FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . VOL 7 . ISSUE 2 Contents The Future Role of U.S. FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Future Role of U.S. Counterterrorism Operations Counterterrorism Operations in Africa By Michael A. Sheehan and Geoff D. Porter in Africa REPORTS By Michael A. Sheehan and Geoff D. Porter 4 Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate By Ken Menkhaus 9 An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabab’s Internal Divisions By Stig Jarle Hansen 12 The Malian Government’s Challenge to Restore Order in the North By Bruce Whitehouse 14 The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest By Hannah Armstrong 17 Will Terrorism in Libya be Solely Driven by Radical Islamism? By Geoffrey Howard and Henry Smith 19 Religious Violence in Tunisia Three Years after the Revolution By Anne Wolf 23 Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria A French Tiger helicopter lands at Mopti airport in Sevare, Mali, on February 2, 2013. - Pascal Guyot/AFP/Getty Images By Jacob Zenn n his state of the union on Qa`ida threats in various regions across January 28, 2014, President the globe—depending on the nature of 29 Recent Highlights in Political Violence Barack Obama’s speech focused the threat and the willingness of other 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts on domestic issues, but singled out partners to participate. IAfrica, specifically mentioning Somalia and Mali, in reference to the evolution The multilateral campaign’s success of the al-Qa`ida threat, the emergence of notwithstanding, numerous violent al-Qa`ida affiliates and the need for the non-state actors persist in Africa, in About the CTC Sentinel United States to continue to work with the Sahara, and to its north and south. The Combating Terrorism Center is an partners to disrupt and disable these They include jihadists and ethnic or independent educational and research networks. regionalist militias. Much analysis of institution based in the Department of Social terrorist organizations in Africa has Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Just one year before this speech, the focused on whether different groups West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses capital of Mali was threatened by an are collaborating with one another, the Center’s global network of scholars and al-Qa`ida-dominated militia that had, and while this would unquestionably practitioners to understand and confront in effect, hijacked a local rebellion of increase the threat they pose were it to contemporary threats posed by terrorism and the northern region. Mali immediately be true, the emphasis on collaboration other forms of political violence. became a high priority concern for the detracts from a more fundamental Obama administration, and although problem—all of the groups are already much more needs to be accomplished significant risks to their own country’s The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, in the region, the multilateral response stability. Although the destabilization the Department of the Army, or any other agency to Mali provides many lessons for how of one Saharan or Sahelian country of the U.S. Government. the United States may engage with al- may not be an actionable threat in and 1 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . VOL 7. ISSUE 2 of itself, the region presents a scenario visit to the White House on February 11, New and Emerging Threats where the sum is greater than the 2014, where he and President Obama Operation Serval, however, was parts: the disparate destabilization of discussed intelligence sharing and fundamentally a reactive action, rather several Saharan and Sahelian countries counterterrorism. than a proactive or preemptive one, and simultaneously. apart from the operation’s successes, By the end of January, French and terrorism in North Africa, the Horn Not only do all of the groups pose Chadian troops controlled Mali’s three of Africa, the Sahara and sub-Saharan significant risks to their own country’s major cities along the Niger River. The Africa appears to be increasing. While stability, but they also all have a cross- rebel factions, including terrorists the reasons for the emergence of border component. This cross-border and insurgents, splintered and fled terrorism in the region vary as do the dimension has led to the notion of an throughout northern Mali. The Élysée reasons for the intensifying trend, there arc of instability stretching east to then sought international support via are nevertheless some commonalities. west across the Sahel and Sahara, but a UN peacekeeping operation, while The region is characterized by scant it also leads to another newer and often French forces continued to hunt for high overlooked arc spanning the Sahara value targets. For its part, the United north to south. States trained and equipped some of “Instability in one country the peacekeeping contingents prior can not only spread to The primary counterterrorism to their deployment. In addition, U.S. challenge in the region going forward Special Operations Forces and other another, but simultaneous is to ensure that these groups do not units provided training and assistance instability in several carry out future offensives like the one to regional countries around Mali, in Mali. Additionally, conditions that including Niger, Libya, Mauritania and countries—regardless of can radicalize those who feel aggrieved to Burkina Faso. The United States also whether or not the causes turn frustration into violence should be provided intelligence to support these recognized and addressed. When such operations, including use of an unarmed are related—can pose an offensives do occur, however, France’s MQ-9 drone. enormous challenge.” Operation Serval in Mali may provide many lessons for how to contain the Lessons Learned threat by using carefully coordinated Operation Serval yielded several coalition operations. important lessons for counterterrorism economic opportunities and fierce operations. Foremost, the effectiveness competition for those that do exist, both Operation Serval and efficiency of the operation was legal and illegal. Security services are In the summer of 2012, different helped by identifying the appropriate alternately ineffective or indiscriminate. Islamist groups, including al-Qa`ida players for appropriate roles: an And there is a complex mix of ideologies, affiliates, dominated a largely ethnic international coalition against an al- ethnicities, and nationalisms. separatist rebellion in northern Mali. Qa`ida threat need only be led by a In January 2013, militants made a single major country such as the United Although almost no data supports the surprisingly aggressive southward States, France, or the United Kingdom, notion that poverty leads to terrorism, push and President Amadou Haya which are the only countries that are the sharp perceptions of injustice Sanogo, who came to power through capable of leading complex, multilateral inherent in the unequal distribution of a coup in March 2012, appealed to the operations; when either of the latter two wealth and poverty can lead individuals international community for help. leads, the United States can provide vital to embrace extreme ideologies, either to By the middle of the month, France enabling support such as airlift, logistics justify fighting for resources to alleviate deployed fighter jets to blunt the rebels’ and intelligence; the UN’s ability to poverty or to punish those individuals offensive, quickly adding ground forces provide effective peacekeepers in Africa they hold responsible for making and several thousand Chadian fighters. should not be underestimated as long as them and others poor. In Mali, the For its part, the United States responded their capabilities are not overextended rebellion that was hijacked by AQIM to French requests to contribute three by conducting offensive operations and and other Islamists was fueled by the critical components to the initial as long as they are supported through Tuareg population’s sense of economic stages of the campaign, including in- training, equipment, and embedded marginalization and perceptions flight refueling for French aircraft, advisory support. Doing so frees the that the country’s southern capital heavy airlift of French and Chadian coalition leader to pursue terrorist neglected the north. In Nigeria, soldiers and vehicles, and all sources leaders, disrupt lines of communication, Boko Haram and Ansaru condemn of U.S. intelligence. One consequence and identify remote camps and safe secularism’s role in fostering an of this counterterrorism cooperation houses while maintaining a low profile. environment conducive to corruption was to reinvigorate the United States’ Such has been the case in Mali, where and inequality that can only be operational relationship with France a small French and U.S. footprint combated through the implementation to the point where it is stronger materially augmented the effectiveness of Shari`a (Islamic law). Poverty, lack than it has been in a decade or more. of the UN operation. of opportunity, and acute injustice This strengthened counterterrorism sparked the Jasmine Revolution in relationship was most recently evinced Tunisia and those same sentiments by French President François Hollande’s continue to be exploited by Ansar al- 2 FEBRUARY 2014 . SPECIAL ISSUE . VOL 7. ISSUE 2 Shari`a and proponents of Salafi-jihadi movement. In Nigeria, Boko Haram al-Murabitun Brigade appears to be as ideology. In Algeria, perceptions that and Ansaru are violently at odds adept at moving north and south as it the oil and gas sector job market was with not only Christian aspects of is at moving east and west. The impact unfair and unequal led to protests in Nigerian state and society, but also that these groups can have on their Ouargla and Ghardaia, which then led with proponents of Sufi Islam, both of home countries means that not only is to the radicalization of some individuals which overlay with a strong regionalist there a potential east-west instability seeking to redress the sector’s injustices.