a newly established entity, for the thesis called “defence deputy” (DD). Concerning the HR and the institutions under his responsibility, the decision could include that the HR has to assist the DD to achieve its purpose together with its subordinate institutions.

One disadvantage of the DD option is that the defence deputy does not consist of the rights to take part in the meetings of the Council of Europe as the HR. This could be changed by a EUCO decision too. An example of such measures without making a treaty change needed is PESCO.

Also here just the participating states take part in the decision-making process while it can rely on the administrative support of EU institutions (Mills, 2019, p. 6).

3.2.2 Opportunities for Embedment Connected to EU Treaty Changes

Legitimacy Through Presidential Option – a Consul for Europe?

Following the approach of legitimacy and efficiency, there would also be a complete other option for the responsibility for ETAF. To establish by treaty change an entity that combines

55 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF the competencies of the HR with the responsibility for ETAF elected by direct and equal elections or by the European Parliament. This would be a shift away from the intergovernmental procedures of actual CFSP and give it a more supranational character. The

Consul would be through its election process more likely to act on European interests than on particular national interests. Besides this, the Europe wide election process of the Consul is likely to increase cohesion within the political landscape within Europe and to contribute to

European unity in mind.

There are several options which competences the Consul could be given, and which control mechanisms could be implemented. The first option would be the competence to decide over the use of ETAF on its own behalves like a head of government in many states. Controlled could those decisions be by giving the competence to block the decisions of the Consul by opposing votes by majorities in the Council and or the parliament. The Council could remain to have an executive role concerning CFSP with the competence to make binding decisions the

Consul has to follow.

Further, the Council and or the European Parliament could be given the right to dismiss the

Consul. Alternatively, the Consul could be just given the role to chair the Council with a potential deciding vote in cases of stalemate within a decision process. The third option would be a gradual distribution of decision-making powers leaving the Consul with the competence to decide over the deployment of ETAF on its behalves, controlled by the Council and or

European Parliament while the decisions over general aspects of CFSP would remain within the council.

The Consul approach is far away from the actual scientific and politic debate but was mentioned as it serves the research question by contributing a discussion of an option which

56 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF would increase legitimacy and efficiency. Against this approach stands, besides being not part of the discussion, that the members of the Council would have to agree to give competences especially about ETAF which they fund to a supranational entity that they cannot control as the actual CFSP entities. Especially the strong opposition against less far going approaches to step away from the actual decision-making process of unanimity to majority voting contradicts the likelihood. An argument that it is not impossible is the funding of the other EU institutions and accepting processes where the member states have no veto power.

Other Improvements Enabled by a Treaty Change

Besides the decision over which entity should oversee ETAF, several other opportunities would come up to increase the legitimacy and efficiency of the legal and political infrastructure ETAF would be embedded in. Aspects that could be part of treaty change are the competences, title, appointment, and deposition of the HR; the competence relationships concerning ETAF; specifications on the mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) TEU) especially concerning the ETAF participants. One severe aspect is the participation process of Non-ETAF-

EU countries. As it is especially likely that some NAMN countries would not take part in the

ETAF their participation within the ETAF relating decision making processes are a hurdle as they do not contribute to it. A step to a solution recognised within a treaty change could be that Non-ETAF-EU countries would abstain their votes in ETAF related decisions and does not send representatives to solely ETAF related institutions. Besides this, it is not an unbridgeable hurdle as it is not unprecedented with Denmark not participating in CFSP.22

22 Ct. Political and Security Committee Decision (CFSP) 2019/948 (7).

57 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF

ETAF and Mutual Defence

The mutual defence clause is predestined to become part of renegotiations as the the deterrent effect of ETAF would make a link into a defence pact necessary. As the actual mutual defence clause was already part of controversial debates, especially by the NAMN states this is a challenging question. A potential compromise would be a precision concerning ETAF added to Article 42(7) TEU which would include that ETAF as force should be used to assist an ETAF member which is victim of an attacked described in 42(7). Recognising the link to NATO this passage could be extended that the same would count concerning the NATO obligations. It further could also include a description for a procedure for a call for alliance for the ETAF countries. This could be realised in a way that a member state sends an call for alliance to the

HR/”Consul” - in case that the communication lines to the attacked states should be cut off that EUCO or the HR/”Consul” could invoke the case of alliance for the ETAF members.

An important question concerning the call for alliance and its effectiveness is then whether the territory of the ETAF members could be the base of ETAF missions to assist the attacked country. The actual defence clauses are vague with their formulations as the members are just invoked to “such action as it deems necessary” in Article 5 of the NATO treaty and the member states “shall have obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” in Article

42(7). If for example in a scenario of an attack on the Baltic states by Russia, Romania and

Bulgaria would decide, that their actions deemed necessary would consist in solely medical aid and that the use of their territory for the use of operations is not a mean of their power the

Black Sea would be practically closed as an operational ground for ETAF, especially if Turkey does not provide its territory as operation ground neither. To prevent such limitations for the strategic flexibility of ETAF the members of ETAF should agree to that their territory can be

58 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF used for ETAF missions. Such agreement then could be also anchored in the TEU. These precisions would fill important gaps the actual formulations leave open.

3.3 Realising ETAF Outside the EU

There are also a variety of arguments that speak for a realisation of ETAF outside of the EU.

The first is that the deciding institution the EUCO must decide unanimously to realise the

ETAF approach within the EU framework. Especially concerning the mentioned stances for military neutrality and non-alliances statuses by some EU members, this could be a hurdle. If there should be a legal or political conception that for the realisation of the ETAF a change of the EU treaties would be inevitable this could be the next hurdle the decision-makers for ETAF like to bypass. Practical issues which would occur if the actual non-aligned or military neutral

EU members could not be convinced to take part in the ETAF approach would be that they would have as EU members nevertheless influence and participation in the political processes connected to ETAF if no agreements are found to exclude them within the EU frameworks.

Especially if the HR is chosen to be responsible for ETAF NAMN countries would in any potential procedure having sources of influence through elections, delegates of the European

Parliament and or the EUCO.

Besides the problems occurring by NAMN states the ETAF states could, in general, be opposed to developments within the EU institutions. On the one side there are increasing stances to bind CSFP more to the legal foundations of the EU which could make it depending to decisions of the court (Hillion & Wessel, 2018, p74 ff; Bendiek,2019, P. 20 ff)). Also the increasing calls of the European Parliament for participation in the CFSP (Brok & Contreras, 2011, p. 283 –

59 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF p.299) and the steps the Commission takes into this fields and other sources of agency drift could be seen by the states willing to participate as unwelcome developments. The actual development of increased multilateral cooperation concerning defence and a stronger linkage to NATO are signs of a shift away from the EU concerning foreign and defence policy. An approach to establish ETAF outside of the EU institutions can also come after a factual dissolution of the EU or out forecasting consideration of a potential dissolution. As the EU is already facing political divides increasingly the breakup of the EU comes a part of the political debate. Therefore, the ETAF approach could instead of being used as uniting and stabilizing factor for the EU being established as insurance for ongoing partnership at least concerning defence for the case of a collapse of the EU.

The advantages of and the strategic outlook to realise ETAF remain, no matter in which framework it is established, as long a practical structure is used. For the reasons described above and assumed that a substantial number of states is convinced to realise the ETAF approach, they could also recognise the option to do so outside of the EU framework.

This would be connected with several challenges and problems. To establish ETAF outside the

EU framework would be likely to be weakening the EU in general with strong political backlash by fractions and entities which are in favour of the EU. Another aspect would be that then the defence architecture would be even more complicated as three alliance systems would exist simultaneously if the entities of CFSP would remain in its institutional status quo.

This would mean three institutions similar to the EUCO (the EUCO itself, the North Atlantic

Council, a similar council for ETAF), three institutions similar to the NATO Military Committee

(The NMC itself, the European Union Military Committee, and a similar ETAF entity) and three institutions concerned with armament (EDA itself, the institutions connected to the NATO

60 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF

Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and a similar ETAF entity) besides other institutions in addition to the national institutions. This could lead to inefficiencies and confusions.

Therefore, also with a realisation of ETAF outside the EU, the Non-members should opt for pragmatically synchronise those institutions. An option to do so could be established by joint meetings of the military, political and administrative officials. An alternative to that would be established by reduction if the ETAF countries would decide to partially decrease payments to

CSDP institutions and retreat their representatives from especially the CSDP institutions or just putting less attention to them. Such measures would, even more, lead to opposition of supporters of the European Union.

Another disadvantage would be that the build-up outside the EU framework would mean that there are no already established institutional bodies to build the ETAF institutions on. An advantage could be that it would be more open for non-EU members as the UK and Norway.

The growth of the power of China, the competition with the USA and their shift in attention to the Pacific, unrest in Africa and the Near and Middle East and the role of Russia as a regional competitor are likely to stay as trends in international politics and as a challenge for European security policy. If the EU loses its function uniting entity the several European states could become separately become game point of the larger powers and the interest and power of the

European states together would be marginalised. To prevent such a scenario there is likely an increased interest to build up a successor to the CSFP among the European states which ETAF and its framework could establish.

For the further thesis, an embedment in the institutional framework of CFSP is assumed with a strong linkage to NATO, due to the advantages and opportunities developed in this chapter but also due to disadvantages to do it outside the EU.

61 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy

4 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy

As for being a useful tool of joint European foreign and security policy, the ETAF must address in its capability set up and characteristics strategic challenges. Three challenge clusters will get further attention. They are chosen as they are prominently mentioned within the scientific debate and in strategy documents with a focus where the build-up of military capabilities could help substantially and better than other measures. Therefore, climate change and cybersecurity are not part of the focus as for them diplomatic actions play a more prominent role or could be addressed also by civil entities. The sections of this chapter, therefore, analyses the instability in Africa and the Middle East, threatening actions by Russia and disputes within the transatlantic alliance.

4.1 Instability in Africa and the Middle East as Threat for

European Security

The destabilization in North Africa, the Sahel and the Middle East have many different causes, some occurring through similar or connected causes.

The common causes are population growth extending the growth of the economy and deficits in policy making, like corruption and lack of incentives for development. In many cases borderlines drown over ethnic regions and ethnic divides are often the starting points of conflict.

The third big reason is the Sunni-Shia divide and divides within the Sunny branch of Islam and the Islamic Revival in general.23 Those conflicts and instabilities affect also Europe by

23 The Sunni-Shia divide is a more or less active conflict hundreds of centuries old which got increasing importance

62 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy constituting problems which connect foreign and domestic security on mainly three ways.

First by increasing irregular migration. Irregular migrants out of Africa and the Middle East are on average more criminal then other groups within Europe (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik

2017, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2018, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2019), decrease political unity within the European Union and are pool for recruitment by terrorists.

Therefore irregular migration is on several ways a security challenge. 24 Second, it gives operational ground for jihadist movements which are also acting against European interests.

Third, the instability gives jihadist Europeans and migrants combat experience that they can also use back in Europe. Fourth it opens ground for the evolvement of diverging interests to engage within region, like Russia, Qatar or Turkey in Libya or Russia, Qatar, Iran and Turkey in

Syria, or Iran in Yemen.

The causes of the conflicts, ethnic divides, artificial borders, demographics and lack of good government are long term trends. The same counts on the causes of Islamic terrorism and irregular migration. As they establish key security threats a joint European foreign and security need to address them. Peace-making, peacekeeping, military stability missions, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are the military means to do so. Besides that, as

CFSP entities do not fall under legislation of European or international courts they could also prevent irregular migration directly by refoulement/ push back and other preventing

since 1979. In this year the Islamic Revolution in Shia Iran took place and turned this state into a traditionalist Shia Islam dominated system and a promoter of anti Western terrorist groups. 1979 saw also the hostage crisis in Mecca in Saudi Arabia which turned this state to become a major promoter of traditionalist interpretation of Sunny Islam, especially Wahabism. The third important aspect of the year 1979 was the invasion of the UDSSR into Afghanistan and the fight of the Mujahedin and other Islamic insurgents in Afghanistan against it, which was a key birth place of modern Jihadism. Both countries Saudi Arabia and Iran compete to gain hegemony in the Arabic Region. Other players as Qatar and Turkey play another role as promoter of another traditionalist approach of Sunny Islam with Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Shia-Sunny-divide and the competing branches of traditionalist approaches of Islam, most prominent Wahabism and Salafism fuel the Islamic Revival and gives it in many instances a radical turn which often translate in the building up of terrorist organisations. 24 Ct. Chapter 1 What is European Security and Foreign Policy? Specifications of Key Terms.

63 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy measures.

4.2 Russia as Security Challenge

Russia challenges European security interests on many ways, in different fields which is routed in different developments and incentives. While the embedment of Russia within

Europe was not clear after the Cold War and dialogues and cooperation started the last 20 years saw on average a turn to a reciprocal threat perception.

4.2.1 Driving Forces For Aggressive Actions From a Russian Perspective

The threat perception out of a Russian perspective emerges from several sources. The ones outlined here are chosen for their actuality and repeated mention in scientific and political debate. For a deeper and broader look into theoretical and practical explanations of the

Russian foreign and defence policy and the motives behind it Handbook on European Defence

Policies and Armed Forces (Meijer & Wyss, 2018), The Tragedy of Great Power

Politics (Mearsheimer, 2003) and World Order (Kissinger, 2014) give highly recognised impressions.

One relates to its perception of the states of the former Soviet Union as their sphere of special interests, which is increasingly occupied by EU and NATO. The motives for that are 1. historic, reaching back into the times Russia was ruled by Tsars; 2. strategic, as it is a Russian key goal to be surrounded by buffer states to prevent major conflicts; 3. Out of a threat perception that western model of liberal democracies combined with the free market could influence the

Russian society. That is why progressing and successful neighbouring countries which use this

64 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy model is seen as a danger for the Russian state, model, system (USarmywarcollege, 2017;

Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2014).

This collides with the interests of the EU which seeks to combine all its European states within its organization and transform its neighbours to become similar to the EU-model (ESS, 2003).

While the efforts to influence and to integrate Europe and its neighbours by the EU members is seen as aggression it is stated by some scholars that are was not the approach by the EU which just did not put attention on the possibility of this interpretation by Russia

(USarmywarcollege, 2017).

The second one is a perception of western foreign policy as a contribution to chaos and instability. The evolvement in the Yugoslav Civil War 1999, the Iraq War, the military actions in

Libya 2011 and the recognition of Kosovo in 2008 contributed beside other actions to this perception.

Besides the threat perception also other motives come into play to sustain measures against

European interests. A political-economic motivation could be estimated behind the strategy to divide the EU and NATO. As the country with the largest population on the European continent with high economic potential and resources, it would be attractive to bypass the institutional structures most European states are united in. To negotiate with Poland, Germany and France separately seem easier for Russia than to do so with all of them united in multilateral institutions. Besides the political-economic explanation, it would also open ways to bypass the interests of smaller states to talk to the more relevant powers on the continent directly.

Mentions that great power policy is the favoured option of organizing international affairs, while small states are seen as confusing and incalculable trouble making entities (Kissinger,

2014; Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016).

65 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy

4.2.2 Challenges and Threats Posed by Russia

Six main threats represented by Russia in European questions are outlined due to their repeated mention in the scientific and political debate. For a a broader and deeper insight in the threats represented by Russia the Handbook-on-Countering-Russian-and-Chinese-

Interference-in-Europe are Handbook on European Defence Policies and Armed Forces (Meijer &

Wyss, 2018) are mentioned as examples of rich sources.

A) Russia showed in Ukraine its motivation to use non diplomatic means to ensure its

interests. It is developing and using strategies for limited conflicts which are

represented by the joint and orchestrated use of a variety of levels of different levels

and capabilities for conflict, concerning the fields of cyber war (attacks on civil and

military infrastructures), different levels of hidden involvement (from mercenaries and

volunteers to soldiers without state emblems, for example the so called “green man” in

Ukraine), “informational warfare” (over its media channels and trolling networks). This

could be followed or joined by regular military operations or leaving strong Russian

forces manoeuvring behind its boarders to deter actions by its opposing side, as it was

the tactic in the Russian involvement in the Ukraine-Donbass conflict. This is

threatening especially for the Baltic states which fear to be cut off in the Suwalki Gap,

and that Russia would create facts before its western allies would be able to

sustainable help them. Which could be followed by Russia building up measures to

deter for later acts to free them (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016)

B) The regular threat by the high nuclear arsenal by Russia and the pronouncement of

new tactical guidelines to use them. (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2014)

C) The measures Russia is taking to weaken the European political and military alliances,

66 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy

most notably the EU and NATO. (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016)

D) The ongoing attacks and espionage measures by using ways of cyber war. (Center for

Strategic & International Studies, 2016)

E) The ongoing provocations by Russian armed forces, like entries into non-Russian

airspaces or disturbing actions at the Nordbalt project which could lead to

misunderstandings and are threatening the integrity of territory of many European

states or hindering them to act (Reimann, 2015).

F) In the case of a large scale military conflict especially Russian danger for sea cables, its

hypersonic weapon arsenal and its numerical advantage are major risks that have to be

taken into account and measures have to be taken, to decline those threats.

The ETAF approach with a focus on conventional capabilities could help especially to address

A), C)., E). and F). These aspects find recognition in chapters 3 and 6. The other aspects are questions better other measures of politics, through the NATO alliance or technological developments.

4.3 Transatlantic Divide as Security Challenge

The famous quote by British General Hastings Ismay that NATO's purpose for Europe is to “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” gets again especially concerning the first two messages. The strong alliance over the Atlantic got cracks in the second decade of the 21th century while the challenges for European security grew. Therefore, discussions about how and due to political divides even whether ´to keep the Americans in´ becomes increasingly part of the debate and concern of European strategic thinking. The US as

67 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy the last actual superpower combines with its military a unique set of capabilities and resources to deploy and use them. Together with the provision of a nuclear umbrella through

NATO, the US is a cornerstone of the European security architecture. If the US would fully retreat the European continent and NATO an IISS study showed that without taking into account maintenance or personal connected costs additionally costs for systems required to fill capability gaps would amount between 94,4 and 111.4 billion US dollar for a limited naval conflict and between 288 and 357 billion US dollar for a limited ground-based conflict scenario. Therefore it is in European economic and strategic interest to keep the ties to the US strong if it does not want to invest heavily more in armament and or become a plaything in geopolitical developments (Barrie & Barry & Béraud-Sudreau & Boyd & Childs & Giegerich,

2019).

4.3.1 Causes For Transatlantic Divide: Geopolitical Trends

A general theme is that the geostrategic outlook of the USA changed. One important issue is that it became independent from oil and gas imports by the use of fracking. Before this, it was also for the US itself vital to secure the sources of fossil fuels, especially in the gulf region.

Another important shift is the growth of China in geostrategic weight. This is threatening for the US as it its long-term strategic goal to prevent any power to gain regional hegemony at one of the oceans bordering the US. In this case, China has the potential. Chinas main geostrategic approach is to get in power over its vital sea routes. Vital are the ones that connect China with the supply of food and energy sources that must be important as the Chinese consumption of those cannot sufficiently supply out of its territory. But first, these sea routes are bordering important US allies. Second, the US saw itself also always as responsible for the security of

68 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy trade routes. If China would control them this would collide with the US approach (The

Institute of World Politics, 2018). The emerging China left the US putting more attention on this arena (Mearshimer, 2003) which is also pronounced by the Trump administration

(National Security Strategy, 2019) For the future a shift of forces and money to the pacific seems likely which will result in the decrease of investments in other areas like Europe. This is something the ETAF approach should anticipate.

4.3.2 Causes For Transatlantic Divide: Political, Strategic and Military Disappointments

Beside the geostrategic shifts, there are further causes of frictions. While there had been always smaller conflicts, like around the European Interceptor Site (EIS) pushed forward by the USA and debates about appropriate burden sharing, the annexation of Crimea and the hybrid approach against Ukraine with the ongoing civil war brought for a short term a new dynamic into European security policy. One result was the proclamation of the 2 per cent GDP target in the NATO Wales Summit of 2014. The Goal with some specifications to increase the military budget of NATO member states to this level within a time frame of 10 years (Wales

Summit Declaration, 2014). While the countries bordering Russia fast implemented this goal, other states showed less or weak interest to full fill this. Some states do not develop plans to increase its budgets fundamentally while others declare openly not to do so or pronounce arithmetic tricks. For example, Germany wanted to count their budget for development aid as part of its defence spending. (Bennhold, 2019).

The question grew on the US side in military, politics and think thanks, why Europe is not

69 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security Policy investing more in its security, as the thread of Russia is in many scenarios mainly one for

Europe. For the Trump administration the 2 per cent is one red line and brought up in many instances. Until now beside the states which bordering Russia many states still not full fill the

2 per cent goal, while many argumentations are brought up to downplay it by European scholars, officials and politicians. Most prominently are that it was just a proclamation and therefore not binding, and that the two per cent target is not purposeful tool, as a higher investment for example in pensions would not change anything in capabilities – leaving aside that the Proclamation included also a goal of use 20 per cent in equipment (Kamp, 2019).

Besides these aspects also a political divide is recognised by some scholars. Different strategic approaches concerning for example concerning bilateralism and multilateralism, the Iran deal and the Paris climate change agreement and Israel (Bendiek, 2018, p. 34).

The ETAF approach can contribute to address several aspects of this challenge cluster. As

ETAF would relate to higher defence investment and connected to NATO it could ease the tension concerning the financial burden sharing. If the ETAF units would be used within the

NATO capability projects like NRF it would also anticipate another source of conflicts and fulfilling European NATO these obligations. Beside the reduce of transatlantic tensions and strengthening the transatlantic bounds the capabilities sustained by ETAF can also anticipate a potential reduce of engagement of the US for European security interests.

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5 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe

The precedent chapters showed the status quo of the actual actual European security architecture, advantages of the ETAF approach, analysed options for an institutional embedment of ETAF and analysed three challenge clusters for European foreign and security policy. These aspects contribute to the following chapter which develops an potential build-up of capabilities, gives answers how a building up process can look like and how its budget can be secured.

5.1 Proposal ETAF´s Spectrum of Capabilities

With an assumed budget of 40 Billion Euros25 different things could be achieved. This chapter contributes to the thesis with the analysis of an approach for a capability built up of ETAF taking into the strategic challenges described in Chapter 5.

To be a useful tool of joint European foreign and security policy the capability built up of ETAF forces should be able to sustain medium sized missions,26 act as strategic enabler and framework nation, help to fill capability gaps, recognising the findings of Chapter 3. Beside this it should best go in line with NATO and CFSP approaches and goals. Therefore, a higher readiness rate is assumed for ETAF.

The challenge complexes are used as guidelines for the capability built up. For ETAF those provide mainly three tasks: territorial defence and deterrence in front of Russia and stability and anti-terrorist missions; respond to the potential reduced reliability of the US in the future

25 Ct. Section Budget. 26 Like Opération Serval in Mali implemented by France.

71 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe and full filling tasks and develop capabilities the US is no longer holding in the benefits for

Europe like securing trade routes.

The usefulness of ETAF is also dependent on its efficiency of using its budget. Therefore, special attention will be given on possible fields for sparing money recognising the capabilities provided by the European states.27 Beside this the approach outlined hear follows a guideline of “strategic flexibility”. This means for the thesis that the systems taken under recognition should be useful in as much for full filling the tasks described above as possible. All these aspects considered, the budget of 40 billion would give the opportunities to pay and equip a

50.000 – 100.000 men strong force.

5.1.1 Air Capabilities

European armed forces especially joined with NATO allies are in the field of aviation-based capabilities superior in front of their potential competitors. This counts in front of Russia

(Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2014) but also concerning involvements in out of area deployments as most insurgencies have no air force on their disposal. To establish with

ETAF another air force which has a wide frame of capabilities and this with subtense could be a questionable approach. First aviation is in general highly cost intensive. Second, the high capacities for area denial systems (A2/AD) within the disposal of the Russian Armed Forces are likely to significantly reduce the ability for air-based warfare and are increasingly spread also among other potential competitors. This reduces the value partially of the air force as a

27 Detailed analysis of European capabilities can be found within The Handbook of European Defence Policies & Armed Forces, Mutual Reinforcement: CSDP and NATO in the Face of Rising Challenges and Defending Europe: scenario-based capability requirements for NATO’s European members, beside the EDA Annual reports, the official aspects of the European Defence Plan (European Defence Agency, 2020).

72 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe provider of entry by force, airspace superiority and tactical and strategic bombing. To add another independent air force equipped with a wide range of functions seems therefore not a reasonable approach. In an approach for strategic flexibility, ETAF's flying capabilities and systems should be focused as support for the other branches navy and army.

They could consist out of helicopters to transport Airborne soldiers, to work as ground support and reconnaissance; logistic and tanker aircraft perhaps connected or replacing

European Air Transport Command tanker command to fill the gaps in this sector and providing also EU national armed forces a source they could rely on in addition to the EATC, cheaper ground support and reconnaissance aeroplanes for stability and counterinsurgency missions or STOVL planes that could be also used as a reserve for carrier-based aviation; 28 a carrier-based fleet STOVL planes to support naval invasions, ground support and execute missions to secure trade routes. With the investment in systems which provide those capabilities ETAF would reduce shortfalls like air-based mobility and reconnaissance (Meyer,

2020, p. 6; Krause, 2019, p. 2) and would full fill one of the proposed key tasks of ETAF as serving as a strategic enabler.

This capabilities and systems would be able to achieve tasks for at least two of the several tasks ETAF is likely to be used for and represents, therefore, a high rate of strategic flexibility.

To build out these forces an own branch could not be realised by preferring to organise them around the branches army and navy.

28 Most insurgents are lacking substantial anti air capabilities and an air force in general. This gives in those areas potentials to save costs by not investing in the most expensive and up to date systems.

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5.1.2 Ground Forces

A strategic flexible ground force would mainly contain in mechanized infantry, airborne and amphibious brigades. Mechanized and Airborne units are a capable force in stability missions with the protection of the first and the manoeuvrability of the later. In the Russian peninsula, the protection by the armoured grenadiers would increase their survivability compared to light infantry considering the actual numerical advantage of the Russian artillery (Meyer,

2020, p. 27, p. 44). The amphibious and air bourn forces have the advantage of being deployable in a variety of scenarios. Even if the Slaviki Gap another option of entry would be available to the Baltics. Besides this, the regular tasks of reconnaissance, medical corps, logistics and pioneers must be achieved.

Amphibious Warfare

Amphibious warfare could be a reasonable key capability for ETAF. First, the strategic spheres of interest for Europe are often close to coasts, for example, the Mediterranean peninsula. The ability for amphibious warfare opens up options and represents deterrence in itself as competitors have also to take into account to defend their coasts. Second, the capabilities within the European armies for amphibious warfare are minor. Third, the diffusion of capable

A2/AD capabilities (Brustlein, 2019, p.40) makes mainly air-based entry by force not as convenient as it had been before. Fourth marines have a wide range of capabilities connected to actual and foreseeable challenges as anti-piracy operations, security of naval vessels and bases beside fulfilling tasks of regular infantry (Center for Strategic & International Studies,

2018). For those reasons landing operations mainly supported by sea should be in the operational framework of ETAF. They could be used in the Mediterranean peninsula, around

74 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe strategic trade routes as the Arabic gulf and gulf of Aden the red sea the Persian gulf or other areas and also in the eastern Arena if for example the Slaviki gap would be closed and air transport would not be possible due to A2/AD missiles to reinforce the forces in the Baltic states.

ETAF Firepower Without Main Battle Tanks?

The purchase of main battle tanks for ETAF could be set under discussion. While the other systems are used nearly equally on both arenas the use of battle tanks would be less strategic flexible as their usage would mostly lay on the eastern arena. For counterinsurgency and stability missions main battle tanks do not add recognisable advantages compared to cheaper motorized armoured vehicles. Further Ret. Bundeswehr General ret. Krause stated in his book Die Bundeswehr als Teil einer Europäischen Armee Realistische Perspektive oder unrealistische Vision? [The Bundeswehr as part of a European army Realistic perspective or unrealistic vision?] that tanks are within the systems where Europe is already doubling resources (Krause, 2019, p. 2). Therefore, it seems not wise to invest in already existing resources within ETAF. But this must not mean that ETAF would spare the capabilities of main battle tanks. They can be provided by joint deployments with member states which feature main battle tanks. ATGM-armed light vehicles with the use of first-look/first-hit/first-kill capability, individual man-portable, vehicle-launched, and helicopter-launched fire, should build be a replacement, for some capabilities represented by main battle tanks, while the capability of direct fire could be carried by anti-tank platforms like the Italian Centauri 2, which add also value for out of area operations. Further anti-tank measures could be provided by mines and UAV guided artillery (Thesenpapier I Wie kämpfen Landstreitkräfte künftig?,

2018, P. 10).

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Special Forces

Special forces and their capabilities seem also needed but as they often act in with a high sense of secrecy and in unconventional ways it would depend on the political processes whether they can be unfolded. The political decision-making process would be more controversial as the views concerning such missions diverge. Especially foreign internal defence, covert ops, high-value targets, and unconventional warfare seem to be aspects where there are fields that would open up many discussions. The opposite could be also thinkable that ETAF and especially its special forces would be used preferably as a force which accomplishes the “dirty work” outside of the spotlight of the press through inconspicuous and complicated bureaucratic structures used willingly by states which have an intention to have as themselves a white west. Such processes are common in the EU, in general, to put unpopular decisions on the supranational level and are also realised by other special forces where the French Foreign Legion serves as a prominent example (Cooper, 2006, p. 273). For use in such a manner speaks also that ETAF would act outside the jurisdiction. The secrecy could be kept by the establishment of a security council.

Special forces provide often also the capabilities for hostage rescue. If the ETAF special forces would be seen as capable it could be that many states would rely on them and ask for their use, besides the fact that most states have forces for those types of missions and would intend to use them. For those purposes then an eased decision-making process compared to the CFSP or NATO process with their veto power would be necessary. What in any case remains are airborne operations, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and direct action accomplished by a special selected, trained and equipped troop to support ETAF commanders in their operational plans.

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5.1.3 Navy

In the field of challenges for future European security and strategic interests, the navy is of key importance. To anticipate them navy would be a good area to be integrated into ETAF. One key task would be to anticipate a potential large-scale involvement of the US navy in the Pacific in the case of conflict with China. This could bind US capabilities to a degree that it would no longer secure sea trade routes which are important for Europe. The same would be true if the

USA would drive in general a more isolationist course or a divide between Europe and the US would appear and the USA would decrease its sea presence in areas Europe is benefiting at the moment. Increased European navy power could besides this worst-case scenario have an impact in burden-sharing. In general, the navies in Europe are underfunded and need to be stocked up to full fill the minimal NATO obligations (Meijer & Wyss, 2018 p. 573).

Main parts of the increased investment in the field of naval warfare could be realised in ETAF which would make sense as the development of NAVY capabilities are a cost incentive projects which are uneasy to be realised by one or even more states. Navy forces within ETAF would also fall under the approach for strategic flexibility as they could be essential for all fields of challenges. The challenge of becoming more responsible for the security of sea routes is already described. In the case of Russia naval forces have first a deterring role. The capabilities must be of a scale that would make substantial aggression for Russia seem too costly. The fast and substantial gaining of naval supremacy in the Baltic Sea would be key as Naval based logistics to the Baltic Sea by a closing of the Slawiki gap would be a high strategic benefit. And sea-based ground support and suppression of AD/2D would be as well. Naval forces would be also in such a conflict important for building the opportunity for amphibious assault and amphibious landing which would be a strategic asset.

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To realise those approaches main parts of the ETAF navy could be organised around several multi-purpose amphibious assault ships with the capability to carry STOVL like the

Italian Trieste-class, the French Mistral-class, the Spanish Juan Carlos I-design or the US Wasp- class design. This would also go in line with the ETAF approach to reduce capability shortfalls, in this case, carrier-based aviation and sea-based mobility (Meyer, 2020, p.6 f).

5.1.4 ETAF as Capability Pool

Beside the traditional branches of an army it should be also reconsidered that ETAF would be through its transnational institutional body also a good starting point for pooling projects.29

Aspects that the thesis did not took a focus on like space and cyber warfare, laser technology and UAV development could be also part of the long time capability set, if states decide to invest jointly in one capability.

5.2 Building and Transition Process of ETAF

The building of forces is not an unprecedented development but in any case a challenging one

(Dupuis. 2017). This chapter analyses an approach how this built up process can be achieved with a focus on training and equipment from the first to the later units. Special attention on establishing common political goals and strategic and tactical harmonization is given in

Chapter 6 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions. After the political decision to establish ETAF is made and the political and strategic goals and a legal framework are agreed for training and the containment over of equipment are the most important determinants for the ETAF built up.

29 Pooling: Combined efforts to achieve a military capability for joint use.

78 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe

After the alliance of ETAF would have recruited the first soldiers then the training of those soldiers is likely to be realized in the first time primary in facilities of the national armies.

When ETAF contains over own facilities its members would have the obligation to assign instructors, before it can get the sole responsibility to train its troops for itself (Gareis, 2011, p.

463). In some areas where the adoption of one common agreed standard among the ETAF states also for the national armies is established the training and education can occur within national armies. Such common standards would be also of value in cooperation of ETAF and national units and it would ease the transition of ETAF soldiers to national armies after their contract ended and vice versa. Training-tasks can also be given to one member state, if its standard is accepted as the ETAF standard. An example is that key parts of the training of the

German Air Force are implemented in the USA.

The aspect of containment over equipment would be in the first years the main aspect to slow this process down. The first equipment could consist of systems the nation-states are decommissioning beside other equipment that they voluntary assess especially for the first training. This takes into account that it would be difficult to secure all equipment directly from the marked as the production lines could not directly be extended as military equipment production is often connected to delays and is in many cases time consuming. Nevertheless, for the most capabilities suitable systems are on the marked which ETAF could be equipped with and also with the use of licence contracts the production of them could be increased.

After this phase the equipment can steadily built on more systems developed especially for

ETAF purposes and linkages to national and multilateral defence projects like PESCO. This would reduce time and financial costs concerning development and also benefits of scale could be achieved through this. In all stages there should be strong linkages to CARD and

79 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe

NDPP. In the IISS study concerning the replacement of US capabilities a timeframe is estimated of 12 to 15 years concerning some capabilities also 20 years. This can be also the time frame for ETAF (Brustlein, 2019, p. 42 f).

Another aspect that takes time is the establishment of an ETAF own general staff. Before this time ETAF must rely on assessments of high ranked officers of the member states. They could underwent for reasons of cohesion a preparing course for example implanted by the European

Security and Defence College (Kaurse, 2011, p. 506).

To build an armed force nearly from scratch is a challenging venture but not unprecedented and even had been accomplished under difficult environments.(Dupuis, 2017). Such a built up had been recognised also to be possible from a military perspective (Krause,2019, p. 12).

5.3 Budget

To be a useful tool for joint European defence policy ETAF must be also funded by a significant budget. Through the thesis 10 per cent of the European investments in defence is assumed or at least 40 billion. This subchapter shows analyses an approach on how this budget could be achieved.

In 2014 at the after the revaluation of the Russian threat, NATO Members decided at the Wales

Summit to enlarge their military budgets at least to the level of 2% of GDP for each state. Also, the CFSP has with PESCO the goal to enlarge its defence budgets to accomplish the goals of

CFSP. Nevertheless, the defence budget increases are spread unevenly. While Countries which are bordering Russia tend to invest more, the ones more distant like Spain have not shown significant enlargements (NATO Annual Report 2018, 2019; EDA Annual Report 2018, 2019).

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The insisting by the US on the spending goals as part of European achievements to fulfil their duties while NATO is still crucial for European defence makes is one reason, why Europe should increase its budget.30 The other one is that NATO and CFSP see the described capability gaps and are faced with big security challenges. This is also part of recognition of CFSP institutions as the EDA states that the EU states should drive for defence spending with the target of 2 per cent of GDP (Dutard, 2017, p. 62).

5.3.1 Base Budget Built by GDP Linked Efforts

The political declaration for the commitment of the 2 per cent target and the challenges can be the base for an increase in defence spending needed for ETAF. It is assumed that all ETAF countries strive for the 2 per cent target and that this can be also achieved by investing in

ETAF. With this under consideration, the GDP of the 27 current EU states was estimated by

Eurostat for 2017 to 2019 on average around 13 trillion Euros. Ten per cent of this 2 per cent target/ 0.2 per cent of GDP makes sense as a minimum ratio for the establishment and maintenance of ETAF. It would mean a base budget of 26 billion Euros. If the GDP of Europe should decrease caused by the Corona crisis the base budget would decrease, then too. Even without a crisis future GDPs could not be estimated in an accurate way. It is not possible to accurately forecast possible down falls or rises, that is why it is worked with the GDP data of the last three years which could be also reached in the next years again.

This budget would already correspondent to the defence budget of Italy of 2019 which has an active personnel of 165.000 soldiers. If it is considered that the ETAF approach mainly focuses on army and navy forces it opens up financial scope to fund those areas substantially. In the

30 Ct. Chapter 2, 3.

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US-Armed forces around a third is invested in the Air force.31 If this derived third could be used in the case of ETAF for land and naval forces this would also increase relatively the spending invested per soldier in those areas, a measure which correlates with the effectiveness of armed forces (Schnell, 2011, p. 202).

5.3.2 Proposal for a Financial Gap-Closing Mechanism

In addition to the base budget, there could be made the base rule that the gaps between the member states defence budgets to the 2 per cent target, minus the agreed 0,2 per cent base budget, must be invested in the ETAF budget. This must not be seen as a punishment but could be also promoted or seen as spending for the European idea. This would be especially attractive to include Germany in the defence framework with its high GDP compared to other states.

The defence spending in the 27 EU countries laid constantly average on 1.2 per cent of GDP during the last three years (Eurostat, 2020). It is assumed that the gap-closing-mechanism would increase the budget between 0,4 and 0,1 per cent of GDP in a decreasing manner since its implementation taking into account that France and other states are already reached a level of 1.8 per cent GDP defence spending. The decrease is a result that states have generally an incentive to spend the money within their budget. The gap closing mechanism could, therefore, compensate if NAMN states would not be part of ETAF.

A side effect is that the German army would not enlarge disproportionate connected to its high

GDP compared to other European countries. Even if 2011 Radek Sikorski, during this time

Poland’s foreign minister, stated in a speech held in Berlin that he feared “German power less

31 For example the US used around a third of its budget for their airforce while having already an air capability on their aircraft carriers in the budget of their navy. (US Budget, 2019)

82 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe than German inactivity” (Kamp, 2019) that does not mean that this counts for all European countries to all times. The Gap closing mechanism would serve that the Bundeswehr would not fall out of the European frame.

The political will for a measure like the gap closing mechanism is not scientifically to be forecasted. Nevertheless, there are many historic and actual examples where the budget goals for common projects and institutions had been connected to GDP ratios like the NATO obligations during the Cold War or the funding for the EU institutions. Beside this the examined advantages of ETAF could be political incentives.

5.3.3 ETAF as “Great Pool”

Beside this, states would generally be welcome to spend more then 0,2 per cent of their GDP for ETAF outside the Gap-closing-mechanism. This could be achieved if states want to send signals of European solidarity or want to give initiative for a special sector to be funded in a pooling approach. This could be also connected with incentives, like that funding states find recognition by the establishment for production lines.

5.3.4 Links of Budget Matters to Several Aspects of the Research Question

With an economic situation compared to the three years before 2020 the basic budget of 0,2 of

GDP extended by the gap-closing-mechanism with approximately 0,1 per cent of GDP and an approximated billion funded by the great-pool-approach would mean a budget of around 40 billion.32 With this budget ETAF could be funded substantially. It could be armed with up to

32 0,2 per cent + 0,1 percent of EU-27 GDP of 13 trillion correspondents to 39 Billion Euros + 1 billion resulting from the great-pool-approach.

83 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe date weapon systems. The budget would serve also for good payments and care services for

50 – 100000 soldiers. ETAF would therefore have the capability to be used on the missions it would be created for under consideration of the research question. Advantages of this budget approaches are, that the share is distributed equally in the basic budget, that the gap closing mechanism could directly enlarge the defence spending to 2 per cent and could prevent imbalances between Germany and the rest of Europe. The actual and historic funding examples showed that this budget is a reasonable one and with this that the ETAF approach as such is theoretical possible on the funding side. With a budget ETAF designed like this ETAF further can contribute to keep the USA as NATO ally in Europe.

84 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

6 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

ETAF composed out of soldiers of different countries, regions, with different historic, economic, and cultural backgrounds combining a set of states with partially diverging strategic outlooks would be different from its national siblings. Out of these different challenges emerge. In the sections of this chapter some of them will be discussed whether they are actually problems and how they could be anticipated. They refer to the challenges von

Krause mentions: harmonized understanding of security and defence policy, renunciation of sovereignty, common military culture, common armaments and harmonized law and to aspects a paper by SWP scholars about an approach to establish an transnational EU brigade

(Vogel, Schulz, 2020) made adding the question where to garrison ETAF.

6.1 How Common Ground Can Be Developed

One way to handle such a task problem would be to convene a council or several councils which focus on special areas built up by representatives out of the military and research institutes of member states and CFSP and NATO institutions. To build such council around military personal would increase the expertise and also reduce the influences of political side games as the personal just has to find pragmatic solutions for the future with less interests concerning political bargains. They could debate and find compromises and solution based on the political conceptions given by the states and CFSP. A good base would be a white book developed by the Council, EEAS and the EDA if ETAF would be embedded within the EU structures.

85 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

The ETAF convention would then send the proposals to the political decision makers which could agree or in parts give it back for further discussion. Such a process has a mainly successful historic predecessor with the building up of the Bundeswehr with the Himmerod memorandum which built the successful base for the Bundeswehr up to this day without major changes or breaks. While Himmeroder group was homogenous consisting of officers of just one army out of one state. The challenge for such a convention consisting preferably not just out of generals but also other ranks and military experts out of likely over 20 states is likely to be bigger. But decisions and agreements within the EU and NATO nevertheless are found and which can also count for the ETAF approach.

6.2 Strategic and Tactical Divergences as Challenge

Especially in strategic and tactical approaches, there is a wide difference between the actual

European armed forces. While France for example as a more robust agenda, Germany is more relying on defensive and conflict avoiding measures which give more space for non-military measures. This brings up challenges in multinational missions as missions have to be especially prepared and, in the field,, in some instances, the different approaches lead to surprises for the commanding officers (IF79. 2013). In permanent multinational units for example within the Franco German Brigade, such differences are the source for divide.

Nevertheless, when such a common ground would be given in frames by the Council and developed by actual ETAF forces it is likely that the level of cohesion is similar to the one found in national armed forces. It would also not have to start of nowhere as some harmonisations are already achieved through NATO exercises and joint missions (Krause,

2011, p.500 ff).

86 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

6.3 Different Alliance Memberships and Military Neutrality

An aspect of diverging strategic approaches on a political level bears a hurdle as the European linkages to military alliances correlate and overlap but not completely cover each other. The defence architecture of Europe resembles more to a colourful curtain of which some colours will be discussed here.

On the one hand, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Cyprus and Malta are EU-non-NATO- states. This would not exclude from the ETAF approach but behind these non-memberships stand stances for neutrality with the exception to Cyprus. In the case of Austria and Finland, this neutrality was a forced decision as a result of the Second World War and became crucial in the cold war. In the case, permanent neutrality is also part of the constitution. In the case of

Finland, it was legally bound not to act against the interests of the Soviet Union (Devine,

2011). This aspect ceased to exist with the fall of the Soviet Union. But also, in those states evolved a more or less strong tradition of neutrality during the years. This becomes part of partially strong domestic debates if it comes to CSDP or cooperation with NATO. This did not prevent them to join the EU, which includes a defence pact and also did not prevent the CSDP cooperation with NATO. This means that in theory that the stances for military neutrality would not be an excluding factor for membership to ETAF. The cooperation of ETAF to NATO is likely to be also part of the discussion but was so far no severe hurdle within the already existing CFSP.

If in the founding documents for ETAF it is written down that ETAF is bound to NATO Article five for its members, this is something they would have to accept but without having to join

NATO as a state. They would not have the right to declare Article 5 but would be helped on the base of the Lisbon Treaty and of a mutual defence agreement for ETAF. For all missions

87 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions through which ETAF would support NATO missions, they would declare to vote neutral in any institutional framework honouring their neutrality status. It could be also discussed whether non-NATO-ETAF-participants could prevent permanent ETAF garrisons within their country or that in these territories at least the NATO-treaty is not binding.

What participants would have to accept is that ETAF is recruiting in their countries and that their financial contributions would also potentially partially be used for NATO missions. A compromise which would be part of severing discussion but seems with a look on the already achieved interactions between NATO and CSDP not unbridgeable (Devine, 2011). Incentives for participation are shown in the chapters before and perhaps lead to a shift away from the neutrality of those states. Further reading on the neutrality stances by EU states are Neutrality and the development of the European Union's common security and defence policy: Compatible or competing? by Karen Devine

On the otherhand Iceland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, UK and Albania are

European NATO members but not EU members. In this group Iceland does not have armed forces to safe costs, Montenegro and Albania are minor powers and all three have not the economic potential to substantially contribute to the ETAF project. In these cases, it could make sense not to additionally have them participating in ETAF and its decision-making process. Their territories would, in any case, be secured and open for use by NATO.

Norway and the UK, on the other hand, are highly interconnected with Europe, sustain remarkable armed forces and economic potential. In those cases, it seems worthwhile to discuss how they could be included in the ETAF project. In the case for the especially powerful

UK, it seems on the one side highly unlikely that they would participate. It was all ready for a long time an opponent to a far less extensive approach of PESCO when it was still within the

88 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

EU as it would weaken NATO (Mills, 2019). While Brexit was also brought about with arguments that the UK should stop to send money to the EU institutions it also seems politically difficult that it would be open for contributing to the 0,2 per cent -0,3 per cent of its

GDP again to the continent.

On the other side, it is difficult to forecast the British position as it is ambiguous and also dependent on the political climate and it is proclaimed from the UK and the EU that they both have an interest of strong military cooperation, perhaps the UK would see this as an opportunity not to lose foothold on the continent.

Norway is deeply involved in the institutional framework of the EU including CSDP (Tardy,

2014). It can be assumed that it can be won as ETAF member depending on the conditions and the institutional framework. So far, the EU has not been appealed to give its partners voting rights in many institutions. For such a far going approach such measures would be necessary, for Norway but especially the UK and the discussed option for an ETAF Defence Council could be a useful forum for this.

89 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

6.4 Military Culture and Political Status of the Soldier

Also concerning military culture and the status in society European states differ. Both aspects are crucial for the build-up and sustainment of regular armed forces and will find attention in this section.

6.4.1 Military Culture as Challenge and Task for ETAF

The aspect of military culture which combines historic understanding, traditions, habits, rituals, social norms, and the self-perception of the forces is an important one as serving in the military is not a regular job. To serve as a soldier it is the only job in the western world which has in its set of tasks to put a wide range of violence on opponents and the risk to get killed. To do so regular and good payment is not the only essential aspect to have real soldiers. To give the soldier a consistent identification and to bind the military to its political structures a consistent military culture has to be developed (Gareis, 2011, p. 461 ff).

For a force consisting out of a personal recruited all over Europe the development of military culture is a challenge which is faced with the fact that there are different languages, religions, different nuances of values, historic understandings and habits throughout Europe. This gives military culture difficulties but also mayor importance. A military culture of ETAF must decrease differences and highlight shared grounds and build up cohesion though itself (Gareis,

2011).

A decrease in differences could be established by using just one language as service language,33 the uniforms, a common legal structure and in general the shared education and training system. It is important to develop a corps spirit which keeps an understanding that all

33 The best option seems English as it is relatively easy to learn and already has a significant number of speakers.

90 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions servants are equal in their value concerning their routes. When this is not achieved tendencies could develop of divides and hierarchies based on the grounds of heritage as it was in the Red

Army where Russians build the peak of the ethnic hierarchy degrading the servants of the other Soviet Republics with a staged tendency (Wimbush & Alexiev, 1982).

To prevent such developments the identification with ETAF itself and its task is important

(Gareis, 2011, p.461 f). Building up of official traditions and rituals is a key element to build up such identification a measure successfully accomplished within the French Foreign Legion

(Larroumet, 2004).

A key motivation for soldiers is the feeling of belonging to its nation which represents a

“fellowship of destiny”. The feeling of connection to the nation is still in most cases stronger than the one to Europe but as those both do not exclude each other European identity is something that could equally unite all ETAF soldiers. The straightening and development of the European identity would be a usable base stone for ETAF's military culture. An approach that unites European and national identity and the approach to work as soldier directly for

Europe and by doing so also for the nation he is descending from would give the soldier needed justification (Gareis, 2011, p. 462).

In this European identity it must be recognised that Europe and its people are correlating in many areas by facing nuanced differences. This is also true for the historic understanding which will be a special challenge as Europeans often fought against each other (Mack, 2011).

Nevertheless, in the inter European Wars especially World War One and Two all sides lost and could also in the armed forces be more an warning example that European Armies serve better together then against each other. Beside the recognition and canalisation of old divides and their casualties there are also positive routes a pan European Army could built on. A

91 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions reference point for the ETAF forces could be the historic example the Roman Army gives.

Together with linkages to the Battle of Thermopyles, to leaders like Alexander the Great, and

Karl the Great and a successful naval power like the Vikings sources for transnational military culture would be given out of all regions Europe consists of.

Beside the long term historical loans, NATO and joint deployments and exercises achieved shared understanding (Gareis, 2011, p. 457). The build up of a shared military culture for

ETAF would therefore not has to emerge out of nothing but has a base to translate those already emerged feelings of correlating goals and of belonging into the new ETAF forces.

6.4.2 Political, Legal and Social Status of Soldiers

The status of the soldier itself will be also a field for discussion as they differ within Europe.

While for in many countries soldiers are not allowed to form unions and even engage politically like for example in France in other states soldiers have many more rights for example in Germany where the soldier is seen as “citizen in uniform” allowed to have unions, to engage in politics and even having some opportunities to influence the daily life in service.

Also, here to develop a common ground is key and has to be found early (Kirsch, 2011, 483).

Those are some of the main challenges concerning military culture and status of soldiers. The main route has to be given from the beginning on and is part of a decision-making processes best given to convention of military experts and decided then by the political responsible. The building up of military culture then needs time to develop organically. It can then be developed guided by the higher stages of the hierarchy and also emerge spontaneously through experiences by soldiers in training, service, and mission. It is a challenging process but many historic and actual examples show that it is not impossible and could be learned of.

92 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

6.5 Geography as Challenge for ETAF

The geographic distances in general and the more specific decisions where to build up garrisons would be a challenge for ETAF.

6.5.1 Distance as Disadvantage and Options for Anticipation

The geographic distances would be mostly a disadvantage compared to the national armies. A soldier of the Czech Republic will be always able to reach each region of his country within 4 hours. The garrisons for most ETAF soldiers on the other hand, no matter where the final bases are decided to be build up, will be in most cases further away.

Anticipation through Payment System – Proposal for Bonus as Distance Compensation

Solutions for this disadvantage could be extra charges for soldiers who have high distances from their descendent or in general a relative higher payment compared to what they would earn in their national army. The disadvantage of this could be jealously and aversion by the soldiers of national armed forces to ETAF soldiers. Another measure would be mainly opt for short contracts combined with special care for the reserve as it is full filled in the US armed forces, where even officers in can have an active duty of just four years (Smith, 2020) The hurdle to serve in ETAF then would be not such a big one even for potential ETAF soldiers with the intend to stay routed in their descending region. This measure of the options for short contracts could be minimized by permanent options to enlarge the contract and a system of benefits for doing so and benefits for soldiers which would sign for longer contracts in general. These benefits could be higher payments faster rise in the rank structure and special education.

93 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

Anticipation through Joint System of Training and Education

To build up cohesion in the force and the strengthen the ETAF military cultural identity at least the basic training for all recruits could be achieved in an acquired period in training units composed out of all states no matter where the recruit would descended from. The same would make sense for special trainings, courses for officers and the general staff. This would secure that the higher levels of command have a high degree of cohesion which then could translate to the lower ranks.

6.5.2 Three Concepts of Stationing ETAF – Development of a Military

District Model

Beside these general challenges geography represents and which could anticipated with these measures the decision would have to be made where to station the garrisons. There are three main options: strong centralisation, regional focuses, and decentralisation.

In the discussion about EU avant-garde battalions the option to centre them is put forward.

The argument is that it would be less expensive and easier to coordinate. Counter arguments described are: that then a bargaining about where this concentration would take place as it would be a beneficial economic factor; that the country or countries where the troops are stationed would become likely overrepresented in the recruits and with this more influential on the force in general; the problem of over representation would be connected with the problem that on the other hand the states where the force is stationed would have difficulties to get recruits (Vogel & Schulz, 2020).

For the ETAF approach the centralisation would have the same advantages described. Another advantage would be if the garrisons are centralised around the centre of population that it

94 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions would reduce on average the distance to the regions the soldiers would descent of. A centralisation of garrisons in eastern Europe and the Baltic of the land forces on the other hand would have the advantage that they would already be in the area one main task lays.

Such an approach in contrast would make a threat perception by Russia likely and bear the risk that the deterrence measure is interpretation as preparation for aggression. Beside the advantages of a centralised approach the problems of it described would be with the ETAF approach and 50.000 to 100.000 soldiers much bigger as they would be with the stance for an

EU brigade.

A decentralised approach would have the advantage that the benefits for hosting countries would be widely spread and that the distances for most soldiers from their descending regions would be short. The then decreased heterogeneity in the several units would be a challenge for the feeling of unity within ETAF concerning the military culture. The cohesion is endangered as it is likely that divides would emerge between soldiers out of the predominant hosting countries and soldiers with different backgrounds because differences in languages, habits and cultural aspect are likely to emerge. It would also raise permanently the question why ETAF would be founded in general if ETAF units would be more or less small siblings of the National armies. A quota system which could also lead here to heterogeneity in the troops would lead the decentralised approach ad absurd um as it would delete its main advantage of establishing short distances for service members. Beside that it would not have the advantage of the centralised approach like easing the command structure. Because of those reasons it is not a realistic solution.

95 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

Regional Garrison Focus/ Military District Approach for ETAF

The regional focus has several advantages compared to the other two options. If the main part of soldiers would be stationed in one geographical area where they are descending from this would ease the recruitment and and the payments of distance-bonuses would be in most cases lower. On the same time the regions would have a base of heterogeneity that would likely prevent one national group to become predominant. In this scenario wishes of recruits where to be stationed would be realised if the personal demands would allow it. Far distance stationing against the preferences of a soldier would be at least in the lower ranks an exception and connected to distance-bonus-payments.

The regional garrison approach can be also connected to a military district system which is adaptive to regional environments, strategic approaches and built up stronger cooperation to the national armed forces to the states the district includes. Many European states already built up multilateral regional military cooperation. This cooperation could be in many cases the base for interactions between ETAF and the national armed forces and be a useful guideline for the military districts.

A military district structure could be set up as follows:

A) District South West and Atlantic: centring the EU Med34 (Without Greece and Cyprus, potentially adding Netherlands and Belgium).

B) District Central Europe: centring the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC)35 (potentially adding Germany).

34 Members of EU MED: Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain. 35 Members of CEDC: Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia.

96 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions

C) District South East: centring the Craiova Group36, adding Cyprus and potentially adding other Balkan countries.

D) District North: centring NORDEFCO.37

E) District East: centring Poland and Baltic states (potentially adding Benelux and Germany).

With this order most responsibility for territorial defence could rely on B), D), and E) while for naval capabilities most weight could be put to District South West and Atlantic which stretches

36 Members of Craiova Group: Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Greece. 37 Members of NORDEFCO: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.

97 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions over the boarders of traditional naval powers. District South East would have special responsibilities for the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

6.6 Different Economic Backgrounds of Soldiers as Challenge for

Recruitment and Payment

As ETAF soldiers would descend from different economic backgrounds the payment system for soldiers and civil personal would be a challenge. But it is not one unable to be achieved.

There are two bigger directions to address it. The one is the equal payment levels for all ranks and tasks proposed by some politicians and soldier unions (Vogel & Schulz, 2020). This is the payment system for the French-Foreign-Legion. This has the advantage that there would not be any feelings of unfair treatment between the soldiers ETAF soldiers. For example in the

French-German-Battalion or between Blackwater mercenaries and US soldiers differences in payment are a bone of contention. Such an approach tough is predesignated to influence the composition of ETAF. If for example the ETAF average income would be set as point of orientation it is likely that recruits from regions where the average income is lower would be overrepresented in applications for serving in ETAF while the opposite would be true for soldiers from regions with higher average incomes. This would lead likely be a disadvantage for a transnational European force if some regions would be overrepresented. Even a quota system which prefers minor represented nationalities is unlikely not be able to absorb this.

Another likely problem would be animosities in front of ETAF soldiers by soldiers of national armies in regions of lower economic backgrounds especially if they are stationed in such a region. The question would arise why the ETAF soldier earns 20 or 30% more for the same

98 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions service.

With the one income solution also, a lower set could be set. This would be to make the over representations of descendent of a limited group of countries even more severe. This could be done for financial reasons and to help the on average poorer regions in the south of Europe with high unemployment rates to ease these problems. Such a solution nevertheless seems unlikely, considered the political stances for European social policies.

The other option is a system that recognises the economic background of the servants is.

Payments of soldiers would be oriented at the average income of the state from which a soldier comes from. If the soldiers are then stationed in a state with higher living costs this could be also recognised. Such a system is already achieved for example with the staff of EU institutions. The connected regulations and procedures could be mirrored and adapted for the use of ETAF recruitment and soldiers’ payments.

6.7 Competition over Recruits

A problem arising with the realisation of ETAF would be that ETAF and national armed forces would compete for the same personal base which is seen widely as limited (Vogel & Schulz,

2020; Vogel Schulz, 2019).Another aspect is that legal basis on the national level have to be established that citizens are allowed to serve in ETAF and that ETAF is allowed to recruit on the state level. This problem is not easy to be resolved. The only option to solve it would rely on increasing the personal potential for military service in general by making military service on the national level as the ETAF level more attractive, to professionalise the recruiting process or gaining soldiers through experiences within conscription for military service38 and

38 The last aspect just counts for national armed forces as conscription into ETAF is not estimated.

99 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions building up the reputation for the military. In line with these basic problems for the military personal potential like the post-heroic culture and low fertility rates are not a given that could not be strategically addressed by state institutions. The competition around recruits could therefore be a starting point of a rethinking of the status of defence and soldiers in European states and societies.

Besides this, the problem would be perhaps smaller than first expected as the service in a national army still offers different advantages than ETAF and vice versa. ETAF and national armed forces would also on many occasions address different persons. Persons more oriented nationally in their identity and a high preference to be stationed within his country are still more likely to apply for national armies. ETAF, on the other hand, would be mostly addressing a more flexible personal milieu and offer other advantages like a transnational experience and

“adventure”. And if the contracts for ETAF are mostly realised in a short term format it could also mean that the personal resource going into ETAF will not be lost as ETAF enlisted could join their national armies after getting some military experience in ETAF but wanting to build up a personal life within his or her home country afterwards. This could be supported by recognising of the ranks achieved within ETAF in the national armies.

Two other aspects show that the personal problem is maybe smaller than expected are the high youth unemployment rates even among well educated in many states (Euronews, 2020) and the fact that the EU is achieving less with more soldiers than the USA (Schnell, 2011, p.

202). Nevertheless, it is likely that in the case of competing recruitments ETAF is likely to become an ongoing target for blame if the HR institutions of the national armed forces cannot achieve their targets. But the competition could in the best-case result in an increase in the attractiveness of armed forces and efforts to increase the recruitment potential in general.

100 Conclusion

Conclusion

This thesis showed that the European states united in EU and NATO did not achieve to become an actor in foreign and defence policy correspondent to the economic power they sustain. The

European security infrastructure continues to be widely fragmented. While the CFSP accomplished on some fields smaller steps into a more joint direction like PESCO they act so far more as symbols of self-assurance compared to the challenges Europe is facing. Also, within NATO, there is the potential for internal divides which question the alliance and diverging interests among the members which not always suit into the interests of Europe.

Here the best example is Turkey but also to assume that Europe and especially the US would always find the substantial common ground concerning issues which are relevant for Europe is not reasonable to assume. Besides that, both alliances are faced with influences by Russia and China to weaken the unity within and between their societies. Besides the status quo of the institutions, it also referred to actual security challenges for Europe. Combined this analysis shows that Europe needs to act decisively concerning European foreign and security policy if it does not want to risk that out of challenges become vital damage for its security architecture and the economy as harm for its citizens besides the threat of becoming a plaything in international politics between the larger actors within a multipolar world. Such decisive action should be accomplished jointly as joint action enables Europe to accumulate its strength and unleash its potential.

Therefore, to examine a potential solution to this approach, the research question was whether European transnational armed forces can be a useful tool for such a joint European foreign and defence policy. The thesis did show that. First under consideration that a useful approach has to be practicable and possible and second under consideration whether and

101 Conclusion how it can add value to the actual security architecture of Europe.

The analyses of the legal bases and institutional structure of CFSP and NATO in Chapter 1

Security Architecture of Europe and Chapter 3 Institutional Frameworks to Embed ETAF showed that ETAF can be established already in the framework of the first and in cooperation with the second. Besides these legal changes were shown that could contribute to the efficiency and legitimacy of a joint European foreign and security policy. Chapter 5 Transnational Armed

Forces for Europe developed an approach how to finance ETAF and gave historic and actual examples of similar financing models. Chapter 6 Challenges for ETAF and Solutions further showed that there are ways to address and, in most cases solve those challenges by actual and historic examples. With this it is shown that the ETAF approach given by the the assumptions of a budget of 40 billion Euros or an equivalent of 10 per cent of the accumulated actual defence expenditures in the 27 EU states is practicable and possible taking into account legal, financial, cultural, strategic, tactical and political considerations.

The usefulness or how it could add value to Europe's defence architecture was especially shown by an analysis of the characteristics of ETAF in Chapter 2 Arguments for European

Transatlantic Armed Forces. As transnational armed force consists of servicemen out of all participating states the deterring effect is larger than the one of multinational or national units as they just represent a fraction of a defensive alliance. An analysis of ETAF's characteristic of being similar to a club good showed further how it could open up decision- making processes for military action under a joint framework and that it would be a good base to enable member states to act within the CFSP framework as it can provide necessary capabilities with a low threat for withdrawal. The third aspect within its characteristics is that the investments made have the potential to strengthen the transatlantic relationship to the US.

102 Conclusion

Besides those aspects arguments where developed why the ETAF approach has advantages compared to continuing the speed and scope of actual European foreign and security policy and compared to other approaches for joint European armed forces. The first aspect is likely to give way for endangering developments as referred to in the introducing sentences of this conclusion. While the analysis of alternative approaches for an “EU Army” would be connected to sever political and legal hurdles which are mostly sidelined by the ETAF approach.

With special attention to challenges for the security architecture and actual developments in military technology analysed in Chapter 4 Strategic Challenges for Joint European Security

Policy a development and an analysis of a potential capability built up of ETAF showed in

Chapter 5 Transnational Armed Forces for Europe how ETAF can contribute to anticipate those challenges and add value to the security infrastructure of Europe consisting of CFSP and

NATO.

With this the thesis contributes to the scientific and political debate concerning European foreign and security policy by examining a far going approach with a high potential to improve

CFSP and anticipating European security challenges - in a time where decisive steps seem to be needed but congruent and far going approaches are missing. Its value for the scientific debate is also based on doing pioneer work as it is the only or one of the few research papers that examined the establishment of European transnational armed forces in addition to the national armies; while approaches to merge all European national armies into one or increase the power of EU entities over national armies got more attention by the scientific community.

Ideas going into this direction with a lower scope are becoming increasingly part of the debate, like approaches by the German Social Democrats and Radoslav Sikorski, former Polish foreign minister and member of the European Parliament show. For those smaller approaches

103 Conclusion especially the analyses of the challenges for transnational armed forces and the developed options to anticipate them can contribute to the further debate and can be part of the guidelines for their implementation.

The public support for joint European foreign and security is often derived in surveys

(Dennison, 2019) while results on specific designs of it are rare (Petersen, 2011, P.300 ff). In the end, a potential implementation is depending on the public opinion and especially the views and motives of politicians. Therefore, a promising field for further research on the objective could be found in creating surveys about the public and political support for such an approach compared to other approaches. Besides this the research on the legal issues, a deeper recognition of the aspects with the methods of political economy and more detailed elaborations on a practical capability set can contribute to the objective.

With the shown potential to be a useful tool for joint European foreign and security policy, the limitations for the approach are given by the political will to do steps into such a direction.

Incentives for politicians to do so are provided in the thesis. The actual proposals to make steps into the direction of European transnational armed forces in addition to national armies must show their political sustainability. The thesis showed that there are many reasons to go them and larger ones.

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