Competition and Market Structure in the Zambian Banking Sector
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No 168 - January 2013 Competition and Market Structure in the Zambian Banking Sector Anthony Musonda SIMPASA Editorial Committee Rights and Permissions All rights reserved. Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa (Chair) Anyanwu, John C. Faye, Issa The text and data in this publication may be Ngaruko, Floribert reproduced as long as the source is cited. Shimeles, Abebe Reproduction for commercial purposes is Salami, Adeleke Verdier-Chouchane, Audrey forbidden. The Working Paper Series (WPS) is produced by the Development Research Department of the African Development Bank. The WPS Coordinator disseminates the findings of work in progress, Salami, Adeleke preliminary research results, and development experience and lessons, to encourage the exchange of ideas and innovative thinking among researchers, development practitioners, policy makers, and donors. 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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP Competition and Market Structure in the Zambian Banking Sector Anthony Musonda Simpasa1 Working Paper No. 168 January 2013 Office of the Chief Economist 1 Anthony Simpasa is a Principal Research Economist at the Development Research Department, African Development Bank (AfDB). The author is grateful to Raphael Kasonde, Jonathan Chipili and Douglas Kalamatila for assistance with the data and to Jacob Oduor and an anonymous referee for insightful comments on the earlier version of this paper. Abstract Studies on banking competition in suggests that the degree of developing countries, and especially in competitiveness may not be as low as Africa, are sparse. This study evaluates previously understood. The study shows the degree of competition in the that risk taking, revenue diversity and Zambian banking sector in the wake of regulatory intensity are all important dynamic market shifts induced by entry determinants of market power. Tight of new foreign banks and privatisation monetary policy is also found to of the state-owned bank. Using a strengthen the banks’ exercise of market detailed bank-level panel data set, we power. Generally, the findings lend measure competition using the H- support to previous research suggesting statistic and the time varying Lerner that increased foreign bank penetration index. The estimation of Lerner index and divestiture of state ownership in provides the first ever documented banking can heighten competitive empirical evidence on the evolution of pressures in the banking sector. Thus, competition in the Zambian industry. the main policy lessons drawn from the This is important in assessing foreign analysis is that competitive conditions influence on competitiveness. For the H- could be further enhanced by easing statistic, results show that Zambian regulatory impediments and in the long- banks earned their revenue under run, allowing more foreign bank conditions of monopolistic competition. participation could spur competitive This finding is corroborated by the conduct in the industry. estimate of the Lerner index which JEL Classifications: C33, D43, G21, L13 Key Words: Banking, competition, Lerner index, market power Author’s E-mail Address: [email protected] 1. Introduction Competition in the banking industy has been a subject of great scholarly inquiry and continues to occupy a large body of empirical research. From public policy perspective, competitiveness of the banking sector represents a socially optimal target, since it reduces the cost of financial intermediation and improves delivery of high quality services thereby enhancing social welfare. Banking competition also promotes economic growth by increasing firms’ access to external financing (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2004; Pagano, 1993). However, Petersen and Ranjan (1995) show theoretically that banks wielding market power tend to lend to young firms whose credit record may be opaque, hence leading to high lending rates. In practice, Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) argue that although concentrated banking systems offer growth opportunities for young firms, there is strong evidence of a general depressing effect on growth associated with banks’ exercise of market power and this impacts all sectors and firms. Hence, competition in banking should be placed at the centre of any public policy agenda since it has the mechanism to respond to the dynamic changes in economic conditions, especially those that affect delivery of financial services. Financial sector reforms initiated in 1992 in Zambia brought great anticipation that competition in the banking system would be enhanced, thus leading to reduced intermediation spreads and improved access to financial services. However, expectations have been at variance with practical observations. The banking system is highly concentrated, segmented and dominance by few large banks (de Luna Martinez, 2006; GRZ, 2004; Finmark Trust, 2006). This may be due to the inherent nature of banking systems in developing countries which undermine the efficacy of policy reforms in generating a 'critical level' of competitive pressure in the aftermath of deregulation as envisaged. However, concentration ratios as measures of competitiveness do not provide adequate and conclusive explanations of actual bank behaviour and may lead to wrong inferences on competitive conditions (Hausman & Sidak, 2007). Instead, banking competition should be assessed based on market contestability arising from presence or absence of entry barriers (Baumol, 1982). Mwenda and Mutoti (2011) remedy this by measuring banking competition in the Zambian banking sector using the H statistic. However, although this is an improvement over concentartion ratios, the authors do not condition the competitive index on changes in market conditions brought about by entry of new foreign banks in recent years and privatisation of the Zambia national Commercial Bank (ZNCB) in 20072. To evaluate foreign influence and privatisation effecs on competitive conduct of banks operating in Zambia, we estimate the statistic across two periods (pre-entry/pre-privatisation and post-entry/post-privatisaiton) and the time varying Lerner index and compare the results. Accordingly, our study reconciles the dilemma of inconsistencies between expectations of policy reforms and observed evidence on the conduct of Zambian banks. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two presents stylised facts on the Zambian banking sector while section three is a summary of the related empirical literature. Section four discusses the methodology and data issues and section five presents estimation results. Section six concludes the paper. 2. Stylized facts of the Zambian banking sector After more than two decades of financial repression, financial liberalisation offered an opportunity for a revival of the Zambian banking industry. As part of the broader economic reform package, financial reforms were in recognition that a well-functioning and competitive financial system is critical to the country’s overall economic development. Accordingly, major obstacles in the banking sector were eliminated, creating a platform for open bank entry into the sector in order to foster competition and infuse efficiency among financial intermediaries. In 2004, the Government embarked on the Financial Sector Development Programme, a comprehensive strategy aimed at building and strengthening financial sector infrastructure to enable it support economic diversification and sustainable growth (GRZ, 2004). The FSDP blueprint concluded that dominance of foreign owned banks may be a possible source of 2 The Government sold 49% of its 99.8% stake in ZNCB to Rabo Financial Institutions Development B.V (RFID), a subsidiary of the Dutch owned Rabobank, which also assumed management rights and representation at the board. Subsequently, RFID offloaded 3.41% to Lizara Investments Limited, a nominee of the Zambia National Farmers Union, while 1.32% was offered to employees through the Employee Share Ownership Programme without affecting its controlling rights in appointing management. In 2008, the ZNCB undertook an Initial Public Offering, which Hsaw Government’s stake diluted by 24.68%, reducing its stake to 25%. The long-term plan is for the State to completely divest its interests in the bank. 2 collusive behaviour. The implementation of the FSDP has helped address key bottlenecks in the financial system, including improving the governance of the banking sector, after crisis of the mid-1990s. In 2006 there were 13 commercial banks. Out of these, seven were subsidiaries of foreign banks; one joint venture with majority foreign ownership, four domestic private banks and a public sector bank. As indicated above, ZNCB a public sector and the second largest bank by asset size, was privatised in 2007 although by regulatory definition, it is still majority owned by Zambians with 54.41% domestic interest. This case provides a unique feature