DOCSLIB.ORG

Indian-Administered Kashmir | No 5 | October to November 2007

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Indian-Administered Kashmir | No 5 | October to November 2007 Indian-administered Kashmir | No 5 | October to November 2007 INDIAN-ADMINISTERED KASHMIR | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation No significant changes have been observed in Indian-administered Kashmir in the past two months. On 26 November, the cease-fire along the Line of Control (LoC) reached its fourth year with the truce still holding, apart from a few isolated incidents of violations. At the same time, Indo-Pakistani peace talks are continuing although at a slow pace. From 18-19 October, the two countries met to discuss conventional and nuclear confidence building measures, and on 22 October they held their second meeting of the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism. During these meetings, both countries renewed their commitment to the cease-fire but failed to make any progress on the contentious issues of Kashmir and the Siachen glacier. India makes the current instability in Pakistan responsible for the slow progress in the peace process, while Pakistan claims that the peace process does not advance because of India’s inflexibility. Nevertheless, according to Pakistani officials, the back-channel diplomacy on the peace process between India and Pakistan continues despite Pakistan’s domestic problems. Pakistan’s ability to engage in foreign politics has indeed been limited in the past weeks due to its internal crisis. After the declaration of emergency rule on 3 November, the newly constituted Supreme Court validated Musharraf’s re-election as president on 23 November. Whatever the result of the general elections in January will be, Pakistan’s policy towards Kashmir is not expected to change significantly. Even if the uncertainty over Pakistan’s future leadership does make it more difficult for India to negotiate, India has also shown little flexibility in advancing the peace process and has yet to deliver on some of its promises, such as the adherence to a “zero-tolerance” policy towards human rights violations and the implementation of the recommendations of the working groups set up under the Indian-sponsored roundtable conferences on Kashmir. Among other things, these working groups had recommended the revocation of draconian anti-terrorist legislation and unconditional dialog with militant groups. A fifth working group set up under the roundtable conference, tasked with the controversial issue of center-state relations, has so far failed to reach a consensus and to come forward with clear recommendations. The up-coming state elections (expected in 2008) have affected the behavior and public positioning of major political parties and the Kashmiri separatists. The tone between the different contestants has become increasingly hostile. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP), a major ally of Kashmir’s coalition government, continues to publicly denounce its coalition partner Indian National Congress (INC) for lack of cooperation and coordination and has threatened to quit the government on several occasions. Nevertheless, despite the deepening rift between the PDP and the INC, the opposition party National Conference (NC) refutes speculations of an electoral alliance with the INC. At the same time, not only the separatists but also leading pro-Indian parties have capitalized on Kashmiri grievances to gain additional votes by demanding demilitarization and an end to human rights violations, and making blurred suggestions for self-rule and autonomy. Among the pro-India camp, it’s the NC which is at the forefront of anti-India campaigning in Kashmir. The NC’s patron and former Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah warned the Indian government on 21 October of another 1990-like rebellion in Kashmir if human rights abuses continue unabated. And again on 19 November, Farooq said that continuing human rights abuses by the Indian Army in the state have forced his party to rethink Kashmir's accession to the Indian union in 1947. While Syed Ali Shah Geelani from the hardline faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is repeatedly placed under house arrest, there have been reports that talks between New Delhi and the moderate faction of the APHC might resume at the end of the year. This would raise the profile of the moderate faction of APHC, which has lost significant ground to hardliners due to the break-down of talks. Talks between the two sides had stalled after the moderate APHC had refused to participate in the roundtable conference organized by India in April. Possibly as a consequence of their mutual rapprochement, the moderate faction of the APHC even indicated that it might participate in state elections provided that India implements the four-point formula advanced by Pakistan. Against this backdrop and considering the fact that the hardline APHC faction has announced a full-out boycott of the polls, a re-unification of the two Hurriyat fractions prior to the elections is illusionary. In terms of international engagement to resolve the Kashmir issue, a Kashmir conference was hosted at the House of Commons in London from 28-29 November. A seven-point resolution adopted by the end of the conference highlighted the importance of the right to self-determination, demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), an inclusive dialog and the revocation of draconian laws. The conference was attended by mainstream parties from J&K and the moderate faction of the APHC. FAST Update | Indian-administered Kashmir | No 5 | October to November 2007 In a positive development, on 21 October Kashmiri Hindus or “Pandits” celebrated Dussehra festival, which marks the victory of Lord Rama over the evil Ravana, in Srinagar after a gap of 20 years. Senior separatist leader Shabir Shah was present when a group of Pandits set ablaze an effigy of Ravana at a stadium in Srinagar. Also positive in terms of economic development is that India and Pakistan have cleared nine out of 14 proposed items for trade between the two divided parts of Kashmir through the LoC. The items to be exported from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad include Kashmiri carpets, shawls, furniture and wood carving items, fruits, spices, etc. On 8 October, the United Jihad Council, a conglomerate of different militant groups, announced a three-day cease-fire from 12 to 14 October, to facilitate peaceful Eid celebrations at the end of Ramadan. The announcement was widely welcomed by Kashmiri separatists and even some of the pro-Indian political parties. However, believing that militants might use the cease-fire to re-assemble their strengths, the Indian government refused to reciprocate the offer. According to security officials, the levels of violence in J&K have decreased by 40% (60% in Srinagar city) compared to last year despite continuing efforts of infiltration from across the LoC. At the same time, army officials estimate the number of militants in J&K at only 800 (half of last year) while maintaining Relative Forceful Events by Year that several of the active militants (around 60%) are foreigners. It is difficult to verify whether these figures are accurate. It can, however, be noted that recent militant activity has primarily come from Hizbul Mujahideen (mostly made up of Kashmiris), Lashker-e-Toiba (predominantly foreigners) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (predominantly foreigners). Data collected by FAST International and South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) confirm the trend of declining militancy-related violence and fatalities compared to previous years (see graph). Despite these positive trends, Indian officials and security personnel persistently reject claims for troop reduction. The demand for demilitarization has resounding support in the Kashmir Valley, even from among the pro-India mainstream parties, given the high presence of Indian troops in J&K (approx. 700,000 Source: FAST event data troops). India’s inflexible stance on the issue of demilitarization appears to undercut the work of a committee set up in spring to look into the issue of demilitarization. The committee had been set up by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to avert the PDP from leaving the coalition government over the issue of demilitarization. To demonstrate some level of goodwill, Defense Minister A. K. Anthony announced on 27 October that top priority had been given in getting security forces to vacate the government infrastructure in Kashmir by 30 November. Security forces subsequently vacated many, although not all schools, hospitals and colleges in the Kashmir Valley. Instead they were shifted to alternative places. It is mostly the paramilitary forces and the police, which continue to occupy government buildings. Claims by Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad in mid-October that no innocent persons had been killed in custody in the past 10 months were quickly refuted by separatists. Despite decreasing militant violence, there has been no real let-up in human rights violations committed by security forces and militants. The most prominent cases of human rights violations during the reporting period were the shooting of a teacher by Indian troops in Kupwara on 19 October and the killing of a baker on 17 November in Kulgam by the Rashtriya Rifles. The heavy presence of security forces in civilian areas, draconian laws and widespread impunity are all factors contributing to this poor human rights record. On 18 October, the United Jihad Council signed a declaration not to use anti-personnel mines following a visit by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. No significant developments on Kashmir are expected in the future. As seen in last years, militant violence is likely to decrease during the winter months. Indo-Pakistani talks might gain new momentum after the general elections in Pakistan although no major break-through on Kashmir is expected in the coming months. Political violence, militancy, hostility and alliance-building among the major parties might rise before and during the state elections. Due to an election boycott by (hardline) separatists and India’s refusal to engage in unconditional talks with militants and hardliners, an end to violence in Kashmir is not in sight.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Jihadi Factor in India-Pakistan Peace Process
    ch ar F se o e u R ● ISSUE BRIEF THE JIHADI FACTOR IN INDIA-PAKISTANn PEACE PROCESS r d e a v t r i e o s n b O ORF ISSUE BRIEF MAY 2006 ISSUE BRIEF # 6 The Jihadi Factor in India-Pakistan Peace Process By Wilson John Senior Fellow, ORF he India-Pakistan peace process, punctuated with struments of the state policy, and make an assessment wheth- fl uctuating waves of optimism and anxiety, has com- er de-linking the issue of terrorism from the peace talks is Tpleted three years, and it is appropriate, and timely, really prudent and viable, in the long run. to review whether the primary conditions of its long-term objectives have been met and, if not, whether the failure COMPOSITE DIALOGUE would undermine the credibility of the dialogue on which On April 22, 2003 the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Atal Bihari peace and stability in the region have come to lean on heav- Vajpayee, told the Indian Parliament that India was unilater- ily. Such an assessment has become all the more important ally opening “the doors for talks” with Pakistan.1 The offer in view of the proposed visit of Prime Minister Manmohan was based on two simple premises: one, that Pakistan would Singh to Pakistan later this year. stop cross-border infi ltration and second, it would destroy Although it could be argued, that the peace process in the the terrorist infrastructure in place on its soil. This statement past three years has gone beyond the issue of terrorism, it was a sequel to his declaration made in Srinagar on April would be naïve to forsake, altogether, an assessment of Paki- 18 that “we are again extending the hand of friendship, but stan’s Kashmir policy and its strategy of using terrorist groups hands should be extended by both sides.”2 A signifi cant ad- in achieving some of its foreign policy objectives in India.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan, Country Information
    Pakistan, Country Information PAKISTAN ASSESSMENT April 2003 Country Information and Policy Unit I SCOPE OF DOCUMENT II GEOGRAPHY III ECONOMY IV HISTORY V STATE STRUCTURES VI HUMAN RIGHTS VIA. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES VIB. HUMAN RIGHTS - SPECIFIC GROUPS VIC. HUMAN RIGHTS - OTHER ISSUES ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS ANNEX B: POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS AND OTHER GROUPS ANNEX C: PROMINENT PEOPLE ANNEX D: REFERENCES TO SOURCE MATERIAL 1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT 1.1 This assessment has been produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a wide variety of recognised sources. The document does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. 1.2 The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum / human rights determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum / human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. 1.3 The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain. These sources have been checked for currency, and as far as can be ascertained, remained relevant and up to date at the time the document was issued. 1.4 It is intended to revise the assessment on a six-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum-seeker producing countries in the United Kingdom. 2. GEOGRAPHY file:///V|/vll/country/uk_cntry_assess/apr2003/0403_Pakistan.htm[10/21/2014 9:56:32 AM] Pakistan, Country Information General 2.1 The Islamic Republic of Pakistan lies in southern Asia, bordered by India to the east and Afghanistan and Iran to the west.
    [Show full text]
  • Exploring Transnational Jihad Roots and Caliphate in Kashmir
    CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES D W LAN ARFA OR RE F S E T R U T D N IE E S C CLAWS VI CT N OR ISIO Y THROUGH V ISSUE BRIEF No. 69 January 2015 Shweta Desai is an former Associate Exploring Fellow of CLAWS, focussing on conflict and security in Syria and transnational Transnational Jihad Jihad. She traveled to Kashmir as a part Roots and Caliphate of a field research trip. in Kashmir There is no presence of Al Qaeda or ISIS establishing Key Points base in India. However, the roots of militancy in Kashmir have linkages to transnational Jihad. The growing support for the extremist group in the J&K 1. The rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) and remains a worrying factor. the subsequent joining of Indian nationals in its rank has raised concerns for the security agencies In the plethora of anti-India posters and graffiti1 2. It has also renewed fears that the global Islamist scrawled at various interjections from the militancy could attract the low-intensity conflict in walls of residential neighbourhoods, besides mosques in down-town Srinagar, to the narrow Kashmir, particularly after some flags and graffiti by-lanes of Anantnag, on the shutters of shops, supporting the extremist militant organisation voicing the popular sentiments of `Boycott were spotted in the valley. elections’ and `Quit India’2, there is a sudden 3. Kashmir, has a long history of militancy sponsored spurt of affinity towards the dreaded militant by Pakistan based militant groups, with threads group of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, whose even linking it with al Qaeda.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan Army and Terrorism; an Unholy Alliance
    Pakistan Army and Terrorism; an unholy alliance Pakistan has been known for its perennial support of the Taliban in Afghanistan and other terrorist organizations in Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir. The dramatic events of the terrorist attacks on the twin towers in the United States (U.S) on the 11th of September 2001 also referred to as 9/11, shook the tectonic plates of world politics, pushing Pakistan into being a focal point of global politics. Pakistan became the key strategic partner of United States’ War on Terror; post the terrorist attacks, taking a complete U-turn in her traditional foreign policies towards Afghanistan and Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir, albeit temporarily under international pressure for heavy monetary gains. The country, in which sectarian groups targeting minority communities (Shias, Sufis, Ahmadis etc.) and Kashmir- focused groups confined their operations to Indian Administered Kashmir and the rest of India, has become a victim of its own holy war as a consequence of the ‘unholy alliance’ between the Inter Intelligence Services (ISI), Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, military and self-styled religious scholars. This historic alliance has resulted in colossal rise of radical Islam being a factor in the country’s proclivity to Islamic fundamentalism. Jihadi Groups There are several kind of militant groups operating in and from Pakistan that can be distinguished by their sectarian background (Ahl-e-Hadith, Deobandi, Jamaat-e-Islami etc.), and their areas of operation (Afghanistan, India, Pakistan). Their objectives may vary from overthrowing the Pakistani government, seizure of Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir or support of Afghan Taliban.
    [Show full text]
  • EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation
    European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation October 2018 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation October 2018 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9476-319-8 doi: 10.2847/639900 © European Asylum Support Office 2018 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: FATA Faces FATA Voices, © FATA Reforms, url, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO COI REPORT PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 3 Acknowledgements EASO would like to acknowledge the Belgian Center for Documentation and Research (Cedoca) in the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, as the drafter of this report. Furthermore, the following national asylum and migration departments have contributed by reviewing the report: The Netherlands, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis Hungary, Office of Immigration and Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Office Documentation Centre Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation Sweden, Migration Agency, Lifos
    [Show full text]
  • Indian Security Perspectives from Terrorism and Triangular Relation of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Balochistan
    International Journal of Research in Social Sciences Vol. 9 Issue 3, March 2019, ISSN: 2249-2496 Impact Factor: 7.081 Journal Homepage: http://www.ijmra.us, Email: [email protected] Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International Journal - Included in the International Serial Directories Indexed & Listed at: Ulrich's Periodicals Directory ©, U.S.A., Open J-Gage as well as in Cabell‟s Directories of Publishing Opportunities, U.S.A Indian security perspectives from terrorism and triangular relation of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Balochistan. Rahul Kumar India‟s diplomatic manoeuvring with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the backdrop of terrorism which has umbilical cords connected need to be cut down drastically. Balochistan as troubled province of Pakistan is problematic for region is instrumental in growth of insurgency and terrorism of this pocket. The challenging security of India needs to be augmented well from all non-state actors posing threat and rogue states which are following terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. The entangled relationship with these countries and terrorism needs certain coherence and objective in combatting terrorism. The crucial juncture will have strategic goalposts and determination to fight back growing menace of terrorism emanating from the fault line of the region. There has been paradigm shift in India‟s AF- Pak policy.AF-Pak has been used by US foreign policy circle for the geopolitical space of the region. USA policy makers has crafted to curtail the growing influence of terrorist organisation like Al- Qaeda and its affiliates design against US. The hyphenated word was used to stress the compounded problem of terrorism and its splinter groups operating from the region as it was never intended to demean Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Country to Form a Large Islamic State
    July 2012 Lashkar-e-Taiba: The Three-Headed Snake …………….…….……………….. TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) [Type the author name] United States Army 6/1/2012 OEA Team Threat Report Purpose • To inform the Army training community of the militant Islamist threat presented by Lashkar-e-Taiba. • To lay out the group’s history, goals, significant activities, and ties to other organizations. • To discuss common tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the group. Executive Summary • Lashkar-e-Taiba is a militant Islamist group based in Pakistan and Kashmir, and operates primarily in Southern Asia. • Lashkar-e-Taiba is related to and nearly indistinguishable from two other Islamist organizations: Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. • The group is responsible for several major attacks in the region, including the three- day-long attacks in Mumbai, India in 2008. • Lashkar-e-Taiba pioneered fidayeen attacks, in which a small group assaults a target with the expectation of being killed. • The group is global in scope and has links to other global terror organizations, specifically al-Qaeda and Jaish-e-Muhammad, and also has ties to the Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence agency. Cover: Lashkar-e-Taiba logo, Muhammad Hafiz Saeed, and Jamaat-ud-Dawa logo and flag. 2 UNCLASSIFIED OEA Team Threat Report Regional Map 3 UNCLASSIFIED OEA Team Threat Report Introduction Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a militant Islamist organization based in Pakistan and Kashmir1, is related to and nearly indistinguishable from two other Islamist groups: Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad and its successor, Jamaat-ud-Dawa.2 LeT was founded in 1990 by Muhammad Hafiz Saeed for the purpose of regaining all of Kashmir for Pakistan through jihad, and operates in Southern Asia.
    [Show full text]
  • The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: an Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir
    The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir Item Type Report Authors Howenstein, Nicholas Citation Howenstein, N. (2008). The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir. Bradford, Pakistan Security Research Unit, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. PSRU Research Reports, No.1. Rights © 2008 Howenstein, N. and the University of Bradford. Reproduced by permission from the copyright holders. Download date 25/09/2021 21:15:54 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10454/2224 The University of Bradford Institutional Repository http://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk This work is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our Policy Document available from the repository home page for further information. To see the final version of this work please visit the publisher’s website. Where available, access to the published online version may require a subscription. Author(s): Howenstein, N. Title: The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir Publication year: 2008 Pakistan Security Research Unit: Research Report 1 Publisher: Pakistan Security Research Unit, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford (http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Home) Publisher’s repository: http://bradscholars.ac.uk:8080/dspace Original online publication is available at: http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/resrep1.pdf Citation: Howenstein, N. (2008). The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan: Violence Vs. Stability
    PAKISTAN: VIOLENCE VS. STABILITY A National Net Assessment Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Working Draft: 5 May 2011 Please send comments and suggested revisions and additions to [email protected] Vira & Cordesman: Pakistan: Violence & Stability 3/5/11 ii Executive Summary As the events surrounding the death of Osama Bin Laden make all too clear, Pakistan is passing through one of the most dangerous periods of instability in its history. This instability goes far beyond Al Qa‟ida, the Taliban, and the war in Afghanistan. A net assessment of the patterns of violence and stability indicate that Pakistan is approaching a perfect storm of threats, including rising extremism, a failing economy, chronic underdevelopment, and an intensifying war, resulting in unprecedented political, economic and social turmoil. The Burke Chair at CSIS has developed an working draft of a net assessment that addresses each of these threats and areas of internal violence in depth, and does so within in the broader context of the religious, ideological, ethnic, sectarian, and tribal causes at work; along with Pakistan‟s problems in ideology, politics, governance, economics and demographics. The net assessment shows that these broad patterns of violence in Pakistan have serious implications for Pakistan‟s future, for regional stability, and for core US interests. Pakistan remains a central node in global counterterrorism. Osama Bin Laden was killed deep inside Pakistan in an area that raises deep suspicion about what Pakistani intelligence, senior military officers and government officials did and did not know about his presence – and the presence of other major terrorists and extremist like Sheik Mullah Omar and the “Quetta Shura Taliban.” Pakistan pursues its own agenda in Afghanistan in ways that provide the equivalent of cross- border sanctuary for Taliban and Haqqani militants, and that prolong the fighting and cause serious US, ISAF, and Afghan casualties.
    [Show full text]
  • US Media Framing of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1999
    U.S. Media Framing of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1999: Religious Framing in an International Conflict? A thesis presented to the faculty of the Scripps College of Communication of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Science Sagar Atre May 2013 © 2013 Sagar Atre. All Rights Reserved. This thesis titled U.S. Media Framing of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1999: Religious Framing in an International Conflict? by SAGAR ATRE has been approved for the E.W. Scripps School of Journalism and the Scripps College of Communication by Yusuf Kalyango Assistant Professor of Journalism Scott Titsworth Dean, Scripps College of Communication ii ABSTRACT ATRE, SAGAR, M.S., May 2013, Journalism U.S. Media Framing of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1999: Religious Framing in an International Conflict? Director of Thesis: Yusuf Kalyango This study examines the framing of religion in the news coverage of a conflict between India and Pakistan which happened from May 5, 1999 and July 30, 1999 in selected U.S. news outlets. The study looks into the coverage of the conflict in seven national and regional U.S. newspapers, and three U.S. television channels. The theoretical framework of this study was framing, and the frames of reactionary depiction and partisan alignment were used to study if the news outlets framed any country or its religion like Hinduism and Islam negatively or in a partisan manner. The findings showed that the coverage of the conflict covered Pakistan and Islam negatively, and held them responsible for invading India and escalating the conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • INDIAN-ADMINISTERED KASHMIR | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation
    Indian-administered Kashmir | No 3 | June to July 2007 INDIAN-ADMINISTERED KASHMIR | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation The situation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) has not changed significantly. India and Pakistan reiterated their resolve to deal with outstanding issues between them, including Kashmir but the pace of the peace talks remains slow and no major breakthroughs were reported. The peace talks between India and Pakistan are overshadowed and further slowed down by the current political instability in Pakistan. President Musharraf faces a dilemma. On the one hand, he earned international support by making a U-turn on Islamabad's traditional stand on the Kashmir dispute (see FAST Update Feb-March 2007). On the other hand, Musharraf estranged Islamist groups in Pakistan who accuse him of making too many concessions to India. The storming of Islamabad's Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) by Pakistani troops has enraged Islamists across the country and in J&K. Indo-Pakistani relations have been further strained by the landmark nuclear deal struck between India and the US at the end of July; Pakistan perceives the nuclear deal as a threat, claiming it will allow India to produce nuclear weapons, and fears a shifting of its ally, the US, towards its regional rival India. India, on the other hand, could argue that it currently has no interest in pushing forward talks with Musharraf because it is not clear whether his successor will stick to any agreement reached. Additionally, India has shown little flexibility in making further concessions to Pakistan or Kashmiri separatists over the Kashmir issue. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s statement at Jammu University in mid-July that there is no question of changing the borders although these could be made irrelevant, reconfirmed India’s position that the Kashmir issue has to be resolved within the Indian constitution and through economic development.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan--Violence Versus Stability
    Pakistan—Voilence versus Stability versus Pakistan—Voilence Pakistan—Violence versus Stability versus Pakistan—Violence a report of the csis burke chair in strategy Pakistan—Violence versus Stability a national net assessment 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 C E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org ordesman Authors Anthony H. Cordesman Varun Vira Cordesman / V ira / Vira September 2011 ISBN 978-0-89206-652-0 CSIS Ë|xHSKITCy066520zv*:+:!:+:! CSIS a report of the csis burke chair in strategy Pakistan—Violence versus Stability a national net assessment Authors Anthony H. Cordesman Varun Vira September 2011 About CSIS At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to decisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS conducts research and analysis and devel- ops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent international policy institutions, with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. Former U.S.
    [Show full text]