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Contents The Future Role of U.S. feature article 1 The Future Role of U.S. Counterterrorism Operations Counterterrorism Operations in Africa By Michael A. Sheehan and Geoff D. Porter in Africa Reports By Michael A. Sheehan and Geoff D. Porter 4 Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate By Ken Menkhaus 9 An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabab’s Internal Divisions By Stig Jarle Hansen 12 The Malian Government’s Challenge to Restore Order in the North By Bruce Whitehouse 14 The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest By Hannah Armstrong 17 Will Terrorism in Libya be Solely Driven by Radical Islamism? By Geoffrey Howard and Henry Smith 19 Religious Violence in Tunisia Three Years after the Revolution By Anne Wolf 23 Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria A French Tiger helicopter lands at Mopti airport in Sevare, Mali, on February 2, 2013. - Pascal Guyot/AFP/Getty Images By Jacob Zenn n his state of the union on Qa`ida threats in various regions across January 28, 2014, President the globe—depending on the nature of 29 Recent Highlights in Political Violence Barack Obama’s speech focused the threat and the willingness of other 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts on domestic issues, but singled out partners to participate. IAfrica, specifically mentioning Somalia and Mali, in reference to the evolution The multilateral campaign’s success of the al-Qa`ida threat, the emergence of notwithstanding, numerous violent al-Qa`ida affiliates and the need for the non-state actors persist in Africa, in About the CTC Sentinel United States to continue to work with the Sahara, and to its north and south. The Combating Terrorism Center is an partners to disrupt and disable these They include jihadists and ethnic or independent educational and research networks. regionalist militias. Much analysis of institution based in the Department of Social terrorist organizations in Africa has Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Just one year before this speech, the focused on whether different groups West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses capital of Mali was threatened by an are collaborating with one another, the Center’s global network of scholars and al-Qa`ida-dominated militia that had, and while this would unquestionably practitioners to understand and confront in effect, hijacked a local rebellion of increase the threat they pose were it to contemporary threats posed by terrorism and the northern region. Mali immediately be true, the emphasis on collaboration other forms of political violence. became a high priority concern for the detracts from a more fundamental Obama administration, and although problem—all of the groups are already much more needs to be accomplished significant risks to their own country’s The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, in the region, the multilateral response stability. Although the destabilization the Department of the Army, or any other agency to Mali provides many lessons for how of one Saharan or Sahelian country of the U.S. Government. the United States may engage with al- may not be an actionable threat in and

1 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 of itself, the region presents a scenario visit to the White House on February 11, New and Emerging Threats where the sum is greater than the 2014, where he and President Obama Operation Serval, however, was parts: the disparate destabilization of discussed intelligence sharing and fundamentally a reactive action, rather several Saharan and Sahelian countries counterterrorism. than a proactive or preemptive one, and simultaneously. apart from the operation’s successes, By the end of January, French and terrorism in North Africa, the Horn Not only do all of the groups pose Chadian troops controlled Mali’s three of Africa, the Sahara and sub-Saharan significant risks to their own country’s major cities along the Niger River. The Africa appears to be increasing. While stability, but they also all have a cross- rebel factions, including terrorists the reasons for the emergence of border component. This cross-border and insurgents, splintered and fled terrorism in the region vary as do the dimension has led to the notion of an throughout northern Mali. The Élysée reasons for the intensifying trend, there arc of instability stretching east to then sought international support via are nevertheless some commonalities. west across the Sahel and Sahara, but a UN peacekeeping operation, while The region is characterized by scant it also leads to another newer and often French forces continued to hunt for high overlooked arc spanning the Sahara value targets. For its part, the United north to south. States trained and equipped some of “Instability in one country the peacekeeping contingents prior can not only spread to The primary counterterrorism to their deployment. In addition, U.S. challenge in the region going forward Special Operations Forces and other another, but simultaneous is to ensure that these groups do not units provided training and assistance instability in several carry out future offensives like the one to regional countries around Mali, in Mali. Additionally, conditions that including Niger, Libya, Mauritania and countries—regardless of can radicalize those who feel aggrieved to Burkina Faso. The United States also whether or not the causes turn frustration into violence should be provided intelligence to support these recognized and addressed. When such operations, including use of an unarmed are related—can pose an offensives do occur, however, France’s MQ-9 drone. enormous challenge.” Operation Serval in Mali may provide many lessons for how to contain the Lessons Learned threat by using carefully coordinated Operation Serval yielded several coalition operations. important lessons for counterterrorism economic opportunities and fierce operations. Foremost, the effectiveness competition for those that do exist, both Operation Serval and efficiency of the operation was legal and illegal. Security services are In the summer of 2012, different helped by identifying the appropriate alternately ineffective or indiscriminate. Islamist groups, including al-Qa`ida players for appropriate roles: an And there is a complex mix of ideologies, affiliates, dominated a largely ethnic international coalition against an al- ethnicities, and nationalisms. separatist rebellion in northern Mali. Qa`ida threat need only be led by a In January 2013, militants made a single major country such as the United Although almost no data supports the surprisingly aggressive southward States, France, or the United Kingdom, notion that poverty leads to terrorism, push and President Amadou Haya which are the only countries that are the sharp perceptions of injustice Sanogo, who came to power through capable of leading complex, multilateral inherent in the unequal distribution of a coup in March 2012, appealed to the operations; when either of the latter two wealth and poverty can lead individuals international community for help. leads, the United States can provide vital to embrace extreme ideologies, either to By the middle of the month, France enabling support such as airlift, logistics justify fighting for resources to alleviate deployed fighter jets to blunt the rebels’ and intelligence; the UN’s ability to poverty or to punish those individuals offensive, quickly adding ground forces provide effective peacekeepers in Africa they hold responsible for making and several thousand Chadian fighters. should not be underestimated as long as them and others poor. In Mali, the For its part, the United States responded their capabilities are not overextended rebellion that was hijacked by AQIM to French requests to contribute three by conducting offensive operations and and other Islamists was fueled by the critical components to the initial as long as they are supported through Tuareg population’s sense of economic stages of the campaign, including in- training, equipment, and embedded marginalization and perceptions flight refueling for French aircraft, advisory support. Doing so frees the that the country’s southern capital heavy airlift of French and Chadian coalition leader to pursue terrorist neglected the north. In Nigeria, soldiers and vehicles, and all sources leaders, disrupt lines of communication, Boko Haram and Ansaru condemn of U.S. intelligence. One consequence and identify remote camps and safe secularism’s role in fostering an of this counterterrorism cooperation houses while maintaining a low profile. environment conducive to corruption was to reinvigorate the United States’ Such has been the case in Mali, where and inequality that can only be operational relationship with France a small French and U.S. footprint combated through the implementation to the point where it is stronger materially augmented the effectiveness of Shari`a (Islamic law). Poverty, lack than it has been in a decade or more. of the UN operation. of opportunity, and acute injustice This strengthened counterterrorism sparked the Jasmine Revolution in relationship was most recently evinced Tunisia and those same sentiments by French President François Hollande’s continue to be exploited by Ansar al-

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Shari`a and proponents of Salafi-jihadi movement. In Nigeria, Boko Haram al-Murabitun Brigade appears to be as ideology. In Algeria, perceptions that and Ansaru are violently at odds adept at moving north and south as it the oil and gas sector job market was with not only Christian aspects of is at moving east and west. The impact unfair and unequal led to protests in Nigerian state and society, but also that these groups can have on their Ouargla and Ghardaia, which then led with proponents of Sufi Islam, both of home countries means that not only is to the radicalization of some individuals which overlay with a strong regionalist there a potential east-west instability seeking to redress the sector’s injustices. element. Somalia’s al-Shabab is riven axis, but there is a north-south one as In Libya, contestation for control with clan rivalries and jingoism. well. Taken together, the vectors of Tunisia is struggling to come to terms instability and insecurity morph and “Operation Serval may with not only divisions over the role of multiply. religion in state and society, but also be seen as a template for divisions about the use of violence Operation Serval may be seen as a future counterterrorism in Salafism. And Libya’s numerous template for future counterterrorism militias draw inspiration from engagements: a threat is perceived, it engagements: a threat is almost anything—ethnicity, region, is quickly acted on, and objectives are perceived, it is quickly hometown, interpretations of Islam, clearly delineated. The U.S. commitment tribe, or even an urban neighborhood is limited, but its strategic objectives are acted on, and objectives are or city suburb. achieved. The challenge going forward clearly delineated.” will be to try to apply the lessons learned It is in this complex environment that from Operation Serval elsewhere in terrorist organizations operate and Africa and against more diffuse targets evolve. Past analysis has emphasized than a coordinated—but ultimately over limited economic activities in the trying to understand whether groups heterogeneous and disparate—rebel Sahara, particularly over provision of like Boko Haram or al-Shabab are offensive. services to international oil companies shifting to a more internationalist stance in the upstream and over smuggling and whether there are any actionable Michael A. Sheehan is the Distinguished routes, has led to bouts of violence, linkages between the groups. The Chair in the Combating Terrorism Center. some sporadic and others sustained. groups themselves debate this, weighing Prior to the CTC, he was the Assistant the benefits and costs of joining forces, Secretary of Defense for Special Operations In part, the limited and seemingly and while these are no doubt worrying and Low Intensity Conflict from 2011- unfair economic opportunities that developments, it overlooks a more 2013. A career Army Special Forces officer characterize the Sahel and Sahara fundamental problem. Instability in one with experience on the National Security stem from poor governance. In some country can not only spread to another, Staff and in the United Nations, he has instances, governments are genuinely but simultaneous instability in several also served as the Ambassador-at-Large unjust and uneven. In others, the countries—regardless of whether or for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State government is absent, thereby creating not the causes are related—can pose an Department and the Deputy Commissioner space for illicit commercial activities on enormous challenge. At the moment, for Counterterrorism at the New York City which terrorists and violent non-state Mali is far from stable. Somalia is Police Department. actors thrive. Somalia and Libya and even worse off, with Libya not too far parts of northern Nigeria, northern Mali behind. Niger has started to sound the Dr. Geoff D. Porter is an assistant and western Tunisia lack a meaningful alarm bells, while the trend in Tunisia professor with the Combating Terrorism government presence. These are not is troubling. The Algerian state remains Center at West Point. In addition, he is ungoverned spaces—the so-called strong, but social grievances can quickly the founder and president of North Africa stateless areas that terrorist groups are turn deadly. In some instances, the Risk Consulting. He specializes in political said to favor—but they are poorly and causes of instability are related and in stability, violent non-state actors, and the only intermittently governed spaces. others they are not, but the cumulative extractives industry in North Africa. They are not stateless, but the states do impact could be catastrophic. In the fall short of maintaining a continuous case of terrorists and violent non-state The viewpoints expressed in this article and beneficial presence. The collapse actors in Africa, the sum of the parts do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. of authoritarian regimes in the region may be greater than the whole. Army or the Department of Defense. during the Arab Spring has amplified this shortfall and afforded terrorists Violent non-state actors and terrorist and violent non-state actors more room groups’ cross-border connections to maneuver. add a north-south arc of instability to the commonly understood one that Making matters worse, the economic stretches east-west across the Sahara. unevenness and inconsistent projection Boko Haram may be linking with AQIM of states’ hard and soft power are which may be linking with Ansar al- exacerbated by ideological and ethnic Shari`a in Libya and also the Uqba ibn differences. In Mali, the rebellion Nafi Brigade in Tunisia. Militant groups that was eventually taken over by in southern Libya have revived ties to Islamists began as an ethnic separatist northern Niger. Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s

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enjoyed considerable support from a clans that suffered the most casualties.8 Al-Shabab’s Capabilities broad section of Somali society at home Its draconian interpretations of Shari`a Post-Westgate and in the large Somali diaspora, from (Islamic law) and rule by fear proved which it raised funds and attracted unpopular among Somalis, and this By Ken Menkhaus recruits.4 It also enjoyed sympathy led to defections.9 The group’s suicide and support from individuals in the bombing attacks—which included al-shabab’s attack on Nairobi’s wider Islamic world, and absorbed targeting newly-graduated medical Westgate shopping mall in September several hundred foreign jihadists into doctors and students lining up for 2013 raised important questions about its ranks.5 Although not formally an al- scholarships—demonstrated a callous the resilience and possible resurgence Qa`ida franchise during this time, al- indifference to civilian casualties and of a jihadist group that most believed Shabab benefited from public relations further alienated Somalis.10 Aid and had fallen on hard times since 2011. support and advisers from al-Qa`ida.6 support from the diaspora shrank, in Some questioned whether the attack By mid-2008, it was able to recapture part because al-Shabab was designated was evidence that al-Shabab had become most of the territory of south-central a terrorist organization by the U.S. a more dangerous transnational threat, Somalia as well as most of the capital government and others in 2008, while others suggested it was an act of Mogadishu, pinning Ethiopian forces, creating high legal risks for financial desperation by the beleaguered group.1 African Union peacekeepers, and the backers. Whole clans, including This question has taken on even more weak Transitional Federal Government two particularly large and powerful urgency in the wake of al-Shabab’s (TFG) down in a few districts of the city. lineages (the Habar Gidir Ayr and bold terrorist attack on Somalia’s Within a two year period, al-Shabab the Ogaden), broke from al-Shabab and presidential palace, Villa Somalia, on had ascended from a small and little- began fighting it.11 Reports of internal February 21, 2014. known armed group to one of the most splits in al-Shabab’s leadership— successful and high visibility jihadist principally over tactics, clan interests, This article examines the state of al- movements in the world.7 affiliation with al-Qa`ida, and policies Shabab today and the significance of toward international aid agencies— the Westgate mall attack. It begins The year 2008 was its high water mark, increased.12 with a review of the troubles that have however. During the next three years, al- afflicted al-Shabab in the past several Shabab’s progress stalled. It was unable Al-Shabab’s fortunes slid quickly in years, and then explores the new to dislodge the African Union Mission 2011. In June of that year, a top al- nature of the organization, its aims, the in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers and Qa`ida figure working with al-Shabab, types of threats it poses, and its future the TFG from the capital, and it took Fazul Abdullah Mohammad, was killed prospects. It finds that al-Shabab is a heavy losses trying to fight AMISOM’s in a checkpoint shoot-out that was franchise with distinct components, the better equipped forces, which alienated widely believed to be a set-up by his fastest growing of which is a wing that rival in al-Shabab, Ahmed “Mukhtar 13 identifies as much with East Africa as Peace(building),” Review of African Political Economy Abu al-Zubayr” Godane. This incident, Somalia. The group is simultaneously 36:120 (2009). along with the 2012 death of UK-born weaker and, at least in the short term, 4 Roland Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a jihadist Bilal al-Berjawi and several more dangerous in Kenya and Somalia. Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujaheddin in other foreign jihadists, prompted an Somalia,” SciencesPo/CERI, March 2011. Al-Shabab’s Troubles 5 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant 8 Christopher Anzalone, “Al-Shabab’s Setbacks in So- Some analysts had concluded that al- to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008),” United Na- malia,” CTC Sentinel 4:10 (2011). Shabab was in decline and in “dramatic tions, March 2010, p. 15. 9 Marchal. turmoil” because the group’s meteoric 6 Ties between al-Qa`ida and al-Shabab were far thin- 10 “Somalia: Al Shabaab Attack Indefensible,” Human rise in 2007 was followed by several ner in 2006-2009 than was feared at the time, as made Rights Watch, October 5, 2011. years of eroded public support, internal clear by the recently recovered, translated, and declassi- 11 These clans did not defect entirely—some individuals 2 divisions, and self-inflicted wounds. fied diary of the top al-Qa`ida “assistant” to al-Shabab, and groups stayed with al-Shabab—but the main base of Fazul Abdullah Mohammad. See Nelly Lahoud, Beware these clans swung quickly away from the group at the be- Al-Shabab constituted a powerful of Imitators: Al-Qa`ida Through the Lens of its Confidential hest of clan leaders. The Habar Gidir Ayr shifted support Islamo-nationalist insurgency in 2007- Secretary (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, to the armed Sufi group Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama, while the 2008 when it emerged as the main armed 2012), p. 87. For an assessment of al-Qa`ida’s early pub- Ogaden, organized as the Ras Kamboni militia, split with resistance against an Ethiopian military lic support for al-Shabab, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, al-Shabab over control of Kismayo seaport revenues and, 3 occupation of southern Somalia. It “The Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab,” after losing a battle against al-Shabab, turned to Kenya Middle East Quarterly 16:4 (2009). In February 2012, al- and Ethiopia as external allies. These sudden shifts high- 1 Robert Rotberg, “A Wounded Leopard: Why Somalia’s Shabab leader Godane announced a formal merger with light how thin ideological commitment is to “radical” al-Shabab Attacked a Nairobi Mall,” Globe and Mail, Sep- al-Qa`ida, but that remained a merger on paper only. Al- Islamist positions in Somalia, and how clan interests fre- tember 23, 2013. Shabab has actually lost much of its support from foreign quently trump ideology. 2 Raffaello Pantucci, “Bilal al-Berjawi and the Shifting jihadists in recent years. See Abdi Aynte, “Understand- 12 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursu- Fortunes of Foreign Fighters in Somalia,” CTC Sentinel ing the al-Shabaab/al Qaeda ‘Merger,’” African Argu- ant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008),” p. 6. 6:9 (2013). ments, March 19, 2012. 13 “Al Shabaab Leader Arranged Fazul’s Death,” Somalia 3 For background on the two year Ethiopian military 7 Stig Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Report, June 16, 2011. Whether true or not, the rumor was intervention in Somalia in 2007-2008, see Ken Men- Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012 (Oxford: accepted by many Somalis and shaped their perceptions khaus, “Somalia: They Created a Desert and Called it Oxford University Press, 2013). of al-Shabab.

4 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 exodus of many foreign fighters who In June 2013, a bloody internal battle The New Al-Shabab believed that Godane was purging non- broke out within al-Shabab, culminating Even prior to its disastrous in-fighting Somali leaders, and as a consequence in a major purge. This internecine in 2013, al-Shabab was morphing into an these foreign fighters no longer trusted blood-letting was the culmination of entity quite different from the jihadist their Somali counterparts.14 That same years of mounting internal rifts between force it represented in 2007-2008. year, al-Shabab presided over one of the Godane and a growing number of his worst famines in two decades, which critics within al-Shabab, who publicly As the group ceded control of most cost 260,000 Somali lives.15 The group criticized him for killing “true Muslims,” urban centers, its tactics shifted toward damaged its reputation among Somalis committing strategic blunders, and asymmetrical warfare, featuring by blocking international food aid from having dictatorial tendencies.20 In greater reliance on suicide bombings, entering most of its areas of control, some ways, what was surprising is improvised explosive devices, hit- denying that a famine existed, and by how long the group managed to remain and-run attacks, political threats and seeking to prevent famine victims in cohesive before the clashes occurred.21 assassinations, and grenade attacks. The purge is thought to have killed an This allowed it to fight AMISOM and “Battle lines are not as estimated 200 members of al-Shabab’s its Somali enemies on its terms, and feared “Amniyat” network—described put fewer of its fighters at risk.25 To clear as they appear to be in by a recent United Nations report as execute these tactics, the group relied Somalia due to al-Shabab’s al-Shabab’s “‘secret service,’ which increasingly on its Amniyat network.26 is structured along the lines of a This shift in tactics hinted at a change extensive collusion with clandestine organization within the in al-Shabab’s wider strategy, which and penetration of rivals.” organization.”22 Al-Shabab leaders focused on the role of a spoiler—blocking opposing Godane met different any progress by the federal government, fates. Top al-Shabab figures Ibrahim preventing normalization of life in the al-Afghani and Maa’lim Hashi were capital, and harassing AMISOM with rural southern Somalia from traveling executed; American Omar Hammani the aim of eventually driving it out of to areas where aid was available.16 One (Abu Mansur al-Amriki) was killed; the country.27 analyst concluded that “the political cost Shaykh Mukhtar Robow escaped and [of blocking food aid] was tremendous” remains at large; and Hassan Dahir The group’s tactical shift also included for al-Shabab.17 In the summer of 2011, Aweys fled but was captured by pro- an emphasis on collusion with its al-Shabab also withdrew from most of government militias, handed over to erstwhile enemies in Somalia, resulting the areas of Mogadishu it had controlled, the Somali Federal Government (SFG), in head-spinning deals and tactical conceding that it was too costly to wage and placed under arrest.23 The hard- alliances that have confounded external conventional war against AMISOM. liner Godane consolidated his control actors attempting to defeat the group. During the ensuing year, Mogadishu over a smaller, weaker, but now more This included al-Shabab temporarily enjoyed a boom of new development unrestrained al-Shabab.24 cooperating with the Somali national and real estate construction fueled by armed forces in common cause against returning diaspora members, a sharp Al-Shabaab is Raising Millions Illegally in Somalia,” Kenyan forces and the Ogaden clan 18 and public rebuke of the group. Al- CNN, August 5, 2011. militia (known as the Ras Kamboni Shabab was subsequently pushed out 20 Harun Maruf and Dan Joseph, “Despite Setbacks, al- militia) after the latter captured the of most of the remaining urban centers Shabab Still a Potent Threat,” Voice of America, Novem- seaport of Kismayo from al-Shabab in under its control, including from the ber 19, 2013. October 2012, and then subsequent al- strategic port city of Kismayo in October 21 Stig Hansen argued forcefully that the group had Shabab collusion with Kenyan forces 2012, which had been al-Shabab’s greater cohesion than its critics appreciated, which was and the Ras Kamboni militia in illegal 19 principal source of revenue. true up until June 2013. See Stig Hansen, “Somalia: Ru- charcoal exports out of Kismayo 28 mors of Al-Shabaab’s Death are Greatly Exaggerated,” seaport. The group is rumored 14 Pantucci. African Arguments, April 25, 2013. to have a number of other mixed 15 “Mortality Among Populations of Southern and Cen- 22 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and relationships with rival Somali actors, tral Somalia Affected by Severe Food Insecurity and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 the result of extortion, penetration, Famine during 2010-2012,” London School of Hygiene (2012),” United Nations, July 2013, p. 5; personal inter- and Tropical Medicine and Johns Hopkins University view, international security official, Mogadishu, Somalia, al Studies, 2014). School Bloomberg School of Public Health, May 2, 2013, January 2014. 25 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and p. 8. 23 Maruf and Joseph. The SFG is the post-transition, Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 16 Ken Menkhaus, “No Access: Critical Bottlenecks in successor government to the TFG, selected in August (2012),” United Nations, June 19, 2012, p. 6. the 2011 Somali Famine,” Global Food Security 1:1 (2012). 2012 for a four year term. It remains a weak authority 26 Ibid., p. 5. 17 Marchal. with limited capacity to govern the capital and minimal 27 This was a chronic problem for the group even in 18 Laila Ali, “‘Mogadishu is Like Manhattan:’ Somalis influence in the countryside, necessitating the continued 2007-2008. It was able to articulate clearly what it was Return Home to Accelerate Progress,” Guardian, Janu- presence of AMISOM for its protection. against, but not what it was for. That made it a spoiler. ary 11, 2013. 24 For an excellent analysis of Godane’s consolidation 28 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and 19 The UN Monitoring Group in July 2011 estimated that of control over al-Shabab and what it means for the or- Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 al-Shabab earned $35-50 million per year from port rev- ganization’s new orientation, see Matt Bryden, The Re- (2012),” p. 7. Kenyan authorities denied this charge. See enues in Kismayo, and another $30-60 million in taxes invention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? “Kenya Denies Defying UN Ban on Somalia Charcoal on Somali businesses. See Barbara Starr, “UN Report: (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Internation- trade,” BBC, July 15, 2013.

5 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 or shared interests in making money as international humanitarian Somali society, including in positions or temporarily avoiding conflict.29 A agencies and local non-governmental in the SFG and foreign missions.38 It confidential UN Monitoring Group organizations.35 Refusal to pay risked serves as both an effective intelligence report in February 2014 charged that lethal reprisal, and nearly everyone in network and an operational arm of arms provided to the Somali government the private sector or the aid industry al-Shabab, with units specializing in were being channeled to al-Shabab, was compelled, directly or indirectly, assassinations, explosives, and hit- suggesting collusion at high levels in to contribute to al-Shabab’s coffers.36 and-run attacks.39 Amniyat’s reach is the government.30 Battle lines are not This gave the group a diversified source now felt in previously peaceful parts of as clear as they appear to be in Somalia of revenue that sustained it after losing northern Somalia, such as in Puntland, due to al-Shabab’s extensive collusion diaspora contributions and seaport where al-Shabab related attacks are with and penetration of rivals.31 revenues from Kismayo. occurring on an almost daily basis.

Al-Shabab also shifted its recruitment Finally, the group expanded its network Al-Shabab as an Armed Force tactics. Having lost much of its core and operations beyond south-central The military command of al-Shabab, base of support among the strongest Somalia, both into East Africa and known as Jaysh al-Usra (the Army of clans, it began courting support from northern Somalia. This site expansion Hardship), was estimated to control marginalized, aggrieved sub-clans served it well when it began losing 5,000 fighters before the recent in- and minority groups, a tactic which territory and support in south-central fighting. Al-Shabaab’s fighting units— continues to work well for the group.32 It Somalia. including irregulars who can be called also coerced recruits, which backfired, up for “pay as you go” missions40—are producing desertions, low morale, and Disaggregating Al-Shabab mainly composed of young recruits, and community resentment. In addition, The result of these changes is an al- have not proven to be especially capable its recruiting energies were redirected Shabab today that manifests itself in in the face of superior AMISOM forces. toward Kenya, again targeting the several different forms. Disaggregating This group is more fluid than Amniyat, marginalized. These included: poor al-Shabab is helpful in clarifying the includes some fighters who have joined slum-dwellers in Nairobi, who were kinds of threats it now poses. These mainly for a paycheck, and has seen convinced to convert to Islam and wage different manifestations include: its share of desertions or defections. jihad; Somali Kenyans, many of whom Yet it has also contributed “martyrs” feel they are second-class citizens; Al-Shabab as a Network: Amniyat to recent hybrid al-Shabab terrorist and Swahili coastal Muslims who feel The clandestine Amniyat network attacks involving both suicide bombers dominated by “up-country” Kenyan remains the most intact and feared and suicide infantry.41 Christians.33 Al-Shabab’s messaging part of the organization, and according began to include Swahili language as to some observers is the main base of Al-Shabab as an Administration part of this campaign, and paid off support for Godane, answering directly Although al-Shabab does not take on the with 200-500 East African recruits in to him.37 Some of Amniyat’s operatives role of a state within a state in its area training camps in the Jubba valley of pose as secularized Somalis and assume of control, it continues to provide basic Somalia.34 This effort was, in retrospect, roles across the full spectrum of administration, including oversight of the beginning of al-Shabab “franchising” education and health sectors, policing, 42 into East Africa, and the start of its new 35 Jeffrey Gettleman and Nicholas Kulish, “Somali Mili- judicial, and arbitration roles. In role as a voice for the marginalized. tants Mixing Business and Terror,” New York Times, Sep- consequence, communities under its tember 30, 2013. UN Monitoring Group allegations that control consistently enjoy higher levels Al-Shabab also shifted its attention to top Somali contractors for the World Food Programme of law and order than when “liberated” “taxation”—involving a combination were major financial contributors to al-Shabab- pro by AMISOM and left to deal with Somali of willing support, extortion, and voked a major controversy, since any financial support national armed forces that are predatory 43 partnership—of businesses operating to a designated terrorist group constituted a violation of and poorly controlled. Al-Shabab’s in south-central Somalia, as well the USA PATRIOT Act and other counterterrorism leg- islation. See “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia 38 Reno; personal interviews, international security of- 29 Personal interview, international security official, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008).” ficials, Mogadishu, Somalia, January 2014, and Nairobi, Mogadishu, Somalia, January 2014. 36 On February 2, 2014, al-Shabab arrested 15 members Kenya, July 2013. 30 Louis Charbonneau, “Exclusive: UN Monitors Warn of the Telecom company Hormud in the town of Jilib for 39 Most of the small-scale, hit-and-run attacks, especial- of ‘Systematic’ Somali Arms Diversion,” Reuters, Febru- refusing to pay $50,000 to the group. See “Al Shabaab ly grenade attacks, which occur daily in Mogadishu, are ary 13, 2014. Arrests Hormud Staff, Manager in Jilib,” Radio Bar-ku- believed to be carried out by young men who are paid by 31 The issue of al-Shabab penetration of the Somali gov- lan, reported in AMISOM Media Monitoring, February Amniyat per attack, but who are not part of the group. ernment is documented in William Reno, “Rethinking 3, 2014. Many aid agencies and their local counterparts See personal interview, UN official, Mogadishu, Somalia, Counterinsurgency in Somalia,” CTC Sentinel 6:4 (2013). reject the claim that they have had to divert funds to al- January 2014. 32 Marchal. Shabab when operating in or near its areas of control, 40 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursu- 33 For more detailed discussion of al-Shabab recruit- but evidence is strong that local staff had no choice but to ant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008),” p. 15. ment, see Marchal. disguise fees that went to the group. See Menkhaus, “No 41 Bryden, p. 7. 34 Starr. Al-Shabab now publishes a Swahili and Eng- Access: Critical Bottlenecks in the 2011 Somali Famine.” 42 Marchal; Ibrahim. lish magazine, Gaidi Mtaani (“Terrorism Street”). See 37 Mayat Ibrahim, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab Amniyat 43 The Somali National Armed Forces consist of brigades “Shabaab Supporters Focus on Westgate in 4th Issue of Branch Tasked with Protecting Godane,” Sabahi, July 16, organized around clans which pursue clan rather than Gaidi Mtaani,” SITE Institute, January 15, 2014. 2013. national interests. In the recovered areas of the Lower

6 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 ability to provide basic law and order extent to which al-Shabab’s leadership and counterinsurgency violence in continues to attract some Somalis in the exercises direct control over this Somalia into neighboring states that countryside. This branch of al-Shabab, network is difficult to determine. Yet have armed forces inside Somalia. however, has been weakened with the the various constituencies of the East group’s loss of territory. Africa wing—the Nairobi slum recruits, The presence of Kenyan military forces the Swahili coastal recruits, and the inside Somalia (now reframed as part Al-Shabab as a Criminal Racket Somali Kenyan recruits—are widely of AMISOM) served as a powerful The group’s systematic collection of viewed as among the most dangerous pretext for the attack, allowing al- “taxes” on Somali businesses is little in the al-Shabab franchise, in part Shabab to justify the act of terrorism as more than extortion, and points to the because they can more easily access soft retaliation for Kenyan forces “bombing fact that the group is acting increasingly targets in East Africa.47 The group has innocent people” in Somalia and to like a mafia in much of the country. also exerted influence and even indirect demand a Kenyan withdrawal or face Al-Shabab has not degenerated into control over critical areas inside Kenya, additional attacks.50 Yet fears that al- a criminal racket the way many most notably the Eastleigh neighborhood Shabab would launch a major terrorist protracted insurgencies do, but there of Nairobi (a slum heavily populated by attack in Kenya have been raised for are signs that the group is moving ethnic Somalis) and the border town of years, and might have occurred with or in that direction, including alleged Mandera.48 without the Kenyan military’s incursion involvement in illicit smuggling of into southern Somalia in October 2011. ivory.44 Roland Marchal’s close analysis Al-Shabab as a Global Icon The Kenyan government is an ally of of the group concluded that the main Al-Shabab’s global reputation is the West in counterterrorism directed source of al-Shabab’s finances today is tarnished, and its global network against al-Shabab; it is replete with “protection money.”45 clearly weakened in recent years, but soft targets such as hotels and shopping it may have been partially revived with malls frequented by a large expatriate Al-Shabab as an East Africa Franchise the high visibility Westgate attack. The community; al-Shabab has its al-Hijra Al-Shabab’s East Africa affiliate, al- group still enjoys some support from network inside Kenya; and Kenya’s Hijra, consists of hundreds of recruits the Somali diaspora and is known to security sector, though improved, from Kenya and neighboring countries have links to al-Qa`ida in the Arabian remains compromised by weak capacity who have trained under the al-Shabab Peninsula and Boko Haram.49 and corruption.51 All the ingredients flag in Somalia but whose grievances were in place for al-Shabab to commit a and targets are in East Africa. This Al-Shabab as a Voice of the Disenfranchised major terrorist attack in Kenya. wing of al-Shabab executed the July The group’s turn since 2008 toward 2010 bombings in Kampala, Uganda, recruiting from marginalized groups In past years, al-Shabaab appears to that killed 74 people, an attack in Somalia and East Africa gives it a have been constrained from launching attributed to al-Shabab but involving powerful “Robin Hood” narrative and a a large-scale terrorist attack inside a group of terrorists that included deep pool of grievances upon which to Kenya for fear of the consequences only one Somali. Al-Hijra group is the draw across the region. it could have on the many Somalis subject of intense Kenyan and Western who now reside in Kenya and who counterterrorism efforts, especially Threat Assessment: Westgate and Beyond have major fixed investments in the since the Westgate bombing. Previously Critical details of the Westgate mall country.52 Fear of blowback from within viewed as “fumbling and amateurish attack are still either in dispute or not operationally,” the group has gained in the public domain, so caution must be 50 Hamza Mohamed, “Q&A: Al-Shabab Defends Nai- 46 sophistication and discipline. The used when drawing conclusions about robi Attack,” al-Jazira, September 25, 2013. the attack and what it suggests about 51 “Al Shabaab Westgate Mall Attack Focuses Attention and Middle Shabelle, these clan paramilitaries are being al-Shabab. Still, some observations can on Corruption in Kenya’s Security Forces,” OE Watch used to consolidate claims by their clan over contested be made. 3:11 (2013). A recently completed Kenyan Parliamen- land, prompting armed resistance from other clans in ar- tary investigation into the Westgate attack levels serious eas recently vacated by al-Shabab. These clashes are now First, the attack was only the latest and charges against Kenyan security agencies. See “Kenyan occurring on an almost daily basis, and are considered by most deadly incident in a pattern that Security Agencies Ignored Warnings Before Westgate UN observers to be one of the top threats for armed con- had already been set by al-Shabab’s Attack: Report,” Reuters, January 26, 2014. flict in Somalia in 2014. This information is based on per- East Africa wing when it launched twin 52 Al-Shabab had, prior to the Westgate attack, engaged sonal interviews, UN officials, Mogadishu, Somalia, Jan- terrorist bombings in Kampala, Uganda, in numerous small-scale attacks and assassinations in- uary 2014. These same government security forces are in July 2010. That was the first instance side Kenya, mainly in northeast Kenya. According to the main perpetrators of rape and assault in local villages of spillover of the current insurgency one study, al-Shabab launched 100 attacks inside Kenya and internally displaced persons camps, according to UN between 2008 and 2012, and a quarter of all the group’s human rights investigations. Most of the rape victims are Kron, “Extremist Group Gains Foothold Among Ke- acts of terrorism occurred inside Kenya. But nearly all of children. For details, see “Report of the Independent Ex- nyans,” New York Times, October 9, 2013. these were relatively low-level incidents, often involving pert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, Sham- 47 “Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization,” Interna- single grenades thrown into a compound. As such, they sul Bari,” United Nations, August 16, 2013, p. 11; “World tional Crisis Group, January 25, 2012, p. 8. did not constitute “game-changing” acts of terrorism on Report 2013: Somalia,” Human Rights Watch, 2013. 48 “Al-Shabaab Militias Run the Show in Mandera, Says the scale of the Westgate mall attack. See “Background 44 Gettleman and Kulish. Report,” Daily Nation, January 25, 2014. Report: Al-Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya,” 45 Marchal. 49 “Africa’s Islamist Militants Co-ordinate Efforts in National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Re- 46 Matt Bryden, quoted in Nicholas Kulish and Josh Threat to Continent’s Security,” Guardian, June 26, 2012. sponses to Terrorism (START), September 2013.

7 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 the Somali community may have kept deliberation by a shura (council)—have dissolution of dozens of armed groups al-Shabab from taking the war into now been reduced to the impulses of the and movements. Al-Shabab’s strong Kenya on a grand scale. The Westgate group’s most gratuitously violent, and secret network, its mafia-like extortion mall attack indicates that the group now unopposed, leader. practices, and its collusion with a is now both less constrained under range of Somali political actors put it Godane’s consolidated rule and willing Inside Somalia, some manifestations in a strong position to dissolve and re- to take a major gamble with little regard of al-Shabab are weaker and less emerge within other entities if it sees for Somali reactions. This could be threatening today. The group’s ability fit, or to morph into a violent criminal interpreted as a sign of weakness on the to hold contested territory against syndicate. It is important not to conflate part of a group that desperately needs AMISOM and Somali national armed al-Shabab and the threat of violent to reverse its losses and reframe its forces is now limited, a reflection of the extremism in Somalia; the latter could narrative as a fight against the foreign weakness of its standing armed forces. easily outlive the former. invasion of Somalia.53 It is also a much weaker political movement. It now stands little This is especially the case with regard Second, although the attack was chance of establishing an Islamic to the East African manifestations of carefully planned, it was relatively state in Somalia, a goal that was not al-Shabab, which could survive longer simple and low cost, and involved a so improbable in 2008. The territory than the original franchise in Somalia. small cell.54 Only four gunmen, using under its control is still large, but is Al-Shabab has found in East Africa a semi-automatic weapons, were directly shrinking, as the group is pushed into rich supply of aggrieved populations involved in the attack, which killed more remote rural areas by AMISOM ripe for recruitment. 67 people, while at least four others offensives. Al-Shabab has been reduced have been arrested for abetting the to a powerful spoiler in Somali political Conclusion operation.55 The lethality of the attack affairs, but it is not a viable alternative Al-Shabab today is both weaker and revealed little about al-Shabab’s to the SFG. more dangerous and unconstrained robustness or sophistication; it only than in the past. In the short term, served to remind how vulnerable all Amniyat, however, continues to this is bad news for Kenya, Ethiopia, open societies are to acts of terrorism. pose a chronic and serious threat. the Somali government and people, and It maintains a capacity to launch international actors operating in Somalia. Third, unlike the 2010 Kampala frequent, sometimes deadly attacks and Al-Shabab’s Amniyat network retains bombings, which were executed suicide bombings against AMISOM, the capacity to launch destabilizing and almost entirely by non-Somali East the SFG, and international diplomatic demoralizing attacks inside Somalia and African members of al-Shabab, the missions and aid agencies. Most of al- extort funds from Somali businesses and Westgate mall attack was carried out Shabab’s daily attacks in Mogadishu polities. The group’s franchises in East and supported mainly if not entirely are low-level—grenades thrown into Africa are in a position to recruit from by ethnic Somalis, at least one of compounds, assassinations, and hit- marginalized groups and mount acts of whom had Norwegian citizenship.56 and-run shootings. Yet over the past terrorism in the wider region. Whether the ethnic Somalis entered year the group has launched numerous Kenya from Somalia or were Kenyan high visibility and devastating attacks, Kenya, and possibly other countries in Somalis remains contested, but the including a suicide bombing and assault East Africa and the Horn, is likely to Somali identity of the attackers makes on the United Nations compound, a be the target of additional al-Shabab it less likely that this could have been bombing of the high court, and multiple attacks, especially as al-Shabab responds a freelance operation by al-Hijra that bombings of popular restaurants and to a major AMISOM offensive inside was not sanctioned by Godane.57 The hotels. It is the principal source of Somalia in the first months of 2014.59 willingness to kill dozens of civilian insecurity in most of Somalia, including Kenyan security crackdowns intended shoppers fits Godane’s profile, and the northern state of Puntland. to disrupt the group and prevent such raises the question of whether al- Penetrating and breaking the committed attacks run the risk of setting off wider Shabab’s policies—once the result of Amniyat network, and encouraging tensions with the Somali Kenyan and defections, will take time. As a recent Kenyan Muslim communities if executed 60 53 Ken Menkhaus, “What the Deadly Attack on a Kenya UN monitoring report concluded, in a heavy-handed manner. Al-Shabab Mall Was Really About,” Think Progress, September 22, Amniyat has been structured “with 2013. the intention of surviving any kind of 59 Al-Shabab has already attempted another attack, 58 54 One estimate of the total cost of the operation settled dissolution of al-Shabab.” which failed—a bomb left at an outdoor restaurant at on a figure of $100,000. See Gettleman and Kulish. Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. See 55 Tom Odula, “Kenya: Names of Two Other Mall Ter- This notion that dangerous elements “Four Somalis Charged over Kenya ‘Light Bulb’ Airport rorists Revealed,” Associated Press, February 6, 2014. of al-Shabab could survive the Attack,” Agence France-Presse, February 3, 2014. 56 “Bodies of Westgate Gunmen ‘Are with FBI,’” New Vi- organization itself is critical. The 60 This occurred in early February 2014 when a Kenyan sion, February 11, 2014. past 23 years of war and state collapse police raid on what was described as a meeting of jihadist 57 Because so many Somalis have been able to secure in Somalia has seen the rise and elements provoked several days of clashes in Mombasa. Kenyan identity papers illegally, distinguishing between See “Foreigners Among the Mombasa Mosque Chaos who is a bona fideSomali Kenyan citizen and who is a So- 58 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Suspects,” The Standard, February 5, 2014. For an earlier mali from Somalia has become very problematic for the Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 warning about blowback from heavy-handed Kenyan re- Kenyan government. (2012),” p. 5. sponses, see “Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization.”

8 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 has every interest in inflaming tensions An In-Depth Look at Al- Embedded in the Local Economy and Tribal between Kenyan Muslims and the Politics government. Shabab’s Internal Divisions Al-Shabab’s success can be partly explained by its ability to embed itself In the longer term, however, al- By Stig Jarle Hansen in Somalia’s local context. In Kismayo, Shabab’s downward trajectory since for example, al-Shabab profited by 2009 shows few signs of reversal, at al-shabab’s attack on Nairobi’s taxing exports from the port city, least inside Somalia. Additional losses Westgate shopping mall in September which was accomplished by levying of top leaders could lead to a quick 2013 led many to question whether it fees on the transport trucks on the unraveling of the group, at which signified the group’s increased focus road into Kismayo.3 Although the point the chief security threat will be on international targets. Yet since its Kenyan military took control of the residual Amniyat network, which inception in 2006-2007, al-Shabab Kismayo in October 2012, al-Shabab will retain the capacity for extortion has always issued global rhetoric. still manages to earn significant and political violence. Al-Shabab’s best The group frequently attacked revenues from the town. According hope for resurgence is the incompetence international targets in Somalia, and to a report from the Arms Monitoring and venality of its domestic rivals, it conducted a terrorist attack in Group of the United Nations, “revenue chief among them the Somali Federal Kampala in 2010 as retaliation for the that al-Shabaab currently derives [in Government.61 Corruption and failure Ugandan government’s decision to send 2013] from its Kismaayo shareholding, to deliver basic services is eroding the troops to Somalia. Although the attack its Barawe exports and the taxation of government’s legitimacy, while land on Westgate mall suggests that al- ground transportation likely exceeds grabs and predatory behavior by poorly Shabab will continue to attack targets the estimated $25 million it generated controlled and clannish government in the region, the bulk of its military in charcoal revenues when it controlled armed forces in areas recovered from efforts will remain concentrated in Kismaayo.”4 Al-Shabab also controls al-Shabab threaten to drive local Somalia. parts of several of the most important communities back into al-Shabab’s roads in central Somalia, where it can arms.62 The Westgate mall attack depicted demand taxes. al-Shabab as a strong, coherent Dr. Ken Menkhaus is professor of Political organization. Al-Shabab, however, In terms of tribal politics, al-Shabab Science at Davidson College, where he suffered from a number of setbacks in has harnessed manpower support, has taught since 1991. He specializes on 2013. Besides key battlefield losses, for example, from the Gaaljecel and the Horn of Africa, focusing primarily some of its top leadership was purged Duduble, sub-clans of the Hawiye clan, on conflict analysis, peacebuilding, as a result of infighting. In June 2013, and gained influence in their territories.5 humanitarian response, and political Islam. forces loyal to al-Shabab’s leader, In Hiiraan and Galguduud respectively, He has published more than 50 articles and Ahmed “Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr” these sub-clans have a strong presence.6 chapters on Somalia and the Horn of Africa, Godane, killed al-Shabab members Al-Shabab has posted videos purporting including the monograph Somalia: State Ibrahim al-Afghani and his close to show these clan members pledging Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism companion, Maa’lim Hashi.1 Godane allegiance to al-Shabab, although it (2004), “Governance without Government in also reportedly ordered the death of the is unclear to what extent these tribes Somalia” in International Security (2007), well-known American jihadist, Omar support the group.7 and “Terrorism, Security, and the State,” Hammami, in September 2013.2 in the Routledge Handbook of African Somali clan politics have provided al- Politics, edited by Nic Cheeseman and David This article first examines how al- Shabab several potential opportunities Anderson (2013). He has been an adjunct Shabab has used tribal politics to gain for growth, as the group can exploit clan instructor for the Combating Terrorism support in Somalia, and then provides grievances and clan conflicts. Members Center’s practitioner education program an in-depth look at some of the from the Ogaden clan (known as the since 2007. infighting that plagued al-Shabab in Ras Kamboni militia), for example, 2013. It argues that understanding the internal dynamics of al-Shabab will 3 “United Nations Report of the Monitoring Group on help to better determine the potential 61 U.S. government concern about the weak leadership Somalia and Eritrea,” United Nations, 2013, p. 39. trajectories of the group. It finds that and in-fighting in the SFG was publicly voiced by Direc- 4 Ibid. the group remains a potent threat to tor of National Intelligence James Clapper. See Katar- 5 For an example, see “Hubayr Sub-Clan Pledges Alle- both Somalia and to African states that ina Manson, “Somalia President Fights Back on ‘Weak giance to al-Shabaab,” al-Shabab, June 24, 2012; “Bay’at have deployed troops to Somalia. Leadership’ Claim from US,” Financial Times, February of the Gaaljal Clan to al-Shabaab in the Shao Region in 7, 2014. Also see “Recently Accused Government Forces the Islamic State of Hiraan,” al-Shabab, November 15, in Lower Shabelle Accused of Crimes by Local District 2012; Stig Jarle Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia: The His- Chiefs,” Harar24News, February 1, 2014. Land-grabbing tory and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group (London: Ox- in the Lower and Middle Shabelle Regions by clan mili- ford University Press and Hurst, 2013). For an overview tias “hatted” as government forces is considered by UN 1 “Godane Loyalists Reportedly Execute al-Shabaab of recruitment patterns, see “Somalia: Rekruttering til officials as a top source of possible armed conflict. This is Leader Ibrahim al-Afghani,” Sabahi, June 28, 2013. al-Shabaab,” The Norwegian Country of Origin Informa- based on personal interviews, UN officials, Mogadishu, 2 Nicholas Kulish, “American Jihadist is Believed to tion Centre (Landinfo), July 6, 2012. Somalia, and Nairobi, Kenya, January 2014. Have Been Killed by His Former Allies in Somalia,” New 6 Ibid. 62 Ibid. York Times, September 12, 2013. 7 Ibid.

9 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 initially used their allies in al-Shabab It would be incorrect, however, to Al-Shabab re-established itself along to gain partial control over Kismayo assume that al-Shabab is a clan-based looser lines of command. By 2011, port in 2008, although this relationship organization due to these internal it became a rather decentralized eventually turned sour.8 Similarly, dynamics. Instead, al-Shabab is an organization. According to a military in Beledweyne, one clan enlisted al- organization that attempts to survive source, al-Shabab’s centralization Shabab’s support to fight against a rival in an environment plagued by the of taxation was weakened, as were clan. Before 2010, al-Shabab was active fragmented forces of Somali clan training and command lines. Local al- in Murusade clan territories, and fought politics. Al-Shabab takes advantage Shabab leaders less frequently sent for the Murusade against that clan’s of clans at times, while at other times rivals.9 By fighting on behalf of one side clans take advantage of al-Shabab.12 in a clan conflict, al-Shabab can earn “The major disagreements that clan’s support in the future.10 This local dynamic, however, should were not about not detract from the global aspect of Local clans, in return, have also taken al-Shabab’s rhetoric and the group’s internationalism vs. advantage of al-Shabab. Clans have, at ties to other jihadist organizations. Al- nationalism, but instead times, offered recruits to al-Shabab, Shabab itself is a complex organization intending to infiltrate the organization with both global and local aims, but about other ideological and by moving its clan members into its focus is primarily local, which is tactical issues.” positions of leadership within the seen as a stepping stone to achieving group. This allows them to influence al- more global objectives.13 Nor should it Shabab and to gain access to resources detract from the fact that al-Shabab’s or to enlist the support of al-Shabab in attacks in Mogadishu have increased or received recruits from centralized their clan conflicts. Some clans pursue in severity in February 2014. This was training institutions.17 The level of a “hedging” strategy, where traditional best displayed by al-Shabab’s assault on decentralization varied, however. For clan leaders attempt to insert prominent the presidential palace on February 21, example, al-Shabab’s secret police, clan members in high positions in both illustrating an ability to penetrate even the Amniyat, which is controlled by the government and in al-Shabab, the most secure areas of Mogadishu. Godane, was disbanded as a concession thus gaining influence within both to dissenters in al-Shabab, but then later organizations, although it is hard Al-Shabab’s Internal Divisions re-established. Over time, as battlefield to measure how widely this tactic is Internal divisions have also weakened losses increased and al-Shabab suffered practiced.11 al-Shabab. The roots of the current more defeats, old issues of contingency split date as far back as 2010 and the resurfaced, as did the discussion of the Al-Shabab leader Godane has few clan ill-fated Ramadan offensive, when al- treatment of Muslims and disregard for connections in al-Shabab’s main area of Shabab attempted to oust the African Muslim casualties. operations, yet he continues to operate Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in regions where he lacks established forces in a frontal attack, rather than Al-Shabab and its leader, Godane, had roots. Al-Shabab also has had sub- the asymmetric operations it usually been criticized on this specific subject commanders from a diverse pool of favors. The Ramadan offensive left sub- as early as 2009 by Usama bin Ladin clans operate in territories controlled commanders Hasan Yaqub and Mukhtar and al-Qa`ida operative Fazul Abdullah by other clans, seemingly illustrating Robow disgruntled with Godane’s Mohammad.18 In 2012, these criticisms the group’s ability to transcend clan leadership.14 After the offensive, one burst into the open when the American dynamics. Indeed, al-Shabab has been of al-Shabab’s strengths, its shura jihadist Omar Hammami broke ranks able to transcend clan politics more council, ceased to exist, probably due to and launched a video attack on al- than other Somali organizations. animosity between members and fear of Shabab’s leadership, which he later attack from the United States.15 Anger directed more forcefully at Godane. 8 “The Smiling Warlord Who Controls Ras Kamboni,” within the organization, however, was Hammami also focused his criticism Daily Nation, June 12, 2012. not only directed against Godane, but on issues of military strategy, the 9 See, for example, Roland Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi also against sub-commanders such as marginalization of foreign fighters in the Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al Robow for withdrawing from combat organization, Shari`a implementation, 16 Mujaheddin in Somalia,” SciencesPo/CERI, March 2011; too quickly. and al-Shabab’s general mistreatment 19 Hansen. of other Muslims. 10 Somalia today faces several contingent clan issues, such as the discrimination of the Ayr sub-clan of the Hawiye against Benadiris in Lower Shabelle, the wider 17 Hansen. discrimination of minority clans, and the issue over the 18 Nelly Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: Al-Qa`ida Through control of the southern port of Kismayo, the latter putting 12 Marchal; Hansen. the Lens of its Confidential Secretary (West Point, NY: the Ogaden clan against the government in Mogadishu, 13 Remote global issues in line with al-Qa`ida’s narra- Combating Terrorism Center, 2012); Nelly Lahoud et al., a government that many Ogaden clan members consider tive. Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? (West Point, dominated by the Hawiye clan family. 14 Hansen. NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2012). 11 The author personally observed this “hedging” strat- 15 Ibid. 19 Omar Hammami, “Urgent Message to Whoever it egy when in Somalia interviewing government and al- 16 Ibid.; Mohamed Shil, “Al-Shabab: What Will Happen Might Reach,” 2012, available at www.youtube.com/ Shabab leaders from the same clan. Next?” Somalia Report, September 3, 2011. watch?v=GAr2srINqks.

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In response, al-Shabab tried to kill Important sub-commanders in the internationalist statements.29 By taking Hammami on a number of occasions,20 organization—such as spokesperson a nuanced view of the infighting, the and forces reportedly loyal to Godane Ali “Dheere,” Ali Jabal, Yuusuf major disagreements were not about succeeded in killing the American Ciise “Kabakutukade” and Maxamad internationalism vs. nationalism, but jihadist in September 2013.21 Al- Dulyadeyn—made no indications of instead about other ideological and Shabab’s attacks on Hammami supporting the al-Shabab opposition, tactical issues. after the latter’s critique of the although as of December 2013 there militant group’s central leadership were rumors that Godane made These issues included al-Shabab’s led to further discussions and the attempts to arrest Kabakutukade.26 actions toward Muslims—specifically, breakdown of cooperation between Additionally, al-Shabab’s Kenyan allies the group’s killing of large numbers leaders within al-Shabab. in the Muslim Youth Center (MYC), now of Muslim civilians—as well as the known as al-Hijra, seemed to indicate treatment of al-Shabab figures who Several al-Shabab leaders announced support for Godane.27 disagreed with certain policies of a fatwa (religious ruling), removing the requirement that al-Shabab fighters Implications “Al-Shabab’s biggest be loyal to the amir if he was violating Godane’s victory over his opposition the Qur’an, which they alleged Godane was interpreted by some as a victory danger to the West is most guilty of by targeting dissenters within for internationalists over nationalists, likely through potential al-Shabab.22 These leaders ranged claiming that Godane himself had from al-Shabab’s second-in-command, been the main impetus behind al- logistics support for Ibrahim al-Afghani, to late-comer Shabab’s increasingly international other al-Qa`ida units, its Hassan Dahir Aweys, a leader more focus on targeting the West, and for or less forced into al-Shabab after following the global agenda of al- indoctrination of Somalis his clan-based Islamist organization, Qa`ida.28 This view, however, is filled into al-Qa`ida’s ideology, Hisbul Islamiyya, had been defeated by with inconsistencies because it puts al-Shabab on the battlefield. individuals such as Omar Hammami and its growing reach in and Ibrahim al-Afghani in the so-called other African countries.” Godane’s retribution was swift, nationalist camp. Hammami delivered a and veteran al-Shabab leader and four-part lecture criticizing al-Qa`ida internationalist Ibrahim al-Afghani for being too nationalist, and al-Afghani was killed on June 20, 2013.23 Fighting was a veteran of Afghanistan who the group’s leader, Godane. Other ensued in all al-Shabab-controlled was highly respected internationally. disagreements centered on strategy, provinces, and al-Shabab leaders in This view also overlooks Godane’s Shari`a implementation, and the control opposition to Godane, such as Fuad references and allegories in speeches of power within the organization. Khalif “Shongole” and Mukhtar Robow, to local Somali issues, although these Rather than interpret the Westgate retreated.24 A propaganda battle references are carefully phrased attack as an indication of increased ensued, where Robow accused Godane to appeal to nationalist sentiments focus on international targets, it should of failing to protect Muslims, being “an without using the word “nation” or instead be viewed as an extension of al- American spy,” and not respecting other mentioning “sacrifices for Somalia,” Shabab’s ongoing strategy of striking Muslims.25 Godane, however, seemed to instead emphasizing the position of their opponents in Somalia in their outflank Robow on his home turf, while the Somali fight in the wider struggle home countries, as they did in Kampala, Shongole remained on the defensive. of the umma (Islamic community). It Uganda, in 2010.30 also overlooks Mukhtar Robow’s more 20 Kulish. 29 See, for example, M. Hassan, “Al-Shabaab Bans So- 21 Ibid. mali Flag,” Hiiraan, 2010. Also see “Audio Speech of 22 “Officials in Shabaab Faction Give Fatwa Against 26 Personal interview, Yahya Ibrahim, professor based Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Al-Zubair Amir of the Harakat Targeting Hammami,” SITE Institute, January 15, 2014. in Mogadishu, December 22, 2013. Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen About the Recent Develop- 23 “Godane Loyalists Reportedly Execute al-Shabaab 27 “Swift and Appropriate Action Demanded to Deal ments in the Country,” April 2012, available at www. Leader Ibrahim al-Afghani.” with Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki,” Muslim Youth Center, azelin.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/shaykh-mukhtar- 24 Personal interview, human rights activist based in March 29, 2013, available at www.somalisecuritystud- abc5ab-al-zubayr-22about-the-situation-in-the-coun- Baidoa, January 1, 2014; personal interview, Yahya Ibra- ies.blogspot.no; Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, “Turning Away try22-en.pdf. him, professor based in Mogadishu, December 22, 2013. From The Truth Won’t Make It Disappear: Demystifying 30 Nevertheless, the huge increase in alleged al-Sha- 25 Zubair al-Muhajir, “Yes There is a Problem - Open the Abu Mansur Saga,” February 23, 2013, available at bab activity targeting East Africa is notable. Al-Shabab Letter From Sheikh Zubayr al-Muhajir to Sheikh Abu al- www.somalisecuritystudies.blogspot.no; Sam Adams, has gained a foothold in Kenya, and Tanzanian and Zubair,” April 18, 2013, available at www.somalisecuri- “Terrorist Widow’s Angry Twitter Rant at al-Qaeda Ethiopian authorities report internal al-Shabab activi- tystudies.blogspot.no; Ibrahim al-Afghani, “Urgent and ‘Prat’: Wife of 7/7 Bomber Breaks Cover to Accuse Rival ties as well. See, for example, ”Training Video AK 47,” Open Letter to Our Amiir Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri,” Extremist of Being ‘Irritating,’” Daily Mail, April 11, 2013; al-Shabab, June 26, 2013, available at www.jihadology. April 2013, available at www.somalisecuritystudies. Bosir Boniface, “Kenyan Jihadist Resurfaces, Sheds Light net/page/4/?s=al-Kat%C4%81i%E2%80%99b+Media& blogspot.no; Hammami; Mukhtar Robow, “The Martyr- on Current State of al-Shabaab,” Sabahi, July 12, 2013. submit. In Ethiopia, there were at least two court cases dom Night in Barawe, [and what happened ] Before and 28 See, for example, Magnus Taylor, “Westgate Attack against an alleged al-Shabab cell in Haraar and a wider After It,” 2013, available at www.cunaabi.com/playau- Puts Al Shabaab Top of the Global Jihadist Premier network in 2012-2013. In Tanzania, al-Shabab-related dio.php?id=395. League,” African Arguments September 24, 2014. materials were confiscated in 2013, and Tanzanian police

11 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2

Godane has strengthened his control The Malian Government’s disaffection in the north, a fractured over al-Shabab. Although Mukhtar military, and systemic corruption—have Robow still wields militias, according Challenge to Restore Order yet to be fully addressed by the Malian to sources within his own clan as well in the North government and its international as in the United Nations he is on the partners. defensive, even in his own areas. Al- By Bruce Whitehouse Shabab will likely still attack civilian The Northern Regions targets in the region and kill foreigners as of mid-february 2014, only 1,600 Mali’s three northernmost regions of to gain international attention. Al- French troops remain in Mali, down Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal comprise an Shabab will likely continue to attack from 2,500 at the beginning of the year area the size of Texas. These regions countries that have deployed forces and from more than 4,000 shortly after spent most of 2012 under the control of in Somalia. Additionally, although the start of the French intervention jihadist groups allied with al-Qa`ida in al-Shabab has formally merged with in January 2013. From the outset, the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had al-Qa`ida, it appears to still operate the government of French President hijacked a separatist rebellion launched parallel to the al-Qa`ida structure. François Hollande has sought to portray by the Tuareg-dominated Movement its military engagement in Mali as a for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) Al-Shabab’s biggest danger to the short-term endeavor. Hollande stated after the fall of Libya’s Mu`ammar West is most likely through potential last month that “most of the mission has Qadhafi.3 In January 2013, militants logistics support for other al-Qa`ida been accomplished.”1 pushed southward toward the town of units, its indoctrination of Somalis into Mopti, perhaps intending to forestall al-Qa`ida’s ideology, and its growing Indeed, the past year brought many international intervention by capturing reach in African countries. Its Western signs of a return to stability in the the nearby airbase.4 This action brought members are decreasing, and a majority troubled West African country. In an immediate French military response. of members appear to be ethnic Somalis, May, international donors pledged French troops needed only a few weeks but returning foreign fighters will more than $4 billion in aid to support to drive these groups out of the cities clearly remain a threat. Similarly, it is Mali’s recovery, while in July a and towns they had occupied. The possible that al-Shabab would target United Nations peacekeeping force, MNLA, after having fallen out with its the United States, especially since the Multidimensional Integrated erstwhile jihadist allies, subsequently U.S. drones and special forces have Stabilization Mission in Mali retook control of the town of Kidal, targeted and killed al-Shabab members (MINUSMA), took control from its stronghold in the far north and the in Somalia.31 Moreover, the United an African Union mission.2 The historical flashpoint of previous Tuareg States and other Western targets serve presidential election in July, in which nationalist rebellions. Its fighters as a “media enhancer” for al-Shabab; it voter participation reached an all- supported, or at least tolerated, French gains more attention through attacks time high (despite low turnout in areas and Chadian troops in the region as on Western targets and creates the where rebel groups remained active), they searched for jihadist hideouts in impression that the organization is was hailed both at home and abroad the desert.5 increasingly powerful. as a surprise success. The pervasive insecurity and political uncertainty that The Malian government aims to assert Dr. Stig Jarle Hansen is an associate followed the country’s March 2012 coup its presence in Kidal in accordance professor and head of the masters program d’état seemed diminished. with a peace agreement signed in June in international relations at the Norwegian 2013, but it was not until November, University of Life Sciences. He is an expert Six months after the election, however, through the concerted efforts of UN on radicalism in Africa (especially the the challenges to Mali’s long-term negotiators, that the MNLA finally Horn), and he has appeared frequently as stability remain daunting, as the new agreed to vacate the governor’s office an expert commentator on CNN, BBC and government of President Ibrahim and state radio station, key symbols al-Jazira. Boubacar Keita struggles to find its of central government authority in footing. The government desperately the region.6 Government services are needs to reestablish state sovereignty currently nonexistent. The process over the country’s northern regions, of cantonment of the region’s rebels reform the armed forces, and clamp has stalled, and thousands of armed down against corruption and strengthen MNLA fighters continue to move freely the rule of law. Until major progress is made in each of these areas, little can be 3 Andrew Lebovich, “The Local Face of Jihadism in done to reduce the threat of terrorism. Northern Mali,” CTC Sentinel 6:6 (2013); Georg Klute, allegedly closed down an al-Shabab-affiliated “radical- This article finds that the underlying “Post-Gaddafi Repercussions in Northern Mali,” Strate- ization camp,” although the “camp’s” exact purpose is causes of Mali’s 2012 instability— gic Review for Southern Africa 35:2 (2013). not known. 4 “Mali Asks France for Help as Islamist Militants Ad- 31 See, for example, Mohammed Ibrahim, “U.S. Drone 1 “Mali: les effectifs militaires français ramenés mi-févr- vance,” France 24, January 11, 2013. Strike Kills Foreign Commander Fighting for Militants ier de 2.500 hommes à 1.600,” Agence France-Presse, 5 “Mali War Shifts as Rebels Hide in High Sahara,” New in Somalia,” New York Times, January 22, 2012; David January 8, 2014. York Times, February 9, 2013. D. Kirkpatrick et al., “U.S. Raids in Libya and Somalia 2 “Donors Pledge About $4.22 Billion to Aid Mali Recov- 6 “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Strike Terror Targets,” New York Times, October 5, 2013. ery,” Reuters, May 15, 2013. Mali,” United Nations, January 2, 2014, p. 7.

12 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 in Kidal. Malian officials and security The European Union, meanwhile, Corruption forces maintain only a token presence has sought to strengthen the Malian Nepotism, graft, and lack of discipline in the town, and the Malian judicial military, overseeing the creation and in the army merely reflect the wider system has yet to extend to the region training of four new battalions. The pattern of venality within the Malian where, according to a report by the EU Training Mission in Mali was state. Donor governments, convinced UN secretary general, “the authority launched in February 2013 with the aim that the country was on the right track of judicial officers is not recognized of building discipline, unit cohesion after its 1991 transition to democracy, by local residents,” and traditional and combat capacity, all of which have were largely willing to overlook this authorities have only a tenuous grip on been sorely lacking. Yet this mission problem. The subsequent influx of public order.7 The Malian government’s has also exposed longstanding fault international assistance only made presence is more pronounced and lines in Mali’s military: in June 2013, matters worse, rendering Mali’s welcome in other northern cities such members of the inaugural training government utterly dependent on as Timbuktu, Gao, and Ansongo, where battalion boycotted their graduation foreign aid and unaccountable to its Tuareg separatism has historically ceremony, accusing their commanders people.17 A culture of impunity emerged, been much weaker and which are more of embezzling European Union funds such that public officials caught abusing multiethnic than Kidal. Nevertheless, intended for their upkeep.12 Mutinies their office ran little risk of losing their in late 2013, these towns witnessed and disputes over leadership, pay, and jobs, let alone going to prison. President violent public protests against corrupt promotions have broken out among Keita has represented himself as a public officials, police racketeering, soldiers both in Bamako and in the reformer who will clean out the “Augean and endemic insecurity.8 The sentiment north, sometimes turning deadly.13 stables” in Bamako, and declared 2014 runs strong among northerners that This partly explains why, in light of “the anti-corruption year.” He arrested their state has abandoned them. the army’s operational impediments, magistrates and the head of the national Mali’s previously elected president, a lottery; his anti-corruption czar issued The Armed Forces former army officer himself, outsourced a report detailing tens of millions of President Keita has made greater security in the north to various local dollars of losses from state coffers due headway in reasserting authority militias and opted not to confront to embezzlement for 2012 alone.18 over Mali’s restive armed forces. AQIM.14 The military’s dysfunctions, Most notably, he ordered the arrest of coupled with its spotty human rights Previous presidents, however, all Amadou Haya Sanogo, the officer who record,15 have left foreign governments announced anti-corruption drives amid led a junta that took power in March reluctant to offer assistance. The United great fanfare but without significant 2012.9 Sanogo’s broad support in the States, most notably, has yet to renew impact. It remains to be seen whether army rank-and-file, as well as among cooperation with Mali’s armed forces. Keita’s administration will succeed certain sectors of the population in “Any eventual resumption of assistance where its predecessors failed. One of the the capital Bamako, had previously to the Malian military will prioritize most worrisome forms of corruption is dissuaded civilian authorities from security sector reform, professional the growing trend of land expropriation challenging him, but in the wake of norms, the reassertion of civilian in and around Bamako and other Malian deadly clashes within the security authority, accountability mechanisms, cities: members of Mali’s classe politique forces, he is now awaiting trial for the and the rule of law,” a U.S. Department have often been able to count on the killings of at least 21 of his comrades- of State spokesperson said in September complicity of dishonest officials to force in-arms.10 Keita also dissolved Sanogo’s 2013.16 poor families off their property, and the army reform commission and removed problem has become widespread enough 11 many of his allies from senior posts. 12 “La révolte du premier bataillon malien formé par for civil society leaders and human 19 After nearly two years of tense civil- l’Union européenne,” La Croix, June 14, 2013. rights groups to take notice. military relations, the Malian armed 13 “Une attaque par des soldats maliens d’un camp mili- forces are again under civilian control. taire de ‘Bérets rouges’ à Bamako fait plusieurs blessés,” Public faith in the state’s ability to Les Echos, February 8, 2013; “Au Mali, l’armée humiliée uphold the rule of law has ebbed engage sa refondation,” Le Monde, July 12, 2013. tremendously, and not only in the 14 On the history of the “militiatary” strategy in Mali, see north. While the brutal punishments Martin van Vliet, “The Challenges of Retaking Northern inflicted by jihadist groups in 7 Ibid. Mali,” CTC Sentinel 5:11-12 (2012). According to Colonel El northern Mali generated considerable 8 “Mali: à Kidal et Tombouctou, le ras-le-bol monte chez Hajj Ag Gamou, one of the Malian army’s top command- les habitants,” Radio France Internationale, October ers in the north, the government of Amadou Toumani 17 Isaline Bergamaschi, “Mali: How to Avoid Making the 12, 2013; “Corrupt Police Blamed as Jihadists Return to Touré (president from 2002-2012) had a tacit agreement Same Mistakes,” Good Governance Africa, April 1, 2013. Mali’s Streets,” Sapa-Agence France-Presse, October 17, with AQIM not to molest the group as long as it did not 18 Thierry Oberlé, “Au Mali, IBK lance la lutte contre 2013. carry out hostile acts on Malian soil. See Isabelle Lasserre la corruption,” Le Figaro, January 10, 2014; Mamadou 9 “Mali’s President Replaces Junta-Linked Army Chief,” and Thierry Oberlé, Notre Guerre Secrète au Mali (Paris: Fofana, “IBK à propos de la lutte contre la corruption: Reuters, November 9, 2013. Fayard, 2013), p. 101. ‘J’ai déjà remis 100 dossiers à la justice,’” L’Indépendant, 10 “Mali: General Sanogo Arrested and Taken into Cus- 15 “Mali: Preliminary Findings of a Four-Week Mission: January 11, 2014. tody in the ‘Missing Red Berets’ Case,” International Serious Human Rights Abuses Continue,” Amnesty In- 19 Adama Dao, “Journée mondiale de l’habitat au Mali: Federation for Human Rights, December 3, 2013. ternational, June 7, 2013. Mettre fin aux expulsions forcées,” Le 26 Mars, October 11 “Mali’s President Replaces Junta-Linked Army 16 “U.S. Lifts Restrictions on Bilateral Assistance to 12, 2013; Madiassa Diakité, “Spéculation foncière: le Mali Chief.” Mali,” U.S. Department of State, September 2013. sur une poudrière?” Le Républicain, January 9, 2014.

13 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 international outrage in 2012, few northern elites instead of fostering an The In Amenas Attack in outside of Mali paid attention to the open, inclusive dialogue to air long- the Context of Southern upsurge in lynching of suspected held grievances.25 Under the previous thieves throughout the country—a government, a similar divide-and-rule Algeria’s Growing Social phenomenon that began well before the strategy created short-term stability, Unrest 2012 crisis.20 In many neighborhoods in but it undermined long-term stability Bamako, anyone accused of theft faces by further weakening the state and By Hannah Armstrong the threat of being doused in gasoline leaving northern populations dependent and set alight by a mob.21 Residents on trafficking and other illicit activities in january 2013, 32 militants seized have so little trust in law enforcement’s for survival, which paved the way for control of the Tigentourine gas plant effectiveness that they have removed rebellion.26 at In Amenas in southern Algeria, suspects from police custody expressly beginning a four-day siege that killed to see them lynched.22 The country’s future, however, is dozens of foreign hostages. In agreement not entirely in Keita’s hands. Mali’s with early statements by Algerian The harsh justice exacted by AQIM and international supporters have been slow officials, investigators from Norway’s its allies can only be understood against to match their promises of support with national oil company, Statoil, concluded the backdrop of chaos that has prevailed action. MINUSMA remains chronically it was “likely that the terrorists throughout Mali for many years, abetted underfunded and undermanned (its benefited from some insider knowledge by crooked elites and negligent officials. troop strength currently stands at half in their planning of the attack.”1 The The jihadists, while they controlled the of its authorized 12,600 total).27 As of plant—a joint venture among Norway’s city of Timbuktu, were disliked for October 2013, a substantial portion Statoil, BP, and the Algerian public their ideology but tolerated for bringing of the aid funds pledged for Mali have hydrocarbons company Sonatrach— was order. “Whether the person is white or yet to be disbursed. Aid from some key guarded by the Algerian military, and it black, they are lashed with the same donors, including Canada, has been accounted for 10% of Algeria’s natural whip,” one resident told a journalist.23 suspended since the 2012 coup. gas production, generating revenues of If AQIM commander Abu Zeid was a approximately $5 million per day.2 bloodthirsty zealot, he was perceived as In the meantime, northern Mali an honest one, and he even paid off his remains volatile. Sporadic rocket and Survivors said that while militants local debts before fleeing Gao last year improvised explosive device attacks, lacked crucial technical details,3 they ahead of the French advance.24 Many as well as car bombings, have occurred appeared well-informed about the Malians would not expect the same of in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, killing facility. They knew, for example, the their political leaders, who often appear civilians and MINUSMA peacekeepers. location of the management office, to citizens as not only incapable of The jihadist groups that fled the field of when top management would arrive, ensuring justice, but actively opposed battle early last year have not given up that high-level executives would be, to it. the fight, and could simply be awaiting unusually, on site,4 and how to kill the departure of French forces before the electricity within the first few Conclusion reasserting themselves on the ground. minutes of the attack.5 In addition to President Keita must make significant As France’s military operation in Mali agreeing that insider knowledge was a progress if he wants to restore his draws down, it is clear that until the key component in the attack, Algerian people’s faith in the Malian state, Malian government offers basic services officials and Statoil investigators also its ability to uphold the law, and its and earns the respect of more of its willingness to protect the weak against citizens, the terrorist threat will persist the predations of the powerful. While for the foreseeable future. 1 “The In Amenas Attack, Report of the Investigation Keita’s rhetoric has been encouraging, into the Terrorist Attack on In Amenas,” Statoil, Febru- some of his actions risk repeating Bruce Whitehouse teaches Anthropology, ary 2013, available at www.statoil.com/en/NewsAnd- the mistakes of his predecessors. In Global Studies and Africana Studies Media/News/2013/Downloads/In%20Amenas%20 recent legislative elections, his party at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, report.pdf. backed several northern candidates Pennsylvania. He was a Fulbright Scholar 2 Geoff D. Porter, “The New Resource Regionalism in connected to Tuareg rebels, leading in Bamako, Mali, from 2011 through North Africa and the Sahara,” SciencesPo/CERI, July some to suspect that he seeks to co-opt 2012. He blogs about Mali at www. 2013. bridgesfrombamako.com. 3 The militants reportedly did not know how to restart 20 Bruce Whitehouse, “‘A Festival of Brigands’: In the flow of gas, which might have enabled them to blow Search of Democracy and Political Legitimacy in Mali,” up the plant. See Paul Sonne and Benoit Faucon, “Algeria Strategic Review for Southern Africa 35:2 (2013). Probes Possible Role of Local Workers in Attacks,” Wall 21 Bruce Whitehouse, “Vigilante Democracy,” Bridges Street Journal, January 28, 2013. from Bamako blog, April 12, 2012. 25 “Mali: Reform or Relapse,” International Crisis Group, 4 According to the Wall Street Journal, “Top executives 22 Ibid. January 10, 2014. there at the time included Statoil’s country manager in 23 Jon Lee Anderson, “State of Terror: What Happened 26 Peter Tinti, “Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Algeria; a senior London-based executive from BP; the When an Al Qaeda Affiliate Ruled in Mali,” New Yorker, Past, Present and Future,” The Global Initiative Against top adviser and former vice president of JGC; and all three July 1, 2013. Transnational Organized Crime, January 2014. senior on-site managers for BP, Statoil and Sonatrach. A 24 “Aqmi: la face cachée du chef terroriste Abou Zeïd,” 27 “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in number of those executives died.” See ibid. Radio France Internationale, February 24, 2013. Mali,” p. 11. 5 Ibid.

14 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 concluded in unison that there was no as well as a fresh round of attacks that being written off in the national direct link between a six-month strike four months later upon French mining press as violent radicals or separatists at the Tigentourine plant, which had facilities in northern Niger and upon would prevent them from being taken succeeded in shutting down the facility Nigerien security forces.9 Belmokhtar seriously, protesters sought to fend in the lead-up to the attack, and the hails from the southern Algerian city off criticism by, for example, singing attack itself.6 of Ghardaia,10 which though situated the national anthem and waving flags squarely in the Sahara, functions as a during a sit-in in front of the mayor’s This article provides an analysis of gateway between southern and northern office in Ouargla.13 the In Amenas attack that situates Algeria. the event within the context of recent Nevertheless, militants may prey upon momentum-gaining social movements The rise of Islamist terrorist attacks in the despair that results when peaceful in southern Algeria. These movements southern Algeria can only be understood means of struggle are repressed or are not in and of themselves radical, within a larger framework. Apart from remain unaddressed. Yacine Zaid, but reflect a growing disenchantment smuggling, recent radicalization in a leader of the southern protest with the Algerian state’s ability to southern Algeria can be attributed to movement, was imprisoned in Ouargla fulfill the functions expected of it in the the social and economic grievances of in October 2012. Among more than 100 south, such as providing employment the marginalized southern population. people sharing a space in jail, he said, opportunities and development, and Since 2011, southern Algeria has were drug dealers, Islamic radicals curbing corruption. It is only the witnessed an unprecedented largely who had kidnapped the governor of coarsest interpretation that views Illizi, arms traffickers, civil society counterterrorism in southern Algeria activists, and petty criminals.14 In as a matter of killing militants; mapping “The current challenge for the prison, he saw the influence of terrorism onto the failure of peaceful Algerian stability in the religious extremists spread among the movements to achieve significant change inmates: and reform, on the other hand, may south lies within the grey reveal root reasons for radicalization area that separates peaceful They won’t tell you the terrorists and subsequent policy measures to are right, but they won’t tell you address them. protest from radicalized they’re wrong...there is a [tacit] violence.” approval, that these are men of Rising Discontent in Southern Algeria God who stand up for their ideas. Algeria stands out among Arab They say, “they’re right, it’s not and African states for its hard-won normal what we’re suffering the competence in counterterrorism, having peaceful protest movement, centered people of the south,” so they start defeated various terrorist groups on demands to address unemployment, to lean towards the bad kind of between 1993 and 2003 and overseen a fight corruption, and improve struggle.15 transition from civil war to peace since development in Ouargla, Laghouat and then. Today, the jihadist threat, which Ghardaia—the three largest cities that He added that “youths who see that the during the “black decade” hailed largely border the gas and oil extraction zones peaceful movement will not succeed are from northern Algeria, has changed. of Hassi Rmmel and Hassi Messoud.11 tempted by other means. The terrorists Southern, Saharan katibas (battalions), In defiance of defamatory claims that are everywhere and nowhere.”16 which were formed in Algeria during its goal was secession and its adherents the 1990s but played a negligible role at terrorists, the protest movement has Ali Arhab, a salaried Sonatrach worker that time, launched the careers of a new remained mostly peaceful, although and trade union leader at the Hassi generation of leaders such as Abu Zeid at times reaching riotous peaks. Rmmel gas facility, described the and Mokhtar Belmokhtar.7 Both built Perceived corruption and inequality difficult conditions at the extractive jihadist support networks on the backs in the extractive industries, the most industry plants in the desert, where of criminal smuggling networks in the high profile economic activity in a 99% of workers are men. “It’s like a Sahara, and served as key figures in the zone that suffers from a dearth of barracks, like an open-sky prison— seizure of northern Mali by a trio of al- economic opportunities, played a key Qa`ida-linked groups. Abu Zeid was role in animating protests in southern areas in North Africa and the Sahara. He pointed out reported killed by intervention forces Algeria as well as in numerous other that “protests for more employment opportunities, bet- 8 in northern Mali in February 2013. sites in North Africa and the Sahara ter education, and better infrastructure have focused on 12 Belmokhtar went on to mastermind the in the past several years. Aware the extractive industries because it is often the most high attack on the Tigentourine gas facility profile economic activity in a region that suffers from a 9 “Mokhtar Belmokhtar ‘Masterminded’ Niger Suicide deficit of economic opportunities.” See Porter. 6 Ibid.; “The In Amenas Attack, Report of the Investiga- Bombs,” BBC, May 24, 2013. 13 Walid Ait Said, “Les chômeurs du sud ont manifesté tion into the Terrorist Attack on In Amenas.” 10 “Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” BBC, June 4, 2013. dans la sérénité et la vigilance; Une leçon de patriotisme,” 7 For more on this, see Jean-Pierre Filiu, “The Fractured 11 For more on this, see “The Protest Movement of the L’Expression, March 16, 2013. Jihadi Movement in the Sahara,” Hudson Institute, Janu- Unemployed in Southern Algeria,” Arab Center for Re- 14 Personal interview, Yacine Zaid, Algiers, Algeria, ary 8, 2014. search & Policy Studies, May 14, 2013. January 2014. 8 Steven Erlanger, “France Confirms the Death of a Qae- 12 North Africa scholar Geoff D. Porter shed light on how 15 Ibid. da Leader in Mali,” New York Times, March 23, 2013. mining facilities are perceived in underdeveloped desert 16 Ibid.

15 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 even if you are free, there is nowhere to southern Algerians for the job market. grey area that separates peaceful protest go,” he explained.17 Employees belong Anadarko, for example, has agreed to from radicalized violence. They also to different ranks depending on where fund and expand the Ouargla university reveal the centrality of the extractive they are from: expatriates working as career center after March 2014.23 industries—as either a symbol or a mechanics or operators, Arhab said, target—to both ideological frameworks. earn three to four times more than the The Risks in Stifling Peaceful Protests The Tigentourine attack came as a salaried Algerians—most of whom hail Grievances that first seek redress in particular shock, as it was the first time from northern Algeria—who fill the very the form of peaceful protest may sour terrorists had targeted an extractive same roles.18 One rank lower, Arhab and turn radical if handled carelessly industries installation in Algeria. In said, are the contractors—in catering, or with coercion. Lamine Bencheneb, a this sense, it uniquely reflects how the transport, and lodging—who in turn man from Illizi in southeastern Algeria, threat has migrated from the north of the make three to four times less than began as a peaceful protester on behalf of country in the 1990s to the south in the salaried Algerians.19 It is in contracting the rights of southerners to employment present day. that locals, or Saharans, are most likely and development, but died last year in to find employment. It is the contractors the attack on Tigentourine, which he Conclusion who were on strike at the Tigentourine helped mastermind.24 Belmokhtar’s Two overlapping but distinct narratives facility in the lead-up to the terrorist group, an offshoot of an offshoot of al- emerged in the early hours of the attack. “[Saharan] contract workers Qa`ida, managed to deploy a couple of Tigentourine attack. On the one hand, are much more of a risk than [salaried] blond Canadians in the Tigentourine Belmokhtar’s group issued classically Sonatrach workers,” Ali said.20 attack, and received a majority of the transnational demands for the media attention as a result, yet it was withdrawal of Western intervention Southern youths are motivated to Bencheneb’s group, Sons of the Sahara forces from Mali and the release of achieve stable, salaried careers within for Islamic Justice, that connected with Aafia Siddiqui and the “blind shaykh” extractive industry installations. local driver contractors working inside from prison29; on the other hand, the The prevalent negative stereotypes the gas complex, who provided insider Sons of the Sahara called upon the of southern youths being “lazy” and knowledge used in the attacks.25 youth of Algeria “to respond to injustice only seeking jobs that will allow and aggression” by overthrowing the them to sit all day, as security guards Another southern Algerian group Algerian regime and installing an or drivers, are false, according to Leah calling itself Sons of the Sahara Islamic state.30 Bittat, an American who set up a career began releasing confused jihad- center in Ouargla with countering esque YouTube videos replete with Analysis of the attack on the violent extremism funding from the Kalashnikov rifles months after Tigentourine gas plant that narrowly U.S. Embassy in Algiers.21 The students the Tigentourine attack, asserting focuses on the narrative of global travel from all over the south, including “Saharan” as a nationality, yet jihad, or on how insecurity in Libya Illizi on the Libyan border and El denying that its goal is independence.26 may have facilitated the coordination Oued, to attend the regional university According to the video, the first of the and attack, ignores the underlying local in Ouargla, and tend to have a much three concrete demands is “justice with context without which the attack cannot higher level of English than northern regard to the natural resources that be properly understood. Extractive Algerians as well as a higher level come from the Sahara.”27 Reflecting the industries in southern Algeria are of initiative, she said.22 Bittat stated ambiguity of the southern population’s a central focus of a well-organized, there was a high demand for the status with regard to the state, the largely peaceful social movement for career center services, which focus on speaker said: “We have reached a justice and livelihoods, the repression preparing local university students point where we prefer death to life as and ignoring of which risks further to enter the private sector extractive Algerians under the domination of your fueling radicalization. industry job market. The service laws!”28 ended up registering 10 times more Hannah Armstrong is a Fellow of the students a month than it planned, and The tragic trajectory of Lamine Institute of Current World Affairs. She has all training sessions were standing Bencheneb and the appearance of new researched regional politics and security room only. The Algerian economy is Sons of the Sahara videos demonstrate from within the Saharo-Sahel since slowly transitioning toward a more that the current challenge for Algerian 2012, and regularly publishes reportage, liberal model, and the private sector stability in the south lies within the analysis, and policy papers. She holds is making efforts to better prepare an M.A. from the School of Oriental and 23 “Algeria Fact Sheet 2013,” Anadarko Petroleum Cor- African Studies in London, and is fluent 17 Personal interview, Ali Arhab, Algiers, Algeria, Janu- poration, 2013. in French and conversant in North African ary 2014. 24 Ibid. dialects and Modern Standard Arabic. 18 Ibid. 25 Mounir Boudjemaa, “In Amenas, Revélations sur une 19 Ibid. attaque terroriste,” Liberte, January 19, 2013. 29 Myra MacDonald, “Insight - In Amenas Attack Brings 20 Ibid. 26 This group is distinct from, but linked to, the Sons of Global Jihad Home to Algeria,” Reuters, January 24, 21 Personal interview, Leah Bittat, Algiers, Algeria, Janu- the Sahara for Islamic Justice. 2013. ary 2014. 27 The video is available at www.youtube.com/ 30 Duncan Gardham, “Terrorist Group Behind Algerian 22 Ibid. One reason is “because French isn’t their second watch?v=4ZBwAjPLZyU. Gas Plant Attack Filmed Training in the Desert,” Tele- language.” 28 Ibid. graph, January 23, 2013.

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Will Terrorism in Libya be conflict. These legacies include: the 100 deaths since mid-2012.7 These lack of functioning state institutions, incidents are attributed to Islamist Solely Driven by Radical the atomization of political power, groups in the northeast who allegedly Islamism? and cleavages and changing power seek retribution for repression and dynamics between Arab tribes and violence committed against them under By Geoffrey Howard and Henry Smith ethnic minorities that were exploited Qadhafi.8 Although this claim is not by Qadhafi. These factors have been proven, it is an eminently plausible terrorism in north africa and the exacerbated by the realities of conflict explanation. The changing relationship Middle East is widely portrayed as the and the post-conflict competition for between new power centers, in this domain of violent Islamist groups. This power and influence. Recognizing that case Islamist militias, and Qadhafi- conclusion is reasonable given the the evolution of terrorism in Libya will era power centers, such as his security record of political violence in North be inherently linked to the trajectory forces, is one of the key fault lines Africa since the colonial period. Libya’s and inclusiveness of politics, the article in Libya. This fault line has driven experience with terrorism before the also identifies the common factors political violence between a range of 2011 uprising was consistent with driving these actors’ intent to adopt actors in the post-conflict period.9 It this paradigm. There was a campaign extremist violence.3 is not the only possible motivation, of violence in the 1990s against the however, for Islamist groups to adopt Mu`ammar Qadhafi-era authorities Islamists and Violence violence. Other explanations include led by groups inspired by radical, Domestic Islamist groups with a range fears of political marginalization violent interpretations of Sunni of political affiliations, ideological by other actors, and—particularly Islam,1 predominantly in the northeast positions, degrees of engagement and for the more ideologically zealous of the country. The authorities at the cooperation with state institutions, and groups, such as Ansar al-Shari`a time used this threat to justify violence attitudes toward the use of violence and those with ideologies comparable and repression against the population, have been implicated in terrorist- to al-Qa`ida—perceptions that their which was also sometimes explained in type incidents and other forms of interpretation of Islamic principles is terms of counterterrorism, and certainly political violence, most regularly in not being respected in the forthcoming after 9/11 in terms of the U.S. narrative the northeastern towns of Benghazi constitutional process, or, at a further of the global war on terrorism.2 and Derna.4 Ansar al-Shari`a was extreme, their interpretation of Islamic implicated in the September 2012 principles is being rejected in favor of Terrorism, and other forms of political attack against the U.S. Consulate political systems perceived as secular violence, has changed starkly since in Benghazi, although it has denied or threatening.10 the end of the 2011 conflict. A myopic responsibility.5 The Brigade of the focus on Islamist radicalism as the Imprisoned Shaykh `Umar `Abd al- Nevertheless, ideologically motivated sole driving force of terrorism misses Rahman, a group about which little is Islamist groups are just one set the complexities of Libya’s politics known, claimed responsibility for the of actors whose grievances and and society, and the challenges facing rocket attack against the International perceptions of their interests—be they Libya’s stability, security and internal Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commercial, political or ideological— cohesion. in Benghazi in May 2012, accusing being marginalized are likely to drive the non-governmental organization terrorism. Libya is characterized by This article seeks to demonstrate of attempting to convert internally the proliferation of local and regional that the range of actors with the displaced members of the Tawergha power centers that emerged during capability—and, more importantly, the ethnic minority to Christianity.6 and after the 2011 uprising. New power potential intent—to pursue political centers are competing for influence violence in forms that could be Aside from these incidents, in the vast and resources with established groups described as terrorism have increased majority of cases responsibility is not that formed the backbone of Qadhafi’s in Libya, encompassing Islamist claimed by any group. Unclaimed attacks extremists, marginalized Arab tribes, include a number of assassinations 7 See the various articles in the Libya Herald. and non-Arab ethnic minority groups. against members of the Qadhafi-era 8 See Maha Ellawati, “Dead Intelligence Officer Names,” This article assesses each of the security services, which now exceed Libya Herald, September 2, 2012; Pargeter, “The Capture main groups of actors to demonstrate of Abu Anas al-Libi: Reactions and Militancy in Libya.” how their evolving capabilities and 9 Wolfram Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution,” SWP degrees of intent to use terrorism as 3 This article does not seek to apportion blame for past Research Paper, May 2013. a political tactic are products of a set incidents. It also does not assess the potential role of the 10 Some of Ansar al-Shari`a’s statements have reflected of interrelated legacies of Qadhafi’s state’s security forces in terrorism. an agenda that is hostile toward Libya’s political tran- capricious ruling system and the 2011 4 Alison Pargeter, “The Capture of Abu Anas al-Libi: sition and Western interests. One of the group’s com- Reactions and Militancy in Libya,” CTC Sentinel 6:11-12 manders, Mahmoud al-Barasi, in early December 2013 1 Dirk Vanderwalle, Libya Since Independence; Oil and (2013). criticized protesters in Derna as secularists, liberals and State-Building (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1998). 5 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Libyan Militia Blamed for At- proponents of democracy, and attacked Western values 2 Douglas Birch, “Moammar Gaddafi Offered to Help tack on U.S. Consulate Denies Responsibility,” New York and political structures. See Ansar al-Shari`a’s twitter U.S. Fight Against Terrorism,” Associated Press, Febru- Times, September 19, 2012. feed, available at www.twitter.com/AnsarShariaa_ly, ary 25, 2011; Ronald Bruce St John, Libya From Colony to 6 “Red Cross Says One Wounded in Attack on Office in and “Ansar Al-Sharia Threatens Bloodshed in Libya,” Revolution (London: Oneworld Publications, 2012). Libya,” Agence France-Presse, June 12, 2012. Libya Herald, November 25, 2013.

17 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 patronage networks and his security been subject to political stigmatization actively marginalized by the majority forces. This struggle for influence has and reprisal attacks resulting from Arab population, their intent to engage the potential to increase these groups’ perceptions that their members were in violence may increase. intent to engage in violence to highlight loyal to Qadhafi. Forces from Misrata, grievances, put pressure on or disrupt for example, have engaged in violent There are important differences national-level politics, or pursue reprisal attacks against the town of between Libya’s ethnic minorities, ideological and other goals. While these Bani Walid—traditionally home to but their political demands are fairly dynamics affect Islamist groups—as the Warfalla tribe—because of its consistent: cultural and linguistic rights outlined above—these clashes between association with Qadhafi, perceptions and recognition in the new constitution, pre- and post-conflict power centers that it stands against the 2011 uprising, with mechanisms to guarantee that these affect a broader range of actors. and long-standing enmity between these are preserved and protected. At the communities that pre-dates Qadhafi.15 same time, these groups have attempted Manipulation and Evolution of Relations Among Tribes Tribes empowered by the uprising will Shifting power dynamics among tribes probably continue attempts to remove “Tribes empowered by have been among the primary drivers Qadhafi-era networks from positions of the uprising will probably of violence since the end of the 2011 influence, or seek retribution for past conflict.11 Many of the factors fueling injustices. In turn, these tribes are likely continue attempts to the violence have political overtones. to express discontent to the interim remove Qadhafi-era Local tribes and ethnic groups authorities due to their fears that they competed for resources and political will become economically marginalized networks from positions influence following the 2011 uprising, and politically disenfranchised. There is of influence, or seek during which tribes that had been clearly a risk that the exclusion of these powerful under King Idris (1951-1969) groups from the transition could lead retribution for past and earlier attempted to regain their them to resort to violence as a political injustices.” ascendancy over those that had been tactic to express their grievances, influential under Qadhafi. Despite but also as their sole means of being initially attempting to reduce the politically relevant. The recent violence influence of tribes under the banner in Sebha appears to be an example of to increase their enfranchisement in of “modernization,” Qadhafi fell back this dynamic.16 the formal and informal economies, on the support of tribal groups to for instance through employment in strengthen his political position.12 He Relationships Between Arabs and Ethnic the energy sector and control of the used patronage to promote certain tribes Minorities smuggling trade.17 These dynamics have while marginalizing others. In simplified Comparable to how relationships caused significant violence, as well as terms, three tribes emerged as key to among Arab tribes were manipulated, disruption affecting the state and other this strategy: Qadhafi’s own Qadhadhfa Libya’s three main ethnic minorities— non-state actors. tribe, which is based primarily in Sebha the Amazigh (Berber), Tubu and Tuareg and Sirte; the Warfalla, which is Libya’s populations—were also marginalized Some notable examples of violence largest tribe and whose members are and instrumentalized to different occurred in the southeastern town of spread throughout the country; and the degrees by Qadhafi. Unsurprisingly, Kufra between the Tubu and the Zwai Merghara, whose members tend to be these groups have taken advantage of tribe, in the southwestern town of found largely in the southwest.13 their newfound freedom and political Sebha between various Arab tribes and space to cement their influence and ethnic minorities, and in Ghadames Tribes marginalized by Qadhafi have guarantee their interests. When these between the local Arab and Tuareg attempted to supersede groups that groups perceive that their interests populations.18 Such violence reflects he favored. In Sebha, for example, the are not being adequately represented competition between different actors Awlad Suleiman attempted to supplant or respected, or that they are being for political and commercial influence, the Qadhadhfa and other tribes in the particularly it seems with the Tubu, city, leading to intermittent outbreaks Libya Herald, March 11, 2013. who achieved ascendancy in the regions 14 of violence. Furthermore, tribes have 15 Government-aligned militias in effect laid siege to south of Sebha through their control of the town for around a month from early October 2012, the southern borders and cross-border 19 11 Wolfram Lacher, “The Rise of Tribal Politics” in Ja- and launched rocket attacks and other military strikes smuggling. Competition for control son Pack ed., The 2011 Libyan Uprising and the Struggle for against it. The offensive was fueled by tensions between the Post-Qadhafi Future (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, the town and neighboring Misrata, which worsened fol- 17 Jamal Adel, “Demonstrators Quit Sarir Power Station 2013). lowing the death in September 2012 of Omran Shaban, After Successful Negotiations,” Libya Herald, January 16, 12 Dirk Vanderwalle, A History of Modern Libya (Cam- the Misratan militia member credited with capturing 2014. bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Qadhafi in October 2011. Shaban had been abducted in 18 Rebecca Murray, “Tribal War Simmers in Libya’s Des- 13 Hanspeter Mattes, “Formal and Informal Authority July 2012 and was subsequently tortured by elements ert,” Inter Press Service, October 11, 2012; “Uneasy Calm in Libya Since 1969” in Dirk Vandewalle ed., Libya since from Bani Walid. See “Clashes in Ex-Gadhafi Bastion in Sebha After Clashes,” IRIN, May 14, 2012; Marcus 1969 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Bani Walid,” BBC, October 21, 2012. Rhinelander, “Distrust in Ghadames as Tuareg Dream of 14 “Tense Calm in Sebha After Six Days of Clashes,” Lib- 16 “Clashes Leave 88 Dead in Libya,” Agence France- a New City,” Libya Herald, April 7, 2012. ya Herald, January 4, 2013; “Four Die in Sebha Clashes,” Presse, January 25, 2014. 19 See Henry Smith, “The South” in Pack.

18 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 of lucrative smuggling networks and the state, Islamists, tribes and ethnic Religious Violence in informal economic activity has been minorities, there are commonalities a major cause of violence.20 Another behind the factors driving these Tunisia Three Years after example is the violence between the different groups to engage in violence. the Revolution Amazigh residents of the northwestern Most importantly, intent to engage town of Zuwarah and the Arab residents in violence will be tied to political By Anne Wolf of the neighboring towns of Jmail and developments in the transitional Rigdalin.21 This reflects Qadhafi’s process, and the extent to which the in february and july 2013, suspected repression of Libya’s Amazigh process is inclusive. If groups perceive Islamist extremists assassinated Chokri population, and the perception among that their interests are not being Belaid and Mohammed Brahmi, two left- the Amazigh that people from Jmail and adequately represented or that they wing opposition politicians and fierce Rigdalin took part in this repression and are being actively marginalized by critics of Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda- benefited from preferential employment others during the constitution-drafting led government.1 In August 2013, the patterns in the energy sector under the process, then they might resort to Initiative for Discovering the Truth former leader.22 violence as a political tactic. about the Assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohammed Brahmi (IRVA)2 Libya does not have a history of It is for this reason that the motivations accused Ennahda and officials at the ethno-nationalist uprisings or for Islamist groups to commit violence Ministry of Interior for “complicity rebellions comparable to countries will not be too dissimilar to the in the killings” and “collusion with in the Sahel, such as Mali and Niger. motivations for marginalized tribes terrorist movements.”3 The Ennahda- Political violence linked to ethnic and ethnic minority groups, and it led government vehemently denied minorities’ marginalization and would be misguided to focus analysis the charges. Although most of IRVA’s disenfranchisement, however, occurred or policy solely on the former actors. accusations are unverified,4 they reflect both before and after the 2011 uprising.23 Despite these comparable motivations, the mood of an increasing number As such, perceptions of marginalization these different actors do not currently of Tunisians who hold Ennahda would encourage groups to engage show many signs of cooperation or responsible for the rise in religiously- in violence, or potentially increase coordination. It is plausible, however, motivated violence in Tunisia.5 This separatist sentiment. The process of that shared discontent among dynamic led to the launch of a National drafting Libya’s new constitution will marginalized Arab tribes, ethnic Dialogue in October 2013 that ultimately be a key indicator as to whether the minorities and Islamist groups could forced the Islamist-led government out minorities’ demands for cultural and encourage their collaboration as the of office. political rights will be respected; an transitional process stutters along. exclusive focus on Libya’s Arab identity Such a development would be destructive This article details recent incidents of or a lack of protection for non-Arab to the nascent Libyan state. religious violence in Tunisia, as well as culture and languages will be indicators the core domestic and regional factors that these demands are being ignored. Geoffrey Howard is a Libya analyst with behind it. It then discusses domestic Control Risks. He leads analysis of political strategies to counter violent Salafists in Conclusion and security risk in Libya, conducting The fragmentation of post-conflict in-depth research into risks affecting 1 “Tunisia Brahmi Killing: ‘Same Gun Used’ in Belaid Libya means that there is a broad organizations operating and investing in Murder,” BBC, July 26, 2013; “La liste des terroristes im- range of actors that have the capability Libya and other countries in North Africa. pliqués dans les assassinats de Belaïd et Brahmi,” Lead- to engage in political violence. Such Mr. Howard travels regularly to the region ers, July 26, 2013. violence has taken forms that can be and has lived in both Libya and Syria. 2 IRVA was established shortly after the assassination of labeled terrorism. Capacity shortfalls in Prior to joining Control Risks, Mr. Howard Chokri Belaid. Although it claims to be an independent centralized security provision, coupled worked in Tripoli for a number of leading initiative, IRVA members include mostly relatives and with the widespread availability of Libyan financial institutions. friends of Belaid, as well as opposition party members, weapons, means that these groups can most of whom are fiercely opposed to the Islamists. act with relative impunity while the Henry Smith is a senior consultant, Middle 3 “Assassinats de Belaid et Brahmi: Laâguili remet des state struggles to gain a monopoly over East and North Africa, for Control Risks. documents à la justice,” La Presse, October 8, 2013. the use of force. Despite the legacy He coordinates Control Risks’ political 4 Most of IRVA’s accusations derive from unnamed and complexity of relationships among and security risk consulting projects in sources and have not been independently verified. See, the Middle East and North Africa. He for example, Monia Ben Hamadi, “Tunisie: Le gouverne- 20 These details are based on the authors’ interviews previously led Control Risks’ analysis ment Larayedh accusé de crime d’Etat après de nouvelles and research conducted in Libya since July 2011. of North Africa, and has traveled to révélations sur l’assassinat de Mohamed Brahmi,” Al 21 “31 Claimed Dead as Fighting Around Zuara Intensi- Libya on regular occasions since early Huffington Post Maghreb, September 20, 2013. fies,” Libya Herald, April 3, 2012. 2010. Mr. Smith contributed to an edited 5 Most of Tunisia’s opposition parties and the often secu- 22 “Divided We Stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts,” In- volume published in July 2013 by Palgrave lar-leaning media outlets have treated IRVA’s statements ternational Crisis Group, September 14, 2012. Macmillan on the 2011 Libyan uprising and as “revelations” and “independently verified facts.” See, 23 A notable pre-2011 conflict example of ethnic violence the subsequent civil conflict. He is a member for example, “Réactions de figures de l’opposition: Indig- in Libya was in 2008, when the Tubu and the Qadhafi- of the UK’s Institute of Risk Management, nations,” La Presse, October 3, 2013; “Tunisie: L’IRVA era security forces clashed in the southeastern town of achieving the International Certificate of livrera demain de nouvelles révélations sur l’assassinat Kufra. Risk Management with distinction. de Bélaîd,” Tunisie Numerique, November 6, 2013.

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Tunisia, and evaluates whether future has declared responsibility for the on February 16, 2014, suspected Islamist governments are likely to be more killings and investigations appear to be militants killed two policemen in the effective in controlling the spread of full of loopholes, it is still not entirely Jendouba area of western Tunisia.15 religious violence. It finds that active clear who is responsible.11 These incidents clearly indicate that collaboration between Tunisia’s secular religiously-motivated violence in parties and Ennahda should be a priority Equally worrying, the same month that Tunisia is not only on the rise, but that to launch an effective and long-term Brahmi was assassinated, violence in attacks are increasingly organized. strategy to counter religious violence. the Mount Chambi area close to the Algerian border came to the fore when Domestic Factors of Jihadist Activity in Recent Incidents of Religious Violence eight Tunisian soldiers were shot and Tunisia Since the Tunisian revolution in early their throats slit.12 Clashes between The factors driving the increase in 2011, religiously-motivated violence security forces and al-Qa`ida-linked religious violence in Tunisia are complex has steadily increased. Until late 2012, groups in Mount Chambi have been and include socio-political, economic, however, it was primarily characterized and regional dynamics. An important by small scale attacks and vandalism. event that contributed to the rise in In June 2012, for example, Tunisian “The attack in Sousse Salafist activity was the release of all Salafists angered at an arts exhibition marked the first suicide political prisoners, including jihadists, they considered blasphemous rioted in following a general amnesty shortly Tunis and other cities, throwing rocks bombing in Tunisia since after the revolution.16 Ennahda’s initial and petrol bombs at police stations the Djerba attack in 2002. dialogue-seeking strategy, in which they and other buildings.6 Yet the real turned a “blind eye” to many instances of threat of religious violence was first These incidents clearly small-scale religious violence, also likely witnessed in September 2012, when indicate that religiously- helped violent Salafists to evolve, both protesters outside the U.S. Embassy in ideologically and organizationally.17 Tunis turned violent and attacked the motivated violence in Indeed, only following the assassination embassy, leaving three people dead.7 Tunisia is not only on the of Mohammed Brahmi in July 2013 did Ennahda’s leaders clearly distance An unprecedented scale of religious rise, but that attacks are themselves from the AST, declaring it a violence was reached with the increasingly organized.” terrorist organization.18 assassinations of Belaid and Brahmi, incidents that deeply unsettled the AST’s classification as a terrorist country. The government was quick organization came despite the fact to create a list of suspects and linked ongoing since December 2012. In July that many of its members were not Tunisia’s Ansar al-Shari`a (AST)8 2013, a bomb exploded in La Goulette jihadists.19 Alaya Allani, a specialist to both killings.9 Yet the speed with in a car belonging to the National on radicalization in Tunisia, explained which Ennahda presented the names Guard, while a second bomb went off that some Salafists were appalled of the suspects, especially at a time in the town of Mhamdia in Ben Arous when they learned the group might when political opposition blamed the Province targeting a security patrol of be involved in the assassinations, Ennahda Party for the killings, should the National Guard.13 and left AST as a result.20 Moreover, prompt caution.10 Indeed, as no group some members of Ennahda’s doctrinal In October 2013, a few days after 6 Tarek Amara and Lin Noueihed, “Tunisian Salafi Isla- the start of the National Dialogue, a 15 “Militants in Tunisia Kill Four, Including Two Police,” mists Riot over ‘Insulting’ Art,” Reuters, June 12, 2012. suicide bomber attacked a hotel resort BBC, February 16, 2014. 7 For more details, see Anne Wolf, “Tunisia: Signs of in Sousse, while authorities barely 16 “Tunisie: tous les prisonniers politiques auraient été Domestic Radicalization Post-Revolution,” CTC Sentinel averted another attempted suicide libérés,” Le Monde, March 2, 2013. 6:1 (2013). bombing on the mausoleum of Tunisia’s 17 For example, no action was taken when a group of 14 8 AST was founded after the Tunisian revolution by Af- first President Habib Bourguiba. Salafists attacked protesters who expressed solidarity ghanistan veteran Sayf Allah bin Hussayn, also known The attack in Sousse marked the first with the owner of Nassma TV, Nabil Karoui, who was ac- as Abu Iyadh. It quickly became Tunisia’s main Salafist suicide bombing in Tunisia since the cused of violating sacred values. For details, see Roberta organization, bringing together up to 5,000 people at its Djerba attack in 2002. Most recently, Lusardi, “Tunisia’s Islamists: Ennahda and the Salafis,” first congress in Kairouan in May 2012. Following the as- Middle East Policy Council, May 8, 2012. sassination of Mohammed Brahmi, Tunisia declared AST 11 Kamel Gadhgadhi, who the government accused of 18 Already in May 2013, the Interior Ministry announced a terrorist organization due to its alleged involvement in both assassinations, was killed during a police raid in that AST was an illegal organization and that it would the killing. On January 10, 2014, the U.S. Department of early February 2014. See “Alleged Killer of Chokri Belaid prohibit its activities. In August 2013, Prime Minister State declared AST a foreign terrorist organization. Dead,” al-Arabiya, February 4, 2014. Ali Larayedh declared AST a terrorist organization, 9 “Tunisia Prime Minister: Ansar al-Sharia Assassi- 12 Oussama Romdhani, “In Tunisia’s Mount Chaambi insisting that “anyone belonging to it must face judicial nated Belaid and Brahmi,” Middle East Online, August Attack, Pictures Add to Tragedy,” al-Arabiya, August consequences.” See “Tunisia Declares Ansar al-Sharia a 27, 2013. 4, 2013. Terrorist Group,” BBC, August 27, 2013. 10 See Andrew Lebovich and Aaron Zelin, “Alleged 13 Nissaf Slama, “Second Bomb Targeting National Guard 19 Some members of AST, for example, only pursued Brahmi Killer: Tracing Ties Between Aboubaker el-Ha- Detonates Near Tunis,” Tunisia Live, July 31, 2013. charity work for the group. kim, Ansar al-Sharia, and Al-Qaeda,” Tunisia Live, July 14 “Suicide Attack Hits Tunisia Resort Town,” al-Jazira, 20 They focused solely on da`wa. See personal interview, 26, 2013. October 30, 2013. Alaya Allani, Tunis, Tunisia, November 2013.

20 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 wing are ideologically close to non- exclusion partly explains why even an Although activism occurs primarily violent Salafists,21 as are many young increasing number of young Tunisians outside Tunisia,34 some members of al- Ennahda militants, many of whom from middle-class families have joined Murabitun have been found in the Mount never had the opportunity to learn the Salafist movement.27 For example, Chambi region where militants close about moderate Islamist ideologies Bizerte, a middle-class coastal city, has to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb during the repressive regime of Zine one of the highest numbers of jihadists (AQIM) leader Abdelmalek Droukdel El Abidine Ben Ali.22 fighting in Syria.28 train.35 Indeed, as France’s military intervention in northern Mali pushes Regardless, many analysts agree that Regional Factors of Jihadist Activity in Tunisia AQIM fighters toward other countries, a security approach alone does not Reinforced by criminal cross-border security forces have discovered help to tackle many of the root causes activities, the links between domestic Algerians, Malians and Mauritanians of radicalization in Tunisia, such as and regional jihadist organizations have in the Tunisian mountains.36 Some of economic marginalization, which is become increasingly fluid.29 In January them have been part of the Uqba ibn particularly high among the youth. 2013, authorities were deeply alarmed Nafi Brigade, an AQIM-linked cell the Indeed, university graduates have the when 11 of the 32 hostage takers of Tunisian interior minister announced highest unemployment rate, which Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s “Signed-In- dismantled in December 201237 but that International Monetary Fund statistics Blood Battalion” at the In Amenas gas has been de-facto active in the Mount placed at 33.5% in late September facility in Algeria were Tunisians.30 Chambi region ever since. Some of the 2013—almost 10% higher than before Concern only heightened when Mount Chambi militants have been the revolution.23 The extent of the Belmokhtar created the al-Qa`ida- active members of AST, yet AST leader youth’s current economic frustration affiliated al-Murabitun in August Abou Iyadh denies any organizational is particularly severe in light of their 2013, a merger with the Movement links between them. initial hope for a quick economic for Unity and Jihad in West Africa recovery following the ousting of Ben (MUJAO) that aims to pursue jihad Another key cause of the rise in jihadist Ali.24 against Western targets throughout activity in Tunisia is the increasing the region, including in Tunisia.31 One number of Tunisians who have Political exclusion is another key factor month after its creation, Tunisian traveled to Syria to fight against the that has made some young Tunisians radio station Mosaique FM reported Bashar al-Assad regime. Tunisian more prone to religious violence.25 Most that around 300 Tunisians have foreign fighters in Syria have fought political parties struggle to integrate joined al-Murabitun.32 Although it is alongside the al-Qa`ida-linked Jabhat the youth, and young Tunisians often impossible to independently verify al-Nusra,38 as well as the more radical describe party politics as “sclerotic” this possibly exaggerated number, it is fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the “same as before.”26 Immediately beyond a doubt that Tunisians are active and the Levant (ISIL). Motives for after the revolution, many international members of al-Murabitun, in particular fighting in Syria include ideological donors gave money for civil society as heightened security measures have conviction, economic opportunities, projects that absorbed some of the youth, recently made jihadist training more as well as the prestige and social but such funding has declined during difficult in Tunisian territory.33 recognition that jihadists associate the past year, leaving even more youth with the experience.39 Jihadism in Syria without prospects. Such socio-political 27 This assertion is based on the author’s personal ob- has been supported by several public 40 servations in Tunisia. It cannot be proven, as no reliable figures and imams in Tunisia. A recent 21 For more details, see Anne Wolf, “An Islamist ‘Renais- surveys or similar studies exist. estimate by the International Centre sance’? Religion and Politics in Post-Revolutionary Tu- 28 Hazem al-Amin, “Tunisia’s ‘Road to Jihad’ in Syria for the Study of Radicalisation placed nisia,” Journal of North African Studies 18:4 (2013). Paved by Muslim Brotherhood,” al-Monitor, October 23, 22 For more details, see Anne Wolf, “The Salafist Temp- 2013. 34 Libya, especially, has become a site for training and tation: The Radicalization of Tunisia’s Post-Revolution 29 For details, see “La Tunisie des frontières: jihad et strategic operations following the fall of the Mu`ammar Youth,” CTC Sentinel 6:4 (2013). Fabio Merone, for exam- contrebande,” International Crisis Group, November 28, Qadhafi regime. ple, insisted that “declaring Ansar al-Sharia a coherent 2013. 35 Benjamin Roger, “Tunisie: sur la trace des jihadistes and homogenous terrorist organization is a big mistake.” 30 For details, see Anne Wolf and Raphael Lefèvre, “Al- du mont Chaambi,” Jeune Afrique, May 7, 2013. See Fabio Merone, “One Last Chance for Ansar al-Sharia geria: No Easy Times for the Generals,” Journal of North 36 “Tunisie, Terrorisme: Les terroristes de Châambi in Tunisia,” Tunisia Live, August 30, 2013. African Studies 18:3 (2013). se composaient de 30 individus dont 15 algériens, et 15 23 These details are from IMF Tunis staff. 31 Mohammad Ben Ahmad, “North African Terror maliens, tunisiens et mauritaniens,” Tunivisions, Au- 24 An Arab Barometer survey conducted shortly after Groups Merge,” al-Monitor, August 26, 2013. gust 31, 2013. the revolution revealed that 78% of young Tunisians ex- 32 Jamel Arfaoui, “Tunisians Join Mourabitounes Ter- 37 Monia Ghanmi, “Tunisia Foils al-Qaeda Expansion pected the economic situation to improve within the next rorist Group,” Magharebia, September 20, 2013. Plan,” Magharebia, December 24, 2012. few years following the revolution. For details, see Alissa 33 On August 30, 2013, Tunisian authorities instituted 38 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting a Returned Tunisian For- Strunk, “Tunisia’s Feuding Youth,” The Middle East heightened security measures by creating a buffer zone at eign Fighter from the Syrian Front,” The Washington Channel, August 12, 2013. the southern borders with Libya and Algeria. Also in Au- Institute for Near East Policy, November 8, 2013. 25 See Monica Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian gust, Tunisian security forces launched a bombing cam- 39 Fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra make $250-300 a Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current,” Mediterra- paign and intensified army patrols in the Mount Chambi month. For more information, see ibid. nean Politics 8:1 (2013). area. That being said, the creation of this buffer zone may 40 Amira Masrour, “Syria Claims Tunisian Govern- 26 Personal interviews, youth activists, Tunis, Tunisia, have limited impact since the vastness of the Sahel makes ment Support for Fighters in Syria,” Tunisia Live, June December 2013. full control of cross-border activity nearly impossible. 21, 2013.

21 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 the number of Tunisian fighters in creation of anti-terrorist crisis cells.45 In Conclusion Syria at 970, making Tunisia the third August 2013, Tunisian Prime Minister A unified strategy to combat religiously- biggest contributor of foreign fighters Ali Larayedh declared that a national motivated violence in Tunisia seems after Jordan and Saudi Arabia.41 This committee to formulate a strategy to distant. Tunisia’s political environment figure is particularly significant when combat terrorism would be established.46 remains divided, and major opposition one considers Tunisia’s relatively small Most of these declarations, however, parties have criticized the nomination of population. How authorities choose to have not translated into action. Mehdi Jomaa as interim prime minister deal with fighters returning from Syria on December 14, 2013. There are even will partially determine Tunisia’s future Tunisia also increased coordination splits within Tunisia’s Ministry of stability. with neighboring countries to fight Interior, which has manifested in jihadists, especially with Algeria.47 sensitive information being leaked to Confronting Jihadists Deep mistrust between countries in opposition politicians and newspapers The Tunisian government has employed North and West Africa continues to critical of Ennahda.50 Secular parties a number of measures to counteract undermine in-depth coordination and are still struggling to form coalitions, Salafi-jihadi activity in the country. multinational strategies, despite the fact and are strategizing to form coalitions To limit the number of Tunisians going that transnational threats emanating based around an anti-Islamist (or, to fight in Syria, officials have asked from AQIM and al-Murabitun require anti-Ennahda) stance rather than an individuals under the age of 35 to show regional responses.48 elaborate security program, in order a parental authorization when traveling to attract votes. Little change to the to Libya or Turkey, as most Tunisians Security expert Haykel Ben Mahfoudh status quo can be expected until these leave for Syria through these two argued that the absence of a clear coalitions solidify. The election of countries.42 Additionally, on August and transparent domestic strategy to Jomaa is unlikely to change much in 30, 2013, authorities ordered the combat religious violence partially that respect, as his main duties consist creation of a buffer zone at the southern accounts for increased jihadist of organizing the next elections. borders with Libya and Algeria.43 The activity, as post-revolution politics creation of this zone, however, may not have focused primarily on transitional The finalization of the constitution is prevent jihadists from leaving Tunisia justice and constitution-drafting. All a sign of hope that Tunisia’s Islamists since the vastness of the Sahel makes prior counterterrorism strategies and more secular parties might be full control of cross-border activities have lacked basic requirements such able to collaborate eventually, despite nearly impossible. Also in August, as a statement of the scope, budget, mutual distrust. Further collaboration security forces launched an aerial and overall objective of operations, should be a priority, as the only ones bombing campaign and intensified therefore undermining their effective who have benefited from political crisis army patrols in the Mount Chambi implementation.49 Although officials and stagnation so far are the jihadists; area. These efforts have made militant recognize that the fight against political and economic disillusionment activities more difficult to maintain in religiously-motivated violence needs can push some Tunisians toward Tunisia’s mountains, but violent cells to also tackle some of the root causes jihadist activity, and the failure to have remained operationally close to of radicalization—most importantly, develop a concrete security policy the Algerian border. Clashes between youth marginalization—these factors prevents effective action against security forces and jihadists have have largely remained unaddressed. jihadist groups. If cooperation can continued throughout the country.44 Tunisians returning from jihad in Syria be achieved, Tunisia could launch have been questioned and some have the wide-ranging political, socio- The legal framework for such been imprisoned, but no reintegration economic and security reforms that counterterrorism operations is Ben policy has been formulated. are needed to tackle the root causes of Ali’s 2003 anti-terrorism law, although radicalization, establish reintegration the Ministry of Interior has repeatedly programs for fighters returning from announced additional steps toward Syria, and pave the way for an effective increased security, including the strategy against jihadists currently 45 “Tunisie: création de cellules de crise antiterroristes,” operating in Tunisia. Radio France Internationale, March 27, 2013. 41 “ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; 46 “Ali Laarayedh: ‘Vers la formation d’un conseil con- Anne Wolf is a graduate of Cambridge Steep Rise Among Western Europeans,” The Interna- sultatif pour la formation d’un comité national de lutte University specializing in North African tional Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, December contre le terrorisme,’” Kapitalis, August 6, 2013. affairs. She works in Tunisia as a 17, 2013. 47 “L’Algérie réaffirme son soutien à la Tunisie et à la journalist, researcher and political risk 42 See, for example, “Tunisie: Empêcher les départs pour Libye en insistant sur la sécurité régionale,” Al Huff- analyst. le jihad,” Arte.tv, October 4, 2013. ington Post Maghreb, December 7, 2013; Jamel Arfaoui, 43 “La Tunisie sécurise ses frontières avec la création de “Collaboration algéro-tunisienne contre le terrorisme,” 50 Documents purportedly leaked by Tunisian security zones militaires ‘tampons,’” Jeune Afrique, August 30, Magharebia, August 5, 2013. officials allege that U.S. intelligence informed the Minis- 2013. 48 For more information, see Raphael Lefèvre, “Com- try of Interior about a plan by extremists to assassinate 44 “Tunisian Police Arrest More Militants, Seize Arms,” mentary on Current Events,” Journal of North African Brahmi. The then-minister of interior, Lotfi Ben Jeddou, Reuters, January 2, 2014; “One Killed After Tunisia Po- Studies 18:5 (2013). claimed that the information was withheld from him. See lice, Islamist Militants Clash,” Reuters, November 12, 49 Personal interview, Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, security Asma Smadhi, “Leaks Prompt Inquiry into Brahmi As- 2013. expert, Tunis, Tunisia, November 2013. sassination,” Tunisia Live, September 18, 2013.

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Leadership Analysis of It finds that Khalid al-Barnawi and incentive to regionalize Boko Haram’s Mamman Nur are uniquely capable of ideology, and he was the mastermind of Boko Haram and Ansaru in expanding Boko Haram’s international the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Nigeria connections to al-Qa`ida in the Abuja on August 26, 2011.10 Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabab, By Jacob Zenn the Movement for Unity and Jihad Nigerian security forces killed Yusuf in West Africa (MUJAO),4 Mokhtar and 800 of his followers, who called in may 2013, nigerian security forces Belmokhtar’s factions,5 al-Qa`ida core themselves “Yusufiya,”11 in clashes in launched a military offensive targeting and other militant groups in Africa. July 2009.12 After this, AQIM leader Boko Haram1 safe havens after On the local level, al-Barnawi and Abdelmalek Droukdel offered his President Goodluck Jonathan declared mid-level commanders from Ansaru “Salafist brothers” in Nigeria “men, a state of emergency in northeastern are likely operating with Shekau and weapons, and ammunition to gain Nigeria. Despite an initial reduction in Boko Haram, but Nur’s ideological revenge on Nigeria’s ruling Christian Boko Haram attacks, the militant group disagreements with Shekau may inhibit minority” for killing “the martyr Shaykh reestablished a base in Borno State, his followers from collaborating with Muhammad Yusuf” and the deaths of along Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, Boko Haram at this time. Muslims in clashes with Christians in and killed more civilians than in any the Middle Belt.13 period since its first attack under leader Muhammad Yusuf’s Disciples Abubakar Shekau in September 2010.2 Before 2009, Abubakar Shekau was Dozens of Yusuf’s followers fled the deputy of Boko Haram leader Nigeria, including the future Although Shekau is Boko Haram’s Muhammad Yusuf, while Mamman commander in Kaduna, Abu most visible leader, recent Boko Haram Nur, who reportedly introduced Muhammed, who trained in Algeria and Ansaru operations suggest that Shekau to Yusuf, was Yusuf’s third-in- under the Nigerian Khalid al- Shekau is not the only leader. This command.6 The three met as theology Barnawi,14 the latter of whom was article examines other militant leaders students in Borno.7 Yusuf admired the who contributed to the operational and Taliban, Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa`ida eroonian. See “Boko Haram Infiltrates Cameroon,” Cam- ideological development of Boko Haram (particularly AQIM), while Shekau eroononline.org, January 11, 2012. and Ansaru, but specifically focuses preached takfiri (excommunication) 10 Nur said, for example, that “replacing the Shari`a on Khalid al-Barnawi and Mamman ideology, but they both focused on from Usman dan Fodio’s jihad” in Niger, Nigeria and 8 Nur. The article also discusses Adam their native Nigeria. Nur, who is Cameroon with the “European secular constitution 9 Kambar, who may have been in contact Cameroonian, may have had an caused poverty and misery.” During the early 1800s, Us- with Usama bin Ladin; Abu Muhammed, man dan Fodio, a Fulani, led a revolt against the Hausa whose kidnapping cell targeted and during election season. kingdoms in what is now southern Niger, northern Ni- foreigners in northern Nigeria; and 4 MUJAO was the governing authority in Gao, Mali, in geria and northern Cameroon and subsequently estab- Kabiru Sokoto and Habibu Bama, who 2012 and early 2013, but has also carried out operations lished an Islamic caliphate based in Sokoto. Dan Fodio attacked churches in Nigeria’s Middle in Timbuktu and Kayes, Mali, Algeria, Niger and Mau- believed the rulers of the Hausa states were mixing Islam 3 Belt region. ritania. See Andrew Lebovich, “Trying to Understand with aspects of traditional religions, which is a practice MUJWA,” al-Wasat blog, August 22, 2012. he wanted to eliminate. For details, see Jacob Zenn and 1 Boko Haram identifies itself as Jama`at Ahl al-Sunna 5 Belmokhtar’s Katibat al-Mulathimin (Veiled Brigades) Atta Barkindo, “Religious Roots of Boko Haram,” Coun- li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad, meaning “People Committed to announced it merged with MUJAO in August 2013 into cil on Foreign Relations, May 9, 2013; Shaykh Muham- the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” a new group called al-Murabitun. Belmokhtar, however, mad Yusuf, “Tarihin Musulmai (History of Muslims),” in Arabic. Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf dif- ceded leadership of al-Murabitun to an unnamed com- YouTube, undated; Jide Ajani, “UN House Blast: Mas- fered from mainstream Nigerian Islamists by prohibiting mander who reportedly fought against both the Soviets termind, Nur, Declared Wanted,” Vanguard, September Western-style education and service in Nigeria’s secular and the United States in Afghanistan. See Bakari Gueye, 1, 2011. government. “Belmokhtar, MUJAO Launch New Jihadist Group,” 11 “Yusufiya” means the “followers of Yusuf.” 2 According to Shekau, killing civilians for the purpose Magharebia, August 25, 2013. 12 “Boko Haram Leader, Yusuf, Killed,” Vanguard, July of “conquering and taking their money follows verses 6 “How Nur, Shekau Run Boko Haram,” Vanguard, Sep- 30, 2009; Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Radical Ideologue: of the Qur’an” about ghanima, or spoils of war, that “we tember 3, 2011; “Profile of Nigeria’s Boko Haram leader An In-Depth Look at Northern Nigeria’s Abu Shekau,” take from our enemies in the battle we fight in the name Abubakar Shekau,” BBC, June 4, 2013. Militant Leadership Monitor, September 1, 2011. of Allah.” Boko Haram carried out sporadic attacks be- 7 “Profile of Nigeria’s Boko Haram leader Abubakar 13 Droukdel also praised “Brother Farouk,” the 20-year- fore Shekau took over leadership of Boko Haram in July Shekau.” old Nigerian who attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound 2010, but its first attack after Shekau became leader was 8 Takfiri ideology is the practice of declaring other Mus- airliner on Christmas Day 2009 on behalf of al-Qa`ida in on September 7, 2010, when approximately 50 fighters lims infidels. In his pre-2009 sermons, Shekau cited the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) attacked Bauchi prison and freed more than 100 Boko Salafists, such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Wahhab, to was the only other al-Qa`ida affiliate to condemn the Haram members. See Sani Muhd Sani, “Attack On argue that any Muslim who pledged allegiance to the killing of Yusuf. See “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Bauchi Prison - Boko Haram Frees 721 Inmates,” Leader- Nigerian flag instead of Islamic symbols or associated Condolence, Support and Comfort for our Brothers and ship, September 8, 2010. with Christians was an infidel. See “Mallam Abubakar People in Nigeria 20/08/09,” available at www.ansar1. 3 Nigeria’s “Middle Belt,” which includes Kaduna, Jos Shekau,” YouTube, undated. info/showthread.php?t=11556; “North Africa Qaeda Of- (Plateau State), and Abuja, is a region of central Nigeria 9 Although some reports suggest Nur is Chadian, he fers to Help Nigerian Muslims,” Reuters, February 1, populated by diverse ethnic groups. It is where majority is most often described as Cameroonian. The promi- 2010. Muslim northern Nigeria and majority Christian south- nent Shaykh Ibrahim Mbombo Mubarak of the Central 14 Al-Barnawi’s nisba of Barnawi (the Bornoan) indi- ern Nigeria meet and clash, particularly over land use Mosque in Douala, Cameroon, also said that Nur is Cam- cates that either he or his descendants are from Borno.

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Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s longtime may have facilitated Nur’s meeting with funding from a terrorist group based kidnapping and smuggling accomplice.15 the two African al-Qa`ida affiliates, as in Algeria, which possibly came from Another follower, Adam Kambar, who well as Nur’s return to Kano in early Khalid al-Barnawi.25 This funding was arrested in Kano in 2007 after 2011. likely contributed to Nur’s attack on the training with AQIM in Algeria, met al- United Nations and some of the more Barnawi in Algeria in 2011, but became Shekau was shot and detained during than 10 church bombings in the Middle the leader of an AQIM training camp.16 the July 2009 clashes, which allowed Belt in 2012 that, according to Nigerian Nur to become leader until Nur left security forces, bore the “hallmark of al- Nur was one of Yusuf’s few followers Nigeria and Shekau was released Qa`ida” and followed Droukdel’s offer who fled to East Africa (reportedly to from custody.19 In July 2010, Shekau of support for attacks on Christians in Somalia) and trained with al-Shabab announced from a hideout in Borno the Middle Belt.26 and AQIM militants.17 Kambar was that he succeeded Yusuf and formed based in Kano, served as the “main link” Jama`at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da`wa wa Nur may also have taken part in the between Boko Haram and AQIM and al- al-Jihad,20 although it was commonly Federal Police Headquarters attack in Shabab, and also financed training for known as “Boko Haram.” Shekau Abuja on June 16, 2011. This attack, Nigerians with AQIM in Mali for attacks pledged loyalty to “the amir of al-Qa`ida which was the first suicide bombing in on “Western interests” in Nigeria that in the Islamic Maghreb,” Usama bin Nigeria’s history, was claimed by the Nur would later carry out.18 Kambar Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the same intermediary to Agence France- “Islamic states” in Iraq and Somalia, Presse who claimed the UN bombing, A nisba identifies a person’s place of origin, tribal affilia- declaring “Oh America, jihad has just employed the same tactics as the UN 21 tion or ancestry. The author interviewed a Mauritanian begun.” with contacts to AQIM members who said al-Barnawi “Mamman Nur, a notorious Boko Haram element with al- was the person who ordered the murders of more than Nur’s Break with Shekau Qaida links who returned recently from Somalia, worked 10 Mauritanian soldiers in Lemgheity, Mauritania, in a After returning to Nigeria, Mamman in concert with the two suspects in masterminding the Belmokhtar-led operation with the GSPC in 2006. Nur masterminded the UN bombing on attack on the United Nations building in Abuja.” It was 15 After his arrest, Kabiru Sokoto reportedly said that August 26, 2011, which killed 21 people later revealed that one of the two Algerian-trained opera- 22 “the leader of Boko Haram, Imam Abubakar Shekau, in Abuja. Nur coordinated the attack tives in the attack was Babagana Ismail Kwaljima (also is calling the shots from Borno State, while another key from a base in Kano with two Nigerians known as Abu Summaya), who was arrested in Kano in strategist, Abu Muhammed, is in charge of North Central who trained with Kambar in Algeria, 2007 after returning from training with AQIM in Alge- 23 [Kaduna].” See “Kabiru Sokoto Names Boko Haram’s and a Nigerian militant, Habibu Bama. ria on suspicion of plotting attacks against U.S. targets Leaders,” The Nation, February 14, 2012; “Exclusif...Mort Bama also carried out the Christmas in Nigeria. The other suspect also trained with AQIM des deux otages occidentaux tués au Nigeria: Une source Day 2011 church bombing near Abuja in Algeria. The UN attack in Abuja in 2011 occurred the d’AQMI livre quelques details,” Agence Nouakchott with Kabiru Sokoto, the commander same day that AQIM attacked Algeria’s premier military d’Information, March 10, 2012; “Suspects Charged in that Muhammad Yusuf appointed for academy outside of Algiers. In addition, the two Nigerian 24 Nigeria Bombing,” al-Jazira, December 25, 2011; “Taking Sokoto State. Kabiru received his suspects who carried out the attack with Nur and the car the Hostage Road,” Africa Confidential, March 15, 2013. used in the bombing were traced to the same district in 16 The U.S. government subsequently listed both al-Bar- the Hostage Road”; “UN Office Bombing: FG Seeks to Re- Kano where AQIM-trained Nigerian militants, including nawi and Kambar as specially designated terrorists. See open Case, Plans to Amend Charges,” Nigerian Tribune, Kambar, were arrested in 2007. See John Gambrell, “Ni- “Barnawi, Kambar: Qaeda-linked Militants with Boko January 23, 2014. geria: 2 Suspects Arrested in UN HQ Bombing,” Associ- Haram Ties,” Agence France-Presse, June 21, 2012; “Re- 19 Shekau may have been misidentified and released ated Press, August 31, 2011; “Boko Haram Gets Sponsor- vealed: Wanted Suspect Arrested, Released in 2007,” from prison or “rescued” by other high-level officials ship from Algeria, FG Tells Court,” Vanguard, May 10, This Day, September 2, 2011; “Five Nigerians on Terror with Boko Haram connections who paid for Shekau to be 2013; “Boko Haram Promises Bloodier Days; Threatens Charges,” BBC, November 27, 2009. released. Shekau claimed in a video that he was rescued More Attacks On Churches And Government Build- 17 “JTF Claims ‘Global Terrorist’ Kambar Killed,” Van- by “fellow believers.” See “Borno Shivers Over Threats of ings,” Sahara Reporters, July 19, 2012; Lawan Adamu, guard, June 7, 2013; “Letter Dated 12 July 2013 from the Boko Haram’s Return,” Sunday Trust, July 4, 2013; “The “The Untold Story of Kabiru Sokoto,” Daily Trust, Febru- Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Boko Haram Terror Chief Who Came Back from the ary 13, 2012; “I am Alive, Says Abubakar Shekau in New Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) Concerning Dead,” France 24, January 13, 2012. Video,” Vanguard, September 26, 2013. Somalia and Eritrea Addressed to the President of the 20 Da`wa in Arabic and Hausa means preaching for the 25 “Boko Haram Gets Sponsorship from Algeria, FG Security Council,” United Nations, July 12, 2013; Je- purpose of proselytizing. “Jihad” means holy war for Is- Tells Court.” maal Oumar, “AQIM Link to Abuja Suicide Bombing,” lam or self-discipline, but Muhammad Yusuf rejected the 26 The Christmas Day bombings in Jos in 2010, for ex- Magharebia, September 9, 2011. latter notion, saying that Western countries brainwashed ample, employed a method never seen before in Nigeria, 18 According to Africa Confidential, Kambar “returned Muslims who were educated in the West to believe that including more than five bombings on churches in two to Nigeria and settled in Kano, where he is said to have jihad meant self-discipline and not holy war. Jama`at districts simultaneously. See Charles Obi, “Kabiru Soko- received messages from Usama bin Ladin. An Ansaru Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad (Sunni Group for to’s Phone Calls,” Insider Weekly, 2013; “Boko Haram source who was close to Kambar claims that there was Preaching and Jihad) may reflect Yusuf’s “preaching” Gets N40million Donation From Algeria,” Sahara Re- only one intermediary between Ansaru and Bin La- and Shekau’s “jihad.” See “Tahirin Musilminai” (History porters, May 13, 2013; “Arrested Kingpin Opens Up,” din, and his then deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, now al- of Muslims), YouTube, undated. Nigerian Tribune, February 13, 2012; “I Belong to Shura Qa`ida’s leader.” See “Bin Laden Files Show al-Qaida 21 “Periodical Review July 2010 – No. 2,” ICT’s Jihadi Council, not Boko Haram,” Vanguard, July 1, 2013; “Jos: and Taliban Leaders in Close Contact,” Guardian, April Websites Monitoring Group, August 2010. Bombers Linked to Al-Qaeda,” Nigeria Politico, January 29, 2012; Bashir Adigun, “Nigeria Government Freed 22 Ajani. 1, 2011; Andrew McGregor, “The Mysterious Death In Bomb Suspect,” Associated Press, September 1, 2011; 23 Ibid. Custody Of Boko Haram Leader Habib Bama,” Terrorism “JTF Claims ‘Global Terrorist’ Kambar Killed”; “Taking 24 The investigation of the UN attack revealed that Monitor 10:13 (2012).

24 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 bombing, involved Kabiru Sokoto and denial of this kidnapping was likely Due to the break-up of Abu Habibu Bama, and was forewarned by related to Shekau’s feud over control of Muhammed’s shura, the three main a Boko Haram spokesman who one day funding with Abu Muhammed.32 Nigerian leaders in Boko Haram’s before the attack said that “brothers network were Shekau in Borno, and al- who arrived from Somalia,” possibly As a result of the feud, Boko Barnawi and Nur in the Middle Belt and referring to Nur, would launch “fierce” Haram reportedly informed on Abu Kano. attacks in Abuja.27 Muhammed’s shura (council) to the Nigerian security forces, who killed Local Defections and Ansaru’s Formation There were rumors that some militants Abu Muhammed and several shura While Shekau feuded with other believed Nur’s al-Qa`ida connections members in Kaduna on March 7, 2012, factions, there was also growing local made him a more competent leader than and uncovered the mortally wounded discontent with Shekau. In July 2011, a Shekau.28 Shekau’s reported favoritism British and Italian hostages in Sokoto.33 new group called the Yusufiya Islamic of ethnic Kanuris of Borno also may have In addition, this information led Movement (YIM)36 released flyers in driven Hausas, non-Nigerians and other security forces to the location of a Borno “distinguishing” the YIM from non-Kanuris to ally with Nur, who was German engineer who was kidnapped “evil” Boko Haram, showing concern for also non-Nigerian.29 Shekau, however, by a Mauritanian-led AQIM cell in Kano the deaths of civilians, and proposing ordered the “death penalty” for anyone in January 2012, which was broken “reconciliation” with the government.37 who did not follow his orders and killed up in May 2012, and to Kambar, who The YIM, however, may have been defectors.30 This may have been the was killed in Kano in August 2012.34 forced out of Borno by Shekau’s killing origin of the split between Boko Haram Other militants connected to Abu of defectors and resurfaced as part of and Ansaru in 2012. Muhammed’s shura, including Kabiru Ansaru after Shekau ordered attacks in Sokoto and Habibu Bama, were also Kano on January 20, 2012, which killed Al-Barnawi’s Unsuccessful Collaboration with arrested or killed in 2012.35 nearly 200 people, mostly Muslims.38 Shekau Within weeks of the attack, Shekau fled Concurrent with Nur’s operations, 32 Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa reportedly said, to Gao, northern Mali, which was then Khalid al-Barnawi’s trainee, Abu “In the case of the 41 million naira ($250,000) there governed by MUJAO, after information Muhammed, masterminded northern was acrimony because they did not quite know how the gleaned from the arrest of one of Nigeria’s first terrorism-related money was spent and nobody dared ask questions for Shekau’s “new recruits” led security 39 kidnapping of foreigners—a British fear of Shekau, who could pronounce death as his pun- forces to his hideout in Kano. and Italian engineer—in May 2011. The ishment.” Kabiru Sokoto reportedly said in trial that operation was claimed by “al-Qa`ida “there is a group in Algeria…that sends money to us and the phone.” See “Northern Politicians Get Jittery as Kabir in the Lands Beyond the Sahel”—a also told us how they spend the money…the money made Sokoto is Rearrested,” elombah.com, February 12, 2012; name that reflected the vision of Boko Haram to split into two because of the way it was “Catholic Church Bombing: I Know the Perpetrators – Belmokhtar and his Malian brother-in- shared.” As Abu Muhammed and al-Barnawi operated Kabiru Sokoto,” Vanguard, May 11, 2013. law and MUJAO spokesperson, Oumar with AQIM, they were also most likely accustomed to 36 Although it was short-lived, the YIM was deemed Ould Hamaha, to expand their zone AQIM’s meticulousness with “expense reports” and credible by the Nigerian media and Borno’s population of operations “throughout the entire transparency, unlike Shekau. See “Exclusif...Mort des and its message and method of delivering flyers was con- 31 Sahara” to Nigeria. Boko Haram’s deux otages occidentaux tués au Nigeria: Une source sistent with the way ex-members of Boko Haram would d’AQMI livre quelques details”; “Boko Haram Deny communicate. The flyers said, “We call on this evil group 27 “Nigerian Islamists Vow ‘Fiercer’ Attacks,” Agence Kidnapping, Killings of Sokoto Hostages,” ThisDayLive, [Boko Haram] to desist, failing which we shall have no France-Presse, June 15, 2011; “Madalla Bombing: Kabiru March 9, 2012. option but to expose and hunt them…We therefore dis- Sokoto Says ‘No Case to Answer,’” Pilot Africa, May 17, 33 “Horror in Sokoto – Al-Qaeda-Funded Group Killed tance our group from all the bombings targeted at civil- 2013. Hostages,” Vanguard, March 11, 2012; Yusuf Alli, “Ka- ians…This is necessary in the light of genuine concern by 28 “How Nur, Shekau Run Boko Haram.” biru Sokoto Names Boko Haram’s Leaders,” The Nation, individuals and group to the mass suffering of innocent 29 “Qaqa: Boko Haram is Under Duress, Divided,” This- February 14, 2012; “Power Tussle in Boko Haram Led to citizens caught in the crossfire between our members and Day, February 7, 2012. Sect Leader’s Arrest,” Leadership, March 26, 2012. the Nigerian troops.” 30 Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa reportedly told in- 34 The German engineer, like the British and Italian hos- 37 Daniel Idonor et al., “Boko Haram Sect Splits,” Van- terrogators after his arrest that “anyone who challenged tages in Sokoto, was shot and killed during the rescue op- guard, July 21, 2011. Boko Haram’s use of violence, including seven recently, eration. See Aminu Abubakar, “German Hostage Killed 38 Boko Haram warned it would attack Kano for months are slaughtered in front of their wives and children.” See in Nigeria During Rescue Bid,” Agence France-Presse, before January 2012, and Shekau justified the attacks in “Abul Qaqa Confession Shows Bloodletting and Fear as May 31, 2012; “Boko Haram Looks to Mali,” Africa Con- a video and text messages and flyers distributed in Kano, Instruments of Control Within Boko Haram,” Sahara fidential, November 30, 2012; “Power Tussle in Boko saying the attack was retaliation for the security forces Reporters, February 6, 2012; “UN House: Boko Haram Haram Led to Sect Leader’s Arrest,” Leadership, March imprisoning Boko Haram militants and their wives. Unveils Suicide Bomber,” This Day, September 19, 2011; 26, 2012; “Nigeria: Taking the Hostage Road”; Aminu 39 “Nigeria Arrests Boko Haram ‘Militants’ in Kano,” “Boko Haram: Six Killed in Factional Clash,” ThisDay- Abubakar, “Nigeria Detains 5 with ‘Al Qaeda-links’ over BBC, December 19, 2011; “Boko Haram National Leader, Live, February 3, 2012. German Kidnap,” Agence France-Presse, March 27, Abubakar Shekau, Narrowly Escapes Arrest,” Premium 31 Hamaha said Belmokhtar and he were “leaving be- 2012; Lawal Danuma, “Kidnapped German Killed in JTF Times, April 6, 2012; Aminu Abubakar; “Boko Haram hind AQIM’s appellation to the Maghreb region (north- Raid,” Daily Trust, May 31, 2012. Leader (Shekau) Escapes Arrest In Kano - Wife Ar- west Africa) but remaining under al-Qa’ida” and “enlarg- 35 Kabiru Sokoto said at his trial that he was not a part of rested,” Nigerian Tribune, March 5, 2012; Udumu Kalu, ing our zone of operations throughout the entire Sahara.” Boko Haram, and that “Shekau is a leader of Boko Haram “Al-Qaeda-Boko Haram Links in Kano Since 2009,” See Baba Ahmed, “Leader of al-Qaida Unit in Mali Quits but not the shura council and it is not true that when I Vanguard, December 24, 2011; “Shekau Leading Boko AQIM,” Associated Press, December 3, 2012. escaped from police custody that I spoke to Shekau on Haram from the Shadows,” Vanguard, January 28, 2012;

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On January 26, 2012, Ansaru released Ansaru’s first high-profile operations suitable for Ansaru’s internationalist flyers in Kano announcing its “public included a prison break in Abuja in militants because Kano was the hub for formation” and saying it was a “humane” November 2012, kidnapping a French funding from al-Qa`ida in Pakistan for alternative to Boko Haram that would engineer in Katsina in December 2012, an the training of Nigerian militants in the only target the Nigerian government ambush on Mali-bound Nigerian troops mid-2000s when Muhammad Yusuf and Christians in “self-defense.”40 in Kogi in January 2013, and kidnapping and his deputies were sending followers Subsequent Arabic-language Ansaru and killing seven foreign engineers to the Sahel and Afghanistan.48 Kano videos in June 2012 dubbed in Hausa in Bauchi in February 2013.44 Ansaru also hosted AQIM operatives like Adam and English and statements to Kaduna- justified the operations as retaliation for Kambar, the AQIM cell that kidnapped based Desert Herald showed Ansaru the French-led intervention in Mali and the German engineer on the same day employed a pan-West African narrative “Western atrocities” in Afghanistan.45 as Ansaru’s formation in January 2012, similar to Mamman Nur and MUJAO.41 These operations and justifications and the AQIM-trained accomplices of Ansaru also displayed the “setting sun” carried the “signature” of al-Barnawi, Mamman Nur in the UN Headquarters logo of AQIM’s predecessor before who previously carried out kidnappings bombing.49 Moreover, the city was the 2007, the Salafist Group for Preaching with Belmokhtar. Moreover, an Ansaru base for regional deputies under Yusuf and Combat (GSPC), whose commanders militant interviewed by the New York who had a “global network” and later included Droukdel, Belmokhtar, al- Times in 2013 claimed that al-Barnawi became suspects in the Federal Police Barnawi, Kambar, Oumar Ould Hamaha was Ansaru’s leader.46 Headquarters bombing in June 2011.50 and other future MUJAO leaders.42 In 2013, there were still anonymous Like the YIM, Ansaru condemned Boko Ansaru, therefore, likely represented factions in Kano that opposed Shekau’s Haram’s killing of Muslim civilians and the revival of Nigerian GSPC militants leadership, supported negotiations with defectors. In line with Droukdel, Ansaru in Kano. It enjoyed the parentage the government, targeted “Western” demanded revenge for the “Christian of Droukdel via Kambar and Nur interests—such as anti-polio non- government’s” violence against Muslims ideologically, and Belmokhtar via al- governmental organization workers— in the Middle Belt, while Ansaru’s Barnawi operationally, combined with and carried out sophisticated attacks on charter checked the power of its amir resentment toward Shekau of defectors Christian targets.51 to prevent the emergence of another who, like the GSPC, did not tolerate the Shekau.43 killing of innocent Muslim civilians.47 If al-Barnawi and Nur are among In contrast to the grassroots base Ansaru’s leaders, their refusal to Kingsley Omonobi, “Boko Haram Leader Shekau Shot, of Boko Haram in Borno, Kano was show their faces or issue individual Escapes to Mali,” Vanguard, January 19, 2013. statements is consistent with 40 Shekau, in contrast, ordered attacks on Nigerian tar- of Ansaru,” snamalislam.com, April 13, 2013. Ansaru militants, who are veiled in gets that Boko Haram perceived as “Western interests,” 44 For details on these attacks, see Jacob Zenn, “Coop- Ansaru videos and photos and use such as English language schools, churches, and the eration or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After pseudonyms. secular and democratic Nigerian government, and Shek- the Mali Intervention,” CTC Sentinel 6:3 (2013). au focuses his statements more on Nigeria’s President 45 Ibid.; “Islamist Group Ansaru ‘Kidnapped’ French Goodluck Jonathan or his “masters,” such as President Man,” BBC, December 24, 2012; “Islamists Ansaru Claim Barack Obama. Attack on Mali-Bound Nigeria Troops,” Reuters, January 48 A former Nigerian State Security Service officer con- 41 Ansaru claims it fights to restore the “lost dignity” of 20, 2013; Suzan Edeh, “Bauchi Deadly Kidnapping: Gap- firmed in 2012 that Muhammed Ashafa was a courier the Sokoto Caliphate, which was founded in 1804 by the ing Bullet Holes in Expatriates’ Live Camp,” Vanguard, between al-Qa`ida and the “Nigerian Taliban” and that Fulani shaykh Usman dan Fodio in northern Cameroon, February 23, 2013. the head of the al-Qa`ida network for West Africa, Mal- northern Nigeria, and southern Niger, and lasted until 46 Adam Nossiter, “New Threat in Nigeria as Militants lam Adnan Ibrahim, who lived in Kano as late as 2012, the United Kingdom and France colonized the region Split Off,” New York Times, April 23, 2013. sent Ashafa to Pakistan in 2003 and 2004 with another and introduced Western education and Christianity in 47 Ansaru’s rejection of Boko Haram’s killing of civil- Nigerian to meet al-Qa`ida representatives. See “Boko the 19th century. See “MOHD Nur & Yusuf.3gp,” You- ians, in particular, resembles the way the GSPC broke Haram Scare For Nigeria’s Police Boss,” PM News Ni- Tube, undated. from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria in the geria, July 23, 2011; Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “Danger Alert: 42 Jacob Zenn, “Ansaru Logo Gives Hints to Boko Haram 1990s in response to the violence perpetrated by the GIA Al-Qaeda Boss in West Africa Lives in Kano,” Odili.net, and Transnational Links,” Council on Foreign Relations, against Algerian civilians. In contrast to the GIA, the April 8, 2012; “Nigerian ‘Trained in Afghanistan,’” BBC, June 21, 2013. GSPC pledged to avoid attacks on civilians inside Al- September 2, 2009. 43 An Ansaru statement said, “There were some broth- geria. According to AQIM research specialist Andrew 49 Ibid. ers who are under the umbrella of [Boko Haram] who Lebovich, “it is striking that, given the aspirational and 50 Ibid. executed a brother who was Muslim and a jihadist with- possibly operational closeness between Ansaru and 51 Such as the simultaneous car bombings in Kano’s out any justification except that he disagreed with the AQIM, Ansaru’s stated justification for its split from Christian Quarter in July 2013 that killed more than 30 group’s activities and showed the desire to be a part of Boko Haram was largely the same as that of the GSPC people. See Taye Obateur, “Boko Haram Leader, Yusuf, Ansaru.” Ansaru’s charter therefore stated that an amir in leaving the GIA.” See also Abu Mundhir al-Shinqiti, Killed,” Vanguard, July 30, 2009; Ademola Oni, “20 Die heads Ansaru’s hierarchy, but acts in accordance with “Question-and-Answer with Abu-al-Mundhir al-Shinq- in Sabon Gari, Kano Bomb Blasts - 42 B’Haram Suspects a shura. Major decisions, such as the opening of a new iti: Question Number 7618: Is it Permissible to Target a Arrested in Lagos, Ogun,” Punch, July 30, 2013; David battlefront, negotiations with the government, or the es- Regime-Sponsored School That Recruits its Students to Smith, “Polio Workers in Nigeria Shot Dead,” Guardian, tablishment of international relationships must be taken the Army After They Complete Their Studies?” Minbar February 8, 2013; “Leader Of Boko Haram Faction in Of- in concert with the shura, whose ruling is binding on al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, July 18, 2013; Andrew Lebovich, ficial Talks With The Nigerian Gov’t Claims Responsibil- the amir. See “Another Islamic Sect Emerges to Counter “Analyzing Foreign Influence and Jihadi Networks in ity for Deadly Kano Bombings, Says Abubakar Shekau Boko Haram?” Desert Herald, June 2, 2012; “The Charter Nigeria,” al-Wasat blog, January 31, 2013. Still Alive,” Sahara Reporters, August 4, 2013.

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Al-Barnawi’s Renewed Role in Boko Haram may override any grievances between time, Shekau’s shura was depleted when Despite al-Barnawi’s suspected role in al-Barnawi and Shekau over Shekau’s Nigerian security forces killed Assalafi Ansaru, there is circumstantial evidence feud with Abu Muhammed. While the in March 2013, his successor in April to suggest that al-Barnawi also operates kidnapping of the French family was 2013, and Shekau’s shura’s fourth and with Boko Haram. First, Shekau not claimed by Ansaru, it was distinctly fifth ranking members in the lead-up promoted one of al-Barnawi’s deputies, characteristic of Ansaru to kidnap to and during the state of emergency.59 Habibu Yusuf (“Assalafi”), to lead Boko foreigners, especially an engineer (the Shekau could benefit from Ansaru’s Haram operations in Sokoto in 2012.52 father of the family), operate outside Sahelian connections, regionally The Nigerian government’s “most of Nigeria’s borders, speak Arabic diverse membership and experienced wanted” list, released in November and justify the kidnapping as revenge militants to train new Boko Haram 2012, included al-Barnawi and Assalafi for France’s “war on Islam” in Mali, recruits, smuggle weapons into Borno as the first and second ranking members demand millions of dollars in ransom and carry out his latest threats to launch in Shekau’s shura. and the release of imprisoned militants, “retaliatory” attacks in Cameroon and and negotiate not with the Nigerian the oil-rich Niger Delta.60 Second, only since the French-led government like Boko Haram, but with intervention in northern Mali in the highest levels of the Cameroonian The reconciliation process between February 2013 has Boko Haram’s new government.55 It is likely that Ansaru Ansaru militants and Boko Haram may “special kidnapping squad” taken transferred the family from northern have begun in Gao, Mali, where Shekau, hostage dozens of government officials Cameroon to Boko Haram in Borno, Belmokhtar, MUJAO and Boko Haram and their female family members in where they were later released for $3.14 and Ansaru militants were reportedly Borno and released them for imprisoned million and in exchange for 19 Boko based or seen in 2012.61 In November militants and ransoms that fund Haram prisoners in Cameroon.56 2012, for example, an Arabic-language more operations.53 If al-Barnawi’s kidnapping squad is taking hostages Fourth, since the French-led 59 Mohammed Zangina, the commander for Kaduna, and Boko Haram is providing them with intervention in Mali, Ansaru has who may have replaced Abu Muhammed, was killed in safe haven, this would resemble the claimed no attacks, except for one January 2013, and Mummodu Bama, who was an expert agreement al-Barnawi’s trainee, Abu Ansaru militant who appeared in a in bomb-making and anti-aircraft weapons, was killed in Muhammed, made with Shekau in 2011 video in which Belmokhtar and MUJAO August 2013. Other non-shura commanders who were for Boko Haram to provide cover for his claimed suicide bombings at two eliminated include Ali Jalingo and Ibrahim Bashir. See 57 kidnappings before that cooperation was French mines in Niger in May 2013. Michael Olugbode, “JTF Kills Top Boko Haram Com- 54 undermined by their feud over funding. The intervention led to the elimination mander in Combined Operation,” This Day, April 28, of key couriers connecting Ansaru to 2013. Third, the money Boko Haram received MUJAO, the killing of AQIM’s southern 60 “Boko Haram Chief Threatens Attacks in Nigeria in ransom for the release of a seven- commander, Abu Zeid, who possibly Oil Region,” Agence France-Presse, February 20, 2014; member French family kidnapped in trained some Ansaru militants, and “Boko Haram Met en Garde le Cameroun,” Le Septentrion, 58 northern Cameroon in February 2013 the retreat of Belmokhtar. Ansaru February 17, 2014. is likely isolated from its Sahelian 61 According to journalists in Mali in 2012, Nigerians 52 “Boko Haram Looks to Mali.” networks and has a weakened network (reportedly in Boko Haram) were in Gao, and Nigerian 53 “Gunmen Kidnap Senior Lecturer in Maiduguri,” in northwestern Nigeria due to the intelligence reports stated that by April 2012 Shekau Vanguard, February 24, 2013; David Molomo, “Dead or demise of Abu Muhammed’s shura, so left Kano and went to Gao. Shekau’s April 2012 video Alive? Customs Officer, Wife, Five Kids, Cousin Missing Ansaru may be able to operate more was his first with Sahelian-style veiled militants and in for 22 Days,” Sun News, April 29, 2013; Kareem Ogori, effectively with Boko Haram in Borno Arabic. In a Boko Haram video of Shekau released in “Gunmen Kidnap Ex-Borno LG Boss, Demand N50m,” and northern Cameroon. At the same November 2012, the opening narration praised Ansaru’s Blueprint, April 8, 2013; Njadvara Musa, “Gunmen Kid- prison break operation that freed Boko Haram members nap Ex-Council Chairman, Reject N10m Ransom,” The 55 According to French President François Hollande, in Abuja three days earlier, which is evidence of possible Guardian [Lagos], April 13, 2013; Maina Maina, “Gun- Cameroonian President Biya was “personally involved” reintegration, and the video was posted on an al-Qa`ida men Kidnap DPO in Bama, Set Town on Fire in Borno,” in the negotiations for the release of the French priest and forum (not YouTube or delivered to Agence France- Daily Post, April 25, 2013; Yahaya Ibrahim, “Borno Wa- “played an important role” in securing the release of the Presse, which Boko Haram regularly uses). See Abuba- ter Board GM Kidnapped,” Daily Trust, April 29, 2013; French family. kar Shekau, “Glad Tidings, O Soldiers of Allah,” Ana “Kidnapped Policeman Killed by Abductors in Borno,” 56 The kidnappers’ second and third statements about al-Muslim network, November 29, 2012. The video also Vanguard, May 1, 2013; Ola Audu, “How Boko Haram the French family (some of which were not released featured Shekau standing in a desert, possibly in Mali, Turned to Kidnapping to Raise Funds in Borno,” Premi- publicly in the media) were delivered in Shekau’s name with other armed militants issuing “glad tidings” to the um Times, May 20, 2013; Yusuf Alli, “Boko Haram Kid- and distinctly like Shekau to demand that the Nigerian “brothers and shaykhs in the Islamic Maghreb” and “Sol- naps 92-yr-old ex-Minister Ali Monguno,” The Nation, and Cameroonian governments release Boko Haram diers of the Islamic State of Mali.” See “Dozens of Boko May 4, 2013. militants and their wives from prison in return for the Haram Help Mali’s Rebel Seize Gao,” Vanguard, April 9, 54 According to Agence France-Presse, “Under the alli- hostages. 2012; “Mali - Mokhtar Belmokhtar, un des chefs d’Aqmi, ance, [Abu] Muhammed and his group were to carry out 57 “Group Linked to Algeria Gas Plant Attack Claims est à Gao,” Lepoint.fr, July 4, 2012; “Exclusive: The Last abductions for ransom, part of which would go toward Niger Raids,” LeMag, May 24, 2013. Days of Shekau, Boko Haram Leader,” Vanguard, August financing Boko Haram operations. Boko Haram would in 58 The key couriers included, among others, Mokhtar 25, 2013; “Boko Haram Leaders Flee Hot Mali to Nigeria,” turn provide security cover for Muhammed’s group.” See Ibrahim and Abdullah Abdullah. See “Judge’s Absence The Nation, January 31, 2013; Jacob Zenn, “Nigerians in “Barnawi, Kambar: Qaeda-linked Militants with Boko Stalls Trial of Mali-based Boko Haram Suspect,” Premi- Gao: Was Boko Haram Really Active in Northern Mali?” Haram Ties.” um Times, May 8, 2013; Nossiter. African Arguments, January 26, 2014.

27 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 video posted on the Ana al-Muslim Mamman Nur’s Status As a Cameroonian, Nur may also have network featured Shekau for the first While it is probable that Shekau and al- played a role in negotiations with the time in a desert with armed militants Barnawi are cooperating, Boko Haram’s Cameroonian government after Ansaru offering “glad tidings to soldiers of the future trajectory may depend on “coordinated” the hostage-takings with Islamic State of Mali” and opening with Mamman Nur. Due to Nur’s ideological Boko Haram in northern Cameroon. a narration praising Ansaru’s attack influence on Ansaru and operational In addition, Nur may be the highest- on a prison that freed Boko Haram connections to AQIM, al-Shabab ranking AQIM-connected militant in militants in Abuja three days earlier.62 and the late Kambar, Nur may be the Ansaru’s network. Subsequent Boko Haram training “Boko Haram” leader communicating videos in March 2013 also for the first with AQIM, al-Shabab, al-Qa`ida Conclusion time opened with photos of al-Shabab in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi leaders, had a higher quality that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Mamman Nur are the three most appeared similar to Ansaru’s videos, (IMU) in Pakistan and other al-Qa’ida influential leaders in Boko Haram’s were uploaded on popular al-Qa`ida affiliates.67 Al-Barnawi has connections network. online forums instead of YouTube, to Belmokhtar and MUJAO in the Sahel, and featured a mid-level commander but it is unclear whether al-Barnawi Nur is connected to al-Qa`ida affiliates in Ansaru’s network, Mummodo Abu has Nur’s ability to connect to formal in Africa and is an operational and Fatima. Fatima is a specialist in suicide al-Qa`ida affiliates like AQIM and al- ideological leader. He likely cooperates operations, and he claimed the Federal Shabab. Al-Barnawi, therefore, may be with al-Barnawi and Ansaru militants Police Headquarters attack in June unable to unite Boko Haram with al- now in Boko Haram, but opposes 2011.63 He also told Desert Herald in June Qa`ida in the way Shekau sought since Shekau’s style of leadership in Borno.70 2012 that Boko Haram and Ansaru have his first overture to al-Qa`ida in July Nur, therefore, was likely based in Kano different interpretations of Islam but 2010 and his more recent call after the with former followers of Muhammad may cooperate in the future.64 state of emergency for “brethren” in Yusuf, who were dissatisfied with Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Syria Shekau and have an internationalist The cooperation between Boko Haram to join “jihad” in Nigeria, to which no outlook. Nur could, however, become and kidnapping specialists in Ansaru al-Qa`ida affiliate responded.68 less relevant because some of his key was confirmed when Boko Haram’s contacts to AQIM, al-Shabab and al- intermediary to Agence France-Presse Nur and Ansaru are likely still in Qa`ida core are dead or in prison, and said the kidnapping of a French priest good standing with al-Barnawi, whose al-Barnawi’s suspected reintegration in northern Cameroon in November kidnappings rarely harm Muslim with Shekau may isolate Nur in Kano.71 2013 was “coordinated with Ansaru.”65 civilians, but not necessarily with The priest, like the French family, was Shekau. Ansaru, for example, sent New Amir,” Agence Nouakchott Internationale, August taken to Borno and exchanged one “greetings” to al-Barnawi’s longtime co- 22, 2013; “Ansar al-Muslimeen Leader Criticizes Boko month later for a weapons smuggler kidnapper, Belmokhtar, and condemned Haram, Greets al-Qaeda Officials in Eid al-Adha Speech,” that Cameroonian President Biya freed the Egyptian military’s coup against SITE Institute, November 15, 2013; “Ansar al-Muslimeen 66 from prison in Cameroon. Mohamed Morsi—as did AQIM and Leader Criticizes Boko Haram, Greets al-Ansar al-Mus- Belmokhtar. Yet in April and September limeen Condemns Massacre in Baga, Calls for Revenge 62 Abubakar Shekau, “Glad Tidings, O Soldiers of Al- 2013, Ansaru issued its first statements Qaeda Officials in Eid al-Adha Speech,” SITE Institute, lah,” November 29, 2012. Two days after appearing on specifically concerning Borno, which May 3, 2013; “Ansar al-Muslimeen Denies Targeting popular jihadist websites, the video was posted to the condemned Boko Haram’s killing of Civilians, Calls for Revolution,” SITE Institute, May 13, Ana al-Muslim network website. civilians in attacks that Shekau claimed 2013; “AQIM Official Sees Foreign Role in Morsis’ Oust- 63 Mummodu Abu Fatima was in a Boko Haram video in Baga and Benisheikh as well as its er,” SITE Institute, July 7, 2013. with Shekau and four of his sub-commanders in March wanton destruction of churches in 70 Nur may follow the principles outlined in documents 2013, but the version Boko Haram released publicly ed- Borno and “misunderstanding of the uncovered from AQIM after the French-led interven- 69 ited out the part showing the names of Shekau’s com- goals of Shari’a.” tion in Mali in 2013, which were written by the Egyp- manders and the “highlight clips” of them training. The tian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s, when Ayman author has seen the clips showing Abu Fatima and other Boko Haram may also have been paid $12.5 million for al-Zawahiri was its leader. The documents said, “even if commanders, which Boko Haram may have intended for the French priest. See Guibai Guitama, “Cameroun - the amir is a very bad person, yet is trying to fight non- an internal, rather than a public, audience. It was filmed Libération du père Georges Vandenbeusch: Le négocia- Muslims, we should work with him and join him…the in a forested area resembling Borno’s Sambisa Forest in teur désigné de Boko Haram réclame son argent,” L’Oeil second-in-command should not become an amir unless contrast to Shekau’s November 2012 video, where he was du Sahel, January 6, 2014. the original amir has died or suffered a lethal injury that in a desert, possibly in Mali. See “World Exclusive: An- 67 An al-Qa`ida “conference call” reportedly included prevents him from performing his duties. The second-in- other Islamic Sect Emerges...to Counter Boko Haram?”; representatives from Boko Haram, the Pakistani Tali- command should not fight the amir over leadership…If “Boko Haram: We Did Not Declare Ceasefire – Shekau,” ban, al-Qa`ida in Iraq, al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb, this is not possible, he should try to find another front or Vanguard, March 4, 2013; “Police Headquarters Bomb- and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). See “Al a good amir and fight under his command.” See Abdul- ing: IG had Meeting with Bomber,” Point Blank News, Qaeda Conference Call Intercepted by U.S.,” Daily Beast, Kader bin Abdul-Aziz, “The Invitation for Monotheism,” June 16, 2011. August 7, 2013. series 3, The Complete Guide to Prepare Yourself for Ji- 64 Ibid. 68 “Boko Haram Denies Losing Nigeria Battle,” al-Jazi- had for the Sake of Allah, undated. 65 “Boko Haram Holding Kidnapped French Priest,” ra, May 30, 2013. 71 Nur may be “Muhammed Marwana,” who claimed to Vanguard, November 15, 2013. 69 “Resolution to the Two Groups Mulathamin and be second-in-command to Shekau in January 2013, when 66 Unsubstantiated reports in January 2013 suggested MUJAO and their Unifying in the Murabitun with a he discussed his involvement in negotiations with the

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Khalid al-Barnawi is regionally At the same time, Shekau’s death could connected, but unless he cooperates create opportunities for the Nigerian Recent Highlights in with Boko Haram he will lack government to negotiate with former Political Violence grassroots support in Nigeria because YIM, Ansaru or Kano-based militants, he operated for years in the Sahel whose current efforts to maintain January 1, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A suicide and has few religious credentials. Al- dialogue are irrelevant as long as bomber detonated an explosives-laden Barnawi is likely willing to carry out Shekau is opposed to reconciliation. vehicle near a passenger bus carrying kidnappings with Ansaru, Boko Haram, Boko Haram’s informing on rival Shi`a pilgrims in Quetta, killing at MUJAO, AQIM or any other militant factions to security forces and least three people. – The News International, group regardless of ideology. He may negotiations with the Nigerian and January 1; Dawn, January 1 have drifted from Ansaru toward Boko Cameroonian governments over Haram or formed new cells under hostages suggest, however, that Boko January 2, 2014 (IRAQ): According Shekau, similar to how Belmokhtar Haram is not as “faceless” as the to media reports, the Islamic State of unilaterally “drifted” from AQIM’s Nigerian government portrays, and that Iraq and the Levant took control of central leadership in favor of “for- it is possible to communicate with Boko more than half of Falluja and parts of profit” kidnappings and smuggling.72 Haram’s leaders. Ramadi. – AFP, January 2

Shekau is a divisive leader, but has This leadership analysis also leads January 2, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide legitimacy because he was Yusuf’s to the conclusion that Ansaru, with bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle deputy and remained close to grassroots its most recent operations in Niger, killed 16 people near a car dealership followers in Borno. He likely retains a Cameroon and possibly Central in Balad Ruz, Diyala Province. – CNN, core group of loyalists because many African Republic, now functions January 2 militants who opposed him, such as the like an “external operations unit” in YIM and Ansaru, already defected or its self-declared area of operations in January 2, 2014 (LEBANON): A suicide were killed by Boko Haram, leaving only “Black Africa” in a way that separates bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle the more ruthless and indoctrinated Ansaru from Boko Haram in Borno killed at least four people in southern militants with Shekau. and avoids conflict with the group.74 Beirut, where Lebanese Hizb Allah The organizational structures of Boko has strong support. The Islamic State If Shekau is killed, a scenario could Haram and Ansaru are permeable, of Iraq and the Levant reportedly emerge where al-Barnawi takes over which will allow mid-level militants to claimed responsibility. – Daily Star, Boko Haram operationally and Nur operate with Boko Haram, Ansaru and January 2; Daily Star, January 4 takes over ideologically, but this is MUJAO as long as they do not run unlikely because both al-Barnawi and afoul of Shekau.75 The regionalization January 3, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic Nur lack sufficient grassroots networks of Boko Haram and Ansaru, with State of Iraq and the Levant in Borno, where Boko Haram carries out hostage-takings of wealthy individuals (ISIL) destroyed the Falluja police more than 80% of its attacks.73 Although and weapons smuggling in Nigeria headquarters and mayor’s office, and Nur was close to Muhammad Yusuf and and Cameroon, also risks creating then declared that the city, which is al-Barnawi is a skilled kidnapper with a multi-million dollar “terrorism located in Anbar Province, was part of Sahelian connections, Shekau’s current economy” in the southern Sahel that their new Islamic state. According to sub-commanders, whose aliases are not fuels corruption and raises tensions Reuters, “disgruntled tribesmen have revealed publicly but are shared with between neighboring countries and sided with the insurgents to fight Boko Haram internally, would likely the region’s Muslims and Christians. against the [Iraqi] government.” ISIL compete to succeed Shekau. militants have also taken over parts Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African and of Ramadi. – New York Times, January 3; Nigerian government after Yusuf’s death in 2009, and in Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown Reuters, January 6 August 2013 wore a veil and claimed the attacks in Ka- Foundation and consultant on countering no’s Christian Quarter that killed more than 30 people. violent extremism, international law of January 4, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): See “Another Boko Haram Figure Speaks, Ruling Out freedom of association, and socio-cultural A car bomb exploded at the gate of Dialogue With Nigeria Gov’t,” Sahara Reporters, Janu- analysis for geospatial visualization. Mr. a joint NATO-Afghan military base ary 29, 2013; “Leader Of Boko Haram Faction in Official Zenn speaks French and Arabic and carried in Nangarhar Province. After the Talks With The Nigerian Gov’t Claims Responsibility out field research on smuggling networks explosion, Taliban militants attacked For Deadly Kano Bombings, Says Abubakar Shekau Still in Western Sahara, Mauritania, Mali and the facility. Five Taliban militants and Alive,” Sahara Reporters, August 4, 2013. Burkina Faso in January 2014. one NATO soldier were killed during 72 “Algeria: ‘Laaouar’ Quits AQIM,” Magharebia, De- the firefight. – RFE/RL, January 4 cember 4, 2012; Madjiara Nako, “Chad Says it Killed Algeria Hostage Mastermind in Mali,” Reuters, March 3, January 5, 2014 (SPAIN): Spanish 2013; “Boko Haram Militants Shows Off Weapons ‘Cap- authorities arrested a suspected tured’ From an Army Baracks,” Sahara TV, April 29, 74 For an analysis of possible Ansaru operations in Cen- Islamist militant at Malaga airport 2013; “Al Qaeda Leaders Sent Scathing Letter to Trouble- tral African Republic, see Jacob Zenn, “Northern Cam- in southern Spain. The suspect, some Employee,” Associated Press, May 29, 2013. eroon Under Threat from Boko Haram and Séléka Mili- Abdeluahid Sadik Mohamed, had 73 Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Abubakar Shekau: Dead tants,” Terrorism Monitor 12:1 (2014). just arrived in Spain after allegedly Again?” Council on Foreign Relations, August 6, 2013. 75 See the case of Mummodu Abu Fatima, for example. fighting for the Islamic State of Iraq

29 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . Vol 7. Issue 2 and the Levant in Syria. Authorities leaders.” Afghan Taliban sources told military advisers arrived in Somalia described Mohamed as a Spanish the Wall Street Journal that they suspected in October 2013 and became fully national born in Ceuta. – CNN, January 5 Afghanistan’s National Directorate operational in December. According of Security was behind the attacks. to AFRICOM, “fewer than five” January 5, 2014 (IRAQ): Two car – Voice of America, January 10 U.S. advisers are part of a “military bombs killed at least nine people in coordination cell in Somalia to provide the mainly Shi`a Shaab district in January 7, 2014 (YEMEN): A car planning and advisory support to the Baghdad. – al-Arabiya, January 5 bomb seriously wounded a Yemeni African Union Mission in Somalia intelligence officer in Aden. – AFP, and Somali security forces to increase January 6, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A suicide January 7 their capabilities and promote peace bomber detonated explosives outside a and security throughout Somalia and government school for boys in Hangu January 9, 2014 (UNITED STATES): the region.” – Deutsche Welle, January 11 District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa According to the New York Times, “Islamic Province. The blast killed a teenage extremist groups in Syria with ties January 12, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A student. The Pakistani Taliban have to al-Qa`ida are trying to identify, suicide bomber on a bicycle detonated blown up hundreds of schools in recruit and train Americans and other explosives next to a police bus in Pakistan, saying that they spread Westerners who have traveled there Kabul, killing a policeman and a secular education. – Dawn, January 6 to get them to carry out attacks when civilian. – Daily Star, January 12 they return home…” Citing intelligence January 6, 2014 (SYRIA): Syrian rebel and counterterrorism officials, the January 12, 2014 (IRAQ): Gunmen groups fought each other for control newspaper said that “at least 70 attacked the Abu Ghurayb army base of the provincial capital Raqqa. A Americans have either traveled to west of Baghdad and then fled into a coalition of rebel groups attempted Syria, or tried to, since the civil war nearby area. At least eight civilians to unseat the Islamic State of Iraq started three years ago.” – New York were killed. – CNN, January 12 and the Levant (ISIL) from the city. Times, January 9 According to a local media activist January 12, 2014 (SYRIA): The interviewed by the Los Angeles Times, “the January 9, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant fighting was pitting other Islamist bomber detonated his explosives reportedly executed dozens of rival groups including Ahrar al-Sham, the among Iraqi army recruits in Baghdad, Islamists during the last two days and Islamic Front, and al-Nusra Front” killing 22 of them. – Reuters, January 9; recaptured territory it had lost to them against the ISIL. A Reuters report New York Times, January 9 in Raqqa Province. – Reuters, January 13 suggested that “dozens of Syrian members of the [ISIL] had switched January 9, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A bomb January 13, 2014 (BELGIUM): Belgium sides, joining other Sunni Islamist tore through the convoy of one of Foreign Minister Didier Reynders factions which have taken advantage Pakistan’s most well-known police said that “more than 200” people from of a local backlash against the ISIL commanders, Chaudhry Mohammad Belgium have traveled to fight in Syria. and the foreign al-Qa`ida jihadists Aslam, the head of the criminal “Most have joined the most extremist prominent among its leaders.” On investigation department (CID), in groups, including the Islamic State of January 7, the leader of Jabhat al- Karachi. He was killed in the blast. Iraq and the Levant,” he said. Of the Nusra, an al-Qa`ida affiliate, called Aslam built a reputation for “fearless 200, more than 20 have been killed for a cease-fire, and the establishment anti-terrorism operations” in Karachi, there. – AFP, January 13 of an Islamic court to settle disputes. and he had survived a number of – Los Angeles Times, January 7; Reuters, January assassination attempts in the past. January 13, 2014 (TURKEY): Turkey 6; New York Times, January 7 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed reportedly arrested a number of responsibility. – The Nation, January 10 suspected terrorists during raids in January 6, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A several Turkish provinces. Turkish suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked January 9, 2014 (SYRIA): A car bomb authorities said that top members of a security checkpoint in Ghazni killed approximately 18 people near al-Qa`ida are among those arrested. Province, killing three police officers. a school in Hama Province. Most of – UPI, January 14 – AP, January 6 the dead were reportedly women and children. – Los Angeles Times, January 9 January 14, 2014 (NIGERIA): A bomb January 6, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A exploded and killed an estimated 43 senior Afghan Taliban leader was January 9, 2014 (SOMALIA): The people in Maiduguri, Borno State. killed by his own security guards Kenyan military said that they launched – ThisDayLive, January 14; al-Jazira, January near Quetta, Baluchistan Province. an airstrike against a meeting of al- 14; Vanguard, January 16 According to Voice of America, the Shabab fighters in Somalia’s Gedo killing of Mullah Salim was just the area, killing at least 30 of them. – Voice January 16, 2014 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida latest incident of Afghan Taliban of America, January 10 in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leaders dying under “mysterious militants executed three simultaneous circumstances” in Pakistan, fueling January 11, 2014 (SOMALIA): attacks on Yemeni army positions in “suspicion of an organized campaign U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Bayda Province. Ten Yemeni soldiers of assassination against Taliban announced that a handful of American were killed. – AFP, January 16

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January 16, 2014 (LEBANON): A car control the nearby city of Falluja. – al- January 22, 2014 (PAKISTAN): bomb exploded in Hermel, close to Jazira, January 19; Reuters, January 18 Gunmen attacked Pakistani police the Syrian border, killing five people. escorting a Spanish cyclist who was Hermel is a mostly Shi`a town, and January 19, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A car trying to cycle around the world. The many of its residents are closely allied bomb exploded inside a military cyclist had just arrived from Iran into with Lebanese Hizb Allah. – Los Angeles base in Bannu District of Khyber Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province when Times, January 16 Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing 20 the incident occurred. The gunmen paramilitary troops. Tehrik-i-Taliban killed six police officers and wounded January 17, 2014 (RUSSIA): A grenade Pakistan claimed responsibility. - AP, the cyclist. – AP, January 21 exploded on the second floor of a January 20 restaurant in Dagestan. When police January 22, 2014 (LIBYA): A car bomb arrived, a car bomb detonated. At January 19, 2014 (UNITED KINGDOM): killed three people in Benghazi. Two of least five people were injured. It was According to the Telegraph, a defector the dead were members of the Libyan not immediately clear whether Muslim from the Islamic State of Iraq and special forces. – UPI, January 22 separatists or criminal elements were the Levant said that Western foreign responsible. – CNN, January 17 fighters in Syria were being trained as January 23, 2014 (SYRIA): Al-Qa`ida jihadists, and then encouraged to return chief Ayman al-Zawahiri released a January 17, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): home to conduct domestic terrorist new audio message, calling on rebels A Taliban suicide bomber detonated attacks. The newspaper reported that in Syria to stop fighting each other. explosives at the fortified entrance of “recruits from Britain, Europe and – Reuters, January 23 the Taverna du Liban restaurant in the U.S. were being indoctrinated Kabul. After the explosion, two other in extremist anti-Western ideology, January 23, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A militants entered the restaurant and trained in how to make and detonate bomb exploded in a vehicle at an opened fire. The attack killed 21 people, car bombs and suicide vests and auto repair shop in the suburbs of including 13 foreigners. According sent home to start new terror cells.” Peshawar, killing at least six people. to Agence France-Presse, “among – Telegraph, January 19 – Los Angeles Times, January 23 the dead were three Americans, two British citizens, two Canadians, the January 20, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A January 24, 2014 (EGYPT): A series of International Monetary Fund head suicide bomber detonated explosives bombs targeted police in Cairo, killing of mission, and the restaurant’s near Pakistan’s main military at least 10 people. In one incident, a car Lebanese owner, who was killed as he headquarters in Rawalpindi, killing bomb exploded outside Cairo’s police tried to fire back at the attackers.” The 13 people. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan headquarters, killing three policemen. incident marked the deadliest attack claimed responsibility. – AP, January 20 Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis claimed on foreign civilians since the U.S.-led responsibility. – Reuters, January 24; intervention in 2001. – AFP, January 18 January 21, 2014 (LEBANON): A Washington Post, January 24 suicide bomber killed at least four January 17, 2014 (SYRIA): Abu Khalid people in a pro-Hizb Allah area of January 24, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): al-Suri, a top figure in the rebel southern Beirut. A group calling A suicide bomber attempted to group Ahrar al-Sham, announced in itself Jabhat al-Nusra in Lebanon assassinate Mohammad Ismail Khan, an internet posting that he considers claimed responsibility for the attack. a vice presidential candidate. The himself a member of al-Qa`ida. His – Bloomberg, January 21; al-Jazira, January 21 bomber, who was said to be in his statement criticized the Islamic State 70s, detonated his explosives next to of Iraq and the Levant, saying that January 22, 2014 (ISRAEL): Israeli Khan’s car in Herat City, but Khan the jihadist group was not al-Qa`ida’s authorities announced that they was not injured. – al-Jazira, January 24 representative in Syria and that it was arrested three Palestinians for not doing the work of Usama bin Ladin alleged involvement in an al-Qa`ida January 25, 2014 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida or other al-Qa`ida leaders. – McClatchy plot to conduct terrorist attacks in chief Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a new Newspapers, January 17 Israel. The group reportedly planned audio statement calling on Muslims to deploy a suicide bomber against in Egypt not to fight their Christian January 17, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Taliban the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, as compatriots. He said that Muslims gunmen on motorcycles killed three well as a separate attack against the should instead focus on opposing men working for a private television International Convention Center in Egypt’s military-backed leaders. Al- station in Karachi. – The News International, Jerusalem. – Haaretz, January 22; Fox News, Zawahiri said, “We must not seek war January 17 January 23 with the Christians and thus give the West an excuse to blame Muslims, as January 19, 2014 (IRAQ): The Iraqi January 22, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A has happened before.” – AP, January 25 military began a major operation on bomb exploded near a police van Ramadi city to expel militants from the in Charsadda District of Khyber January 26, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing at suicide bomber detonated explosives (ISIL), who took partial control of the least seven people. – al-Jazira, January 22 close to a bus carrying soldiers in city on January 1. Ramadi is the capital Kabul, killing at least four people. of Anbar Province. ISIL militants also – BBC, January 25

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January 26, 2014 (SOMALIA): The January 30, 2014 (IRAQ): Gunmen CTC Sentinel Staff U.S. military conducted an airstrike attacked a government building in the against a “senior leader” affiliated heart of Baghdad, killing two people. Editor-in-Chief with al-Qa`ida and al-Shabab in According to one report, police shot Erich Marquardt southern Somalia. According to and killed four of the fighters, while Senior Editor, CTC officials speaking to the Associated two others blew themselves up. – CNN, Press, the strike appears to have January 30 Editorial Board killed the militant. Sources in Somalia COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. later told Voice of America that the Department Head strike also nearly hit Ahmed Godane, Department of Social Sciences (West Point) al-Shabab’s leader. – CNN, January 26; Los Angeles Times, January 26; Voice of America, COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. January 29 Deputy Department Head Department of Social Sciences (West Point) January 27, 2014 (SYRIA): Syrian activists and an Iraqi intelligence MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. official announced that a senior leader Director, CTC in the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was killed in a dispute with rival rebel factions earlier in January. He was identified as Haji Bakr. – AP, January 27

January 27, 2014 (SYRIA): A suicide bomber from Jabhat al-Nusra detonated Contact explosives at an army checkpoint in the Combating Terrorism Center Syrian defense minister’s hometown U.S. Military Academy in Hama Province. The attack killed 13 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall soldiers. The bomber was reportedly a West Point, NY 10996 Saudi foreign fighter. – Reuters, January Phone: (845) 667-6383 28 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ January 29, 2014 (GLOBAL): U.S. Director of National Intelligence James * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 Clapper warned that Jabhat al-Nusra “does have aspirations for attacks on the [U.S.] homeland.” Clapper said that the group is training a growing number of foreign fighters from Europe and the Middle East. Some support of these militant camps are training The Combating Terrorism Center would people “to go back to their countries like to express its gratitude to its financial and conduct terrorist acts…” – AP, supporters, for without their support and January 29; Guardian, January 29 shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you January 30, 2014 (UNITED STATES): are interested in learning more about how The U.S. Department of Justice said to support the Combating Terrorism Center, that it would seek the death penalty please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call against Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association individual accused of bombing the of Graduates at 845-446-1561. Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. The terrorist attack killed three people. – New York Times, January 30

January 30, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber drove an explosives- laden vehicle into a police security The views expressed in this report are those of tower in Nangarhar Province, killing the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, at least two police officers. – CNN, the Department of the Army, or any other agency January 30 of the U.S. Government.

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