Competition and Market Structure in the Zambian Banking Sector

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Competition and Market Structure in the Zambian Banking Sector No 168 - January 2013 Competition and Market Structure in the Zambian Banking Sector Anthony Musonda SIMPASA Editorial Committee Rights and Permissions All rights reserved. Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa (Chair) Anyanwu, John C. Faye, Issa The text and data in this publication may be Ngaruko, Floribert reproduced as long as the source is cited. Shimeles, Abebe Reproduction for commercial purposes is Salami, Adeleke Verdier-Chouchane, Audrey forbidden. The Working Paper Series (WPS) is produced by the Development Research Department of the African Development Bank. The WPS Coordinator disseminates the findings of work in progress, Salami, Adeleke preliminary research results, and development experience and lessons, to encourage the exchange of ideas and innovative thinking among researchers, development practitioners, policy makers, and donors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in the Bank’s WPS are entirely Copyright © 2013 those of the author(s) and do not necessarily African Development Bank represent the view of the African Development Angle de l’avenue du Ghana et des rues Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries Pierre de Coubertin et Hédi Nouira they represent. BP 323 -1002 TUNIS Belvédère (Tunisia) Tel: +216 71 333 511 Fax: +216 71 351 933 Working Papers are available online at E-mail: [email protected] http:/www.afdb.org/ Correct citation: Simpasa, Anthony Musonda, (2013), Competition and market structure in the Zambian banking sector, Working Paper Series N° 168 African Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP Competition and Market Structure in the Zambian Banking Sector Anthony Musonda Simpasa1 Working Paper No. 168 January 2013 Office of the Chief Economist 1 Anthony Simpasa is a Principal Research Economist at the Development Research Department, African Development Bank (AfDB). The author is grateful to Raphael Kasonde, Jonathan Chipili and Douglas Kalamatila for assistance with the data and to Jacob Oduor and an anonymous referee for insightful comments on the earlier version of this paper. Abstract Studies on banking competition in suggests that the degree of developing countries, and especially in competitiveness may not be as low as Africa, are sparse. This study evaluates previously understood. The study shows the degree of competition in the that risk taking, revenue diversity and Zambian banking sector in the wake of regulatory intensity are all important dynamic market shifts induced by entry determinants of market power. Tight of new foreign banks and privatisation monetary policy is also found to of the state-owned bank. Using a strengthen the banks’ exercise of market detailed bank-level panel data set, we power. Generally, the findings lend measure competition using the H- support to previous research suggesting statistic and the time varying Lerner that increased foreign bank penetration index. The estimation of Lerner index and divestiture of state ownership in provides the first ever documented banking can heighten competitive empirical evidence on the evolution of pressures in the banking sector. Thus, competition in the Zambian industry. the main policy lessons drawn from the This is important in assessing foreign analysis is that competitive conditions influence on competitiveness. For the H- could be further enhanced by easing statistic, results show that Zambian regulatory impediments and in the long- banks earned their revenue under run, allowing more foreign bank conditions of monopolistic competition. participation could spur competitive This finding is corroborated by the conduct in the industry. estimate of the Lerner index which JEL Classifications: C33, D43, G21, L13 Key Words: Banking, competition, Lerner index, market power Author’s E-mail Address: [email protected] 1. Introduction Competition in the banking industy has been a subject of great scholarly inquiry and continues to occupy a large body of empirical research. From public policy perspective, competitiveness of the banking sector represents a socially optimal target, since it reduces the cost of financial intermediation and improves delivery of high quality services thereby enhancing social welfare. Banking competition also promotes economic growth by increasing firms’ access to external financing (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2004; Pagano, 1993). However, Petersen and Ranjan (1995) show theoretically that banks wielding market power tend to lend to young firms whose credit record may be opaque, hence leading to high lending rates. In practice, Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) argue that although concentrated banking systems offer growth opportunities for young firms, there is strong evidence of a general depressing effect on growth associated with banks’ exercise of market power and this impacts all sectors and firms. Hence, competition in banking should be placed at the centre of any public policy agenda since it has the mechanism to respond to the dynamic changes in economic conditions, especially those that affect delivery of financial services. Financial sector reforms initiated in 1992 in Zambia brought great anticipation that competition in the banking system would be enhanced, thus leading to reduced intermediation spreads and improved access to financial services. However, expectations have been at variance with practical observations. The banking system is highly concentrated, segmented and dominance by few large banks (de Luna Martinez, 2006; GRZ, 2004; Finmark Trust, 2006). This may be due to the inherent nature of banking systems in developing countries which undermine the efficacy of policy reforms in generating a 'critical level' of competitive pressure in the aftermath of deregulation as envisaged. However, concentration ratios as measures of competitiveness do not provide adequate and conclusive explanations of actual bank behaviour and may lead to wrong inferences on competitive conditions (Hausman & Sidak, 2007). Instead, banking competition should be assessed based on market contestability arising from presence or absence of entry barriers (Baumol, 1982). Mwenda and Mutoti (2011) remedy this by measuring banking competition in the Zambian banking sector using the H statistic. However, although this is an improvement over concentartion ratios, the authors do not condition the competitive index on changes in market conditions brought about by entry of new foreign banks in recent years and privatisation of the Zambia national Commercial Bank (ZNCB) in 20072. To evaluate foreign influence and privatisation effecs on competitive conduct of banks operating in Zambia, we estimate the statistic across two periods (pre-entry/pre-privatisation and post-entry/post-privatisaiton) and the time varying Lerner index and compare the results. Accordingly, our study reconciles the dilemma of inconsistencies between expectations of policy reforms and observed evidence on the conduct of Zambian banks. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two presents stylised facts on the Zambian banking sector while section three is a summary of the related empirical literature. Section four discusses the methodology and data issues and section five presents estimation results. Section six concludes the paper. 2. Stylized facts of the Zambian banking sector After more than two decades of financial repression, financial liberalisation offered an opportunity for a revival of the Zambian banking industry. As part of the broader economic reform package, financial reforms were in recognition that a well-functioning and competitive financial system is critical to the country’s overall economic development. Accordingly, major obstacles in the banking sector were eliminated, creating a platform for open bank entry into the sector in order to foster competition and infuse efficiency among financial intermediaries. In 2004, the Government embarked on the Financial Sector Development Programme, a comprehensive strategy aimed at building and strengthening financial sector infrastructure to enable it support economic diversification and sustainable growth (GRZ, 2004). The FSDP blueprint concluded that dominance of foreign owned banks may be a possible source of 2 The Government sold 49% of its 99.8% stake in ZNCB to Rabo Financial Institutions Development B.V (RFID), a subsidiary of the Dutch owned Rabobank, which also assumed management rights and representation at the board. Subsequently, RFID offloaded 3.41% to Lizara Investments Limited, a nominee of the Zambia National Farmers Union, while 1.32% was offered to employees through the Employee Share Ownership Programme without affecting its controlling rights in appointing management. In 2008, the ZNCB undertook an Initial Public Offering, which Hsaw Government’s stake diluted by 24.68%, reducing its stake to 25%. The long-term plan is for the State to completely divest its interests in the bank. 2 collusive behaviour. The implementation of the FSDP has helped address key bottlenecks in the financial system, including improving the governance of the banking sector, after crisis of the mid-1990s. In 2006 there were 13 commercial banks. Out of these, seven were subsidiaries of foreign banks; one joint venture with majority foreign ownership, four domestic private banks and a public sector bank. As indicated above, ZNCB a public sector and the second largest bank by asset size, was privatised in 2007 although by regulatory definition, it is still majority owned by Zambians with 54.41% domestic interest. This case provides a unique feature
Recommended publications
  • Bank of Zambia's Autonomy Amidst Political Turnovers in Zambia
    bit.ly/pocketsofeffectiveness Pockets of Effectiveness Working Paper No. 11 Bank of Zambia’s autonomy amidst political turnovers in Zambia Caesar Cheelo1 and Marja Hinfelaar2 September 2020 1 Southern African Institute for Policy and Research (SAIPAR), Lusaka, Zambia Email correspondence: [email protected] 2 Southern African Institute for Policy and Research (SAIPAR), Lusaka, Zambia Email correspondence: [email protected] ISBN: 978-1-912593-66-8 Pockets of effectiveness (PoEs) are public organisations that function effectively in providing public goods and services, despite operating in an environment where effective public service delivery is not the norm. This project, which investigates PoEs in relation to the politics of state-building and regime survival in sub-Saharan Africa, is being led by Professor Sam Hickey, based at the Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester, in collaboration with Professor Giles Mohan (The Open University), Dr Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai (University of Ghana), Dr Badru Bukenya (Makerere University), Dr Benjamin Chemouni (University of Cambridge), Dr Marja Hinfelaar (SAIPAR, Lusaka) and Dr Matt Tyce (GDI,The University of Manchester). It is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and Department for International Development with some additional funding from the FCDO-funded Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre. http://www.effective-states.org/research/pockets-of-effectiveness/ Bank of Zambia’s autonomy amidst political turnovers in Zambia Abstract This working paper analyses the role of Zambia’s central bank, the Bank of Zambia (BOZ), in delivering on its mandate, following banking reforms in the early 1990s. Despite occasional political pressures arising out of the competitive clientelist democracy, especially with regards to banking supervision and appointments of governors, BOZ has been able to deliver on its mandate and is regarded as a ‘pocket of effectiveness’.
    [Show full text]
  • An Investigation Into the Policy and Regulatory Challenges of Digital Financial Services Ict Infrastructure in Zambia
    AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE POLICY AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL FINANCIAL SERVICES ICT INFRASTRUCTURE IN ZAMBIA BY KAPONDA KOMBE A dissertation submitted to the University of Zambia in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree in Masters of Engineering in ICT Regulation, Policy and Management. THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA LUSAKA 2019 COPYRIGHT All rights reserved. No part of this dissertation may be reproduced or stored in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from the author or the University of Zambia. i DECLARATION I, KOMBE KAPONDA, declare that this dissertation represents my own work and that it has not been previously submitted by any other person for a degree at the University of Zambia or any other University and it does not incorporate any published work or material from another dissertation. I, the undersigned, declare that this has not previously been submitted in candidature for any degree. The dissertation is the result of my own work and investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by given explicit references. A complete list of references is appended. Signature: ………………………. Date: ……………………………. ii APPROVAL This dissertation by KOMBE KAPONDA is approved as fulfilling the partial requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Engineering in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Regulation, Policy and Management by the University of Zambia. Examiner 1: ………………………Signature: ………..…..………Date: ………..…………. Examiner 2: ………………………Signature: ………..…..………Date: ………..…………. Examiner 3: ………………………Signature: ………..…..………Date: ………..…………. Chairperson Board of Examiners: …………….……Signature: ………..………..Date: ……………..…… Supervisor: ……………………..…… Signature: ………..…….....Date: ……………..…… iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I give praise and thanks to our Lord for giving me good health, understanding and many other blessings during the course of my study.
    [Show full text]
  • Annex Iv: Banking in the Republic of Zambia
    © Shutterstock.com ANNEX IV: BANKING IN THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA Issuing authority: Bank of Zambia The Bank of Zambia Bank Square, Cairo Road P.O. Box 30080 Lusaka http://www.boz.zm a) Foreign exchange control processes b) Banking The Zambian currency is the Kwacha. The Kwacha rates The Bank of Zambia aims to provide excellent banking can fluctuate significantly. The Republic of Zambia has a services to its clients. It fulfils the following functions free market economy with no exchange controls. Major through the banking division: currencies can be bought and sold over the counter at I. Banker to the government bureau de change companies and banks in the country. II. Banker to commercial banks Money exchange services are available in cities and towns across the country and most will publish their Kwacha III. Settlement agent. exchange rates in-store. c) Currency management Exchange rates will vary from day to day, so ensure that you use a credible service provider; select the type of The Bank of Zambia has the sole right to issue bank notes service you are looking for and relevant companies will be and coins in the country. Its key role is to gain and main- presented. Bank accounts may be held in local or foreign tain public confidence in the currency. Subsequently, the currency, and funds are easily transferred out of the currency division is responsible for the designing and country or held offshore. Amounts of more than $5,000, ordering of banknotes and coins to meet the country’s carried in or out in cash or traveller’s cheques, must be demand.
    [Show full text]
  • Zambia Interbank Payment and Settlement System (Zipss) Operating Rules
    Bank of Zambia ZIPSS Rules ZAMBIA INTERBANK PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (ZIPSS) OPERATING RULES Bank of Zambia Banking, Currency and Payment Systems Department JULY, 2015 1 Bank of Zambia ZIPSS Rules Table of Contents 1. General Principles and Objectives.............................................................................................. 1 1.1 General .................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Role of Bank of Zambia ........................................................................................................... 1 2. Access Criteria and Conditions ................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Categories of Participants ....................................................................................................... 3 2.2 Operational Capacity .............................................................................................................. 3 3. Adding Participants and Changes in Participants’ Status............................................................ 6 3.1 Adding or modifying a Participant .......................................................................................... 6 3.2 Suspension or Termination ...................................................................................................... 6 4. Security ....................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Financial Inclusion Risk Assessment Report
    REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA FINANCIAL INCLUSION RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT NOVEMBER, 2016 REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA FINANCIAL INCLUSION RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT NOVEMBER 2016 Contents 1.0. FINANCIAL INCLUSION RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................................................... 2 1.1. What is Financial Inclusion? ...................................................................................................... 2 1.2. Legal and Regulatory Framework of the Financial Sector in Zambia .......................... 2 1.3. Application of Risk Based Supervision and of simplified Customer Due Diligence (CDD) .......................................................................................................................... 3 2.0. OBJECTIVES OF RISK ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION PRODUCTS .................... 5 3.0. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................... 6 3.1. Questionnaires .............................................................................................................................. 6 3.2. Interviews ........................................................................................................................................ 7 3.3. Field Visits ........................................................................................................................................ 8 3.4. Desk Research .............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • A N N U a L R E P O R T 2 0
    A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 1 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Vision Mission Statement ii Board of Directors iii Senior Management as at 31 December 2016 v Governor's Overview 1 Statement on Corporate Governance 4 1.0 Developments in the Global Economy 6 2.0 Macroeconomic Developments in Zambia 9 2.1 Monetary Developments and Inflation 9 2.2 Financial Markets 15 2.3 Balance of Payments 18 2.4 External Debt 23 2.5 Fiscal Sector Developments 24 2.6 Real Sector Developments 27 3.0 Financial System Regulation and Supervision 32 3.1 Banking Sector 32 3.2 Non-Bank Financial Institutions 41 4.0 Banking, Currency and Payment Systems 54 4.1 Banking 54 4.2 Currency 54 4.3 Payment Systems 57 5.0 Strategy and Risk Management 62 6.0 Human Resource Management 65 7.0 Bank of Zambia Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2016 68 i 8.0 2016 Annual Statistical Annexures 131 Mining, tourism, and the coming on stream of Mamba Power Plant contributed to improved economic performance in 2016 VISION To be a dynamic and credible central bank that contributes to the economic development of Zambia ii MISSION STATEMENT To achieve and maintain price and financial system stability to foster sustainable economic development REGISTERED OFFICES Head Office Bank of Zambia, Bank Square, Cairo Road P. O. Box 30080, Lusaka, 10101, Zambia Tel: + 260 211 228888/228903-20 Fax: + 260 211 221764 E-mail:[email protected] Website: www.boz.zm Regional Office Bank of Zambia, Buteko Avenue, P.
    [Show full text]
  • Central Securities Depository
    / CENTRAL SECURITIES DEPOSITORY SYSTEM RULES Bank of Zambia SEPTEMBER, 2014 1 Table of Contents 1 General Principles and Objectives .............................................................................. 6 1.1 General ................................................................................................................. 6 1.2 Role of the Bank of Zambia ................................................................................. 7 1.3 Delivery versus Payment ...................................................................................... 7 2 Eligible Securities ....................................................................................................... 8 2.1 Basic Structure ..................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Issuers ................................................................................................................... 8 2.3 Primary Register ................................................................................................... 8 2.4 Issuance ................................................................................................................ 8 2.5 Redemption .......................................................................................................... 8 2.6 Discount/ Interest /Coupon................................................................................... 8 2.7 Ownership Restrictions .......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Water Draft 16062011.Ppt [Compatibility
    For discussion purposes only. No party may place reliance on this draft Valuation Group Project Water: Assessment of the FirstRand offer 17 June 2011 Strictly private and confidential This Draft Report (“Draft Report”) has been prepared on the basis of the limitations set out in the Scope and Basis of valuation detailed on page 7 and the matters noted in the transmittal letter over the page. This draft contains a number of outstanding matters, identified by square brackets (“[ ]”) and italics, that require clarification or confirmation by management. In addition, this report is still subject to our internal review procedures and accordingly, we reserve the right to add, delete and/ or amend the report as appropriate. No party may place any reliance whatsoever upon this Draft of the Report. There are agreed terms for confidentiality that cover the Draft Report. These preclude you from disclosing the Draft Report to any other party without our prior written consent. Further details are provided on page 3 of this report. Deloitte LLP is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority © 2011 Deloitte LLP. Private and confidential For discussion purposes only. No party may place reliance on this draft Deloitte LLP Athene Place 66 Shoe Lane London EC4A 3BQ The Bank of Zambia Tel: +44 (0)20 7936 3000 Bank Square www.deloitte.co.uk Cairo Road Lusaka 17 June 2011 FAO: Deputy Governor - Operations Dear Sir Valuation advice in connection with the FirstRand Limited (“FRL” or “FirstRand”) offer for selected assets and liabilities of Acid, the Bank under review for FRL offer purposes.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Mapping the Retail Payment Services Landscape: Zambia This
    Mapping the Retail Payment Services Landscape: Zambia This report was commissioned by FinMark Trust Bankable Frontier Associates LLC www.bankablefrontier.com 30 November, 2012 1 Acknowledgements: Our thanks to the Banking, Currency and Payment System Department at the Bank of Zambia and executives from the private sector who gave their time to answer questions and help us understand their view of the current context for payment services in Zambia. Thank you to Edwin Banda and colleagues at Lusaka Probe Market Research for focus group facilitation and translation support. And with sincere gratitude, thank you to the individuals who shared so openly the most intimate details of their financial lives during our demand side research. Authors: Ahmed Dermish Denise Dias Caitlin Sanford Bwalya ChonaBwalya Project Director Supply Side Researcher Demand Side Researcher P. Chona Associate Bankable Frontier Associate Consultant Bankable Frontier Associates Bankable Frontier Associates Associates 2 Abstract This report is part of a series commissioned by FinMark Trust to examine the retail payments landscape in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It distils key findings from research conducted in Zambia in March 2012 and provides tools for understanding key drivers for retail payments system development in the country. Zambia has made remarkable progress towards modernization of its national payment system, but there is a long way to go until most of the population can benefit from convenient, accessible and affordable electronic payments. This research finds that there is no single major regulatory or policy obstacle limiting progress, despite the fact that the applicable framework can still be improved. The Bank of Zambia is aware of the current regulatory gaps and is working on addressing them.
    [Show full text]
  • Goes Bad, Partners Turn on Each Other Workers
    No 44 www.diggers.news Friday October 6, 2017 Muvi TV unveils ex-sex workers in new R4M series Linda Jere Zambia National Women’s Lobby chairperson Beauty Katebe has urged government to broaden its women MUKULA SCAM empowerment programmes to capture commercial sex ...goes bad, partners turn on each other workers. Story page 4 And Muvi TV’s Ready for Marriage (R4M) Extraordinary Beyond host Master Chimbala says the programme will help transform lives. R4M is a Muvi TV reality show which features men and women competing for a wedding sponsorship package. To page 5 NAPSA gets Intermarket Bank shares Mirriam Chabala Finance minister Felix Mutati today told Parliament that the National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA), has acquired a significant stake in Intermarket Bank, which is expected to resume operations under the name “Zambia Industrial Commercial Bank Limited” Mutati said the Authority decided to convert its K50 million credit in Intermarket Bank after the institution failed to pay the Authority its deposits. Earlier, Mutati rendered a ministerial statement to the House without specifying the shareholding structure of the bank. To page 4 Mumbi Phiri warns unruly PF members To page 5 A truck loaded with Mukula logs parked at Lusaka’s Garden Compound Police this morning - Picture by Mukosha Funga Zambia will manufacture own ARVs - Minister Martha Chilosha And Dr Chilufya has directed Responding to a question ensure that local manufacturing Minister of Health Dr Chitalu health facilities across the country from Luena UPND member of of drugs including ARVs was Chilufya says Zambia will start to stop allocating specific days to parliament David Kundoti who enhanced.
    [Show full text]
  • (ROSC) Corporate Governance Public Disclosure Authorized
    Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Corporate Governance Public Disclosure Authorized Corporate Governance Public Disclosure Authorized Country Assessment Zambia December 2006 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Overview of the Corporate Governance ROSC Program WHAT IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROSC ASSESSMENTS Corporate governance refers to the structures and processes for the direction and control of com - Corporate governance has been adopted as one panies. Corporate governance concerns the relation - of twelve core best-practice standards by the inter - ships among the management, Board of Directors, national financial community. The World Bank is the controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and assessor for the application of the OECD Principles of other stakeholders. Good corporate governance con - Corporate Governance. Its assessments are part of tributes to sustainable economic development by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund enhancing the performance of companies and (IMF) program on Reports on the Observance of increasing their access to outside capital. Standards and Codes (ROSC). The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance The goal of the ROSC initiative is to identify provide the framework for the work of the World weaknesses that may contribute to a country’s eco - Bank Group in this area, identifying the key practical nomic and financial vulnerability. Each Corporate issues: the rights and equitable treatment of share - Governance ROSC assessment reviews the legal and holders and other financial stakeholders, the role of regulatory framework, as well as practices and com - non-financial stakeholders, disclosure and trans - pliance of listed firms, and assesses the framework parency, and the responsibilities of the Board of relative to an internationally accepted benchmark.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Economy of Central Bank Effectiveness: the Case Of
    ESID Working Paper No. 153 Bank of Zambia’s autonomy amidst political turnovers in Zambia* Caesar Cheelo1 and Marja Hinfelaar2 September 2020 1Southern African Institute for Policy and Research (SAIPAR), Lusaka, Zambia Email correspondence: [email protected] 2 Southern African Institute for Policy and Research (SAIPAR), Lusaka, Zambia Email correspondence: [email protected] ISBN: 978-1-912593-67-5 * This paper was produced for the ESRC-FCDO project, ‘Investigating Pockets of Effectiveness in Developing Countries: A New Route to Building State Capacity for Development’. email: [email protected] Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) Global Development Institute, School of Environment, Education and Development, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK www.effective-states.org The Bank of Zambia’s autonomy amidst political turnovers in Zambia Abstract This working paper analyses the role of Zambia’s central bank, the Bank of Zambia (BOZ), in delivering on its mandate, following banking reforms in the early 1990s. Despite occasional political pressures arising out of the competitive clientelist democracy, especially with regards to banking supervision and appointments of governors, BOZ has been able to deliver on its mandate and is regarded as a ‘pocket of effectiveness’. Its relatively independent position has been attributed to the conscious efforts of its top echelon to entrench BOZ’s autonomous position and work towards legislative independence in 2016. Besides changes in the legislative framework, BOZ’s countervailing powers were strengthened by the acknowledgement on the part of political leaders that the central bank acts as an important ‘signaller’ to international financial markets; a strong tradition of self-assessment; and an emphasis on public accountability.
    [Show full text]