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Deliverable D1.1 DELIVERABLE D1.1 STATE OF THE ART, PROJECT CONCEPT AND REQUIREMENTS Grant Agreement number: 786922 Project acronym: ASTRID Project title: AddreSsing ThReats for virtualIseD services Start date of the project: 01/05/2018 Duration of the project: 36 months Type of Action: Research & Innovation Action (RIA) Name: Orazio Toscano Project Coordinator: Phone: +39 010 600 2223 e-mail: [email protected] Due Date of Delivery: M10 (28/02/2019) Actual Date of Delivery: 27/02/2019 Date of Revision Delivery: 27/02/2020 Work Package: WP1 – Reference Architecture Type of the Deliverable: R Dissemination level: PU Editors: POLITO Version: 3.0 Deliverable D1.1 List of Authors POLITO POLITECNICO DI TORINO Fulvio Valenza, Fulvio Risso, Riccardo Sisto, Guido Marchetto CNIT CONSORZIO NAZIONALE INTERUNIVERSITARIO PER LE TELECOMUNICAZIONI Matteo Repetto, Alessandro Carrega DTU DANMARKS TEKNISKE UNIVERSITET Thanassis Giannetsos ETI ERICSSON TELECOMUNICAZIONI Orazio Toscano INFO INFOCOM S.R.L. Maurizio Giribaldi SURREY UNIVERSITY OF SURREY Mark Manulis AGE AGENTSCAPE AG Benjamin Ertl GIOUMPITEK MELETI SCHEDIASMOS YLOPOIISI KAI POLISI ERGON UBITECH PLIROFORIKIS ETAIREIA PERIORISMENIS EFTHYNIS Anastasios Zafeiropoulos, Eleni Fotopoulou, Thanos Xirofotos TUB TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAET BERLIN Tran Quang Thanh, Stefan Covaci Page 2 of 203 Deliverable D1.1 Disclaimer The information, documentation and figures available in this deliverable are written by the ASTRID Consortium partners under EC co-financing (Call: H2020-DS-SC7-2017, Project ID: 786922) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the European Commission. The information in this document is provided “as is”, and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The reader uses the information at his/her sole risk and liability. Copyright Copyright © 2019 the ASTRID Consortium. All rights reserved. The ASTRID Consortium consists of: ERICSSON TELECOMUNICAZIONI (ETI) UNIVERSITY OF SURREY (SURREY) CONSORZIO NAZIONALE INTERUNIVERSITARIO PER LE TELECOMUNICAZIONI (CNIT) INFOCOM S.R.L. (INFO) POLITECNICO DI TORINO (POLITO) TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAET BERLIN (TUB) TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF DENMARCK (TUD) AGENTSCAPE AG (AGE) GIOUMPITEK MELETI SCHEDIASMOS YLOPOIISI KAI POLISI ERGON PLIROFORIKIS ETAIREIA PERIORISMENIS EFTHYNIS (UBITECH) DANMARKS TEKNISKE UNIVERSITET (DTU) This document may not be copied, reproduced or modified in whole or in part for any purpose without written permission from the ASTRID Consortium. In addition to such written permission to copy, reproduce or modify this document in whole or part, an acknowledgement of the authors of the document and all applicable portions of the copyright notice must be clearly referenced. Page 3 of 203 Deliverable D1.1 Table of Contents DISCLAIMER .................................................................................................................................................................. 3 COPYRIGHT ................................................................................................................................................................... 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................................ 4 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................................... 7 2 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 8 3 PROJECT CONCEPTS AND CURRENT TRENDS IN CYBER-SECURITY .................................. 8 3.1 THE VIRTUALIZATION WAVE: CLOUD, EDGE, AND FOG ............................................................................................. 9 3.2 THREATS FROM CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS ........................................................................................................... 10 3.3 INCREASING THREATS AGAINST SYSTEMS BASED ON IOT, CLOUD, EDGE AND FOG .......................................... 11 3.3.1 Statistics about cyber-attacks in Virtualized Platforms .......................................................................... 12 3.4 CHALLENGES AND EMERGING TRENDS .................................................................................................................... 16 3.5 TOWARDS INTEGRATED AND PERVASIVE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ................................................................ 20 3.5.1 Context and enforcement ....................................................................................................................................... 22 3.5.2 Detection and policies .............................................................................................................................................. 23 3.5.3 Awareness and reaction .......................................................................................................................................... 23 3.5.4 Forensics and legal validity ................................................................................................................................... 24 3.6 THE ASTRID CONCEPT ............................................................................................................................................. 25 3.6.1 What is ASTRID? ......................................................................................................................................................... 25 3.6.2 Technical approach ................................................................................................................................................... 27 3.7 APPLICATION SCENARIOS .......................................................................................................................................... 30 3.7.1 Situational awareness.............................................................................................................................................. 31 3.7.2 Distributed firewalling ............................................................................................................................................ 34 3.7.3 Network monitoring ................................................................................................................................................. 36 3.7.4 Trusted and safe execution .................................................................................................................................... 38 3.7.5 Response to Attacks and Enabling Forensic Investigation ..................................................................... 41 3.7.6 Lawful interception ................................................................................................................................................... 43 3.7.7 Protection of data confidentiality and personal data ............................................................................... 45 4 RELEVANT TECHNOLOGIES AND APPROACHES ..................................................................... 46 4.1 ORCHESTRATION MODELS AND STRATEGIES .......................................................................................................... 47 4.1.1 Cloud Orchestrators .................................................................................................................................................. 47 4.1.2 NFV Orchestrator ....................................................................................................................................................... 48 4.1.3 Northbound APIs ........................................................................................................................................................ 51 4.1.4 Virtual Network Functions Profiling Mechanisms...................................................................................... 51 4.2 AUTOMATIC CONFIGURATION OF NETWORK SECURITY FUNCTIONS ................................................................. 52 4.2.1 Policy Based Configuration ................................................................................................................................... 52 4.2.2 Modelling of Network Security Functions....................................................................................................... 54 4.2.3 Issues in Automatic Network Security Configuration ............................................................................... 55 4.3 PROGRAMMABLE DATA PLANES FOR PACKET PROCESSING .................................................................................. 57 4.3.1 Technologies for building fast data planes .................................................................................................... 58 4.3.2 Programming abstractions ................................................................................................................................... 62 4.4 DATA COLLECTION, FUSION, ABSTRACTION ............................................................................................................ 63 4.4.1 Log Collectors ............................................................................................................................................................... 63 4.4.2 Log Storage ................................................................................................................................................................... 64 4.4.3 Graph Databases .......................................................................................................................................................
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    94192bindex.qxd 6/3/08 3:29 PM Page 835 Index Symbols and Numbers 2600 # key, as end of dialing feature, 96 meetings, 512–522 10 reserved bytes, and virus detection, 291 writer indicted, 73 10297, 484 2600 Hz, 221 10457, 484 300 baud modems, 43 10502, 484 311, 483 10811, 484 31337SP34K, hacking, 816–817 10nnn, 93–97 3D glasses, 812–816 110w, 761 411 128-bit keys, cryptosystems, 308 directory assistance, 47 1633 Hz, 31 step offices and, 51 1980s 414 gang, 22 corporate history, see corporations. see 56-bit keys, Data Encryption Standard, 308 corporations, 1980s 62-second trick, and virus detection, 291 early days of Net. see Internet, early days of 64-bit keys, cryptosystems, 308 hacker philosophy. see hackers, philosophy *67, 483, 669 last days of Ma Bell. see Ma Bell 710 trick, 667 new toys. see telecommunications toys, 1980s 800 numbers raids. see raids, 1980s allocating, 92–93 stories. see stories, 1980s types of, 111–112 1990s 802.11b wireless networks, 733–739 computer revolution. see computer revolution background and basics, 733–734 hackers and the law. see law enforcement, 1990s community, 737–738 hackers really discovered in, 233–234 detecting, 734–736 hacking other things. see hacking other things getting to know your neighbors, 739–743 pop culture. see pop culture,COPYRIGHTED 1990s hacking MATERIAL Captivate network, 743–744 stories. see stories, 1990s non-beaconing, 737 2000 and beyond packet types, 734 hacker stories. see stories, 2000 and beyond practical examples, 738–739 lawsuits. see lawsuits, 2000 and beyond securing, 737 retail hacking.
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